

Cooperating to Build Peace The UN-EU Inter-Institutional Complex

Thierry Tardy

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About the Author

Dr Thierry Tardy is Faculty Member at the GCSP, and was Course Director of the European Training Course in Security Policy (ETC) between 2005 and 2009. His research focuses on crisis management, UN peace operations, security regionalism, UN-EU relations and European security. His latest book publications are: *Crisis Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. Actors, Activities, Challenges* (*Gestion de crise, maintien et consolidation de la paix. Acteurs, activités, défis*), De Boeck, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2009; *European Security in a Global Context. Internal and External Dynamics*, edited, London, Routledge/GCSP, 2009. Other publications include: “A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.18, No.2, April 2011, pp.144-159, and “Peace operations: the fragile consensus”, *SIPRI Yearbook*, Stockholm, Oxford University Press, 2011.

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List of Acronyms

| | |
|----------|---|
| AU | African Union |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU) |
| CMPD | Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (EU) |
| CPCC | Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (EU) |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy (EU) |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECHO | European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department |
| EEAS | European External Action Service (EU) |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy (EU) |
| EU | European Union |
| FAFA | Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| IFS | Instrument for Stability (EU) |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| MONUC | <i>Mission des Nations unies en RDC</i> (UN Mission in the DRC) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OECD-DAC | OECD Development Assistance Committee |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PBC | Peacebuilding Commission |
| PBF | Peacebuilding Fund |
| PBSO | Peacebuilding Support Office |
| RO | Regional Organization |
| SCO | Shanghai Cooperation Organization |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDG | UN Development Group |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNHCR | UN High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNRWA | UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

Executive Summary

The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are both key institutions in the peacebuilding realm. The UN has, since the end of the Cold War, embraced post-conflict peacebuilding as one of its core activities, and most of its sixteen current peacekeeping operations include a peacebuilding component. Likewise, the EU has become an increasingly important institution of peace consolidation in all its aspects, both through the role of the European Commission and more recently that of the intergovernmental Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Post-conflict peacebuilding is an all-encompassing activity, which takes place at the nexus of security and development and that requires a wide range of policy responses. This theoretically places the UN and the EU in favourable positions, as institutions that aspire to develop a holistic approach, and to cover the entire continuum of conflict management.

The simultaneous involvement of these two institutions in post-conflict peacebuilding poses the question of their respective policies in different terms. From Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Chad, through military cooperation or UN-led but European Commission-financed civilian programmes, questions arise as to the interaction between two different types of actors, the nature and depth of inter-institutional relations, the division of tasks and the level of mutual reinforcement or redundancy.

This paper examines the UN-EU relationship in post-conflict peacebuilding through the analysis of its rationale, achievements, and limitations. While it integrates the peacekeeping element, which is part of the peacebuilding endeavour, the study goes beyond the military-related dimension of the UN-EU relationship to focus on the civilian aspects of the broad post-conflict peace consolidation realm.

The question of the interaction between the UN and the EU in conflict management emerged a decade ago when the UN was going through a period of reform of its peace operations through the Brahimi report process and the EU was designing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Prior to that, the relationship existed at the level of the European Commission (EC) and some UN agencies, but was not given much visibility. Since the early 2000s, the two institutions have achieved a great deal in terms of both institutionalizing their relationship and operationalizing it. In these efforts, peacebuilding has been one among various areas of UN-EU cooperation. As the bulk of the two institutions' crisis management activities takes place in post-conflict environments, their growing interaction has logically implicated their respective peacebuilding policies.

Overall, while UN-EU cooperation in peacebuilding has produced tangible results, it also offers an under-explored potential. The UN and the EU have constituted a “network” of institutions that are engaged in reciprocal and presumably supportive actions, and to an extent converge on how best peace should be built. Cooperation between the UN (and its agencies) and the European Commission is relatively well-established, with the Commission acting as a donor for peace consolidation activities implemented by various UN organs. In contrast, achievements in the CSDP field have been less visible as the EU has yet to live up to its ambitions in the civilian sphere of post-conflict peacebuilding. In this respect, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the External Action Service may help strengthen the overall coherence of EU activity, yet the absence of streamlining of peacebuilding in the new external relations apparatus can also be a source of persistent internal dysfunction.

Furthermore, the UN-EU inter-institutional complex also sheds light on the nature of international organisations, and the way they define and pursue their agendas, at the junction between institutional and inter-governmental dynamics. International organisations are political entities that are concerned about their own existence and visibility, and that have not totally broken away from traditional features of international relations and power politics. In other words, while sharing a number of similarities as peacebuilding actors, the UN and the EU are also competing for their positions on the “peacebuilding market”. Although it might be less tangible than in the more narrowly-defined and politicized peacekeeping field, the UN-EU relationship is also an illustration of relations of power between political entities whose peacebuilding agendas, strategies, and priorities do not systematically converge.

Introduction

Tackling contemporary conflicts requires a multiplicity of actors that display various comparative advantages and levels of expertise and that interact to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the broad crisis response efforts. The necessity to “work together” throughout the conflict management spectrum has become a priority for most security institutions. In post-conflict environments in particular, multidimensional peace missions have increasingly involved a variety of state and non state actors. Among them, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) have integrated the cooperation imperative as they have asserted themselves as central actors of the broader peacebuilding realm.

The UN has, since the end of the Cold War and the *Agenda for Peace*, embraced post-conflict peacebuilding as one of its core activities, and most of its sixteen current peacekeeping operations include a peacebuilding component. Likewise, the EU has become an increasingly important institution of peace consolidation in all its aspects, both through the role of the European Commission (EC) and more recently that of the intergovernmental Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Post-conflict peacebuilding is an all-encompassing activity, which takes place at the nexus of security and development and that requires a wide range of short-term and longer-term policy responses, from good governance and institution-building to economic recovery and development, security and rule of law. This theoretically places the UN and the EU in a favourable position, as institutions that aspire to develop a holistic approach, combining military and civilian activities, and covering the entire continuum of crisis management.

The simultaneous involvement of these two institutions in post-conflict peacebuilding poses the question of their respective policies in different terms. From Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Chad, through military cooperation or UN-led but EC-financed civilian programmes, beyond the on-going debate about the rationale, legitimacy and effec-

tiveness of the two institutions policies, questions arise as to the interaction between two different types of actors, the nature and depth of inter-institutional relations, the division of tasks or the level of mutual reinforcement or redundancy.

In 2009, the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict stated that the UN has a "critical and significant role to play in peacebuilding", while also recognizing that the UN is only "one of several actors working to support post-conflict countries" and that the "coherence of this broader international effort is key to helping countries to succeed in their efforts to construct a viable peace".¹ The same imperative of working with partners applies to the EU which is officially "committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts".² At a time when it seeks to acquire an international stature and demonstrate that it has reached security actor status, the EU needs to work with others to achieve both its strategic and policy goals.

The question of the interaction between the UN and the EU in crisis management emerged a decade ago when the UN was going through a period of reform of its peace operations through the Brahimi report process³ and the EU was designing ESDP. Prior to that, the relationship existed at the level of the EC and some UN agencies, but was not given much visibility. Since the early 2000s, the two institutions have achieved a great deal in terms of both institutionalizing their relationship and operationalizing it. From the Balkans to Africa, the UN and the EU have got to know each other as crisis management actors, working together at headquarters and field level and incrementally defining the framework of their relationship with, among other documents, two joint declarations on crisis management (see below).

In these efforts, peacebuilding has been one among various areas of UN-EU cooperation. As the bulk of the two institutions' crisis management activities takes place in post-conflict environments, their growing interaction has logically implicated their respective peacebuilding policies. Yet, in contrast to the more nar-

1 Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, United Nations, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, §5.

2 European Council, "A Secure World in a Better World", European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, p.11.

3 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, United Nations, A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

rowly-defined and security-related peacekeeping field,⁴ the UN-EU relationship in peacebuilding – understood as a broader agenda in which the security/peacekeeping element is only one dimension –, has been relatively under-researched in the academic/policy community.⁵

This paper examines the UN-EU relationship in post-conflict peacebuilding through the analysis of its rationale, achievements, and limitations. While it integrates the peacekeeping element, the study goes beyond the military-related dimension of the UN-EU relationship to focus on the civilian aspects of the broad post-conflict peace consolidation realm. In principle, the two institutions display comparative advantages in the peacebuilding field and are willing to – and indeed do – cooperate to achieve shared objectives. But international organisations are also political entities that are concerned about their own existence and visibility, and that have not totally broken away from traditional features of international relations and power politics.

Why then and how do institutions such as the UN and the EU cooperate in the peacebuilding domain? What kinds of material motivations – access to resources, information, etc. – and ideological – based on shared values and norms – underlie their relationship? What are the achievements of UN-EU interaction and what are the main challenges? Beyond these policy-relevant questions, the inter-institutional relationship informs us about the very nature of international organisations, simultaneously semi-autonomous actors of the international system and instruments in the hands of their member states. Indeed, what is at stake in the UN-EU relationship is also the power hierarchy that emerges between two different actors that are eager to cooperate for a common goal, but that also develop agendas and identities that are not necessarily compatible.

4 See C. Major, "EU-UN Cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006", *Occasional Paper n°72*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2008; B. Charbonneau, "What is so special about the European Union? EU-UN cooperation in crisis management in Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, vol.16, n°4, August 2009, pp.546-561; R. Gowan, "ESDP and the United Nations", *European Security and Defence Policy. The First Ten Years (1999-2009)*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2009, pp.117-126; T. Tardy, "The Evolution of the Relations of the United Nations with other International Organizations: Perspectives through the Example of United Nations-European Union Cooperation", *Challenges Forum Report 2008*, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Stockholm, 2009, pp.35-56.

5 The notable exception is C. Gourlay, "EU-UN Cooperation in Peacebuilding. Partners in Practice?", UNIDIR, Geneva, 2009; see also by the same author "UN-EU cooperation in peacebuilding: natural partners?", in J. Wouters, S. Blockmans, and T. Ruys (eds.), *The European Union and Peacebuilding. Policy and Legal Aspects*, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2010.

Regionalisation of Security Governance

The end of the Cold War has led to a fundamental reshuffle of the international security architecture, security governance actors and methods. Among the many features of this reorganisation is regionalisation, understood as the emergence of international organisations that aspire to play a role in the security realm at a regional level.⁶ These institutions, called regional organisations, operate at an intermediate level between the state/national level and the international level, which is principally the prerogative of the United Nations. Institutions such as the African Union (AU), the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or more recently the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have emerged as actors of the broad spectrum of security management with differing statutes, mandates, capabilities and degrees of institutionalisation. In doing so, notwithstanding their intergovernmental nature – with the EC being the only real exception –, these institutions have been increasingly approached as “actors” of the international system,⁷ some of them enjoying a degree of autonomy that distinguishes them from the sum of the politics of their member states. This evolution has implications for the nature of the international system and its constituting parts that go beyond the remit of this paper, but that needs to be borne in mind in the analysis of inter-institutional interaction and the constraints attached to it.

The trend towards security regionalism can be explained by different factors. There is first the need to respond to the widening security agenda by a diversification of the type of actors that can play a role in its management. In a post-Cold

6 See L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, Oxford University Press, 1995; D. Lake and P. Morgan (eds.), *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World*, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; M. Pugh and W.P.S. Sidhu (eds.), *The United Nations and Regional Security*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003; A. Bellamy and P. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalisation and Contemporary Peace Operations”, *International Security*, vol.29, n°4, 2005, pp.157-195.

7 See M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations”, *International Organization*, vol.53, n°4, 1999, pp.699-732; C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, Routledge, 1999; T. Gehring and S. Oberthür, “Organizations as Corporate Actors in the International System. Conceptualizing the EU as a Corporate Actor in International Negotiations and Regimes”, communication, 7th International Relations Pan-European Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010.

War environment, security needs are simply too large to be tackled solely by the United Nations or by any state alone and other actors must therefore share the burden.⁸ Regional organisations fill a gap in the security architecture, and offer comparative advantages – proximity, local expertise, flexibility – that the UN does not necessarily display.

Second, the emergence of regional security actors has come in response to the difficulties that the UN, i.e. the global level, was facing in its role of maintaining international peace and security. In Europe in particular, the transformation process of NATO and the EU into crisis management actors was partly initiated by some European states because of a general distrust vis-à-vis the UN following the Bosnian and Somali failures in the early 1990s. By the same token, the birth of the AU in lieu of the Organization for African Unity was in part driven by the will to give African states the instrument to take care of their own security after the UN failure in Rwanda in 1994. In this case, regionalism appears as a substitute to the global level that is perceived as being inappropriate or ineffective.

Third, transformation of institutions into crisis management actors came in response to internal existential debates about the relevance of those institutions in the post-Cold War era. For NATO in particular, adopting a crisis management posture in a regional context, though not being a regional organisation in the legal sense, allowed for a new *raison d'être* at a time – immediate post-Cold War era – when the collective defence dimension had lost its centrality.

Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, regional organisations, whose definition remains problematic, have imposed themselves as actors in the regulation of international security. Consequently, alongside the state level, two levels of security management are juxtaposed: the global level, embodied by the UN, and the regional level, embodied by regional organisations. This juxtaposition poses

8 In 1992, *An Agenda for Peace* of UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali advocated burden-sharing of the maintenance of international peace and security with regional actors. Subsequently, a series of documents addressed the issue of UN-Regional Organisations relations with the aim to codify them. See “Declaration on the enhancement of Cooperation between the UN and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security”, General Assembly, A/RES/49/57, 9 Dec. 1994; “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace”, Report of the Secretary-General, S/1995/1, 25 January 1995; “Report on Sharing Responsibilities in Peace-Keeping: The UN and Regional Organizations”, Joint Inspection Unit, A/50/571, 17 Oct. 1995; UNSC resolution 1631, 17 Oct. 2005 (first UNSC resolution on UN-Regional organisations cooperation); “A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities”, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/204, S/2006/590, 28 July 2006; “Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the UN and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security”, S/2008/186, 7 April 2008; “Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional and other organizations”, Report of the Secretary-General, A/65/382, S/2010/490, 20 September 2010.

a series of questions on the interaction between these two levels, in terms of primacy, division of labour, compatibility or competition.

The interaction between the UN and regional organisations is theoretically governed by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on “Regional Arrangements”. A form of subordination of the regional to the global is implied in the Chapter VIII provisions relating to the recourse to force (Article 53), but also in the necessity for the regional agencies to report to the Security Council on all activity regarding the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 54). However, Chapter VIII has limited relevance, on the one hand due to the imprecision of its provisions and of the definition it offers of regional organisations, on the other, due to the fact that organisations such as the EU or NATO do not consider themselves as regional arrangements in the sense of the Chapter. The study of the interaction between the two levels of regulation should consequently surpass the framework of Chapter VIII and integrate a political approach of the relationship between two international organisations, understood as intergovernmental entities with a relative degree of autonomy, that interact at juridical, political, and operational levels.

The UN and the EU: Partners in Peacebuilding

The Premises of the UN-EU Partnership in Peacebuilding

The UN has been involved in post-conflict peacebuilding since its inception, but the activity was first conceptualized in the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* by the then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Post-conflict peacebuilding was defined as being about identifying and supporting “structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.⁹ Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding has become an important activity of the UN per se and of its agencies (UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, etc.), but also of the financial institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This activity is carried out in many post-conflict environments, where the UN is also present through a peacekeeping operation or not. Furthermore, almost all UN-led peace operations contain a peacebuilding dimension, with activities falling within the three large baskets of good governance and institutions-building, economic recovery and development, and security and rule of law. In 2005, the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), mandated to “bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery”,¹⁰ marked a new stage in the evolution of the UN institutional arrangements and involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding.

The European Union is equally critically involved in peace consolidation activities.¹¹ Until ESDP was developed in the late 1990s, the EU policy towards building peace after conflicts was mainly the responsibility of the EC. The EC has been actively involved in post-conflict recovery through economic and humanitarian aid, electoral support and the financing of programmes carried out by other ac-

9 “An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping”, United Nations, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992.

10 UN Security Council Resolution 1645, 20 December 2005.

11 See J. Wouters, S. Blockmans, and T. Ruys (eds.), *The European Union and Peacebuilding*, *op.cit.*; H. Miall, “The EU and the Peacebuilding Commission”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol.20, n°1, March 2007, pp.29-45.

tors. Through a second-track approach, the EU peacebuilding role was further developed in the framework of ESDP and in particular the civilian aspects of crisis management, with the EU becoming increasingly involved in civilian ESDP missions having an important peacebuilding dimension (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)). In the meantime, five¹² of the six military ESDP missions have taken place in post-conflict environments and were part of a broader peacebuilding effort.

This simultaneous engagement of the UN and the EU in peacebuilding has led the two organisations, and their member states, to interact at both headquarters and field levels, which has, in turn, led to different levels of cooperation and coordination. In parallel, an internal conceptualisation of the relationship has taken place, as well as its institutionalisation.

On the EU side, the EC and the Council Secretariat developed their own, separate, approach to their relationship with the UN. Several communications of the EC address, implicitly if not explicitly, the issue of the interaction with the UN in a peacebuilding environment, and stress the availability of the EU to work with the UN.¹³ The Council takes a similar route when looking at the civilian aspects of crisis management in an ESDP context. In 2001, two documents addressed the issue of EU cooperation with international organisations in the field of civilian crisis management.¹⁴ Likewise, the two organisations adopted in 2003 a UN-EU Joint Declaration on Crisis management (see below), followed by several implementation documents on the EU Council Secretariat side.¹⁵ While these various texts reiterate the EU commitment to the UN's overall objective of maintaining international peace and security, they also define the terms of EU support to UN

12 Operations Concordia in Macedonia (2003), Artemis in the DRC (2003) (although the operation itself was more about securing a city), EUFOR DRC (2006), Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (since Dec. 2004), and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008-2009). The sixth EU-led military mission, that has no peacebuilding dimension, is the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (Atalanta).

13 See Communication from the Commission, "Building an effective partnership with the United Nations in the fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs", 2001, and Communication from the Commission, "The EU and the UN: the Choice of Multilateralism", 2003.

14 See "EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management", Annex to the Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg, European Council, June 2001 and "EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management", Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex V, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

15 See in particular "EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations. Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration", Annex II, ESDP Presidency Report, European Council, 15 June 2004; "EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management. Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration", Annex IV to the Annex, ESDP Presidency Report, European Council, 13 December 2004.

operations.¹⁶ Given the difficulty of defining peacebuilding within the EU, none of these documents are specifically about peacebuilding but rather address the broader crisis response issue. Yet all examine EU-UN relations in crisis management contexts that inherently have a peacebuilding dimension. EC and Council documents emphasize the convergences between the EU and the UN – in terms of objectives as well as of methods – and the availability of the EU to develop further the partnership with the UN, through joint action and institutionalisation of the relation.

On the UN side, institutionalisation of cooperation with the EU took place in the broader framework of the relationship between the UN and regional organisations (ROs) and the dialogue that the UN Secretariat initiated (with, among others, regular meetings between the UN and ROs). In this process, the EU was given special attention – compared with other regional organisations – in accordance with its peacebuilding (and funding) potential and in response to the EU aspirations.

Intergovernmental versus Community Approach: Two Different Levels of Institutionalisation

Institutionalisation means that the two organisations have adopted a series of joint documents that lay out the objectives, the means, and the practicalities of their cooperation in the broad area of peacebuilding, and that furthermore define the contours of UN-EU partnership in political, operational and financial terms. It also implies the establishment of instruments that allow for inter-institutional cooperation at different levels.

In the pre-Lisbon Treaty context, such institutionalisation differed significantly between the EC and the Council. In the peacebuilding field, we see a higher degree of institutionalisation between the Commission and the UN (and its agencies) than between the Council and the UN. In fact, the differences between the two approaches are such that it is difficult to talk about EU-UN relations while ignoring the Commission/Council dichotomy.

At the European Commission level, cooperation with the UN and its agencies predated the birth of CFSP/ESDP and has further expanded with the emergence

16 The Göteborg document (June 2001, see footnote above) defined four guiding principles of the Union's cooperation with international organisations ("added value", "interoperability", "visibility" and "decision-making autonomy"), and put forward different options of EU civilian participation in crisis management operations led by international organisations.

of EU second pillar activities.¹⁷ Peacebuilding as a concept or an activity does not explicitly belong to the Commission's vocabulary (see below on the post-Lisbon development). Cooperation with the UN is however relatively well institutionalized in the development and humanitarian fields, as well as in electoral assistance, which all have ramifications with the broad peacebuilding agenda.¹⁸ "Desk-to-desk" dialogue (through video-conferences among other communication channels) between the Commission and the UN Secretariat and with some specialized agencies allow for regular exchange at the operational level and coordination on foreseen or existing joint activities. The Commission has also signed "partnership agreements" with six UN agencies (UNDP,¹⁹ WHO, ILO, FAO, UNHCR and WFP), as well as a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) with the UN Secretariat (2003). Likewise, the EC, the UN Development Group (UNDG²⁰) and the World Bank have signed a "Joint declaration on post-crisis assessments and recovery planning",²¹ and run joint assessments in post-conflict environments.

Furthermore, the institutionalisation process has been induced by the way the European Commission functions, i.e. more as a donor than as an operational actor. In the peacebuilding field, the Commission finances programmes that most often it does not run by itself, but subcontracts to NGOs or other international organisations, among which are UN agencies. Between 2001 and 2008, € 2.2 billion out of € 5.9 billion (i.e. approximately 37%) of European aid²² dedicated to peacebuilding-related activities was disbursed through UN bodies,²³ with seven of them – UNDP, WFP, UNRWA, UNICEF, FAO, WHO and the UNHCR – receiving the bulk (57%) of the aid.²⁴ In 2007, € 318 million of European aid transited through the UN for peacebuilding programmes including elections and institution-building, rule of law, justice reform and human rights, Security Sector Reform (SSR),

17 See T. Tardy, "L'Union européenne et l'ONU: Quel partenariat dans la gestion civile des crises?", in B. Delcourt, M. Martinelli and E. Klimis (eds.), *L'Union européenne et la gestion de crises*, Institut d'études européennes, University of Brussels, 2008, pp.157-174.

18 Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, DG Relex was in the lead in the field of crisis management, and coordinated with other Commission bodies such as DG Development, DG Trade, EuropeAid, and ECHO.

19 EC-UNDP strategic partnership agreement, June 2004.

20 UNDG brings together 32 UN funds, programmes, agencies, offices and departments that are involved in development activities.

21 See Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning, European Commission, UN Development Group, World Bank, 25 September 2008.

22 From EuropeAid but with the humanitarian aid (ECHO) not counted.

23 With the West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan being the first four recipients.

24 See European Commission, *Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building. Preliminary Study: Scoping and Mapping*, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Brussels, 2009.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of combatants (DDR), de-mining, and support to refugees.²⁵ Cooperation between the Commission and UNDP in electoral assistance is particularly well established, with UNDP running electoral monitoring programmes financed by the Commission and the two institutions co-managing the programmes.²⁶ A Joint Task Force on electoral assistance was also established between the EC and UNDP, bringing together experts of electoral assistance from the two institutions, and dealing with election monitoring, joint training, guidelines development, and lessons learnt.

In the same vein, the Instrument for Stability (IfS),²⁷ that replaced in 2006 the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, is in part aimed at capacity-building in other organisations, including the UN, involved in “post-conflict and post-disaster recovery”.²⁸ Up to one third of IfS money is spent through UN agencies.²⁹ The 2008 Annual Action Programme of the IfS (which implements the “Strategy paper 2007-2011”) makes “cooperation with international organizations on early warning and early recovery” a priority. Key UN agencies and the World Bank are particularly targeted, with a focus on developing common methodology and related training. IfS can also be used for “financial and technical assistance” for the implementation of recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission.³⁰ In this respect, if EU member states contribute up to 70% to the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) (USD 204 million out of 290 million at the end of 2008³¹), the IfS has not so far been used to finance directly the PBF.³² The European Commission does however support the Peacebuilding Support Office, and until the Lisbon Treaty entered into force (1 December 2009), was permanently invited as an “institutional donor” to both the Organizational Committee of the PBC and to country-specific meetings.³³

25 See European Commission, *Financial Contributions of EuropeAid to the UN Funds, Programmes and Specialized Agencies in 2007*, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, 2008, quoted by C. Gourlay, “EU-UN Cooperation in Peacebuilding. Partners in Practice?”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2009, p.72.

26 Cooperation has been further formalized by the signature in 2006 of the EC-UNDP “Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of Electoral Assistance Programmes and Projects”.

27 The IfS is an assistance mechanism established in 2006 and designed to provide rapid technical and financial response to pre- and post-crisis situations through short-term and long-term activities.

28 Regulation n°1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability, *Official Journal of the EU*, 24 November 2006, art.4§3.

29 Interviews by the author at the European Commission, November 2009.

30 Regulation n°1717/2006, *op.cit.*, art.4§3.

31 Cf. “Peacebuilding Fund. Financial Reporting on Sources and Use of Funds”, UNDP, 2008, Annex 1.

32 C. Gourlay reports it is because the IfS serves a similar purpose to PBF. See C. Gourlay, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

33 See M. Spornbauer, “Musical Chairs Revisited: Status and Terms of Participation of the EU in the UN PBC”, *International Organisations Law Review*, 2008/5, pp.299-322.

This type of cooperation has created important institutional and cultural links between the two institutions, with a division of tasks relatively well identified, in particular when the EC acts as a donor for UN operational agencies. In those instances though, the nature of inter-institutional cooperation is peculiar in the sense that it is based on comparative advantages, i.e. the two bodies are doing what they presumably do best and do not enter into competition in the field. One is providing resources to the other and both find cooperation beneficial because of a clear division of tasks. Inter-institutional cooperation would be different if the Commission was a truly operational actor, present in post-conflict environments alongside UN agencies, with the associated risks of overlap and competition.

Things are significantly different in the ESDP domain, where EU-UN relations are by and large less formalised and where the EU potentially competes with the UN. ESDP-related documents recurrently state that the efforts made will enable Europeans to “respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organizations such as the UN”.³⁴ In the framework of the 2001 Göteborg document on civilian crisis management, the EU has defined a series of scenarios of cooperation with the UN, including the possibility for the EU to provide a civilian component to a larger UN operation, that could be “a single component with a single task (e.g. police) or a multifunctional component (e.g. police plus civilian administration plus rule of law) under its own chain of command also reporting to the UN chain of command”.³⁵

In the meantime, a “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management” was adopted in September 2003, and identified four specific areas of cooperation: communication, planning, training, and lessons learnt. The Declaration was up-dated in 2007.³⁶ The 2003 document led to the establishment of a UN-EU Steering Committee,³⁷ where peacebuilding issues such as SSR or rule of law are

34 Presidency report on ESDP, European Council, Nice, December 2000.

35 “EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management. Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration”, Annex IV to the Annex, ESDP Presidency Report, European Council, 13 December 2004.

36 “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management”, September 2003 and “Joint Statement of UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management”, June 2007.

37 Under the Nice Treaty, the Steering Committee was bringing together representatives from DPA, DPKO and OCHA on the UN side, DG-E-IV (America, United Nations), DG-E-V (Africa), DG-E-VIII (Defence), DG-E-IX (Civilian Crisis Management), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), EU Military Staff, New York Liaison Office (NYLO) and DG-Relex (European Commission) on the EU side. It theoretically meets twice a year to discuss thematic as well as country-specific issues. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU representation at the Steering Committee is assured by different units of the External Action Service, including the CMPD, CPCC and the EU Military Staff.

regularly discussed, and allowed for the further institutionalisation of the relationship. Political dialogue at the highest level also takes place on a regular basis and cooperation is developing in the fields of training, exercises, and lessons learnt,³⁸ though peacebuilding is not identified as a separate activity.

Notwithstanding, cooperation has not reached the level that is observed between the Commission and UN agencies, and is also less visible in the peacebuilding field per se than in peacekeeping. As a matter of fact, despite a recurrent EU discourse on its holistic approach and the importance of civilian aspects of crisis management as the added-value of the EU in the security field, the EU has not demonstrated real capacities in this domain. Sixteen of the twenty-four ESDP operations have been of a civilian nature and almost all of them were taking place in a peacebuilding or post-conflict environment.³⁹ Nevertheless, with the exception of EULEX Kosovo that is of significant strength, the other missions were rather modest in scope and have not entailed a well institutionalized working cooperation with the UN. In the case of the DRC, cooperation between the EU civilian missions (EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC DRC and EUPOL DRC) and the MONUC proved to be uneasy, with the compatibility between similar activities – in the SSR domain – carried out simultaneously by the UN and the EU being questioned.⁴⁰ In the Kosovo case, political divergences initially delayed the Security Council's endorsement of the EU-led civilian mission and complicated UN-EU cooperation on the ground as well as the UN handover to the EU.⁴¹ Kosovo was also the first instance – followed by Georgia – where politics at the UN Security Council did have a negative impact on UN-EU relations in crisis management (with Russia opposing a UN Security Council endorsement of the EU mission).

As for military aspects, and insofar as they are part of a peacebuilding effort, inter-institutional cooperation has gone through a fair amount of progress. The two institutions are now working on a certain number of issues (based on the

38 See Council of the Union, "Progress report on recommendations for the implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management", Brussels, December 2008.

39 Only the operations in Georgia (EUJUST Themis), the two operations in the Palestinian territories (EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM Rafah), and the operation in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) were not per se post-conflict peacebuilding operations.

40 See R. Gowan, "ESDP and the United Nations", *European Security and Defence Policy. The First Ten Years (1999-2009)*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2009, p.121.

41 Besides political dialogue, EULEX Kosovo and UNMIK established an intensive dialogue in the pre-deployment phase of EULEX on practical issues related to the handing-over of premises, equipment and other assets.

four categories of communication, planning, training and lessons learned defined in the 2003 UN-EU Joint Declaration) and have given substance to their relationship in a series of practical cooperation, from the DRC in 2003 and 2006 to Chad in 2008/09. The relationship is nevertheless unbalanced, in the sense that it is mainly the EU that defines the terms of its engagement with the UN, and highly politicized. In practical terms, the UN and the EU are developing a working relationship, but they also face a series of technical and political obstacles that constitute limitations to what can be achieved.⁴² In particular, the military nature of peacekeeping – versus the civilian nature of peacebuilding – appears to make it a more sensitive and state-controlled area and therefore less conducive to inter-institutional cooperation.⁴³

Overall, if the UN-EC relationship has developed further than the UN-Council one, on both fronts it has evolved in a pragmatic rather than strategic way. Cooperation has been event-driven and most of the time not the result of a pre-defined policy. As underlined by a report evaluating the Commission's external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family, UN bodies have been treated by the EC "as partners 'on an ad hoc basis'" rather than through a structured strategic approach.⁴⁴ This is even more the case for the intergovernmental side of the EU that has engaged with the UN mainly in response to events, in Africa in particular.

Reciprocal Needs and Similar Agendas

Why do international organisations cooperate in the security field? What is the rationale for UN-EU interaction in peacebuilding? To what extent is inter-institutional cooperation based on materialist motives and to what degree is it value-based? To what extent can coordination be an answer to peacebuilding dilemmas?

Contemporary peacebuilding is an activity that requires large-scale financial and operational capacities and also implies a social engineering process that is highly political. Peacebuilders go beyond the establishment of "negative peace" to promote, through an economic, political and social transformation, what is

42 See T. Tardy, *op.cit.*, *Challenges Forum Report 2008*.

43 This is illustrated by the insistence of the EU on maintaining its autonomy of decision and subsequent reluctance to place any military unit under UN command.

44 "Evaluation of Commission's external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family", Final Report, ADE, Volume I, May 2008, p.iii.

called sustainable or positive peace. This project contains an important normative dimension, and is sometimes referred to as “liberal peace”, understood as the combination of economic liberalization and democratization.⁴⁵ By nature, the promotion of “liberal peace” is a value-based endeavour; it is about establishing a Western-style liberal model in war-torn societies on the basis of its alleged virtues. To summarize, peacebuilding is a complex, political, and value-based enterprise that poses a series of challenges that no single institution can address, and that therefore induces some form of inter-institutional cooperation. As the 2009 UN report on peacebuilding notes, “Partnerships and coordination among the main regional and international actors is essential since no single actor has the capacity to meet the needs in any of the priority areas of peacebuilding”.⁴⁶ In this context, inter-institutional partnerships are sought for different sets of reasons that pertain to materialist and/or ideological motives.⁴⁷ They can find their rationale in reciprocal needs (and benefits), as well as in a sense of common understanding – or even shared values – among partnering institutions.

Materialist motives imply the rational calculation that inter-institutional cooperation pays off, as it gives access to resources that would otherwise be missing, and therefore influences outcomes. Institutions develop comparative advantages that are sought by others and that may induce cooperation. Institutions cooperate in peacebuilding to get access to information, expertise, finance or material resources that are in need and that are made available through cooperation. Uniting materialist and ideological motives is the issue of legitimacy. Inter-institutional cooperation may allow for legitimacy transfer between a legitimizing institution and an organisation for whose action’s legitimacy is not generated internally. Such a legitimizing process may come from a UNSC resolution that confers both legality and legitimacy to a peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation, or simply from the multi-organisational nature of the peacebuilding activity. Furthermore, partnerships may be a way to gain visibility or influence within the partner institution or

45 For a critique of the “liberal peace” approach, see R. Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004; O. Richmond and J. Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*, Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

46 Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, §5.

47 See K. Haugevik, “New partners, new possibilities. The evolution of inter-organizational security cooperation in international peace operations”, *NUPI Report*, Oslo, 2007, p.8.

more broadly to enhance one's position.⁴⁸ Partnering with the UN or with NATO is for the EU a means to build up its status as a security actor.

At the same time, institutions may cooperate for ideological reasons, meaning that institutions' values, normative base and culture shape their propensity and willingness to cooperate with other organisations, especially when these organisations have similar postures. Cooperation is not only interest-driven, but may also reflect a certain conception of international action.

Both categories of motives characterize UN-EU cooperation in peacebuilding. Resource-dependence drives the UN move towards the EU: the UN needs the financial and material resources of the EU and sees the EU as a capacity-provider. Given the weight of the EC in the financing of UN activities, UN agencies have an objective interest in engaging in long-term cooperation with the Commission. The EU also displays comparative advantages that are not necessarily present within the UN, such as political clout, logistics or rapid reaction and robust capability in the military field.

In return, the EU turns to the UN as a source of legitimacy, but also as an operator for actions that the EU could not implement on its own. A report evaluating the Commission's external cooperation with UN agencies lists UN comparative advantages that justify an EU-UN partnership as follows:

“the existence of UN-managed multi-donor interventions; privileged policy dialogue with government; neutrality and legitimacy of the UN system; experience in the field obtained through a continued and extended presence for instance of peacekeeping forces; historical thematic expertise in a number of areas (e.g. children and adolescent issues for UNICEF, environment for UNEP); and its role as a platform for tackling global problems”.⁴⁹

The same report even claims that most of the Commission's funding channelled through the UN could not have been disbursed without the UN presence,⁵⁰ in particular in situations where the Commission “has had its cooperation with local governments interrupted (e.g. DRC, Iraq)”, where “the international community had provided the UN with the mandate to intervene (e.g. UNRWA, elections in the

48 T. Gehring and S. Oberthür, “The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.15, No.1, 2009, pp.125-156.

49 “Evaluation of Commission's external cooperation with partner countries through the organizations of the UN family”, Final Report, ADE, Volume I, May 2008, p.iv.

50 *Ibid.*

DRC)", or in politically sensitive situations (e.g. refugees, elections).⁵¹ For the EU, the financing of UN programmes strengthens its position and influence within the UN, and facilitates policy dialogue with recipient countries. In both cases, inter-institutional cooperation is justified on the basis of comparative advantages and access to the other's resources.

In the meantime, it can be argued that the UN and the EU, i.e. their secretariats, cooperate because they share some common features that create a presumption of a mutually-beneficial relationship. The two organisations are different in many respects (membership, mandate, degree of autonomy vis-à-vis their member states, internal politics or functioning), yet, they share some characteristics as security actors. They have a common approach to threat assessment,⁵² have the same ambition to embrace the entire spectrum of crisis management activities, and can even be seen as sharing certain values, such as the belief in the virtues of international law and multilateralism, a preference for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a related uneasiness with the use of force.⁵³ The 2009 UN report on the "partnership" between the UN and the EC in post-crisis recovery stated that "the United Nations and the European Union share the conviction that lasting peace and sustainable development are rooted in universal values – respect for human rights and the rule of law, and equal access to development opportunities for all".⁵⁴ In the peacebuilding field, the UN and the EU both develop an inclusive approach combining military and civilian aspects, place the same premium on the articulation between security, development and human rights,⁵⁵ and to a large extent share the "liberal peace" view of post-conflict rehabilitation. Those

51 *Ibid.*

52 As illustrated in the High-Level Panel Report and in the *European Security Strategy*. See also "Paper for submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change", p.12, approved by the GAERC, 17-18 May 2004.

53 See T. Tardy, *op.cit.*, *Challenges Forum Report 2008*, p.38.

54 "Renewing Hope, Rebuilding Lives. Partnership between the United Nations and the European Commission in Post-Crisis Recovery", United Nations, Brussels, 2009, p.4. In the same vein, the 2006 edition was stating that "The European Union and the United Nations are natural partners, [...] united by the core values laid out in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights." "The Partnership between the UN and the EU. The United Nations and the European Commission working together in Development and Humanitarian Cooperation", United Nations, 2006, p.6.

55 Both institutions establish a direct link between security, development, and human rights. See "In Larger Freedom. Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All", Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/205, 21 March 2005. The 2006 report on the EU-UN partnership in the field of development and humanitarian cooperation states that "Member states of the Union support all three pillars of the UN's work, namely peace and security, human rights and development", *op.cit.*, p. 8.

convergences can also be observed at the normative level, for example with the broad acceptance from both the UN and the EU of OECD-DAC principles on good governance, gender equality, whole-of-government approaches to fragile states⁵⁶ or on other peacebuilding-related issues.

In reference to organisation theory, Paris notes that the peacebuilding business is a “‘network’ in the sense that statebuilding actors constitute a system that is neither purely a ‘market’ in which individual actors pursue their individual goals with little sense of sharing common objectives, nor is it purely a ‘hierarchy’ or a system of top-down or command management.”⁵⁷ The network reflects a form of interdependence characterized by the identification of respective comparative advantages and reciprocity among the actors. The UN-EU relationship in peacebuilding is a network in the sense that the two institutions interact iteratively, have established permanent institutional links, and contribute, through their activities, to the implementation of the objective – peace consolidation – of the network. There is *prima facie* compatibility between the UN and the EU that would naturally engage in cooperation because of the similarities of their agendas and peacebuilding policies. The UN-EU relation is in this respect distinct from the UN-NATO or even the UN-AU relations that do not contain the same degree of ideological convergence. While the UN-NATO relationship is closer to a “market” (non-iterative transactions, weak reciprocity), the UN-AU relationship is an illustration of a “hierarchy” (in which the UN sets the parameters of the interaction). In the same vein, the UN-EU relationship in the peacekeeping field slightly differs in the sense that it combines characteristics of network,⁵⁸ market and hierarchy (with the EU that tends to define the terms of the interaction) and is more *ad hoc* and case-based than in the peacebuilding domain.⁵⁹

56 See Communication of the Commission, “Towards an EU response to situations of fragility. Engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace”, Brussels, 2007.

57 R. Paris, “Understanding the ‘coordination problem’ in postwar statebuilding”, in R. Paris and T. Sisk (eds.), *The Dilemmas of statebuilding. Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, London, Routledge, 2009, p.61. See also W. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization”, *Research in Organizational Behaviour*, Vol.12, 1990, pp. 295-336.

58 A. Herrhausen, “Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding. A Theory-Guided Approach”, Social Science Research Center Berlin, 2007, p.8.

59 This is particularly the case when considering the UN-EC relationship that comes closer to the network than the link between the UN and the intergovernmental side of the EU.

Challenges to UN-EU Cooperation

The UN and the EU have done much in institutionalizing their relationship in the peacebuilding domain over the last ten years. No other UN-RO relationship has reached an equivalent level of inter-institutional linkages. Yet the two institutions are also facing a certain number of political and technical challenges that hamper their cooperation, and in the end the coherence of their peacebuilding policies. These challenges range from conceptual confusion about peacebuilding, a lack of internal coherence, to competing agendas and political divergences.

Conceptual Confusion and Lack of Internal Coherence

At the conceptual level, it is noteworthy that the common efforts displayed by the UN and the EU to work together in peacebuilding have taken place while neither of the two institutions have a well-defined idea of what constitutes “peacebuilding”.⁶⁰ Within the UN, the work towards the integration of missions (with all UN actors theoretically under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General), as well as the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005, have helped clarify the peacebuilding architecture, and the UN secretariat is therefore probably more advanced than the EU in terms of thinking about and streamlining post-conflict early recovery and peacebuilding. However, peacebuilding lies at the heart of the security-development nexus, and is therefore conceptually hostage of the divergences between different schools of thought – or between the UN Secretariat and UN agencies for example – about how best peace can be built. The same constraints exist at the EU, where the Commission/Council dichotomy in the pre-Lisbon configuration and the absence of streamlining of peacebuilding in the new setting (see *infra*) add to the uneasy conceptualization of the term. The difficulty on both the UN and EU sides to define the scope and

60 See C. Gourlay, *op.cit.*, “EU-UN Cooperation in Peacebuilding. Partners in Practice?”, Introduction. See also M. Berdal, “Building peace after war”, *Adelphi Paper*, IISS, London, 2009, Introduction.

meaning of peacebuilding complicates any attempt to develop the relationship further or to assess its effectiveness. The mere identification of activities that belong to peacebuilding versus others that do not is difficult for both organisations. Within the EU, conceptual confusion is further complicated by the inconsistency in the communication of figures and/or budget that relate to peacebuilding.⁶¹

Inter-institutional cooperation also suffers from the diversity of actors that are involved in peacebuilding on each side and from the subsequent lack of internal coherence. Multi-actors cooperation is dependent on the number of players engaged and is usually all the more successful as the number of players is limited.⁶² However, we have seen that neither of the two institutions can be seen as a coherent, homogeneous entity. On the UN side, the Department for Political Affairs is formally in charge of peacebuilding, but the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also have prerogatives. Outside the Secretariat, many of the UN agencies are involved one way or the other in peacebuilding activities, with UNDP being a central actor of post-conflict early recovery and longer-term development programmes. Within the broader UN family, institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF also play a key role in post-conflict rehabilitation, while behaving independently from the UN Secretariat or agencies. In 2006, the report on UN system-wide coherence in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment, entitled “Delivering as one”,⁶³ deplored the fragmented approach of different UN entities and emphasized the need for a more effective, unified and coherent United Nations. It pointed to the

“proliferation of agencies, mandates and offices, creating duplication and dulling the focus on outcomes. Even when mandates intersect, UN entities tend to operate alone with little synergy and coordination between them. [...] The loss of cohesion prevents the United Nations from being more than the sum of its parts”.⁶⁴

The Peacebuilding Commission is mandated to ensure a certain degree of coordination, but its size, stature, and position within the UN institutional architecture do not allow it to represent the whole UN family on peacebuilding issues.

61 See C. Gourlay, *op.cit.*, pp.101-102.

62 See R. Axelrod and R. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”, in K. Oye (ed.), *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, pp.234-238.

63 See “Letter dated 9 November 2006 from the Co-Chairs of the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment addressed to the Secretary-General”, A/61/583, UN General Assembly, 20 November 2006.

64 *Ibid.*, pp.18-19.

On the EU side, the EC/Council dichotomy, together with the military/civilian divide within ESDP, have also led to institutional compartmentalization that the Lisbon Treaty was supposed to address. Along the same lines as the “Delivering as one” report, a 2006 EC communication pointed to the necessity to “bring together different instruments and assets, whether within the Commission, between the Council and Commission, or between the EU institutions and the Member States”⁶⁵ so as to improve the EU’s effectiveness, coherence and visibility. As it was, EU action was fragmented and furthermore reflected different peace-building philosophies among its constituting agents: a short-term, security-oriented and in principle visible approach in the ESDP framework versus a longer term, development-oriented and more discreet way for the Commission. Not only were the two approaches not easy to reconcile by nature, but they also suffered from internal turf battles between the Commission and the Council.⁶⁶ Such discrepancies have had a direct impact on the peacebuilding posture, for example when the two EU bodies adopt different policy documents on the same topic, as was the case with SSR.⁶⁷

EU visibility and coherence were to be improved by the Lisbon Treaty and the streamlining of EU external action that it carries. First, the legal personality conferred to the EU – while it was until then only the European Community that enjoyed it – will enhance its coherence and representation, as in the UN Peacebuilding Commission for example, where EU representation had been the object of tension between the Council and the Commission. Second, the creation of the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (with C. Ashton as the first holder of the position) as the merger of the former High Representative position and external relations Commissioner, together with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) bringing together Commission and Council Secretariat prerogatives, should also facilitate EU representation (in particular in the field with EU Ambassadors representing all EU entities) and activity in the conflict management domain.

65 Communication from the Commission, “Europe in the World. Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility”, Brussels, 8 June 2006, p.6.

66 See C. Gourlay, “Civil-Civil Co-ordination in EU Crisis Management”, in A. Nowak (ed.), “Civilian crisis management: the EU way”, *Chaillot Paper 90*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, June 2006, pp.103-122.

67 See D. Law and O. Myshlovska, “The Evolution of the Concepts of Security Sector Reform and Security Sector Governance: the EU Perspective”, in D. Spence and P. Fluri (eds.), *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*, John Harper, DCAF, 2008, pp.2-26.

However, the Lisbon Treaty provisions are unlikely to significantly modify the EU approach vis-à-vis peacebuilding and therefore the parameters of inter-institutional cooperation in this field. Peacebuilding remains ill-defined under the new framework. The Lisbon Treaty does not mention the term “peacebuilding”, and the newly-created Peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and mediation unit (that is under the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy in the EEAS) is not given much visibility or importance. Overall, although peacebuilding is often presented as “central to what the EU does externally”, “conceptual diversity” and “institutional fragmentation” still prevail over the mainstreaming of the peacebuilding instruments that the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS could have potentially brought.⁶⁸ Not only is peacebuilding split between different units of the EEAS (Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), etc.) with little foreseen coordination between them,⁶⁹ but it is also the more general question of strategic vision on peacebuilding – or lack thereof – that is raised.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the silo approach (illustrated by the Commission versus Council compartmentalisation) that was supposed to be remedied by the establishment of the EEAS is likely to remain in the peacebuilding field. Indeed, while a significant portion of the Commission’s responsibility and units have been transferred to the EEAS (including the entire DG Relex), the development bodies and funds remain within the Commission (with the creation of the EuropeAid Development and Cooperation Directorate-General that merged DG Development and DG EuropeAid⁷¹), maintaining the dichotomy between short-term peacebuilding instruments located in the EEAS and the longer-term mechanisms of the Commission. Given the importance of development issues in the broader peacebuilding field, this persistent institutional fragmentation is likely to have an impact on the cohesion of EU policy.⁷² Consequently, despite the fact

68 See C. Major and C. Mölling, “Towards an EU Peacebuilding Strategy?”, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, European Parliament, April 2010.

69 See “Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding inside the EEAS”, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), Brussels, 21 February 2011.

70 *Ibid.*

71 EuropeAid Development and Cooperation is mandated to play the leading role in the development debate with, among others, international institutions.

72 In the same vein, DG Trade remains in the Commission while it too contributes to long-term peacebuilding policies.

that the EEAS is presented as making the EU a “better partner for the UN”,⁷³ it is however difficult for the UN to assume that it now has a more coherent and unitary peacebuilding actor to deal with. Most importantly, internal coordination appears as much challenging and subject to turf battle as inter-institutional cooperation can be.

Overall, the variety of entities involved one way or another in peacebuilding makes it impossible to speak about the UN or the EU as a whole, thus also limiting the pertinence and accuracy of the term UN-EU relationship. At the working level, the fragmentation also makes it difficult for each side to identify interlocutors in the counterpart institution as well as to be clear about division of tasks and overall peacebuilding strategies.⁷⁴ In reality, what we have seen so far is more a multiplication of bilateral relations between the EC and different UN agencies, or between the EU Council and the UN Secretariat rather than a genuine and comprehensive partnership between two coherent entities. In this sense, the UN-EU relationship in peacebuilding is more multi-tracked than it is the case in the field of peacekeeping, where there are fewer interlocutors (basically DPKO on the UN side and the Council Secretariat (or EEAS today) on the EU side).

Competing Agendas and Power Hierarchy

Finally, while the UN and the EU are often presented as “natural partners”⁷⁵ because of the convergences of their activities and methods, the narrative about convergences should not hide important political differences that can play against long-term cooperation and coordination.

First, UN-EU cooperation is hampered by the inherent competition that characterizes any inter-institutional relationship. As peacebuilding actors, the UN and the EU must demonstrate that they display a certain number of comparative advantages, and ensure their visibility and effectiveness. The UN also puts forward the will to remain at the centre of the international security architecture (in rela-

73 “EU High Representative Ashton addresses UN Security Council on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations”, UN Security Council, New York, 8 February 2011.

74 In interviews by the author at the European Commission (November 2009), it was stressed that the UN system-wide coherence was still missing and negatively impacted on UN-EU relations. By contrast, Mats Berdal asserts that the “EU arguably has a more dysfunctional institutional structure in this area than the UN”. See Berdal, *op.cit.*, “Building peace after war”, p.146.

75 “The Partnership between the UN and the EU. The United Nations and the European Commission working together in Development and Humanitarian Cooperation”, United Nations, 2006, p.6.

tions with regional actors) while the EU is adamant that it should preserve its autonomy of decision and action. These imperatives are not, by nature, conducive to inter-institutional cooperation, and may lead to competition on issues such as positioning, access to information, and market conquest. It follows that while burden-sharing is seen as a response to the multiplicity of needs, an increased role for the EU in crisis management may also take place at the expense of the UN, with the idea that regional and global multilateralism are not necessarily mutually-reinforcing.⁷⁶

Furthermore, as already noted, peacebuilding is a normative activity that reflects the political and economic visions of whoever tries to build peace. Peacebuilding actors are projecting their own conceptions of state governance, economic recovery or social justice onto the target societies where they intervene. The social engineering that is taking place through peacebuilding is by nature intrusive and partial. This limits the extent to which two organisations – with different membership – can share the same objectives or the same visions on how to reach them. It follows that, as Smith and Laatikainen put it, there is the “risk that strong regional groupings (such as the EU) prove able to protect and promote their own interests, and that of their members, in opposition to universalism/multilateralism”.⁷⁷ One is here at the junction between institutional approaches and inter-governmental dynamics. In this context, while the EU is often presented as an impartial, depoliticized crisis management actor that would take part in peacekeeping/peacebuilding programmes with the sole objective of bringing stability, it is in fact a highly-politicized security actor whose action is largely state-driven and that pursues objectives that may diverge from those of the UN. A 2008 report auditing co-operation of the European Commission with UN agencies underlines that “Commission’s visibility provisions created difficulties at operational level and their coherence with a number of principles such as pooling of donor funding and the neutrality of the UN system are questioned by the outside world.”⁷⁸ The EU surely cannot pretend it is a neutral peacebuilding actor, and even less so when its presence in a peacebuilding context is directly linked with the foreign policy of one of its member states, be it France in francophone Africa (from the DRC to Chad and Central African Republic), Portugal in Guinea-Bissau or Germany in Af-

76 See K. Laatikainen and K. Smith (eds.), *The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

77 *Ibid.*, p.8.

78 “Evaluation of Commission’s external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family”, Final Report, ADE, Volume I, May 2008, p.v.

ghanistan. Charbonneau notes that while the EU is treated as an “appealing model for the world and an ‘international good citizen’”, “European multilateralism and thus the construction, transformation and reproduction of a ‘world governed by norms and rules’ both reflect and are the expressions of relations of power”.⁷⁹ In other words, the EU’s alleged goodwill in the crisis management field needs to be checked against the political agenda that both the EU and its member states are promoting. For Charbonneau, it follows that UN-EU cooperation (in Africa and in the military field in particular) does not “challenge the implicit power hierarchy”⁸⁰ between the two institutions, even if, once again, the unbalanced relationship is more tangible in the peacekeeping than in the peacebuilding field. In the latter, the UN tends to display more comparative advantages than in the former, and the primacy of one institution over the other is less visible.

Nevertheless, the issue arises of coordination between actors that may have different political agendas or priorities while engaged in the same peacebuilding project. Inter-institutional coordination is often presented as the solution to over-lapping activities or to the lack of effectiveness of peacebuilding activities.⁸¹ In reality though, as Paris puts it, coordination understood as an administrative and procedural response is of little help when “statebuilding agencies pursue conflicting or incompatible strategies”.⁸² In policy terms, it follows that UN-EU inter-institutional cooperation and coordination can only be further developed and institutionalized to a limited extent,⁸³ and cannot be a substitute for a rapprochement at the highest political level.

Furthermore, not only political agendas may hinder the development of UN-EU cooperation, but there is also a tension between the need to institutionalize the relationship, and that of maintaining a certain degree of flexibility in the relation. All UN-EU after-action reviews recommend the institutionalisation of the relationship while admitting that each situation is different from the other and that coordination can only work to a certain extent. This poses a limit to the identification of lessons learned and best practices, as well as to the elaboration of typologies of scenarios of UN-EU cooperation. At the same time, the two institutions will be

79 B. Charbonneau, “What is so special about the European Union? EU-UN cooperation in crisis management in Africa”, *International Peacekeeping*, vol.16, n°4, August 2009, p.555.

80 *Ibid.*, p.550.

81 See R. Paris, “Understanding the ‘coordination problem’ in postwar statebuilding” (pp.53-78), in R. Paris and T. Sisk (eds.), *The Dilemmas of statebuilding*, *op.cit.*

82 *Ibid.*, p.59.

83 See “After-Action Review. UN-EU planning for EUFOR Tchad/RCA”, UN-EU Steering Committee, New York, April 2008.

all the more equipped to face new situations as they have institutionalized their relationship and learnt from past experience. Institutionalisation and standardization have to be compatible with a certain degree of flexibility.

Finally, if the most important divergences are of a political nature, UN-EU co-operation may also be hindered by different working methods that in turn, create political tensions. Gourlay reports “persistent frictions [between the UN and the Commission] that stem from different perceptions of the nature of the partnership and different operational practices.” For example, the EC has “unusually high financial accountability standards” that have led to the “widespread perception within the UN that the EC is an ‘overly’ demanding donor when compared with other donors.” Conversely, from the EC perspective, the UN is often seen as an “unreliable implementing partner precisely because of insufficient and delayed narrative and financial reporting.”⁸⁴ Gourlay continues with saying that

“the EC-UN relationship is also strained by different interpretations of what partnership means in practice. From the EC point of view, co-management as defined in the [Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement] requires that the UN provide the EC with full information and involve the EC in strategic decision-making relating to project implementation. From the UN perspective, however, the EC is viewed as a demanding donor that wants to interfere in UN project management where it has no responsibility for the implementation for the project and does not deserve a ‘privileged’ status vis-à-vis other donors. While both partners argue that the partnership should be based on mutual respect between ‘equals’, both often feel disrespected.”⁸⁵

Similar differences have been observed in the peacekeeping field, where different working methods in the areas of financing or logistics have impeded cooperation in the case of DRC⁸⁶, while key differences in the respective decision-making, planning and command processes and structures have negatively impacted the joint effort in Chad.⁸⁷

On these different issues, inter-institutional dialogue should be aimed at standardizing procedures and harmonizing working methods. Yet exchange at the highest political level must also be a priority, as a way to tackle and alleviate political divergences, and therefore lay the foundations of a mutually-beneficial partnership.

84 Gourlay, “EU-UN Cooperation in Peacebuilding. Partners in Practice?”, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

85 *Ibid.*

86 See C. Major, “EU-UN Cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006”, *Occasional Paper n°72*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2008.

87 See T. Tardy, “UN-EU Relations in Crisis Management. Taking Stock and Looking Ahead”, *op.cit.*, pp.46-48.

Conclusion

UN-EU cooperation in peacebuilding has produced tangible results and also offers an under-explored potential. Cooperation between the UN (and its agencies) and the European Commission is relatively well-established, with the Commission acting as a donor for peace consolidation activities implemented by various UN organs. In contrast, achievements in the CSDP field have been less visible as the EU has yet to live up to its ambitions in the civilian sphere of post-conflict peacebuilding. In this respect, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the External Action Service may help strengthen the overall coherence of EU activity, yet the absence of streamlining of peacebuilding in the new external relations apparatus can also be the source of persistent internal dysfunction.

Overall, the UN and the EU have constituted a “network” of institutions that are engaged in reciprocal and presumably supportive actions. They cooperate in a wide range of peacebuilding activities, and to an extent converge on how best peace should be built. As inter-institutional cooperation characterizes multidimensional crisis management, other security institutions – such as the AU, NATO or the OSCE – could well draw on the UN-EU relationship to develop their own partnerships. Likewise, UN-EU linkages in the peacebuilding field could constitute a basis for further inter-institutional development in other functional areas, such as terrorism, organised crime or environmental degradation.

In the meantime, the UN-EU inter-institutional complex also reveals the nature of international organisations, and the way they define and pursue their agendas, at the junction between institutional and inter-governmental dynamics. In other words, while sharing a number of similarities in the peacebuilding realm, the UN and the EU are also to an extent competing for their own visibility, comparative advantages or positions on the “peacebuilding market”. Although it might be less tangible than in the more narrowly-defined peacekeeping field, the UN-EU relationship is

also an illustration of relations of power between political entities whose peacebuilding agendas, strategies, and priorities do not systematically converge.

Furthermore, while UN-EU inter-institutional cooperation does help in bringing coherence to the broad international peacebuilding efforts, the extent to which it provides an answer to the main peacebuilding/statebuilding dilemmas, such as legitimacy, local ownership, internal coherence and coordination, effectiveness of the action, or knowledge of the local context, is not guaranteed. In other words, inter-institutional cooperation, though fundamental to the success of peacebuilding strategies, remains only one of many elements of success.

GCSP

avenue de la Paix 7bis

P.O.Box 1295

CH - 1211 Geneva 1

T +41 22 906 16 00

F +41 22 906 16 49

info@gcsp.ch

www.gcsp.ch



Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Centre de Politique de Sécurité, Genève
Genfer Zentrum für Sicherheitspolitik

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