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GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS



UNITED NATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS

***GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR
PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS***

General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations

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General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations

This text reflects current United Nations peace-keeping practice. It is intended as a general guide for governments. The text deals with peace-keeping only and does not cover enforcement operations. It will be followed by more detailed texts on specific aspects of peace-keeping operations.

CHAPTER

1

***UNITED NATIONS GUIDELINES FOR
PEACE-KEEPING***

INTRODUCTION

1. The primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations Charter, signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco by the 50 founding States, assumed that the post-World War II order would be based on continuing cooperation among the allied powers – China, France, the (then) Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was anticipated that whenever other states could not settle their disputes peacefully, these five permanent members of the UN Security Council would act in concert to deter or roll back aggression. With the Cold War dividing the wartime allies, and the two superpowers frequently supporting opposing sides in conflicts around the globe, the Council could not effectively implement its mandate to maintain peace, especially when enforcement action was a possibility.
2. Even at the height of the rivalry between East and West, however, a common interest existed among the Council's members to contain regional conflicts and prevent them from escalating into direct superpower confrontation; to manage the Cold War rivalries related to the decolonization process; and in some cases to enable governments that had enmeshed their forces in untenable situations beyond their borders to withdraw them without loss of prestige.
3. The practice of United Nations peace-keeping was developed in order to serve such functions. Not provided for in the Charter, it was improvised as an instrument of pragmatic diplomacy, to be used to the extent possible in a world which, although deeply

divided, still retained some crucial political interests in common. The goals of peace-keeping during this period were limited: to effect and maintain cease-fires and stabilize situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. This approach shaped peace-keeping operations for over four decades.

4. Following the end of the Cold War, the dramatic increase in cooperation greatly increased the demand for United Nations peace-keeping operations. As the permanent members of the Security Council, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, began to work more closely with each other to promote the containment and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, the Council, working with other interested States, became the focal point of initiatives to terminate or control conflict situations.
5. In some cases this opened the door to a comprehensive settlement which went far beyond cease-fires and separation of forces in order to address the causes of the conflict. To assist with the implementation of these settlements, the United Nations fielded multidimensional operations which included, in addition to the military component which had always been prevalent in peace-keeping, a wide range of civilian experts to monitor and assist in areas such as human rights, civilian police, elections, rehabilitation of civic institutions, and the re-integration of combatants to normal life.
6. The end of the Cold War also had negative repercussions and was accompanied by a wave of nationalist, ethnic, religious, and civil wars. In an era of instant

awareness through global communications media, the world's peoples felt a moral responsibility to try to alleviate these tragedies. In such cases peoples turned for action to their governments, which in turn looked to the United Nations, and through it established new and exceedingly complex operations. Unlike most earlier peace-keeping operations whose goal was to halt conflict between States, these were deployed in the midst of violence within a single country or, equally challenging, a confusing mix of internal and international conflict, which demonstrated that the technique of peace-keeping was not a panacea for situations where one or more of the parties in conflict preferred to continue with war.

KEY CONCEPTS

7. The United Nations uses a range of instruments to respond to different types of conflict:
8. **Preventive Diplomacy** is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.
9. **Peace-making** is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.
10. **Peace-keeping** is a United Nations presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their reso-

lution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.

11. **Peace-enforcement** may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
12. **Peace-building** is critical in the aftermath of conflict. Peace-building includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
13. This range of instruments provides a certain amount of flexibility in responding to the different types of conflict which confront the international community. The focus of these guidelines is United Nations peace-keeping operations. As will be discussed, these often result from peace-making efforts and sometimes incorporate peace-building activities. Peace-enforcement is beyond the scope of this document.

CHAPTER

2

TYPES OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

MAINTENANCE OF CEASE-FIRES AND SEPARATION OF FORCES

14. The type of peace-keeping developed during the Cold War has been referred to as “traditional” peace-keeping, though in fact it represents much of the current and likely future work of the United Nations. It can be further divided into two broad categories: military observer missions and peace-keeping forces. Military observer missions are composed of unarmed officers and range in strength from a few observers to several hundred. Peace-keeping forces are composed primarily of armed military units; their strength has ranged from about a thousand to tens of thousands of troops. Some examples include UN operations in Cyprus, the Golan Heights and Kashmir.

15. Operations of this type function on the basis of a limited agreement or understanding between the parties. They monitor cease-fires and by their presence enable combatants to pull back to a safe distance from each other, where passions may cool and an atmosphere conducive to negotiations may be created. By monitoring and reporting on the parties’ adherence to commitments regarding, for example, a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone and areas of limitation, and by investigating complaints of violations, the peace-keeping operation constitutes an important confidence-building measure, enabling each party to be reassured that “the enemy” will not be able to exploit the cease-fire in order to gain military advantage. Supervision, interposition, observation (using static posts, patrols, overflights or other technical means with the agreement of the parties), are common activities of a peace-keeping operation. These operations are normally deployed without

prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerning the substantive questions at issue, which can be resolved only through negotiations.

PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT

16. As a relatively recent innovation the same objective, i.e. to promote the conditions for a negotiated settlement, may be pursued through the preventive deployment of such operations. In this case, instead of preventing a recurrence of fighting, the operation is deployed in order to prevent it from happening at all. Through many of the same activities as undertaken for the maintenance of cease-fires, e.g. the establishment of a de-militarized zone, interposition, observation, and reporting to the parties themselves as well as to the Security Council, a preventive deployment operation serves as a confidence-building measure, providing a reassuring presence and a certain amount of transparency to prevent the type of miscalculations which could lead to war. It also provides "early warning" to the Security Council and raises the political price of any aggression into its area of operation. This new type of operation has been deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENTS

17. In contrast to peace-keeping operations which, as described above, are deployed after a cease-fire but before a settlement of the conflict in question has been negotiated, in the late 1980s a new type of peace-keeping operation was developed for the purpose of helping parties to a conflict implement a comprehensive settlement which they had reached.

Such settlements have involved not only a cease-fire and other military arrangements but also a wide range of civilian matters. As a result, the United Nations was required to undertake an unprecedented variety of functions: the supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral re-forms; the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

18. Such operations have been deployed in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. They have been completed in a limited period of time and in most cases have been comprehensively successful.

PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS DURING CONTINUING CONFLICTS

19. A new type of operation is the use of United Nations forces to protect humanitarian operations. Humanitarian agencies endeavour to provide succour to civilian of war wherever they may be. Too often of late, the warring parties, one or more of which may be irregular militias or self-proclaimed authorities, make it difficult or impossible. This is sometimes because of the exigencies of war but more often because the

relief of a particular population is contrary to the war aims of one or another of the parties. There is also a growing tendency for the combatants to divert relief supplies for their own purposes. Where the conflict is within a state, the humanitarian agencies often have to undertake their tasks in chaotic and lawless conditions. In some, but not all, such cases the resulting horrors explode on the world's television screens and create political pressure for Governments to take measures in order to ensure that humanitarian relief reaches the victims of the conflict. The international community has responded with a new kind of operation to escort or conduct humanitarian relief activities and to be able to protect them in self-defence if attacked. In such situations of sustained hostility, even the restrained use of force by UN troops has led, perhaps inevitably, to their being drawn into confrontations and conflict, demonstrating the limits of peace-keeping operations confronted with a determination of one side or the other to continue war. The unprecedented difficulties arising for the operations in the former Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, in Somalia illustrate this quandary.

CHAPTER

3

PRINCIPLES OF PEACE-KEEPING

LEGITIMACY

20. Legitimacy is the most important asset of a peace-keeping operation. It rests on an understanding that the operation is just and is representative of the will of the international community as a whole rather than some partial interest. At the highest level, the legitimacy of an operation derives from the fact that it is established and given its mandate by the Security Council which, by Charter agreement of all Member States of the United Nations, is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. This legitimacy is further enhanced by the composition of a peace-keeping operation, typically including personnel from a broad spectrum of States. Finally, the conduct of the operation itself is an essential element of legitimacy. At all levels the operation must demonstrate firmness in adhering to the mandate entrusted to it by the international community, coupled with understanding for the parties to the conflict whose vital interests are at stake. The bearing and behaviour of all personnel must be of the highest order, commensurate with the important responsibilities entrusted to the peace-keeping operation.

CONTINUOUS AND ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

21. The operation in the field is only the most visible part of a complex set of political efforts which must be deployed to achieve the objectives of the international community. When a United Nations peace-keeping operation is launched, it is understood that the members of the Security Council and other Member States in a position to do so will take the necessary political and diplomatic action, in support of the

Secretary-General, to ensure that the decisions of the Council are carried out.

22. The importance of the Security Council's support becomes evident especially when an operation encounters difficulties. The influence which the Council and its individual members bring to bear in support of their collective decisions determines the extent to which such challenges are met by the United Nations as an entity.

SUSTAINED COMMITMENT OF TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

23. The capacity of a peace-keeping operation to fulfil its mandate is dependent upon the continuous and active participation of all national contingents in the operation. This is particularly important with regard to operations where conditions may be volatile and the risk for peace-keeping personnel considerable. It is essential for troop-contributing countries to take into account the possibility of casualties to their personnel before deciding to commit them to such operations. The withdrawal of a contingent when an operations faces difficulties can result in severe disruptions and seriously undermine the Organization's efforts.

CLEAR AND ACHIEVABLE MANDATE

24. The Security Council determines the mandate of a peace-keeping operation. It is important for explicit and realistic objectives to be set out in the mandate, so that the peace-keeping operation and the political and material support on which it depends can be focussed and directed towards generally recognized and agreed ends. A mandate open to contradictory

interpretations could leave different components of an operation working at cross purposes, and the efforts of governments to support different aspects of the operation through diplomatic efforts could be self-cancelling. This has sometimes occurred in recent peace-keeping operations.

CONSENT AND COOPERATION

25. In contrast with enforcement, peace-keeping operations are non-coercive in nature and require the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict. Though consent is a legal requirement, cooperation is above all a practical requirement for the operation to be able to deploy and carry out its tasks.
26. If a peace-keeping operation is deployed in a highly volatile setting, possibly involving armed elements not under the control of any discernible authority (as in many conflicts within states), universality of consent in the area of operation becomes less probable. Formal commitments made by the parties at a high level may not necessarily be respected by their followers on the ground. Securing and promoting consent and cooperation at every level are therefore essential and ongoing tasks of an operation.
27. If a peace-keeping operation has secured the agreement of the parties at a senior level to a particular course of action, everything possible should be done to ensure that agreement is transmitted down to the local level, i.e. to those who might otherwise be confronting or challenging the peace-keepers in the field. Similarly, one of the most useful commodities that peace-keepers at whatever locale can pass on to their superiors are the fruits of agreement reached with local leaders.

28. All parties to the conflict, as well as the countries contributing personnel, should be fully aware of the objectives of an operation as well as the manner in which it intends to carry out its mandate. Incomplete or inaccurate communication may foster suspicion and undermine confidence and trust and, consequently, cooperation. The necessary transparency can be achieved in part by means of active and comprehensive public affairs and community information programmes, and by directly involving the parties themselves, to the extent prudence will allow, in the execution of the mandate.
29. Three aspects of peace-keeping in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina led the operations to forego the consent of the parties, to behave in a way that was perceived to be partial and/or to use force other than in self-defence. These have been the tasks of protecting humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas and pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept. Peace-keeping operations with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force were given additional mandates that required the use of force. However, it turned out not to be possible for these very different mandates to be combined, nor could they be executed without much stronger military capabilities than had been made available.
30. The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinc-

tion between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel.

IMPARTIALITY AND OBJECTIVITY

31. The impartial and objective pursuit of the mandate, regardless of provocation and challenge, is essential to preserving the legitimacy of the operation and the consent and cooperation of conflicting parties. The effort to maintain impartiality, however, must not promote inaction. On the contrary, peace-keepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively, without fear or favour. Importantly, neither side should gain unfair advantage as a result of the activities of a peace-keeping operation.

32. At times a party may come to oppose elements of a settlement to which it had previously agreed and on the basis of which a peace-keeping operation had been mandated by the Security Council. In these circumstances, impartiality should not be interpreted as equidistance between the mandate and a party's newly revised position. Rather, it is the Security Council mandate which manifests the legitimate will of the international community and which the peace-keeping operation is charged to uphold. Since the means which a peace-keeping operation utilizes to achieve its objectives do not include forcible military action, political means must therefore be employed to overcome resistance to the mandate, bringing to bear as appropriate the weight of the Security Council and other Member States which are in a position to persuade recalcitrant parties. Any decision to revise the mandate can only be taken by the Security Council (or, in exceptional cases, the General Assembly if it

was the organ which provided the original mandate of the operation).

NON-USE OF FORCE

33. As discussed, peace-keeping is a non-coercive instrument, based on the consent and cooperation of the parties. Force is not the means which it utilizes to achieve its mandate. However, peace-keepers at all times retain the right of self-defence, in which case force may be used as a last resort. The right of self-defence ends with the threat that gave rise to it; retaliation is not self-defense.
34. The peace-keeper's right to self-defence does not end with the defence of his/her own life. It includes defending one's comrades and any persons entrusted in one's care, as well as defending one's post, convoy, vehicle, or rifle. Each peace-keeping operation is expected to function as a single, integrated unit and an attack on any one of its members or subunits engages the right to self-defence of the operation as a whole.
35. Since 1973, the guidelines approved by the Security Council for each peace-keeping force have stipulated that self-defence is deemed to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peace-keeping force from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. This is a broad conception of "self-defence" which might be interpreted as entitling United Nations personnel to open fire in a wide variety of situations. In practice, commanders in the field have been reluctant to use their authority in this way, for well-founded reasons relating to the need for a peace-keeping operation to maintain the active cooperation of the parties to a

conflict. Peace-keeping forces have gone to great lengths in order not to be drawn into cycles of attack and retaliation, which would turn them into enemies rather than peace-keepers who are above the fray.

33. Commanders should seek to develop a range of options, appropriate to the specific operation and short of the actual use of force, for dealing with threats. This may include, for example, negotiation, raising a matter to a higher political level, employment of a variety of defensive measures and the concentration of sufficient armed force to act as a deterrent.
34. While peace-keeping is incompatible with enforcement, in exceptional circumstances a United Nations operation may be mandated by the Security Council to carry out, concurrently, aspects of both in a single mission area. This is an inherently problematic situation and must be handled with utmost caution and care. Experience has shown that it is dangerous for a peace-keeping operation to be asked to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. In general in such a situation, decisions regarding the use of force or any escalation in the level of force should be highly centralized, since decisions made at the tactical level could have extreme consequences for the entire operation.
35. Issues underlying wars between or within countries cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time. Conflicts the United Nations is asked to resolve usually have deep roots and have defied the peacemaking efforts of others. Their resolution requires patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that permits, over a period of time, the build-

ing of confidence and negotiated solutions to long-standing differences. Such processes often encounter frustrations and set-backs and almost invariably take longer than hoped. It is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up. Peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum. There is no easy transition from one to the other.

UNITY

39. If it is to be effective a United Nations operation must function as an integrated unit reflecting the will of the international community as a whole. International forces can be vulnerable to attempts by the parties to the conflict to differentiate between contingents and single them out for favourable or unfavourable treatment. This may lead to repercussions in the home countries as well as on the ground which can seriously undermine an operation. Experience has shown that when command in the field is divided and military units receive guidance from national as well as United Nations Headquarters the difficulties inherent in an international operation are exacerbated and the risk of casualties rises. Maintaining the integrated, strictly international character of an operation remains the best safeguard against such a development. It is therefore not permissible for a contingent commander to receive or accept instructions from national authorities on operational matters. (See also paragraph 59). Not only do such practices jeopardize the effectiveness of an operation and the safety and security of its personnel, they undermine the very legitimacy of the institution of United Nations peace-keeping.

40. In the field, common sense and sound management practice dictate that the head of mission ensures that national contingent commanders are involved in operational planning and decision-making, especially where their respective contingents are concerned. Such involvement should take the form of consultations among professionals in a unified force. However, they cannot be allowed to develop into indirect negotiations with national headquarters, which could impede action and undermine the willingness and vigour with which the orders of the United Nations are carried out.
41. A multi-dimensional peace-keeping operation may involve a wide array of functions, including not only military arrangements such as cease-fires and the cantonment and demobilization of forces, but also a variety of civilian matters, such as the establishment of new police forces and the verification of elections and respect for human rights. Such multi-dimensional operations are generally headed in the field by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who has authority over all components of the operation. It is the Special Representative's responsibility to ensure unity, with the efforts of the different components of the mission being complementary and mutually re-enforcing, rather than conflicting. It is incumbent on personnel at all levels to establish and nurture coordination amongst components.
42. It is important to stress unity of effort in cases in which a peace-keeping operation is deployed in tandem with, or in protection of, a major humanitarian relief effort, which ordinarily involves a number of agencies of the United Nations System as well as a wide array of non-governmental organizations

(NGOs). Generally in these situations a humanitarian coordinator is appointed to ensure effective coordination amongst the UN humanitarian agencies and, to the extent possible, the NGOs as well. In the field the humanitarian coordinator reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who normally has authority to coordinate all elements of the UN system that are active in the area of operation.

CHAPTER

4

TASKS AND TECHNIQUES

43. A range of operational activities has been developed in the conduct of peace-keeping operations. These depend on the mandate and may include:

OBSERVATION

44. A peace-keeping operation relies on accurate and impartial observation and reports. The content of the observation not only serves the respective level of command initiating the collection of information but also higher echelons. For example, the violation of an agreement observed by United Nations personnel may result in a protest or other formal notification to the party concerned and could lead to further investigation. Daily information gathering in the area of operations can be achieved by static and mobile operating techniques. The mandate and the tactical and logistical considerations determine which type is more applicable for a mission. Static forms of deployment are positions and observation posts; mobile forms are various means of patrolling, inspections and investigations.
45. Observation is often coupled with responsibility for the **supervision** of parties' adherence to agreements. Supervision may be required in all stages of an operation from initial cease-fire through separation of forces and, in some cases, disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation of military or paramilitary personnel. Supervisory tasks may include negotiating and planning the process of withdrawal and disarmament, and in some cases assisting the parties to promulgate the essential information so that their constituent elements can respond in a timely manner. Supervision also includes the investigation of complaints and alleged breaches of agree-

ment. In some cases, it may be possible and desirable to delegate certain supervised tasks jointly to the parties to a conflict. Establishment of joint commissions involving UN representatives and the local parties at a senior level which are replicated at local levels can be valuable tools in carrying through agreements.

INTERPOSITION

46. The interposition of peace-keeping forces between opposing factions remains one of the basic tasks in the establishing and maintenance of cease-fires. It is usually pre-planned with the consent of the parties to the conflict and normally follows (but could precede) the withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from a cease-fire line. The interposition might be phased with advance groups deployed to provide a screen between withdrawing factions. Interposition may also be used as a short-term emergency response to forestall or manage a local crisis. It should be accompanied by immediate negotiations with the antagonists.

LIAISON, NEGOTIATION AND GOOD OFFICES

47. Liaison with the parties at every level is essential to build trust, ensure the timely passage of information, and maintain regular communications for purposes of negotiation and mediation. Therefore, liaison arrangements should be established at every possible level as soon as possible. The requirement for liaison opportunities will increase in proportion to the complexity of the political environment. At the political or strategic level, liaison should include those with ready access to policy makers; at the operational and

tactical levels, a working relationship is needed with the parties on a day-to-day basis.

48. Negotiation refers to a direct dialogue with one or more parties, e.g. to secure the safe passage of a relief convoy. Mediation means to act as a go-between for the parties. Negotiation and mediation have enormous potential to de-escalate a situation, to promote understanding and consensus and to work out solutions to small and large problems at every level.
49. Good offices constitute an indispensable element of all peace-keeping operations. When faced with a problem from the parties, UN personnel are frequently able, and are therefore expected, to resolve it at the level at which it is encountered. Should this prove difficult, however, it may be possible to delay any action by the parties which would lead to a deterioration of the situation. This gains time to transmit the problem up the chain of command where higher UN authorities, either in the mission area or at United Nations Headquarters in New York, can ensure that the parties at a sufficiently high level understand the larger consequences of the situation on the ground.

CONTROL MEASURES

50. **Sectors.** The most effective means of exerting control in peace-keeping operations is the allocation to commanders of responsibility for geographical areas of operation. Accordingly, the area of operation is generally broken down into sectors allocated and sub-allocated to formations, units and sub-units. If possible sector boundaries should take account of political and civil authority borders, the location of

identity groups and parties to the conflict, and significant geographical features.

51. **Guards and Checkpoints.** Within the framework of sectors, peace-keeping operations will usually require control to be established either to monitor, limit or deny access to many areas including:

- Key terrain (such as cease-fire lines, de-militarized zones and areas of limitation)
 - Installations
 - Centres of population
 - Stocks of material.

This may be achieved by the use of guards (for the custody and accounting of material, for example) and checkpoints. Checkpoint requirements and the procedures and tactics they employ will depend on the provisions and authority of the mandate, the Status of Forces Agreement and the Standard Operating Procedures. Guards and checkpoints may constitute a major interface between the peace-keeping contingent and the people living in the area. It is therefore imperative that such duties are carried out in scrupulous observation of good manners and local custom.

52. **Crowd Control.** A peace-keeping operation may be mandated to support the civil authority in ensuring that public assemblies are peaceful and are not subject to intimidation and violence. This role is typically carried out by a civilian police component of the peace-keeping operation. Reconnaissance, deployment of reserves, and liaison with the civil authority will be critical factors guiding the execution of such a control measure. Force is used only as a last resort and must be restricted to the minimum requirement. The use of crowd control techniques and equipment designed to avoid inflicting casualties is essential.

53. In general with regard to control measures, the ability to initiate negotiations quickly at the site of an incident can be extremely important. Similarly, a capacity to concentrate forces in order to establish a calming presence can be a valuable asset for defusing situations before they get out of hand. Judgment should be exercised to ensure that such an action will have the desired effect rather than starting an escalatory spiral.
54. While powers of arrest are not ordinarily part of a peace-keeping mandate, the civilian police and/or human rights components of a multi-disciplinary operation may be mandated to monitor the civil authority's discharge of such responsibilities.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

55. Peace-keeping operations need an effective information capacity to enable them to explain their mandate to the population and, by providing a credible and impartial source of information, to counter misinformation disseminated about them, even by the parties themselves.

CHAPTER

5

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

56. **The United Nations Charter** established six principal organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat. In addition, there are subsidiary organs, specialized agencies and other bodies related to the United Nations which, altogether, form the “United Nations system”. In short, as described in the next three paragraphs, the Security Council (or in exceptional cases, the General Assembly) authorizes and sets the mandate of a peace-keeping operation. The Secretariat manages the implementation of these decisions using resources made available by the General Assembly.
57. **The General Assembly** is composed of representatives of all United Nations Member States, each of which has one vote. Fundamentally important, the General Assembly approves and apportions the budget of the Organization, including the expenses related to peace-keeping operations.
58. **The Security Council** has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is the principal organ which authorizes and gives the mandate to peace-keeping operations. The Council consists of five permanent members and ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. When discharging its duties, the Security Council acts on behalf of all Members of the United Nations which are bound by the Charter to accept and carry out Council decisions.
59. **The Secretariat**, comprised of the Secretary-General and staff working at United Nations Headquarters and in the field, carries out the decisions of

the other organs (paragraph 55 above) of the United Nations. With regard to peace-keeping, this entails the planning, executive direction and logistic support of all operations.

60. **Military and police personnel** contributed by Member States to United Nations peace-keeping operations remain members of their national armed forces or police. However, the operational authority over such forces and personnel is transferred to the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. United Nations operational authority entails the exclusive authority to issue operational directives within the limits of 1) a specific mandate of the Security Council, 2) a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole), and 3) an agreed period of time. An earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification to the United Nations. From time to time, special arrangements may be made for specific units to suit particular requirements. Operational authority includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub-units of a contingent and general responsibility for logistic support. The detailed logistic arrangements may vary, depending on the circumstances; they are worked out in the course of planning for an operation, in consultation with contributing governments.
61. **The head of a peace-keeping operation** or chief of mission is appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Security Council. The chief of mission exercises operational authority in the on behalf of the Secretary-General. He determines the further delegation of authority in consulta-

tion with United Nations Headquarters. The chief of the military component of a peace-keeping operation (Force Commander or Chief Military Observer), who may not be the chief of mission, is also appointed by the Secretary-General. He is given appropriate authority over all military units and personnel in the mission in the light of operational requirements.

62. **In the case of multi-faceted operations** to address a complex emergency, the UN, through its various agencies and programmes, may also carry out humanitarian, development, and related tasks in the area. In these circumstances, the head of the peace-keeping mission normally has authority to coordinate all elements of the UN system that are active in the area of operation.
63. **In establishing an operation**, the General Assembly, Security Council and Secretariat continuously interact, as exemplified in the following brief description of an operation's establishment. Generally, the Security Council will authorize a peace-keeping operation in principle and request the Secretary-General to submit a detailed plan, together with a rough cost estimate. Time permitting, the Secretary-General dispatches one or more reconnaissance missions, then prepares a report to the Council with options and recommendations as appropriate. The Council then passes a second resolution, approving all or part of the Secretary-General's plan and formally authorizing the peace-keeping operation. At this point, a detailed budget is prepared by the Secretariat and submitted, first, to the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), then to the Assembly's Fifth Committee, and finally to the ple-

nary of the General Assembly for decision. Unlike a national government, the United Nations has no armed forces apart from what its Members provide it specifically for each peace-keeping operation. Therefore, throughout this process the Secretariat is in contact with potential troop-contributing countries in order to identify those which are prepared to provide the necessary personnel and equipment.

64. **Financing.** After the Security Council establishes the mandate and the General Assembly authorizes the funds, the Member States are assessed according to a special scale approved by the General Assembly. Like the scale of assessments for the regular UN budget, it is a progressive scale reflecting the different economies of the Member States. Under the peace-keeping scale of assessments, the five permanent Members of the Security Council pay a somewhat higher proportion in view of their special responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security. Once a peace-keeping operation is underway, troop-contributing countries are reimbursed at fixed rates for the personnel they provide, and are also compensated for the depreciation of their equipment. When Member States do not pay their assessed contributions for peace-keeping in full and on time, one consequence is a delay in these reimbursements to troop-contributing countries.
65. **Planning and Preparation.** Since peace-keeping operations do not rely exclusively on military activity - but rather on diplomatic, economic and humanitarian endeavours in pursuit of political objectives - planning is a unified, multi-disciplinary effort. The focal point for the planning of peace-keeping operations is the Office of Planning and Support of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

66. **Initial Development Phase.** The effective execution of peace-keeping operations requires an assessment of the situation on the ground. This is achieved by the combined efforts of various departments of the Secretariat, including the Department of Peace-keeping Operations; the Department of Political Affairs; the Department of Humanitarian Affairs; the Department of Administration and Management; the Department of Public Information; and the Office of Legal Affairs. Their assessment embraces a wide range of factors which may affect the operation. The Secretariat will usually dispatch a survey mission to observe field conditions and to facilitate forthcoming liaison, the results of which will determine the nature of the overall operational activities, resulting in a planning concept for the operation.
67. **Pre-deployment Phase.** Based on the planning concept, the Secretariat, with involvement of key personnel designated for the future operation, develops a comprehensive plan which takes into account the allocation of personnel, equipment and the level of sustainability and specifies all the functions to be performed in the peace-keeping operation. Potential troop contributors are involved at the earliest possible stage in this process, so that they may prepare their personnel, assemble necessary equipment and ensure a proper level of sustainability for a specified period of time (normally 60-90 days).

TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

68. The most essential planning factor for United Nations peace-keeping operations is the assurance of support from Member States in providing manpower and Planning can be enhanced by mutually agreed upon

understandings between the Secretariat and troop contributors concerning stand-by arrangements. Although these agreements do not guarantee particular contributions from Member States for a specific operation, they do reflect potential contributions on a case-by-case basis. Stand-by arrangements are valuable to the planning process in that they provide a generalized data base from which the Secretariat can derive initial estimates of available resources.

69. Each Member State is responsible for training and preparation of its personnel and units who must be trained to maintain an attitude of disciplined impartiality and professional performance in order to command the respect of the conflicting parties.
70. Equipment needed for a peace-keeping operation will differ from one mission to another, depending on operational conditions. All equipment should meet the operational and technical requirements specified by the Secretariat, and each Member State is responsible for adequate training of all personnel contributed to the mission, inclusive of the necessary skills to operate the equipment.

HOST COUNTRIES

71. A peace-keeping operation is deployed with the consent of the host country, and it is expected that the parties will make every effort to facilitate the deployment of the operation. The operation enjoys the status, privileges and immunities of the United Nations provided in the Charter (Article 105) and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Peace-keeping personnel, in turn, must respect the laws and customs of the host country.

72. As soon as an operation is authorized by the Security Council, the Secretary-General will seek to conclude a status of forces agreement with the host Government(s) regulating the presence of the operation. The provisions of the agreement cover, among other things, the following topics: the status of the operation and its members; responsibility for criminal and civil jurisdiction over the members of the operation; taxation, customs and fiscal regulations pertaining to the members of the operation; freedom of movement, including the use of roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields; provision of water, electricity and other public utilities; locally recruited personnel; settlement of disputes or claims; protection of United Nations personnel; and liaison. Such agreements also require, *inter alia*, that the parties provide certain facilities (e.g. suitable premises for the operation's headquarters) free of charge.