PAVEL FLORENSKY

An Essay Orthodox Theodicy Twelve Letters

translated by Boris Jakim

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY Richard F. Gustafson

THE PILLAR AND GROUND OF THE TRUTH

PAVEL FLORENSKY

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AN ESSAY IN ORTHODOX THEODICY IN TWELVE LETTERS

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TRANSLATED
AND ANNOTATED BY

Boris Jakim

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY RICHARD F. GUSTAFSON

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Solely from the point of view of book production the original Russian edition of *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* (published by *Put*', Moscow, 1914) is one of the most unusual books of the century. In his introduction to the present volume, Richard Gustafson tells us that "in characteristic Symbolist fashion, Florensky stressed the aesthetic character of his . . . book. He carefully chose the illustrations, created a special typeface for it, and oversaw its production." Two typeface sizes (the smaller size for "less significant" material), illustrations ("vignettes") from Ambodicus preceding each chapter, hundreds of pages of end notes (foreshadowing Nabokov's *Pale Fire*), some of which are of essay length, numerous addenda in addition to the end notes, copious Greek and some Hebrew, etymological digressions, symbolic logic and mathematical equations, various kinds of tables, and a "sophianic" sky-blue cover—are some of the distinctive features of this work.

In this English translation an attempt has been made to reproduce as many of these features as possible. There are divergences, however, between the original book and the present volume. Production constraints have made it necessary to transliterate most of the Greek and all the Hebrew. Some of Florensky's Greek seems to have had only a decorative purpose, and has been omitted. As is typical of Russian prose, there is much use of italics in the original; in this translation, I have kept only such italics as seemed absolutely essential. The different typeface sizes are indicated by indented type. The translator's notes, indicated in the text by lowercase superscript letters and given at the foot of each page, emphasize topics and figures from Eastern Orthodoxy, Russian religious thought, and Russian culture.

I AM grateful to Father Robert Slesinksi, the Reverend Mark Everitt, Laury Magnus, and Richard Gustafson for checking various parts of the manuscript. Allen Mandelbaum has provided encouragement in the course of this long project. Constantin Andronikof's excellent French translation of this work (*Le colonne et le fondement de la verité* [Lausanne: Editions l'Age d'Homme, 1975]) has served to confirm (or to veto) some of my guesses concerning Florensky's more obscure and abstruse verbal formulations, and has proved invaluable in deciphering the many French names in the book. I also wish to acknowledge Asheleigh E. Moorhouse, whose translation of Chapter VI (see "On the Holy Spirit,"

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in *Ultimate Questions: An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought*, ed. Alexander Schmemann [Crestwood, NY, 1977], pp. 137-72) alerted me to some inaccuracies in my own version. I wish to thank Igor Vesler for his computer assistance and Olga Jakim for help with the illustrations. I am also grateful to Richard Pevear for suggesting I send the manuscript to Princeton University Press, and to Robert Brown of Princeton University Press for valiantly shepherding this unusual work through the long acceptance and production processes.

Lines from *The Odyssey of Homer*, a new verse translation by Allen Mandelbaum (originally published by the University of California Press, 1990), are reprinted by permission of Bantam Books, a division of Bantam, Doubleday, Dell Publishing Group, Inc.

George L. Kline has graciously permitted me to quote passages from his translation of V. V. Zenkovsky's *A History of Russian Philosophy* (New York and London, 1953); his articles "Leontyev, Konstantin Vasiliyevich" and "Russian Philosophy" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York, 1967); and his paper "The Potential Contribution of Classical Russian Philosophy to the Building of a Humane Society in Russia Today" (presented at the Conference on Russian Thought and Culture, University of Oregon, May 2, 1994).

I would like to thank Paulist Press, Mahwah, New Jersey, for permission to quote passages from Basil Krivocheine's introduction to *Symeon the New Theologian: The Discourses* (New York, 1980). Copyright by the Missionary Society of St. Paul the Apostle in the State of New York.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION BY RICHARD F. GUSTAFSON

• • •

Russian religious thought is a unique modern expression of the Eastern Christian worldview. It came of age early in the twentieth century, in a period now referred to as the "Russian religious renaissance" and is known to the West mainly in the works of Nikolai Berdiaev and Leon Shestov. The roots of modern Russian religious philosophy can be traced to the nationalist debates about Russia and its world-historical cultural mission in the mid-nineteenth century. The Westernizers, following the lead of Peter the Great, argued that Russia's future lay in an alliance with the West. They were challenged by the Slavophiles, who claimed that Russia's unique social and religious experience not only shaped its past but destined its future. One of the early prominent Slavophile thinkers, Ivan Kireevsky (1806–1856), called for the creation of a modern Russian philosophy which would use as a "convenient point of departure" the then fashionable German idealist philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, but corrected by the "basic principles of ancient Russian culture."

Vladimir Solovyov (1853–1900) took up Kireevsky's directive; his philosophy of "total unity" and his theology of Godmanhood are the culmination of this nineteenth-century Russian philosophical endeavor and the intellectual foundation on which the religious renaissance rested. As with Solovyov, this return to religious roots was a decided reaction against the prevailing positivism of the times and for some a movement "from Marxism to idealism." But this idealism tended to lose sight of Kireevsky's basic principles of ancient Russian culture. Father Pavel Florensky (1882–1937) regrounded the philosophical endeavor on these basic principles, and his unique book *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* (1914) became a seminal work for the new Russian Orthodox philosophy.

Florensky, a polymath and renaissance man, was born in Azerbaijan and lived most of his early years in Tbilisi, Georgia. He claimed that the mountainous Trans-Caucasian environment shaped his way of thinking. His mother was Armenian and his father Russian. From his mother's line he believed he inherited his artistic tendencies, while from his father, a railroad engineer descended from the clergy, both his scientific and religious interests.² In later years he imagined his childhood days as an

¹ James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, eds., *Russian Philosophy* (Chicago, 1965), I, 213.

² Pavel Florensky, *Detiam moim*, *Vospominaniia proshlykh dnei* (Moscow, 1992), 413–415. Future references to this volume (identified as DM) will be given parenthetically in the text.

Edenic paradise now lost and asserted that "the child has absolutely precise metaphysical formulas for everything other-worldly, and the sharper his sense of Edenic life, the more defined is his knowledge of these formulas" (DM, 74). His memoirs record many moments of his "direct contemplation of Nature's countenance" (DM, 75) when he felt himself "face to face with the native, solitary, mysterious and infinite Eternity, from which everything flows and to which everything returns" (DM, 50). These childhood moments of "ecstasy" with their sense of "magic" gave him "an objective, noncentripetal perception of the world, a kind of inverse perspective" which allowed for a "penetration into the depth of things" (DM, 438-39). In school, however, Pavel turned from this childhood mysticism toward the sciences and their laws, a scholarly interest that he maintained throughout his life. "The mystery I kept within myself, the laws were proclaimed for myself and others" (DM, 190). The decisive moment came in the summer of 1899, when Florensky, reared in a home without religion, had a metaphysical dream of existential darkness and meaninglessness through which he heard or saw the name of God. When later he heard a voice call out his name, he became convinced of the "ontologicalness of the spiritual world" (DM, 215-16).

Florensky's adult life was shaped by this dichotomous lure of mystical intuition and the laws of science. In the fall of 1899 he entered Moscow University, where he studied mathematics with the noted mathematician N. V. Bugaev (1837–1903) and philosophy with S. N. Trubetskoi (1862–1905) and L. M. Lopatin (1855–1920). In 1904 he rejected a research fellowship for advanced work in mathematics to enroll in the Moscow Theological Academy, and in 1911 he was ordained to the priesthood. The Pillar and Ground of the Truth grew out of his candidate's thesis, "On Religious Truth" (1908) and his Master's dissertation, "On Spiritual Truth" (1912). Upon graduation Florensky joined the faculty, where he taught until the closing of the Academy after the revolution. In these years he also served as editor of the important Bogoslovskii vestnik (Theological Herald) and wrote numerous articles on mathematics and the philosophy of language, as well as theology, some of which remained unpublished.

After the revolution Florensky redirected his scholarly activity. He developed his interest in art history, wrote a book on the analysis of space in art and a seminal study on icons, and taught the theory of perspective at the State Higher Technical-Artistic Studios (VKHUTEMAS). He also pursued research in physics and electrical engineering, worked for the Commission for the Electrification of Soviet Russia, and served as an editor of the Soviet *Technical Encyclopedia*, to which he contributed many articles. In 1927 he invented a noncoagulating machine oil, which the Soviets called "dekanite" in commemoration of the Bolshevik Revolution. His book on dielectrics became a standard textbook. Throughout

this period he remained a priest and appeared at government offices in his cassock. Arrested briefly in 1928, Florensky managed to pursue his scholarly activities until 1933, when the Soviet government sentenced him to ten years of corrective labor in Siberia. At various camps he continued his scientific work and ministered to his fellow prisoners. On August 8, 1937, he was executed. Florensky was rehabilitated in 1956 and then was slowly rediscovered, first mainly as a philosopher of language and culture of interest to Soviet semiotics. In post-Communist Russia he has reemerged as a seminal philosopher and theologian and become a major symbolic figure in the back-to-roots movement.

Florensky must be seen first of all, however, as a man of his era. He arrived in Moscow in 1899 at age seventeen, in time to experience the growth and flowering of Russian Symbolism. He befriended Andrei Bely (1880–1934), the son of his mathematics professor N. V. Bugaev, and Viacheslav Ivanov (1866–1949), a distinguished classics scholar, both of whom were important Symbolist poets and theoreticians. Florensky's first published review was of Bely's "Northern Symphonies," and Florensky himself published poems in the Symbolist Journal *Vesy (The Scales)*. In his memoirs he claimed retrospectively, "I have always been a symbolist" (DM, 154).

Russian Symbolism, with its renewed concern with the significance of language and classical and medieval culture, its focus on intuitive knowledge, and its mystical apprehension of the divine root of reality couched in the language of Vladimir Solovyov, was seemingly made for Florensky, and his philosophical and theological work must be seen in the light of this important movement. With the Symbolists Florensky shares a "conception of the world and culture as a composition of symbols, turned both upward toward its original homeland and meaning and downward toward the fate of man in history." Florensky's fundamental conception of truth is constructed according to the Symbolist model of reality where all phenomena are reflections, emanations, or manifestations of the noumena and we are to move, in Viacheslav Ivanov's programmatic phrase, de realibus ad realiora. Florensky's ornate, metaphorical, and lyrical writing style, which Berdiaev dismissed as "stylized archaism" and decadent Alexandrianism, is characteristic of much Symbolist procedure.4 The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, which was conceived and written at the height of the movement, represents in style, structure, and worldview the most elaborated work of Russian Symbolist theology.

The Pillar and Ground of the Truth is constructed not as a philosophical treatise, but as a series of twelve letters addressed to an unidentified "brother," "friend," "elder," and "Guardian," who may be understood

³ K. G. Isupov, "Zhitie i mirosozertsanie Pavla Florenskogo," in Pavel Florensky, *Opravdanie kosmosa* (St. Petersburg, 1994), p. 6.

⁴ Nikolai Berdiaev, Tipy religioznoi mysli v Rossii (Paris, 1989), p. 544.

symbolically as Christ.⁵ Poetic moments describing the narrator's present sense of separation from this "far, yet eternally near friend" are sprinkled throughout the text, thus identifying the narrator's spiritual mood, which is his constant awareness of "two worlds" and his desire to reach out from this world to experience or touch the other world. Argument often yields to emotion, and logic to lyricism. The basic assumption is that "the philosophical creation of truth is closest to artistic creation." The narrator's "I" is not an "abstract, colorless, impersonal 'consciousness in general," Florensky insisted at the defense of his Master's dissertation, but "concretely general, symbolically personal," a "methodological 'I'" in dialogue with its addressee. The method is "dialectical," understood as an "ever growing ball of threads of contemplation, a clot of penetrations, ever congealing, ever intruding into the essence of the subject studied . . . , an aggregate of the processes of thought which 'mutually reinforce and justify each other." Furthermore, the dialectical development of this concrete, living narrator's thought cannot be linear or "presented as a singlevoiced melody of discoveries," but resembles more a "fabric or lace, whose threads are woven into varied and complex patterns."6 Such a book, like any typical modernist text, cannot be read, but only reread.

In characteristic Symbolist fashion, Florensky stressed the aesthetic character of his own book. He carefully chose the illustrations, created a special typeface for it, and oversaw its production. "A book, as a whole, must itself be an artistic work and consequently have its own composition and its own construction," argued the professor of art history. "Its structure and external appearance must be determined first of all by its inner idea. Its dimensions, the character of its paper and cover, its typeface, its sectioning, the consistency in the use of various typefaces for the delineation of the parts, chapters, and paragraphs, the manner of opening and closing the various sections, the placing of charts, diagrams, tables, formulas, etc. all this has an expressive dimension" which when successful, "corresponds to the idea of the book itself." With its many illustrations, charts, tables, diagrams, formulas and sections in varying size script, not to mention its one thousand fifty-six footnotes and thirty addenda, what, we may ask, is the idea of The Pillar and Ground of the Truth and how is it one aesthetic whole?

Florensky subtitles his book "An Essay in Orthodox Theodicy." His theodicy, however, is not a justification of the goodness of God in the face of evil, but of the divine Truth to be ascertained even in this sinful world.

⁵ The "elder" refers to Father Isidore of the Gethsemane Hermitage, whose holy life and wisdom were especially important to Florensky. The "friend" was Florensky's roommate at the academy, S. S. Troitsky, who later married Florensky's sister. See P. A. Florensky, *Stolp i utverzhdenie istiny* in two volumes (Moscow, 1990), 2, 829–30.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 823–26.

⁷ P. A. Florensky, Analiz prostranstvennosti i vremeni v khudozhestvenno-izobratitel'nykh proizvedeniiakh (Moscow, 1993), pp. 237–38.

This Truth is attained through our experience of "ecclesiality," which is understood as the new life in the Spirit, experienced within Orthodoxy and represented ideally in the lives of the ascetics and elders in the monastic tradition. In modern Russia this tradition was renewed in the late eighteenth century through the revival of hesychast mysticism, a yoga-like form of meditative practice based on the silent recitation of the Jesus Prayer. The nineteenth century, which experienced an incredible growth in the monastic population, witnessed a creative encounter between the monasteries and the artists and intellectuals, reflected, for example, in the works of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. This encounter fostered a renewed interest in the culture of liturgy, icons, and patristics.

Florensky, who had himself wanted to become a monk, consciously grounds his whole book in this monastic sense of ecclesiality. The complex system of layers of text and additions to the text serves to create the sense of the depth of this tradition even as it recovers it and places it on a par with secular culture. One reason for the importance of *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* lies in its extensive reference to the patristic tradition and its creative reading of the liturgy, for these verbal creations best represent the basic principles of ancient Russian culture. Florensky, who preferred medieval culture to renaissance or modern, gives these verbal systems of symbols (as well as the iconographic ones) the same high regard Viacheslav Ivanov gave to classical Greek culture. While many editions of the Eastern Christian Fathers were newly translated and published in the nineteenth century, as Florensky's notes testify, it was Florensky who was responsible for legitimizing their relevance to modern philosophical and theological discourse in Russia. Likewise, Florensky was the first to see the incredible resources that lay hidden in the rich and poetic Greek and Slavonic liturgical texts which he approached with Symbolist reverence. Liturgy, for Florensky, was the "heart of human activity," for it expressed the two worlds, human and divine, of what he called homo liturgus. 8 With the secularization of life, "cult," Florensky believed, branched off into "culture," whose activities are "secondary and express human nature one-sidedly." With his firm belief that liturgy was humanity's "primal activity" and his focus on the symbolic meaning of liturgical texts Florensky enabled the development of modern Orthodox liturgical theology.

The more massively and metaphysically crudely and archaically we conceive religious concepts, the more profound will the symbolism of their expression be and therefore the closer we will come to a genuine understanding of strictly religious experience. This compressed, densified character of religious concepts char-

⁸ "Iz bogoslovskogo naslediia sviashchenika Pavla Florenskogo," in *Bogoslovskie trudy* 17 (1977), 107. This publication contains Florensky's main liturgical studies, pp. 85–248.

acterizes our entire liturgy.... (PGT, 63) The liturgy is the flower of Church life and also its root and seed. What richness of ideas and new concepts in the domain of dogmatics, what abundance of profound psychological observations and moral guidance could be gathered here even by a not very diligent investigator! Yes, liturgical theology awaits its creator.⁹

Ecclesiality also means for Florensky the mystical life of the church. The Truth is attained in the ascetic's mystical experience of encounter with the "other world." Florensky had a special admiration for the humble purity and spiritual strength he saw in his own beloved elder, Abba Isidore, who "gave me the most solid, the most undeniable, the purest perception of a spiritual person I have had in my entire life." (PGT, 233). In 1908 he wrote a whole book about him. ¹⁰ In characteristic Eastern Christian fashion, Florensky saw the ascetic virtues, especially chastity, aesthetically, and he related life in the Holy Spirit to the experience of beauty: "Ecclesiality is the beauty of new life in Absolute Beauty, in the Holy Spirit" (PGT, 234). This Divine Beauty, understood as order and wholeness, is at one with Truth and Goodness. ¹¹ This Divine Truth, Beauty, and Goodness are revealed and manifested in Creation.

Ecclesiality also entails the dogmatic tradition of the church. The fundamental dogmatic premise of Florensky's theodicy (as of Solovyov's theology of Godmanhood) is that the Creator and Creation are one, as God and Man are one in Christ. The whole book can be considered an exploration of the epistemological, ontological, and moral implications of the two central Christian doctrines Florensky believed both symbolized the religious experience of medieval Kiev and Moscow and prophesied the "two fundamental ideas of the Russian spirit." Florensky's theodicy rests on the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, understood as basic principles of ancient Russian culture. ¹³

The first controlling idea of *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* is epistemological and is treated mainly in letters two, three, and six. In a

⁹ Pp. 63, 217–18 of this translation. Henceforth all references to the present translation of *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* will be designated as PGT and given (in parentheses) in the body of the text.

¹⁰ St. Paul Florensky, Salt of the Earth: A Narrative on The Life of the Elder of Gethsemane Skete, Hieromonk Abba Isidore, Palatine, California, 1987.

¹¹ On the aesthetic dimension of Florenskii's thought, see Victor Bychkov, *The Aesthetic Face of Being: Art in The Theology of Pavel Florenskii*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, Crestwood, N.Y., 1993.

¹² See P. A. Florensky, "Troitse-Sergieva Lavra i Rossiia" in *Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo* Dvizheniia, No. 117, pp. 5–22. English translation by Robert Bird: *The Trinity St Sergius Lavra and Russia* (New Haven, 1995).

¹³ Father Georges Florovsky, who in general treats Florensky rather harshly, is in one sense quite correct to note that Florensky "by-passes the Incarnation" and gives us "no discussion of Christology." See his *Ways of Russian Theology*, trans. by R. L. Nichols (Belmont, 1987), II, 278. But it is also clear that Florensky considered the Incarnation a central doctrine, which he associated with Sophia (see below). In PGT the idea of the Incarnation, especially the notion of "consubstantiality," is of major importance.

fashion characteristic of the whole Slavophile tradition from Kireevsky on, Florensky grounds his theory of knowledge in an attack on "rationality." In this tradition, Reason, understood as the processes of thought and the laws of logic, is considered the foundation of Western philosophy, with its roots in both Aristotle and Aquinas, its modern champion in Descartes, and its apotheosis in Hegel. Florensky, trained in logic and mathematics, attacks the logical laws of this rationality with impressive manipulations of symbolic logic. At bottom, however, his approach is Symbolist. The law of identity, A = A, is read as a sign of reality in a state of isolating sin: "This formula affirms in advance the separateness and egotistical isolation of the ultimate elements of being, thus rupturing all rational connection between them" (PGT, 22). Truth, he argues, is antinomial, to be represented as A + (- A), and every singular truth is to be understood symbolically as a truth about the Truth, which can be experienced only "discontinuously." Christian doctrine is seen as a web of antinomial statements about this Truth. Florensky's characterization of this antinomial Truth seems to have captured something of the epistemological spirit of Orthodoxy, which is so grounded in apophatic theology. It may reflect Dostoevsky's pro and contra and was certainly useful to later Russian religious thinkers, not the least significant of whom was Mikhail Bakhtin,14

This attitude to Western conceptions of rationality and logic is reflected in the structure of the book. Florensky claimed that his book was but "jottings, written at different times and in different moods" (PGT, 5). In fact throughout he had to deal with his firm belief that "the single and integral object of religious perception disintegrates in the domain of rationality into a multiplicity of aspects, into separate facets, into fragments of holiness" (PGT, 234). A rational system violates the one religious Truth. But without a system, "it is practically impossible to decide what should be said and what should not be said, what should be said first and what should be said after" (PGT, 234-35). In virtual despair he comes to the conclusion that "when a religious object enters the sphere of rationality, what is most appropriate is the conjunction 'and'" (PGT, 235). This concern for appropriate form was shared by many of his fellow thinkers, who resolved it in various ways. Berdiaev's style of fiery flow from the creative depths, Frank's notion of philosophy as the rational transcendence of the limitations of rational thought, and Shestov's whole mad imagined Borgesean universe peopled with the monstrous phrases of Western rationalism represent some of the solutions to this deep-seated cultural aversion to the logical ordering of discourse. 15 Florensky's mod-

¹⁴ On the relationship of Bakhtin and Florensky, see K. Clark and M. Holquist, *Mikhail Bakhtin* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 135–37.

¹⁵ For other roots of this attitude, see A. D. Sukhov, "Russkaia filosofiia kak istoricheskii tip: Protsess stanovleniia," in *Filosofiia i kul'tura v Rossii: Metodologicheskie problemy* (Moscow, 1992), pp. 3–12.

ernist conception of the text as a fabric made from many interwoven strands is one of the more successful attempts among Russian religious thinkers to resolve the anxiety of genre that follows from their attack on rationality.

Florensky also argued that this Western rationality was a logic of things, of entities understood as dead and closed off one from another. His epistemology is an epistemology not of separate things, but of persons, who are understood to be "consubstantial" (Gr. homoousios, "of the same nature"). Consubstantiality is a complex notion, especially important in Eastern Christian thought. It surfaced in the early incarnational debates about the relationship of the human and the divine in Christ. At the Council of Chalcedon in 451 c.E. Christ's consubstantiality with the Father in divinity and with us in humanity was affirmed; the union of Christ's two natures was understood to be "without confusion, without change, without division, without separation."16 This conception of consubstantiality was later used to characterize the relationship of the three persons of the Trinity, who were understood to be of the same nature. The first and last of the four apophatic definitions later traveled from the doctrinal statement into the liturgy, which then popularized this conception of a union that is "not separate" and "not merged." Florensky develops his whole theory of Truth from this "antinomian seed of Christian life-understanding:"

[Consubstantiality] expressed not only a christological dogma but also a spiritual evaluation of the rational laws of thought. Here rationality was given a death blow. Here for the first time a new principle of the reason's activity was proclaimed *urbi et orbi*. (PGT, 41)

Furthermore this doctrine of unity in separation grounds Florensky's firm belief that

the act of knowing is not only a gnoseological but also an ontological act, not only ideal but also real. Knowing is a real *going* of the knower *out* of himself, or (what is the same thing) a real *going* of what is known *into* the knower, a real unification of the knower and what is known. That is the fundamental and characteristic proposition of Russian and, in general, of all Eastern philosophy. (PGT, 55)

This conception of knowing, which is actually borrowed from the intuitivist epistemology of Nikolai Lossky (1870–1965), is a form of loving. It is understood as a process of mutual self-emptying and results in a "living moral communion of persons, each serving for each as both object and subject." The epistemological and moral moments are ontological and

¹⁶ J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York, 1978), pp. 338–43.

share the same structure. To know the Truth, furthermore, entails a "real entering into the interior of the Divine Tri-Unity," which is possible "only through the transubstantiation of man, through his deification, through the acquisition of love as the Divine essence. . . . In love, and only in love is real knowledge of the Truth conceivable" (PGT, 56). At root Florensky's theory of knowledge rests on the ancient Eastern Christian conception of salvation as deification, the restoration of fallen humanity to the image and likeness of God. Rational knowledge, knowledge of things, is fallen knowledge, what Berdiaev would call "objectification." Real knowledge, knowledge of persons, comes with love. Knowledge of God comes to the saintly, spiritual souls like Abba Isidore, who love God. Florensky's whole epistemological position strikingly prefigures Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and his conception of identity as "belonging together." ¹⁷

The second controlling idea of The Pillar and Ground of the Truth is moral and is explored mainly in letters four, eleven, and twelve. It focuses on mutual relationships between human beings and between humanity and God, understood subjectively and metaphysically. The Goodness of these relationships rests on what is called love. This love is modeled after the Incarnation and is imagined as a process of kenosis, of self-emptying. "The metaphysical nature of love lies in the supralogical overcoming of the naked self-identity 'I = I' and in the going out of oneself" (PGT, 67). This metaphysical conception prefigures the "actual entities" of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) by some fifteen years. 18 Florensky understands this metaphysically realized self as an action whereby "I transcends itself, the norm of its own being, and voluntarily submits to a new image so as thereby to incorporate its own I in the I of another being which for it is not-I." This process, understood mutually, simultaneously transforms the I from a self-enclosed entity into its true state of transcendence and the other from an objective not-I into a person. Furthermore from God's point of view, Florensky believes

[that this] whole process of the interrelation of the lovers is a single act, in which an infinite series of individual moments of love is synthesized. This single, eternal, and infinite act is the consubstantiality of the lovers in God, where I is one and the same as the other I, but also different. (PGT, 68)

This conception of true self as a self-transcending entity, ever reaching out to and receiving the other, of true love as a metaphysical moment of consubstantiality in God, and of true life as the synthesis of all human love is

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 116-18.

¹⁷ Robert Slesinski, *Pavel Florensky: A Metaphysics of Love* (Crestwood, N.Y., 1984), p. 115. This book is an excellent study of Florensky, with special attention to the philosophical and theological issues in *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth*.

characteristic of such different Russian thinkers as Solovyov and Tolstoy. ¹⁹ What is different in Florensky is his attempt, not always clear in my view, to ground this metaphysical conception of love in the doctrine of the Trinity, read in Hegelian fashion as a triadic opposition of self and other.

Florensky's most controversial theological teaching is his notion of love as friendship, the lyrical center and culminating idea of the book. The basic idea, characteristically antinomian and ambiguous, is that "to live among brothers, it is necessary to have a Friend, if only a distant one" and that "to have a Friend, it is necessary to live among brothers, at least to be with them in spirit" (PGT, 297). Christian love is an antinomian combination of *philia* (friendship) and *agapē*, and in the "*friendly*, *philic* structure of the *brotherly*, *agapic* community of Christians . . . the limit to fragmentation is not the human atom that from itself relates to the community, but a community molecule, a pair of friends, which is the principle of actions here, just as the family was this kind of molecule for the pagan community" (PGT, 301). This consubstantial dyad, gathered in Christ's name, is transformed into a new "spiritual essence, a particle of the Body of Christ, a living incarnation of the Church" (PGT, 303).

To bolster his argument for this dyad Florensky recalls the pairing of the Apostles in the gospels and of saints in hagiography and iconography. And in the "gracious office" of the "half-ecclesiastical, half popular" rite of *adelphopoiesis* (Russ. *bratotvorenie* and *pobratimstvo*), for which he gives a detailed bibliographical note, he finds the appropriate liturgical expression of philic love, just as in the general communal liturgy he sees the appropriate expression of agapic love (PGT, 328–30). Sanctified thus in the liturgy, friendship becomes an essential element of ecclesiality. It is important to note that in this notion of friendship the significance of the structure of addressed letters for the main idea of *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* becomes clear; the whole work in one way or another is about this need for a friend in a world of brothers, of Christian philic life in the Christian agapic community.

In his discussion of friendship Florensky also resorts to one of his favorite devices, argumentation from language. As a Symbolist thinker, Florensky believed that words had some inherent relationship to their referent. While he was aware of the newer philology which considered words as arbitrary signifiers unrelated to the signified, he considered it but a fashionable scientific theory and later wrote several important stud-

¹⁹ In his *Lectures on Godmanhood* Solovyov imagined all metaphysical entities as "mutually penetrating," each "mutually acting" on the other and "making room for" the other in itself. The totality of these entities is the "essence" of Christ, second person of the Trinity; with Creation this essence is embodied and with deification becomes the Body of Christ or the Church. For Tolstoi's understanding of metaphysical entities he calls "beings" and their relation to each other and the "All," see my *Leo Tolstoy, Resident and Stranger* (Princeton, 1986), 94–109; 449–455.

ies in philosophical linguistics in defense of his views.²⁰ In The Pillar and Ground of the Truth he often explores an idea as expressed in various languages (he himself controlled all the European languages, classical and modern, as well as classical Hebrew and a few modern Caucasian and Central Asian languages). Several words for "truth," for example, are considered in some detail, and each is understood as revealing an aspect of the Truth (PGT, 14-20). This same procedure is used for the word "love." In his exploration of the four Greek words for love (agapē, erlōs, philia, and storge), Florensky explores the various subjective and social experiences designated by the signs. But it is the Russian words for "friend" that are most useful to him. The word priiatel', which means both "friend" and "receiver" and is related to the notions of "agreeable" and "acceptable," signifies that "between lovers the membrane of selfhood is torn," because "the loved one . . . is received by his friend and nestles, like a mother's child, beneath his heart" (PGT, 310). The most important linguistic argument in the book, however, comes from Florensky's relating the phonetically similar, but etymologically unrelated words "friend" (drug) and "other" (drugoi). Throughout the book, in theme and structure, this bit of philosophical paranomasia takes on mythic proportions. All the quasi-Hegelian discussion of I and the other turns on this relationship. "Friendship" (druzhba) entails both the loss of self to the other and the discovery of self in the other: "The I, being reflected in a friend (drug), recognizes in the friend's I its own other (drugoe) I" (PGT, 314). This other I is understood as the image of God, and Florensky can say that "friendship is the seeing of oneself with the eyes of another, but before a third, namely the Third." It is "self-contemplation through a Friend in God."

The notion of friendship is Florensky's response to the general modern European reevaluation of love that emerged in Russia with the "woman question" of the mid-nineteenth century and flowered in the mysticism of eros in the Symbolist period. In mid-century Nikolai Chernyshevsky (1828–89) argued in his novel What Is To Be Done? (1863) for a rational but sexual love freed from the strictures of marriage and dependence. Tolstoy, ever troubled by his own sexual urges, argued in The Kreutzer Sonata (1890) for the rejection of sexuality even in marriage. Solovyov in The Meaning of Love (1892–94) tried to restore meaning to sexuality by grounding it in a higher theological conception of the person as an androgynously interrelated male and female. Vasily Rozanov (1856–

²⁰ See "Nauka kak simvolicheskoe opisanie," "Antinomiia iazyka," "Stroenie slova," and especially "Imeslavie kak filosofskaia predposylka" in P. A. Florensky, *U vodorazdelov mysli* (Moscow, 1990). For a picture of the complex state of late nineteenth-century philological study (more complex than Foucault presents it in *Les Mots et les choses*), see C. H. Plotkin, *The Tenth Muse: Victorian Philology and the Genesis of the Poetic Language of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (Illinois, 1989), especially chapters two and three.

1919), a friend of Florensky's, preached a doctrine of divine sexuality to be realized in the bedrooms of bourgeois marriage. The Symbolist writers Dmitry Merezhkovsky (1865–1941) and his wife Zinaida Gippius (1869–1945) lived in a *ménage à trois*, which they believed was an embryonic church. The new visibility and sometimes tolerance, if not acceptance, of homosexuality, which was spawned by the late-nineteenth-century homosexual liberation movements in Germany, had a strong impact on Russian cultural life in the beginning of the twentieth century, and not a few of the poets and artists followed the ways of Tchaikovsky.

In this context Florensky's notion of friendship has a decided homophilic, if not homoerotic, tinge. All dyadic friendships in his discussion are same-sex unions. And this is what is significant theologically, even for our own era. ²¹ Florensky decenters heterosexual marriage in his presentation of ecclesiality in order to privilege pairs of friends. He moves the discussion of Christian life away from the union of the flesh to the union of the spirit. Marriage is understood as a remnant from pagan life, now blessed by the church; friendship is inherently Christian. To my knowledge, Florensky's *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* is the first Christian theology to place same-sex relationship at the center of its vision.

The third controlling idea of *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* is ontological; it is explored mainly in letters five, nine, and ten. For Florensky what truly and objectively is is God's original creation. And he hopes "to live and feel together with all creation, not with the creation that man has corrupted but with the creation that came out of the hands of its Creator; to see in this creation another, higher nature; [and] through the crust of sin, to feel the pure core of God's creation" (PGT, 192). This pure core of God's creation is what Florensky calls Sophia. The Old Testament concept of God's Wisdom (Hbr. *chochma*, Gr. *sophia*) was traditionally associated by Christianity with Christ. It was introduced into Russian religious philosophical discourse by Solovyov, who reread it as the "eternal feminine," of which he claimed to have had three visions. For the Symbolist poets, Bely, Ivanov, and especially Aleksandr Blok (1880–1921) this notion of Sophia as the eternal feminine proved productive for their poetry and their own mystical worldviews.

Florensky was the first Russian religious philosopher to develop Solovyov's idea. In characteristic fashion he redirected Solovyov's views, by placing them squarely in the church culture of liturgy and patristics. He also stressed the role of St. Sophia in the culture of Russia, pointing to the Kiev and Novgorod Cathedrals dedicated to her and the numerous icons depicting her. Historically, Florensky argued, the image of Sophia has

²¹ For a modern study of same-sex unions in early Christian culture, including an indepth analysis of the liturgies of adelphopoiesis, written by a medievalist and social historian, the late and much missed John Boswell, see his *Same-Sex Unions in Premodern Europe* (New York, 1994). Boswell was aware of Florensky's work.

surfaced at three different moments, in Greek patristics as an object of contemplation, in the Slavic medieval world as an emblem of chastity and spiritual perfection, and in modern Russia as a symbol of the unity of all creation, the mystical church (PGT, 282). With Solovyov and Florensky Sophia became the privileged image of God's original vision of Creation, which, although now fallen, is to be restored as the universal church. The doctrine of salvation as deification is redirected from the individual to the cosmos. Thus conceived by Solovyov and legitimized by Florensky, Sophia entered Russian religious philosophy, spawned a whole school of sophiology, and culminated in the systematic theology of Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944), the most complete and suggestive expression of Russian sophiological theology.

For Solovyov Sophia was the passive, receptive (hence feminine) partner of the active, energizing, and ordering Logos, and their union comprised the metaphysical Christ, the second person of the Trinity. In its original conception Creation was the Body of this Christ. The actual world came into being when Sophia broke away from this union with the Logos and thus fell into chaos and matter. The cosmogonic story in its evolutionary unfolding is a process of the reordering of this fallen Sophia by the Logos. Creation is a form of Incarnation and Transfiguration. Florensky, who holds firmly to the notion of creation ex nihilo, redirects attention from this near-gnostic story of Creation to its idea and vision. His Sophia is still passive and feminine, and like Solovyov he associates Sophia with the Logos; their union is conceived as the idea of the Incarnation ever-existing in the Trinitarian Godhead. For Florensky, therefore, Sophia is God's idea of and love for Creation. This Sophia, understood as the original nature of Creation, is imagined as a monad which is by God's condescension (and not by nature) a fourth person of the Trinity. Thus Sophia is the "Great Root by which creation goes into the intra-Trinitarian life and through which it receives Life Eternal from the One Source of Life" (PGT, 237).

While the designation of Sophia as a fourth hypostasis (albeit not by nature) was perhaps unfortunate and to some seemed heretical, Florensky succeeded more clearly than Solovyov in bringing the concept of Sophia into relationship with the whole Trinity. From the point of view of the theological Trinity *ad intra*, Sophia is the substance and power of being, the reason and meaning of being, and the purity and beauty of being; from the point of view of the economical Trinity *ad extra*, Sophia is the Body of Christ, The Church, The Virgin Mary. For Florensky these "separate aspects of faith disintegrate atomistically only for scholastic theology, but, in living life, these aspects, each retaining its independence, become so closely interwoven that one idea imperceptively evokes another" (PGT, 243–44). And "the speech of faith . . . clothes its knowledge of dogmatic truth in a symbolic garment, in figurative language, which

covers the higher truth and depth of contemplation in consistent contradictions" (PGT, 244). Florensky's Sophia stands next to friendship as a controlling symbol of his whole vision.

If Sophia is all of Creation, then the soul and conscience of Creation, Mankind, is Sophia *par excellence*. If Sophia is all of Mankind, then the soul and conscience of Mankind, the Church, is Sophia *par excellence*. If Sophia is the Church, then the soul and conscience of the Church, the Church of the Saints, is Sophia *par excellence*. If Sophia is the Church of the Saints, then the soul and conscience of the Church of Saints, the Intecessor for and Defender of creation before the Word of God, Who judges creation and divides it in two, the Mother of God, "Purifier of the World," is, once again, Sophia *par excellence*. But the true sign of Mary Full of Grace is Her Virginity, the beauty of Her soul. This is precisely Sophia. (PGT, 253)

The qualities most commonly associated with Sophia are virginity, chastity, purity, beauty, and wholeness, the signs of ecclesiality. They are the marks of the original creation, and hence the ideals that all creation should seek to restore. For Florensky, these qualities, which are at root aesthetic, are attained through the ascetic life, especially as he saw it in his beloved Abba Isidore. "The goal of the ascetic's strivings is to perceive all of Creation in its original triumphant beauty. The Holy Spirit reveals itself in the ability to see the beauty of creation" (PGT, 226). The vitae of the ascetic saints, Florensky observes, often "depict the life of the saint in the midst of nature, 'with beasts,'" because they "express the whole essence of a new, reconciled, restored life together with all of creation" (PGT, 222). It is this cosmic vision of nature transformed that seems most appropriate for our world today. Sophia is the great symbol of ecological vision, the sign of hope that we can, with God's grace, work to restore that original purity, beauty, and wholeness that marked our paradise. Sophia is also a feminine symbol, in the Christian tradition the most consistent image of the female aspect of the Divine. While Florensky's ethical sympathies seem to lie more with his homophilic conception of friendship, his aesthetic and mystical conception of Sophia should be suggestive for the developing feminist restructuring of Christian theology.²²

To reduce Florensky's book to an outline of its fundamental themes, however, may well do it a great disservice. *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* is, to be sure, a strange and difficult work. It can be academically obsessive and pretentious. It is at times philosophically abstract and at

²² See Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York, 1983) and Sally McFague, *The Body of God, An Ecological Theology* (Minneapolis, 1993) for significant studies in this area, with extensive bibliographies.

times poetically lyrical. It attempts to appeal almost simultaneously to the intellect, the will, and the heart. It meanders and repeats, it teaches and exhorts, it preaches and prays. Yet, while this book may try Western readers' patience from time to time, it will also trace anew their steps along familiar paths and lead them down roads less traveled. The ultimate value of *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* rests in the quality of its cosmic vision of love and the richness of its variegated texture. It is this vision and texture that come from the heart of the culture of Russian Orthodoxy.²³

²³ For further assessments of Florensky, see N. O. Lossky, *History of Russian Philosophy* (New York, 1951), pp. 176–191 and V. V. Zenkovsky, trans. George L. Kline, *A History of Russian Philosophy* (New York and London, 1953), II, 875–890.

THE PILLAR AND GROUND OF THE TRUTH

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An Essay in Orthodox Theodicy in Twelve Letters

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BY FATHER PAVEL FLORENSKY

η δε γν σις φγ πη γνεται.St. Gregory of Nyssa

^a "Knowledge becomes love."
See p. 65 of the present work and Florensky's note 115.

To the Most Fragrant and Most Pure Name of the Virgin and Mother

THE PILLAR AND GROUND OF THE TRUTH.



FINIS AMORIS, UT DUO UNUM FIANT.
THE LIMIT OF LOVE: TWO ARE ONE.

"Do not reproach me with the fact, my lords and brothers, that, the youngest among you, I dare write about holy miracles. I know my own poverty and both my conscience and my vice-stained mind fill me with remorse; and my many sins make this great work a difficult undertaking for me. And it is not my business, but yours, great and ancient fathers, to learn from the miracles of our saintly father Sergius, and to illuminate our crude spirits with this teaching and to proclaim it to future generations by writing. But I pray you, listen attentively: if I do not write, and you also do not wish to do it, who will then fulfill the royal injunction and who will proclaim the holy miracles, if our predecessors too have not written for so many years? Though I am a sinner, and am ignorant and without art for such a task, my character suits it and I experience the need to undertake it, but He who fulfills every good work is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit."

Simon Azar'in, cellarer of the Trinity-Saint-Sergius Monastery.^a The year 1646. (From *The Tale* of the Newly Appeared Well.)

^a The Trinity-Saint-Sergius Lavra, founded outside Moscow by Sergius of Radonezh in the 13th century, was the first Russian monastery consecrated to the Holy Trinity. Saint Sergius was the greatest Russian saint, and the Trinity-Saint-Sergius Lavra was the greatest Russian monastery. Following the ideals of early Christian monasticism. Sergius lived for years in solitude in a "desert" (actually a forest) near Moscow. In this forest, on the site of the future monastery at Sergiev Posad, he built a small wooden church and consecrated it to the Most Holy Name of the Life-Giving Trinity. This was to become the Holy Trinity Cathedral of the future Trinity-Saint-Sergius Lavra. Before Sergius, the consecration of churches to the Trinity was neither common nor accepted. It was a novelty and even considered daring, as Father Sergius Bulgakov points out (see Put', No. 5 [Oct.-Nov. 1926]: 5). Bulgakov further speculates that the young, uneducated monk Sergius had direct empirical knowledge of the Trinity, and that the consecration of this church to the Trinity expresses a special spiritual election, an answer to a call sounding in Sergius' soul. Florensky himself had a close association with the Trinity-Saint-Sergius Lavra: he served as a pastoral assistant in the Chapel of the Red Cross there.



E me alo. I feed with myself.

I. To the Reader

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LIVING religious experience as the sole legitimate way to gain knowledge of the dogmas—that is how I would like to express the general theme of my book or, rather, my jottings, which have been written at different times and in different moods. Only by relying on immediate experience can one survey the spiritual treasures of the Church and come to see their value. Only by passing a damp sponge over the ancient writings, can one wash them with living water and decipher the letters of the church literature. The ascetic saints of the Church are alive for the living and dead for the dead. For a soul that has become dark, the faces of the saints become dark; for a soul that has become paralyzed, the bodies of the saints are frozen in terrible fixity. Is it not well known that the hysterics and the possessed are afraid of saints? And are not those who sin against the Church forced to look away from it in fear? But unclouded eyes see as always the faces of the saints as radiant, "as the faces of angels." For a purified heart, these faces are, as always, inviting; as in the past, they cry out to those who have ears to hear. I ask myself, Why are the common folk, in their pure immediacy, involuntarily drawn to these saints? Why in their mute sorrow do the common folk find comfort in these saints as well as the joy of forgiveness and the beauty of heavenly celebration?

I do not delude myself. I firmly know that I have done no more than light a penny candle of yellow wax. But even this little flame, trembling in my unaccustomed hands, has brought forth a myriad of sparkling reflections in the treasure-house of the Holy Church. For many centuries, day

after day, the treasure has been deposited here—precious stone by precious stone, gold coin by gold coin. Like fragrant dew on fleece, like heavenly manna, the gracious power of God-illuminated souls has descended here. Like the finest pearls, the tears of pure hearts have been collected here. Here, both heaven and earth have heaped their treasures over many centuries. The most secret yearnings, the most concealed aspirations to God-likening; the azure moments of angelic purity that come after the storm; the joys of communion with God and the holy torments of ardent repentance; the fragrance of prayer and the quiet longing for heaven; eternal seeking and eternal finding; infinitely deep intuitions of eternity and the childlike peace of the soul; awe and love, love without end. . . . Ages have passed, but all this has abided and grown.

And every one of my spiritual efforts, every sigh that issues from my lips, summons the entire store of accumulated gracious energy to my aid. Invisible arms bear me over the flowering meadows of the spiritual world. Afire with myriads of myriads and leoders of leoders¹ of looks, glistening, sparkling, playing like the beams of a rainbow or like an infinite number of radiant splashes, the treasures of the Church produce in my poor soul a state of fear and trembling. Uncountable and ineffable are the riches of the Church. I can take part of them for my own use; my eyes burn with greed. I reach in, and I grab a handful at random. I have not yet seen what I have grasped. What do I have in my hands? Diamonds, carbuncles, or emeralds? Or perhaps tender pearls? I do not know if my handful is better or worse than all that remains. But having, in the words of Athanasius the Great, taken "little from much," I know that I am dissatisfied in advance by my work, because my eyes burn too greedily at the sight of these treasures. What do a few small piles of precious stones mean when they are measured by the cubic yard?

And I involuntarily remember how the general spirit of this work gradually changed in my consciousness. At first my intention was to use no references, only my own words. But it soon became necessary to enter into conflict with myself and allow room for brief extracts. But the farther along I got, the more they began to grow and expand into large fragments, until finally, it appeared that I had to discard everything of my own and publish only the works of the Church. Perhaps that is the only right way, the way that consists in directly addressing the Church itself. And who am I to write about what is holy? "I know my own poverty and both my conscience and my vice-stained mind fill me with remorse; and my many sins make this great work a difficult undertaking for me." But if I nevertheless do attribute some significance to my Letters, it is an exclusively preparatory one, for catechumens. These letters are intended to

^b See the quotation from Simon Azar'in on the page preceding Chapter I of this book.

^c A catechumen is one receiving rudimentary instruction in the doctrines of Christianity, preliminary to admission among the faithful of the church.

provide some sustenance for them until they are able to receive nourishment directly from their Mother's hand.

Ecclesiality^d—that is the name of the refuge where the heart's anxiety finds peace, where the pretensions of the rational mind are tamed, where great tranquillity descends into our reason. Elet it be the case that neither I nor anyone else can define what ecclesiality is! Let those who attempt such a definition dispute one another and mutually refute one another's formulas of ecclesiality. Indeed, do not its very indefinability, its ungraspableness by logical terms, its ineffability prove that ecclesiality is life, a special, new life, which is given to man, but which, like all life, is inaccessible to the rational mind?² And do not divergences in the definition of ecclesiality, the variety of incomplete and always insufficient verbal formulas for what ecclesiality is, empirically confirm what the Apostle told us: namely that the Church is the body of Christ, "the fullness of him that filleth all in all" (Eph. 1:23)? How then can this "fulness" of Divine life be packed into a narrow coffin of logical definition? It would be ridiculous to think that this impossibility disproves in any way the existence of ecclesiality. On the contrary, its existence is rather proved by this impossibility. And to the extent that ecclesiality is prior to all its separate manifestations; to the extent that it is the Divine-human element out of which the sacraments, the dogmas, the canons, and even to some degree the temporary, everyday routine of the Church have been crystallized in the course of Church history—to that extent one can preeminently apply to the Church in this fullness the Apostle's prophecy: "there must also be divergences among you (dei kai aireseis en humin einai)" (1 Cor. 11:19), i.e., divergences in the interpretation of ecclesiality. Nevertheless, anyone who does not flee the Church receives into himself by his very life the unitary element of ecclesiality and knows that ecclesiality is and what it is.

Where there is no spiritual life, something external must exist as an assurance of ecclesiality. A specific function, the pope, or a system of functions, a hierarchy—that is the criterion of ecclesiality for Roman

^d It would be presumptuous of me to define ecclesiality [tserkovnost' in Russian] when Florensky himself says that he cannot. Using Florensky's own language, ecclesiality is the essence of the church (existing before the institution of the church), "the Divine-human element out of which the sacraments, the dogmas, the canons, and even to some degree the temporary, everyday routine of the Church are crystallized in the course of Church history." Ecclesiality = spiritual life. Ecclesiality, as Florensky sees it, appears to be a peculiarly Orthodox concept, and he claims that only the Orthodox, among the branches of the Christian church, have preserved it in its purity.

^e I use the word reason to render *razum* (equivalent to the German *Vernunft*) and rationality/rational mind to render *rassudok* (equivalent to *Verstand*). The corresponding adjectives *razumnyi* and *rassudochnyi* are rendered as reasonable (used in the sense of pertaining to reason) and rational. "Reason" is the mind or intelligence in man that comes from God and is able to see things integrally; the "rational" mind comes from man and tends to oppose what comes from God. The rational mind must be "killed off" by an act of ascesis, self-sacrifice, and then it is replaced by "reason," the mind that is in its proper subservient place, i.e., subservient to spirit in man.

Catholics. On the other hand, a specific confessional formula, the creed, or a system of formulas, the text of the Scripture, is the criterion of ecclesiality for Protestants. In the final analysis, in both cases what is decisive is a concept, an ecclesiastical-juridical concept for Catholics and an ecclesiastical-scientific concept for Protestants. But by becoming the supreme criterion, a concept makes all manifestation of life unnecessary.

Furthermore, since no life can be commensurate with a concept, all movement of life inevitably spills over the boundaries marked by the concept, causing harm and becoming intolerable. For Catholicism (it is understood that I take both Catholicism and Protestantism in their extreme, in their principle), all independent manifestation of life is noncanonical; for Protestantism, it is unscientific. In both cases, life is truncated by a concept; it is rejected in advance in the name of a concept. If Catholicism is usually associated with a denial of freedom while Protestantism is decisively associated with an acceptance of freedom, both of these associations are incorrect. Catholicism also recognizes freedom, but a freedom that is defined beforehand; everything that is outside the defined limits is illegitimate. On the other hand, Protestantism recognizes compulsion, but only outside the predefined bounds of rationalism. Everything outside these bounds is unscientific. If in Catholicism one can perceive the fanaticism of canonicity, then in Protestantism one can perceive the equally great fanaticism of scientism.

The indefinability of Orthodox ecclesiality, I repeat, is the best proof of its vitality. Of course, we Orthodox cannot point to any one ecclesial function about which it can be said that it sums up all of ecclesiality, for what would be the sense of all the other functions and activities of the Church? Likewise, we cannot point to any one formula or book which could be taken as the fullness of ecclesial life. And if such a formula or book did exist, what would be the sense of other formulas or books, of all other activities of the Church? There is no concept of ecclesiality, but ecclesiality itself is, and for every living member of the Church, the life of the Church is the most definite and tangible thing that he knows. But the life of the Church is assimilated and known only through life—not in the abstract, not in a rational way. If one must nevertheless apply concepts to the life of the Church, the most appropriate concepts would be not juridical and archaeological ones but biological and aesthetic ones. What is ecclesiality? It is a new life, life in the Spirit. What is the criterion of the rightness of this life? Beauty. Yes, there is a special beauty of the spirit, and, ungraspable by logical formulas, it is at the same time the only true path to the definition of what is orthodox and what is not orthodox.

The connoisseurs of this beauty are the spiritual elders, the *startsy*, the

^f A starets (derived from staryi, old; startsy is the plural) has been likened to the directeur de conscience of Roman Catholicism. According to Igumen [Abbot] Feodosius (Popov), starchestvo (the relationship between a starets and those he directs) "consists in a truthful

masters of the "art of arts," as the holy fathers call asceticism. The *startsy* were adept at assessing the quality of spiritual life. The Orthodox taste, the Orthodox temper, is felt but it is not subject to arithmetical calculation. Orthodoxy is shown, not proved. That is why there is only one way to understand Orthodoxy: through direct Orthodox experience. One hears that, in foreign lands, people are now learning how to swim, lying on the floor, with the aid of equipment. In the same way, one can become a Catholic or a Protestant without experiencing life at all—by reading books in one's study. But to become Orthodox, it is necessary to immerse oneself all at once in the very element of Orthodoxy, to begin living in an Orthodox way. There is no other way.

spiritual relationship of spiritual children to their spiritual father." (See Feodosius' memoirs in Sila Bozhiya i nemoshch' cheloveka [God's Power and Man's Impotence], edited by Sergei Nilus, 2d reprint edition [Sergiev Posad, 1992], p. 171.) Feodosius further points out that, in the Philokalia [see Florensky's Note 135], Clement and Ignatius have named five distinguishing features of this relationship: (1) complete trust in the starets; (2) perfect candor before him in word and deed; (3) complete eradication of one's own will and complete obedience to the will of the starets; (4) abstention from argument and disputation regarding questions of faith; and (5) complete and truthful confession of one's sins and profoundest secrets. Rooted in evangelical, apostolic, and patristic teaching, starchestvo is an exercise whose purpose is to empty oneself of one's own will and intellect, indeed of oneself. It is through the monk's own will that Satan attacks him, and by entering into the relationship of starchestvo the monk closes the doors of his soul to Satan. He closes the doors to Satan and opens the doors to God's radiance, and, at the extreme limit of saintliness, he is "deified" [see note e on p. 94]. Essential to starchestvo is the relationship with another person. God is attained and Satan is defeated through another person. Many spiritual writers have pointed out the dangers of the solitary ascetic path (ibid., pp 171 ff).

Following Theophanus the Recluse [See note *a* on p. 12], Feodosius indicates that the *starets* does not absolve or punish. His role is rather to understand and define the spiritual state of the one he directs, to explain to him how he has come to sin, and to indicate how he can avoid this sin in the future, and how he can extinguish the passion from which the sin arose (ibid.).

The practice of *starchestvo* has a long tradition in the Christian East. It flourished in the ancient Egyptian and Palestinian monastic communities in the 4th to 6th centuries. It was then transplanted to Mount Athos [see note *d* on p. 185] in Greece, and finally transported to Russia. In Russia, *starchestvo* is chiefly associated with Optina Pustyn' [see note *d* on pp. 92–93].



Sic semper. Always such.

II. Letter One: Two Worlds

.

My meek, my radiant friend!

Our vaulted room greeted me with coldness, sadness, and loneliness when I opened its door for the first time after my trip.

But, alas, I entered it alone, without you.

That was not only the first impression. I washed up and put things in order. As before, rows of materialized thoughts were stretched out on the bookshelves. As before, your bed was made and your chair stood in its place (let there be at least the illusion that you are with me!). At the bottom of a clay pot, oil was burning as before, casting a beam of light upward-at the icon of the Savior. As before, in the late evening the wind was blowing noisily through the trees outside the window. As before, the night watchman's stick made an invigorating sound, and locomotives passed by with a deep-voiced roar. As before, roosters were stridently calling to one another just before the morning. As before, at about four in the morning, the bells rang their summons to the matins. Days and nights became one for me. It was as if I did not know where I was and what was happening to me. The worldless and the timeless had come to reside beneath the ceiling, between the narrow walls of our room. And beyond those walls, people would come, speak, tell the news, read newspapers, leave, then come again—and this eternally. Again distant locomotives would cry out in their deep contralto. Eternal peace here; eternal movement there. Everything as before . . . But you are not with me, and the whole world seems deserted. I am alone, absolutely alone in the whole world. But my sorrowful loneliness aches sweetly in my heart. At times, it seems that I have become one of those leaves that are whirled about by the wind on paths.

I rose today in the early morning and seemed to sense something new. Indeed, in a single night the back of summer had been broken. Golden leaves whirled over the ground in serpentine, wind-driven eddies. Flocks of birds were set in motion. There were files of cranes, and a swirling of crows and daws. The air was filled with the cool aroma of autumn, the smell of decaying leaves, a longing for the distances.

I went out to the edge of the woods.

One after another, one after another, leaves were falling to earth. Like dying butterflies, they were describing slow circles in the air as they descended to earth. On the fallen grass the wind was playing with the "liquid shadows" of tree limbs. How good it was, how joyous and sad! O my distant, my quiet brother! In you is spring, while in me is autumn, perennial autumn. It seems that my whole soul is melting in sweet agony at the sight of these fluttering leaves as I smell

the fragrance of faded aspen groves.

It appears that the soul finds itself in seeing this death, that it has a foretaste of resurrection in this fluttering. Seeing death! I am surrounded by it. And I speak now not of my thoughts, nor of death in general, but of the death of those dear to me. So many, so many have I lost these last years. One after another, one after another, like yellowed leaves, dear people fall away. In them I had felt a soul; in them I had sometimes seen a reflection of Heaven. I had known only good from them. But my conscience is not at peace: "What did you do for them?" They no longer are, and now between me and them lies an abyss.

One after another, one after another, like the leaves of autumn, those people whom our heart has come to love forever whirl above the dark chasm. They fall, and there is no return, no possibility of embracing the feet of each of them. Gone is the opportunity to drench oneself with tears and to implore forgiveness, to implore the whole world for forgiveness.

Again and again, every sin, every "petty" baseness is present, ineradicably distinct, in my consciousness. More and more deeply, "petty" inattentions, egotism, and heartlessness are branded into the soul with letters of fire, gradually crippling it. Not that there was ever anything clearly bad, anything clearly, tangibly sinful. But always (always, O Lord!) it was in the petty things. And out of petty things, mountains grew! And looking back, one can see nothing but foulness. Nothing good . . . O Lord!

Autumn leaves keep falling without interruption. One after another they describe circles above the earth. Gently, the inextinguishable lamp burns, and one after another our dear ones die. "I know he will rise on the day of resurrection, the last day." Nevertheless, with a kind of tranquil grief, I repeat before *our* cross, which you made from an ordinary stick and which our gentle Elder blessed, I repeat, "Lord! If Thou hath been here, my Brother would not have died."

Everything whirls. Everything slides into death's abyss. Only One abides, only in Him are constancy, life, and peace. "To Him is drawn the whole course of events, as the periphery to the center. Toward Him converge all the radii of the circle of the ages." It is not I who speak thus, from my own meager experience. No, this is the testimony of a man who had wholly immersed himself in the element of the One Center: Bishop Theophanus the Recluse.^a On the other hand, outside of this One Center, "the only certain thing is that nothing is certain and that there is nothing more miserable or arrogant than man (solum certum nihil esse certi et homine nihil miserius aut superbius)." This was said by one of the noblest pagans, Pliny the Elder, who wholly gave himself to the satisfaction of his boundless curiosity. Yes, in life everything is in a state of unrest, everything is as unstable as a mirage. And out of the depths of the soul there rises an unbearable need to find support in the "Pillar and Ground of the Truth," in stulos kai hedraioma tes aletheias (1 Tim. 3:15), in tes alētheias, and not merely alētheias—not in just one of the truths, not in one of the particular and fragmented human truths, which are unstable and blown about like dust chased by the wind over mountains, but in total and eternal Truth, the one Divine Truth, the radiant and celestial Truth, that "Truth" which, according to the ancient poet, is the "sun of the world."3

How can one approach this Pillar?

At the undecaying body of St. Sergius, which always gives peace to the troubled soul, we hear every day and every hour a call that also promises repose to the troubled mind. The 43rd pericope from Matthew (11:27–30), which is read at the office of St. Sergius, has primarily a cognitive meaning, and even a knowledge-theoretic or epistemological meaning. This becomes most clear when we recognize that the subject of the entire eleventh chapter of Matthew is the problem of knowledge, the problem of the insufficiency of rational knowledge and the necessity of spiritual knowledge. Yes, God has "hid" all things that can be called worthy of knowledge "from the wise and prudent, and [has] revealed them unto babes" (Matt. 11:25). It would be an unjustifiable violence to Scripture to reinterpret the "wise and prudent" to mean the "pseudo-wise" and "pseudo-prudent," and the "babes" to mean virtuous wise men. The Lord, of course, said without irony precisely what he wanted to say: true

^a Theophanus the Recluse was a 19th-century Russian-Orthodox bishop known for his spiritual and ascetic writings. He is the translator into Russian of the *Philokalia* [see Florensky's note 135], the famous compilation of mystical and ascetic writings of Eastern Christianity.

human wisdom, true human prudence is insufficient just because it is human. At the same time, the mental innocence of "babes," the absence of mental riches which prevent one from entering the Kingdom of Heaven, can turn out to be a condition for the acquisition of spiritual knowledge. But the fullness of all is in Jesus Christ, and therefore knowledge can be acquired only through Him and from Him. All human efforts at knowledge, which exhaust the poor wise men, are in vain. Like ungainly camels, they are loaded down with their knowledge. And like salt water, science only inflames the thirst for knowledge. It never gives peace to the feverish mind. For the Lord's "easy yoke" and "light burden" (Matt. 11:30) give the mind what it cannot get from the cruel yoke and hard, unbearable burden of science. That is why, at the grave of one who pours forth grace, the Divine words keep sounding like an unceasing source of living water:

"All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him. Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light" (Matt. 11:27–30).

But far be from me the desire to convince anyone. I give of my meagerness. And if but one soul were to feel that I speak to it not with my lips and not into the ears, I would wish for no more. I know that you will accept me, for it is you who destroy the bounds of my egotism.

My Brother! You who share my soul. Torn away and lonely, I am nevertheless with you. Rising above time, I see your clear gaze; once again, I speak to you face to face. It is for you that I write down my discontinuous thoughts. You will not hold it against me that I do so without system, only placing a signpost here and there.

On quiet autumn nights, in holy hours of silence, when a tear of rapture sparkles on my eyelashes, I will secretly begin to write down for you schemata and pitiful fragments of those questions which we so much discussed together. You know in advance what I will write. You know that my writing will not be didactic, and that the pompous tone comes from my foolish incompetence. If a wise teacher does even the difficult as if in jest, an inexperienced pupil employs a solemn tone even in trivial things. And I, after all, am nothing more than a pupil who repeats after you the lessons of love.



His ornari aut mori. Te receive either death or a crown.

III. Letter Two: Doubt

....

"THE Pillar and Ground of the Truth." But how can one recognize it?

This question inevitably leads us into the domain of abstract knowledge. For theoretical thought "the Pillar of the Truth" is certitude.

Certitude assures me that the Truth, if I have attained it, is in fact what I sought. But what did I seek? What did I mean by the word "Truth"? In any case, I meant something so total that it contains everything and therefore something that its name expresses only by convention, partially, symbolically. The Truth, according to the philosopher, is the "all-one existent." But then the word "truth" does not cover its own proper content and in order to disclose the meaning of the word truth if only approximately, in view of a preliminary understanding of our search, we must see what aspects of this concept have been taken into consideration by different languages, what aspects of this concept have been underscored and fixed through its etymological shells among different peoples.

Our Russian word for truth, "istina," is linguistically close to the verb "est" [to be]. Hence, "istina," according to the Russian understanding of it, embodies the concept of absolute reality: istina is "what is," the genuinely existent, to ontōs on or ho ontōs on, in contradistinction to what is imaginary, unreal, unactual. In the word "istina," the Russian language marks the ontological aspect of this idea. Therefore, "istina" signifies absolute self-identity and, hence, self-equality, exactness, genuineness. Istyi, istinnyi, istovyi [true, authentic, real] are words that issue from the same etymological nest.

Scholastic philosophy too did not shy away from an ontological understanding of the truth. For example, one can point to the semi-Thomist Dominican John Gratideus from Ascoli († 1341), who decisively insisted that "Truth" must be understood not as equality or agreement, which is introduced into a thing by a cognitive act of the reason, but as the equality that the thing itself injects into its existence from outside: "Formally, truth is the equality or conformity that the thing itself, insofar as it is thought, injects into itself in the nature of things outside."

Let us now turn to the etymology. *Is-ti-na* and its derivatives (cf. the Lettish *ist-s*, *ist-en-s*) are related to *es-t'*, *est-e-stvo* (to be, essence). They can be compared with the Polish *istot-a* [entity], *istot-nie* (really), *istniec* (to exist really). Others have the same view of the etymology of the word "*istina*." According to the definition of V. Dal', for example, "*istina* is all that is genuine, authentic, exact, just, that which *is*. All that *is* [*est'*] is *istina*. Are not *est'* and *estina*, *istina* one and the same?" Dal' asks. Mikloshich, Mikutsky, and our specialist in old words, F. Shimkevich, are of the same opinion. It is clear from this that, among the various meanings of the word "*istyi*," we find "closely resembling." According to the old explanation of a certain merchant, A. Fomin, "*istyi*" means similar, exact. Thus, he explains the ancient locution "*istyi vo otsa*" to mean "exactly like the father." 12

This ontologism in the Russian understanding of the truth is strengthened and deepened for us if we consider the etymology of the verb est'. Est' comes from the root es, which in Sanskrit gives as (e.g., ásmi = esmi; asti = esti). Esm', est' can without difficulty be related to the Old Slavic esmi; the Greek eimi (esmi); the Latin (e)sum, est; the German ist; the Sanskrit asmi, asti, etc. 13 But in accordance with certain hints in the Sanskrit, this root es signified—in its most ancient, concrete phase of development—to breathe, hauchen, athmen. In confirmation of this view of the root as, Curtius points to the Sanskrit words as-u-s (the breath of life), asu-ras (vital, lebendig); and, equivalent to the Latin os, mouth, the words âs, âs-ja-m, which also signify mouth; the German athmen is also related to this. Thus, "est" originally meant to breathe. Respiration, or breath, was always considered to be the main attribute and even the very essence of life. And even today, the usual answer to the question, "Is he alive?" is "He's breathing." Whence the second, more abstract meaning of "est'": he's alive, he has strength. Finally, "est'" acquires its most abstract meaning, that of the verb that expresses existence. To breathe, to live, to be—these are the three layers in the root es in the order of their decreasing concreteness, an order that, in the opinion of linguists, corresponds to their chronological order.

The root *as* signifies an existence as regular as breathing (*ein gleichmässig fortgesetze Existenz*) in contrast to the root *bhu*, which one finds in *byt*', *fui*, *bin*, *phuō*, etc., signifying becoming (*ein Werden*).¹⁴

Pointing to the link between the notions of breathing and existence, Renan gives a parallel from the Semitic languages, namely the Hebrew verbal substantive *haja* (to happen, to appear, to be) or *hawa* (to breathe, to live, to be). ¹⁵ In these words he sees an onomatopoeia of the process of breathing.

Thanks to this opposition between the roots *es* and *bhu*, they complement each other: The former is used exclusively in forms of *duration*, derived from

the present. The latter is primarily used in those forms of time which, like the aorist and the perfect, signify an accomplished becoming. ¹⁶

Returning now to its Russian understanding, we can say that the truth [istina] is existence that abides, that which lives, living being, that which breathes, i.e., that which possesses the essential condition of life and existence. Truth as the living being par excellence—that is the conception the Russian people have of it. To be sure, it is not difficult to see that it is precisely this conception of the truth that forms the distinctive and original feature of Russian philosophy.¹⁷

The ancient Greek underscores a wholly other aspect of truth. Truth, he says, is alētheia. But what is this alētheia? The word alēthe(s)ia or, in the Ionian form, alētheie, like the derivatives alēthes (truthful), alētheno (I conform to truth), and so forth, consists of the negative particle a (a privativum) and *lethos, lathos in Doric. This latter word, from the root ladho, has the same root as the verb latho, the Ionic letho, and lanthano (I pass by, I slip away, I remain unnoticed, I remain unknown). In the medium voice this verb acquires the sense of memoria labor, I let slip in memory, I lose for memory (i.e., for consciousness in general), I forget. Connected with this later nuance of the root lath are: lēthē, the Doric latha, lathosuna, lēsmosuna, lēstis, i.e., forgetting and forgetfulness; *lēthedanos*, i.e., compelling one to forget; *lēthar*gos i.e., forgetting and, therefrom, lethargos, a summons to sleep, Schlafsucht, as the desire to immerse oneself in a stage of forgetting and unconsciousness, and, further, the name of a pathological sleep, lethargy. 18 The ancient idea of death as a transition to an illusory existence, almost to selfforgetting and unconsciousness, and, in any case, to the forgetting of everything earthly, finds its symbol in the image of the shades' drinking of water from the underground river of Forgetfulness, "Lethe." The plastic image of the "water of Lethe," to Lēthēs hudor and a whole series of expressions, such as meta lēthēs, i.e., in forgetfulness; lēthēn echein, i.e., to have forgetting, that is, to be forgetful; en lēthēs tinos eina, i.e., to forget something; lēthēn tinos poiesthai, i.e., to produce forgetting of something; lesmosunan thestai, to bring to a state of forgetting; *lestin iskein ti*, i.e., to forget something, and so forth—all this taken together testifies that forgetting for the Greek understanding was not merely a state of the absence of memory, but a special act of the annihilation of a part of the consciousness, an extinguishing in the consciousness of a part of the reality of that which is forgotten, in other words, not a lack of memory but the power of forgetting. This power of forgetting is the power of all-devouring time.

All is in flux. Time is the form of existence of all that is, and to say "exists" is to say "in time," for time is the form of the flux of phenomena. "All is in flux and moving, and nothing abides," complained Heraclitus. Everything slips away from the consciousness, flows through the consciousness, is forgotten. Time, chronos, produces phenomena, but, like its mythological image, Chronos, it devours its children. The very essence of consciousness, of life, of any reality is in their flux, i.e., in a certain metaphysical forgetting. The most original philosophy of our day, Henri Bergson's philosophy of time, 19 is wholly built on this unquestionable truth, on the idea of the reality of time

and its power. But despite all the unquestionableness of the latter, we cannot extinguish the demand for that which is *not* forgotten, for that which is *not* forgettable, for that which "abides" in the flux of time. It is this unforgettableness which is *a-lētheia*. Truth, in the understanding of the Greeks, is *a-lētheia*, something capable of abiding in the flux of forgetfulness, in the Lethean currents of the sensuous world. It is something that overcomes time, something that does not flow but is fixed, something eternally remembered. Truth is the eternal memory of some Consciousness. Truth is value worthy of and capable of eternal remembrance.

Memory desires to stop movement; memory desires to freeze the motion of fleeting phenomena; memory desires to place a dam in front of the flux of becoming. Thus, the *unforgettable existence* that is sought by consciousness, this *alētheia*, is a fixed flux, an abiding flow, an immobile vortex of being. The very striving to remember, this "will to unforgettableness," surpasses the rational mind. But the latter desires this self-contradiction. If, in its essence, the concept of memory transcends the rational mind, then Memory taken in its highest measure, i.e., the Truth, *a fortiori* transcends the rational mind. Memory-Mnemosyne is the mother of the muses, the spiritual activities of mankind, the companions of Apollo, of Spiritual Creativity. Nevertheless, the ancient Greeks demand of Truth the same quality that is indicated by Scripture, for there it is said that "the truth of the Lord endureth for ever" (Ps. 117:2) and that "Thy truth is unto all generations" (Ps. 119:90).

As is well known, the Latin word for truth, veritas, derives from the root var. In view of this, the word veritas is considered to have the same root as the Russian words vera (faith) and verit' (to believe), and the German words wahren, to preserve or protect, and wehren, to prevent, as well as to be strong. Wahr, Wahrheit, truthful, truth, are also related words, like the French verité, which directly derives from the Latin veritas. That the root var originally refers to the cultic domain is seen, as Curtius²⁰ tell us, from the Sanskrit vra-ta-m, sacred rite, vow; from the Zend varena, faith; and from the Greek bretas, something revered, a wooden or stone idol; the word heortē (instead of *e-For-tē*), cultic worship, religious feast, also appears to be related. The cultic connection of the root *var* and especially the word *veritas* is clearly seen in a survey of Latin words of the same root. Thus, there is no doubt that the verb ver-e-or or re-vereor, which is used in classical Latin in the more general sense of I am apprehensive of, I take care, I am afraid, I am terrified, I revere, I respect, I tremble with fear, originally referred to mystical dread and to the caution that was provoked by this dread when one came too close to holy beings, places, and objects. Taboo, the sacred, the holy, is what forces a man vereri. This led to the Catholic title of spiritual persons: reverendus. Reverendus or reverendissimus pater is a person toward whom one must behave respectfully, cautiously, fearfully. Otherwise, something bad could happen. Verenda,-orumor or partes verendae are pudenda, and it is well known that antiquity had a reverent attitude toward them, treated them with fearful religious respect. Then, the noun verecundia, religious fear, modesty, the verb verecundor, I have fear, and the adjective verecundus, fearful, shameful, decent, modest, once again point to the cultic domain of the application of the

root *var*. It is clear from this that, strictly speaking, *verus* means protected or grounded in the sense of that which is the object of a taboo or consecration. *Verdictum*, the verdict of a judge has, of course, the sense of the religiously obligatory judgment of persons who head a cult, for the law of antiquity is only an aspect of cult. The meanings of other words, such as *veridicus*, *veriloquium*, etc., are clear without explanation.

A. Suvorov, the author of the Latin etymological dictionary, indicates that the Russian verbs *govoriu*, *reku* [I speak, I say] express the original sense of the root *var*. But, on the basis of what has been said above, it is unquestionable that, if the root *var* really means "to speak," it is precisely in the sense attributed to this word by all of antiquity, that is, in the sense of a powerful, vatic word (be it ritual consecration or prayer) which is capable of making its object not only juridically and nominally but also mystically and really a source of fear and trembling.²¹ Thus, strictly speaking, *vereor* means "the power of ritual consecration exerted over me."

After these preliminary considerations it is not difficult to guess the meaning of the word *veritas*. Let us first remark that this word, which is of late origin, had wholly belonged to the domain of law and acquired only with Cicero a philosophical and generally theoretical sense, a sense that refers to the domain of knowledge. Even in the generally moral sense of sincerity, *parrēsia*, this word is encountered before Cicero just once, in Terence, ²² in the phrase: "obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit" (obsequiousness produces friends while sincerity produces hatred). Furthermore, although in Cicero the word *veritas* at once acquires a wide application, this is primarily in the legal and, in part, the moral domain. Here, *veritas* means either the real situation of a juridical case as opposed to its false clarification by one of the parties involved, or justice, or finally the just cause of the plaintiff. It is only rarely equated with "truth" as we tend to understand it.²³

The juridical nuance of *veritas*, a word religiously juridical in its root and morally juridical in its origin, was subsequently preserved and even grew more pronounced. In later Latin the word even came to have a purely juridical meaning. According to du Cange, *veritas* means *depositio testis*, the deposition of a witness, *veridictum*. *Veritas* then came to mean *inquisitio judicaria*, judicial inquest. It also came to mean right, privilege, particularly with respect to property, and so forth.²⁴

The ancient Hebrews, and the Semites in general, captured in their language a special aspect of the idea of Truth: the historical aspect, or more precisely, the theocratic aspect. Truth for them was always the Word of God. For the Hebrew, the irrevocability, certainty, and reliability of this Divine promise is what characterized it as Truth. Truth is Reliability. "It is easier for heaven and earth to pass away than for one tittle of the law to fail" (Luke 16:17). The Truth as it is represented in the Bible is precisely this absolutely irrevocable and unalterable "law."

The Hebrew word²⁵ 'emet or, in colloquial pronunciation, emes, truth, has as its basis the root 'mn. The verb 'aman derived therefrom means, strictly speaking, I supported, I propped up. This main meaning of the verb 'aman is strongly indicated by nouns of the same root from the domain of architecture:

'omenah, column, and 'amon, builder, master, and, in part, by 'omen, pedagogue, i.e., builder of children's souls. The intransitive middle sense of the verb 'aman, was supported, was propped up, then serves as the point of departure for a whole brood of words that are fairly removed from the main meaning of the verb 'aman, i.e., was strong, firm (as supported, as propped up), and therefore was unshakable. From this we get the meanings: suitable for use as a support to lean upon without damage to it, and finally, was faithful. From this we get Amen, meaning: my word is firm, verily, of course, thus it must be, fiat. It serves as a formula to seal a union or a vow. It is also used to conclude a doxology or a prayer (here it is said twice). The meaning of the word "amen" is well clarified from Rev 3:14: "These things saith the Amen, the faithful and true witness." Cf. Is. 65:16: "'elohe-'amen, the God that one should trust." From here one can understand the whole combination of meanings of 'emet (instead of amenet). Its most immediate meanings are firmness, stability, durability, and therefore safety. Further, we get faithfaithfulness, fides, by virtue of which he who is constant in himself preserves and fulfills the promise, the concepts of Treue and Glaube. One can then also understand the connection of this latter concept with the honesty and wholeness of the soul. As the distinguishing characteristic of a judge or a judicial sentence, 'emet therefore signifies justice, truthfulness. As the distinguishing characteristic of inner life, it is opposed to pretense and has the meaning of sincerity, primarily sincerity in the worship of God. Finally, 'emet corresponds to the Russian word istina (truth) in opposition to falsehood. This is precisely how this word is used in Gen. 42:16, Deut. 22:20, 2 Sam. 7:28. Also see 1 Kings 10:6, 22:16, Ps. 15:2, 51:6, etc.

Derived from this latter nuance of the word 'emet is the term meames, which is used by Hebrew philosophers, e.g., Maimonides, "to describe people who, not being satisfied with authority and custom, strive for intellectual knowledge of truth." ²⁶

Thus, for the Hebrews, Truth really is the "reliable word," "reliability," "the reliable promise." And since to "put... your trust in princes, ... in the son of man" (Ps. 146:3) is vain, the sole reliable word is the Word of God; Truth is God's unalterable promise, which is insured by the Lord's reliability and immutability. Thus, for the Hebrews, Truth is not an ontological concept, as it is for the Slavs. It is not an epistemological concept, as it is for the Greeks. And it is not a juridical concept, as it is for the Romans. Instead, it is a historical, or rather, a sacred-historical concept, a theocratic concept.

The four nuances of the concept of truth observed by us can be combined in pair fashion, in the following manner: The Russian *Istina* and the Hebrew *'emet* refer primarily to the Divine content of the Truth, while the Greek *Alētheia* and the Latin *Veritas* refer to its human form. On the other hand, the Russian and Greek terms have a philosophical character, while the Latin and Hebrew terms have a sociological character. By this I mean that, in the Russian and Greek understanding, Truth has an immediate relation to every person, while, for the Romans and the Hebrews, it is mediated by society. All that we have said about the division of the concept of the truth can be conveniently summarized in the following table:

	According to Content	According to Form
Immediate personal relation	Russian Istina	Greek Alētheia
Social mediation	Hebrew 'emet	Latin Veritas

"What is truth?" Pilate asked of the Truth (see John 18:38). He did not receive an answer. He did not receive an answer because the question was vain. The Living Answer stood before him, but Pilate did not see the Truth's truthfulness. Let us suppose that the Lord answered the Roman Procurator not only with this screaming silence but also with the quiet words, "I am the Truth." But even then the questioner would have remained without an answer, for he would not have known how to recognize the Truth as truth, could not have been convinced of its genuineness. The knowledge that Pilate lacked, the knowledge that all of mankind lacks above all, is knowledge of the conditions of certitude.

What is certitude? It is the discovery of the proper character of truth, the recognition in truth of a certain feature that distinguishes it from untruth. Psychologically, this recognition is expressed as untroubled bliss, the satisfied thirst for truth.

"Ye shall know the Truth (*tēn alētheian*), and the Truth (*hē alētheia*) shall make you free" (John 8:32). Free from what? Free in general from sin (see John 8:34), from every sin, free (in the domain of knowledge) from everything that is untruthful, from everything that does not conform with the truth. "Certitude", says Archimandrite Serapion Mashkin,²⁷ "is the feeling of truth. Certitude appears when we pronounce a necessary judgment and consists in the exclusion of the suspicion that the judgment pronounced will change some time or somewhere. Certitude is therefore the intellectual feeling of accepting the judgment pronounced as a true one." "By a criterion of truth," the same philosopher says in another work, "we mean the state of the truth-possessing spirit, a state of complete satisfaction, of joy, in which there is no doubt whatever that the stated proposition conforms to genuine reality. This state is reached when a judgment about something satisfies a proposition called a measure of truth or its criterion."

The problem of the certitude of truth is reducible to the problem of finding a criterion. The entire demonstrative force of a system is focused, as it were, in the answer to this problem of finding a criterion.

Truth becomes my possession through an act of my judgment. By my judgment, I receive truth into myself.²⁸ Truth as truth is revealed to me by my affirmation of it.

Consequently, the following question arises: If I affirm something, by what do I guarantee for myself its truthfulness? I receive something into myself as a truth. But should I do this? Is not the very act of my judgment what removes me from the truth I seek? In other words, what sign should I see in my judgment so as to be inwardly at peace?

Every judgment is either through itself or through something else, i.e., it is given either directly or indirectly, as a consequent of something else. It has in this something else its sufficient ground. If it is not given through itself or mediated by something else, it lacks all real content and rational form, i.e., it is not a judgment at all but only sounds, flatus vocis, vibrations of the air, nothing more. Thus, every judgment necessarily belongs to at least one of two classes. Let us now examine each of these classes separately.

A judgment given directly is the self-evidence of intuition, *evidentia*, *enargeia*. It subsequently becomes fragmented:

This self-evidence can be the self-evidence of *sensuous* experience, and then the criterion of truth is the criterion of the empiricists of *external* experience (the empirio-criticists, etc.). "All things that can be reduced to direct perceptions by the sense organs are certain. The perception of an *object* is certain."

This self-evidence can be the self-evidence of intellectual experience, and the criterion of truth in this case is the criterion of the empiricists of *internal* experience (the transcendentalists, etc.). "All things that can be reduced to axioms of reason are certain. The self-perception of a *subject* is certain."

Finally, the self-evidence of intuition can be the self-evidence of *mystical* intuition. A criterion of truth as it is understood by the majority of mystics (especially Indian mystics) is obtained: "All things that remain when everything that is irreducible to the perception of the subject-object is filtered out are certain. Only the perception of the subject-object in which there is no split into subject and object is certain."²⁹

These are the three kinds of self-evident intuition. But all three of these aspects of what is given (sensuous-empirical, transcendental-rationalistic, and subconscious-mystical) have one insufficiency in common: their naked, unjustified givenness. This givenness is perceived by consciousness as something external to itself, as something compulsory, mechanical, self-imposing, blind, and dull, as, in the final analysis, something irrational and therefore *conditional*. The mind does not see the internal necessity of its perception. It sees only an external necessity, i.e., a necessity forced upon it, an inevitability. To the question, "Where is the ground of our judgment of perception?" all these criteria answer: "This ground lies in the fact that sensuous perception, intellectual apprehension, or mystical awareness is precisely this very same perception, apprehension, or

awareness." But why is "this" precisely "this," and not something else? What does the reason of this self-identity of the immediately given consist in? "It consists in the fact," it is said, "that, in general, every given is itself: every A is A."

A = A. That is the final answer. But this tautological formula, this lifeless, thought-less, and therefore meaningless equality A = A, is, in fact, only a generalization of the self-identity that is inherent in every given. But by no means is this formula an answer to our question "Why?" In other words, this equality transfers our particular question from a single given to *givenness in general*. It displays our painful state of the moment on a gigantic scale, as if projecting it by a magic lantern upon the whole of being. If previously we had bumped against a stone, it is now announced to us that this is not an isolated stone but a solid wall, a wall that encompasses the entire domain of our enquiring mind.

A = A. That says everything. It says: "Knowledge is limited by conditional judgments." Or simply: "Be silent, I tell you!" Mechanically stopping up our mouth, this formula dooms us to abide in the finite and therefore in the accidental. This formula affirms in advance the separateness and egotistical isolation of the ultimate elements of being, thus rupturing all rational connection between them. To the question "Why?" or "On what ground?" it repeats "sic et non aliter, thus and not otherwise," interrupting the questioner but not being able to satisfy him or to teach self-limitation. Every philosophical construction of this type follows the paradigm of the following conversation I once had with an old female servant:

I: "What is the sun?"

She: "It is our little sun."

I: "No, I mean what is it?"

She: "It's the sun."

I: "But why does it shine?"

She: "The sun is the sun, that's why it shines. It shines and shines. Look, see what the sun is like."

I: "But why?"

She: "Good God, Pavel Aleksandrovich, as if I know! You're the educated and learned one. We're ignoramuses."

It is self-evident that the criterion of givenness that is applied by the overwhelming majority of philosophical schools in one way or another cannot give certitude. From "is," no matter how deep it lies in nature or in my being, or in the common root of the one and the other, it is impossible to extract "necessary."

Furthermore, even if we did not notice this blind character of the naked tautology A = A, even if we did not suffocate in this "it is because it is," reality would force us to direct our mental gaze upon it.

That which is accepted as the criterion of truth in virtue of its givenness turns out to be violated by reality from all sides.

By a strange irony, precisely that criterion which seeks to base itself exclusively on its own factual lordship over everything, on the right of power over every actual intuition, is in fact violated by every factual intuition. The law of identity, which pretends to absolute universality, turns out to have a place nowhere at all. This law sees its right in its actual givenness, but every given actually rejects this law *toto genere*, violating it in both the order of space and the order of time—everywhere and always. In excluding all other elements, every A is excluded by all of them, for if each of these elements is for A only not-A, then A over against not-A is only not-not-A. From the viewpoint of the law of identity, all being, in desiring to affirm itself, actually only destroys itself, becoming a combination of elements each of which is a center of negations, and *only* negations. Thus, all being is a total negation, one great "Not." The law of identity is the spirit of death, emptiness, and nothingness.

Once present givenness becomes the criterion, it is such absolutely everywhere and always. Therefore, all mutually exclusive A's as givens are true; everything is true. But this annuls the power of the law of identity, for this law then turns out to contain an internal contradiction.

But there is really no need to point out that one person perceives in one way while another person perceives in another way. One does not inevitably have to refer to the *self-disharmony* of consciousness in space. Such multiplicity is also manifested by every individual subject. Change occurring in the external world, in the inner world, and finally in the world of mystical perceptions proclaims harmoniously: "The previous A is not equal to the present A, and the future A will differ from the present A." The present opposes itself to its past and its future in time just as, in space, a thing is opposed to all things that lie outside it. In time as well, consciousness is self-disharmonious. Contradiction is everywhere and always, but identity is nowhere and never.

The law A = A becomes a completely empty schema of self-affirmation, a schema that does not synthesize any real elements, anything that is worth connecting with the "=" sign. "I = I" turns out to be nothing more than a cry of naked egotism: "I!" For where there is no difference, there can be no connection. There is therefore only the blind force of stagnation and self-imprisonment, only egotism. Outside of itself, I hates every I, since for it this I is not-I; and hating, I strives to exclude this I from the sphere of being. And since the past I (I in its past) is also considered objectively, i.e., since it also appears as not-I, then it too is irreconcilably subject to exclusion. I cannot bear itself in time and negates itself in all ways in the past and future. Thus, since the naked "now" is a pure zero of content, I hates the whole of its concrete content, i.e., the whole of its life. I turns out to be a dead desert of "here" and "now." But what then is

governed by the formula "A is A"? Only a fiction (an atom, a monad, etc.), only a hypostatized abstraction of a moment and a point, which, in themselves, do not exist. Yes, the law of identity is an unlimited monarch. But its subjects do not object to its autocracy only because they are bloodless phantoms, without reality, because they are not persons but only rational shades of persons, i.e., things that do not exist. This is sheol. This is the kingdom of death.

Let us recapitulate what we have said. Only that is rational, i.e., only that conforms to the measure of rationality and satisfies the demands of rationality, which is isolated from everything else, which is not mixed with anything else, which is self-contained, in short, which is self-identical. Only A that is equal to itself and unequal to what is not A is considered by rationality as genuinely existent, as to on, to ontōs on, as "truth." On the other hand, to everything that is unequal to itself or equal not to itself, rationality refuses to attribute genuine being, ignores it as "non-existent" or as not truly existent, as to mē on. Rationality only tolerates this mē on, only admits it as not-truth, by capturing it, to use Plato's expression, through some sort of illegitimate argument, hapton logismōi tini nothōi (nothos, strictly speaking, means "of illegitimate birth").³⁰

Only the first, i.e., the "existent", is recognized by rationality, which rejects the second, i.e., the "non-existent." Rationality pins on this "non-existent" the label to mē on, does not notice it, making believe that it does not exist at all. For rationality only an affirmation about the "existent" is truth. By contrast, a declaration about the "non-existent" is, strictly speaking, not even a declaration. It is only a doxa, an "opinion," only the appearance of a declaration, devoid of the power of a declaration. It is only a "manner of speaking."

But for this reason it turns out that the *rational* is at the same time *unexplainable*. To explain A is to reduce it to "something else," to not-A, to that which is not A and which therefore is not-A. It is to derive A from not-A, to generate A. And if A really satisfies the demand of rationality, if it is really rational, i.e., absolutely self-identical, it is then unexplainable, irreducible "to something else" (to not-A), underivable "from something else." Therefore, rational A is absolutely non-reasonable, a blind A, untransparent for reason. That which is rational is non-reasonable, non-conformable to the measure of reason. Reason is opposed to rationality, just as rationality is opposed to reason, for they have opposite demands. Life, flowing and non-self-identical, might be reasonable; it might be transparent for reason (we have not yet found out if this is the case). But, precisely for this reason, life would be nonconformable with rationality, opposed to rationality. It would rip apart the limitedness of rationality.

^a See note e on p. 7.

And rationality, hostile to life, would in turn rather seek to kill life than agree to receive life into itself.³¹

Thus, if the criterion of self-evidence is insufficient *theoretically*, as something that stops the seeking of the spirit, it is also of no use *practically*, since it cannot achieve its claims even within the limits it has set for itself. The immediate givenness of all three kinds of intuition (objective, subjective, and subjective-objective) does not give certitude. This is a radical condemnation of all philosophical dogmatic systems. And we do not exclude Kant's system, for which sensuousness and reason with all its functions are simple givens.

I now turn not to immediate but to *mediated* judgment, to what is commonly called discursion, for here reason *discurrit*, runs to some other judgment.

By its very name, the certitude of this judgment consists in its reducibility to *another* judgment. The question about the ground of a judgment is answered not by this judgment itself but by another judgment. In the other judgment, the given appears as justified; it appears in its truth. Such is the relative proof of one judgment on the basis of another. To prove relatively means to demonstrate how one judgment forms the consequent of another, how it is generated by another.³² Reason shifts its focus here to a grounding judgment. But this judgment cannot be simply given, for then the whole matter would be reduced to the criterion of self-evidence. This judgment too must be justified in another judgment. And the next judgment leads to another judgment. And it goes on and on. But this is very similar to how our forebears spoke. They constructed entire chains of explanatory links. For example, we read in a Serbo-Bulgarian manuscript of the 15th century:

"Tell me: What supports the earth? The high water. But what supports the water? A great flat rock. But what supports the rock? Four golden whales. But what supports the golden whales? A fiery river. But what supports the fire? Another fire that is twice as hot. But what supports the other fire? An iron oak that is rooted in the power of God." 33

But where is the end? Our forebears ended their "explanations," or "justifications," of present reality by referring to the attributes of God. But since they did not show why these attributes should be accepted as justified, our forebears' reference to God's will or power (if it was not a direct rejection of explanation) must have had a formal significance, the significance of an abbreviated representation of the continuation of the explanatory process. Modern language uses the abbreviation "etc." for this purpose. But the meaning of both answers is the same: They are used to attempt to show that there is no end to this justification of the given reality. In fact, when someone, abandoning his childish faith, has entered upon the path of explanations and justifications, he inevitably encounters Kant's rule that "the wildest hypotheses are more tolerable than recourse

to the supernatural."³⁴ Therefore, to the question, "Where is the end?" we answer, "There is no end." Instead, there is an infinite regression, *regressus in indefinitum*, a descent into the gray fog of "bad" infinity, a never-ending fall into infinitude and bottomlessness.³⁵

This should not surprise us. It could not be otherwise. For if the series of descending justifications were broken somewhere, the broken link would be a dead end, and this dead end would destroy the very idea of certitude of the type being considered now, i.e., of abstract-logical, discursive certitude, in contradistinction to the type considered previously, i.e., concretely intuitive certitude. The possibility of justifying every step of the descending ladder of judgments, i.e., the incontrovertible, constant possibility of being able to descend at least one step below any given step, i.e., the constant admissibility of transition from n to (n + 1), whatever n is, this possibility contains the whole essence, the whole reasonableness, the whole meaning of our criterion in the same way that an egg contains the embryo.

But this essence of the criterion is also its Achilles' heel. *Regressus in indefinitum* is given *in potentia*, as a possibility but not in *actu*, not as a finished reality, a reality that is realized at a given time and in a given place. A reasonable proof only gives rise in time to the dream of eternity but never makes it possible to touch eternity itself. Therefore, the reasonableness of a criterion, the certitude of truth, is never given as such in reality, actually, in its justifiedness. It is always given only in possibility, potentially, in its justifiability.

In its immediately given concreteness, intuition is something actual, although it is blind and therefore conditional. Intuition could not satisfy us. But discursion, in its always only mediately justified abstractness, is invariably only something possible, unreal, although (and this makes up for it!) it is reasonable and unconditional. Of course, it, too, we consider unsatisfactory.

Let me say it simply: Blind intuition is a bird in the hand while reasonable discursion is a bird in the bush. If the former provides nonphilosophical satisfaction by its presence and its reliability, the latter is, in fact, not attained reasonableness but only a regulating principle, a law for the activity of reason, a road on which we must walk eternally in order . . . in order never to reach any goal. A reasonable criterion is a direction, not a goal.

If blind and absurd intuition can still give comfort to the nonphilosophical mind in its practical life, reasonable discursion is, of course, suitable only for the literary exercises of a school or for the self-satisfaction of the scholar's study, for those whose "profession" is philosophy but who have never partaken of it.

An impenetrable wall and an uncrossable sea; the deadliness of stagnation and the vanity of unceasing motion; the obtuseness of the golden calf

and the eternal incompletion of the Tower of Babel, i.e., a stone idol and "ye shall be as gods" (Gen. 3:5); present reality and never-finished possibility; formless content and contentless form; finite intuition and boundless discursion—those are the Scylla and the Charybdis on the way to certitude. A very sad dilemma! The first way out is to embrace obstinately the self-evidence of intuition, which in the last analysis is reduced to the givenness of a certain organization of reason, whence comes Spencer's notorious criterion of certitude. The second way out is to plunge hopelessly into reasonable discursion, which is empty possibility, to descend lower and lower into the depths of motivation.

But neither way out provides satisfaction in the search for Incorruptible Truth. Neither way out leads to certitude. Neither way out provides a sight of the "Pillar of the Truth."

Can one not ascend above both obstacles?

We return to the intuition of the *law of identity*.

But, having exhausted the resources of *realism* and *rationalism*, we involuntarily turn to skepticism, i.e., to an examination, a critique, of the self-evident judgment.

As establishing the *de facto* inseparability of the subject and its predicate in consciousness, this judgment is assertoric. A link between the subject and the predicate exists, but it does not have to exist. There is as yet nothing in the character of this link that makes it apodictically necessary and irrevocable. The only thing that can establish such a link is proof. To prove is to show why we consider the predicate of a judgment apodictically linked with the subject. Not to accept anything without proof is not to admit any judgments except apodictic ones. The basic requirement of skepticism is to consider every unproved proposition uncertain, to reject absolutely any unproved presuppositions, however self-evident they may be. We already find this requirement clearly expressed in Plato and Aristotle. For Plato, even "right opinion" that cannot be confirmed by proof is not "knowledge," "for how could something unproved be knowledge?" But neither can it be called "lack of knowledge." 36 For Aristotle, "knowledge" is nothing else but "proved possession, hesis apodeiktikē,"37 whence comes the very term "apodictic."

It will be objected, however, that this latter proposition, i.e., the acceptance of only proved propositions and the sweeping away of everything unproved, is itself unproved. By introducing this proposition, does not the skeptic use the same sort of unproved presupposition as the one he condemned when the dogmatist used it? No. It is only an analytical expression of the essential striving of the philosopher, of his love of the Truth. Love of the Truth demands precisely truth, nothing else. The uncertain does not have to be the sought-for truth. It may be untruth, and therefore the lover of the Truth must necessarily take care that he does not accept untruth under the guise of self-evidence. But precisely this kind

of doubtful character distinguishes self-evidence. Self-evidence is the obtuse primary thing, which is not grounded further. And since self-evidence is unprovable, the philosopher falls into an aporia, ³⁸ into a difficult position. The only thing that he could accept is self-evidence, but it too he cannot accept. And not being able to state a certain judgment, he is fated *epechein*, to delay with the judgment, to refrain from judgment. Epoche or the state of refraining from all statement is the last word of skepticism.³⁹

But what is epoche as a state of the soul? Is it "ataraxy, or imperturbability," that profound tranquillity of the spirit which has refused all statements, that meekness and quietude about which the ancient skeptics dreamt? Or is it something else? Let us see.

And further, does one who has decided on ataraxy really become peaceful and tranquil like Pyrrho, the same Pyrrho in whom skeptics of all ages have seen their patron and almost a saint?⁴¹ Or is it that the enchanting image of this great skeptic has its roots not in the theoretical search for truth but in something else, in something that skepticism has not succeeded in touching? Let us see.

Expressed in words, epoche comes down to the following two-part thesis:

I do not affirm anything;

I also do not affirm the fact that I do not affirm anything.

This two-part thesis is proved by a proposition established earlier: "Every unproved proposition is uncertain." And the latter is the opposite side of love of the Truth.

If this is the case, I do not have any proved proposition; I do not affirm anything. But having just stated what I have stated, I must also remove this proposition, for it too is unproved. If we open up the first half of the thesis, it will have the form of the two-part judgment:

I affirm that I do not affirm anything (A'); I do not affirm that I do not affirm anything (A").

Now, as it turns out, we are obviously violating the law of identity by stating contradictory predicates about one and the same subject, about its affirmation, A, in one and the same connection. But that is not all.

Both parts of the thesis are an affirmation. The first is the affirmation of an affirmation, while the second is the affirmation of a nonaffirmation. The same process is inevitably applied to each. Thus, we obtain:

I affirm (A₁'); I do not affirm (A₂'). I affirm (A₁"); I do not affirm (A₂").

In the same way, the process will go further and further. Each new link will double the number of mutually contradictory propositions. The series goes toward infinity, and sooner or later, we are compelled to interrupt the process of doubling, in order to fix in immobility, like a frozen grimace, this obvious violation of the law of identity. We then get a powerful contradiction, i.e., at the same time we get:

A is A; A is not A.

Not being in a position to harmonize actively these two parts of one proposition, we are compelled passively to surrender to contradictions that rip apart the consciousness. In affirming one thing, we are compelled at the same moment to affirm the opposite. In affirming the latter, we at once turn to the former. In the same way that an object is accompanied by a shadow, every affirmation is accompanied by the excruciating desire for the opposite affirmation. After having inwardly said "yes" to ourselves, we say "no" at the same moment. But the earlier "no" longs for "yes." "Yes" and "no" are inseparable. Doubt, in the sense of uncertainty, is far away. Absolute doubt has now begun. This is doubt as the total impossibility of affirming anything at all, even its own nonaffirmation. Progressing stage by stage, manifesting the idea that inheres in it in nuce, skepticism reaches its own negation but cannot leap across this negation. And so, it becomes an infinitely excruciating torment, an agony of the spirit. To clarify this state, let us imagine a drowning man who is attempting to grab hold of a polished sheer cliff face. He claws at the cliff with his fingernails, loses hold, claws at it again, and, crazed, catches at it again and again. Or let us imagine a bear that attempts to push aside a log suspended in front of a beehive. The farther he pushes the log, the more painful the return blow. The greater the inner fury, the sweeter the honey seems.

Such also is the state of the consistent skeptic. What we see is not even affirmation and negation, but insane convulsions, a furious marching in place, a tossing from side to side, a kind of inarticulate philosophical howl. The result is an abstention from judgment, absolute epoche, not as a tranquil and dispassionate refusal of judgment but as a concealed inner pain, a pain that clenches its teeth and strains every nerve and muscle in an effort not to scream and not to let out a completely insane howl.

To be sure, this is not ataraxy. No, this is the most furious of tortures, pulling at the hidden fibers of one's entire being. It is a pyrrhonic, truly fiery (Gk. pur = fire) torment. Molten lava flows in the veins, and a dark flame penetrates the marrow of the bones. At the same time, the deadening cold of absolute solitude and perdition turns the consciousness into a block of ice. There are no words. There are not even any moans to moan

out—if only into the air—a million torments. The tongue refuses to obey. As Scripture says: "my tongue cleaveth to my jaws" (Ps: 22:15; cf. Ps. 137:6, Lam. 4:4, Eze. 3:26). There is no help, no means to stop the torture, for the consuming fire of Prometheus comes from within, for the true focus of this fiery agony is the very center of the philosopher, his "I," which struggles to obtain non-conditional knowledge.

I do not have truth but the idea of truth burns me. I do not have the evidence to affirm that there is Truth in general and that I will attain this Truth. By making such an affirmation I would renounce the thirst for the absolute, because I would accept something unproved. Nevertheless, the idea of Truth lives in me like a "devouring fire," and the secret yearning to meet Truth face to face makes my tongue cleave to my jaws. It is this yearning that seethes and bubbles in my veins like a flaming stream. If there were no hope, the torture too would cease. Consciousness would then return to philosophical philistinism, to the domain of the conditional. For this fiery hope in Truth melts with its black flame every conditional truth, every uncertain proposition. It is also uncertain whether I yearn for Truth. Perhaps that too only seems. But perhaps this very seeming is not seeming?

In asking myself this last question, I enter into the last circle of the skeptical hell, into the place where the very meaning of words is lost. Words cease to be fixed; they fly out of their nests. Everything turns into everything else. Every word-combination is completely equivalent to every other, and any word can change places with any other. Here, the mind loses itself, is lost in a formless, chaotic abyss. Here, delirium and senselessness lurk.

But this maximally skeptical doubt is possible only as an unstable equilibrium, as the limit of absolute dementia, for what is dementia but dement-ia, or mindlessness, the experience of the non-substantiality, the nonsupportednes, of the mind. When this doubt is experienced, it is carefully hidden from others. And after being experienced, it is remembered with great reluctance. From the outside it is almost impossible to understand what this is. Delirious chaos pours forth through this ultimate limit of reason, and the mind is deadened with an all-penetrating cold. Here, behind a thin barrier, spiritual death begins. Therefore, the state of ultimate skepticism is possible only for the blink of an eye, followed by the return to the fiery torment of Pyrrho, to epoche, or by the plunge into the pitch-black night of despair, whence there is no escape and where the very thirst for the Truth disappears. From the sublime to the ridiculous is a single step, and this is precisely a step that takes one away from the ground of reason.

Thus, the way of skepticism also leads to nothing.

We demand certitude, and this demand is expressed in the decision not to accept anything without proof. But at the same time the very proposi-

tion "not to accept anything without proof" must be proved. Let us see, however, if we have made any dogmatic assertion in the foregoing discussion. Let us turn back.

We have sought a proposition that would be absolutely proven. But on the path of our seeking, a certain feature of this sought-for proposition which remains unproved has crept in. Namely, this sought-for absolutely proved proposition has for some reason been recognized in advance as *first* in its provenness, as that from which all positive work begins. There is no doubt that this very affirmation of the primacy of an absolutely proved judgment is, since it is unproved, a *dogmatic presupposition*. For it is possible that the sought-for proposition will be in our hands, though not as the first but as a result of other propositions, uncertain ones.

"From the uncertain the certain cannot be derived." This indisputably *dogmatic* presupposition lies at the base of the affirmation of the primacy of the certain Truth. Yes, it is dogmatic, for nowhere is it proved.

Thus, again rejecting the path we have taken, we reject the dogmatic presupposition we have found and say: We do not know whether or not a certain proposition exists; but if it does exist, we do not know whether or not it is first. Moreover, that "we do not know" we also do not know, and so on, as before. Further, our epoche will begin, and it will be of a kind similar to that encountered before. But our present state will be somewhat new. We do not know whether or not the Truth exists. But if it exists, we do not know if reason can lead to it. And if reason can lead to it, we do not know how reason could lead to it and where reason could meet it. But, in spite of all this, we say to ourselves: If the Truth exists, it could be sought. Perhaps we could find it by taking some road at random, and then it would perhaps announce itself as such, as the Truth.

But why do I speak in this way? Where is the ground for my affirmation? There is no ground. Therefore, given the demand that my presupposition be proved, I now remove this presupposition from the agenda and return to epoche with the affirmation: "Perhaps this is true or perhaps the opposite is true." Once I am asked for an answer to the question, "Is this so?" I say, "It is not so." But if I am asked decisively, "Is this not so?" I say, "It is so." I ask; I do not affirm; and what I put into my words is something not at all logical. What is this something? It is the tone of hope but not the logical expression of hope. And from this tone there follows only the fact that I will nevertheless try to make the proposed *unjustified*, but not condemned, attempt to find the Truth. If I am asked about grounds, I will curl up in myself like a snail. I see that I am threatened either by the insanity of abstaining from the search or by the—perhaps vain labor of attempts: work in the full consciousness that it is ungrounded, and that its justification is conceivable only as an accident, or rather as a gift, as gratia quae gratis datur. Does not St. Seraphim of Sarov speak of the same thing when he says, "If a man, out of love for God, does not overmuch concern himself with himself, that is a wise hope"? In conformity with St. Seraphim's words, I do not want to "concern myself overmuch with myself," with my rational mind. That is, I want to hope.⁴³

Thus I grope along, all the while remembering that my steps do not have any significance. At my own risk, on the off chance, I am attempting to grow something, being guided not by philosophical skepticism but by my own feeling. And for a time I will refrain from turning this feeling into ash with pyrrhonian lava. I cherish a secret hope—hope for a miracle. Perhaps the flow of lava will move aside before my shoot, and the plant will turn out to be a burning bush. But this, I keep to myself. And in keeping it to myself, I accept the word of the kathismab which I have heard a thousand times in church but which has only now for some reason surfaced in my consciousness: "Those who seek God shall not be deprived of any good." Yes, those who seek, those who thirst. The verse does not say "those who have," and it would be superfluous to say this, for it goes without saying that those who have God, the Original Source of all good, will not be deprived of any particular good. And perhaps it would be incorrect to say this, for can anyone say that he has God wholly and that he is therefore not one of those who seek? But it is precisely those who seek God who will not be deprived of any good. Seeking is affirmed by the Church as non-deprivation. It turns out that those who have not are identical to those who have. But although this equality is as yet unproved, it has become dear to my soul. And since I do not have anything, why should I not submit myself to this power of God's word?

Thus, I enter into a new domain, that of *probabilism*—under the necessary condition, however, that my entry into this domain be only a trial, only an experiment. The true homeland is still epoche. But if I resisted my presentiment and did not desire to leave epoche, it would still be necessary to justify my stubbornness, which I could not do, just as now I cannot justify my leaving epoche. Neither for the one nor for the other do I have any justification. But, practically, of course, it is *more natural* to search for a path, even if only hoping for a miracle, than to sit in place in despair. But in order to search it is necessary to be outside of one's rational mind. Here again, a question arises: By what right do we go beyond our rational mind? By the right that is given to us by the rational mind itself: It compels us to it.⁴⁴ Indeed, what remains to be done when the rational mind refuses to serve?

I want to form a problematic construction, keeping in mind that perhaps it will accidentally turn out to be certain. "Turn out to be!" With these words, I have carried my search from the ground of speculation to the domain of experience, of actual perception, but of experience and perception which must be united with inner reasonableness as well.

^b A kathisma is one of the twenty sections into which the Psalter is divided for liturgical use in the Eastern Orthodox Church.

What are the formal, speculative conditions that would be satisfied if such experience actually arose? In other words, what judgments would we necessarily form concerning this experience (let me emphasize once again that we do not have this experience)?

These judgments are as follows:

- (1) The absolute Truth exists, i.e., it is unconditional reality.
- (2) The absolute Truth is knowable, i.e., it is unconditional reasonableness.
- (3) The absolute Truth is given as a fact, i.e., it is a finite intuition, but it is absolutely proven, i.e., it has the structure of infinite discursion

Moreover, the third proposition, after analysis, implies the two others. In fact, "Truth is intuition." This means that it exists. Further, "Truth is discursion." This means that it is knowable. For intuitiveness is the *de facto* givenness of existence, whereas discursiveness is the ideal possibility of knowing.

This means that all our attention is concentrated on a proposition that is dual in content but one in idea: "Truth is intuition; Truth is discursion." Or more simply:

"Truth Is Intuition-Discursion."

Truth is intuition that is provable, i.e., discursive. In order to be discursive, intuition must be intuition which is not blind, not obtusely limited. It must be intuition that tends to infinity. It must be speaking, reasonable intuition, as it were. In order to be intuitive, discursion must not lose itself in boundlessness. It must be not only possible but also real, actual.

Discursive intuition must contain a synthesized infinite series of its own grounds, whereas intuitive discursion must synthesize its whole infinite series of grounds into a finitude, a unity, a unit. Discursive intuition is intuition that is differentiated to infinity, whereas intuitive discursion is discursion that is integrated to unity.

Thus, if the Truth exists, it is real reasonableness and reasonable reality. It is finite infinity and infinite finitude or—to use a mathematical expression—actual infinity, 45 the Infinite conceived as integral Unity, as one Subject complete in itself. But complete in itself, the Truth carries in itself the whole fullness of the infinite series of its grounds, the depth of its perspective. The Truth is a sun that illuminates both itself and the whole universe. Its abyss is the abyss of power, not of nothingness. The Truth is immobile motion and moving immobility. It is the unity of opposites, coincidentia oppositorum.

If that is the case, skepticism in fact cannot destroy truth and truth is in fact "stronger than everything." ⁴⁶ The Truth always gives to skepticism a justification of itself. The Truth is always "answerable." To every "why" there is an answer, and all these answers are not given separately,

are not linked to one another externally, but are woven into an integral, inwardly fused unity. A single moment of perception of the Truth gives the Truth with *all* its grounds (even if they have never been conceived separately by anyone anywhere!). The blink of an eye gives all the fullness of knowledge.

Such is absolute Truth, if it exists. In it, the law of identity must find its justification and ground. Abiding above all ground that is external to it, above the law of identity, the Truth grounds and proves this law. The Truth contains the explanation of why being is not subject to this law.

A probabilistically presuppositious construction leads to the affirmation of the Truth as a self-proving Subject, a Subject *qui per se ipsum concipitur et demonstratur* (that is conceived and proved through itself), a Subject that is absolute Lord of itself, that is master over the infinite series of all of its grounds, which are synthesized into a unity and even into a unit. We cannot concretely conceive such a Subject, for we cannot synthesize an infinite series in its entirety; on the path of successive syntheses we will always see only the finite and conditional. Adding a finite number to a finite number an arbitrary number of times, we get nothing but a finite number. Ascending higher and higher into the mountains (to use Kant's image⁴⁷), we would hope in vain to touch the sky with our hand. And it is insane to count on the Tower of Babel. In the same way, all of our efforts will always yield only what is in the process of being synthesized, but never what is already synthesized. An infinite Unit is transcendental for human attainments.

If, in consciousness, we had a real perception of such a self-proving Subject, this perception would be precisely an answer to the question of skepticism and would therefore destroy epoche. If epoche is resolvable at all, it is so only by this kind of destruction, by sovereign satisfaction, as it were. But epoche definitely cannot be merely avoided or eliminated. The attempt to disdain epoche is inevitably a logical trick, nothing more. And in the vain attempt to perform this trick, all dogmatic systems, not excluding Kant's, come to ruin.

In fact, if the condition of intuitive concreteness is not satisfied, the Truth will be only an empty possibility. If the condition of reasonable discursiveness is not satisfied, the Truth will be no more than blind givenness. Only a finite synthesis of infinity, a synthesis realized independently of us, can give us reasonable givenness or, in other words, the self-proving Subject.

Having in itself all the grounds of itself and all the manifestations of itself to us, having in itself all the grounds of its reasonableness and its givenness, this Subject is self-grounded not only in the order of reasonableness but also in the order of givenness. It is *causa sui* both in essence and in existence, i.e., it not only *per se concipitur et demonstratur* but also *per se est*. It "is through itself and is known through itself." This was understood well by the scholastics.

Thus, according to the definition of Anselm of Canterbury,⁴⁸ God is "per se ipsum ens," "ens per se." Thomas Aquinas⁴⁹ remarks that God's nature "per se necesse esse," for it is "prima causa essendi, non habens ab alio esse." Here is a more precise definition of the meaning of this "per se": "Per se ens est, quod separatim absque adminicolo alterius existit, seu quod non est in subjecto inhaesionis: quod non est hoc modo per se accidens." ⁵⁰

This conception of God as having His being and reason in Himself runs through scholastic philosophy like a scarlet thread and finds its extreme but one-sided application in Spinoza. According to the third definition in Spinoza's *Ethics*, ⁵¹ which leaves its particular imprint on his entire system, a substance is precisely that which has its being and reason in itself: "*Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur.*"

The self-proving Subject! Formally, we can affirm that this "Infinite Unit" explains everything, for to give an explanation of something is, first of all, to show how it does not contradict the law of identity and, secondly, to show how the givenness of the law of identity does not contradict the possibility of the grounding of this law.

A new question arises, however. Let us suppose that the infinity of the series of grounds that is synthesized into a finite intuition has appeared in our perception as a kind of revelation. Let that be the case. But how precisely can this intuition form a basis for the law of identity with all its violations?

First of all, how are the multiplicity of coexistence (disharmony, otherness) and the multiplicity of succession (change, motion) possible? In other words, how is it that spatiotemporal multiplicity does not violate identity?

It does not violate identity only if a multitude of elements is absolutely synthesized in the Truth, so that "the other"—both in the order of coexistence and in the order of succession—is at the same time "not other" *sub specie aeternitatis*; if the *heterotēs*, the differentness, the alienness of the "other" is only an expression and disclosure of the *tautotēs*, of the identity of "this one."

If "another" moment of time does not destroy and devour "this" moment, but is both "another" moment and "this" moment at the same time, if the "new," revealed as the new, is the "old" in its eternity; if the *inner structure* of the eternal, of "this" and "the other," of the "new" and the "old" in their real unity is such that "this" must appear outside the "other" and the "old" must appear before the "new"; if the "other" and the "new" is such not through itself but through "this" and the "old" and "this" and the "old" is what it is not through itself but through the "other" and the "new"; if, finally, each element of being is only a term of a substantial relationship, a relationship-substance, then the law of identity, eternally violated, is eternally restored by its very violation.

This last proposition at once gives an answer to the old question: How is it possible that every A is A? In this case, from the very law of identity

there flows a spring that destroys identity, but this destruction of identity is also the power and force of the eternal restoration and renewal of identity. Identity, dead as fact, can be and necessarily is alive as act. The law of identity will then be not a universal law of superficial being, as it were, but the surface of deep being, not a geometrical figure but the external aspect of a depth of life inaccessible to the rational mind. And in this life this law can have its root and justification. The law of identity, blind in its givenness, can be reasonable in its createdness, in its eternal being-created. Fleshly, dead, and deadening in its statics, this law can be spiritual, living, and life-giving in its dynamics. To the question, Why is A A? we answer, A is A because, eternally being not-A, in this not-A it finds its affirmation as A. More precisely, A is A because it is not-A. Not being equal to A, i.e., to itself, it is always being established in the eternal order of being by virtue of not-A as A. This will be discussed in greater detail later.

Thus, the law of identity will receive its grounding not in its lower, rational form but in its higher, reasonable form. This "higher form of the law of identity" is the fundamental discovery of Archimandrite Serapion Mashkin. Let us note that the value of the discovery is revealed only in the concrete development of a system of philosophy. 52

Instead of an empty, dead, formal self-identity A = A, in virtue of which A should selfishly, self-assertively, egotistically exclude every not-A, we get a real self-identity of A, full of content and life, a self-identity that eternally rejects itself and that eternally receives itself in its self-rejection. If, in the first case, A is A (A = A) because of the exclusion from it of everything (and of itself in its concreteness!), now A is A through the affirmation of itself as not-A, through the assimilation of everything and the likening of everything to itself.

From this it is clear what the nature of the self-proving Subject is and what constitutes its self-provenness, if this Subject exists at all.

This Subject is such that it is A and not-A. For the sake of clarity, let us designate not-A through B. What is B? B is B, but it would itself be a blind B if it were not also not-B. What is not-B? If it is merely A, then A and B would be identical. A, being A and B, would be only a simple, naked A, just like B. (As we shall see, in heresiology this corresponds to modalism, Sabellianism, etc.). In order for there not to be the simple tautology "A = A," in order for there to be a real equality of "A is A, for A is not-A," it is necessary that B itself be a reality, i.e., that B at once be B and not-B. The latter, i.e., not-B, we shall for the sake of clarity designate as C. Through C the circle can be closed, for in its "other," in not-C, A finds itself as A. In B ceasing to be A, A receives itself mediately from another, but not from the one with which it is equated, i.e., from C. And here it receives itself as already "proved," already established. The same thing goes for each of the subjects A,B,C of the triple relationship.

The self-provenness and self-groundedness of the Subject of the Truth, I, is the relation to He through Thou. Through Thou the subjective I becomes the objective He, and, in the latter, I has its affirmation, its objectivity as I. He is I revealed. The Truth contemplates Itself through Itself in Itself. But each moment of this absolute act is itself absolute, is itself Truth. Truth is the contemplation of Oneself through Another in a Third: Father, Son, and Spirit. Such is the metaphysical definition of the "essence" (ousia) of the self-proving Subject, which is, as is evident, a substantial relationship. The Subject of the Truth is a relationship of the Three, but this is a relationship that is a substance, a relationship-substance. The Subject of the Truth is a Relationship of Three. And since a concrete relationship is, in general, a system of life-acts, in this case an infinite system of acts synthesized into a unit or an infinite unitary act, we can affirm that the ousia of the Truth is the Infinite act of Three in Unity. Later we will explain this infinite act of Life more concretely.

But what is each of the "Three" in relation to the infinite act-substance?

What is real is not the same thing as the whole Subject, and what is real is precisely the same thing as the whole Subject. In view of the necessity of further discussion, we will call it "hypostasis" where it is "not the same thing." Earlier we applied the term "essence" (*ousia*) to designate it as "precisely the same thing."

The Truth is therefore *one essence with three hypostases*. Not three essences, but one; not one hypostasis, but three. But, despite all this, hypostasis and essence are one and the same. Expressing myself somewhat imprecisely, I will say: "A hypostasis is an absolute person." But the question arises: "What constitutes a person if not essence?" And also: "Is essence given except in a person?" Nevertheless, all of the foregoing establishes that there is not one hypostasis but three, although essence is concretely one. Therefore, numerically, there is one Subject of the Truth, not three.

"Our holy and blessed fathers," writes Abba Thalassius, "recognize as trihypostatic the one substance of Divinity just as they confess the Holy Trinity as consubstantial. The Unity, extending, according to them, to the Trinity, remains a Unity; and the Trinity, collecting Itself into Unity, remains a Trinity. And this is miraculous. They thus preserve as immutable and unalterable the property of the hypostases, while preserving the commonality of the substance, i.e., Divinity, as indivisible. We confess Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, divided indivisibly and joined divisibly." ⁵⁴

But I will be asked: Why are there precisely three hypostases? I speak of the number "three" as immanent to the Truth, as inwardly inseparable from the Truth. There cannot be fewer than three, for only three hypostases eternally make one another what they eternally are. Only in the unity

of Three does each hypostasis receive an absolute affirmation, which establishes this hypostasis as such. Outside the Three, there is not one, there is no Subject of the Truth. But more than three? Yes, there can be more than three—through the acceptance of new hypostases into the interior of the life of the Three. But these new hypostases are not members which support the Subject of the Truth, and therefore they are not inwardly necessary for this Subject's absoluteness. They are conditional hypostases, which can be but do not have to be in the Subject of the Truth. Therefore, they cannot be called hypostases in the strict sense, and it is better to call them deified persons, etc. But there is also another side which we have neglected up to now (but which later we will examine carefully): In the absolute unity of the Three, there is no "order," no sequence. In the three hypostases, each is immediately next to each, and the relationship of two can only be mediated by the third. Primacy is absolutely unthinkable among them. But every fourth hypostasis introduces in the relation to itself of the first three some order or other, thus through itself placing the hypostases into an unequal activity in relation to itself, as the fourth hypostasis. From this one sees that with the fourth hypostasis there begins a completely new essence, whereas the first three were of one essence.

In other words, the Trinity can be without a fourth hypostasis, whereas the fourth cannot be independent. This is the general meaning of the number three of the Trinity.



Semper adamas. Always unshakable.

IV. Letter Three: Triunity

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"Trinity unisubstantial and indivisible, unity trihypostatic and consubstantial" —that is the only scheme that promises to resolve epoche, if the doubt of skepticism is at all resolvable. Only this scheme would not be melted down by Pyrrhonism if the latter were to encounter it realized in experience. If Truth can exist at all, this is the path to it, the only path. But do we actually take this path? Is it only something that reason demands, though something that is necessary and inevitable for reason? This is not clear. The only idea of truth possible for reason has been found. But do we not risk remaining with a mere idea? That is the question. Truth is undoubtedly that which we said about it, but whether truth exists at all—that we do not know. This question is on the agenda. But before going forward in the investigation of our present question, let me clarify the idea of the Trihypostatic God (which we have hitherto discussed in philosophical terms) using the language of theology.

As is well known, the idea of unisubstantiality or consubstantiality is expressed by the term *homoousios*. Around this term and because of it there occurred, in essence, all of the trinitarian disputes. To look into the history of these disputes is to survey all the colors and shades of the idea of consubstantiality. But I can free myself from this labor by referring to "histories of the dogmatic disputes." ⁵⁵

^a "Trinity unisubstantial and indivisible, unity trihypostatic and consubstantial" is the patristic definition of the Trinity.

As is well known, neither secular pagan literature nor the Antenicene ecclesiastical literature knew a distinction between the words ousia and hypostasis, viewed later as termini technici. In philosophical usage, ousia was doubtless equated with hypostasis. That was the case even in the 5th century. There is every reason to think that the fathers of the first ecumenical council also accepted the words "hypostasis" and "essence" as equivalent and in no wise had in mind that distinction between them that was introduced by later thought. St. Athanasius the Great used them as equivalent, and even thirty-five years after the Council of Nicaea, he decisively affirmed in one of his epistles that "hypostasis is essence and signifies nothing but being itself." On the same ground as Athanasius stood the old generation of Nicaeans.⁵⁶ And at the end of the 4th century, St. Jerome, in an epistle to Pope Damas, states that "the school of secular sciences knows no other meaning of the word hypostasis than essence (usian)."57 But it is also well known that the two terms were distinguished in later theology. They were distinguished, yes. But were they distinct in content? There is no doubt that they are distinguishable from each other the way "right" is distinguishable from "left" and "left" from "right." But is their content distinct nonrelatively, in itself? Is it correct to affirm that one term, hypostasis, signifies the individual, whereas the other term, ousia, or essence, signifies the general?

Here, the answer may, first, be given by the fact that two words are chosen which in all ways coincide in content. Why is this the case? It is the case only because the two things they signify differ from each other only relatively, mutually, not in themselves.

If we may permit ourselves a crude comparison, the contents of the terms considered relate to each other in the same way as an object and its mirror image, as the right and left hands, as dextrorotatory and levorotatory crystals, etc. In all these cases the significant difference between one object and the other is perceived as wholly obvious, but it cannot be logically characterized except relatively, in the relation between the two objects. In perception, not one and the same thing is given, but when we are asked, What precisely constitutes the difference? we must in fact identify the two objects and are formally compelled to accept identity.⁵⁸

This is also the case with regard to the terms "hypostasis" and "essence." For "consubstantiality" signifies the concrete unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but in no wise a nominal unity. In Athanasius and the older Nicaeans, *homoousios* is directly equivalent to *ek ousias tou Patros*. But if this is the case, then *hypostasis* is, so to speak, the personal essence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, insofar as each of them is considered separately from the others; no one hypostasis is fused with any other, but neither is it separable from the others. If terminologically, formally, the word *hypostasis* became fundamentally distinct from *ousia*, then, in content, in its logical significance, *hypostasis* remains definitely

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the same thing as *ousia*. The immeasurable greatness of the Nicaean fathers was expressed precisely in the fact that they dared to use terms that were completely identical in content, by faith defeating rationality and, by virtue of this daring flight, acquiring the power to express—even with purely verbal clarity—the inexpressible mystery of the Trinity. From this it is clear that all attempts to distinguish *ousia* from *hypostasis*, to attribute to each of them an independent, not mutually relative logical position outside the context of dogma, that all such attempts must inevitably lead (and have led) in practice to the rationalization of dogma, to the "cutting of the Uncuttable," ⁵⁹ to so-called tritheism, or the three-god heresy.

The accusation of tritheism has hung over the heads of the Cappodocians^b since ancient times. To be sure, this accusation is unjust, but it is highly significant. The homoiousians distinguished themselves by an even greater deviation toward rationalism. Homoiousios or homoios kat ousian means "of a similar essence," "with a similar essence," and, even if it be given the significance of homoios kata panta, "similar in all," it can never signify the numerical and concrete unity which is indicated by homoousios. The whole power of the mysterious dogma is at once established by the one word homoousios, which was sovereignly proclaimed at the Council of 318, because this word stands for both a real unity and a real distinction. It is impossible to mention without reverent fear and holy trepidation that moment—infinitely significant and unique in its philosophical and dogmatic importance—when the thunder of Homoousios first roared over the City of Victory. Here, it was a question not of a special theological problem but of a radical self-determination of the Church of Christ. And the single word homoousios expressed not only a christological dogma but also a spiritual evaluation of the rational laws of thought. Here rationality was given a death blow. Here for the first time a new principle of the reason's activity was proclaimed *urbi et orbi*.

Let us recall what the whole of the Christian life-understanding consists of. It is the development of a musical theme which is a system of dogmas, dogmatics. But what is dogmatics? It is the Creed analyzed into its component parts. But what is the Creed? It is nothing but an expansion of the baptismal formula: "In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." And this formula is unquestionably the unfolding of the word *homoousios*. To consider the many-branched and wide-spreading mustard tree of the Christian life-understanding as having grown from the seed of the idea of "consubstantiality" is not only a logical possibility. No, that is precisely the way it was historically. The term *homoousios*

^b Three great theologians of the 4th century, Basil the Great (329–379), Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335–c. 394), and Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329–390) (also called the Divine, or the Theologian), make up the Cappodocians (i.e., of Cappodocia in Asia Minor). It has been said of this group that "in this trinity are concentrated all the rays of that brilliant epoch of Christianity."

expresses precisely this antinomic seed of Christian life-understanding, this one name ("in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit," and not "in the names" ⁶⁰) of the Three Hypostases. ⁶¹

To a significant degree, philosophical tendencies were the source of homoiousian rationalization. That is perhaps why the ascetic and spiritual athlete Athanasius the Great (who perhaps by determination from above did not receive a philosophical education and, in any case, broke inwardly with everything that is not from faith) was able to express with mathematical precision what, even in a later epoch, eluded precise expression for intellectual minds.

It is remarkable how much effort had to be expended by the Cappadocians—who were proud of their university years!—to resist the philosophical terminology which pulled them toward tritheism. A. A. Spassky says that "commonality of nature (*koinōnia*), according to the sense of the entire terminology of the Cappadocians, does not yet speak of the real being of the essence and does not guarantee its numerical unity. Nature in Divinity and in men can be one, but it finds its concrete realization in hypostases." 62

Despite this tritheistic tone of their writings, in their souls the Cappodocians were fully orthodox, and it is clear that their inner understanding went immeasurably further than their imprecise words. As if correcting himself, Basil the Great announces in his 38th Epistle: "Do not be amazed if we say that one and the same thing is united and separated, and if we conceive, as if through a glass darkly, some new and exceptional united separation and separated union." And Gregory of Nyssa in his *Great Catechism* decisively takes a standpoint above rationality: "He who penetrates with precision into the depths of mystery, that one, although he gains a certain idea (an idea that is modest on account of unknowability) of the knowledge of God, cannot, however, clarify with words this ineffable depth of mystery: how one and the same thing is both countable and evades counting, is seen as separate and consists in unity, is distinguishable in hypostasis but is not divisible in subject."

Thus, the formula of "one essence" and "three hypostases" is acceptable only insofar as it simultaneously identifies and distinguishes the terms "hypostasis" and "essence," i.e., only insofar as it again amounts to the purely mystical, supralogical doctrine of the old Nicaeans or to the word homoousios. And conversely, every attempt to interpret rationally the above formula by placing different contents into the terms ousia and homoousios inevitably leads either to Sabellianism or to tritheism. Pre-Athanasian theology—the theology of the apologists grounded in ancient philosophy—committed the first kind of error (that of different kinds of monarchianism), giving disproportionate weight to the unity of God's essence and thereby depriving the hypostases of their proper being. This theology either subordinated the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father

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or it fused the hypostases. Post-Athanasian theology, which also constrained itself with the terms of ancient philosophy, sinned in the opposite sense, for, in counterweight to apologetical monarchianism, it insisted overmuch on the independence of the hypostases and thereby fell into tritheism. If the first tended to turn the hypostatic multiplicity of Divinity into a mere appearance, the second, without doubt, tended to eliminate Divinity's essential unity.

The equilibrium of the two principles is in Athanasius. His theology is the point at which the error becomes precisely zero before the doctrine goes from minus to plus. Therefore, we can say that Athanasius the Great is the bearer *par excellence* of the Church consciousness in regard to what we are examining—the dogma of the Trinity. After him, theology was perhaps refined in particular questions, but in which of the later fathers in the age of the councils was the equilibrium of the two principles so mathematically precise and in which of these fathers was the supralogical character of the dogma shown more clearly than in this defender of consubstantiality, this saint, of the orthodox the most orthodox?

A. A. Spassky⁶⁵ states that: "Among the defenders of the Council of Nicaea, Athanasius occupied an exceptional place; he was not only their leader but also the index of their position in the Church. All the tricks directed against the Nicene Creed usually began with Athanasius; his exile served as a clear symptom of the intensifying reaction; his victory was the victory of the Council of Nicaea and of its doctrine. It can be said that Athanasius carried the Nicene Creed on his shoulders out of the storm of doubts caused by this Creed in the East. It is not by chance that the later generation of Nicaeans called him a savior of the Church and a pillar of Orthodoxy."

It is not by chance, let me add, that Gregory of Nazianzus cannot find sufficiently strong words to praise the Great Alexandrian. He is "blessed, a truly godly man and a great trumpet of truth." He "healed the infirmity" of the Church; he is a "courageous champion of the Word" and a "builder of souls." It is not by chance that "to suffer something excruciating to the utmost for Athanasius was deemed by ascetics to be the highest accomplishment of ascetic piety, was considered by them to be much more pleasing to God than prolonged fasting, lying on the bare ground, and other torments in which they always delight."66 "Most holy eye of the universe, the archpriest of priests, great confessor, this great voice, the pillar of faith, this—if one can use this expression—second great light and precursor of Christ, deceased in honorable old age, full of worthy days, after having given guidance and performed exploits of asceticism, after having gained great renown for his hand, after the living death, The Trinity transported him to Itself, the Trinity for Which he lived and suffered so much torment." "I am confident," adds Gregory, "that by this description everyone will recognize Athanasius."67 Indeed, he was always

vigilant. When an attempt was made to distort *homoousios* in a subtly rationalistic way, Athanasius hurried to warn Jovian about those who "pretend that they confess the Nicene faith, but in reality reject it, reinterpreting the term *homoousios*." And he did not hesitate to call them Arians. And that is why, as Gregory of Nazianzus points out, he understood that "together with syllables the ends of the universe will fall apart," that there cannot even be a small retreat here, that every rationalization, however seemingly subtle, of the dogma makes it "a salt without taste," that it is not just a distortion of dogma when the eternal Pillar of the Truth is replaced by dust carried by the wind over the roads. "The Nicene fathers," according to Athanasius himself, "should be venerated, but those who have not accepted the Creed should be considered anything at all, but least of all Christians." The whole meaning of the dogma is in the Athanasian position on *homoousios*. And outside of "consubstantiality" there is only the vanity of restless, human opinions.

That is why crude Rome too was not taken in by any subtleties, and all the flattering, over-subtle speeches of the eastern semi-Arians, like multitudinously noisy waves, broke on the rock of faith—on the unbending demand of Rome that they return to the Nicene Creed.

Let us return to the problem of skepticism. In order that the law of identity be given not only as a blind principle of rationality, in order to liberate oneself from the empiricism of rationality, which is no better than the empiricism of sensuousness, it was necessary to go beyond rationality, to enter into the domain where rationality with all its norms is rooted. This means that it was necessary to achieve in experience a synthesis of the nonrelative and relation, of the primary and the derived, of rest and motion, of unit and infinity, etc. Rationality does not accept these combinations. Where every A is A and only A, the sought-for synthesis is absolutely impossible. If it is possible at all, it is possible only beyond rationality. For rationality, a synthesis once achieved will be conceived as an ideal limit of rationality, as transcendental in relation to rationality, as a regulative principle. But in an effort to embrace this synthesis, rationality, by its very structure, cannot apprehend the wholeness of this synthesis and inevitably breaks it down into incompatible, mutually opposed terms. Coincidentia oppositorum unrestrainably falls apart into mutually exclusive opposita. And once this happens, for rationality there will become inevitable either the elimination of one of the terms in favor of the other or their rhythmic alternation—a battle, like the battle between visual fields of different color in a stereoscope. One or the other, but not a synthesis! It is appropriate to mention that the victory of one term over the other will correspond to one heresy or another, while the alternation of fields will correspond to the rational "orthodoxy" of the textbooks, which is actually a false orthodoxy, a bouquet of incompatible heresies.

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In seeking certitude, we collided with a combination of terms that for rationality does not have and cannot have meaning. "Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity" does not signify anything for rationality if this expression is taken in its true content, not in a content that indulges rationality. This is a kind of square root of 2. Nevertheless, the present norm of rationality itself, i.e., the law of identity and the law of sufficient reason, leads us to such a combination, demands that this combination have its meaning, that it be the starting point of all knowledge. Condemning itself, rationality demands but cannot encompass Trinity in Unity. But in order to have experience of this demand, of this postulate of reason (if it can be experienced at all!), reason must think it, must construct for itself a new norm. For this norm it is necessary to defeat rationality—the only thing that we have, even if it is not justified: Divine wisdom and human wisdom have collided. Therefore, from itself, reason could never have arrived at the possibility of this combination. Only the authority of the One Who has Power can be the point of departure for such efforts.⁶⁸

Having come to trust and to believe that the Truth consists in this effort, reason must become emancipated from its limitedness within the confines of rationality. Reason must reject the closedness of rational constructions and turn to a new norm. It must become a "new" reason. A free act of ascesis is required here. Free, for reason can make an effort and rise to what is better, whereas it does not have to do this. It could instead remain content with what it already is: finite, conditional, and "good." Ascesis, for what is required is an effort, an exertion, a self-renunciation, a casting of the "old Adam" from oneself while everything that is given—"natural," finite, familiar, conditional—attracts one to itself. What is necessary is self-overcoming, faith. If the "untrembling Heart of immutable Truth (alētheiēs eupeitheos atremes ētor)" for which Parmenides⁶⁹ yearned is at all possible, the path to Him cannot avoid the Gethsemanic ascesis of faith.

The Arians and the Orthodox: this is a typical case where two positions clearly contradict each other. "At the same time that the Orthodox," writes one investigator "posed the question of whether it is necessary to conceive in God three real Persons, three indivisible unities of the Divine Being, and answered this question with a categorical affirmation, the Arians asked, Is it possible to conceive the trinity of the Divine Persons together with the indivisible unity of their being? And they answered: no, it is not possible." Accomplishing the ascesis of faith, the Orthodox sought what is needful, higher, whereas the Arians, inwardly protecting themselves, asked in a calculating way: "Will the Truth not demand a sacrifice from us"? And, seeing the Garden of Gethsemane, the Arians retreated. Both made a free choice. But the Arians used their freedom to enslave themselves, while the Orthodox used it to free themselves

from the bondage of fleshly limitation. "You dare to teach and conceive the impossible," Eunomius wrote to Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa concerning the christological dogma.⁷¹ That is a cry of the flesh, a cry of rationality, a rationality that wanders about the elements of the world and egotistically trembles in fear for its integrity, a rationality that is self-satisfied despite its total inner disintegration, a rationality that dares, in its infinite fear of the smallest pain, to adapt very Truth to itself, to its blind and meaningless norms. But for animal fear for oneself there is only one cure: the scourge. The One Who has Power has raised this scourge above corruptible rationality. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in the world shall keep it unto life eternal" (John 12:24, 25). He who does not wish to lose his life will burn in Gehenna, in the inextinguishable fire of epoche, where "their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched."

Thus, the point of departure is total trust and the total victory of the will over the attraction to the flesh, over vacillations that keep one from the ascent, from the submission of rationality to faith. Sweating drops of blood, I will say: "*Credo*, *quia absurdum est*. I want nothing of my own. I do not even want my rational mind. Thou alone, Thou only. *Dic animae meae: salus tua Ego sum!* Not my will but Thy will be done. Trinity in Unity, have mercy upon me!"⁷²

This necessary stage of personal development is, in the history of the Church, typically represented by the second century and is inevitably connected with the name Tertullian, who in his fiery person expressed the first step of faith in all its purity: *Credo quia absurdum*.⁷³ I believe despite the moans of the rational mind. I believe precisely because in the very hostility of rationality to my belief I see the pledge of something new, something unheard-of and higher. I will not descend into the lowlands of rationality whatever the terrors with which it might frighten me. I have seen already that if I remain with rationality I will die in epoche. I now wish to be irrational. And in answer to the flattering assurances of rationality, I will scream: "You are lying! I have heard this a thousand times!". And then let the pitiless scourge whistle.

Blessed is he who has preserved the customs of the fathers, their dark tradition, who answers with a tear the singing of the psalm; who, having with his will torn away the mind's doubt, reads the Holy Bible with tender devotion, and, hearing at night the churchbell ringing, lights with reverence, with prayer, the sacred candle before the saintly image, and weeps before it.

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Then, having risen onto a higher step, having assured for myself the impossibility of slipping to the rationalistic plane, I say to myself: Now I believe and hope to understand what I believe. Now I will not transform the infinite and eternal into the finite and the temporal. The higher unity will not fall apart in my case into incompatible moments. Now I see that my faith is a source of higher understanding, and that my rational mind gets its depth in this faith. And resting from the difficulty experienced, I calmly repeat after Anselm of Canterbury: "Credo ut intelligam. At first it appeared to me that I 'know' something; after the crisis, I began to 'believe.' Now I know because I believe."

It took nine centuries for mankind to reach this state. And having said this, I ascend to the third step. I come to understand my faith. I see that it is worship of the "Known God," that I not only believe but know. The boundaries of knowledge and belief merge. The rational barriers melt and are in flux. All of rationality is transformed into a new essence. And, joyous, I cry out: *Intelligo ut credam*! Glory be to God for all. "Now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known" (1 Cor. 13:12). It took another nine centuries for mankind to ascend to this step.

These are the three steps of faith, in both phylogeny and ontogeny. But, in describing these steps, I have gone too far forward. It is necessary to turn back and to disclose the nature of the final step of the belief in the Holy Trinity. In other words, it is necessary to disclose how the truthfulness of the dogma is really experienced, how epoche is really resolved.

The ascesis of faith overcomes, defeats, overturns the rationalistic "absurdity" of dogma. One is conscious that this ascesis is the source of knowledge. But the final goal, after all, is the *givenness* of knowledge. In the conditions of earthly life, this givenness has two steps: symbolic knowledge and knowledge that is immediate—though not integral.

The ascesis of faith consists in going from the given assertoric truth of the world to the apodictic, but not yet given, Truth of dogma. It consists in preferring the certain but not yet present "there" to the doubtful though present "here."

The law of identity and its higher form are understood by us in their possibility. The demand that one apprehend the reality of this possibility signifies the necessity of going out of the domain of concepts into the sphere of living experience. Reasonable intuition would be the final all-resolving link in the chain of conclusions. Without this intuition, we revolve in the domain of postulates and presuppositions of certain knowledge. It is true that these presuppositions are inevitable, but we do not see whether they are satisfied. The whole chain, thrown into the sky, has for

^c The Russian original says precisely the opposite, but that appears to contradict the meaning intended here.

a moment become suspended in the air, has for a moment become frozen in a fixed position. But if it does not catch "there," it will fall back on our heads with a sinister clanging and rumble. Or perhaps the Truth does not exist at all? Then all of reality becomes an absolutely meaningless and insane nightmare, and we are compelled to pass from a reasonable but excruciating epoche to an insane and endless agony, eternally suffocating, eternally dying without the Truth.

Either the Triune Christian God or the dying in insanity. *Tertium non datur*. Pay attention: I do not exaggerate. That is precisely the way things are. I lack the words to express myself even more drastically. Between eternal life inside the Trinity and the eternal second death, there is no clearance, not even a hair's breadth. Either/or. Rationality in its constitutive logical norms is either completely absurd, insane down to its most microscopic structure, composed of unprovable and therefore wholly random elements; or its ground is the supralogical. Either/or. Either it is necessary to admit the fundamental randomness of the laws of logic or it is necessary to recognize the supralogical ground of these norms, a ground which, from the viewpoint of rationality itself, is postulatively necessary but which therefore has an antinomic character *for rationality*.

Both the one and the other lead beyond the limits of rationality. The first decomposes rationality, introducing into the consciousness an eternally insane agony, while the second reinforces it with the ascesis of selfovercoming, with a cross that for rationality is an absurd self-renunciation. The faith by which we are saved is the beginning and the end of the cross and of co-crucifixion with Christ. But so-called "rational" faith, faith with rational proofs, faith according to Tolstoy's formula, "I want to understand in such a way that every unexplainable proposition would appear to me a necessity of reason,"⁷⁶ such faith is a harsh, cruel stony growth in the heart, which keeps the heart from God. Such faith is a slander against God, a monstrous product of human egotism, which desires to subordinate even God to itself. There are many kinds of atheism, but the worst is the so-called rational faith. It is the worst, for, besides the rejection of the object of faith ("things not seen" [Heb. 11:1]), it is hypocritical, accepts God but rejects His very essence, His "invisibility," i.e., His suprarationality.

I ask myself, What is "rational faith"? I answer: "Rational faith" is foulness and abomination before God. You will not believe until you reject your own self, your own law. But "rational faith" does not desire to reject selfhood. It even asserts that it knows the Truth. But if it has not rejected itself, "rational faith" can have only itself. The truth is known through itself, in no other way. In order to know the Truth, it is necessary to have it, and for this it is necessary to stop being only oneself and to participate in the Truth itself. "Rational faith" is the beginning of satanic pride, the desire not to receive God into oneself, but to try to pass oneself

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off as God. "Rational faith" is imposture and self-willfulness. The rejection of monism in thought for the sake of God is precisely the beginning of faith. Monistic continuity is the banner of the seditious rationality of a creature that has renounced its Principle and Root and has disintegrated into the dust of self-assertion and self-annihilation. Dualistic discontinuity is the banner of a rationality that ruins itself for the sake of its Principle and, in unity with Him, acquires its renewal and strength. In the opposition of these two terms is the opposition between a creature who dares to desire to take the place of the Creator and is inevitably cast from Him into the agony of eternal annihilation, and a creature who humbly accepts eternal deification from the Truth: "Behold the servant of the Lord! Let it be for me according to Thy word."

But that is the case if the Truth exists. The latter condition, like a sentry post before a bridge, stands before the passage to the domain of the Truth. Between the domain of knowledge in concepts, of knowledge about the Truth, of postulative and therefore hypothetical knowledge, and the presupposed, demanded domain of knowledge in intuition, of knowledge of the Truth, of essential knowledge, which contains its own ground and is therefore absolute, there lies an abyss, which cannot be avoided by any detours, across which there is no strength to leap. For it is necessary to step onto a wholly new land, about which we know nothing. We do not even know if this land really exists. We do not know, for the spiritual goods we seek lie outside the domain of fleshly knowledge. They are what "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man" (1 Cor 2:9; cf. Is. 64:4). But the bridge leading somewhere, perhaps to that presupposed edge of the abyss, to the Eden of unfading spiritual joys, or perhaps leading nowhere, is faith. We must either die in agony on our side of the abyss or go blindly and seek a "new earth," "wherein dwelleth righteousness" (2 Peter 3:13). We are free to choose, but we must decide either on the one or on the other: Either the search for Trinity or the dying in madness. Choose, worm and nonentity: Tertium non datur!

It is perhaps in the contemplation of the inevitability of such a choice that Blaise Pascal had the idea of wagering on God. 77 On the one hand, everything, but an everything that is not yet certain. On the other hand, a thing that seems to be something for the fool but that for one who knows its true value is absolutely nothing without that other thing, and everything if that other thing is found. The idea of such a wager was expressed most clearly by a certain merchant, who had hung a multitude of holy lamps, icons, crosses, and other sacred objects in his store. When an "intellectual" began to express his skepticism about all of this, the merchant said: "Sir! All this costs me 50 roubles a year. That's nothing for me. But what if it works?" Of course, such a formulation of Pascal's wager sounds crude, even cynical. Of course, even in Pascal it can appear

to be overcalculating. Nevertheless, the general meaning of this wager, always equal to itself, is unquestionable: it pays to exchange certain nothing for uncertain infinity, especially since the one who exchanges can once again receive his nothing, but this time as something. But if, for abstract thought, the profit in such an exchange is immediately clear, this idea cannot be translated at once into the domain of the concrete life of the soul. The exposed selfhood defends itself like a wounded beast.

The self-assertive pagan rationalism of ancient times maintained that Christ's promises are unprovable, for they refer to future goods. But to this Arnobius answered that of two uncertain things the one that gives us hope must always be preferred to the one that does not.⁷⁸

Thinking man had already understood that, on this shore, he has nothing. But to step out on the bridge and to cross it, an effort is needed, an expenditure of strength. But what if this expenditure is for nothing? Is it not better to remain in a death agony here, before the bridge? Perhaps when one goes out onto the bridge, one will walk all of one's life eternally expecting the other side. What is better: to die eternally, in sight perhaps of the promised land, to freeze in the icy cold of absolute nothing and to burn in the eternal fire of pyrrhonian epoche; or to exhaust one's last strength, perhaps for a chimera, a mirage that moves further away as the traveler makes an effort to come closer? I remain, I remain here. But excruciating sorrow and sudden hope do not permit me to die peacefully. Then I leap up and run headlong. But the cold of a despair just as sudden cuts my legs out from under me; and infinite fear possesses my soul. I run back headlong.

To go and not to go, to seek and not to seek, to hope and to despair, to be afraid of expending one's last strength and, because of this fear, to expend much more of this strength running back and forth. Where is the way out? Where is the refuge? To whom, to what can one rush for help? "Lord, Lord, if Thou existeth, help my insane soul. Come Thyself, Thou Thyself, lead me to Thyself! Whether I want it or not, save me.⁷⁹ As Thou canst and as Thou knowest, allow me to see Thee. Forcibly and through suffering, draw me to Thyself."

This cry of ultimate despair is the beginning of a new stage of philosophizing, the beginning of a living faith. I do not know if the Truth exists or not. But I feel with my whole being that I cannot be without it. And I know that if the Truth exists, it is everything for me: reason, goodness, strength, life, and happiness. Perhaps it does not exist, but I love it. I love it more than anything that exists. My relation to the Truth is a relation to something that exists. And I love it, this Truth which perhaps does not exist, with all my soul and all my mind. For its sake, I renounce everything, even my own questions and my own doubt. I who doubt behave with it as one who does not doubt. I who stand on the edge of nothingness walk as if I were already on the other side, in the land of

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reality, groundedness, and knowledge. The triple act of faith, hope, and love overcomes the inertia of the law of identity. I stop being I, my thought stops being my thought. By an unfathomable act I renounce the self-affirmation "I = I." Something or Someone helps me escape my selfenclosedness. According to St. Macarius the Great, "The Truth itself stimulates man to seek the Truth."80 Something or Someone extinguishes in me the idea that I am the center of philosophical seeking, and, in place of this idea, I put the idea of the Truth itself. Being nothing but what I have been given, I, given to myself, unfathomably for myself renounce this my sole property and bring to the Truth this sole sacrifice that I can make. But again I bring this sacrifice not by my power but by the power of the Truth itself. Previously, sinful selfhood had put itself in the place of God, but now with the help of God I put God in my place, God, Whom I do not yet know but for whom I yearn and whom I love. I renounce the fearful worry about what will become of me and decisively perform an operation on myself. I abandon the edge of the abyss, and with a firm step run onto the bridge, this bridge which perhaps will collapse beneath me.

My fate, my reason, the very soul of the whole search, that is, the requirement of certitude, I entrust into the hands of the Truth itself. For the Truth's sake, I renounce proof. In this lies the difficulty of the ascesis, that one brings as sacrifice what is most treasured, what is first and foremost, and knows that if this too deceives, if this sacrifice too is in vain, then one has no place to go. For it is the final means. If the Triune Truth itself should turn out not to exist, where would one seek the Truth? And when I step out onto the bridge of faith, a new depth is revealed in the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (Heb. 11:1)—in those words which previously were so unacceptably contradictory for rationality.


For greater concreteness of exposition let us briefly examine the main directions in the understanding of faith that are contained in the very etymology of the word "faith" in various languages.

The Russian "verit" (to believe) signifies, strictly speaking, to trust (doveriat'), i.e., it indicates a moral connection between the one who believes and the one whom he believes. Somewhat akin to this is the German glauben, as are the related erlauben (to permit), loben (to praise), geloben (to vow), and lieben (to love), as well as the English "believe," which derive from the root lub (cf. the root liub in the Russian word liubit', to love) and originally meant to venerate, to trust, and also to approve. The Greek pisteuein is related to peithestai, to obey or rather to allow oneself to be convinced, but it also refers to the person himself: "to award trust," to "trust." Here one can formulate the following proportion: pistis:pistos = faith:faithful (Russ. vera:vernyi).

The Hebrew *ge'emin*, from the verb 'aman, to support, signifies the firmness of a person or thing when one rests upon them, and, also—which is

extremely important—it turns out to be of the same root as 'emet, truth. Hence, if the Russian verit' and the German glauben denote the subjective moment of faith, as a moral activity of relation to Some Person, then the Hebrew ge'emin denotes the nature of this Person as the nature of the Truth and signifies faith as a state of truth, as the abiding in the Truth, which is understood, of course, in the Hebrew sense.

Further, the Latin *fides*, like the Greek *pistis*, signifies the awarding of trust and trust itself, whereas the verb *credere* derives from the Sanskrit *šraddhā*, i.e., "to place one's heart in [God]," so that it has, according to the Latin tradition, a sacred meaning.⁸¹



Inflammatur. I burn but I do not exhaust myself.

v. Letter Four: The Light of the Truth

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You soar more easily and higher than I above the "flaming wall of the universe," my winged Friend. Nevertheless, I write and will write to you—more for my own sake than for yours. Unwaveringly, the lamp throws its beam of light on the Savior's Image. It is now a silent autumn night. Snow lies deep beneath the window. All is quiet; I do not even hear the night watchman's stick. I alone languish here, in my cell, and it seems to me that I died long ago. In these careless and watery lines—is my connection with life; and if I have not yet died completely, it is because of my conversation with you, with you alone, my quiet, gentle Guardian, the very thought of whom cleanses and uplifts me. Is it possible that I should not jot down my thoughts for you? For I hope that perhaps you will hear me to some extent in these letters, and then a stream of quiet reconciliation, purity, and faith will pour into me. Faith . . .

It was in faith that I unexpectedly found for myself the first hint of what I had been seeking. It sometimes happens in February that the cleanwashed sun shines with the clearest of smiles and a soft wind blows. Although spring is far away, something springlike is in the air. I think of the poem: "... nature, as if in its sleep, encounters the morning of the year ..." So it is in prayer as well. Having made a strenuous effort over myself for love of the Truth, I entered into personal, living communion with the Truth. (I add, without eagerness, the formal disclaimer: if the Truth exists at all.) I renounced myself and thereby violated the lower law of identity,

for the naked "I" stopped existing. "I" was fortified, but in a new sense. That "I" which demanded proof began dimly to apprehend such proof, began to feel that there would be proof. As after an illness, a kind of recovery occurred. An invigorating freshness was felt and the distant roar of Eternity itself was heard; I walked as if in a predawn mist and regarded the hazy features of the Truth itself. It was as if my body had been turned into soft wax, as if milk were flowing through all my veins, for it is precisely this way after a long prayer with genuflections. My simile appears to be funny but I will not seek a better one. Love for people has somehow become connected with this, and in love I found the first stage of the intuition that I had long desired.

If God exists, and for me this was becoming unquestionable, He necessarily is absolute love. But love is not an attribute of God. God would not be absolute love if He were love only for another, for the conditional, for the corruptible, for the world. For then God's love would depend on conditional being and would thus be accidental. God is an absolute being because He is the substantial act of love, act-substance. God, or the Truth, ⁸² not only has love but, above all, "God is love, *ho Theos agapē estin*" (1 John 4:8, 16). That is, love is God's essence, His own nature, and not only His providential relationship, which is proper to Him. In other words, "God is love" (more precisely, He is "Love"), and not only "the Loving One," even if the "perfectly Loving One."⁸³

This proposition is the summit of theoretical ("negative") knowledge and the "mountain pass" to practical ("positive") knowledge.84 Heretofore every judgment has been accompanied by its inevitable shadow, the condition: "If God exists at all." Now in the light of intuitive-discursive knowledge, this shadow fades and disappears. But together with it the possibility of persuasion disappears, because the time for ascetic action has come. Here, one can only indicate in a general way some of the features of this new path, but only through personal experience can one become persuaded of the correctness of all that follows. That which for one who has experienced is already absolute knowledge is, for the theoretician, only a continuation of probabilism. But for the philosopher the experimentum crucis has been completed. His hypothetical construction turned out to be either Truth (and then certain Truth) or an empty conjecture. But if this construction is false, then there is in general no Truth. In this case the very proposition asserting falsehood cannot be true, and so on. The philosopher falls into epoche and is compelled to begin everything anew, to toil, to try again, and to believe, to believe eternally—to believe unto agony and death. He who desires Truth cannot be satisfied with mere nihilism. "Believe in the Truth, put your hope in the Truth, love the Truth." That is the voice of the Truth itself, constantly sounding in the philosopher's soul. And if he were to encounter failure in the first attempt at faith, he would make the attempt again with redoubled determination. Moreover, I write all this more as a formal answer to the question "But what if?" than in a substantial way, for experience proves that faith is always successfully attained. As the Bible says of Abraham: "He believed in the Lord; and he counted it to him for righteousness" (Gen. 15:6 = Rom. 4:3). He obeyed the mysterious call of the Unknown Truth. "By faith Abraham, when he was called to go out into a place which he should receive for an inheritance, obeyed; and he went out, not knowing whither he went. By faith he sojourned in the land of promise, as in a strange country . . . " (Heb. 11:8, 9).

As it was for Abraham, so it was for the other righteous (cf. Heb. 11). "And truly, if they had been mindful of that country from whence they came out, they might have had opportunity to have returned. But now they desire a better country, that is, an heavenly: wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God" (Heb. 11:14–15). That is the experience of history. The righteous have wholeheartedly striven toward the "Invisible" Heaven, toward the Heaven not given to them, and Heaven received them. And the philosopher who strives to attain the Truth will return neither to the idolatry of blind intuition nor to the self-willfulness of proud discursion. No, he will not cease striving toward the

Known God.85

But let us look more closely at how and by virtue of what the philosopher is received by Heaven.

Whatever we may think of human reason, we can affirm that it is an organ of man, his vital activity, his real power, logos. Contrarily, if we recognize reason to be autonomous and therefore something unreal, dianoia, we are inevitably doomed to a just as indisputable and predetermined denial of the reality of knowledge. 86 For if reason is not associated with being, then being is not associated with reason, is alogical. Illusionism and all kinds of nihilism, which end in flaccid and pitiful skepticism, are then inevitable. The only way out of this quagmire of relativity and conditionality is the recognition that reason is associated with being and that being is associated with reason. And if that is the case, the act of knowing is not only a gnoseological but also an ontological act, not only ideal but also real. Knowing is a real going of the knower out of himself, or (what is the same thing) a real *going* of what is known *into* the knower, a real unification of the knower and what is known.⁸⁷ That is the fundamental and characteristic proposition of Russian and, in general, of all Eastern philosophy. We deduced this proposition previously in a somewhat different and more certain way, directly indicating that the heart and soul of this "going out of oneself" is the act of faith in the religious sense, in the orthodox sense, for the true "going out" is precisely faith. Everything else may be an illusion and a temptation. Thus, knowing is not the capturing of a dead object by a predatory subject of knowledge, but a living moral communion of persons, each serving for each as both object and subject. Strictly speaking, only a person is known and only by a person.

In other words, *essential knowing*, understood as an act of the knowing subject, and essential truth, understood as a known real object, are both real, although they are distinguished in the abstract rational mind.

Essential knowing of the Truth, i.e., communion with the Truth itself, is therefore the real entering into the interior of the Divine Triunity, and not only an ideal touching of the Triunity's outer form. Therefore, true knowledge, knowledge of the Truth, is possible only through the transubstantiation of man, through his deification, through the acquisition of love as the Divine essence: he who is not with God does not know God. In love and only in love is real knowledge of the Truth conceivable. On the other hand, knowledge of the Truth is revealed by love: he who is with Love is unable not to love. The cause cannot be distinguished from the effect here, for both are only aspects of the same mysterious fact, the fact of God's entering into me as a philosophizing subject and my entering into God as the objective Truth.

Considered within me (according to the mode "I"), "in itself," this "entering into" is knowledge. "For another" (according to the mode "Thou"), it is love. Finally, "for me," as objectified and objective (i.e., according to the mode "He"), it is beauty. In other words, perceived *in me* by another, my knowledge of God is love of the one who perceives. Contemplated objectively, by a third, love of another is beauty.

What for the subject of knowledge is truth is love of this subject on the part of the object of knowledge, while for one who contemplates knowledge (knowledge of the object by the subject) it is beauty.

"Truth, Good, and Beauty." This metaphysical triad is not three different principles, but one principle. It is one and the same spiritual life, but seen from different points of view. Spiritual life as emanating from "I," as having its center in "I," is the Truth. Perceived as the immediate action of another, it is Good. Objectively contemplated by a third, as radiating outward, it is Beauty.

Manifested truth is love. Realized love is beauty. Love is God's action in me and my action in God. This co-activity is the principle of my communion with Divine life and being, i.e., with essential love, for God's absolute truthfulness reveals itself precisely in love.

Knowing me as His creation, loving me through the Son as His "image," as His son, rejoicing in me in the Holy Spirit as His "likeness," God actively knows, loves, and rejoices in me, for I am given to Him. Here, the source of knowledge, love, and joy is God Himself. But my knowledge of God, my love of God, and my joy in God are passive, because God is only partly given to me and can be given only to the extent

of my God-likeness. The likening to God's love is active love of what is already given to me. Why love precisely, and not knowledge and joy? Because love is a substantial act, going from the subject to the object and having support in the object, whereas knowledge and joy are directed toward the subject, and the subject is the point of application of their force. God's love goes over to us, but knowledge and contemplative joy abide in Him. For this reason it is not the Hypostasis of the Father or the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit (Paraclete = Comforter, Giver of Joy) that became incarnate, but the Son-Word, the hypostatic Divine Love, the Father's Heart, if it is permissible to use Jacob Boehme's powerful phrase: the Son of God is "the heart in the Father, das Herz in dem Vater." 88

To avoid misunderstandings it is necessary to emphasize the *ontologism* of this understanding of love, an ontologism that has its historical roots in the ancient, realistic understanding of life. The modern, illusionistic understanding of life is dominated by the psychological interpretation of love, which, though not excluded by the ancient view, is impoverished in comparison with the latter. This new understanding starts, it appears, with Leibniz, and it is easy to see why. For Leibniz, "monads have neither windows nor doors" through which real interaction in love would occur. Therefore, doomed to the self-enclosedness of ontological egotism and purely internal states, they love only illusorily, not going out of themselves through love. Thus emerges, under the influence of Friedrich Spee, Leibniz's famous definition, so highly valued by him and so often repeated. 90

According to this definition, "love is a rejoicing in the happiness of another or others, considered also as one's own happiness." A similar definition appears in the unpublished fragments of Leibniz. This definition appears in *Definitio justitiae universalis*. And in the 1st letter to Arnauld (1671) it is stated that "love is pleasure in the happiness of another." In the letter to Arnauld of 23 March 1690, we find the same thing. Finally, in the foreword to the *Codex juris gentium diplomaticus* (1693), we read: "Charity is universal good will, and good will is a state of love or estimation. To love or esteem is to take pleasure in the happiness of another or (what is the same thing) to recognize the happiness of another as one's own (*Caritas est benevolentia universalis, et benevoltenia amandi sive diligendi habitus Amare autem sive diligere est felicitate alterius delectari, vel, quod eodem redit, felicitatem alienam adsciscere in suam)," etc. 92*

With small changes, Leibniz's definition has been repeated numerous times in subsequent philosophy.

According to Christian Wolff, "love is the disposition of the soul to receive pleasure from the happiness of another (amor est dispositio animae ad percipiendam voluptatem ex alterius felicitate)." Also: "The

disposition to produce significant satisfaction from the happiness of another—is love (*Die Bereitschaft aus eines andern Glück ein merkliches Vergnügen zu schöpfen—ist die Liebe*)."⁹⁴

Mendelssohn's definition is that "love is the pride of being satisfied with the happiness of another." 95

Just as illusory, if not more, is Spinoza's conception of love. We could have predicted this, knowing as we do that, for Spinoza, the essence of our soul lies in knowledge96 and that he calls the soul mens, which, strictly speaking, means mind, thought. "Love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Amor est laetitia concomitante idea causae externae)," he says in the Ethics. 97 The psychologism of these words is particularly typical if we take into consideration the general ontological slant of Spinozism. For Leibniz and his followers, love, as we have seen, is conditioned by the idea of the happiness of another. For Spinoza, "the idea of an external cause," i.e., the idea of some not-I, only accompanies enjoyment as a purely subjective state of I. But, in both conceptions, love is interpreted exclusively psychologically and thus is deprived of its significance as a value. Love can even be considered undesirable. If love does not lead anywhere metaphysically, if it does not really connect anyone with anyone else, if it is not ontological but only psychological, why should we then see in it anything more valuable than a mere titillation of the soul? Being a source of false ideas about the interaction of that which exists, love turns out to be false and harmful. For the psychological understanding, love is the same thing as desire. Here, this confusion is not at all an accidental and secondary feature of rationalistic philosophy. It is rather a deep-rooted, necessary consequence of the most essential principles of this understanding of life. For love is directed toward a person, whereas desire is directed toward a thing. But the rationalistic understanding of life does not distinguish, and is not able to distinguish, between a person and a thing. More precisely, it has only one category, the category of thingness, and therefore all things, including persons, are reified by this understanding, are taken as a thing, as res. This deficiency was pointed out by Schelling. 98 "The error of Spinoza's system," says Schelling "does not at all consist in the fact that he places things in God, but in the fact that he speaks of things, i.e., according to the abstract conception of cosmic entities, according to the conception of the infinite substance itself, which for Spinoza is also a thing. This is where we get the lifelessness of his system, the soullessness of the forms, the poverty of the concepts and expressions, the pitiless severity of the definitions, a severity that is in complete agreement with the abstractness of his mode of thinking. His mechanical view of nature also follows quite consistently from this."

If that is the case, what does the opposition between thing and person that lies at the basis of the opposition between desire and love consist in?

It consists in the fact that a thing is characterized through its outer unity, i.e., through the unity of the sum of its features, while a person has his essential character in an inner unity, i.e., in the unity of the activity of self-building, in that very same self-positing of I about which Fichte speaks. Therefore, the identity of things is established through the identity of concepts, while the identity of a person is established through the unity of his self-building or self-positing activity. But about two things it can never be said in the strict sense that they are "identical." They are only "similar," even if it be "in all things," *kata panta*. Therefore, the identity of things can be generic (*identitas generica*, *tautotēs tōi idei*⁹⁹), or specific (*identitas specifica*), i.e., an identity of features, according to some number of features, including coincidence according to a transfinite set of features and even (the limiting case) according to all features. Nevertheless, it cannot be a numerical identity (*identitas numerica*, *tautotēs kat arithmon*).

The concept of *numerical* identity is inapplicable to things. A thing can only be "similar" or "dissimilar"; it can never be "identical or "not identical." On the contrary, about two persons it is, in essence, impossible to say that they are "similar." One can only say that they are "identical" or "not identical." For persons as persons, only numerical identity is possible, no other. To be sure, one sometimes hears it said that two people are "similar," but this is an imprecise word-usage, for what is really meant is a similarity not of persons but of the properties of their psycho-physical mechanisms. That is, it is a question of what is not the person although it is in the person. A person, understood in the sense of a pure person, is for each I only an ideal, a limit of strivings and self-building. But for the love of pure persons, i.e., persons who have fully mastered the mechanism of their organization, who have spiritualized their body and soul, for the love of such persons only pure numerical identity, homoousia, is possible, whereas for pure things only generic similarity, homoiousia, is possible. Persons who are not yet pure, persons insofar as they are thinglike, fleshly, are capable of falling into the "similarity" of desire. But insofar as they are pure and have detached themselves from "thingness," they are capable of achieving the "identification" of love.

But what is this thingness of a person? It is the vacuous self-equality of the person, giving to the person the unity of a *concept* that is self-confined in the combination of its attributes, i.e., the unity of a dead, fixed concept. In other words, it is nothing but the rationalistic "comprehensibility" of a person, i.e., the subordination of a person to the rationalistic law of identity. On the contrary, the personal character of a person, this living unity of his self-building activity, the creative transcending of his self-enclosedness, constitutes his nonsubsumability in any concept, his "incomprehensibility," and therefore his unacceptability for rationalism. It is the victory over the law of identity that raises a person above a lifeless

thing and makes him a living center of activity. But it is clear that activity is essentially incomprehensible for rationalism, for activity is creativity, i.e., the addition to the given of that which is not yet given, and thus the overcoming of the law of identity.

Rationalism, i.e., the philosophy of concept and rationality, the philosophy of things and lifeless immobility, is wholly connected with the law of identity and can be succinctly characterized as a *homoiousian philosophy*. It is a fleshly philosophy.

By contrast, *Christian philosophy*, i.e., the philosophy of idea and reason, the philosophy of persons and creative acts, is based on the possibility of overcoming the law of identity and can be characterized as a *homoousian philosophy*. It is a spiritual philosophy.

The tendency to pure homoiousianism as to its limit determines the history of modern philosophy in Western Europe, whereas the attraction to pure homoousianism constitutes the distinctive nature of Russian (and of all Orthodox) philosophy. It does not bother us that neither in the West nor in Russia is there a completely homoiousian or homoousian thought. We know that the former is impossible except in the fires of Gehenna while the latter is impossible except in Paradise—in illuminated and spiritualized humanity. But the tendencies of the two philosophies are so definite that their classification according to their ideal limits is legitimate and convenient.

The present dominance of Western philosophy explains why the term "numerical identity" is so abused and little used today. When there is talk of identity, what one means—more or less decisively—is fullness of similarity, not more, as Destutt de Tracy¹⁰⁰ let slip at the beginning of the 19th century ("identity," he says, "is perfect and complete similarity") and Palagyi¹⁰¹ now says decisively, namely, that "'an identical truth' is one that can be represented in infinitely many matching acts of judgment." This (or a similar) idea is placed at the basis of the recent definition of identity in mathematical logic. Here, identity is conclusively and consciously supplanted by similarity.

The destruction of the idea of numerical identity is, as we have said, manifested most markedly in modern logic. But to discuss this in detail would be too much of a burden for the reader.

In those cases where numerical identity has been dealt with, the attempt to define this term has always remained either a simple clarification or an indication that the source of the idea of numerical unity must be sought in the self-identity of consciousness. Thus, Aristotle¹⁰² descriptively defines identity as "a kind of unity in existence, whether it is a question of several different entities (beings) or of only one entity, which is viewed as several. In this way, it is said, for example, that one and the same entity is identical to itself, and then this entity is viewed as if it were two entities instead of one."

On the other hand, according to Leibniz, 103 both a real and a moral personal identity are made known in the self-consciousness.

This idea, though in a highly modified form, was further developed by Kant, ¹⁰⁴ and, through Kant, it became the basis of Fichte's and Schelling's systems of speculative idealism. An uncountable number of times and in diverse variations, philosophers of the most different orientations have repeated the basic theme that the idea of identity in general is the reflection of the self-identity of I (either as a product of reflection or as a result of unconscious projection and habit). In other words, they have repeated that identity in the proper and primary sense can be perceived only in the self-identity of the person and not in the self-similarity of the hing. Finally, the "dean" ¹⁰⁵ of the Marburg school, Hermann Cohen, ¹⁰⁶ has announced that "the self-identity of being is a reflex of the identity of thought (*die Selbigkeit des Seins is ein Reflex der Identität des Denkens*)."

The general conclusion from the above is clear: the more rigorous is the definition of identity, the more distinctly will it isolate into its object the specific identity and the more decisively will it exclude numerical identity from its consideration. And, here, this definition concerns itself exclusively with things. But when one deals with numerical identity, all that can be done is to describe it, to explain it, by referring to the source of the idea of identity. And, here, this source, this proto-identity, is found in the depths of a living person.

It is natural that it could not be otherwise. For numerical identity is the most profound and, one might say, the unique characteristic of a living person. To define numerical identity is to define a person. ¹⁰⁷ But to define is to give a concept. However, it is impossible to give the concept of a person, for a person differs from a thing precisely by the fact that, in contrast to a thing, which is subordinate to a concept and therefore "conceptualizable," a person is "unconceptualizable," transcends all concepts. One can only create a symbol of the fundamental characteristic of a person, or a sign, a word, and, without defining this word, introduce it formally into a system of other words, arranging the matter in such a way that this word is subject to general operations on symbols, "as if" it were in fact the sign of a concept. As for the content of this symbol, it cannot be a rational content. It can only be a content that is immediately experienced in the experience of self-creativity, in the active self-building of the person, in the identity of spiritual self-consciousness. That is why the term "numerical identity" is only a symbol, not a concept.

The general conclusion from this digression is the necessity of a strict distinction between numerical and generic identity and therefore a strict distinction between love as a psychological state, which corresponds to a philosophy of things and love as an ontological act, which corresponds to a philosophy of persons. In other words, Christian love must be removed in the most decisive way from the domain of psychology and transferred

to the sphere of ontology. And only by taking account of this requirement can the reader understand that all that we have said about love and all that remains to be said is not a metaphor but a precise expression of our true understanding.

Man's knowledge of God is inevitably revealed and manifests itself as active love for creatures, a love that is already given to me in immediate experience. And manifested love for creatures is contemplated objectively as beauty. Whence the pleasure, the rejoicing, the consolation in love during its contemplation. That which makes one rejoice is called beauty; love as an object of contemplation is beauty.

My spiritual life, my life in the Spirit, the process of my "likening to God" is beauty, that same beauty of original creation about which it is said: "And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen. 1:31).

To love the invisible God is to open passively one's heart to Him and to await His active revelation in such a way that the energy of Divine love descends into the heart. "The cause of the love of God is God, *causa diligendi Deum Deus est*," says Bernard of Clairvaux. ¹⁰⁸ By contrast, to love visible creatures is to allow the received Divine energy to reveal itself—through the receiver, outside and around the receiver—in the same way that it acts in the Trihypostatic Divinity itself. It is to allow this energy to go over to another, to a brother. For merely human efforts, love for a brother is absolutely impossible. It can be achieved only through the work of God's power. Loving, we love by God and in God.

Only one who has come to know the Triune God can love with a true love. If I have not come to know God, have not come to commune with His Being, I do not love. And contrarily, if I love, I commune with God, know Him. But if I do not love, I do not commune with Him and do not know Him. There is a direct relationship between knowledge and love for creatures here. The center from which this knowledge and this love proceed is my abiding in God and God's abiding in me.

"And hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments. He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him. But whoso keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected: hereby know we that we are in him. He that saith he abideth in him ought himself also so to walk, even as he walked" (1 John 2:3–6). But until now this co-abiding of God and man has been only a presupposition of free faith, not a fact of powerfully compelling experience.

John's Epistles are devoted almost exclusively to this relationship. ¹⁰⁹ "Let us love one another, for love is of God (*hoti hē agapē ek tou Theou estin*). And every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is love" (1 John 4:7–8). "Every one that loveth is born of God." This is not only a change, or an improve-

ment, or a perfecting. No, this is precisely a procession "from God," a communion with the Holy. One who loves has been reborn, or born a second time, into a new life. He has become a "child of God," has acquired new being and a new nature, "was dead, and is alive again" (Luke 15:32) for passage to the new kingdom of reality. That is the message of the parable of the prodigal son in Luke 15. Let it be the case that to others, to people with "hearts of stone," he continues to appear as he was, a mere man. But, in fact, in the invisible depths of his "prodigal" soul, a mysterious transubstantiation has taken place. The epoche and agony of absolute skepticism were only the pangs of birth from the confined and dark womb of fleshly life into the unencompassable expanses of infinite and all-radiant life. One who loves has passed from death to life, from the kingdom of this world to the Kingdom of God. He has become one of the "partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4). He has come into the new world of Truth, in which he can grow and develop. In him abides the seed of God, the seed of Divine life (see 1 John 3:9), the seed of Truth itself and genuine knowledge. Knowing the Truth, he now understands why such a change has occurred in him: "We know that we have passed from death unto life [and therefore from the darkness of ignorance into the light of truth] because we love the brethren. He that loveth not his brother abideth in death. Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer and ve know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in him" (1 John 3:14–15). But this should not be taken in a tautological sense, in the sense that "not to have eternal life" is only another way of saying "to hate" and "not to love." Rather, it should be taken in the sense of a metaphysical connection of two states. One who does not have eternal life, i.e., one who has not entered into the life of the Trinity, cannot love, for love of one's brother is a manifestation, as if an emanation, of Divine power, radiating from the loving God. The usual-moralizing-interpretation makes John's words appear flat and insipid. This interpretation weakens the metaphysical chain linking these two acts, knowledge and love. And in general let me mention that the more massively and metaphysically crudely and archaically we conceive religious concepts, the more profound will the symbolism of their expression be and therefore the closer we will come to a genuine understanding of strictly religious experience. This compressed, densified character of religious concepts characterizes our entire liturgy, which has the same relation to Protestant and sectarian liturgies that old red wine has to tepid sugar water. Let me mention only the order of the service before the Creed during the liturgy of the faithful:

The deacon proclaims: "Let us love one another, that with one accord we may confess (*agapēsōmen allēlous*, *hina en homonoiai homologēsōmen*)." But confess what? An answer is given to this by the choir, i.e., in essence, by the faithful in their representatives, who take up and complete the deacon's proclamation: "The Father, and the Son, and the Holy

Spirit, the Trinity consubstantial and indivisible (Patera, Gion, kai agion Pneuma Triada homoousion, kai achōriston." Then the priest bows three times and says to himself: "Thou art my beloved, O Lord, my fortress, O lord, my support and refuge." If there are several priests, they, in addition to this, express to one another their love with a brotherly kiss and witness together: "Christ is among us." After this gathering in the love of the Church as a whole, what is necessary is separation from all that is outside, from all that does not participate in this love, from what is alien to the Church: the world. Therefore the deacon proclaims: "The doors! The doors! Let us attend wisdom (tas thuras, tas thuras en sophiai proschōmen)." That is, "Close the doors, so that no one foreign may enter: we shall listen to wisdom." (Let us note that the Slavonic translation of the phrase en sophiai proschōmen as "let us attend with wisdom" [premudrostiu vonmen] is incorrect, and that this phrase should be translated as "let us attend wisdom" [premudrosti vonmem]111). Now when all that is needed for the confession of the consubstantial and undivided Trinity is prepared, "wisdom" itself comes: the people, i.e., the very body of the Church, sing the "Creed." But let us remember what the "Creed" is. Historically and metaphysically, it is nothing but an extended exposition, an explanatory amplification, an elaboration of the baptismal formula: "In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit."112 In pronouncing this formula, we think precisely all that is contained in the Creed. But what, in turn, is the baptismal formula? It is essentially no more and no less than an expression of the dogma of the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity. Thus, everything that precedes the Creed is a preparation for "attending" to the word "consubstantiality," homoousia. "Consubstantiality" is precisely "wisdom."

The idea behind this order of the liturgy is clear: mutual love alone is the condition of "unity of thought," *homonoia*, the one thought of those who love one another, in contrast to the external relation to one another which yields nothing more than "similarity of thought," *homoinoia*, on which secular life is based: science, social life, government, etc. But "unity of thought" provides the ground that makes possible joint confession (*homo-logēsōmen*), i.e., understanding and acknowledgement of the dogma of consubstantiality, *homoousia*. *In* or *through* this unity of thought, we come into contact with the mystery of the Triune Divinity.

The same idea of the unbreakable connection between the inner unity of believers and the knowledge and therefore the glorification of God, who is "Trinity in Unity," is contained in the priest's exclamation at the liturgy: "And grant that with one voice and one heart we may glorify and praise Thine most-honorable and majestic name, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, now and ever, and unto ages of ages (*kai dos hēmin en heni stomati, kai miai kardia doxazein, kai anumnein to pantimon kai megaloprepes honoma sou*)." The only difference is the addi-

tional element of the glorification of the name of the Triune God, a glorification that emanates from the confession by the faithful of this *one* Name said in three names.

In the same way, the following proposition has not a juridical-moral but a metaphysical sense: "He that saith he is in the light [the truth], and hateth his brother, is in darkness [in ignorance] even until now. He that loveth his brother abideth in the light, and there is no occasion of stumbling [i.e., no darkness of ignorance] in him. But he that hateth his brother is in darkness, and walketh in darkness, and knoweth not whither he goeth, because that darkness hath blinded his eyes" (1 John 2:9-11). Light is the Truth, 114 and this Truth unfailingly manifests itself. The mode of the transmission of this Truth to another person is love, whereas the mode of the transmission to another of dark, stubborn ignorance, which does not desire to recognize itself as dark ignorance, is hate. "He that doeth good is of God: but he that doeth evil hath not seen God" (3 John 1:11). The inner light of the soul in oneself and its revelation in another person conform to each other so precisely that, by the fluctuation of the one, it is possible to judge decisively about the other. If there is no love, there is no truth. If there is truth, there is inevitably love. "Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not: whosoever sinneth hath not seen him, neither known him" (1 John 3:6). "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for His seed (sperma autou) remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil: Whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither is he that loveth not his brother" (1 John 3:9–10). Love follows from the knowledge of God with the same necessity as light radiates from a lamp or nocturnal fragrance emanates from the open calvx of a flower: "knowledge becomes love (he gnosis agapē ginetai)." 115 Therefore, the mutual love of Christ's disciples is the sign of their learning, their knowledge, their walking in the truth. Love is the characteristic sign by which a disciple of Christ is recognized: "this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another" (John 13:35).

But one cannot make a greater error than to identify the spiritual love of one who knows the Truth with altruistic emotions and the striving for the "good of mankind," a striving that, at best, is grounded in natural sympathy or in abstract ideas. For "love" in this sense, which we call "Judaic," everything begins and ends in empirical works, the value of which is determined by their visible effect. But for spiritual love, or love in the Christian sense, this value is only tinsel. Even moral activity (philanthropy and so on) is, taken in itself, an absolute zero. What is desirable is not the outward appearance, not the "skin," of special activities, but life full of grace, which overflows in every creative act of a person. But "skin" as "skin," the empirical outward appearance as such, can always be falsified. No age dares to deny that there are "false apostles, deceitful

workers, transforming themselves into the apostles of Christ," that even "Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light" (2 Cor. 11:13–14). But if all that is external can be falsified, then even the greatest deed and the greatest sacrifice, the sacrifice of one's life, are, in themselves, nothing:

Though I speak With the tongues of men And (even) of angels, And have not love, I am become as sounding brass Or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy And understand all mysteries, And all knowledge, And though I have all faith, So that I could move mountains, And have not love, I am nothing. (It profiteth me nothing). And though I bestow all my goods, And though I give my body To be burned, And have not love, It profiteth me nothing.

(1 Cor. 13:1-3)¹¹⁶

So-called "love" outside of God is not love but only a natural, cosmic phenomenon, which is as no more subject to absolute Christian judgment than the physiological functions of the stomach. It is therefore self-evident that in this book we use the words "love," "to love," and their derivatives in their Christian sense and pay no attention to familial, tribal, and national habits; to egotism, vanity, love of power, lust, and other "refuse of human feelings" that clothes itself in the word "love." 117

True love is a going out of the empirical and the passage to a new reality.

Love of another person is the reflection of true knowledge upon this person, while knowledge is revelation of the Trihypostatic Truth to the heart, i.e., the abiding in the soul of God's love of man: "If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us" (1 John 4:12). We thus enter with Him not only into an impersonal, providential-cosmic relationship, but also into a personal father-son communion. Therefore, "if our heart condemn us not" (1 John 3:21) (but of course the heart itself must, for its own judgment, be cleansed at least to some extent of the crust of filth that has made its surface rot, and become capable of judging about the genuineness of love), that is, if we are conscious with a chaste

consciousness that we really love "not in word, neither in tongue but in deed and truth" (1 John 3:18), that we have really entered into a personal communion with God, then "we have confidence toward God," (1 John 3:21), for he who is of the flesh judges everything according to the flesh. For "he that keepeth His commandments dwelleth in Him, and He in him" (1 John 3:24). If we love Him, "we dwell in Him, and He in us" (1 John 4:13).

We say "love." But in what is this spiritual love expressed *concretely*? In the overcoming of the boundaries of selfhood, in the going out of one-self, for which spiritual communion "one with another" is necessary. "If we say that we have fellowship with him [with God], and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth: But if we walk in the light, as he is the light, we have fellowship one with another" (1 John 1:7–8).

Absolute Truth is known in love, but the word "love," as we have already explained, is understood here not in a subjectively psychological sense but in an objectively metaphysical one. It is not the case that love of one's brother is the content of the Truth as the Tolstovans and suchlike religious nihilists affirm. It is not the case that this love of one's brother exhausts everything. Absolutely not. Love of one's brother is a revelation to another, a passage to another, the inflow into another of that entering into Divine life which in the God-communing subject is perceived by this subject as knowledge of the Truth. The metaphysical nature of love lies in the supralogical overcoming of the naked self-identity "I = I" and in the going out of oneself. And this happens when the power of God's love flows out into another person and tears apart in him the bonds of finite human selfhood. Owing to this going out of itself, I becomes in another, in not-I, this not-I. I becomes consubstantial with the brother, consubstantial (homoousios) and not only like-substantial (homoiousios). And it is this like-substantiality that constitutes moralism, i.e., a vain, inwardly insane attempt at a human, extra-Divine love.

Rising above the logical, empty, contentless law of identity and becoming identified with the beloved brother, I thereby freely makes itself not-I or, using the language of sacred hymns, it "empties," "exhausts," "ravages," "humbles" itself (cf. Phil. 2:7). 118 It deprives itself of the attributes necessarily given and proper to it as well as of the natural laws of its inner activity according to the law of ontological egoism or identity. For the sake of the norm of another's being, I transcends itself, the norm of its own being, and voluntarily submits to a new image so as thereby to incorporate its I in the I of another being, which for it is not-I. Thus, the impersonal not-I becomes a person, another I, i.e., Thou. But in this "impoverishment" or "exhausting" of I, in this "emptying" or "kenosis," there occurs a reverse restoration of I in the norm of being proper to it. And this norm is now not merely given; it is also justified. That is, it is not merely present in the given place and at the given moment, but has universal and

eternal significance. In another person, through its kenosis, the image of my being finds its "redemption" from under the power of sinful self-assertion, is liberated from the sin of isolated existence, about which Greek thinkers¹¹⁹ spoke. And, in a *third*, this image, as redeemed, is "glorified," i.e., is grounded in its incorruptible value.

By contrast, without kenosis, I would possess its norm only potentially, not in act. Love is "yes" spoken by I to itself; hate is "no" spoken to oneself. R. Hamerling¹²⁰ puts this idea untranslatably but expressively in the lapidary formula: "das lebhafte Sich-selbst-bejahen de Seins"— "the living yes to itself of being." Love combines value with givenness¹²¹ and introduces duty into fleeting givenness. And duty is what gives givenness duration. Without duty, givenness rei [flows away], whereas with duty, it menei [remains]. It is love that unites the two worlds: "The great thing is that there is a mystery here, that the fleeting aspects of the earth and eternal Truth have come into contact here." 122

The love of the lover, by transferring his I into the I of the beloved, into Thou, gives to the beloved Thou the power to know the I of the lover in God and to love this I in God. The beloved then becomes the lover and rises above the law of identity. And in God the beloved identifies himself with the object of his love. He transfers his I into the first I through a third I, and so on. But only the rational mind views these mutual self-submissions, self-exhaustions, self-humblings of the lovers as a series that tends to infinity. Rising above the bounds of its nature, I goes out of temporalspatial limitedness and enters into Eternity. There the whole process of the interrelation of the lovers is a single act, in which an infinite series of individual moments of love is synthesized. This single, eternal, and infinite act is the consubstantiality of the lovers in God, where I is one and the same as the other I, but also different. Every I is not-I, i.e., Thou, by virtue of the renunciation of oneself for the sake of another. And it is I by virtue of the renunciation of the other I for the sake of the first. Instead of individual, separate, self-assertive I's, we get a dyad, a di-unitary being that has the principle of its unity in God: "finis amoris, ut duo unum fiant" ("the limit of love: two are one"). Furthermore, every I sees in the Divine image of another I its own Divine image as in a mirror.

This dyad has love by its very essence and, as concretely incarnate love, it is beautiful for objective contemplation. If for the first I the point of departure of consubstantiality is truth, and for the second I, for Thou, it is love, then for the third I, for He, it is beauty. In He, beauty excites love, and love gives knowledge of truth. Enjoying the beauty of the dyad, He loves this duality and thereby comes to know every I, affirming every one, in its hypostatic self-being. By this affirmation the contemplating I restores the self-identity of the contemplated hypostases: of the first I as the loving and beloved I and of the second I as the beloved and loving I, as Thou. By surrendering itself to the dyad, by breaking through the shell of this dyad's enclosedness within itself, the third I thereby communes with

the dyad's consubstantiality in God and the dyad becomes a trinity. But He, this third I, as contemplating the dyad objectively, is itself the principle of a new trinity. Through the third I's, all trinities grow together into a consubstantial whole, into the Church, or Body of Christ, as an objective disclosure of the Hypostases of Divine love. Each third I can be first in the second trinity and second in the third, so that this chain of love, beginning with the Absolute Trinity (which by its force holds everything together as a magnet holds together a pattern of iron filings), extends farther and farther. Love, according to St. Augustine, is "a kind of life that couples or strives to couple" (vita quaedam copulans vel copulare appetens). 123 A similar idea is expressed by John Scotus Erigena: "Love is a connection, or bond, through which all things are coupled in ineffable friendship and unbreakable unity (Amor est connexio aut vinculum quo omnium rerum universitas ineffabili amicitia insolubilique unitate copulatur)."124 This in fact is the breath of the Holy Spirit, which comforts with the joy of contemplation, is omnipresent, and fills everything with a treasure of goodness, gives life, and, by its indwelling, cleanses the world of all foulness. But the Holy Spirit's life-creating activity becomes clear to the understanding only in the higher insight of spirituality.

Such is the schema of the self-grounding of persons. But how does love, this centrifugal force of being that emanates from one who knows the Truth, *concretely* reveal itself? Without going into detail, let me just cite the generally known passage (1 Cor. 13:4–7) from St. Paul's "Hymn of Love" which says everything:

Love suffereth long:
Love is kind.
Love envieth not.
Vaunteth not itself,
Is not puffed up.
Doth not behave itself unseemly.
Seeketh not her own.
Is not easily provoked,
Thinketh no evil,
Rejoiceth not in iniquity,
But rejoiceth in the truth.
Beareth all things,
Believeth all things,
Hopeth all things,
Endureth all things.¹²⁵

However, having spiritual life in different metaphysical aspects (knowledge, love, and delight) according to its special place in the trinity, each of the hypostases of the trinity is also distinguished by its special type of spiritual life, by its special organization, by the special character of its path to God. This imparts a special nuance to the knowledge, love, and

joy of the hypostasis. Thus, the love of the first hypostasis is fiery and jealous; the love of the second is meek and sacrificial; the love of the third is enthusiastic and trembling.

Neither intuition nor discursion gives knowledge of the Truth. This knowledge arises in the soul from the free revelation of Trihypostatic Truth, from the grace-giving visitation of the soul by the Holy Spirit. This visitation begins in a volitional act of faith, which is absolutely impossible for human selfhood and is accomplished through "attraction" by the Father Who is in heaven. But he who has accomplished the act of faith does not know through Whose power it has been accomplished. Only by believing in the Son and acquiring in Him the promise of the Holy Spirit does the believer find out that there is a Father (see Luke 10:22). Only in the Son of God does he recognize the Father as the Father, thereby himself becoming a son. Through the Son he acquires the Holy Spirit and then in the Comforter he contemplates the ineffable beauty of God's essence and rejoices ineffably when he sees in his heart the "spiritual light," the "light of Tabor." And he himself becomes spiritual and beautiful. Thus, the troparion of St. Sergius of Radonezh tells us:

The Holy Spirit has entered you; by the Spirit's action you are adorned with light.

That is, the Holy Spirit is directly called the Source and Cause of the radiant beauty of St. Sergius. "Spiritual light," sometimes combined with spiritual "warmth" and "fragrance," is in fact the reasonable intuition we have been seeking, the intuition that includes the series of its own groundings. It is perfect beauty as the synthesis of absolute concrete givenness and absolute reasonable justifiedness. Spiritual light is the light of the Trihypostatic Divinity Itself, the Divine essence, which is not only given, but also self-given. Spiritual light is the "light of reason," the light that started to shine for the world at the Birth of our Lord Jesus Christ, as is sung in the Christmas troparion:

Thy birth, O Christ our God, has shed upon the world the light of reason . . .

Spiritual light is the "Light of Christ" that "illuminates everyone." Spiritual light is the "mental light" that makes "the soul vigilant before Thee," God, as the Holy Church tells us. It is the light of God's love, about which we pray:

With love illuminate me, I pray that I may see Thee, Word of God¹²⁷

Spiritual light is the light whose seeing constitutes the contemplation of God and therefore our salvation, the salvation of us who cannot be without God. Does not the Orthodox believer pray: "Save me with Thy illumination"?¹²⁸

And, after having seen the light, does he not find peace: "For I am not alone, I am with Thee, my Christ, the light of three suns illuminating the world." ¹²⁹

And at matins does the Orthodox believer not offer praise to the "Father of lights" (James 1:17) "who has shown us the light"?

And, as he prepares to dismiss the assembly, does the priest not unceasingly pronounce the comforting prayer: "Christ, the true light, who lights and sanctifies every man who comes into the world, let the light of Thy face be a sign upon us that we may see the unapproachable light. . . "?

Finally, let us mention: "O tranquil light of the holy glory of the immortal Father, heavenly, holy, blessed, O Jesus Christ. Having come at the setting of the sun, having seen the evening light, we sing the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, God. Thou, the Son of God, giver of life, art worthy at all times of being sung by the voices of saints. Thus the world praises Thee."

This hymn clearly expresses the connection of all the ideas we are examining. The Lord Jesus is the meek, tranquil light from the holy glory of the immortal, hence holy, and therefore blessed Heavenly Father. But He, this tranquil sun to the world, rose over the earth and then set. It is as if once again He is not with us. We saw the light of this setting Sun and, in the light of this Light, we saw the light of the eternal and consubstantial Trinity. For this reason we now sing the praises of the Trinity, of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, of God; and the Son of God, who gives life to the world by the trisolar illumination of creation, is glorified by the world in hymns of thanksgiving.

These passages concerning the light of Tabor are taken almost at random, from a numberless multitude of examples. The idea of the light that is full of grace is one of the few fundamental ideas of the whole liturgy, for the liturgy was formed by spirit-bearing people, people who had experience of knowledge that is full of grace. Yes, the spiritual light . . .

Even in sense perception, light is the beautiful in itself, the intuitively beautiful. Everything else—sound, smell, warmth, etc.—is beautiful through rhythmical division. It is beautiful not in the proper, intuitive sense, but in the sense of a certain intellectual satisfaction. Let us remark that we scarcely remember a tone in itself, in its absolute pitch, and that we do not even reproduce a smell or a taste in our imagination. The relative pitch of tones, i.e., a certain unconsciously apprehended rational content, is what constitutes the object of musical pleasure. According to Leibniz's *mot*, the soul, in listening to music, "unconsciously practices arithmetic," i.e., it practices that activity which has always been considered the pattern and type of rationality.

On the other hand, light is beautiful apart from all divisions, apart from form. It is beautiful in itself, and it makes all that is visible beautiful. "There is no object so repulsive that intense light would not make

beautiful," says one almost contemporary writer. "The stimulus it gives to the feelings and its possession of a kind of infinity, like space and time, impart to all matter a merry appearance." 133 Beauty, as a certain manifestation or disclosure of that which becomes objective, is essentially connected with light, for everything that is manifested is precisely light. Or, as the Apostle witnesses, "all things that are reproved are made manifest by the light" (Eph. 5:13). And through this, all things dissolve in the light that makes them manifest and are themselves transformed into light: "Whatsoever doth make manifest is light" (Eph. 5:13). Thus, if beauty is precisely manifestation and manifestation is precisely light, then, I repeat, beauty is light and light is beauty. Absolute light is the absolutely beautiful. It is Love itself in its perfection, and this Love makes every person spiritually beautiful. Crowning the love of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit is both the object and the organ of perception of the beautiful. That is why the holy fathers called asceticism, as the activity directed at the contemplation of the ineffable light by means of the Holy Spirit, not a science and not even a moral work, but an art, and not just an art, but art par excellence, the "art of arts." 134 Theoretical knowledge, philosophy, is love of wisdom, whereas the contemplative knowledge given by asceticism is philokalia, love of beauty. Collections of ascetic writings, 135 long known as "philokalias," are in no wise a "philo-kalia" (Russ. Dobroto-liubie) in the modern sense of the word, i.e., in the sense of the love of the good. Kalia (Russ. dobrota) is taken here in the ancient, general sense that signifies not moral perfection but beauty, 136 and philokalia signifies love of beauty. In fact, asceticism produces not a "good" or "kind" man but a beautiful one, and the distinguishing feature of the saintly ascetics is not their "kindness," which even people of the flesh, and very sinful ones, can possess, but spiritual beauty, the blinding beauty of a radiant, light-bearing person, a beauty wholly inaccessible to the man of flesh. "There is nothing more beautiful than Christ, the only sinless one."137 But there is no need to talk about asceticism, for entire books have been written to describe the ascetic path to the eternal Truth, the unique path. In asceticism, as in mathematics, there are no royal roads, for only the purified heart can receive the ineffable light of Divinity and become beautiful.

Macarius the Great says: "When man broke the commandment, the devil covered his whole soul with a dark curtain. For this reason, grace finally comes and removes the whole cover, so that the soul, having become pure and having apprehended its proper nature, this irreproachable and pure creation, always remains pure and with pure eyes contemplates the glory of the Holy Light and True Sun of Truth shining in the heart itself." "Just as the visible eye, being pure, always sees the sun, so the mind, having become perfectly pure, always sees the glory of Christ the Light and abides with the Lord

day and night, in the same way that the body of the Lord, having become one with Divinity, always abides together with the Holy Spirit. But people do not attain this measure all at once. They attain it rather by labors, sorrow, great ascetic works."¹³⁹

This self-purification, or self-correction, is required for the concentration of the entire being in the heart, 140 for the inner fortification of the heart by all the powers of the spirit-mind, will, and feeling. "Concentration of the mind in the heart is attention; concentration of the will is vigilance; concentration of feeling is sobriety."141 This triple selfconcentration entails "the entering of the inner temple," in which one can see the "heavenly temple." The light of Divine knowledge is the possession of a purified person. But God's love, illuminating the righteous person, radiating from this person, can—by God's ineffable mercy, by the prayers of the Mother of God, for some special purpose—sometimes be perceived by people who have not attained spirituality. The solitude of the ascetic is only a path to higher unity. The boundaries of the stubbornly self-sufficient I are eroded and destroyed in the ascetic, and through him an unearthly power pours into the soul of one who comes into contact with him. A great ineffable light shines for one who comes into contact with the ascetic. But does one who has not attained perfection see in this light everything that can and must be seen in it? I doubt it.

It was this way even in the Old Testament: "And it came to pass, when Moses came down from mount Sinai with the two tables of testimony in Moses' hand, when he came down from the mount, that Moses wist not that the skin of his face shone while he [God] talked with him. And when Aaron and all the children of Israel saw Moses, behold, the skin of his face shone; and they were afraid to come nigh him. . . . And till Moses had done speaking with them, he put a vail on his face. But when Moses went in before the Lord to speak with him, he took the vail off, until he came out. . . . And the children of Israel saw the face of Moses, that the skin of Moses' face shone: and Moses put the vail upon his face again, until he went in to speak with him" (Ex. 34:29–35).

But what was almost the sole exception in the Old Testament, for the sake of a personal "friend of God," has become almost the rule in the New Testament. One can cite innumerable stories of light radiating from the ascetic saints. Here are several examples:

"There was an abba, of the name Pambo, about whom it is told that he prayed to God for three years and said: 'Give me glory upon earth.' But God glorified him in such a way that none could look at his face, because of the light that shone from his face." 142

"They said of Abba Pambo, that just as Moses had taken on the image of the glory of Adam, when his face shone with the glory of the Lord (Ex.

34:29), in the same way, the face of Abba Pambo shone like lightning, and he was like an emperor seated on a throne. The same effect was to be seen in Abba Silvanos and Abba Sisoes."¹⁴³

"The following was related about Abba Sisoes. Before his death, when the fathers sat beside him, his face shone like the sun. And he told the fathers: 'Abba Anthony has come.' A little later he said: 'The assembly of the Prophets has come.' And his face shone even more brightly. Then he said: 'Now I see the assembly of the Apostles.' The light from his face became twice as bright, and he was speaking to someone. Then the elders began to ask him: 'With whom are you conversing, father?' He answered: 'Angels have come to take me, but I am asking that they leave me for a while to let me repent.' The fathers told him: 'You, father, have no need of repentance.' He answered them: 'No, I am sure that I have not yet begun to repent.' But all knew that he was perfect. Suddenly his face again shone as brightly as the sun. All were terrified, but he told them: 'Look, here is the Lord. He says: Bring to me the chosen vessel of the desert.' And at once he surrendered his spirit, and was radiant like lightning. The whole temple was filled with fragrance."

"One of the fathers related that someone met Abba Silvanos and, seeing that his face and body shone as bright as an Angel's, he fell on his face. He said, moreover, that certain other fathers had this same gift." ¹⁴⁵

"One brother, having come to the monastery, to the cell of Abba Arsenius, looked into the room through the door and saw that the father appeared to be on fire. This brother was worthy of the vision. When he knocked, the father went out, and seeing that the brother was terrified, he asked him: 'Were you knocking for a long time? Did you see anything here?' The brother told him: 'No.' After conversing, the father released him." 146

From examples that are almost contemporary, I take only an excerpt from N. A. Motovilov's tale of his visit to St. Seraphim of Sarov^a at the beginning

^a The light shining from St. Seraphim (1759–1832) is perhaps the most powerful light that has ever shined in Russia. He was born Prokhor, of the Moshnin merchant family in the town of Kursk. His parents were known as pious church-builders. Prokhor found his calling early on; at the age of nineteen he became a novice at the hermitage of Sarov. A year later he was afflicted by a grave illness that forced him to remain in bed for three years. At the end of 1782 or the beginning of 1783 his health improved rapidly, and he was mysteriously and completely cured. Just before his death, Seraphim revealed how he was cured. The Mother of God had appeared and said about him: "this one is of our kind." She then touched his head with her hand and his sides with a staff She was carrying, and this cured him.

In 1786 Prokhor was consecrated as a monk and given the name Seraphim (the fiery or flaming or warming one). Several years of ardent prayer and extreme devotion to the Church followed, accompanied by numerous visions. He saw angels participating in the liturgy and singing in church. Finally, he saw Christ Himself, who appeared to him in the image of the Son of Man, entering the church with the heavenly powers and blessing those praying and serving. In 1793 Seraphim was consecrated as a hieromonk (a monk consecrated as a priest). Soon afterward he went to live in the "desert" (actually a forest) at Saroy,

of the winter of 1831.¹⁴⁷ Here we will see how spiritual intuition becomes incarnate in all the spheres of the concretely given. St. Seraphim was explaining to Motovilov that the whole goal of Christian activity lies in the acquisition of the Holy Spirit. Motovilov did not understand how one can be certain of being in the Holy Spirit. It is here that we pick up this eyewitness account:

"Then Father Seraphim took me very firmly by the shoulders and said: 'We are now both in God's Spirit! Why don't you look at me?'

I answered: 'I can't, father, because lightning is streaming from your eyes. Your face has become brighter than the sun, and my eyes are splitting with pain.'

Father Seraphim said: 'Don't be afraid. You too have now become as bright as I. You too are now in the fullness of God's Spirit. Otherwise you could not see me as I am now.'

And inclining his head toward me, he said softly into my ear: 'Be thankful to the Lord God for His ineffable mercy to you. You saw that I didn't even cross myself, but only prayed to myself inwardly in my heart to the Lord God and said inwardly to myself: "Lord! Make him worthy to see clearly and with bodily eyes that descent of Your Spirit with which You favor Your servants when You condescend to appear to them in the wonderful radiance of your glory." 'And here the Lord fulfilled at once the request of the humble Seraphim.' "How can we not thank Him for this ineffable gift which He has granted to us both? God does not always manifest his mercy in this way even to the great fathers of the desert. The grace of God, like a mother full of

and became a recluse. V. I. Il'in comments: "It was as if the ancient evergreen woods surrounding the hermitage . . . were calling him to immerse himself totally in the contemplation of God, to gather all his inward forces toward the undivided service of God, toward continuous daytime and nocturnal prayer to God. But to sacrifice oneself to God is inevitably to sacrifice oneself to people. Having successively passed through the stages of life in the desert, innocent suffering, a thousand days of solitary prayer on a rock, hesychastic silence, and the life of a recluse, he returned to serve people armed with an abundance of spiritual experience, saintliness, and prophetic intelligence. He returned for *starchestvo* [see note *f* on pp. 8–9], which was the culmination of his path in the world" (V. I. Il'in, *St. Seraphim of Sarov*, 3d edition [New York, 1971], pp. 30–31).

Seraphim returned to the world of people in 1825, and entered onto the path of starchestvo that continued until his death in 1832. Having gained power in his solitude over the spiritual world, he also gained power over the material world. In addition to guiding and comforting people, he performed many miraculous cures and made many extraordinary prophecies. Il'in writes: "Having acquired the immeasurable gift of the Holy Spirit, St. Seraphim is especially mysterious. He is 'already half-way not a monk,' as Florensky remarks; more than that, he is almost not a man. His caress, besides delight, brings fear and trembling (mysterium tremendum). Few people take note of that unutterable separation from 'the world lying in evil' into which the Lord caught him up" (ibid., p. 183). "To come to know and to learn how to venerate St. Seraphim is to know and to learn how to venerate Orthodoxy, which focuses its strongest beams in him. In the image of Seraphim we come to understand the meaning and beauty of the New Israel, the Eternal Israel in which the Lord showed us His eternally eschatological, eternally 'future,' eternally 'New Nature'" (ibid., p. 184). "The dark fire, the black flame, of Gehenna, prepared for those who blaspheme against and reject love, is overcome and defeated by the white, luminous heat of the Spirit. Eternal bliss is attained on the narrow path of 'greatest resistance.' That was Saint Seraphim's path—he died fully in Christ, and that was why his paschal joy was so great" (ibid., p. 185).

lovingkindness toward her children, has deigned to comfort your afflicted heart, at the intercession of the Mother of God Herself. Why then, my friend, do you not look me straight in the face? Look freely and don't be afraid. The Lord is with us.'

Encouraged by these words, I looked at his face and was seized by an even greater fear and trembling. Imagine in the middle of the sun, dazzling in the brilliance of its noontide rays, the face of the man who is speaking to you. You can see the movements of his lips, the changing expression of his eyes. You can hear his voice; you can feel his hands holding you by the shoulders. But you can see neither those hands nor his body nor yourself. You can see nothing except a blinding light, which shines around, lighting up with its brilliance the snow-covered meadow and the snowflakes, which continue to fall unceasingly on me and the great elder. Is it possible to imagine the state in which I was in then?

'What do you feel now?' Father Seraphim asked me.

'I feel extraordinarily good,' I said.

'But how good? In what way?'

I answered: 'I feel such serenity and peace in my soul that I can find no words to express it.'

'This,' Father Seraphim said, 'is the peace our Lord spoke of when He said to His disciples: "I give my peace to you not as the world gives. If you were of the world, the world would love you; but since you are chosen by me from the world, the world will hate you for this. But be of good cheer, I have overcome the world" (Cf. John 16:33). It is to these people who are hated by this world and chosen by the Lord that the Lord gives that peace which you now feel in yourself. What else do you feel?'

'An extraordinary sweetness!' I answered.

And he continued: 'That is the sweetness about which the Holy Scripture speaks: "They shall be filled with the richness of Thy house and Thou shalt let them drink of the torrent of Thy sweetness." Now this sweetness overfills our hearts and courses through all our veins with ineffable joy. This sweetness causes our hearts to melt, and we are both filled with bliss that cannot be expressed by any language. What else do you feel?'

'An extraordinary joy in all my heart.'

And Father Seraphim continued: 'When the Holy Spirit descends on a person and envelops him the fullness of His presence, the soul overflows with ineffable joy, for the Spirit of God fills everything He touches with joy. This is the same joy about which the Lord speaks in His Gospel: "A woman when she is in travail hath sorrow, because her hour is come: but as soon as she is delivered of the child, she remembereth no more the anguish, for joy that a man is born into the world. And ye now therefore have sorrow: but I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no man taketh from you" (John 16:21–22). But however comforting this joy may be which you now feel in your heart, it is insignificant compared with that joy about which the Lord Himself spoke with the lips of his Apostle: that joy that "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him" (1 Cor. 2:9). What else do you feel?'

I answered: 'An extraordinary warmth.'

'How is it that you feel a warmth? We're sitting in the woods. It is now winter and there is snow beneath our feet, we are covered by more than an inch of snow, and flakes are falling on us. What warmth can there be here?'

I answered: 'The kind one feels in a bathhouse when the steam rises in a column.'

'And the smell?' he asked. 'Is it the kind you find in a bathhouse?'

'No,' I answered. 'There is nothing on earth like this fragrance. When my mother was still alive, I liked to dance and used to go to balls and dancing soirées; my mother would spray me with her perfume which she would buy in the finest stores of Kazan, but even that perfume was not this fragrant.'

And Father Seraphim, smiling pleasantly, said:

'I myself, my friend, know this just as well as you, but I ask you on purpose whether you feel this way. It's absolutely true. No earthly fragrance can compare with the fragrance we smell now, for we are surrounded by the fragrance of God's Holy Spirit. What of earth can be comparable to Him? Notice, you told me that we are surrounded by warmth as in a bathhouse, but neither on you nor on me nor beneath our feet does the snow melt. This must mean that this warmth is not in the air but in ourselves. It is that same warmth about which the Holy Spirit compels us to cry out to the Lord with the words of the prayer: "Warm me with the warmth of Thy Holy Spirit." Warmed by this warmth, desert hermits do not fear the winter frost, for they are clothed, as if in warm furs, in garments of grace, woven of the Holy Spirit. That is the way it must be in reality, for the grace of God must abide within us, in our heart, for the Lord said: "The kingdom of God is within you" (Luke 17:21). By the kingdom of God the Lord meant the grace of the Holy Spirit. This kingdom of God is now within us, but the grace of the Holy Spirit is illuminating and warming us from outside, filling with a diverse fragrance the air that surrounds us, giving delight to our feelings with a heavenly sweetness, filling our hearts with ineffable joy . . . '"

The testimony just presented, as nearly contemporary to us and written by a capable observer, is full of highly significant details and vivid features. In this respect it is immeasurably valuable and perhaps almost unique. But a numberless series of sayings and lives of the saints bears witness to the reality of the light, so that one would have to be mad to deny the certainty of these appearances of the light that is full of grace. These appearances are also confirmed by the fact that halos on icons (be they nimbuses, auras, or glories in their various forms ¹⁴⁸), which represent precisely this light full of grace that emanates from bearers of the spirit, could neither arise nor take hold in iconography and other forms of representational art if they were only (as is frequently supposed) a convention, a conventional attribute of saintliness.

Such a persistent and widespread phenomenon could hardly arise if it did not express some reality lying at its basis. But a question arises: Have not non-Christian mystics, e.g., neoplatonists, ¹⁴⁹ had the same vision of

the light? For it is indisputable that they too saw some sort of light, that they too knew the bliss of their vision. Yes, they saw, and knew bliss. It is even possible that they saw the light of Divinity. I say "possible" because the vision of the inner light can be a tempting illusion, a spiritual error, i.e., a phenomenon of purely subjective and psychophysiological significance. And sometimes, perhaps always, this vision occurs not without the participation of dark powers, which take the form of an angel of light. However, even if that were the case, this light about which the mystics of all lands and nations teach and which they interpret precisely as the heavenly light, the Divine light, is merely an intuition for them, not a reasonable self-proving intuition. This light gave to them a new spiritual reality but little justified it, just as ordinary, sensuous intuition, which blindly gives the reality of the sensuous world, leaves this reality unproved, unjustified. The light of the mystics did not resolve epoche for them, and could not resolve it. Even seeing, they did not see. You ask why this was so. It was because they did not have the dogma of Trinity, but had mere phantoms of the doctrine of trinity. 150 These phantoms did not have the salt of this dogma, i.e., the supralogical overcoming of the law of identity. In order to apprehend the self-provenness of the spiritual light, it is necessary to know in advance the results of the analysis of this light. Then, before our spiritual eyes, Trinity is synthesized into Unity; we see homoousios actually given. The dogma that, because of its supralogical character, could not be proclaimed by anyone except God Himself, that upon lips that are not the Lord's lips would remain a mere collection of words, is Wundt's¹⁵¹ "apperceiving mass," which permits one to direct the spiritual gaze at that at which it must be directed to resolve epoche. In themselves, no human powers can analyze the Infinite Unit, just as they cannot synthesize It. For Synthesized Infinity is absolutely indivisible into units. And only by having the dogma in our consciousness, i.e., this dogma which is an analysis communicated by God Himself, can we apprehend in the Divine light the realization of this dogma.

That is why the light seen by Plotinus and other mystics, whatever its origin, is just as indifferent a matter for an absolute skeptic as sensuous light. This light only complicated the task of skepticism by indicating a new kind of blind intuition, which does not have its ground in itself. And, in general, has not much been seen that has not been understood and could not be understood? In order to see, a hypothesis was needed; but to state a hypothesis that explicitly contradicts the norms of rationality it was necessary to live in the depths of the Holy Trinity, to be the Son of God; and for this hypothesis to be believed by anyone at all, it was necessary to have an infinite authority, based on self-renouncing love, on immaculate purity, on unfathomable beauty, and on infinite wisdom. Outside of Christ, the hypothesis of Trinity was impossible. Absolute vision was therefore impossible outside of Christ.

Father Serapion Mashkin gives roughly the same answer to the question of the light of the neoplatonists. "A hypothesis," he writes in another place, "is the 'mind's eye.' It is the possibility of a phenomenon as well as its apperceiving 'mass.' He who has this 'eye' also perceives in experience the actuality of hypothetical possibility, acquires knowledge that approaches a state in which the necessity of being is known, a state that gives *certitude*."

If a dogma is the "mind's eye," the primary bearer of dogma is "mankind's eye," that eye by which mankind looks at the inaccessible light of ineffable Divine glory. Only now is the inner meaning of the name given by St. Gregory of Nazianzus to Athanasius the Great clarified. Having expressed and defined the dogma of the Trinity, Athanasius truly was the "Most Holy eye of the universe." ¹⁵² Through him the universe perceived the Truth.

The thorny path of contemplative ascesis is crowned by the bliss of absolute knowledge.

"And being thence admonished to return to myself, I entered even into my inward self, Thou being my Guide: and able I was, for Thou wert become my Helper," says St. Augustine. "And I entered and beheld with the eve of my soul (such as it was), above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Light Unchangeable. Not this ordinary light, which all flesh may look upon, nor as it were a greater of the same kind, as though the brightness of this should be manifold brighter, and with its greatness take up all space. Not such was this light, but other, yea, far other from these. Nor was it above my soul, as oil is above water, nor yet as heaven above earth: but above to my soul, because It made me; and I below It, because I was made by It. He that knows the Truth, knows what the Light is; and he knows It, knows eternity, Love knoweth it. O Truth Who art Eternity! and Love Who art Truth! and Eternity Who art Love! Thou art my God, to Thee do I sigh night and day. Thee when I first knew, Thou liftedst me up, that I might see there was what I might see, and that I was not yet such as to see. . . . And Thou criedst to me from afar: 'Yet verily, I AM that I AM.' And I heard, as the heart heareth, nor had I room to doubt, and I should sooner doubt that I live than that Truth is not, which is clearly seen, being understood by those things which are made." 153b

Glory to Thee, Who hast shown us the light!

^b From E. B. Pusey's translation of *The Confessions*. The Washington Square Press Edition (New York, October, 1962). The passage quoted is on pp. 117–18.



Pignus amoris. The pledge of love.

VI. Letter Five: The Comforter

....

Do you remember, my gentle one, our long walks in the forest, the forest of dying August? The silvery trunks of the birches stood like stately palms, and their gold-green tops, as though exuding blood, pressed against the crimson and purple aspens. And above the surface of the earth, the branches of a hazel grove spread like green gauze. There was a holy hush of solemnity beneath the vaults of this temple.

My far and yet eternally near Friend, do you remember our intimate conversations? The Holy Spirit and religious antinomies—that, it appears, is what interested us most. And finding ourselves in this solemn grove, we walked at sunset through the cornfield, became drunk with the flaming west, and rejoiced that the question was becoming clear, that we had come independently to the same answer. Then our thoughts flowed out in streams flaming like the vault of heaven, and we grasped each other's thoughts almost before they were spoken. The roots of our hair tingled with an inspired, cold, yet flaming rapture. Shivers ran up our spines.

My brother, you who shared one soul with me, do you remember the reeds over the black backwater? We stood in silence at the precipitous bank, and listened to the mysterious evening rustlings. An ineffably exultant mystery grew in our souls, but we were silent about it, speaking to each other by silence. That was then.

But now it is winter outside. I work at a lamp, and the evening light in the window seems blue and majestic like Death. And I, as if before my death, review all that has passed, and am again agitated by an unearthly joy. But there is nothing for me to gather now that I am alone. I now write down my poor fragmentary thoughts for you. Nevertheless, I write: so many hopes are connected with the question of the Holy Spirit that I will attempt to write something—in your memory. Let the pages of this letter be the dried flowers of that autumn.

Knowledge of the Truth, i.e., of the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity, is achieved by the grace of the Holy Spirit. The entire ascetic life, i.e., life in the Truth, is directed by the Holy Spirit. The third Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity is, as it were, the closest, the most open for the ascetic of Truth. It is this Hypostasis, "the Spirit of Truth" (John 16:13), that bears witness in the very soul of the ascetic to the Lord, i.e., to *consubstantiality*. It is this Hypostasis that "shall teach . . . what . . . to say" (Luke 12:12) to all who stand outside the Spirit and therefore persecute the Lord, i.e., the idea of consubstantiality. Nevertheless, knowledge of the Spirit as the Comforter, the joy of the Comforter makes golden only the highest points of sorrow. Just as the roses of the sun that has become fatigued in the course of the day smile on the snowy peaks of the Caucasus. Only at the end of the path of thorns can we see the rosy clouds of purified creation and the snowy-white radiance of holy, transfigured flesh.

Only at the end. It is thus in the personal life of each of us. It is also thus in the integral life of mankind. Before it stepped out with firm foot on the way of salvation, mankind was supported by the Lord. Then all sorrows were forgotten. But the sorrows were already there in embryo; they were being prepared. "Can the children of the bridechamber mourn, as long as the bridegroom is with them? But the days will come, when the bridegroom shall be taken from them, and then shall they fast" (Matt. 9:15).

It is true that, at the beginning of the ascetic way, the Bride will meet one with a gentle kiss. It is true that apostolic Christianity trembled with the fullness of joy. But this kiss, this joy, is only a betrothal. It is given in view of the long way, the many torments—not because we are worthy of it but to give us courage.

The miraculous moment flashed blindingly, and then it apparently was no more. The Lord left the earth and all that with His light He had overcome—directly, visibly—on the earth. He is with us, but not in a human, earthly manner. It is the same way in personal life, at the beginning of the ascetic way, when great ineffable joy fills our soul without our having deserved or expected it. That joy—like the Most Pure Body and Precious Blood of Christ, which are given to us for nourishment and sustenance—is given "in betrothal to the future Kingdom," in betrothal to the spiritualization and illumination of the whole being. 154

That, I repeat, is how it is at the beginning of the way. Infinitely joyous is this beginning. It is so unutterably good then that, remembering the

sweet parting, mankind finds the strength to overcome obstacles even in the memory of the fleeting vision. With dreams of the bliss of first love, the ascetic chases away the black thoughts of everyday toil, and the boredom and melancholy of gray, everyday life.

But in general, on the average, under ordinary circumstances, both the personal life of a Christian (apart from its highest ascents) and the everyday life of the Church (except for the elect of heaven) know but little, dimly, and confusedly the Holy Spirit as a Person. Connected with this is insufficient and inconstant knowledge of the heavenly nature of Creation.

It could not be otherwise. Knowledge of the Holy Spirit would give perfect spirituality, perfect deification to all Creation, perfect illumination. Then history would end; the fullness of time would be achieved; in the whole world Time would be no longer. Let me repeat, this is the fulfillment that the Mystery-Contemplating Eagle, St. John, was deemed worthy of seeing: "And the angel which I saw stand upon the sea and upon the earth lifted up his hand to heaven. And sware by him that liveth for ever and ever, who created heaven, and the things that therein are, and the earth, and the things that therein are, and the sea, and the things which are therein, that there should be time no longer. But in the days of the voice of the seventh angel, when he shall begin to sound, the mystery of God should be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the prophets" (Rev. 10:5–7). That is what will be at the limit of history, when the Comforter is revealed.

But as long as history continues, only moments and instants of illumination by the Spirit are possible. The Comforter is known only at certain moments and instants by certain individuals, who then rise above time into Eternity: "There is no time for them," and history ends for them. The fulness of the acquisition of the Spirit is inaccessible to the faithful as a whole. It is also inaccessible to an individual believer, within the limits of his life. Christ's victory over Death and Corruption is not yet assimilated by Creation, not wholly assimilated. Thus, knowledge is not perfect. Just as the holy, incorruptible relics of ascetics are pledges of the victory over Death, i.e., manifestations of the Spirit in fleshly nature, so holy spiritual illuminations are pledges of the victory over rationality, i.e., manifestations of the Spirit in psychic nature. But to the extent there is no resurrection, to that extent there is no perfect illumination of the mind by the Holy Spirit. To assert that perfect knowledge or perfect purification of the flesh has been achieved is imposture, the imposture of Simon Magus, Manes, Montanus, the Khlysts, and thousands of other false bearers of the spirit, who have lied and are lying about the Spirit. This is that perver-

^a Khlysts were members of an ascetic and ecstatic sect that originated in Russia in the 17th century or earlier. These schismatics held that God becomes incarnate in many "christs" through their suffering. Khlysts and *khlystovstvo* ("khlysthood") have come to connote frenzied religious ecstasy.

sion of man's nature which is called *prel'shchenie* or *prelest'* (tempting illusion or spiritual error).¹⁵⁵

Yes, the Holy Spirit operates in the Church. But knowledge of the Spirit has always been only a pledge or a reward—at special moments or in exceptional people; and it will be thus until time ends. That is why, when reading the Church literature, one cannot fail to notice a certain phenomenon, which at first seems strange but then, in the light of previous considerations, reveals its internal necessity. That is, all the holy fathers and mystical philosophers speak of the importance of the idea of the Spirit in the Christian worldview but hardly any of them gives a clear and precise explanation of anything. It is clear that the holy fathers know something. But it is even clearer that this knowledge is so deeply buried, so unutterable, that they do not have the power to clothe it in precise words. This applies chiefly to dogmatists, for they are the ones who have to speak decisively and to the heart of the matter. And it is they who turn out to be almost mute, or clearly confused. Let us recall, from the 2nd century, the "binitarian system" of Hermas and the author of the Second Pseudo-Clementine Epistle to the Corinthians. In both places, the Holy Spirit is directly confused with the Church. 156 Or let us recall Tertullian's system, where the Spirit is so poorly distinguished from the Word that He is almost identified with the Latter and is often named instead of Him, 157

I was first struck by this internal contradiction while reading Origen's *On First Principles* (written around 228–229). In expounding Christian dogmatics, Origen expresses the firm confidence that the idea of the Holy Spirit is strictly a Christian idea, the shibboleth of Christianity, as it were.

He writes: "Everyone who in some fashion accepts Providence confesses that an unborn God exists who has created and ordered everything. Everyone who accepts this recognizes Him as the parent of the universe. We are therefore not alone in preaching that He has a Son. Thus, although to Greek and barbarian philosophers this doctrine appears rather amazing and improbable, nevertheless some of them express an opinion about the Son when they confess that everything is created by the word or reason of God. As for the hypostasis [subsistentia, i.e., a literal translation of hypostasis] of the Holy Spirit, about it no one can make any speculation at all, except those who are familiar with the law and the prophets or those who confess faith in Christ." 158

To be sure, one can doubt whether this is really the case. St. Justin the Philosopher in his *First Apology*¹⁵⁹ (probably written around 150 or even 138–39, and therefore eighty or ninety years before Origen's *On First Principles*) no less definitely attributes to Plato knowledge of all three Hypostases. But whether or not Origen's conviction is essentially right, it is highly typical for the understanding of the history of spiritual knowl-

edge. In fact, one might think that, having stated what we quoted above, Origen would occupy himself with deducing the idea of the Holy Spirit, as he had previously occupied himself with deducing the idea of the Father and the Son. But "this task of giving a speculative foundation to the fact of the existence of the Holy Spirit, of indicating the logical necessity of precisely the trinitarian existence of Divinity, was not fulfilled by Origen." This is the judgment of a dispassionate historian and learned dogmatist.¹⁶⁰

However, Origen is in agreement beforehand with this harsh judgment. For what the judge demands of him, what the natural progress of thought demands from him, is "impossible," according to Origen. 161 Yes, the deduction is impossible. Be that as it may, but surely the impossibility of speculation does not justify indecisiveness and indeterminacy in the exposition of dogmatic material. But with the interrogatory form of his exposition, Origen sometimes simply avoids giving an answer and sometimes even forgets about the idea of the Holy Spirit. This forgetfulness, however, is easy to explain! When we subject Origen's system to a profound metaphysical analysis, we find in fact that it has no need of the Spirit. This is, so to speak, a "false window" created for the sake of the symmetry of the building, no more. Origen the giant, who boldly and firmly strides over the fields of dogmatics, who is unafraid to create his own conceptions, which sometimes astound one with the daring and swiftness of their flight, this same Origen unexpectedly avoids what he himself has called the most essential aspect of the Christian understanding of life. And having become something small, a bent and wrinkled dwarf, he mumbles confusedly and unintelligibly about this most essential aspect.

This transformation from the great to the pitiful is so astonishing that it has long been apparent to everyone, from St. Basil the Great, who thought that "Origen . . . does not have a completely sound understanding of the Holy Spirit," ¹⁶² to present-day defenders of Origen. These defenders attempt to justify him by noting that the dominant interest of his time lay in the clarification of the idea of the Son and the Father, by citing the lack of definition in the Councils' decisions concerning the Holy Spirit, or by referring to Origen's intention to speak his mind about the incriminated question in some other work. ¹⁶³ But whether or not this is the case, the clear impression remains that the ideas were fluid and internally unstable in Origen's own consciousness. And one must say the same thing about others, for these others speak of the Holy Spirit either unclearly and fragmentarily, or restrainedly and cautiously.

This fluidity of ideas that arises from the exceptional character of intellectual encounters with the Holy Spirit is also evident in the fact that, in Church writings, it is not rare (as we pointed out above to some extent) to encounter a failure to differentiate the ideas of the Holy Spirit and of

Sophia-Wisdom, and, to some extent, both of these from the Logos. This phenomenon is made the more striking by the fact that the ideas of the Father and the Son have been elaborated with great subtlety and delineated sufficiently. The overall immediate impression that inevitably remains from reading Church writings is similar to the impression one gets from viewing a painting part of which is finished and part of which is only unclearly sketched in. To be sure, one can cite numerous passages from the patristic writings. But one cannot fail to agree that, in general, the matter stands precisely as I have indicated here, and this general impression can easily be demonstrated if we attempt to compare the doctrine of the Father and the Son with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 164

To be sure, debates go on and various affirmations are made concerning the Holy Spirit. But they all have a formal and schematic character. They all differ from corresponding affirmations about the Son and the Father in the same way that pencil sketches differ from a painted canvas. Whereas the hypostatic being of the Father and the Son is apprehended by every nerve of the spiritual organism; whereas heresy with regard to the Father and the Son is organically and immediately unacceptable, unacceptable by the very heart of one's being; whereas the nature of the Father and the Son is disclosed in crystal-clear, geometrically harmonious formulas, which have a religiously axiomatic character—the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is noticed not at all or almost not at all, but is disclosed in a derivative or roundabout manner, as a rational theorem, according to the schema: "Since such-and-such is said about the Son, it follows that we are compelled to say such-and-such about the Spirit."

For a believer the truthfulness of propositions about the Son is immediately evident. But the truthfulness of propositions about the Spirit is clarified in a roundabout way, is established through the formal correctness of the intermediate arguments. The proofs and justifications of logology could and did turn out to be naive, insufficient, and preliminary structures, whereas the very building of dogmatics rested on the great word homoousios, which was immediately true for consciousness, for life according to faith in Jesus Christ.

The consubstantiality of the Word for spiritual people was given from the experience of life, and these people recognized and confessed consubstantiality, despite the weak argumentation and the proofs to the contrary. The argumentation in the doctrine of the Word was no more than an appendix. But, in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, argumentation was almost everything, and without it the dogma lost its persuasiveness. That which Origen, adamantine in other respects, says about the being and origin of the Holy Spirit is a doctrine thought up *ad hoc*, a deliberate sophistry, created so as not to come into conflict with Church tradition. In essence, for Origen, if it were possible, it would have been much more natural and convenient to remain completely silent about the Holy Spirit.

The Spirit "proceeds" from the Father, since otherwise, as Origen put it, the Spirit would have had to have been born either of the Father (and then the Son would have had a "brother," which was the objection to the Orthodox made by the pneumatomachians) or of the Son (and then the Spirit would be the Father's "grandson," which was the argument of Tertullian and others). And Origen speaks so confusedly about the Spirit that, in his *Commentary on John*, ¹⁶⁵ he vacillates between the createdness of the Spirit by the Father and the procession from the Father.

You might say: "Why are you so obsessed with Origen?" First, because he is a very great theologian and a powerful and independent mind. And, second, because he had an immeasurable influence on all later theology. What is said of Origen must *mutatis mutandis* be said of others as well.

In his three Epistles (i.e., Epistles 1, 2, and 4) to Serapion of Thmuis on the Holy Spirit, where he conducts "an exhaustive investigation of the Spirit, which became a model for subsequent writers," 166 Athanasius of Alexandria, not only the "Great" but genuinely great, argues exclusively ad personas. His argument is based primarily on the fact that those who recognize the creatureliness of the Spirit "divide and decompose the Trinity," thereby exposing to danger the very doctrine of the Son, and so on. Thus, Athanasius is compelled to recognize the Holy Spirit as consubstantial, for otherwise it would be necessary to reject everything that is said about the Son. But not even Athanasius clarifies the meaning of the "procession (ekporeusis)" of the Spirit as distinct from the "birth (gennēsis)" of the Son. Of the three personal properties of the Divine hypostases, agennēsia, gennēsis, and ekporeusis, the first two are spiritually wholly comprehensible, while the last one turns out to be only the sign of some sort of spiritual experience that is yet to be understood.

Gregory of Nyssa and Basil the Great¹⁶⁷ also made only formal objections against the pneumatomachians. They too, despite their habit of mental soaring, could not resolve the question of the Holy Spirit. They too viewed the Spirit together with the Father and the Son, not independently.

St. Basil the Great, probably more than anyone else, facilitated the preparation of minds for the Second Ecumenical Council, i.e., for the formulation of the dogma of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, the difference between the famous tolerance of St. Basil the Great in the polemic with the Macedonians and generally in questions of pneumatology, and the heatedness of the entire spiritual atmosphere surrounding questions of logology, this difference is perhaps conditioned to the highest degree by the difference in inner conviction in taking one or the other position. One involuntarily suspects that this is due not only to tolerance of others but also to a certain lack of ardor, the heart being insufficiently concerned with the question. Basil the Great gazed at the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with his peripheral vision, whereas his direct vision was fo-

cused on the consubstantiality of the Son. A willing and free confession and defense of the Son inevitably drew him into an involuntary and inevitable confession and defense of the Spirit.

Let us repeat, this is not an accident of the history of theology but the inexorable order in the fulfillment of the hours and seasons, a necessary and inevitable definition given to the relatively indistinct revelation of the Spirit as a Hypostasis, a deficiency of life itself. Our assertion is easy to prove. For where is the immediate expression of spiritual experience? Where is spiritual experience least processed? In prayers and hymns, in the liturgy. The liturgy is the most significant and essential function of the life of the body of the Church. The witness of the liturgy is the most reliable witness. But, let us ask, where should we first look for an indication of the place that was occupied by the Holy Spirit in the minds and hearts of the members of the early Church compared with the other Hypostases? Of course, at the point where the very celebration was directed toward the glorification of all three Hypostases.

The service of the Day of the Trinity should give us a decisive indication of how much the hypostatic character of the Holy Spirit was something apprehended in living Church experience, and not just a theorem of dogmatic theology. And this indication is all the more precious to us because the main part of the Office of the Pentecost¹⁶⁹ (by this I mean the three solemn prayers of genuflection) was composed, most probably, around the time of Basil the Great. What do we find there? The first prayer with genuflection begins with the words: "Lord most pure, incorruptible, without beginning, unfathomable, invisible, unsearchable, immutable, invincible, immeasurable, never desiring evil; who alone has immortality, who lives in unapproachable light, who has created heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things there; who answers men's petitions even before being asked. We pray to You and we beseech You, Lord Who loves man, Father of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ . . ." This is obviously addressed to God the Father.

The second prayer of genuflection is addressed to the Son: "Lord Jesus Christ, our God, who gave Your peace to men and the gift of the Most Holy Spirit when You were still with us in life. As an inalienable inheritance You always bestow it upon the faithful . . ."

Finally, the third prayer, which occupies in the office a place that precisely corresponds to that of the two previous prayers, i.e., which is their liturgical analogue, opens with the address: "Eternally flowing, living, and illuminating Source, consubstantial with the Father, enabling Power, You Who wonderfully accomplished the economy of human salvation . . ."

But to Whom precisely is this prayer addressed? What comes next? According to the meaning of the feast itself (the Day of the "Trinity"!), according to the liturgical place of this third prayer, and finally, accord-

ing to the epithets it uses for the Person to Whom it is addressed, it is natural to expect the following continuation: "O Holy Spirit" or "Comforter" or "King of Truth" or some other name of the Third Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. This expectation is so natural that, in listening to this prayer, one inevitably hears something like this and remains convinced that it is addressed to the Holy Spirit. But this is not in fact the case. Here is the immediate continuation of this prayer which we interrupted: "O Christ our God; You Who have broken the indestructible chains of death and the unbreakable bonds of hell, and trampled a multitude of evil spirits; Who have given Yourself for us as an immaculate sacrifice . . . " and so on. Everything here is addressed to the Lord Jesus Christ, and in no wise to the Holy Spirit.

An age of stereotypical, more or less widespread doctrines, when the dogma of the Holy Spirit was fixed in word only in passing and only insofar as the economic activity of the Spirit was linked to the that of the Father and the Son, was followed by an age in which concepts found for the Son were applied to the Holy Spirit. But it is remarkable that the personal character of the Third Hypostasis was still represented only formally, by the word *ekporeusis*, "procession." However, no concrete content was attached to this word.

And thus it continued. The theological recipe existing then spoke of the Spirit in the same way the Word was spoken of. That is, it created, in essence, a shadowgraph of the Word. This recipe reigned, in one way or another, in orthodox circles, although at the same time in the deserts of the Thebaid and Palestine the Spirit revealed Himself to individual saints, those almost superhuman peaks of the Church. And through these saints, through their souls and through their bodies, the Spirit revealed Himself to those who surrounded them. Meanwhile, unorthodox circles fell into obvious false-teaching when they attempted to know the Comforter by force, forcibly to imprison Him the Spirit of Freedom, in a cage of philosophical concepts. Instead of the Spirit, they captured illusory, pseudomystical experiences of the soul, which was submerged in the dark underground of the world and grasped after dark powers as if they were angels of light. This demonstrated once again that, outside of ascesis and discipline, the Spirit was and is known only negatively.

Mystics of later ages, who always had a lively interest in pneumatology, were not in a better position. Distinguishing in words the Hypostases of the Spirit and the Son, in the last analysis, these mystics usually equated these hypostases in practice. This was because they attributed to the Holy Spirit everything that had been said about the Son and also confused the Spirit with Sophia. 170

But in what does the personal character of the Holy Spirit consist? There has been too much discussion of this but too little has been said. Basil the Great¹⁷¹ admits that "the mode of procession remains inexpli-

cable" and therefore he makes no attempt to clarify it. It is noteworthy that the famous defender of Orthodoxy against Catholic leanings, against attempts to rationalize dogma and to explain forcibly as a philosopheme that which is not subject to philosophy, namely, Mark of Ephesus (on whose gravestone George Scholarius¹⁷² cut the epitaph: "Bishop of Ephesus, luminary of the entire land, heresy-destroying fire, the guiding light of pious souls"), it is noteworthy that this same Mark of Ephesus writes to "Orthodox Christians": "We, together with Justin the Philosopher and Martyr, say that even as $(h\bar{o}s)$ the Son is from the Father, so $(out\bar{o})$ the Holy Spirit is from the Father. But they, the Greco-Latins, say with the Latins that the Son is immediately (amesos) while the Holy Spirit is mediately (emmesos) from the Father. We, together with St. John of Damascus and all the holy fathers, do not know the difference between birth and procession. By contrast, they distinguish with St. Thomas and the Latins two kinds of origin: immediate and mediate." This testimony is not unique; one could cite many such affirmations. Let me mention only St. Gregory of Nyssa, who spoke of "the unfathomability of the procession of the Holy Spirit."174

When theosophical speculation did not have recourse to the Catholic Filioque, that naive product of excessive piety and half-baked theology, this speculation either did not completely spell out or became entangled in the difference between birth and procession. Is it worth mentioning "names"? Let us leave them in peace. Let the inventors of various theories about the Holy Spirit sleep peacefully beneath the earth until the day when all these questions will resolve themselves without our efforts. It would be too naive to seek the cause of this two-thousand-year-old failure to spell out the difference between birth and procession in the insufficient perspicacity of theologians. And can it be a question of perspicacity when we are dealing with faith? "Ex nihilo nihil," more than to anything else, applies to theology, an *empirical* science. 175 If now there are no perfect perceptions of the Holy Spirit as a Hypostasis, if there are no personal pneumatophanies, with the exception of extraordinary cases and where exceptional people are involved, it is not possible to derive the formulas, for the formulas grow in the soil of a common, everyday Church life, in a field of common, constant phenomena, and not in connection with singular points of spiritual life. Of course, in the Holy Church everything is a miracle: sacrament is a miracle; the prayer of the blessing of water is a miracle; every icon is a miracle; every hymn is a miracle. Yes, everything is a miracle in the Church, for everything in its life is full of grace and God's grace is precisely the only thing that is worthy of the name "miracle." But all this is a constant miracle. But there are even rarer currents in the Church, "miracles" in the more customary sense of the word. And the rarer they are, the farther they are from verbal expression. It is not possible to create formulas for such miracles, for every formula is a formula of repeatability. Except for certain separate moments when the believers were jointly (and this is the key!) in the Holy Spirit or began to be in Him, this being in the Holy Spirit did not become an ordinary current of life.

But in those communities where the experience of the Spirit was proclaimed as the norm, there inevitably arose a sectarianism of the khlyst type, the term "khlyst" taken broadly to mean any pseudo-spiritual, pseudo-mystical, psychical (not spiritual) excitement of a group of enthusiasts.

Let us carefully examine the patristic writings, particularly the ascetic ones, where spiritual life is depicted most clearly. Here we see a typical phenomenon: Little is said of the Father; rather more is said of the Son of God; but the Holy Spirit is discussed most of all. But, despite this, one cannot get away from the impression that the Son of God as an independent Hypostasis is known very clearly by the saintly ascetics; and that He is so close to their consciousness that He even somewhat obscures the Father. They also know about the Father, but about the Holy Spirit as a Hypostasis they know little, almost nothing. If, by their indecisiveness or silence, the dogmatist fathers show their inner uncertainty concerning the question of the Holy Spirit, their insufficient knowledge of the Spirit as a Hypostasis, the ascetic fathers by their copious words reveal the same state of consciousness even more clearly. For them the Holy Spirit is, in the practical, the life sense, the "Spirit of Christ," the "Spirit of God," a kind of sanctifying and purifying impersonal power of God. After all, it is not by chance that, later, instead of the Holy Spirit, the fathers began unnoticeably and gradually to speak of "grace," i.e., of something completely impersonal. What is usually known is not the Holy Spirit but His grace-giving energies, His powers, His acts and activities. "Spirit," "spiritual," "spirit-bearing," "spirituality," and so forth appear everywhere in the patristic writings. But it is seen from these writings that these words refer to the special states of a believer, states produced by God, but that they do not (or virtually do not) refer to the personal, independent being of the Third Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. In essence, the holy fathers speak much not about the Holy Spirit but about a holy spirit, and it is difficult to make a demarcation and to distinguish when they speak of the Spirit from when they speak of the spirit. The overall impression is that, from the Spirit, through the Spirit, there is an unnoticeable transition here to the spirit. At best, an inference is drawn from the spirit of God to the Spirit. True, our spirituality comes from the Spirit, just as our sonhood in relation to God comes from the Son and our creative personality comes from the Father. But is it possible that anyone reading the writings of the holy fathers could be uncertain (even if he keeps this uncertainty to himself) as to whether a particular passage is talking about the Son or a son, the Creator or a creator?

Furthermore, wishing to prove the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Father and the Son, the fathers equated the sin-purifying activity of the Holy Spirit with the activity of the Son. 176 Thus, for the holy fathers there was no clear boundary even as regards the perception of the gracegiving acts of the Holy Spirit and the Son. Here, Macarius the Great differs little from St. Isaac the Syrian and John Climacus differs little from St. Ephrem the Syrian. Of course, I am making the matter cruder and simpler than it actually was. My picture is drawn not with fine pencilstrokes but with rough brush-strokes. What I say here is, of course, incomplete. Unquestionably, features of another knowledge, the personal perception of the Holy Spirit, sometimes emerge. But these features are preliminary and incomplete. However, it would be ridiculous to see in this incompleteness a personal defect of the saints, a defect attributable to some deficiency of profundity or purity. Out of the dark abyss of the centuries, out of the fog of history, the holy fathers shine for us like living, incorruptible stars, like the God-seeing eyes of the Church.

But the time has not yet come, and even those radiant eyes could not see Him by Whom all creation will be gladdened and comforted. The fullness of time had not come then, just as it has not yet come now. The fathers felt a longing and waited. In the same way, the righteous in the Old Testament awaited knowledge of the Son of God. The entire life of pre-Christian antiquity—religion, science, art, social life, even personal attitudes—was based entirely on a revelation of the Father, on an experiencing of the Father, the Creator of all things, on a conscious or halfforgotten Covenant with Him. Pre-Christian antiquity's entire understanding of life and the world was the development of a single category, the category of fatherhood, birth, generation, however it is called. 177 And to clarify the unclear features of their knowledge is just as impossible as it is to develop an underexposed photographic plate; and if one were to keep this plate in the developer past a certain time, the whole image would only become "veiled," would be covered with a gray shroud, as it were. In the same way, thought that wishes without holiness to perceive the Spirit is "veiled." By the way, that is precisely what happens to people of the "new consciousness." b

^b The "new [religious] consciousness" was a world-view that appeared in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Heavily influenced by Vladimir Solovyov [See note *c* on p. 432], this worldview was allied with the Symbolist movement in poetry and art. The "new religious consciousness" movement was deliberately opposed to historical Christianity; it yearned for new revelations, attempted to create a religiously based social utopia, but, at the same time, was full of eschatological expectations. The two leading adepts of this movement were Dmitrii Merezhkovsky (1865–1940) and Nikolai Berdiaev (1874–1948). Berdiaev wrote that "the people of the new religious consciousness . . . look with abhorence upon the positive construction of life" (Sub specie aeternitatis, [St. Petersburg, 1907], p. 363, as quoted in V. V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, trans. George L. Kline [New York and London, 1953], Vol. 2, p. 756). This is because this positive con-

As the End of History approaches, new, hitherto almost unseen, rosy rays of the coming Unfading Day appear on the cupolas of the Holy Church. Symeon the New Theologian^c is the first to speak in new tones, differently from the ancient ascetic fathers. In our own Russian Church these tones "play" like the rising sun on the Feast of Feasts. ¹⁷⁸ St. Seraphim of Sarov and the great fathers of the Optina Hermitage^d (the elders

struction of life is overly connected with concentration on "this world." He also writes that "the people of the new religious consciousness . . . wish to relate their religion to the meaning of universal history, to consecrate world culture religiously" (ibid., p. 365, as quoted in Zenkovsky, Vol. 2, p. 756). This "antisecular" world-view is associated, for both Berdiaev and Merezhkovsky, with a sense of the end of history, with a transfer of the center of gravity in the historical dialectic from the past to the future (See V. V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 754–56).

^c Symeon the New Theologian (949–1022) was one of the greatest mystics of the Eastern Church. Basil Krivocheine points out that "Symeon's writings constitute a new genre of spiritual writing, at least among the Eastern Christian fathers. No Christian writer before Symeon, not even St. Augustine, opened his own interior experience of Jesus Christ and the indwelling Trinity to a reading audience as does Symeon" (B. Krivocheine, Introduction, Symeon the New Theologian: The Discourses [New York, 1980], p. 13).

"Symeon appeals to Holy Scripture to show that the individual Christian must grow into a greater conscious awareness of grace operating within his life, since the Son of God had such a conscious knowledge of the Father. A conscious union such as that which Jesus had with His Father is what He wishes to bring to all who desire to receive His Holy Spirit. This conscious union with the indwelling Trinity is possible in this life and should be sought after as the goal of the Christian life. This depends very much on one's desire and efforts to seek purity of heart through a state of constant repentance and faithful observance of God's commandments" (ibid., pp. 17–18). Krivocheine further points out that

both in his personal visions and in his writings ... [Symeon] ... accentuates the symbol of light. He continually presents God as light, applying light equally to each person. ... Symeon's habitual way of presenting Jesus Christ is the Johannine symbol of Him as light (John 8:12, 9:5). The light that is Christ shines within the Christian mystic and he lives in that light. In Discourse XXVIII Symeon describes this light within:

It shines on us without evening, without change, without alteration, without form. It speaks, works, lives, gives life, and changes into light those whom it illuminates. We bear witness that "God is light," and those to whom it has been granted to see Him have all beheld Him as light. Those who have seen Him have received Him as light, because the light of His glory goes before Him, and it is impossible for Him to appear without light. Those who have not seen His light have not seen Him, for He is the light, and those who have not received the light have not received grace. Those who have received grace have received the light of God and have received God, even as Christ Himself, who is the Light, has said, "I will live in them and move among them" (2 Cor. 6:16).

The light is different from the knowledge that is received since it brings such knowledge about. This light of Christ is given only to those who seek Him through purification. Symeon distinguishes between an actual physical, sensible light whereby Christ appeared to him in several, unforgettable visions and the spiritual light that becomes synonymous with an infused contemplation of the constant unity with the indwelling Jesus Christ. (Ibid., pp. 27–28)

^d The Optina Pustyn' hermitage was the center of the great flowering of *starchestvo* [see note f on pp. 8–9] in 19th-century Russia. The *startsy* Leonid (1769–1841), Makarii (1788–1860), and Amvrosii (1812–1891) made Optina Pustyn' famous throughout Russia, drew crowds of the faithful, who asked their counsel. Such figures as Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, the

Lev, Leonid, Makarii, and especially Amvrosii) concentrate in themselves, as in a fiery focus, the people's holiness. They are saints who, in part, are no longer monks in the narrow sense. Through them, as through a telescope, one sees Him Who comes. There is a new, special apocalyptic tenor here. Only the blind cannot see this. It would be frivolous or mad not to follow them but rather to walk past them, for that would be to strive willfully to truncate the eternally predetermined course of world history. This would be to reject the words of the Lord Jesus: "Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?" (Matt. 6:27; also see Luke 12:25).

But pay attention: Our entire understanding of life, our entire science (I speak not of theological science but of science in general, the scientific spirit) is based on the idea of Logos, on the idea of God the Word. This holds true not only for science but even for the whole of life itself, for the whole structure of our soul. We conceive of everything under the category of the law, the measure of harmony. This idea of logism, ¹⁷⁹ an idea that is often distorted to the point of unrecognizability, is the basic nerve of everything that is alive and genuine in our mental, moral, and aesthetic life. The one universal, all-embracing "Law" of the World, the hypostatic Name of the Father, Divine Providence, without the will of Which a hair does not fall from our heads. Which makes "the lilies of the field" (Matt. 6:28) grow and feeds "the birds of the air" (Matt. 6:26), God, Who depletes Himself by His creation of the world and by economy—that is the religious presupposition of our science, and outside of this presupposition, more or less abstractly formulated, there is no science. The "uniformity of the laws of nature"—that is the postulate without which all science is empty sophistry. 180 But this postulate can be made a psychological reality only by faith in That word about Which St. John prophesies in the first verses of his paschal Gospel: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not" (John 1:1-5). 181 Those are the "foundations of science."182 And if we reject them, a cruel revenge is inevitable: the fall of a science that is built on shifting and engulfing sands.

What science has discovered is the lawfulness of the world, the orderliness and harmony of the world, the *cosmos* of creation. This law of the universe, this World number, this harmony of the spheres that is given to

Slavophile Ivan Kireevsky, and Konstantin Leontyev [see note c on p. 184] were drawn to Optina and its *startsy*. Optina Pustyn' is accurately depicted in the monastery described in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The spiritual blossoming at Optina ended soon after the Russian Revolution.

creaturely being is rooted wholly in God the Word, in the personal character of the Son, and in the gifts proper to Him.

But everything that rests not on this character, everything that is connected with the express gifts of the Holy Spirit, is not subject to knowledge by our science, the science of the Logos taken in isolation. Inspiration, creativity, freedom, ascesis, beauty, the value of the flesh, religion, and much else—all this is felt only indistinctly, is described only rarely, is established as being present, but stands outside the methods and means of scientific research, for the fundamental presupposition of such methods and means is, of course, the presupposition of connectedness, the presupposition of continuity, gradualness. In its existing form, the idea of lawfulness is completely inapplicable to all this. There is discontinuity here, and discontinuity goes beyond the limits of our science, does not jibe with the fundamental ideas of the contemporary worldview but destroys this worldview. It may be that the latest investigations and trends¹⁸³ in the domain of the idea of discontinuity hint precisely at the same nearness of the End.

A one-sided knowledge of the First Hypostasis created the religion and life of antiquity, antiquity's "substantial," organic worldview, according to which people thought that a metaphysical cause directly produces its phenomenal effect.

A one-sided knowledge of the Second Hypostasis produced the religion and life of modernity, its "lawful" logical worldview, in accordance with which phenomena are ordered according to their ideal form.

Finally, the free striving toward beauty, the love of the Goal—these are the deviations from scientism that typologically predict an immortal life and a holy, resurrected flesh. Holy fasts are the first fruits of the illumination of the body; holy relics, which we kiss, are glimmers of resurrection; holy sacraments are sources of deification.^e These are the pledges and betrothals of the future kingdom. But this kingdom comes (for individ-

^e The doctrine of "deification" (theosis in Greek; obozhenie in Russian) has been developed by the Greek fathers as a way of expressing the Christian mystery of the Incarnation and of salvation in Jesus Christ. Outstanding names in the development of this concept are Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas. Deification refers to "the New Testament doctrine of union with God, a union that alone can deliver men from death and sin, a union that is the very essence of Christ's work. The grace of deification, granted potentially in baptism, accepted freely and progressively throughout the whole course of life, leads us to vision and union" (John Meyendorff, St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality, [Crestwood, N.Y., 1974], p. 40). As Vladimir Lossky points out, "the deification of the creature will be realized in its fullness only in the age to come, after the resurrection of the dead. This deifying union has, nevertheless, to be fulfilled ever more and more even in this present life, through the transformation of our corruptible and depraved nature and by its adaptation to eternal life. If God has given us in the Church all the objective conditions, all the means that we need for the attainment of this end, we, on our side, must produce the necessary subjective conditions; for it is in this synergy, in this cooperation of man with God, that the union is fulfilled. This subjective aspect of our union with God constitutes the way of union which is the Christian life" (The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church [Crestwood, N.Y., 1976], p. 196).

uals) and will come (for society) only when the Comforter as a Hypostasis is known and will be known, and when the Triunity that illuminates the soul is perceived and will be perceived by this knowledge:

By the Holy Spirit every soul is made alive And is elevated by purity. It is illuminated by the Triunity in sacred mystery."

The holy, hoary mysteriousness of ancient science; the moral, serious rigor of the new science; finally, the joyous, light, winged inspiration of the future "gay science." ¹⁸⁴

My winged one! On paper I sketch thoughts that I feel more than I can express. It is as if some sort of fabric, some sort of body composed of the finest stellar rays is being woven in the world's foundations; something is awaited. Something is lacking. My soul—wishing to be liberated and to be with Christ—longs for something. And something will come: "It doth not yet appear what we shall be" (1 John 3:2). And the more acutely one feels what is being prepared, the closer and more intimate will the connection with the Mother Church become, and the easier and simpler it will be to endure out of love for Her the dirt that is cast upon Her. What will be will be in Her and through Her, not otherwise. With quiet joy I await what will be, and Nunc dimittis is being chanted and resounds in my tranguil heart for days at a time. When that which is awaited comes, when the Great Easter of the world is revealed, all human disputes will end. I do not know whether this will happen soon, or whether it will be necessary to wait for millions of years, but my heart is at peace, because hope already brings to it that which is awaited. Absolutely foreign to me is the desire of people of the "new religious consciousness" 185 to acquire forcibly, as it were, the Holy Spirit. Desiring to destroy the "times or seasons" (Acts 1:7), they stop seeing what is before their very eyes, what is given to them, and what they do not know or understand inwardly. Chasing everything, they lose that which exists now, and greater than which we are now not in a state to acquire, for our heart is not yet pure, the heart of creation is not yet pure, and, impure, it would be consumed in fire from nearness to the Most Pure. Let tranquillity return to them (at least for a brief time), and then perhaps they will see, these men of false knowledge, that they have no real ground beneath their feet, that they are uttering empty words, and are themselves beginning to believe these words. What is happening is similar to what happened to Leo Tolstoy: he created the scheme (!) of a graceless, imaginary ecclesiality. Then he smashed it, which, of course, he was able to do without difficulty. And, satisfied with the victory over a chimera produced by his utterly rational-

f Gradual sung before the Gospel in the matins office.

istic, self-assertive mind, he abandoned grace-giving, even if contaminated, soil and went into a desert of "good" words, which he himself has not learned to manage, but only tempts others with. For ecclesiality is so beautiful that one who participates in it cannot even aesthetically, as a matter of taste, tolerate the unbearable smell of conceits of Tolstoy's kind. Can one imagine anything more tasteless than to write one's own "fifth gospel"?¹⁸⁶

Nevertheless, a true idea lies at the base of Tolstoyism, as well as at the base of the "new consciousness." Consider if only the fact that the ancients prayed to the Father, but that in the course of our entire epoch people pray mainly to the Son. But people pray to the Spirit (if they pray to Him at all) for the most part in expectation of Him, rather than having Him face to face. They pray more in longing for the Comforter than rejoicing in Him before the Father in the Son. I know that many passages can be found that affirm the opposite. I myself can supply them. But I speak of what is typical, although it is almost unprovable. I write "letters" to you instead of composing an "article" precisely because I am afraid of asserting but prefer to ask. What appears typical to me is expectation and hope, but only meek and tranquil expectation and hope.

The Old Testament, too, indisputably bears witness to appearances of the Word and the Spirit, to logo- and pneumato-phanies. In the Old Testament, especially in the Pentateuch, one can find imprecise allusions to the Word and the Spirit. But these allusions are so vague and so inconsistent with the general background of the Scripture that we can find their meaning only in the light of the incarnate Word. Only if we have the dogma of the Trinity in our consciousness, can we see with this "eye" in the Old Testament the first glimmers of the coming knowledge. Try to convince a Chinese to believe in the dogma of the Trinity solely on the basis of the Old Testament! I am not sure that one can even explain to him when the Old Testament speaks about the Hypostatic Word and Spirit and when it simply speaks about the activities of the Father. In any case, no unprejudiced reader can doubt that the doctrine of the Word and, even more so, of the Spirit in the Old Testament emerges with immeasurably less clarity than the doctrine of God the Father. 187 And this is understandable, since even the prophets did not have the fullness of concrete experiences of the Word and the Spirit. A new revelation was, at best, only longed for.

Let us now consider the New Testament. How massive is the doctrine of the Father and the Son, but how relatively undeveloped is the doctrine of the Spirit. The idea of the Spirit sometimes almost dissolves in the idea of spiritual gifts. Is it not highly significant that the power and the gifts of the Holy Spirit that are present in people obscure the Spirit as a Hypostasis? We are spirits, but only in the Spirit; however, this "but" is often forgotten. Can one say that the Godsonhood of people in the Son of

God is in any way comparable with the Son's Own being? Whereas "son" can be confused with "Son" only by madmen or by those who are spiritually seduced (khlysts of various kinds), it is sometimes very easy to confuse "spirit" with "Spirit." Often the same passage is interpreted either as referring to a spirit or as referring to the Spirit.

To be sure, some passages of the Apostle Paul's Epistles reveal the hypostatic being of the Holy Spirit to the consciousness as in a lightning flash. "As many as are led by the Spirit of God," testifies the Apostle of the Gentiles, "they are the sons of God." "Ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God" (Rom. 8:14-16). Further: "And because ve are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father" (Gal. 4:6). Also: "The Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered" (Rom. 8:26). Indisputably, this "intercession" of the Holy Spirit for us, these "groanings which cannot be uttered," these cries of the Comforter, these "Abba, Fathers," were known to the Apostles, as well as to saintly men and women. But it is just as indisputable that these glimmers, these instants and points of spiritual fullness, these flashes of total knowledge have heretofore remained something special, something accessible only to exceptional people at exceptional times—something like the messianic visions of the Old Testament. Just as there were Christ-bearers before Christ, so there are Spirit-bearers before the full descent of the Spirit. These ancient righteous men and women "all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth. For they that say such things declare plainly that they seek a country" (Heb. 11:13-14). Such also were the ancient Christians before Christ: "Who through faith subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, obtained promises, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, escaped the edge of the sword, out of weakness were made strong, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens. Women received their dead raised to life again: and others were tortured, not accepting deliverance; that they might obtain a better resurrection: And others had trial of cruel mockings and scourgings, yea, moreover of bonds and imprisonment. They were stoned, they were sawn asunder, were tempted, were slain with the sword; they wandered about in sheepskins and goatskins; being destitute, afflicted, tormented; (Of whom the world was not worthy:) they wandered in deserts, and in mountains, and in dens and caves of the earth. And these all, having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise: God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect" (Heb. 11:33–40).

The knowledge of Christ trembled before them; they almost touched Christ. They saw their salvation in their hope (Cf. Rom. 8:24). But the "times or the seasons" (Acts 1:7) had to be fulfilled for hope to be realized and for the invisible to become visible. They knew how to wait and be patient: "Hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it" (Rom. 8:24-25). They, great and holy, did not see Christ, in order "that they without us should not be made perfect." But they almost knew Him—at special times and by the purest minds. At such times their faces trembled with eternal life: this is the Spirit-Dove that had brushed their hearts with its snow-white wing. Just as the perception of God the Word trembled before the fathers and the prophets, so the knowledge of the Holy Spirit trembles before the saints of our time, almost touches them. But, here too, the fullness of time has not vet come; here too, the highest peaks of mankind must wait so "that they without us should not be made perfect." Their hearts have been purified. Their temple has been swept and put in order so as to receive the Comforter. But our hearts are full of filth. And here the higher wait for the lower, the seeing wait for the blind, the holy wait for the sinful, the living wait for the dead, the spiritual wait for the fleshly, those who run ahead and even anticipate wait for those who are inert and lag behind. Only at rare moments is the curtain of the future pulled open before them.

"That they without us should not be made perfect." This explains why, despite their profundity, teachings of the Holy Spirit that have appeared in the history of the Church somehow have not received any response and have remained solitary. In addition, those aspects of Christian life which refer specifically to the Holy Spirit, i.e., Christian freedom, filiation, creativity, and spirituality, were falsified or distorted by various heretics who willfully desired to bring these aspects to premature life. People of the "new religious consciousness," from the 1st century to the 20th century inclusive, have always betrayed themselves by their works, for the rose bushes planted by them have always brought forth thorns and thistles. The "new consciousness" has always turned out to be not above the Church, as it has claimed to be, but against the Church and against Christ, anti-Church and anti-Christ. Anyone who possesses the Spirit to the same degree that the saints possessed Him clearly sees how insane it is to pretend to more. But in all ages it has been too easy for people who are utterly unspiritual to fall into self-delusion and to replace real spirituality with their subjectively human, psychic creativity, and then with demoniacal hallucination. Frenzy and enthusiasm, dreamy prophetism and somber exaltation were taken to be rejoicing in the Holy Spirit. Meanwhile, sin, left to itself, acquired "freedom." The search for the "two infinities" began, and beyond this search was the submergence into the "two abysses": into the upper abyss of gnostic theory and into the lower abyss of khlyst practice. And it was this that was passed off as the fullness of the life full of grace. Let me repeat, parallel to all of Church history there stretches the thread of this pseudo-religious consciousness that has always passed itself off as "new." ¹⁸⁸

A dispassionate survey shows that, in the totality of mankind, there is solid ground neither for speculations about the Spirit nor for assertions about a new consciousness. For, if there were such ground, if there were real experience of life with the Holy Spirit, could what is now happening in creation be happening? In the depths of Church consciousness, longings for the Comforter never ceased. But, besides Church exoterism, there is a peculiar kind of Church esoterism; there are longings about which one should not speak too openly. *This* is not understood and not felt by some, because they are not in the Church, because they do not understand the spirit of ecclesiality. They lay bare what cannot be shown, for they are shameless. A continuous chain of shameless heretics of the "new consciousness" stretches along all of Church history, manifesting a hidden artery of the Church.

But inside the Church as well there have been attempts to make affirmations about the Holy Spirit. Here is what seems to me the most instructive:

In his Dogmatic Poems, St. Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of the gradual nature of the revelation of the Trihypostatic Divinity and in this he sees the pledge of new revelations: "He who wishes to find the Deity of the heavenly Spirit on pages of the God-inspired law will see many frequent and convergent ways if only he desires to see, if only he has to any extent attracted the pure Spirit with his heart, and if his mind is piercingly acute. And if anyone demands the revealed words of the all-loving Deity, let him know that his demand is unwise. To the great majority of mortals the Deity of Christ was not revealed, since it was not necessary to impose an overwhelming burden on hearts extremely frail. Not for beginners is the most perfect word. Who would show to eyes still weak the full light of a fire or saturate them with light beyond measure? It is better to teach them gradually to apprehend the bright light, so that they do not do damage to the very sources of this sweetest light. Thus the word too, having revealed the full divinity of the King, our Father, began to illuminate the great glory of Christ, manifested to a few of the wise among people, and then, having more clearly revealed the Deity of the Son, illuminated for us also the Deity of the radiant Spirit. But for those it shed only a faint light, having saved the greater part for us, for whom the Spirit was then abundantly and in fiery tongues divided, showing clear signs of His Deity, when the Savior ascended from the earth." 189

The same idea is expressed even more strongly in Gregory's *Fifth Theological Oration*, *On the Holy Spirit*: "There have been in the whole period of the duration of the world two conspicuous changes in men's lives, which are also called two Testaments, or, on account of the wide fame of the matter, two Earthquakes (Haggai 2:6–7). The one from idols to the Law, the other from

the Law to the Gospel. And now I announce a third earthquake, namely, from this Earth to that which cannot be shaken or moved. Now the two Testaments are alike in this respect, that the change was not made suddenly, nor at the first try. Why not (for this is a point on which we must have information)? That no violence might be done to us, but that we might be moved by persuasion. For nothing that is involuntary is durable, like streams or trees which are kept back by force. But that which is voluntary is more durable and safe. The former is due to one who uses force, the latter is ours; the one is due to the gentleness of God, the other to a tyrannical authority. Wherefore God did not think it behoved Him to benefit the unwilling, but to do good to the willing." With this Gregory explains the gradualness of the revocation of idols, sacrifices, and circumcision. He continues: "To this I may compare the case of Theology except that it proceeds the reverse way. For in the case by which I have illustrated it the change is made by successive subtractions; whereas here perfection is reached by additions. For the matter stands thus. The Old Testament proclaimed the Father openly, and the Son more obscurely. The New manifested the Son, and suggested the Deity of the Spirit. Now the Spirit Himself dwells among us, and supplies us with a clearer demonstration of Himself. For it was not safe, when the Godhead of the Father was not yet acknowledged, plainly to proclaim the Son; nor when that of the Son was not yet received to burden us further (if I may use so bold an expression) with the Holy Spirit; lest perhaps people might, like men loaded with good beyond their strength, and presenting eyes as yet too weak to bear it to the sun's light, risk the loss even of that which was within the reach of their powers; but that by gradual additions and, as David says, Goings up, and advances and progress from glory to glory, the Light of the Trinity might shine upon the more illuminated. For this reason it was, I think, that He gradually came to dwell in the Disciples, measuring Himself out to them according to their capacity to receive Him, at the beginning of the Gospel, after the Passion, after the Ascension, making perfect their powers, being breathed upon them (John 20:22), and appearing in fiery tongues (Acts 2:3). And indeed it is by little and little that He is declared by Jesus, as you will learn for yourself if you will read more carefully. I will ask the Father, He says, and He will send you another Comforter, even the Spirit of truth (John 14:16–17). This He said that he might not seem to be a rival God, or to make His discourses to them by another authority. Again, He shall send Him, but it is "in My Name" (John 14:26). He leaves out the I will ask, but He keeps the shall send. Then he says, I will send (John 14:26), showing his own dignity. Then he said shall come, showing the authority of the Spirit. You see lights breaking upon us, gradually; and the order of Theology, which it is better for us to keep, neither proclaiming things too suddenly, nor yet keeping them hidden to the end. For the former course would be unscientific, the latter atheistical; and the former would be calculated to startle outsiders, the latter to alienate our own people. I will add another point to what I have said; one which may readily have come into the mind of some others, but which I think a fruit of my own thought. Our Savior had some things which, He said, could not be borne at that time by his disciples (John 16:12) (though they were filled with many teachings), perhaps for the reasons I have mentioned; and therefore

they were hidden. And again he said that all things should be taught us by the Spirit when he should come to dwell amongst us (John 16:13). Of these things, I take it, was the Deity of the Spirit Himself, made clear later on when such knowledge should be seasonable and capable of being received after our Savior's restoration (*apokatastasin*), when it would no longer be received with incredulity because of its marvellous character." ^{190g}

St. Gregory of Nazianzus affirms the gradualness of the historical manifestation of the Spirit; but it is necessary to consider yet another aspect: the discontinuity of the meta-historical revelation of the Spirit. Just like the kingdom of God, the Spirit has both a gradual historical manifestation and a discontinuously eschatological manifestation, ¹⁹¹ which are irreducible one to the other. Otherwise, it is incomprehensible how the final state, the illumination of creation, the expulsion of death, in a word, the "future age" could be distinguished from the preliminary state of waiting, from "this age," in which death still reigns.

Thus, the ideas of the Kingdom of God and of the Holy Spirit resemble each other formally. But this resemblance is not only formal. In its general idea, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the Kingdom of the Father unquestionably has its roots in the Gospel, and it gets its verbal justification in the Apostle Paul: "The kingdom of God is righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit" (Rom. 14:17)—En Pneumati Agiōi, "in" or "of the Holy Spirit," i.e., in the righteousness, peace, and joy produced by the Holy Spirit. The subjective state of righteousness, peace, and joy produced by the Holy Spirit is that same Kingdom of God which is "within" us (Luke 17:21), the barely noticeable mustard seed of faith sown in the soul. But growing and showing itself above the field of what is mine and only mine, above the domain of subjectivity, the sprout of the seed of faith becomes objective, cosmic, universal. Liturgy and the sacraments are the outward manifestations of the Kingdom of God in Church life. The working of miracles and contemplative insights reveal the same Kingdom in the personal lives of the saints. And all of us daily summon the Fullness of the acquisition of this Kingdom, the Holy Spirit. For, according to St. Gregory of Nyssa, 192 the Lord's Prayer in Matthew 6:10 and that in the old Luke 11:12 were read differently in a significant way, a difference in reading that does not exist in the modern text. These were

"Our Father . . . Thy kingdom come (*elthetō hē basileia sou*)" (Matt. 6:10 and the modern Luke 11:12).

"Our Father . . . Thy Holy Spirit come down upon us and purify us (elthetō to hagion Pneuma sou eph hēmas, kai katharisatō hēmas)" (the old Luke 11:12).

^g This translation is based on that in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Second Series, ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace, vol. 7, pp. 325–26.

By comparing these variants of the passage from Luke, Gregory of Nyssa deduces that the terms "Holy Spirit" and "Kingdom of God" have the same meaning, i.e., that "the Holy Spirit is the Kingdom (*Pneuma to hagion basileia estin*)." Then, basing his discussion on this conclusion, St. Gregory develops a remarkable doctrine of the Spirit as "the Kingdom of the Father and the Anointment of the Son." ¹⁹³

The Kingdom presupposes a king. This king is the Father, and therefore the royal majesty of the Father Himself resides in the Holy Spirit. Moreover, the Son, who is begotten before the foundation of the world by the Father and is consubstantial with Him, acquires from all eternity in the Holy Spirit the royal glory belonging to the Father. The Spirit crowns the Son with glory. This is the *anointing activity* of the Spirit, and if in relation to the Father the Spirit is the Kingdom, then in relation to the Son, He is Anointment, Chrism. Gregory of Nyssa verifies this conclusion by an analysis of the messianic psalm: "God, thy God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows" (Ps. 45:7; cf. Heb. 1:9). The Anointing One is the Father; the Anointed One is the Son; the Anointment or the Anointing Oil of Joy is the Holy Spirit. 194

The anointing oil has always been a symbol of joy, and the Holy Spirit has always been the Comforter, the Paraclete, the Bringer of Joy. He is the True Chrism, the Chrism of chrisms, the Chrism that relieves the pain of the wounded, torn, broken heart.

Therefore the very name Christ (*Christos*, *Meshiah*; Messiah = the Anointed One) contains an indication of the trinity of Hypostases in Divinity. "The confession of this name," says Gregory, "contains the teaching of the Holy Trinity, because in this name Each of the Persons in Whom we believe is respectively expressed." In this name we recognize the Anointing One, the Anointed One, and the One through Whom He is anointed." The anointing relation of the Spirit to the Son is even more explicit in the Apostle Paul's speech to Cornelius: "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power" (Acts 10:38). By virtue of this anointment He is Christ and King from the foundation, is "eternally clothed with the royal glory of the Spirit, which constitutes His anointment."

Thus, if previously the interrelationship of the Hypostases was defined through love, through the giving of oneself, through the intra-Divine self-depletion of the Hypostases, through eternal humility and kenosis, now, on the contrary, it is defined as eternal restoration and affirmation of One by Another, as glorification and kingship. "Eternally glorious is the Father, Who existed before all ages; the glory of the Father is the everlasting Son [the Father in giving Himself to the Son finds in Him His own glory] just as the glory of the Son is the Spirit of Christ." ¹⁹⁹

The *first* aspect, examined above, of the intra-Divine life consists in the mutual exchange of tragic, sacrificial love, in mutual self-depletion, im-

poverishment, and humiliation of the Hypostases. The second aspect, which we are examining now, is the reverse current as it were, one that we—who have not acquired the Spirit and who know closely only the Sacrificial God—cannot know at all clearly. For creatures there has not yet begun the restoration and the glory, whose revelation they are awaiting, groaning and travailing in pain (cf. Rom. 8: 19-23). In the supratemporal order of the life of the Trinity eternal is this aspect of answering love, triumphant love, glorifying the Loving one and restoring Him, this transfer of glory from Hypostasis to Hypostasis. "The Son is glorified by the Spirit, the Son glorifies the Father; conversely, the Son receives glory from the Father, and the Only Begotten One becomes the glory of the Spirit, because what glorifies the Father if not the true glory of the Only Begotten One, and what glorifies the Son if not the majesty of the Spirit?"200 Thus, the Holy Spirit is Khrisma basileias, the Anointment of the Kingdom; He is Axiōma basileias, the Royal Dignity. But these names are applicable to Him for His activity within the Trinity. He is not a sign of Divine being, not a dignity and not an attribute of Divinity, but a "living, substantial, and personal kingdom (basileia de zōsa kai ousiōdes kai enupustatos Pneuma to hagion)."201 The Holy Spirit is also a Person Who by His unconditional activity, as the Third Person of the Holy Trinity, is to be the Kingdom of the Father and the Anointment of the Son.

A similar doctrine of the anointing activity of the Spirit was developed by St. Irenaeus of Lyons.²⁰² But without stopping to examine this teaching, I will move on to St. Maximus the Confessor.^b

According to Maximus,²⁰³ the first words of the Lord's Prayer "contain an indication of the Father, of the name of the Father, and of the Father's Kingdom, so that, from the very beginning [of the prayer], we learn to honor the Trinity, to invoke it, and to worship it. For the Name of God the Father, Who abides essentially and hypostatically, is the Only Begotten Son of the Father. Whereas the Kingdom of God the Father, which abides essentially and hypo-

^b Father George Florovsky points out that the entire system of Maximus the Confessor (c. 580–c. 662) can be most easily understood from the standpoint of the idea of Revelation. "This is that primordial fact which serves as the focus of all theological reflection. God is revealed—in this is the beginning of the world's becoming. The whole world is the revelation of God; all in the world is mysterious and therefore symbolic. The whole world is grounded in God's thought and will. Therefore, to know the world is to disclose this symbolism, to perceive the Divine will and thought inscribed in the world. Further, the world is the revelation of the Word. The Word is the God of revelation. Logos is revealed in the world. And this revelation is fulfilled in the Incarnation. For Maximus, the Incarnation is the center of the world's being—not only on the plane of redemption but also on the plane of primordial world-creation. Incarnation is willed [by God] together with creation itself, but not only in prevision of the fall. God creates the world and reveals Himself in order to become man in this world. And man is created in order that God become man, and, through that, man be deified. . . ." (G. Florovsky, *Vizantiiskie Otsy V–VIII [vv.]* [Byzantine Fathers of the V–VIII Centuries] [Paris, 1933], p. 200).

statically, is the Holy Spirit. For what Matthew calls the Kingdom here another evangelist calls the Spirit, saying: 'Let Thy Holy Spirit come and purify us.' For the Father has this Name not as newly acquired, and the Kingdom is understood by us not as a quality perceived in Him. Because He never began to be, He does not begin to be Father and King. But, always existent, He always is Father and Son, without having a beginning to His being or a beginning to His being Father and King. If he is always Existent and is always Father and King, then the Son and the Holy Spirit always co-exist with the Father substantially and hypostatically; They exist from Him and in Him naturally, above cause and word, but They came into being not after Him, not according to the law of causality, not later. For the relationship of the Persons of Divinity has the force of joint being and does not permit one to think that Some of Those found in this relationship were after Others."

That is what St. Maximus the Confessor teaches.

Around the Holy Spirit all the uncertainties, difficulties, and torments of our life are crystallized. And all our hopes are in the revelation of the Holy Spirit. Let us pray together for the appearance of the Holy Spirit. Together, let us invoke Him with the mystical invocation of Symeon the New Theologian:

"Come, true light. Come, eternal life. Come, hidden mystery. Come, nameless treasure. Come, ineffable thing. Come, person who flees human comprehension. Come, ceaseless courage. Come, true hope of all who are being saved. Come, resurrection of the dead. Come, powerful one. You do everything always. You transform and change with a single gesture of the hand. Come, fully invisible, untouchable, impalpable. Come, you who always remain unmoving, though you hourly move and come to us, who lie in the underworld, though you yourself live above the heavens. Come, name most desired and encountered more than anything. But to say about you what you are or to know what you are, we are absolutely forbidden. Come, eternal joy. Come, unfading wreath. Come, purple of our great God and Sovereign. Come, girdle, like a crystal transparent and studded with precious stones. Come, unapproachable refuge. Come, the king's purple and the right hand of holy majesty. Come! My poor soul has needed and needs you. Come, alone to alone, for I am alone, as you see. Come! You have isolated me and made me alone on the earth. Come! You have become my need, and made it so that I have need of you, of you who are accessible to no one. Come, my breath and life. Come, the comfort of my contemptible soul. Come, my joy, glory, and unceasing consolation. I give thanks to you because here, amid turbulence, change, and dizzving motion, you have become a spirit one with me; and though you are God above all, you have become for me all in all.

Ineffable drink! You can never be taken away, and you ceaselessly pour yourself into the lips of my soul, and copiously flow in the source of my heart. Shining garment, which burns demons. Purifying sacrifice! You

bathe me with unceasing holy tears, copiously shed from your presence among those to whom you come. I give thanks to you, because for me you have become an unfading day and a sun on this side of its setting. You have nowhere to hide yourself, and with your glory you fill universes. You have never hidden yourself from anyone, but we ourselves always hide from you, until we wish to come to you. For where can you hide, if there is no place where you can rest? Or why would you hide yourself, you who do not despise anyone, do not fear anyone? Create now out of me a tabernacle for yourself, meek Lord, and live in me, and until my death do not leave, do not separate yourself from me, your servant, so that I too, at my death and after my death, will abide in you and reign with you, God Who reigns over everything.

Remain, Lord, and do not leave me alone, so that when my enemies come, who constantly seek to devour my soul, they will find you in me, and run away for good and not defeat me, because they will see you, stronger than all, inside, dwelling in the mansion of my humble soul. Truly, just as you remembered me, Lord, when I was in the world, and when without my knowledge you yourself chose me, and separated me from the world, and placed me before the face of your glory, so even now protect me through your unchanging, perfectly stable abiding in me, so that every day, contemplating you, I, mortal one, may live, so that, possessing you, I, poor one, may always be rich. This way, I would be more powerful than any king; and partaking of you and drinking you, and hourly being clothed in you, I would enjoy unutterable blessed delight. Since you are every good and every adornment and every delight, and to you belongs the glory of the holy and consubstantial Trinity, which is glorified in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and is known and honored by the whole community of the faithful now and always and for ever and ever. Amen."204

Amen. Amen. Amen.



Quocumque ferar. Everywhere straight.

VII. Letter Six: Contradiction

....

THE TRUTH is announced to creation^a by the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth. Here, when the consciousness rises above "the double bound of space and time" and enters into eternity, here, at this moment of annunciation, the One Who announces the Truth and the Truth Announced coincide completely. In the appearance of the Spirit of Truth, i.e., in the light of Tabor,^b the form and the content of the Truth are one. But perceived and assimilated by creation, the knowledge of the Truth falls into time

^a I use the word "creation" to render *tvar*', creatures taken singly or as an aggregate. "Creation" (*tvar*') is not used here in the sense of the creation (*sotvorenie*) of the world, or in the sense of the world as God's creation (*tvorenie*).

^b The mountain upon which the transfiguration of Christ occurred (see Matt. 17) is traditionally believed to be Tabor. On this mountain Jesus was transfigured in the presence of the three disciples he had taken up there: "And his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light" (Matt. 17:2). The light of Tabor has thus come to designate phenomena of supernatural light, e.g., the visible radiance surrounding saints [see the section on Saint Seraphim, in Florensky's text, pp. 74–77]. Many Christian mystics, notably Symeon the New Theologian [See note c on p. 92] and Gregory Palamas, have written about supernatural reality manifested as Light, a light that is physical and nonphysical at the same time. Gregory Palamas writes of the supernatural ability to see God granted to us by the presence of the Holy Spirit in us: "As this faculty has no other means of acting, having quitted all other beings, it becomes itself nothing but light, and grows like that which it sees; it unites with it without mixture, being light. If it looks at itself, it sees the light; if it looks at the object of its vision, that again is light, and if it looks at the means it employs in seeing, that too is light; it is there that there is union; all that is one, so that he who sees can distinguish neither the means, nor the end, nor the essence, but is only conscious of being light, and of seeing a light distinct from any created thing" (quoted in John Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas [Great Britain, 1964], p. 174).

and into space, into the time of the diversity of the individual and into the space of the diversity of the social. This doubly breaks the immediate unity of form and content, and knowledge *of* the Truth becomes knowledge *about* the Truth. And knowledge about the Truth is *truth*.

It is indisputable that *truth* necessarily exists alongside the Truth if creation exists alongside God. The existence of truth is only another expression of the very fact of the existence of creation as such, i.e., as existing as an individual diversity in time and as a social diversity in space. The presence of truth is equal to the presence of creation. But does creation itself exist?

The crux of the matter is that, philosophically, an *a priori* answer cannot be given to this question.

Creation is creation precisely because it is not an Absolutely Necessary Being and because, consequently, the existence of creation can be derived neither from the idea of the Truth, this prime mover of all understanding, nor even from the fact of the existence of the Truth, from God.

Contrary to Spinoza's acosmism and the pantheism of the majority of thinkers, nothing can be concluded about the existence of the world from the nature of God, for the act of world-creation, whether we understand it as instantaneous and attainable in history, as gradual and spread over all of historical time, as being revealed in an infinite temporal process, or, finally, as eternal—this act must certainly be conceived as free, i.e., as proceeding from God without necessity.²⁰⁵

I repeat, the existence of creation, i.e., of our infirmity, is not deducible by any arguments, even the most subtle. And if thinkers still attempt to deduce the existence of creation, then one can affirm in advance that they are either performing a trick of logic or destroying the God-given creatureliness of creation, lowering it—a person free although infirm—from the level of Godlike and creative being to the plane of abstract being, in the capacity of an attribute or mode of Divinity. Thus, the being of truth is not deducible but only demonstrable in experience. In life experience, we come to know both our Godlikeness and our infirmity. Only life experience reveals to us our personhood and our spiritual freedom. Philosophy does not have the power to deduce the fact of truth. But if this fact is already given to philosophy, it is philosophy's business to inquire into the properties, makeup, and nature of human truth, i.e., of truth that is given by God, but in mankind and to mankind. In other words, the question of the formal makeup of truth, of its rational structure, is *legitimate*, whereas its content is the Truth itself. Or (it is also appropriate to ask ourselves) how does Divine Truth appear to human rationality?

In order to answer the question of the logical structure of truth, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that truth is truth precisely about the Truth, not about something else. In other words, truth finds itself in some sort of correspondence with the Truth. The form of truth is capable of

holding its content, the Truth, only when in some way, if only symbolically, it has something from the Truth. In other words, truth must necessarily be an emblem of some fundamental property of the Truth. Or finally, being here and now, truth must be a symbol of eternity.

Even though it is given in creation, truth must be a monogram of Divinity. This-worldly, it must in some sense be not this-worldly. With colors of the conditional it must paint the Unconditional. The fragile vessel of human words must contain the ever-indestructible Adamant of Divinity. Creation is tossed and turned in the turbulent surges of Time, but truth must abide. Creation is born and dies, and generation is succeeded by generation, but truth must be immortal. People argue with one another and contradict one another, but truth must be above argument and contradiction. People's opinions vary from country to country and from year to year, but truth is everywhere and always the same, equal to itself. In a word, truth is "what everyone has everywhere and always believed, because (as the very meaning of the word shows) only that is really and properly universal which encompasses everything to the extent possible (quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est; hoc est etenim vere proprieque catholicum, quod ipsa vis nominis ratioque declarat, quae omnia fere universaliter comprehendit."206 And this requirement can be fulfilled only under the condition that "we follow universality, antiquity, consensus (si sequamar universitatem, antiquitatem, consensionem)."207 Every truth must be an unconditional formula.

But how is that possible? How is it possible to construct the unconditional formula of Divine Truth from the conditional material of the human mind?

Knowledge is given in the form of a certain judgment, i.e., as the synthesis of a certain subject S and a certain predicate P. This excludes neither an analytic judgment nor even an identical judgment, for in these judgments too the subject and predicate are different in some sense. They must first be distinguished in order then to be united.²⁰⁸ But if every judgment is the *synthesis* of a certain duality, then why could there not be another synthesis, the synthesis of a given subject S with another predicate, with P'? Further, why could S not be united with the negation of P, with not-P? It is clear that every judgment is *conditional*, i.e., it can encounter an objection to itself in the form of another, opposite judgment, and even in the form of a contradictory judgment. And if hitherto such an objection has not yet arisen, this in no wise assures the irrevocability of our judgment in the future or in other places.

Life is infinitely fuller than rational definitions and therefore no formula can encompass all the fullness of life. No one formula, therefore, can replace life itself in its creativity, in its creation of the new, every moment and everywhere. Hence, rational definitions are always and

everywhere subject and inevitably will be subject to objections. Objections to a formula are also formulas, counterpropositions. They proceed from aspects of life that are complementary to the aspect in question, that are contrary and even contradictory to the formula that is being disputed.

A rational formula can be above the attacks of life if and only if *it gathers all of life into itself*, with all of life's diversity and all of its present and possible future contradictions. A rational formula can be true if and only if it foresees, so to speak, all objections to itself and answers them. But to foresee all objections, it is necessary to take not them concretely but their *limit*. It follows that truth is a judgment that also contains the limit of all its refutations, or (in other words) that *truth is a self-contradictory judgment*.

From the formal point of view, the unconditionality of truth is expressed precisely in the fact that it *in advance* presupposes and accepts its own negation and answers the doubt concerning its truthfulness by *accepting* this doubt into itself, and even in its limit. Therefore, truth is truth precisely because it is not afraid of any objections. And it is not afraid of them because it itself says more against itself than any negation can say, but truth combines this its self-negation with affirmation. For rationality, *truth is contradiction*, and this contradiction becomes explicit as soon as truth acquires a verbal formulation. Each of the contradictory propositions is contained in a judgment of truth and therefore the presence of each of them is provable with an equal degree of persuasiveness, with necessity. The thesis and the antithesis together form the expression of truth. In other words, truth is an antinomy, and it cannot fail to be such.²⁰⁹

And the truth cannot be anything else, for one can affirm in advance that knowledge of the truth demands spiritual life and therefore is an ascesis. But the ascesis of rationality is belief, i.e., self-renunciation. The act of the self-renunciation of rationality is an expression of antinomy. Indeed, only an antinomy can be believed. Every non-antinomic judgment is merely accepted or merely rejected by rationality, for such a judgment does not surpass the boundary of rationality's egoistical isolation. If truth were non-antinomic, then rationality, always revolving in its proper sphere, would not have a fulcrum, would not see extrarational objects and therefore would not be induced to begin the ascesis of belief. That fulcrum is dogma. With dogma begins our salvation, for only dogma, being antinomic, does not constrain our freedom and allows voluntary belief or wicked unbelief. For it is impossible to compel one to believe, just as it is impossible to compel one not to believe. According to St. Augustine, 210 "no one believes except voluntarily (nemo credit nisi volens),"211

Everything said heretofore has been said—for the sake of simplicity—under the assumption that in logic we take *judgments* as our point of departure. Truth then turns out to be an antinomy of judgments. But it is not difficult to see that, from another point of view, i.e., in *the logic of concepts*, we would arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that truth is an antinomy of concepts. Of course, both conclusions are actually the same conclusion, for an antinomy of concepts is only *psychologically* different from an antinomy of judgments. For every concept is transformable into a corresponding judgment, and vice versa. From the logical point of view, certain elements of two conjugate kinds exist in general in rationality, and these elements are mutually transformable and therefore mutually replaceable in arguments, so that they have the same formal theory. But now not this but only the *antinomic* connection of certain elements in truth, is important for us.

Truth is an antinomy. This important conclusion of our reflections requires a more rigorous expression. In other words, what is needed is a formal logical *theory of antinomy*. Let us indicate a convenient way to obtain such a theory. It is based on the symbolic-logic algorithm, ²¹² which is highly convenient for the concise transcription of logical operations. Therefore, before we present our construction, it would be useful to recall the meaning of certain symbols in symbolic logic. As is well known, the primary and most fundamental principle of symbolic-logic methods is

$$p \subset q$$
 (I)

i.e., the principle of *implication* (when p and q represent propositions) and *inclusion* (when p and q represent classes). In order to make the following exposition more precise, let us have p and q stand for propositions, i.e., products of an act of judgment, although it would be just as legitimate to have them stand for classes. But if \subset is the sign of implication or inclusion or, in other words, if p and q are taken to represent propositions or classes, the above inclusion formula (I) expresses, in essence, *one and the same* fact, i.e., that the truthfulness of q is related to the truthfulness of p, and this fact is expressed by the words "consequently," "thus," "ergo," etc.

 $p \subset q$, i.e., "if p, then q" or "p ergo q." This "consequently" or "ergo," when developed, signifies that

"if p is true, then q is also true";

or:

"if q is false, p is also false";

or:

"p cannot be true if q is false";

or, finally (this expression is the preferred one because of its lack of ambiguity):

"either p is false or q is true." 213

This last formula makes it possible to understand the equivalence of the operation of inclusion \subset to the operation of logical addition \cup . In fact, the combination of the symbols

$$p \cup q$$
 (II),

i.e., the operation of logical addition, signifies nothing else but the alternativity of the components p and q:

"either p is false or q is true,"

or, more simply,:

From this it is evident that it is possible to write the logical equation of two operations, namely:

$$p \subset q \cdot = \cdot - p \cup q \tag{III},$$

where the sign "-" before p signifies the negation or, more precisely, the negative of p. In general, the sign "-" in symbolic logic makes negative the symbol to which it is attached. 215

Let us further recall that the sign \cap is the operator of logical multiplication, i.e., that, placed between two symbols or groups of symbols, it indicates the conjoint existence of these symbols or groups. ²¹⁶ Let us recall, finally, that the symbol V represents "truth," "Veritas," while the inverted V or Λ represents the negation of truth, "-V," or falsehood. ²¹⁷ We now have all the data we need for the logical definition of the antinomy P and the expression of its schemes.

Our reflections on antinomy naturally follow from that method of proof through the reduction to the absurd which in mathematics was used by Euclid to prove the 12th proposition of the 9th book of the *Principles*, ²¹⁸ while in philosophy it was used by the dogmatists for the radical refutation of the arguments of the skeptics against the probability of the truth. ²¹⁹ Later on too, this procedure was frequently used both by mathematicians and by philosophers, ²²⁰ and it became widespread in society in general, serving the aims of the dialectics of the salon and home, as portrayed, for example, by Turgenev in the novel *Rudin*. ²²¹ But despite how widespread this method has been in practical application, it has been long neglected by the logical theory of inferences, and was pointed out only about 10 years ago out by the champion of symbolic logic G. Vailati, of the school of Peano. ²²²

However, neither the public that uses this method almost unconsciously, nor the philosophers and mathematicians who use it half-consciously, nor even Vailati, who has understood it theoretically, saw its inadequacy for those goals toward which it has been applied and its connection with the theory of antinomy.

In symbolic logic this method is expressed by a very simple formula:

$$-p \subset p \cdot C \cdot p \tag{IV}$$

i.e., "if the negative of a proposition (or of a class) implies the proposition that it negates (or the class), then it is true; "si négation d'une proposition implique cette proposition même, celle-ci est vraie." ²²³

Symbolic logic explains and justifies this paradoxical method of reasoning. In effect, according to formula (III),

$$-p \subset p \cdot = \cdot - (-p) \cup p \tag{III'},$$

but, according to the principle of double negation:²²⁴

$$-(-p) = p \tag{V}$$

and hence

$$-p \subset p \cdot = \cdot p \cup p \tag{III''}.$$

But it is clear that the alternative " $p \cup p$," i.e., "p or p," entrains the irrefutable affirmation p, so that

$$p \cup p \cdot \subset \cdot p$$
 (VI)

and ergo

$$-p \subset p \cdot \subset \cdot p$$
,

which is what one was required to prove.

Such is the path indicated by symbolic logic. But is it sufficient? In other words, does Euclid's reasoning constitute a rigorous proof? Of course not. In order to become convinced of this, it is sufficient to represent –p through q:

$$-p = q (VII).$$

It is then clear that there is no reason to exclude in advance the possibility also for q of all that which was said in the foregoing about p, i.e., to exclude the applicability of formula (IV) to q. Thus, the possibility is not excluded that

$$-q \subset q \cdot \subset \cdot q \tag{VIII},$$

or, making corresponding substitutions from formula (VII),

$$-(-p) \subset (-p) \cdot \subset \cdot -p$$
 (VIII'),

or, finally, by virtue of formula (V):

$$p \subset -p \cdot \subset \cdot -p \tag{IX},$$

so that one has provided not only p (IV) but also not-p (IX). Thus, we have obtained two equally indubitable proofs which make up the antinomy P. Here then is the logical scheme of the antinomy P:

THESIS

p:

One can suppose either the thesis p or its negation, the antithesis –p. In the first case, there is no need to prove the thesis, while in the second case it turns out that from the antithesis one can once again derive the thesis, so that the following alternative is obtained: "either the thesis or the thesis":

Antithesis

-p:

One can suppose either the antithesis –p or its negation, the anti-anti-thesis –(–p), i.e., the thesis p. In the first case there is no need to prove the antithesis, while in the second case it turns out that from the thesis one can once again derive the antithesis, so that the following alternative is obtained: "either the antithesis or the antithesis":

 $p \cup p$,

i.e., the thesis p is affirmed.

Symbolically this can be expressed as:

$$-p \subset p \cdot \subset \cdot p \cup p \cdot \subset \cdot p$$
.

Thus, whether we directly affirm the thesis or negate it, we cannot in any case evade it. $-p \cup -p$,

i.e., the antithesis –p is affirmed.

Symbolically this can be expressed as:

 $-(-p) \subset -p \cdot \subset -p \cdot p \cup -p \cdot \subset -p$. Thus, whether we directly affirm the antithesis or negate it, we cannot in any case evade it.

Using the methods and operations of pure logic we have shown the possibility of antinomy in the strictest sense of the word.

From this one must necessarily conclude, first of all, the insufficiency of the logical formula (IV), used to prove the thesis p, if one does not exclude here the possibility of the formula (IX). In effect, the existence of the thesis in no wise guarantees the nonexistence of the antithesis; on the contrary, it *always* presupposes the existence of the antithesis in the domain of the spirit and *often* presupposes it in other domains. In other words, each time it is necessary to become convinced not only of the truthfulness of the thesis p but also to clarify whether it is not half of some antinomy P.

Then, the proposed process leads to the following symbolic definition of the antinomy:

$$P = (p \cap -p) \cap V \tag{X},$$

where V is the sign of truth, *Veritas*, and \cap is the operator of logical multiplication, i.e., the symbol of the coexistence of the terms between which it is placed. Translating the formula (X) into ordinary language, we can say: "An antinomy is a proposition which, being true, jointly contains thesis and antithesis, so that it is inaccessible to any objection. The addition of the symbol V, raising the antinomy *above* the plane of rationality, is precisely that which distinguishes P from falsehood, Λ , lying in the rational plane and defined by the formula:²²⁵

$$\Lambda = p \cap -p \tag{XI}.$$

But what is this factor V in the definition of the antinomy? From the *formal* point of view, it is the result of a certain process which establishes in one way or another in relation to P that it is true, while the two other processes prove that this P in its structure is p and also -p. Therefore, for pure logic, V in the definition of P is only an indication of the *position* of this P, an indication of the relation that is required toward it; V is a finger pointing to the sky in the presence of P, so to speak, but it is not a constituent part of the structure of P itself. In its structure, P does not differ from the simple contradiction Λ and, hence, in the rational sphere *only authority* is that finger which indicates the truthfulness of P in comparison with Λ . That is why for Catholicism (immersed in the psychic and hence rational domain but nevertheless having the spiritual and hence the antinomian as its *object*) authority is *all*, and without an iron authority, without the pointing finger of the Pope, a Catholic is powerless to live. In the domain of the suprasensuous and hence suprarational, the factor V represents the constituent elements, the spiritual unity, the supra-

sensuous reality of antinomy, and in the Holy Spirit this unity, this reality is experienced and perceived directly.

For greater clarity, formula (X) can be expanded to read:

$$-p \subset p \cdot \cap \cdot p \subset -p : \subset : p \cap -p \cap -\Lambda = P$$
 (XII),

i.e., "if the antithesis entrains the thesis and, at the same time, the thesis entrains the antithesis, the combination of the thesis and antithesis, if it is not false, is an antinomy." Such is *the formula of antinomy*. All the antinomies disclosed in philosophy can be expressed (with a greater or lesser degree of precision) by this formula.²²⁶

Thus, truth is an antinomy. The term "antinomy" as a philosophical term is of very late origin, i.e., it appears only with Kant, and that only in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, i.e., in 1781. Till then it was a juridical and, to some extent, a theological term. But though the term "antinomy" is a late one, the very idea of the necessary self-contradictoriness of rationality, connected now with this term, is an old one. One can even assume that this idea first appeared as a simple reflection of the complex opposite-combining structure of the life of the ancient Greeks, both personal and social.

"Upon what is the superiority of the Greek mind based?"—asks one historian of Greek thought. "The secret of its astonishing success"—he answers—"consists in a combination of opposites. An extraordinary richness of creative fantasy along with an ever-vigilant doubt, inquisitive and daring everything; a powerful ability to make generalizations combined with acute powers of observation, exploring all the peculiarities of a phenomenon; a religion that fully satisfies psychic needs without placing fetters on the mind that analyzes its creations. To this must be added a diversity of competing spiritual centers, a constant collision of forces, excluding the possibility of stagnation, and finally, a governmental organization and social structure sufficiently severe to restrain 'the wayward childish urges' of the reckless and sufficiently free not to hinder the bold impulses of exceptional minds. In this combination of gifts and circumstances, one can perceive the source of the dominant success achieved by the Greek spirit in the domain of scientific study." 227

How did the living perception of antinomy begin?

In Asia Minor there lived someone whose mind had a tragic cast, and of the philosophers of antiquity he was perhaps the most sensitive to the truth. At least he was not subject to the inner staleness that too often deadens the soul of professional thinkers. For this reason his contemporaries called him *ho Skoteinos*, "the Dark One." His name was Heraclitus. And it was said that he spent his entire life lamenting the tragic nature of himself and of the world.²²⁸

This Heraclitus was the first to feel clearly that God the Word exists. He was the first to discover the higher harmony and supramundane unity

of being. "Attending not me but truth," he said, "it is reasonable to recognize that all is one." "Wisdom is one (understand it to mean that Reason which governs all through all)." "Reason for all is one and the same . . ." And it was precisely this philosopher who was drawn to the "untrembling heart of certain Truth," as Parmenides²²⁹ said. It was this philosopher who, all of his life, spoke of the separatedness, fragmentedness, and antinomicalness of our earthly lot. Having discovered the perfect harmony of the Word, he saw with all possible acuteness (for one living before Christ) the inner discord of the world. Subsequently, this has happened more than once, and even Spinoza's spiders and Spinoza's joy upon hearing rumors of war²³⁰ could be attributed to the contemplation of one Substance. It is possible that even the Apostle Paul expresses the same pious and ecstatic feeling (though in a purified and spiritualized form) when in the Epistle to the Romans he contemplates from the height of eternity the blindness of the Hebrew nation.

But in the "Christian before Christ," 231 this new perception of dualism between the lower and the higher was still more acute, for it was wholly unreconciled. "People should know," he exclaims, "that war is ubiquitous and that truth is discord, for everything arises and everything is annihilated because of discord." "War is the progenitor and master of everything . . ." "People [unreasonable people! Is it not over you that the philosopher lamented his entire life?] do not understand in what way opposites agree. Like the string of a bow or lyre which is tightened or released, the world's harmony consists in a combination of tension and release. Counteraction brings things close to each other. Out of opposites perfect harmony is formed. Everything arises thanks to discord." Therefore, "unite the whole and the unwhole, the harmonious and the inharmonious. All gives one, and one gives all." "For God, everything is beauty, good, and justice; for people one thing is just, another thing is not."

The world is tragically beautiful in its fragmentedness. Its harmony is in its disharmony; its unity is in its discord. Such is the paradoxical teaching of Heraclitus, later paradoxically developed by Friedrich Nietzsche in the theory of "tragic optimism." And the fundamental tone of Heraclitus' moods, their sap and color, is perfectly expressed by a fragment consisting of a single word: "CONTRADICTION"— $A\Gamma XIBA\Sigma IH$.²³²

Contradiction! One desires to repeat after Heraclitus his lament, a lament that has not lost its acuteness even today: "People do not understand this eternally existent truth before they hear of it; they do not even understand it when they hear of it for the first time. For, although everything occurs according to this truth, people turn out to be uncomprehending when in experience they find speeches and facts such as I expound them [read: agchibasiē, contradiction], understanding every phenomenon according to its nature and explaining it in essence. What they do when

they are awake slips away from some people just as they forget what they do in their dreams."

The glorious names of the Eleatics must be placed after Heraclitus in the history of the idea of antinomy. According to the Eleatics, rationality becomes entangled in insuperable contradictions as soon as it desires to become completely attached to this egotistically fragmented world, a world fragmented in time and in space. But what was said by the Eleatics is too well known for us to repeat here.

A great proponent of the antinomicalness of rationality (though he is still not understood in this aspect) was Plato. The majority of his dialogues are nothing but a gigantic antinomy, developed with all care and artistically dramatized. Plato's very predilection for the dialogic form of exposition, i.e., the form of the contraposition of convictions, already hints at the antinomic nature of his thinking. But this antinomic nature becomes even more palpable if we take into account the fact that nearly every one of the dialogues only sharpens the contradiction and deepens the abyss between "yes" and "no," between thesis and antithesis, but by no means decides the question one way or the other. One of two things holds: this is either a very good antinomism or a very unsuccessful philosophy of integral rationality.

Finally, among the profound and creatively powerful representatives of antinomism, we must include Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa with his doctrine of *coincidentia oppositorum*, i.e., the coincidence in God of opposite determinations. This doctrine found a distinctive and multivalent symbolic expression in his "Application of Mathematics to Theology," which, unfortunately, has not been studied and is almost unknown to historians of thought.²³³

As far as other thinkers are concerned, e.g., Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Renouvier, and others, one scarcely has to mention them: they are sufficiently well known. Finally, the names of the contemporary "pragmatists"²³⁴ can also be inscribed on the golden plaque of the history of antinomism.

Knowledge of contradiction and love of contradiction, along with ancient skepticism, appear to be the highest achievement of antiquity. We must not, we dare not, cover contradiction over with the paste of our philosophemes! Let contradiction remain as profound as it is. If the knowable world is cracked, and if in practice we cannot repair its cracks, neither must we hide them. If the knowing reason is fragmented, if it is not a monolithic slab, if it is self-contradictory, again we must not pretend that this is not the case. The impotent exertion of human rationality to reconcile contradictions should have been repulsed long ago by a bold acceptance of contradictoriness.²³⁵

The Book of Job wholly consists of such a concentrated experience of contradiction. This book is wholly constructed on the idea of antinomi-

calness. Here God "reminds us that man is not the measure of creation"; that "the universe is designed according to a plan which infinitely surpasses human reason." The desires and works of God are essentially incomprehensible to man and therefore appear to him unreasonable (see Job 23). "We cannot find him out . . . he respecteth not any that are wise of heart" (Job 37:23, 24). "Everything is a mystery," says one of Dostoevsky's characters. "God's mystery is in everything; the heart feels frightened and amazed; and this fright gives joy to the heart. It is even more beautiful that it is a mystery." The mystery of moral disorder amazes Job with its magnificence, but his friends do not even notice it (see Job 21). "Lay your hand upon your mouth" (Job 21:5). This is a gesture of silence and mystery, the very same gesture with which John the Seer of Mysteries is often painted on icons.

The mysteries of religion are not secrets that one must not reveal. They are not the passwords of conspirators, but inexpressible, unutterable, indescribable *experiences*, which cannot be put into words except in the form of contradictions, which are "yes" and "no" at the same time. They are "mysteries that transcend meaning." That is why, when it is expressed in church hymns, the rapture of the soul is inevitably enveloped in the shell of a distinctive play of concepts. The whole liturgy, especially the canons and stichera, is full of this ceaselessly exuberant wit of antithetic juxtapositions and antinomic affirmations.

Contradiction! It is always a mystery of the soul, a mystery of prayer and love. The closer one is to God, the more distinct are the contradictions. In Heavenly Jerusalem, there are no contradictions. Here, on earth, there are contradictions in everything; and they can be removed neither by social reorganization nor by philosophical argument. Something great, long desired but wholly unexpected, the great Unexpected Joy, will come suddenly. It will embrace and shake the entire sphere of earthly being. It will roll the heavens up like a scroll, wash the earth, give new powers, renew everything, transubstantiate everything, and show the most simple and everyday things in an all-blinding radiance of effulgent beauty. Then, there will be no contradictions, and no rationality tormented by contradictions. But now the brighter is the Truth of the Triradiant Light shown by Christ and reflected in the righteous, the Light in which the contradiction of the present age is overcome by love and glory, the blacker will be the cracks of the world. Cracks in everything! But I wish to speak of cracks in the domain of speculation.

In heaven, there is only the one Truth. But, here, on earth, we have a multitude of truths, fragments of the Truth, noncongruent to one another. In the history of the shallow and boring thought of "modern philosophy," Kant had the boldness to utter the great word "antinomy," which violated the decorum of the apparent unity. For this alone he would have merited eternal glory. It does not matter if his own

antinomies are unsuccessful. What is important is the experience of antinomicalness.²³⁸

From the point of view of dogmatics, antinomies are inevitable. If sin exists (and the first half of faith is in the recognition that it does in fact exist²³⁹), then our entire being, just like the whole world, is fragmented. Taking as our starting point one corner of the world or our own rational mind, we have no reason to expect that we will get the same result we would have gotten if we had started from another corner. A meeting is improbable. The existence of a multitude of dissonant schemes and theories, which are equally conscientious but proceed from different starting points, is the best proof that there are cracks in the world. Reason itself is fragmented and split, and only the purified God-bearing mind of saintly ascetics is *somewhat* more whole. In this mind, the healing of the fissures and cracks has begun; the sickness of being is being cured; the wounds of the world are being healed. For this mind itself is the healing organ of the world.

Plato's Hippias complains to Socrates: "You and your friends, with whom you are in the habit of conversing, do not view things in their entirety, but break off and grind what is beautiful, and all other things, fragmenting them in your speeches. It is for this reason that such beautiful and intrinsically integral bodies of being slip away from you." But that which the naive Hippias sees as a personal drawback of Socrates is in fact a necessary feature of science as an activity of the rational mind.

Whatever we take, we inevitably fragment the object we are considering, split it into incompatible aspects. When we look at one and the same thing from different points of view, i.e., when we operate in different modes of spiritual activity, we can arrive at antinomies, at propositions that are incompatible in our rational mind. These contradictions are eliminated in the mind only at moments of illumination by grace. But they are eliminated not rationally but suprarationally. Antinomicalness does not say, "Either the one or the other is not true." It also does not say, "Neither the one nor the other is true." It only says, "Both the one and the other are true, but each in its own way. Reconciliation and unity are higher than rationality." Antinomicalness comes from the fragmentedness of being itself, including rationality as a part of being.

As the ideal limit where contradiction is removed, we place dogma. But, for rationality, dogma is only formal. Dogma is filled with the sap of life and becomes self-proving Truth only when the soul is filled with grace. Though it is a regulative norm for rationality, dogma is an intuitively given truth for the grace-purified reason that receives revelation. For rationality, dogma is not more than a categorical imperative that proclaims the demand: "You must think in such a way that every violation of a dogma in one direction is immediately neutralized by a corresponding violation in the opposite direction. All your rational operations on a

dogma must be carried out in such a way that they preserve the fundamental antinomy of the dogma."

By contrast, for reason purified by prayer and ascesis (the limiting case of which is a saint's reason), dogma is a self-proving axiom, which testifies: "You see both my truthfulness and the inner necessity for me to be antinomic in rationality. If now you see unclearly, you will see clearly later, when you purify yourself."

As an object of faith, a dogma inevitably contains a rational antinomy. If there is no antinomy, then rationally, the proposition has an integral character. But then, first of all, this is not a dogma but a scientific proposition. There is nothing to believe here; there is no reason for purification and ascesis. But to me it seems a great blasphemy to think that religious truth, "holiness," can be apprehended in the case of *any* inner state, without ascesis. To be sure, religious truth can shine its rays of grace upon an impure reason in order to attract it, but such truth cannot be accessible to everyone. Thus, I repeat, such a proposition is not a dogma. Secondly, the consciousness then is not full, not deep, has not looked into the inner heart of the object, for we cannot integrally think the essence of a religious object, do not have the power to embrace it rationally without decomposing it. Rationality must necessarily limit itself to one of the sides of an object. And limitation to one side is precisely the meaning of heresy.

A heresy, even a mystical one, is a rational one-sidedness that claims to be everything. The Greek word airesis means choice, tendency, a disposition to something. Then, it means what is chosen, a chosen mode of thought, and finally, a party, sect, or philosophical school.²⁴¹ This word contains the idea of one-sidedness, of some sort of rectilinear concentration on one of many possible affirmations.²⁴² Orthodoxy has a universal nature, but heresy essentially has a sectarian nature. The spirit of a sect is the egoism that emanates from it, spiritual separateness. A one-sided proposition takes the place of absolute Truth, and such a proposition thus excludes everything in which is seen the antinomic complement to the given half of the antinomy, rationally incomprehensible. An object of religion, in falling from the heaven of spiritual experience into the fleshliness of rationality, inevitably splits apart into aspects that exclude one another. The task of an orthodox, universal rationality is to collect all the fragments, their fullness, while the task of a heretical, sectarian rationality is to choose the fragments that please one: "You need many strings to play on the psaltery of Eternity."243

As we have said, for rationality, fullness in unity or integral fullness is only postulated. But the condition of the intuitive givenness of a postulate is the taming of one's rational activity and the going out into the thinking, full of grace, of restored, purified, and re-created human nature. Christ gave the seed of the new creation, "the seed of God" (1 John 3:9), and

the fixed point of the immovable rock on which we can stand, saving ourselves from epoche. But connected fullness is only a hope. It will be given only by the One Who will wash all the filth from creation, by the Holy Spirit. Dogmas are comprehended by the Spirit, in Whom is the fullness of understanding. But, for the time being, the more profound and fuller is the experience, the more acute and diverse will the antinomies of faith be. Indeed, the Holy Scripture is full of antinomies. Not only do the judgments of different Biblical authors (justification by faith in the Apostle Paul and justification by works in the Apostle James, and so on) intersect antinomically, but this is even the case for the same author—not only in different writings but even in the same writing, not only in different passages but even in the same passage. Antinomies stand side by side, sometimes in a single verse. They are found in the most powerful passages, where they shake the soul of a believer like the rushing wind and strike the high places of the mind like lightning. Only genuine religious experience apprehends antinomies and sees how their reconciliation is possible. But for positivistic rationality they are not visible or their paradoxicality appears to be the literary manner of a sick mind.

Consider the Apostle Paul. His brilliant religious dialectic consists of a series of discontinuities; it jumps from one affirmation to another, where each successive affirmation is antinomic with respect to the preceding one. Sometimes an antinomy is even embodied in a stylistic discontinuity of exposition, in an external asyndeton. Rationally contradictory and mutually exclusive judgments have their sharp edges directed against each other.

But, for direct perception, these virgin blocks of "yes" and "no" that are piled on top of one another reveal a higher religious unity, a unity that is capable of achieving its culmination in the Holy Spirit. What inner insensitivity, what religious tastelessness it would be to reduce all these "yes's" and "no's" to a single plane, to consider one layer or another inessential! Antinomies belong to the very essence of experience. They are inseparable from experience the way the color of a petal is inseparable from the pigment contained in it. This can be compared to mist painted on a picture, to a design woven into a fabric. If we wish to see the picture more clearly, if we wish to make the fabric smooth, it would make no sense to erase the mist or to eliminate the design. Together with them, we would destroy the very substance of the picture or the fabric. We would destroy the picture or the fabric itself. It is the same way in religion. Antinomies are the constituent elements of religion, if we conceive it rationally. Thesis and antithesis, as warp and woof, bind the very fabric of religious experience. Where there is no antinomy, there is no faith. But this will be only when faith and hope vanish away and only love remains (see 1 Cor. 13:8–13).

How cold and distant, how godless and stale, seems to me now that time of my life when I considered the antinomies of religion resolvable but not yet resolved, when, in my proud madness, I affirmed the logical monism of religion.

Self-renunciation is the only thing that brings us close to Godlikeness. But both self-renunciation in general and the self-renunciation of rationality in particular are an absurdity for rationality. A cannot be not-A. "Impossible" but "certain"! From I love makes not-I, for true love lies in the rejection of rationality.

I have spoken enough about antinomies in general. Let me present several concrete examples from an uncountable multitude. Paul's antinomies are the first to strike the eyes, and for a very simple reason. In Paul the profundity of theosophical speculations is combined with a dialectical form, whereas in other sacred writers the form is somewhat aphoristic or, on the other hand, systematic. The rational mind is not predisposed to expect connectedness here, and therefore it does not at once notice contradictions behind the aphoristic disjointedness. But a dialectical exposition predisposes the rational mind to expect connectedness, and when the connectedness is disrupted by a "salient point" at which thesis and antithesis converge, the rational mind involuntarily shudders. This clearly means that it is required to sacrifice itself.

For us the most appropriate Epistle is the most dialectical and fiery one, namely, Romans, this antinomy-charged bursting bomb against the rational mind. Here, by way of example,²⁴⁴ is a table of antinomies, chosen in a rather haphazard fashion. (I deliberately exclude certain antinomies that I intend to examine in a future book.)

EXAMPLES OF DOGMATIC ANTINOMIES:

DIVINITY:

Thesis: Consubstantial. Antithesis: Trihypostatic.

Two Natures Are United in Christ:

Thesis: As unmerged and unchanging. Antithesis: As indivisible and inseparable.

RELATION OF MAN TO GOD:

Thesis: Predestination. Rom. 9, where the rejection of Israel is explained from the objective and theological point of view, i.e., the economic point of view, i.e., an answer is given to the question "for what reason?" Antithesis: Free will. Rom. 9:30–10:21, where the rejection of Israel is explained from the moral and anthropological point of view, i.e., from the hamartiological point of view; i.e., an answer is given to the question "why?"

SIN:

Thesis: Through the fall of Adam, i.e., as a chance phenomenon in the flesh (Rom. 5:12–21). *Antithesis*: Through the finitude of the flesh, i.e., as necessarily inherent in it (1 Cor. 15:50ff).

JUDGMENT:

Thesis: Christ as the Judge of all Christians during His second coming (Rom. 2:16, 14:10; 1 Cor. 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:10). Antithesis: God as finally judging all people through Christ (1 Cor 4:5, 15:24, 25).

RETRIBUTION:

Thesis: Retribution applied to all according to their works (Rom. 2:6–10; 2 Cor 5:10). *Antithesis*: Free forgiveness of the redeemed (Rom. 4:4, 9:11, 11:6).

FINAL FATE:

Thesis: Universal restoration and bliss (Rom. 8:19–23, 11:30–36?). *Antithesis*: The double end (Rom. 2:5–12). "Perdition" (2 Cor. 2:15 and elsewhere).

DESERTS:

Thesis: The necessity of the works of asceticism. (1 Cor. 9:24: "So run, that ye may obtain.") Antithesis: The lack of necessity of works of asceticism. (Rom 9:16: "So then it [mercy] is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.") Thesis: "... work out your own salvation with fear and trembling" (Phil. 2:12). Antithesis: "For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his pleasure" (Phil. 2:13). Thesis: Cf. The soul of the Lord desired freely; but it desired freely that which (Antithesis:) it should have desired according to the will of His Father [from John of Damascus' Precise Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, 3:18).

GRACE:

Thesis: "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound" (Rom. 5:20). "Whosoever abideth in him [Christ] sinneth not" (1 John 3:6). "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin." (1 John 3:9). Antithesis: "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid" (Rom. 6:1–2). "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1:8).

FAITH:

Thesis: Is free and depends on the free will of man (see John 3:16–28). Antithesis: Is God's gift and is not found in human

will but in the will of the Father Who draws us to Christ (see John 6:44).

THE COMING OF CHRIST:

Thesis: To judge the world. "For judgment I come into the world" (John 9:39). *Antithesis*: Not to judge the world. "I came not to judge the world" (John 12:47).



Suummet rodit. He eats away at his own.

VIII. Letter Seven: Sin

....

Who does not remember from the years of his youth the edifying tale "Hercules at the Crossroads"? This somewhat cloying fable, which was composed in the 5th century B.C. by Socrates' famous teacher the sophist Prodicus of Ceos and which, according to Aristophanes' Scholiast, 245 was included in Prodicus' work Horai (Seasons of the Year or perhaps Ages of Life), has come down to us in Xenophon's rendering. 246 Everyone remembers, of course, how personified Virtue (hē Aretē) and Vice (hē Kakia), or Happiness (hē Eudaimonia), compete before the youth Hercules in a rhetorical debate about their respective advantages, and how each of them pulls at him to enter onto one of two possible paths—its own. Meanwhile, the author uses the occasion to give a catalogue of virtues and vices, thus providing a pedagogical primer to educate the youth of Athens.

But it would be a mistake to see this tale as exceptional. Probably being a literary reworking of a popular fable and therefore having a centuries-old family tree, this tale became the progenitor of a whole series of literary generations. The theme of "two paths" became a "wandering" one as historians of literature like to say.²⁴⁷

It goes without saying that the content of its main part, i.e., the catalogue of virtues and vices corresponding to the two paths of life, changed every time in accordance with the moral views of the place and time. But in these later reworkings of the theme of "two paths," it is still easy to see

the dispute of the very same Virtue and Vice, a dispute that, in its essence, in its basic kernel, is reduced to the battle for chastity.

Finally, we encounter the most highly developed opposition of the "two paths" in the so-called *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*,²⁴⁸ which was written either at the end of the first century or at the beginning of the 2nd century A.D. Many works resemble this document, are almost variants of it, but to establish with precision the mutual genealogical relations among all of them is a difficult²⁴⁹ and scarcely necessary task, at least for us. We do not even insist overmuch on our conjecture that all these variants have their origin in Prodicus' fable.

What is important for us is not the genetic relationship of different reworkings of a single theme but only the theme itself, only the general idea (widespread in mankind and constant in mankind's consciousness of itself) that "there are two paths, one of life and one of death," and that the "difference between the two paths is great," 250 as the unknown compiler of the *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* writes in the prologue.

Consensus omnium testifies that there are two paths, but how is one to understand the very possibility of this duality? There are two paths! One of them is the path to the Truth. But what about the other path, which does not resemble the first one at all? How can there be another path when the Truth is the source of all being, and outside of the Truth there is nothing? If the Truth is all (if it were not all, how could it be the Truth?), how could one admit some sort of Non-Truth, some sort of Falsehood? God is Life and the Cause of life, i.e., of creativity. Falsehood is therefore Death and the source of death, i.e., of annihilation. God is Harmony and Order, whereas Falsehood is Disorder and Anarchy. God is Holiness, whereas Falsehood is Sinfulness. But again, how can there be Sinfulness? For God is I AM THAT I AM (Ex. 3:14), ho Ōn, Yahweh.²⁵¹ Therefore, Satan, Sin is something wholly other, namely . . .

The answer suggests itself to us spontaneously: sinfulness, even though it is, is something that does not have being. "My fruitless mind, render it fruitful, O God!" cries the soul that has become conscious of its unfruitfulness as a result of sinful filth. Unfruitfulness, impotence, the inability to beget life are the natural fruits of sin. Sin is incapable of creating; it is capable only of destroying. Sin is incapable of begetting, for all bearing of children comes only from the Father, from the I AM. Sin is capable only of killing. Sin is unfruitful because it is not life but death. And Death has its illusory being only by virtue of Life and at the expense of Life. It feeds off Life and exists only insofar as Life gives it nourishment. What Death has is only the life it has corrupted. Even in a "black mass," in the very nest of devilry, the Devil with all his followers could not invent anything new but has produced a blasphemous parody of the sacrament of the liturgy, doing everything backward. What emptiness! What poverty! What shallow "depths"!

This is yet another proof that the Devil (Byron's, Lermontov's, or Vrubel's^a) has—neither in fact nor in idea—anything magnificent or regal about him but is only a pitiful "ape of God," about whom it is said: *Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis*.

According to the lapidary definition of St. John the Divine, "sin is transgression of the law (*he amartia estin hē anomia*)" (1 John 3:4).

In this definition our attention is especially drawn to the article which precedes both the subject amartia and the predicate anomia. When placed in front of a noun, an article is usually an individualizer, separating an object from a series of other objects that are similar to it, 254 whereas without the article the object is one among many, or the word is applied in an abstract sense. Therefore, hē amartia signifies that one is dealing here not with one of many transgressions but precisely with sin as such, as the totality of all the sin existing in the world, sin in its metaphysical root, as Sin. But, further, what is the significance of the article in front of anomia? We know from elementary grammar that an article is not placed in front of a predicate nominative or a predicate adjective, so that, in doubtful cases when it is difficult to figure out where the subject is and where the predicate is, it is recommended that one check to see where the article is placed: the word it precedes should, evidently, be the subject. That is logical: after all, sentences usually express judgments of predication where the subject is subsumed under the domain of the predicate, and therefore the predicate must necessarily have the abstract significance of a general concept, a class. Nevertheless, under special conditions, an article can be placed in front of a predicate. Thus, we find in the Four Gospels, for example:

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ouch outos estin ho tekton (i.e., he who is known by this name; Mark 6:3);
humeis este to halas tēs gēs (Matt. 5:13);
to phōs tou kosmou (Matt. 5:14);
ho luchnos tou sōmatos estin ho ophthalmos (Matt. 6:22);
su ei ho christos ho uios tou teou (Matt. 16:16);
su ei ho basileus tōn Ioudaiōn (Mark 15:2);
egō eimi hē anastasis kai hē zōe (John 11:25);
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and also John 14:8, etc.²⁵⁵ One should also cite the extremely important passages Eph. 1:23b, Matt. 26:27, Mark 14:22, Luke 22:12, and 1 Cor. 11:24 which speak of the Church and the Body of Christ.

The meaning of these passages is clear. They speak not of salt, light, etc, in general, not of a salt alongside another salt, but of what alone has or is worthy of having this name, of that which bears in itself the very essence of those properties which give ordinary salt, ordinary light, etc. their names.²⁵⁶

Thus, *hē anomia* is not one of the transgressions of the law, and not transgression of the law in general, but transgression *kat exochēn*, trans-

^a Mikhail Vrubel' (1856–1910) was the greatest Russian painter of his time.

gression par excellence, that which carries in itself the very principle of transgression of the law: transgression in the purest and fullest form and sense, an act that combines to the highest degree all that due to which individual transgressions are called transgressions, transgression itself, or, in a word, Transgression.

The Apostle does not wish to speak of only one of the features of sin. He does not wish to remain on the periphery of sin. Rather, he wishes to penetrate into its very depths, into its metaphysical nature. Therefore, the definition he gives to sin is an *ontological* definition, not a metaphorical or accidental one. It would be extremely erroneous to understand this definition juridically. Sin is Transgression of the Law, perversion of the Law, i.e., of the Order that is given to creation by the Lord, the inner Harmony of all creation that gives it life, the Organization of the core of being that is given to it by God, the Wisdom that is the meaning of the world. Outside of the Law, Sin is nothing, has only an imaginary existence, for (I allow myself to refer to the Apostle's words, though, perhaps in a rather free interpretation) "by the law is the knowledge of sin" (Rom. 3:20).

If there is no birth, there is no dying. If there is no being, there is no non-being. If there is no life, there is no death. If there is no light, there is no darkness, for the light exposes the darkness. Sin is the parasite of holiness and exists because holiness has not yet been completely separated from it, because, for the time being, wheat and chaff grow together.

Destroying (as every parasitic existence does) its host, sin destroys itself at the same time. It directs itself against itself, devours itself, for anything that does not desire to be humble is annihilated. God, Who never wishes anyone evil, has never annihilated anyone. But evildoers have always destroyed themselves: God "hath scattered the proud" by nothing else than "the thought of their hearts," *dianoiai kardias autōn* (Luke 1:51), or, more precisely, by rational argument (*dianoiai*), for rationality (*dianoiai*), as opposed to reason, is a manifestation of selfhood.

"He hath shewed strength with his arm; he hath scattered the proud in the thought of their hearts" (Luke 1:51). Thus sang the Most Pure Virgin Mary when she met Elisabeth, and thus it is still sung at matins and will be sung for ages of ages.

The self-destructive nature of evil was understood already by the best of the Greeks: "The good," says Plato "are like one another and are friends, while the bad, as it is said of them, are never like themselves, but are inconstant and unstable. And that which is not like itself but is different can hardly be like another or friends with another." Desiring only itself, in its "here" and "now," evil self-assertion inhospitably locks its doors against anything that is not it. But, aspiring to self-deification, evil self-assertion does not remain identical even to itself but falls apart, decomposes, fragments in inner struggle. In essence, evil is a "kingdom

divided against itself." This idea of the fragmenting effect of evil was profoundly expressed by Plato beneath the transparent cover of the myth of the "androgyne." ²⁵⁸

In the *Symposium*, Plato's Aristophanes relates how man's original nature was much different from the present one. There once existed an androgyne, a being composed of the two present sexes but constituting a single person. These androgynes were mighty and strong and, rejoicing in their power, they became arrogant and brazen, and dared to raise arms against the gods. They wished to scale heaven, to fall upon the gods. Then Zeus and the gods decided to weaken them by splitting them apart in such a way that they would be compelled to move about on two legs, not four. Further, Zeus said: "if they continue to be insolent and won't be quiet, I will split them again and they will hop about on a single leg." That is the essence of Plato's myth. I will only add that, according to Plato, love is the instinctive striving of the lovers to reunite what has been divided.

It would be frivolous to see in this myth only a fable invented by Plato. There is no doubt that this is an artistic reworking of an ancient folkmyth. We find similar myths in the monuments of other nations. Thus, in the *Zend-Avesta*, in the book of *Bundeget*, it is related that, from the seed of the heavenly proto-bull (= "Life") *Kaiomor* that spilled onto the earth, there grew an "*oruere*" (= *arbor* or *arvor*, "tree," but also "life" and "soul"). This "tree" is the unification of earth with the principle of heaven. From the tree was born Meshia, male-female, man-woman. Meshia was then divided into a male body, which retained the name Meshia, and into a female body, which received the name Meshiane. This was the first human couple.²⁶⁰

Mysterious threads seem to connect the ideational seed of these narratives with the sacred narrative of the Book of Genesis, i.e., in the words: "And God said, let us make man . . . So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them" (Gen. 1:26, 27).²⁶¹ Mystics of various types have often found here an indication of an original compositeness of the human being, even of an original androgynism, considering sexual differentiation to be a consequence of the metaphysical fall. Thus, the gnostic sect of the Ophites considered primordial man to be an *arsenodēlus*, a male-female.²⁶² This view has been held by adherents of the Kaballah, and by almost all mystical writers, e.g., Boehme, Saint-Martin, Baader, contemporary occultists, and so on.²⁶³ But, in referring to them, I wished to demonstrate, of course, not the necessity of a precisely androgynous interpretation of the abovecited words of Genesis, but only how widespread is the belief that man

^b This is taken from B. Jowett's translation. The edition used is *The Works of Plato*. Four Volumes in One. The Dial Press, New York. The passage cited is on p. 316.

was originally more whole than he is now, and that only his self-assertion was the cause of his fragmentedness.

A person's self-assertion, his opposition to God, is the source of his fragmentation and dissolution, the impoverishment of his inner life. And only love reunifies a person to some extent. But if a person who is already partly fragmented does not desist but wishes to become a god, "as gods" (Gen. 3:5), he is inevitably afflicted by a new fragmentation, newer and newer dissolution. That is the ontological meaning of the myth. And do we not see how before our very eyes—either under the high-sounding pretext of "differentiation" and "specialization" or under the naked desire for disorder and anarchy—both society and the individual, wishing to live without God and to order their lives without God, to define themselves against God, are being splintered and fragmented to their very core? Is not insanity itself, this disintegration of personality, ²⁶⁴ essentially a consequence of the profound spiritual perversion of our entire life? Do not neurasthenia, which is becoming more and more common, and other "nervous" diseases have as their true cause the striving of mankind and men to live in their own way and not in God's way, to live without God's law, in anomie. 265 The denial of God has always led and leads to insanity, de-mentia, for God is precisely the Root of mens, the mind. He "who has said in his heart," i.e., not in words but in his very soul, with all of his being, "There is no God," is insane (Cf. Ps. 14:1, 52:2). For the essential denial of God and insanity are one and the same, fused and indivisible. This is a phenomenon that is described artistically and in its development by Tolstov²⁶⁶ and Dostoevsky.²⁶⁷

Without love (and to have love it is first necessary to have God's love) a person disintegrates into fragments of psychological elements and aspects. God's love is what unifies a person. Therefore, we pray: "Unify me with Thy love, unwedded Bride." Yes, "unify me," or I will fall apart and become that very same "collection of psychic states" which alone is recognized by "scientific psychology," this "psychology without a soul." "Thou art my stronghold, Lord. Thou art my power!" exclaims a soul that has understood its impotence and instability.

Sin is the element of the disharmony, decay, and decomposition of spiritual life. The soul loses its substantial unity, the consciousness of its creative nature. It is lost in a chaotic vortex of its own states, ceasing to be their substance. The I drowns in the "mental deluge" of passions. It is not by chance that the enigmatic and seductive smile of all the faces painted by Leonardo da Vinci, a smile that expresses skepticism, the falling away from God, and the self-assertion of the human "I know," is actually a smile of confusion and waywardness. The individual depicted has lost himself, which is most evident in the "Mona Lisa." In essence, this is a smile of sin, seductiveness, and spiritual waywardness, a lecherous and

corrupt smile expressing nothing positive (this is what constitutes its enigma!) except some sort of inner confusion, some sort of inner trouble of the spirit, but without repentance.²⁶⁸

Yes, in sin the soul slips away from itself, loses itself. It is not by chance that, when we wish to characterize the last stage of the moral fall of a woman, we call her "lost." But there is no doubt that, along with "lost" women (women who have lost themselves in themselves, who have lost their God-like creativity of life), there are also "lost" men. In general, a sinful soul is a "lost" soul. It is lost not only for others but also for itself, for it did not guard itself. And if contemporary psychology keeps repeating that it does not know the soul as a substance, this only exposes the moral state of most psychologists, who for the most part are obviously "lost" men. Then, in truth, it is not "I do" but "with me it is done"; it is not "I live" but "it happens to me."

As creativity, spontaneous activity, and freedom are extinguished in the consciousness, the entire personality is pushed aside by mechanical processes in the organism and, projecting outward the consequences of its own weakness, makes the surrounding world appear lifelike.²⁶⁹ And since sobriety and vigilance are the conditions of a person's life, all insobriety and lethargy facilitate this weakening of the spirit's concentration. When one wishes to sleep, when one is only half-awake, forgetting "with vigilant heart, vigilant thought, vigilant mind to chase away the dejection of sinful sleep"270; and especially when one is in a state of intoxication, under the stupefying effect of narcotics, in all these and similar states, words with a passive sense spontaneously come to us. Then, "the world is thrown from side to side," as one three-year-old boy I know told me about ice he had encountered on the sidewalk. "Words are spoken," and "they want to be spoken." "It is not I who speak them, but they want to speak themselves." "The walls shake" when one leans against them. Things "do not want" to stay in one's hands but leap out of them; they run away and run about by themselves. Liquids spill out of their containers. Even individual parts of the body announce their "autonomy" and independence. The whole organism, both corporeal and psychic, is transformed from an integral and harmonious instrument, from an organ of the person, into an accidental colony, a motley assembly of mutually incompatible self-acting mechanisms. In other words, everything turns out to be free inside me and outside me—everything except me myself.

The neurasthenic half-loss of the reality of the creative I²⁷¹ is also a form of spiritual insobriety, and it is difficult to get away from the conviction that the cause of this half-loss is the "disorderedness" of the person. By distorting his relation to God a person distorts his moral and then even his corporeal life. Thus, pagans knew God through a consideration of his works. "Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as

God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools. And changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness through their own hearts to dishonour their own bodies between themselves: Who changed the truth of God into a lie and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator" (Rom. 1:21–25). The Apostle further tells us that this resulted in a distortion of the natural order of corporeal life and a spoilage of social life. The poisonous principles of disorder, anarchy, and unrestraint have saturated society in all its life-activities (see Rom. 1:26–32).

As the soul becomes "earthy," its freedom is lost. Slowly but inexorably the cancer of the sinful sore eats the heart away. Sins surround the heart, stand around it in close ranks and do not admit me to it, prevent access to the freshening wind of grace. The soul languishes:

... everything suffocatingly earthly it would want to repulse. 272

And the soul calls out: "save me from all siege!" But the heart has surrounded itself with a hard crust.

Yes, the heart is alive, but behind its walls, and one cannot reach it. I myself know only theoretically that it exists, but I have no access to it. Even the divine liturgy slides along this steel armor, hardly scratching it, falling off it, and rushing past one who is incapable of inward attention.

One sometimes falls into a kind of forgetfulness—at the most significant places in the liturgy. The enemy steals the most precious words. You ask yourself, "Could it be that this—the Gospel reading and so on—has already passed?" And only with one's rational mind, which has figured out where in the liturgy one is, does one say: "Yes." On the other hand, sinful desires, even the most unfathomable absurdities, suddenly rush into the decomposing personality. They are extremely bright, these desires, like luminous specks in the brain, and, before any decision is taken, they become deeds. Beneath the blowing of such desires in the sinful person there rises only

the dark flame of the soul.²⁷³

In "Hercules at the Crossroads" and other elaborations of the theme of the "two paths," the main idea is that of organizing one's soul and body, of forging oneself by ascesis, of purifying the whole organism by attention to oneself.

And this kind of soul, which has been "dried" to remove moist sensuousness, i.e., the wisest of souls ("a dry soul is the wisest soul," said a wise man of antiquity²⁷⁴), this reinforced person, this organized man is opposed to a moist soul, a loose, disorganized, "idle and chaotic" person (to use Dostoevsky's phrase).

But what is this "organizedness"? It is when everything in a person is in its proper place, when everything in a person is "fitting (*kata taxin*)." ²⁷⁵

That, however prosaic it may be, is the most precise answer. "Everything in a person is in its proper place." "Everything in a person is fitting." This means that all of a person's life-activities are carried out according to God's law,²⁷⁶ which is given to him, and not otherwise. This means that a person, a microcosm, occupies in the world, the macrocosm, a place assigned to him from all eternity. He does not jump off the path that has been assigned to him and is the fastest path to the Kingdom of Heaven. "That everything is fitting" is precisely what constitutes the beauty of creation, as well as its good and its truth. By contrast, deviation from what is fitting is ugliness, evil, and falsehood. Everything is beautiful, good, and true when it is "fitting." Everything is ugly, evil, and false when it is self-willed and self-directing, when things are done "as one likes." Sin is "as one likes," and Satan is "As One Likes."

Sin lies in the disinclination to leave the state of self-identity, the identity "I = I," or more precisely, "I!" The root sin or the root of all sin is the assertion of oneself as oneself, without relation to that which is other, i.e., to God and to all creation. It is self-immersion without self-transcendence. All particular sins are only variants or manifestations of the stubborn self-immersion of selfhood. In other words, sin is the power of the protection of oneself as oneself that makes the person a "self-idol." 277 It is the power that "explains" I through I, not through God, and grounds I in I, not in God. Sin is the fundamental striving of I by which I becomes firm in its isolation and makes of itself the unique point of reality. Sin is what closes off all reality from I, for to see reality is precisely to go out of oneself and to transfer one's I into not-I, into what is other, into what is visible, i.e., it is to love. Sin is therefore the wall that I places between itself and reality, an encrustation of the heart. Sin is opaque; it is darkness and gloom. That is why it is said, "darkness hath blinded his eyes" (1 John 2:11). And there are numerous other sayings in Scripture where "darkness" is synonymous with "sin." In its unalloyed, ultimate development, i.e., Gehenna, sin is darkness, absence of light, skotos. For light is the visible revelation of reality, while darkness is the isolatedness, the separatedness of reality. It is the impossibility of appearing to one another, mutual invisibility.

The very name for hell in Russian, Ad, from Hades, points to such a gehennal rupture, such an isolation of reality, such solipsism, for everyone there says to himself: "solus ipse sum!" In fact, the Greek Hadēs, Haidēs, or Aidēs (originally AFidēs) comes from the root Fid (= the Russian vid), which forms the verb id-ein, in Russian vi-det' (to see), and the

particle of negation, or rather privation, the *a privativum*.²⁷⁸ Ad is a state of invisibility, which one does not see and where one does not see. Ad is a state of non-seeing (bez-vid). Plato says²⁷⁹: en Aidou, to aeides de $leg\bar{o}$, "by Hades I mean the invisible." Plutarch²⁸⁰ defines it as to aeides kai aoraton, "the invisible and unseeable." And Homer speaks of the "nebulous darkness of Hades: hupo zophon heroenta."²⁸¹

In other words, sin is that which removes the possibility of grounding and, therefore, explanation, i.e., the possibility of reasonableness.^c In the chase after sinful *rationalism*, the consciousness is deprived of the reason inherent in all being. Because of over-intellectualization, the consciousness ceases to see intelligently. Sin itself is something wholly rational. It is wholly according to the measure of rationality. It is rationality in rationality, or devilry, for the Devil-Mephistopheles is naked rationality.²⁸²

But precisely because sin is rationality *par excellence*, it makes God's entire creation and God Himself absurd, depriving Him of the perspective depth of grounding and tearing Him from the Soil of the Absolute. It places everything in a single plane, making everything flat and vulgar. For what is vulgarity but the inclination to tear everything that is visible from its roots and to view it as autonomous and therefore bereft of reason, that is, stupid.²⁸³

The Devil-Mephistopheles, this Pure Rationality, is also Pure Vulgarity,²⁸⁴ because he sees only stupidity. Sin is a principle of unreason, a principle of incomprehensibility and of a dull, insuperable cessation of intellectual seeing. Since the Devil is an "expert flatterer" (according to church hymns), he traps us in an illusory wisdom, thereby deflecting us from genuine wisdom.

According to a plausible etymology, the Russian word for sin (*grekh*) is related to a word for mistake (*ogrekh*)²⁸⁵, so that to sin is to make a mistake, to miss the mark, or just to miss.²⁸⁶ But what does sin make us miss? It makes us miss the norm of being that is given to us by the Truth. We do not hit the target that is pre-marked for us by the Truth. In other words, by not choosing ascesis, we leave our true path, which is marked on the earth by the Divine Finger of the Initiator of our ascesis. I repeat, sin is perversion. Sin is waywardness, a wandering from way to way, not the taking of the one true way. It is the experience of the pagans who were suffered "to walk in their own ways" (Acts 14:16) or the inability of the hardened and wayward heart to know the ways of the Lord, as it happened with the Jews (Cf. Ps. 95:8–10; Heb. 3:7–10).

What is the true way, this "narrow . . . way, which leadeth unto life . . ." (Matt. 7:14, cf. 2:28), "the way of God" (Acts 18:26), "the way of peace" (Luke 1:79), "the way of salvation" (Acts 16:17), "the way of truth" (2 Peter 2:2), and "the right way" (2 Peter 2:15)?

^c See note *e* on p. 7.

The true way is chastity. The etymological makeup of the corresponding Greek word for chastity, so-phrōsynē or sao-phrōsynē, points to the wholeness, healthiness, unimpairedness, unity of the inner life, in general to the normal state of the inner life, to a person's unfragmentedness and strength, to freshness of spiritual powers, to the spiritual organizedness of the inner man. Sophrösyne or sao-phrösyne implies integrity of thought (we understand "thought" in the patristic sense, i.e., in the sense of spiritual life in general), integrity of mind, integrity of reason, healthiness of mind, healthy wisdom, saos phronēsis. That is what the word means for both the Church Fathers and the ancient philosophers. 287 So-phorōsynē is simplicity, i.e., organic unity, or, again, integrity of the person: "A person's spirit must be accessible and hospitable, prepared for veneration and thanksgiving. It must be unburdened hearing and a 'pure,' 'simple' eye."288 The opposite of sophrōsynē is the state of the pervertedness, debauchedness, or reversedness of the soul. The virgin soil of the person is reversed; the inner layers of life (which should be hidden even for I itself; sex is the preeminent example) are turned to the surface. By contrast, that which should be open—the openness of the soul, i.e., sincerity, directness, the motives of acts—is hidden inside, making a person secretive. In this state, a person's life is not lived "in a fitting manner" and everything is out of place in it. A debauched person is turned inside out, as it were. He shows the reverse side of his soul and hides his soul's face. Such a person's eyes avoid looking directly at another person and the lips of such a person expel rotten words. He trembles lest others find out about his weakness, but he himself shamelessly displays what is most shameful.

Shame indicates what should hide inside, even though it is lawful and given by God, and what should be bared.²⁸⁹ But when there is no shame, shamelessness and cynicism appear. What should be hidden is exposed, and what should be shown is hidden. The ascent to the apex of consciousness of all that which should properly remain in the half-darkness of the subconscious domain, or the descent of consciousness into the mysterious twilight of the roots of being, Ham's seeing his parents' nakedness, is precisely that dislocation of psychic life which is called perversion.

It is here that the naturally faceless or impersonal side of our being acquires a face or personality, for this side is the life of the genus, though occurring in a person. Having acquired an illusory resemblance to a person, this generic substratum of the person gains autonomy, whereas the real person disintegrates. The generic domain separates out of the person and, therefore, only having the appearance of a person, it stops submitting to the commands of the spirit, becomes deprived of reason and insane. And, having lost his generic foundation, his root, the person loses consciousness of reality and becomes the face, not of the real foundation of life, but of emptiness and nothingness. That is, he becomes an empty and yawning mask and, not covering anything real, he realizes that he is

false, an actor. Blind lust and aimless falsehood are what remain of a person after his perversion. In this sense, perversion is duality, and the profound symbol of such duality is the depiction (frequently encountered in both the West and the East) of Satan with a second face at the private parts or (this is done by isographers who do not fully understand the meaning of what is depicted) at the stomach.²⁹⁰ A psychological analysis of the experiences involved here can be found in various works of literature.²⁹¹

If shame is the compass of consciousness and the plumbline of personality, shamelessness is the index of the pervertedness and corruptness of the soul. But what is corruptness, rastlennost' in Russian? The same thing. Tlo signifies "bottom, underside, a flat base." ²⁹² Thus, one speaks of the "bottom of a hive," the "bottom of a box." Common in the Tamboy dialect is the expression "do tla sgoret'," to burn completely, i.e., to the bottom. Let us also mention such expressions as "ego obokrali do tla" (he was robbed utterly) and "khleb go tla sgnil" (the bread was completely rotten).²⁹³ The verbs *tlet*' and *tlit*' obviously refer to processes of rotting, destruction, and decomposition that occur at the foundations of buildings directly abutting the ground. In this case, ras-tlenie either signifies complete decomposition (tlenie), i.e., the utter annihilation of the soul, do tla, 294 or, more correctly, it signifies (as does the word raz*vrashchennost'*) the violation of the lawful order of the strata of psychic life, where the *tlo* of the soul is turned up and ends up where it should not, the turning up of the bottom of the soul, corruption (razvrashchenie) to the very bottom, the final stage of decay. Spiritual life comes apart, is shaken apart, falls apart. It is decomposed, fragmented, disunited, divided. This is the splitting of thought, the splitting of the soul into two, duality, lack of firmness in one thing. This is the decomposition of the person that has begun even before Gehenna. This is the dichotomy of the person (see Matt. 24:51 = Luke 12:46). "A man whose thoughts have split into two" has felt the fire of Gehenna already in this life. As the state opposite to chastity, corruption makes a person unchaste. It deprives the mind of its integrity, its unity, and casts it into a state of excruciating instability.

Sin is intrinsically unstable. The unity of impurity is illusory, and the illusoriness of this pseudo-unity is revealed as soon as it is compelled to confront the Good face to face. The impure is united as long as the Pure is not present, but the mask of unity is torn from the impure at the mere approach of the Pure. This dissolution of the impure, this self-decomposition of the "nauseating power" ²⁹⁵ is graphically portrayed in the tale of the healing of the Gadarene man who was possessed by an unclean spirit. It is worth noting that the singular number of the unclean power is suddenly changed into a plural number as soon as the Lord Jesus asks this power what its name is, i.e., when He asks it what its hidden essence is.

Although everyone knows this tale, I will nevertheless present it here. The Evangelist Mark relates how Jesus Christ and His disciples "came over unto the other side of the sea, into the country of the Gadarenes. And when he was come out of the ship, immediately there met him out of the tombs a man with an unclean spirit. . . . And [he] cried with a loud voice [i.e., it is of course the unclean spirit that cried, not the one possessed by it, although it is possible that the unclean spirit cried with the lips of the one possessed], and said, What have I to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of the most high God? I adjure thee by God, that thou torment me not. For he [Jesus] said unto him, Come out of the man, thou unclean spirit. And he asked him, What is thy name? And he answered, saying, My name is Legion: for we are many. And they be sought him much that he would not send them away out of the country. . . . And all the devils besought him, saying, Send us into the swine, that we may enter into them. And forthwith Jesus gave them leave. And the unclean spirits went out, and entered into the swine . . . " (Mark 5:1–13).

Jesus Christ talks not with the possessed man himself but with what is inside him, with the unclean power. This unclean power is a single unclean spirit, which appears as a single spirit and speaks of itself as a single spirit. But as soon as the Lord asks it what its name is, as soon as He wishes this unclean power to reveal its genuine nature, it falls apart into an indeterminate number of unclean spirits, for the "Legion" of the text signifies "infinitely many," "innumerably many," "indeterminately many." "indeterminately many." "indeterminately a sudden change of its singular number in verse 9 into a plural number. Prior to the Lord's question, the singular was used consistently (Mark 5:1–9), whereas, after this question, the plural number is used just as consistently.

This precisely is the general type of the expulsion of unclean spirits. The prayer of exorcism by the Lord's name forces an illusory person to fall apart into fractions, into a "legion" of demonic states, each of which passes itself off as a person²⁹⁷; the exorcism exposes the illusoriness of this unity, which desires to base itself not on the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity but on the like-substantiality [homoiousianism] of self-assertion.

Such is the unstable, damp and rotting nature of sin. But if this is the nature of sin and if its opposite is the self-concentratedness and strength of the soul in chastity, there spontaneously arises the question of the essence of this chastity, which we have heretofore represented only descriptively. The question of the essence of chastity is divided in turn into two questions: First, what is chastity, or spiritual integrity, in the human con-

 $[^]d$ The King James version has "he," but I have changed it to "they" to conform with Florensky's thesis.

sciousness, i.e., as an experience? Second, how should we understand chastity, or spiritual integrity, in the plane of ontology, i.e., as an object of thought?

The first of these questions is answered by the word "bliss." The second is answered by the phrase "eternal memory." Let us examine these answers attentively.

Thus, let us, first of all, examine chastity as the inner experience of a chaste soul, i.e., as bliss. What does "bliss" consist in? What is a "blissful" person? I think that the most precise answer to our question can be acquired through an analysis of the relevant Greek words *makaria*, *makarios*, *makar*. What do these words mean? Aristotle²⁹⁸ explained *makar* as deriving from "to rejoice strongly," *apo mala chairein*. But the word *mala*, as it turns out, was interpolated later, and Aristotle's entire explanation reduces to a simple clarification of the meaning of the word. This is confirmed by Plutarch.²⁹⁹ Also unsatisfactory is the explanation of Eustathius,³⁰⁰ who saw at the basis of *makar* the word *ker*, death, and interpreted *makar* to mean "immortal," not subject to death—*para to mē hupokeisthai kēri*. Against Eustathius, it can be noted that *makar* is used not only concerning the immortal gods but also concerning mortal men.³⁰¹

Schelling³⁰² meditated much upon the root of *makarios*, *makar*, and I will summarize his subtle discussion here. It is true that contemporary linguistics does not agree with Schelling, and nothing is long-lasting in science. But even if his reflections were in fact "unscientific," in life they give much for the understanding of the word *makar*. The main thing that should be noted here is the incomprehensible syllable *ma*. The key to the riddle of *makar* is in the first syllable. According to Schelling's conjecture, this is an ancient particle characterizing negation, deprivation, or, as one author puts it, "*ma* is a particle of forewarning." In other words, Schelling equates *ma* with the negative particle $m\bar{e}$. Following Schelling, one can explain this meaning of *ma* by considering the following series of words with *ma*:

- 1) *Ma-tai-os* means empty, insignificant, illusory. What is absent here, what is being negated? That which one could grasp, could palpably feel. *Ma-tai-os* is the intangible, the nonsubstantial (*substanzlose*). The negation of *tangibility* is denoted by *tai-os*, which has the same root as the epic imperative $t\bar{e}$, take, grab; and as the Homeric participle *tetagōn*, evidently deriving from $ta-\bar{o}$, $ta-g-\bar{o}$, which corresponds to the Latin *tango*.
- 2) To *ma-tai-os* is related the adverb *ma-tēn* (without consequences, vainly, e.g., to speak) and the expressive *ma-ta-ō* (delay, procrastinate, waste time), a verb which is applied to a man who is never ready, who only circles (*shegutitsia*³⁰⁵) some work to be done without applying himself in the proper way.
- 3) The Greek language has various expressions to denote immediate and

- instant consequences, if a thought, word, or, in general, a possibility is followed by an act, a reality (something "tangible"). Such are *aphar*, *aipsa*. It is remarkable that their opposite is the Homeric *maps*, ³⁰⁶ a word which evidently is composed of *ma* and *aipsa*, and which means vainly, for nothing, or rashly, hastily.
- 4) From *maps* are derived the adjective *mapsidios* (in Homer it occurs only in an adverbial form) and *mapsilogos*, e.g., *mapsilogoi oiōnoi*, i.e., birds whose cry has no consequence, signifies nothing.
- 5) *Ma-lak-os*, soft, tender, effeminate, flaccid, indecisive, without energy, just as, deriving from it, the verb *ma-la(k)ssō*, to make soft, to moderate, to weaken, to become languid, has a *negative* significance. This expression is apparently formed from the deprivation of a certain property, i.e., the ability to emit sounds in the case of tearing or breaking. Such is the case of a soft body, whereas the continuity of a hard body cannot be disrupted without noise. In other words, *ma-lak-os* contains the verb *laskō* (whence *lakein* and *elaken*), which signifies to sound, to crack, to yell loudly, to bark loudly, etc. or *lakazō* and *lakeō*, to yell, to make noise, to break with a crack.
- 6) To Schelling's examples, one can add another one, i.e., *ma-chl-os*, lascivious, passionate, whence derives *ma-chl-osunē*, lust, passion. That which is negated here is *chlounis*, castration, so that *machlos* signifies uncastrated.
- 7) The examples presented become even more convincing if one makes a small excursus into the domain of the Ossetic language.³⁰⁷ In this language the particle *ma*, used in conjunction with the imperative and the subjunctive, signifies the imperative negation of an action. For example: *ma zag*, do not speak (the Ossetic *zagen* = the German *sagen*); *ma tsu*, do not go; *ma noaz*, do not drink, etc.

Thus the particle ma has a negating significance. Let us turn to the second part of makar. According to Schelling, it derives not from ker (genetive = $k\bar{e}ros$), "death" (i.e., makar does not mean immortal), but from kardia, kear, $k\bar{e}r$ (genetive = $k\bar{e}ros$), "heart." The epithet constantly associated with ker is philon, so that ker signifies the most sincere part of a man, his proper selfhood, the place of "passions" in general, and, among them, of love in particular (whence the frequently employed phrase: peri kēri philos, friend of the heart; kerōthi means from the heart, e.g., to love); it is preeminently the place of devouring sorrow and pain, of anger and malicious pleasure. But the state of being devoured by sorrow or unrest is not an accidental state of the heart. The heart is constant desire, a ceaseless self-devouring flame that burns in the breast of every man and is, strictly speaking, spirit, the moving, entraining principle of life, so that, in Homer, one who is deprived of life is called akērios, heartless. ³⁰⁸ This is indicated by the derivation of the word *kear* from *kerdein*, keirein (to devour, absumere) rather than from keō, keiō, keazō (to sleep) or from keō, kaiō (to burn, ardere), for the heart is fons ardoris vitalis. The verb keirein is also used in connection with moral devouring, when

one says, for example, that "the members are devoured by grief," "grief eats at the breast," and so on. It is also natural that words that sound substantially similar— $h\bar{e}$ ker, the goddess of death, and to ker, the heart—can be reduced to one and the same original concept—to eat, to devour. The desire to become "for oneself" causes the soul to split into two. This throws unexpected light on a gloss of Hesychios, ³⁰⁹ who explains to ker as psuchēn diērēmenēn, as a "double" or "split" soul. This doubling is precisely the cause of unhappiness. The restlessness of ceaseless desire and willing that ensnares every creature is, in itself, a disruption of bliss, and the kear brought to rest would, in itself, be bliss.

To confirm Schelling's arguments, one can again refer to the Ossetic language. The word *makar* is almost consonant with the Ossetic *ma khar* (it is pronounced without interruption as *makhar*), i.e., "do not eat." The imperative *khar* derives from the verb *kharen*, to eat, in the sense of to destroy, which is evident from the expression *akhtsa bakhorta*: he squandered his money, "destroyed" it, spent it on nothing. In the word *bakhorta*, the prefix *ba* (= the German *be*) indicates that an action has been completed and is equivalent to the Russian *raz*, *iz*, *s*, while the rest of the word derives from the verb *kharen*. It is remarkable that this word can (?) also be related to the idea of death: *Keryen* (in the Digor dialect, according to Vs. Miller, the most ancient of the Ossetic dialects), or *cheryen*, signifies a grave. One should also mention the following words of the same root: *kharch*, *kharchoba* (in the Don dialect), *kharchi*, i.e., food, eatables, except bread and especially meat. The Abarch is that which is eaten. Whence *kharchevnia*, a place for eating, and probably *kharia*, i.e., that which eats, a mug, a mouth.

Thus, for Schelling, *makarios* essentially expresses the idea that the dizzily whirling heart has found rest, that the heart's soaring passions have been fully calmed. In the state of *makaria*, the heart ceases to devour itself. To this it must be added that $m\bar{e}$ (with which ma is equated) is not a negation in the strict sense; $m\bar{e}$ on signifies not "non-being" but the "possibility of being." Therefore, *makaria* is not a simple negation of "devouring," of the opposite of devouring, but the eternal triumph over devouring, the eternal conversion of devouring to possibility alone, the eternal stepping on the head of selfhood. For a blissful one, for a *makar*, selfhood is possibility, and he *potest non peccare*, "has the power not to sin." 312

It is not difficult to see that *makaria* understood in this way is close to the positive understanding of the nirvana of late Buddhism, i.e., to the state of the extinguishing of passion, a state in which every disturbance to the soul has been removed, and the soul finds itself in eternal peace, whereto the unrest of the phantoms of samsara does not reach.³¹³

It is necessary to note, however, that contemporary linguistics³¹⁴ derives *makar* from the root mac, to have force, power, to produce, which

also generated the word makros, long. But one thing is unquestionable: that Schelling correctly conveys at least one aspect of the content of makaria. Makaria is eternal peace as a consequence of the illumination of the soul by the unfading light of the Truth itself. The idea of this "peace," "life" or "eternal life" permeates the whole of Scripture and the whole of the patristic and liturgical literature. To enter into the rest of God—that is the theme of Hebrews 4. This entering constitutes the long-awaited promise of the people of God, its "sabbath" (Heb. 4:9). "For he that is entered into his [God's] rest, he also hath ceased from his own works, as God did from his" (Heb. 4:10). In the Fortress of the Holy Trinity, on the Ground of the Truth, there is no restless whirling and swirling of wicked thoughts. He who is in the Spirit, which completes the work of God, is resting from his own works, not from the "work" of life but from works, from those works about which the Preacher said: "Vanity of vanities . . . vanity of vanities; all is vanity. What profit hath a man of all his labour which he taketh under the sun? One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth for ever. The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose. The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits. The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun" (Eccl. 1:2-9). But he who has not found rest in the Spirit Who Completes must answer to the all-piercing Word of God (see Heb. 4:12, 13). The accused will then receive peace by the mysterious cutting off of mortal works. He will receive a metaphysical sabbath. He will say to himself: "Return unto thy rest, O my soul; for the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee" (Ps. 116:7). "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying; neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away" (Rev. 21:4). Makaria has come.

Bliss as rest from ceaseless, greedy, insatiable desire; as the self-confinement and self-concentration of the soul for eternal life in God. In other words, the fully authoritative and therefore eternally realized command to oneself: *ma-kar*, "do not devour yourself"—that is the task of asceticism. Only by building oneself in earthly life, only by transubstantiating passions and thoughts into a higher contemplation, only by making the lower a symbol of the higher can one acquire bliss (see Rev. 21:27, 22:14–15, etc.).

In the 1st century, when the Distant seemed so near, when the Fiery Tongue still burned above the head of the believer, the Good News for the first time gave people the taste of the sweetness of peace and repose from whirling corrupt thoughts. It thereby freed the consciousness from demon-possession and from permanent demon-fear and slavery.³¹⁵ Christ delivered us from "the restless and anxious world."³¹⁶ That is why

the early Christian writers are particularly sensitive to this new gift of peace.

In the inspired, charismatic sermon of an unknown writer, the author of the Second Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, the torment of fiery Gehenna is opposed to the promise of Christ:

"And know, brothers, that the wandering of our flesh in this world is brief, whereas the promise of Christ is great and wonderful, namely, the peace of the future Kingdom and eternal life." "For," it is stated in another place, "in fulfilling the will of Christ, we find peace; otherwise, nothing will deliver us from eternal punishment if we despise His commandments." The preacher asks his listeners: "How does it appear to you, what must that one suffer who will not endure the incorruptible ascesis? Of those who have not preserved the seal, it is said: 'their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh'" (Is. 66:24). But the effect of the "immortal fruit of resurrection" is characterized as "bliss" and as passage to "an age free of sorrow."

In the same way, in one of the most ancient of the liturgical prayers, the Church prays with the lips of the priest that God lead the faithful "to a fruitful place, to waters of peace, into a paradise of joy, whence all sorrow and groaning are removed—into the light of the saints."³²²

The whole Office of Burial is built on these inseparable ideas of justification, peace, bliss, and immortality, and the opposite ideas of sin, vanity, torment, and death. Christ's victory over death, the gift of life, is viewed as the overcoming of worldly passion, as the cooling of the inner burning of a sinful soul, as the illumination of sinful darkness, as "the habitation of the just" (Prov. 3:33), as peace in God, as rest from sinful wandering, from works which are "all impotent shadows and seductive and illusory dreams."

"Lord, give peace to the soul of Thy servant," "Christ, give peace to the soul of Thy servant"—that is the theme of the Office of Burial. All the rest is only a development of this theme, a development that describes the inner conditions of peace.

As an example, let us take the following troparions:

"With the spirit of the departed righteous, give peace to the soul of Thy servant, Savior, keeping him in the blessed life that surrounds Thee, Friend of men."

"In Thy peaceful places, Lord, where all Thy saints repose, give peace also to the soul of Thy servant, for Thou alone art the Friend of men."

"For Thou art God, Who descended into hell and cut the bonds of the prisoners; give peace to the soul of Thy servant."

The following prayer is permeated with the sweetness of eternal peace: "God of the spirits and of all flesh, who trampled death and abolished the devil, and who gave life to Thy world: Thou, Lord, give peace to the soul of Thy departed servant by the name of . . . in the place of light,

nourishment and peace, whence are removed all sickness, sorrow and lamentation. Blessed God Who art the Friend of men, forgive all sin that he committed by word, deed, or thought, for there is no man who lives and sins not. Thou art the only one without sin; Thy justice is the justice of the ages; and Thy word is the truth. For Thou art the resurrection and the life, and the repose of Thy departed servant by the name of . . . , O Christ our God. . . . "

I am drawn against my will to transcribe this sweet music of peace, quietude, and repose. The sighs of the purified soul glide continuously one after the other like autumn leaves:

"Give peace, O God, to Thy servant, and lead him to paradise, where the faces of the saints and of the righteous shine like luminaires. Give peace to Thy departed servant, ignoring all of his sins."

"Illuminate us, who serve Thee by faith, and save us from the eternal fire."

"Give peace, O our Savior, to Thy servant with the righteous and let him live in Thy habitations, as it is written, ignoring (for Thou art good) his sins, voluntary and involuntary, and all that he did knowingly and unknowingly, O Friend of men . . ."

"Plucking him from the corruption of things that are in flux, make him who is come to Thee worthy of living in the joy of Thy eternal habitations, justifying him by faith and by grace, making him a child of light and cleansing him of sin."

"... install in the sweetness of paradise the one who has departed this world."

"Give peace, O Christ, to the soul of Thy servant, with the saints, there where there is neither sickness nor sorrow nor lamentation but where there is eternal life."

Or listen to the stichera of John the Monk: "What sweetness of life remains uncontaminated with sorrow? What glory remains intact on earth? All is merely impotent shadows, seductive dreams. In one instant all this is swallowed by death. But give peace, O Christ, to the one whom Thou chose in the light of Thy face and in the joy of Thy beauty, for Thou art the Friend of men."

"Where there is worldly passion, the thoughts of this age, thoughts of gold and silver; where there is a multitude of slaves and tumult, all is corruption, ashes and shadow. But come, call out to the immortal King: Lord, make worthy of Thy eternal goods the one who has left us in order to present himself before Thee, give peace to him in Thy bliss that does not age."

"... give him peace in Thy habitations of the righteous."

"Christ will give peace to thee in the land of the living, and may He open the gates of paradise to Thee, and may He let thee live in the kingdom, and may He give to thee the remission of all the sins that thou committed while living, thou who lovest Christ."

Such is the character of spiritual integrity as experience. Let us see now what it is from the ontological point of view.

Chaste life is the integrity and incorruptness of man's being. That is its definition as existent "in itself." "For itself," it is the bliss of a heart made peaceful and measured, a heart brought from the boundlessness of desire to measure, a heart restrained by measure, made beautiful by measure. But (and this is the last question) what is this chastity "for another" and precisely "for Another"? What is it as an aspect of God's life? It is "God's memory," His "eternal memory." "Looking back into the past," says one thinker, "we encounter darkness at its end and attempt in vain to distinguish in that darkness the forms that are similar to our remembrances. We experience then that impotence of enfeebled thought we call forgetting. Non-being is directly revealed in the form of forgetting, which negates it." The river of Time carries everything. It carries everything because in this world nothing has firm roots, nothing has inner stability. "All is an illusory dream," and people too are in flux:

By impotence their poor race is shackled, Fleeting, resembling dreams.³²⁴

Everything is transient, everything passes by, everything fades away. There is only One Who Abides, *Alētheia*. Truth-*Alētheia* is Unforgetfulness, that which is not licked off by the streams of Time; it is Solid Ground not eaten away by corrosive Death; it is Essence most essential in which there is no Non-being at all. In Truth, in the Incorruptible One, the corruptible being of this world finds its protection. From Truth, the Strong One, the world's being receives strength-chastity. God gives victory over Time, and this victory is "remembrance" by God Who does not forget. He Himself is above Time and can make everything commune with Eternity. How? By remembering it.

It is noteworthy that, according to Schwally, the Semitic three-letter root *zkr*, to remember, basically means "to invoke in a cult," while the derivative *zakhar*, male person, means a "cultic person," *kultische Person*, for only this kind of person, a male, could participate in the cult.³²⁵ Thus, the very notion of remembrance turns out to be no more than a reflex of cultic remembrance in prayer, and, in general, memory turns out to be no more than the application to man of what properly applies to God, for to Him alone is it proper to remember in the true sense of the word.

"Remember (*mnēsthēti*), Lord, one by the name of ...," says the priest, removing a piece of the prosphora and placing it on the disk. And in relation to a deceased person, the expression is equivalent: "Give peace, Lord, to one by the name of ..." For this "giving of peace" by the Lord and His "remembering" signify one and the same thing: the

^e The prosphora is one of several loaves of bread each with special seals on the upper side, used in the Eastern Church in the preparation of the Eucharistic elements.

salvation of the one whose name is pronounced. The diptychs, or the lists of names of those living and dead for whom each of us prays, bear the expressive name *pomianiki* or *pominal'niki* in Russian, memorandums.

"Remember (*mnēsthēti*), Lord, by the multitude of Thy generosities, all Thy people who are there and who pray with us, and all our brothers who on land, on sea, in every place of Thy lordship request Thy love of men and Thy assistance, and to all give Thy great mercy . . ."³²⁶ Thus prays the priest at the beginning of the matins. Or even more precisely: "Incline Thy ear and hear us and remember, Lord, by their name, all those who are there and who pray with us, and save them by Thy power."³²⁷

What did the wise thief ask for on the cross: "Lord, remember me (mnēsthēti mou) when thou comest into thy kingdom." He asks to be remembered, and that is all. And in answer, in satisfaction of his wish, his wish to be remembered, the Lord Jesus witnesses: "Verily, I say unto thee. Today shalt thou be with me in paradise" (Luke 23:42–43). In other words, "to be remembered" by the Lord is the same thing as "to be in paradise." "To be in paradise" is to be in eternal memory and, consequently, to have eternal existence and therefore an eternal memory of God. Without remembrance of God we die, but our very remembrance of God is possible through God's remembrance of us.

It is clear that if the Church always prays for remembrance, these prayers become particularly ardent when a final accounting is made with this life. That is why at the end of the great *panikhida* or *parastas*, the deacon proclaims:

"In blessed sleep, may the Lord give eternal rest to Thy servant by the name of . . . who has fallen asleep and assure eternal memory of him."

And the singers sing thrice: "Eternal memory."

In the same way, after dismissal in the Office of the Burial of the laity, the bishop or the first priest proclaims the following thrice: "Thy eternal memory, O our brother who is fittingly blessed and always present in our memory," after which the choir sings thrice: "Eternal memory."

Among the Greeks, however, this last is not done.³²⁸ Here the intention of eternal memory is equivalent to the recognition of *axiomakarias*, i.e., the capability of being blessed in the Bosom of God.

If one asks now what is the meaning of the phrase "eternal memory," whether it requires after it *genetivus objectivus* or *genetivus subjectivus*, then on the basis of the foregoing it must be admitted that both meanings are contained therein, for "my eternal memory" means both God's "eternal memory" of me and my "eternal memory" of God. In other words, it is the eternal memory of the Church, in which God and man converge. And this eternal memory is a victory over death:

He in whom eternal memory lives Eternally triumphs over death . . .

An excruciating thirst for eternal memory and an intense effort to find this memory possessed the entire pagan world. In the most essential aspects of its structure, the pagan world was determined precisely by this need, this longing, this striving to attain eternity. Even if the theory that all of pagan faith with all its realizations in life (what in ancient society is not a realization of faith?) is only an immense variation of the theme of the "cult of ancestors," even if this theory is an exaggerated one, this cult unquestionably has an essential importance for all of pagan life, especially in Greco-Roman pagan life. Here, the voice of ancestor worship almost drowns out all other voices or, at the least, is added to them, forming the basic background to social being. But what is this communion with the deceased if not an attempt to achieve a religious remembrance of them, if not an answer to the anxiety of departed ancestors about eternal memory in the first succeeding generation and future generations. The whole social order primarily serves this need, the need to assure continuous remembrance of the deceased, a constant prayer of remembrance for their souls, a limitlessly long remembrance of them on the part of later generations.

What is this if not the firm decision of later generations not to cast them away (carrion is cast away) but to bury them reverently, to preserve them in the bosom of those religious cells which, in their human aspect, can be called precursors and prototypes of the Church. Life is creativity. But is creativity anything else but the generation of spiritual offspring, the recreation of people according to their Divine image? On the other hand, life is child-bearing. And child-bearing is precisely creativity, the creation in the world of people according to their image, given by God. Both spiritually and corporeally, life desires to propagate itself. How? By leaving in time an abiding image of itself, like the fiery tail trailing a falling star. The creativity of life realizes remembrance of the creator. Therefore, as the priestess Diotima explains in Plato, 329 the aspiration to creativity, spiritual or corporeal, the aspiration to child-bearing, spiritual or corporeal, i.e., eros, is nothing else but an unceasing inner search (a search that is a permanent feature of the soul) for eternal meaning.

Thus, according to the most profound of the pagans, erotic love, conjugal fidelity, parental love for one's offspring, and all higher activities, in a word, all of life has as its basis nothing else but the desire for, the thirst for, eternal memory.

This desire and this thirst are necessary parts of human nature and therefore are absolutely legitimate, but they remain unsatisfied in paganism. In paganism, man seeks the love not of an eternal god but of a mortal brother who is a co-participant in his death. And for remembrance one turns not to what exists eternally but to what is fleeting, to the chain of generations, in which each generation is an "illusory dream." And, taken together, all the generations are not more than vanishing smoke or

dreams. And not only is the succession of generations, appearing and disappearing like the leaves of a tree, illusory, but mankind itself, the *Grand Être* with which Auguste Comte³³⁰ consoled himself, is also illusory. And this succession goes "from nothing to nothing."³³¹ Those who themselves are carried off by Time can offer to their ancestors not eternal memory but only temporary remembrance, even if a long remembrance, even if an indefinitely long remembrance. And what does human remembrance, as powerless as human thought, mean? For it is God Who possesses creative thought; He "thinks by means of things,"³³² which is why His eternal memory is the powerful and real positing in Eternity of that which has already passed in Time. Human thought, especially the thought of perverted and depleted mankind, is only a powerless and illusory positing in Time of what no longer exists in Time, a vain grasping after a shadow that slips away.

Did the pagans themselves understand the insufficiency of this "temporary" remembrance? Did they experience a sense of discontent from this "temporary" memory? Did they desire an eternal remembrance of the soul? Undeniably yes. Pictorial monuments of antiquity all show the black shroud of death covering the eyes.³³³ Either the dull dejection of the East or the ashy melancholy of Egypt—these are the usual moods of the ancients when there is no insane forgetfulness in orgiastic ecstasy. But it would be erroneous to attribute this to the artists' lack of skill. But let us leave the East and Egypt and look at the most noble culture that has ever existed on earth. According to the testimony of a contemporary traveler who is describing just-unearthed monuments, the ability to express various movements of the soul "is used comparatively rarely by the Greek sculptor. His creations rarely rejoice, lament, or are indignant. For the most part what is proper to them is an expression of quiet, tranquil concentration." Their intimate and everyday life is depicted on grave slabs or stellas; however, here one is even more "struck by this expression. On these stellas, the artists most frequently depict how the members of a family meet in the world beyond the grave. They extend to one another their hands with an expression of quiet sorrow on their faces. Calm concentration, a sorrowful reconciliation with what is inevitable—that is the dominant mood of these monuments. There is a quiet lyrical sorrow and concentration here. And the inscriptions on these monuments are just as intimate and simple as the images themselves. 'Farewell, Agathon,' says one of them, for example. It is not to cry that the Greeks came to the graves of their dead, but to remember them as they were when they were alive."334 And what remains for us if not reconciliation and submission if it is clearly understood that

Death and Time reign on the earth.^f

^f A verse of the Russian poet Semyon Yakovlevich Nadson (1862–87).

The Greeks looked upon death with hopeless sorrow. And pitilessly clear for them was the thought of the illusoriness of existence after death. The profound symbol of this consciousness was Odysseus' meeting the shadow of his mother in Hades. This is what Odysseus says:

to clasp my mother's shade within my arms. Three times—my heart kept urging me—I tried; and three times she escaped my hands, much like a shadow or a dream. The pain grew sharp and sharper in my heart.^{335g}

Despite constant remembrance, there is no constant memory and thus no reality after death for the dead.

> this is the law that rules all mortals at their death. For just as soon as life has left the white bones, and the sinews no longer hold together bones and flesh, when the erupting force of blazing fire undoes the body, then the spirit wanders. 336h

Life after death is nothing more than a simulacrum of earthly life that has been washed out and eroded by Time.

For mankind that does not know or does not desire Being, this view of man's lot after death is the only possible one or at least the least sorrowful of all the possible ones. We have proof of this in the artistic images in which Maurice Maeterlinck clothes this ancient teaching in The Blue Bird. 337

But neither the images of the poet nor the theory of Auguste Comte that is equivalent to these images, nor, finally, the cult of "great men," "heroes," "doers," a cult that is ever growing and hypnotizing the masses—nor any speeches, collections of articles, popular editions, celebrations in honor, or clamor—will drown out the truth that was obvious even for the ancient pagans (not to mention the apostates and betrayers of Truth): the truth that, if there is no Eternal Memory, every temporary memory is but a poor consolation. In the bacchanalia of words and cries, the dead are assured that, just as they were "first" and "great," they remain "first" and "great." So in antiquity Odysseus tries to comfort the dead Achilles:

> ... neither past nor future holds a man more blessed than you. In life indeed we Argives honored you as deity;

g Taken from The Odyssey of Homer, a verse translation by Allen Mandelbaum (Berkeley, Cal., 1990), p. 223.

^b Ibid., p. 234.

and now, among the dead, you are supreme. In death you have no need to grieve, Achilles. 338i

But, like Achilles, all the "greats" who are outside the Church respond to these illusory consolations with a "heavy sigh":

Odysseus, don't embellish death for me. I'd rather be another's hired hand, working for some poor man who owns no land but pays his rent from what scant gains he gets, than to rule over all whom death has crushed, 339j

for neither intellectual and artistic creativity nor family life assures eternal memory; therefore, not assuring eternal reality either, they do not firmly establish a person in Eternal Life.

But what is memory? Even its psychological definition, i.e., "the innate capacity for representations," 340 indicates, despite its abstractness, the essential connection of memory with thinking processes in general. On the other hand, the theory of knowledge too, through the concept of transcendental apperception, with all the acts of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition involved in the latter, makes memory a fundamental cognitive function of the mind. A similar conviction is expressed by Plato, who couches it in images of myths: "The mother of the Muses," i.e., the kinds of spiritual creativity, "is Memory (*Mnēmē*)," 341 he says in a dialogue of his youth. Knowledge is "remembrance," *anamnēsis*, of the transcendent world, 342 he says in his maturity. 343

Thus, if transcendental memory is the basis of knowledge for Kant, transcendent memory is the basis of knowledge for Plato. And if, further, we direct our attention to the fact that the "transcendental" in Kant clearly has a transcendent sense³⁴⁴ while the "transcendent" in Plato can be interpreted as "transcendental,"³⁴⁵ the kinship of the thoughts of the two greatest representatives of philosophy becomes unquestionable. To this we must add the views of the most significant and influential representative of the philosophy of the present day, Henri Bergson. For Bergson, "memory" is that activity through which "we enter into the domain of the spirit"³⁴⁶ and which makes a spiritual being self-conscious, i.e., itself. And then we will agree that the whole theory of knowledge is, in the final analysis, a theory of memory.³⁴⁷

However, what especially interests us is the ontological aspect of memory. What is memory as an activity of the soul? It is a creativity of thought and even the only creativity of thought, for, as is well known, imagination is only a form of memory, ³⁴⁸ while the foreseeing of the future is also not more than memory. ³⁴⁹ Memory is the activity of assimilation in thought (i.e., creative reconstruction from representations) of that which is re-

ⁱ Ibid. ^j Ibid.

vealed by mystical experience in Eternity, or, in other words, the creation in Time of symbols of Eternity. We "remember" not psychological elements but mystical ones, for psychological elements are psychological precisely because they occur in Time and flow away irretrievably with Time. To "repeat" a psychological element is just as impossible as to repeat the time with which this element is indissolubly linked. The life of a psychological element is, in essence, a life linked to a single moment of time. But one can touch once again the once-already-experienced timetranscending mystical reality that lay at the base of a single representation that has passed and that is to lie at the basis of another representation, which is coming and which is kindred to the first in the unity of mystical content. Memory always has a transcendental significance, and in it we cannot fail to see our supratemporal nature. For it is clear that, if we speak of a certain representation as of a remembrance, i.e., as of something past, then this "past" character is given to us and is given now, in the "present" in which we speak. In other words, a past moment of Time must be given not only as past but also now as present. That is, all Time is given to me as a certain "now," which is why I myself, looking at all Time, which is given to me all at once, stand above Time.³⁵⁰

Memory is a creation of symbols. When they are put in the past, these symbols, are, in the plane of the empirical world, called remembrances. When they are put in the present, they are called imagination. When put in the future, they are called foresight and foreknowledge. But, in order to be *now* a place for symbols of the mystical, the past, the present, and the future must be experienced as nonsimultaneous but all at once, i.e., from the point of view of Eternity.³⁵¹ In all three directions of memory, the activity of thought expresses Eternity in the language of Time. The act of this expression is memory. The supratemporal subject of knowledge, communing with the supratemporal object, unfolds this communion in Time. That is what memory is.

Thus, memory is the creative principle of thought, i.e., thought in thought and most properly thought. That which in God is called "memory" completely coincides with God's thought, for in God's consciousness Time is identical to Eternity, the empirical is identical to the mystical, and experience is identical to creativity. God's thought is perfect creativity, and His creativity is His memory. God, remembering, thinks, and, thinking, creates.

Language, too, provides evidence that supports the conception of memory expounded here. At least, the root of the word *memory* in the Indo-European languages, mn, signifies *thought* in the entire range of the meanings of this word.³⁵²

The Russian and old Slavic *pamiat*' has the same root as the verbs *po-mia-nia-ti*, *po-mi-nia-ti*, and *po-mi-na-ti*, and clearly derives from the root mn.

From this the connection of the word *pamiat*' with the derivatives of the root mn, men, mon, which refer either to memory or to thought, is clear. These include the Russian mn-i-t', mn-enie, mn-i-m-yi, mn-i-tel-'n-yi; the Old Slavic m'n-ia, m'ne-ti, sa-m'n-e'ti (sa) = dubitare, timere; the Serbian mniti, su-mn'a-ti; the Czech mněti, mni-m, mni-ti, mini-ti; the Polish pomnieć, niemać, mienić, sumnienie, sumienie (conscience); the Ukrainian mn-i-ti, po-mn-ia-ty; the Belorussian su-m' (doubt), su-m-nyi. This list also includes the Sanskrit man (only in the middle voice) (think, believe, appreciate, etc.), mán-jate (to think or imagine), mánas (spirit, will), má-t-is (attention, thought, intention), man-ju-s (audacity and indignation), and so forth; the Lithuanian men-u, min-ju, miñ-ti (remember), min-ta-s = the Old Slavic mat', at-(iz)-mint-is, min-e-ti, perman-i-ti; the Lettish min-ē-t (remember), man-i-ti (think or imagine); the Prussian min-isn-an; the Latin me-mi(=e)n-i (I remember), re-mi-n-isci (to remember), com-min-i-sc-i, com-men-tu-s (= the German ver-mein-t, imagined), men-(t)s (thought, mind, will, etc.), Min-er-va, men-t-io (mention), mon-ere (to remind, to persuade = the German mahnen), mon-s-tru-m (monster; that which attracts attention); the German mein-en (think or imagine), Minne (love), Mensch (man, i.e., "thinker"); the Gothic ga-man, man (I think), mun-an (to think or imagine), mun-d, ga-mun-d-s, mun-s (thought); the Icelandic muna, minna (remembrance); the Old High German minnon, man-ê-n, man-o-n (to exhort, remind), meina (opinion); the Greek menos (a strong movement of the soul, aspiration, desire, will, anger, as well as vital force, life, force, etc.), ma-omai, me-mon-a (to aspire or desire strongly, to strive with one's soul toward something, etc.), mi-mnē-skein (to remind), Mousa from Monsa, mēnis (anger), mania (delirium), man-ti-s (seer), etc. 353

Thus, memory is *thought par excellence*, thought *itself* in the purest and most fundamental sense.

We asked what sin is, and it turned out that it is destruction and perversion. But, after all, destruction is possible as something temporary. Fed by what is destroyed, destruction clearly must inevitably dry up, cease, stop when it has nothing more to destroy. The same thing goes for perversion. What then? What does this limit of destruction lead to? What is this total destruction of chastity? Or, in other words, what is Gehenna? That is the question that now confronts us.

But, beyond this question, there is another question, a similar one. If Gehenna is the upper limit of sin, where is its lower limit, i.e., the limit where again sin is extinguished, but now because of the fullness of chaste strength? In other words, it is necessary for us to clarify what saintliness is and how it is possible. Gehenna as the upper limit of sinfulness and saintliness as its lower limit, or Gehenna as the lower limit of spirituality and saintliness as its upper limit—these are the problems we face next.



Omnis igne salietur. Everyone shall be salted by fire.

IX. Letter Eight: Gehenna

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My starets! I cannot tell you with what apprehension I approach the writing of this letter. Do I not see how difficult it is to find the right words here? The skeleton of our obtuse concepts is too rough and, in covering it with the almost-intangible tissue of experience, it would be easy to tear this tissue to shreds. Perhaps, your hands alone will receive it as not torn. Your hands alone . . . For the question of the second death is a painful, earnest question. Once in a dream I experienced the second death in all its concreteness. I did not see any images. The experience was a purely interior one. Utter darkness, almost materially dense, surrounded me. Powers of some kind dragged me to the edge and I felt this to be the edge of God's being, that beyond it is absolute Nothing. I wanted to scream but could not. I knew that in one more moment I would be expelled into the outer darkness. The darkness began to flow into my whole being. Half my consciousness of self was lost, and I knew that this was absolute, metaphysical annihilation. In ultimate despair I cried with a voice that was not my own: "Out of the depths have I cried unto thee, O Lord. Lord, hear my voice!"354 My whole soul was in those words. Someone's hands gripped me, a drowning man, powerfully and threw me somewhere, far from the abyss. The jolt was sudden and powerful. Suddenly I found myself in my usual surroundings, my room. From mystical non-being I was thrown back into ordinary, everyday life. Here at once I felt myself in the presence of God and then I awoke, drenched in a cold sweat.

Now, almost four years have passed, but I shudder at the mention of the "second death," of the outer darkness and the expulsion from the Kingdom. And now I tremble with my whole being when I read: "Let me not remain alone outside of Thee, life-giver, my breath, my life, my joy, my salvation," that is, let me not remain in the outer darkness, outside of Life, Breath, and Joy. And now with grief and worry I attend to the words of the Psalmist: "Cast me not away from thy presence; and take not thy holy spirit from me." But, after all, my own dream, my own worry, was a mere joke in comparison with a thirty-year burning in the fire of Gehenna, in comparison with a thirty-year dying of the second death. There was in fact such a case:

The papers of "the servant of the Mother of God and of St. Seraphim," Nikolai Aleksandrovich Motovilov, as edited by Sergei Nilus, contain a description, a description astonishing in its intensity and concreteness, of the first stages of demonic possession. The torments of Gehenna, insofar as they can be apprehended by our consciousness in its present state, are depicted here in their living truth. Nilus retells the story:

"Motovilov chanced to spend the night at one of the post stations on the way from Kursk. Finding himself completely alone in the common room, he took his manuscripts [materials for the Life of St. Mitrophanius of Voronezh] from his valise and began to go through them by the dim light of a solitary candle, which was just barely illuminating the large room. One of the first papers he chanced to look at was a note describing the healing of a possessed girl of the gentry, Eropkina, at the shrine of St. Mitrophanius."

Motovilov writes: "I began to wonder how it was possible that an Orthodox Christian woman who has taken Holy Communion, that is, who has participated in the Most Pure and Life-giving Sacraments of the Lord, could suddenly become possessed by a demon, and for more than thirty years. And I thought: Nonsense! That could not be! I would like to see a demon dare to possess me, who often take Holy Communion." Nilus continues: "At that moment, a cold, frightening, foul-smelling cloud surrounded him and began to enter his convulsively clenched lips. However much the unhappy Motovilov struggled, however much he attempted to protect himself against the ice and stench of the cloud creeping into him, all of it entered into him, despite his superhuman exertions. His hands were paralyzed and could not make the sign of the cross; his thought, frozen in horror, could not remember the saving name of Jesus. The repulsively horrible happened, and a period of the most severe torments began for Nikolai Aleksandrovich. Suffering thus, he returned to Voronezh to [Archbishop] Antonii."

The manuscript gives the following description of these torments: "The Lord found me worthy of experiencing really, and not in dreams or through ghostly apparitions, three Gehennic torments: The first was of a fire without light and inextinguishable except by the grace of the Holy Spirit. This torment lasted for three days: I felt that I was on fire but that I did not burn up. Sixteen or seventeen times a day it was necessary for me to be cleaned of Gehennic

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ash, which was visible to all who saw me. This torment stopped only after confession and Holy Communion, after prayers by Archbishop Antonii and litanies for the health of the ailing servant of God, Nikolai, ordered by Antonii to be served at all forty-seven churches of Voronezh. The second torment, lasting two days, was the fierce Tartarus of Gehenna, where not only did the fire not burn, but it could not even warm me. Obeying the Archbishop's request, I held my hand over a burning candle for half an hour, and my hand was covered with soot but it was not even made warm. I wrote down this confirming experiment on a sheet of paper, and I made an impression of my soot-covered hand on the bottom of the paper as a kind of seal. But through Holy Communion I was able to eat and to drink during these two torments, and even to sleep a little, and they were visible to all who saw me then. The third torment, even though it lasted only a day and a half, was extremely horrible and excruciating in its indescribability and unfathomability. How was I able to come out of it alive? It too disappeared as a result of confession and Holy Communion. This time Archbishop Antonii offered me Holy Communion with his own hands. This was the torment of the unsleeping worm of Gehenna. This worm was seen by no one but by me and Archbishop Antonii. I could not sleep, and I could not eat or drink anything, for I was filled with this most evil worm that would crawl throughout me, and would gnaw indescribably at my innards, and, crawling out through my mouth, ears, and nose, would once again return into my innards! God gave me power over it, and I could take it in my hands and stretch it. I make all this known because I must, for it was for a purpose that this vision was given to me from above by the Lord; and let no one think that I dare to invoke the name of the Lord in vain. No! On the day of the Last Judgment, God himself, my Help and Protector, will bear witness that I did not lie about Him, the Lord, and about His act of Divine Providence performed in me by Him."

Nilus continues: "Soon after this horrible trial, inaccessible to an ordinary person, Motovilov had a vision of his protector, St. Seraphim. St. Seraphim comforted the tormented one with the promise that he would be healed when the relic of St. Tikhon of Zadonsk was opened, and that, until that time came, the demon possessing him would no longer torment him so cruelly. That event occurred only after more than thirty years, and Motovilov lived to see that day. He lived to be healed because of his great faith." 357

Final destinies! But who does not know that nearly every soul is now infected with a more or less vulgar Origenism, with the secret belief that one will ultimately be "forgiven" by God?³⁵⁸ So often do people of various estates and positions make this admission that one begins to think that there is some sort of internal inevitability here. Indeed, there is an inevitability here. Consciousness proceeds from the idea of God as Love. Love cannot create in order to ruin; it cannot create, knowing of death; Love cannot fail to forgive. The idea of retribution directed toward creation and all that is creaturely is dispersed in the light of immeasurable Divine Love as a mist is dispersed by the rays of the all-triumphant sun.

From the point of view of eternity, everything is forgiven, everything is forgotten: "God [will] be all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28). In brief, the impossibility of universal salvation is impossible.

That is how it is from the height of the idea of God. But, taking the bi-conjugate point of view, i.e., proceeding not from God's love of creation but from creation's love of God, the same consciousness inevitably arrives at the diametrically opposite conclusion. Now consciousness cannot admit that there could be salvation without the answering love of God. And since it is also impossible to admit that love is unfree, that God has compelled creation to love, it inevitably follows that it is possible that God's love could exist without creation answering His love. In other words, the impossibility of universal salvation is possible.

The thesis ("the impossibility of universal salvation is impossible") and the antithesis ("the impossibility of universal salvation is possible") are clearly antinomic. Insofar as one accepts God's love of creation, the thesis is inevitable, whereas insofar as one accepts the freedom of creation (a freedom that is a necessary consequence of God's love), the antithesis is inevitable. In relation to the idea of creation, the idea of the Triune God as Substantial Love is unfolded in the mutually exclusive terms of forgiveness and retribution, salvation and perdition, love and justice, Savior and Punisher. These aspects are as rationally intolerant of each other as trinity is of unity in intra-Divine life. The unity of God corresponds to retribution while the trinity of God corresponds to forgiveness. Thus, historically too, we have severe monarchianism and indulgent tritheism.³⁵⁹

If human freedom is a genuine freedom of self-determination, then the forgiveness of an evil will is impossible, for this will is a creative product of this freedom. Not to consider evil will as evil would be not to recognize the genuineness of freedom. But if freedom is not genuine, then God's love of creation is also not genuine. If creation does not have *real* freedom, there is no *real* self-limitation of Divinity during creation; there is no "kenosis" and therefore no love. And if there is no love, there is no forgiveness.

By contrast, if there is Divine forgiveness, there is also Divine love. Therefore, creation has genuine freedom. If there is genuine freedom, its consequence—the possibility of evil will—is inevitable, as is, therefore, the impossibility of forgiveness.

Denial of the antithesis is also denial of the thesis. Affirmation of the antithesis is also affirmation of the thesis, and vice versa. Thesis and antithesis are inseparable, like an object and its shadow. The antinomicalness of the dogma of final destinies is logically indisputable. But not only logically: psychologically too, it is certain. The soul demands forgiveness for all; the soul thirsts for universal salvation, the soul longs for "the

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peace of the whole world."³⁶⁰ But, in the presence of evil will, perverted and demonized will, which tends to evil for the sake of evil, which seeks evil as such; in the presence of will that denies God for the sake of denial and hates Him only because He is Love³⁶¹; in a word, in the presence of cynicism,362 "love of evil, 363 and (to use Edgar Allan Poe's expression) "the demon of perverseness," 364 the soul curses God's very forgiveness, denies and does not accept this forgiveness. Pascal says³⁶⁵ "that people never do so much evil and so eagerly as when they do it consciously." And so, "for these people hell is voluntary and insatiable; they are voluntary sufferers. For they have cursed themselves in having cursed God and life. Their wicked pride nourishes them, and they resemble a hungry man in the desert sucking his own blood from his body. But these insatiable ones eternally reject forgiveness and curse God Who calls them. They cannot contemplate the living God without hate, and they demand that there be no God of life, that God destroy Himself and all His creation. And these people will burn eternally in the fire of their own wrath; they will thirst for death and non-being. But they will not receive death . . . " That is what Father Zosima says in Dostoevsky's Brothers Karamazov. 366 Here, it is not God who is not reconciled with creation and does not forgive a wicked soul full of hate. It is the soul itself that is not reconciled with God. In order to force the soul to make peace, in order to force the soul to become loving, God would have to take away its freedom, i.e., He would have to stop being a loving God and become a hating God. But being love, He does not annihilate anyone's freedom, and therefore "those who desert Him of their own will, He subjects to excommunication from Himself, an excommunication which they themselves have chosen."367

God's love, from which previously the inevitability of forgiveness was derived, now blocks the road to this very forgiveness. If previously we demanded universal salvation, now we ourselves "rebel" against it.

Within the limits of rationality there is no resolution and can be no resolution of this antinomy. Such resolution lies only in the actual transformation of reality itself, a transformation in which the synthesis of thesis and antithesis is experienced as a fact, as direct empirical givenness grounded in the Trihypostatic Truth. In other words, the synthesis can be given definitively only in the experience of the final destinies of creation, where a total transubstantiation of the world is given. But in a preliminary way this synthesis is experienced in sacraments, where a particular transubstantiation occurs (you understand, my friend, that about which I speak).

But what are the logical postulates of this future and present synthesis? In other words, what conditions that are jointly unthinkable in the rational mind must be fulfilled for our antinomy to be thought as synthesized? Or in what incompatible logical terms is the one supralogical idea

of eschatology unfolded? The synthesis of eternally boiling, bubbling brimstone and the cool of paradise! Again *coincidentia oppositorum*!

Wave and rock verse and prose, ice and flame are not so unlike.^a

And so, what are *the unthinkable conditions of thinkability*? But, even before trying to answer this question, we must see that its solution cannot be sought in the plane of moralism or legalism, in this plane where it is frequently sought, and that our searching gazes must be directed at the plane of ontology. Our categories will be not "legitimate" and "just" but "necessary" and "because." *Metabasis eis allo genos* is the necessary precondition of the answer. We will now attempt to give this answer a greater formal definition.

A person created by God, that is, a person who is holy and absolutely valuable in his very core, has free *creative will*, which is revealed as a system of acts, i.e., as an empirical character. In this sense, a person is a character.³⁶⁹

But a creature of God is a person and must be saved. An evil character is precisely what prevents a person from being saved. It is therefore clear that salvation postulates a separation between person and character. What is one must become disparate. How does this come about? In the same way that the *trine* is one in God. In essence one, I splits apart; that is, remaining one, I stops being I. Psychologically, this means that a person's evil will, manifested in the lusts and pride of the character, is separated from the person himself. This will thus acquires an independent non-substantial position in being and is absolute nothing "for another" (according to the mode "Thou," which is the metaphysical synthesis of the "I" and "He" of the fragmented person). In other words, the essentially holy "in itself" of a person (according to the mode "He") is separated from the person's "for itself" (according to the mode "I") insofar as the latter is evil.

The different aspects of being acquire independent significance in separating. And my "for itself," insofar as it is evil, departs from my "in itself" into the "outer darkness," i.e., into the darkness outside of God, into the metaphysical place where there is no God. The Triune is the Light of Love, in which He is Being. Outside of Him is the darkness of hate and therefore eternal annihilation. "The Trinity is the unshakable power" and the Ground of all unshakableness. Denial of the Holy Trinity, aversion to it, distance from it, deprives selfhood (which is my "for itself") of stability and makes it spin dizzily round in itself. For Gehenna is the denial of the dogma of trinity. It is not by chance that the denial of the

^a Lines from Pushkin's Eugene Onegin.

proper, trinitarian nature of the symbol "three" lies at the base of black magic. I have heard that a certain priest asked a sorcerer during confession how he cast his spells. The sorcerer admitted that all he says is: "Three is not three; nine is not nine."

The meaning of this blasphemous incantation is clear: three is the holy number of Truth, while nine is trinity taken to a higher power (such in any case is its significance in symbolic arithmology), i.e., nine too is a number of Truth. And, here, the trinity of three is denied; the "ninity" of nine is denied; that is denied in the numbers of Truth which makes them the numbers of Truth: their truth nature. Hence, the incantation "three is not three; nine is not nine" represents an impotent attempt to overturn the "pillar of the Truth" and to erect a "pillar of ungodly wickedness." ³⁷² In other words, Falsehood is affirmed as falsehood, Evil as evil, and Ugliness as ugliness. Satan himself is affirmed. For the essence of evil lies in its rejection of homoousios, and only in this. In the "outer darkness" into which my "for itself," i.e., my selfhood, is cast through its rejection of homoousios, through its stubborn "three is not three; nine is not nine," there, torn away from God, it is being and non-being at the same time. Evil selfhood, deprived of all objectivity (for the source of objectivity is the Light of God), becomes naked subjectivity, which eternally exists and preserves its freedom, but only for itself. This selfhood is therefore unreal. And, after the mysterious division, my "in itself" becomes pure objectivity, eternally real, but only "for another," insofar as it has not revealed itself for itself in loving selfhood, and therefore, being real "for another," it is eternally real.

In itself, the wicked and wrathful "for itself" is perpetual agony, the unceasing, impotent attempt to leave the state of naked selfhood (only "for itself"). This "for itself" therefore burns ceaselessly in the inextinguishable flame of hate. This is one of the aspects of the wicked selfperception of creation, a living picture frozen in its subjectless illusoriness. It is the empty self-identity of "I" which cannot transcend a single, eternal moment of sin, torment, and fury directed at God, at one's own impotence, a single moment of insane epoche, which has become an eternity. It is an eternal exertion demonstrating powerlessness, and it is the powerlessness to make any exertion. Earthly epoche still has a creative character, but epoche after death is absolutely passive. On the other hand, the good "in itself" is an eternally beautiful object of contemplation for another. It is part of another, insofar as this other is good also for itself, i.e., capable of contemplating another's good. For one who loves transforms all that he loves into himself, while one who hates loses even what he has. One who loves belongs to the loved one, while one who hates does not even belong to himself. "He who finds his life will lose it, and he who loses his life for My sake will find it" (Matt. 10:39, cf. Matt. 16:25; Mark 8:35; Luke 9:24, 17:33; John 12:25).

The foregoing is nothing more than a translation into ontological language of "the parable of the talents." A "talent" is the spiritual creativity of one's own person given by God to all people, or "the image of God." Just as investment of energy applied to capital causes it to grow, so it is with regard to the image of God. But just as the growth of capital depends on the scale of the possessor's investment activity (and therefore it would be pointless to give someone capital he will not use), so it is the case with the growth of the soul. Everyone has his own "type of growth," 373 and therefore everyone is given an appropriate spiritual capital corresponding to this "type." Everyone receives his talents from God according to the living revelation of the image of God that is to take place in him, according to his "type" of spiritual growth and success. Some are given one talent; some are given two; some are given five: "To every man according to his strength, his ability (hekastōi kata tēn dunamin)" (Matt. 25:15). And, with His holy gift, God does not desire to compel man, lest He lay on his shoulders "heavy burdens and grievous to be borne" (Matt. 23:4; Luke 11:46).

The one who received five talents earned five more, and the one who received two talents earned two more. But what do these words of the parable mean? If talents are an image of God, how can man, through his effort, through his creativity, add to the godlike being that he already has, double his image of God? Of course, it is in man's power not to create this image but only to assimilate it, just as the living power of an organism does not create its nourishment but only assimilates it. Man does not add to his own person; he does not have the *dunamis* for this. But he assimilates it through the reception into himself of the Divine images of other people. Love is the dunamis through which everyone enriches and grows himself, absorbing others. But how does this happen? Through self-giving. Man receives as he gives. When he gives himself wholly in love, he receives himself, but grounded and deepened in another; that is, he doubles his being. Thus, the one who received five talents added five more, and the one who received two talents added to them not more and not less than two talents (see Matt. 25:16–17).

This doubling of self is faithfulness "over a few things" ("thou hast been faithful over a few things" [Matt. 25:1, 21–23]), over what has been given to everyone, over the cell of the Heavenly Jerusalem that has been vouchsafed to him for safekeeping. But it is not only personal joy that awaits the "good and faithful servant." This great and immeasurable joy would be a small and insignificant droplet compared with that infinite ocean of spiritual merriment which has been prepared for the faithful servant by "the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God" (Rom. 11:33). What awaits him is the entering "into the joy of . . . [the] . . . Lord" ("enter thou into the joy of thy lord," Matt. 25:22–23). What awaits him is participation in the full bliss of God, communion

with the Joy of the Trinity over the perfection of all of God's creation, repose in that Peace of the Lord in which He died, having completed His all-good world-creating work.

But joy is accessible only to one who has in himself the consciousness that he is a person. It is accessible only to one who has entered onto the path of ascesis, to one who is a servant, even if only "over a few things," but a faithful servant. He who has not grounded his person, he who has not earned what has been given to him is blinded in the radiant Light of Trihypostatic Divinity, suffocates in the fragrance of holy incense, is deafened by the sound of heavenly praises. Such a one cannot bear the face of God, goes away from the All-seeing one, and rejects His immortal gifts.³⁷⁴ Thus, the servant who received one talent and did not increase it, the servant who by his activity did not add anything to what was given to him, says to the Lord: "Lord, I knew thee that thou art an hard man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strawed: And I was afraid, and went and hid thy talent in the earth; lo, there thou hast that is thine" (Matt. 25:24–25). Hatred of the good Lord sounds in these words; the servant sweeps away the precious gift with malice and pride. He wants to be "by himself." And then fulfilling the evil but (by God's grace) ever free will of the "wicked and slothful servant," the Lord commands that the talent already rejected by him be taken away and given to the one with ten talents, "for unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath" (Matt 25:29; Cf. Luke 8:18, 19:26). If a person is slothful with regard to spiritual exertion and, because of his wickedness, wants to assure, to legitimize for himself the possibility of such negligence by hiding his own image of God from himself, and when asked about it, he is in a hurry to reject it arrogantly, then what is rejected is taken away from him. But, for the sin of the one who has rejected, the Lord does not punish all of creation by taking away the gift that he found it worthy to receive. The rejected image of God stops existing only for the one who has rejected it, not unconditionally. And the righteous who have entered "into the joy of [their] Lord," into the joy over every image of God created by Him, acquire and assimilate in this joy of the Lord this rejected gift of the Lord as well, whereas the unprofitable servant is cast away from the joy of his Lord, into the darkness outside of God, "into outer darkness" (Matt. 25:30).

The freedom of I consists in the living creativity of its empirical content. The free I is conscious of itself not only as the epistemological subject but also as the creative substance of its states. It is conscious of itself not only as the abstract subject but also as the active cause of all its predicates. Just as the perception of a time series demonstrates the supratemporality of the perceiver, so the perception of the empirical as such demonstrates the supraempirical nature of one who judges about the empirical: I can

rise above the conditions of the empirical, and this constitutes the proof of I's higher, nonempirical nature. But in the experience of one's own creativity, this nature is given as a fact. Holiness is a preliminary selfperception of one's own freedom, and sin is preliminary slavery to oneself. "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" (Matt. 6:21; Luke 12:34). Where that is which you consider valuable, there also will be your self-consciousness, your "for itself." If I has placed its treasure not in its Divine self-creativity, has become attached not to its Divine image in Christ, but to its empirical content, to what is conditional, limited, finite, and therefore blind, it has blinded itself, deprived itself of its freedom, enslaved itself, and thereby anticipated the Last Judgment. The "for itself" of the person is directed at the unfreedom, the blind selfassertion of I. An "obstinate, dark, insuperable urge" wholly dominates the person, and his creative energy, his image of God, is no longer necessary to him, for the "for itself" has fallen out of the domain of the "self," out of the domain of supraempirical freedom, and become enmired in slavery to the empirical. Whence the state of epoche as the impossibility of transcending the empirical. And the more I strives to satisfy its blind desiring, its meaningless finite lust asserting itself as infinite, the more its inner thirst will be enflamed, the higher the flame of its arrogant anger will be. Since I is given to itself only empirically, blindly, and limitedly, this striving to satisfy its infinite need with the finite is essentially absurd. The Koran has preserved a saying attributed to Jesus Christ. Although this attribution to the Lord is highly disputable, I shall present the saying because it expresses our thought well. "He who strives to be rich," the saying goes, "is like a man who drinks sea water. The more he drinks, the stronger his thirst becomes, and he will not stop drinking until he perishes."375 This holds for every desire that is substituted for the Ground of the Truth. An ideal, i.e., a need of the Infinite, when it is projected onto the finite, creates an idol, and this idol ruins the soul, separating the man "himself" from his self-consciousness and thus depriving him of freedom. The definitive, final, and irreversible separation will be the Last Judgment through the coming of the Spirit, when everything that did not place its treasure in Him will be deprived of its heart, for this heart will have no place in being. Everything that is not from God, that "is not rich toward God" (Luke 12:21), is intended as a prey of the "second death" (Rev. 20:6, 14).

In this separation, neither the freedom nor the Divine image of man is annihilated. They are only disunited. But an evil character, who absolutely does not have the aspect of "Thou," absolutely does not exist for God and for the righteous. No one is "Thou" for whom no one is "Thou." Such a one is pure illusion, an illusion that exists only for himself, and a snake biting its own tail can serve as his symbol. Madame Blavatsky³⁷⁶ called "spirits" by the expressive name "husks," corre-

sponding to the occultistic term "*imagines*."³⁷⁷ Without considering the connection between man's *imago* and his naked "for himself," I will say that, in any case, the word "husk" is quite suitable for designating "for himself." This is precisely the empty "skin" of the person, but without a body. It is a mask, an *imago*, without any substantiality. It goes without saying that I am considering the limiting case of total demonization. Generally speaking, this process of separation is partial, so that only the part of the selfhood afflicted and damaged by sin is cut off.

The proposed solution, which is essentially grounded in the distinction in the person between the "image of God" and the "likeness of God," was, as it turns out, expounded in a generally accessible way by a certain Syrian slave. The well-known Protestant missionary Lord Redstock related it in one of his Moscow talks of 1877: "I remember that once in Syria I saw three elders of a certain village who, while sitting in the shade of palm trees in the evening, were discussing the boundlessness of God's justice and mercy. 'How is it?' they asked. 'If God is merciful, he will forgive the sinner all his sins. If he is just, He will punish the sinner without mercy.' Then a slave came up to them and asked for permission to give his opinion. 'I think,' he said, 'that God in His justice will punish and destroy *sin*, while in His mercy, He will forgive the *sinner*.' "³⁷⁸

The mysterious process of God's judgment is a separation, a cutting off, an isolating. Such, first of all, is sacrament. No sacrament makes sin not-sin: God does not justify untruth. But sacrament cuts off the sinful part of the soul and represents it, to the recipient of the sacrament, objectively as nothing (as "covered") and subjectively as self-enclosed evil, directed at itself, as a Serpent biting its tail. That is the way the Devil is depicted on ancient pictures of the Last Judgment.³⁷⁹ Sin becomes an independent act separated from the sinner and directed at itself. Sin's action upon everything external is equal to absolute zero. In the sacrament of repentance, the words of the Psalm are made real for us: "As far as the east is from the west, so far hath he removed our transgressions from us."380 All the forces of sin, cut off by repentance, are closed up in themselves. That is why the holy fathers repeatedly indicated that the annihilation of the attractive force of the forgiven sin serves as the sign of the effectiveness of the sacrament of repentance: by sacrament "the past is destroyed, ta prōta exaleiphetai. 381 Here, exaleiphō properly signifies "I wipe away," "I scratch out," "I scrape out."

"Every sinful fall leaves a certain mark on the soul, influences the soul's organization in one way or another," writes a specialist in asceticism.³⁸² "The sum of a man's sinful acts therefore constitutes a certain past for this man, a past which affects his behavior in the present, and draws him to acts of one kind or another. Mysteriously free conversion consists precisely in the fact that the thread of a man's life is broken, as it were, and his sinful past loses its determining power, is cast out of the soul, as it

were, becomes alien to him. It is not that sin is forgotten or not imputed to a man for reasons extraneous to him. Rather, sin is totally removed from him, is annihilated in him, stops being a part of his inner content, and refers to that past which was erased by grace at the moment of conversion and which therefore has nothing in common with his present."

Let me tell about one such case of judgment from my own life. Sin lay on my soul. In inexpressible torment, I would continually fall down on my knees and then stand up again, having become almost insane with inner struggle. Late one dark night I was praying in grief and in horror for one hour, perhaps two. This was a foretaste of the Last Judgment. I knew that I should confess my sin before you. But I also knew that to confess it would be not to say a mere word but to tear a chunk of my being out of myself. I do not remember whether it is consciously or almost unconsciously that I opened at random my small Gospel. You know what text it fell open to. If a voice had thundered from the heavens, it could not have provided a more precise answer to my vacillations. It cut me asunder as with a sword. It performed a terrifying surgical operation with a single thrust. And then I told you everything. You yourself remember with what joy and peace my soul was filled then.

And here is what one monk, a 65-year-old elder, writes me:

"This was long ago, when I was only thirty years old. I had just taken monastic vows and been consecrated as a deacon; I had to prepare myself to serve. There were occasions when my conscience told me: 'It is necessary to receive confession; without it one cannot approach Holy Communion.' My cell was next to my confessor's cell. Once I left my cell and went to the door of my confessor's cell. But I stopped and my thought said: 'Don't. Don't go in. Why disturb him? It's not a time of fast, after all.' I stood for a while by the door, and then I went away. 'No, don't.' I returned to my cell. My conscience said: 'What are you doing? How will you serve the liturgy? Go, confess!' I again approached the door to the confessor's cell. My thought again said: 'No, don't. Don't go. It's embarrassing.' I stood for a while, then went away again, and my conscience again said: 'How can you approach Holy Communion?' And here, after a long struggle, I finally decided to say a prayer and to enter. In entering, I felt as though I had removed an extremely heavy fur coat; I felt that I could fly, so light was my heart, so much did it jump from the fullness of some sort of inexpressible lightness. There is no way to express this in words. Such is the power of the sacrament of repentance."383

The Holy Eucharist pours healing balm into the wound of repentance, but the Eucharist also judges the communicant. Is it not in this same way that the Anointing and Comforting Spirit will come to heal the wounds of creation with a baptism of fire after the Terrible Day of surgery for the world, after the Judgment of the Son of God and the Word of God, that Very Same Hypostatic Word that "is quick, and powerful, and sharper

than any twoedged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. 4:12)?

It would be ridiculous to examine all these questions relying on one's mental powers alone. What I have expounded for you is a recounting in philosophical terms of what I have read in the Holy Scripture; to an exegetical analysis of passages from the Scripture, I have prefaced the foregoing in order to make it easier to follow the interpretation. The key to these passages is the text from 1 Cor. 3:10–15. Here it is in its context:

- 10. According to the grace of God which is given unto me, as a wise masterbuilder, I have laid the foundation [themelion], and another buildeth thereon. But let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon.
- 11. For other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ.
- 12. Now if any man build upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble;
- 13. Every man's work should be made manifest [hekastou to ergon]: for the day [hē gar hēmera] shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire [en puri apokaluptetai]; and the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is [hekastou to ergon hopoion estin to pur auto dokimasei].
- 14. If any man's work *abide* which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward [ei tinos to ergon menei en epoikodomēsen, misthon lēmpsetai].

(I give such a translation ("subsiste") of the word menei in the 14th verse according to Godet, who reads ménei instead of the commonly accepted meneî, "shall abide," "demeurera." The latter is introduced for the sake of parallelism with the subsequent katakaēsetai, "shall be burned." "But," Godet remarks, "this argument does not have any value; the act of burning is instantaneous, whereas that which abides abides forever: it is this that is expressed by the present tense ménei." 384)

15. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved; yet so as by fire [ei tinos to ergon katakaēsetai, zemiōthesetai, autos de sōthesetai, houtōs de ōs dia puros].

The Apostle speaks of the building of the Church of Christ (see 1 Cor. *supra*). According to his words, the grace given to him gave him the power to lay wisely a solid foundation: "Christ crucified" (1 Cor. 1:23). The sermon, having awakened faith in souls, has mysteriously made a habitation in them for "Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24; cf. Ex. 28:16; 1 Pet. 2:5, etc.). The foundation in

Corinthians is laid irreproachably—by the power of God. But since no other foundation exists except that laid by the Apostle, since there is nothing firm except what rests upon Christ, since no attempt to build without Christ attains its goal (1 Cor. 3:11; cf. the parable of those who build on rock and on sand in Matt. 7:24-27), the question of the foundation is finished with. There should be no more doubts about this question, and it follows that the Apostle's direct work is done. But further, in the building on top of this foundation by "another" (1 Cor. 3:10), what is necessary is attentiveness and care in choosing the material, for on the laid foundation one can build either a first-rate building of solid, fireresistant expensive materials such as costly stone (e.g., marble, jasper, alabaster, decorated with gold and silver, as is the custom in the building of rich houses in the East) or a light structure of materials that are cheap, weak, and easy to ignite: wood, straw, and reed. To the latter type belong all the huts of the East, consisting of a wooden frame, covered with clay mixed with fine straw, and crowned by a reed roof. A rich man's palace, abundantly decorated with gold and silver, and a pathetic hut—these are the types of buildings.

Thus, the Apostle says that "every man" should in time "take heed" from what material ($p\bar{o}s$: "how?") "another" "buildeth thereupon" (1 Cor. 3:10). Who is this "another"? First, Apollos himself; then, all the teachers and leaders of the Church; and generally speaking, all the members of the Church, for every member builds some corner of the Church: his own person.

Activity according to Christ, on Christ, by the power of Christ is precisely the building of Christ's Church. This activity is a real revelation of Divine possibilities given to mankind. And since the Church is built of people, the building materials are, first of all, what people represent in their actually disclosed, empirical character. The nobility and ignobility of his empirical character are what every man should first weigh. For every believer the building material is his inner activity and the outer activity that emanates from the inner. The material is his empirical self, inasmuch as, for himself, the empirical man is not what he is as God's creation, as the image of God, but only such as he freely expresses himself in the ascetic feat that overcomes wicked selfhood.

But this empirical nature is disclosed in a system of thoughts, feelings, and desires, and is manifested in actions. And these actions become autonomous and induce corresponding thoughts, feelings, desires, and actions in other people, independently of the one who provided the first stimulus. In action (and the word is action *par excellence*) an empirical character acquires a material body as it were and spreads spiritual power in this body. In this sense, those interpretations are right (those of Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Osiander, and Godet) that see in these building materials "religious and moral fruits produced in the Church through

sermon."³⁸⁵ The holy, spiritual life of other people, a life that is produced by a believer's activity, is, to the highest degree, *his* life, the objectification of his inner world, just as a work of art is an objectification of the artist's creative idea and just as a child's parents live bodily in the child. It is not by chance that the Apostle constantly speaks about architecture; there really is a profound resemblance here: religiously instructive creativity and artistic creativity are analogous. For spiritual ascesis is art *par excellence*, art that gives the highest beauty to creation. It is not over impersonal matter and impersonal word that the worker toils here but over a personal body and a personal soul, which make man a creature of the word. And if an artist gives beauty to the world, the artist of artists makes the universe shine with the beauty of beauties. Yes, there is nothing more beautiful than a person who, in the mysterious darkness of inner work, has withstood the murk of sinful alarms and, illuminated, reveals the Divine image, shining like a precious pearl, in himself.

Not only the energy of good will but also the energy of evil will finds for itself an autonomous expression, an expression no longer dependent on the one who wills, in a religious community. An evil or good will, once it is excited on the surface of the human sea, never disappears but eternally spreads out in widening circles, and the one who excited it is caught up by it like everyone else. Both Pygmalion, who fell in love with Galatea, and Gogol's artist, who came to hate the portrait he painted, treat their creations as if they were living beings, people. A thought was conceived and embodied. It was born and it has grown up, and nothing will now return it to the maternal womb. A thought is an independent center of actions. In this sense, that interpretation (Pelagius, Bengel, Hoffmann) is right which sees the different members of the Church as "building materials," for these members are the outward manifestation and fruit of the inner life of a religious teacher. The word, in the broad sense, is what excites outward movement; the word is an instrument of the soul. This can be not only an auditory symbol but also any other kind of symbol, any action, insofar as it is not only what it is in itself but also something greater, insofar as it is the visible body of some invisible soul, "the spark of the soul,"386 or a symbol.387 And since, of all words, the most meaningful word is one that is associated with logical content, one tends to accept the opinion of the majority of exegetes (Clement of Alexandria, Erasmus, Luther, de Bèze, Calvin, Grotius, Neander, de Wette, Meier, et al.) that the "materials" represent the doctrines taught by preachers.³⁸⁸

But, first of all, the "materials" are the preachers themselves in their empirical reality, i.e., people themselves, "every man" in his religious work (see 1 Cor. 3:13).

Here ends the first half of the Apostle's thought. Opposing to himself (the adversative *de* in 3:12: *ei de tis*) every other man (3:10: *ethēka*, *allos de*), the Apostle says, as it were: "As for me, my work, is done, and done

well, for it could not have been done in any other way. I laid the necessary and unique foundation. But let those who build on top of this foundation concern themselves with their own work, consider the choice of material." Why? Because "every man's work (ekastou to ergon) shall be made manifest" (1 Cor. 3:13). The material used in building on top of the foundation will disclose its nature, and the work of a whole life (and there is only one life!) can turn out to be nothing. "For the day shall declare it" (1 Cor. 3:13), i.e., the real value of the work. What "day"? Of course, the day of the absolute judgment of every human work, the Day of Judgment, the day of the coming of the Lord, the day of the trial by fire of all that is earthly. The author of the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles speaks of it:³⁸⁹ "Be vigilant," he advises, motivating his warning by the alarms of the last days; and then he adds: "Then the Tempter of the World will appear as the Son of God, and humankind will enter into the fire of trial (eis ten purōsin tēs dokimasias)," an expression possibly taken from 1 Cor. 3:13. This is "the evil day" (Eph. 6:13), "the day of temptation" (Heb. 3:8), "the day of visitation" (1 Pet. 2:12), "the hour of trial" (Rev. 3:10), etc., about which the Apostle Paul also speaks in Corinthians (1 Cor. 1:8; 4:5). Unquestionably, the word "day" has an eschatological meaning and, even if one takes it to mean "history," "time," or "moment of memory," as some exegetes have interpreted it, the context reflects an eschatological light upon these concepts, so that they appear as preparations to the Last Judgment.

The trial, says the Apostle, will be by fire. The word "fire" here is as much a metaphor as all the words about building. But the image of fire is encountered too often in Scripture as an expression God's all-penetrating and all-purifying judgment to permit one to see it merely as a figure of speech. By its nature, fire has some closer connection with this judgment, with the purifying wrath of God. For this reason it is said that the "Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven" and will "in flaming fire . . . [take] ... vengeance" (1 Thess. 1:7-8). Similarly, in Psalm 50:3, "Our God shall come, and shall not keep silence: a fire shall devour before him," after which the judgment on Israel is described. And the Son of Thunder was commanded to write to the angel of the church in Thyatira that the Lord's eyes were like "a flame of fire" (Rev. 2:18)—a sensation that by personal experience is excruciatingly familiar to everyone and that is experienced every time a spiritually higher man looks into one's soul, his gaze piercing the grotesque features of one's character. The Apostle even explains his thought: "because (hoti) it shall be revealed by fire (en puri apokaluptetai)." But what is the subject of "revealed"? What or who is revealed in fire? The subject could be "day," and then the translation will be: "the day of Christ is revealed by fire or with fire." Or (what gives almost the same result) the subject could be taken from verse 11, i.e., the

subject could be "Lord," and then one would get: "The Lord is revealed by fire" (Cf. 2 Thess. 1:7). If that is the case, the word "fire" definitively acquires a real character, and a tautegory therefore bursts through the allegory and the allegory imperceptibly passes into the thing itself. But both subjects yield the same meaning. One can also take the word apokaluptetai in an impersonal sense, so that the foregoing proposition is proved even more; the translation will then have a gnomic sense, a sense of general principle: "For, in general, it is precisely through fire that such a disclosure of the genuine nature of things occurs." This assumption provides a good explanation of the indefinite present apokaluptetai, which is sharply distinguished from the factual futures before (dēlōsei) and after (dokimasei) it. In essence, with this interpretation, the meaning of the whole verse remains the same as in the previous interpretations. But, in any case, one cannot accept that the subject is the word "work," which would give (to use Godet's expression) an "intolerable tautology"390 of the foregoing.

The end of verse 11 does not present any difficulties except in connection with the word *auto*. If one relates it to *to pur*, the translation would read: "the fire itself," i.e., the fire by virtue of its own nature. If, however, one relates it to *to ergon*, as the direct complement to *dokimasei*, one gets: the fire tries it [every man's work], so that its nature will become clear.

In the following verses (1 Cor. 3:14, 15), the possibility of a two-fold result of this trial by fire on the day of the Lord is depicted. "If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward" (1 Cor. 3:14). What work is it that abides? Having finished with a whole series of "current works," the Apostle surrenders himself to an inspired lyrical flight and, in his hymn to love (1 Cor. 13), he himself gives an answer to the question he has just posed: "And now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love (nuni de ménei pistis, elpis, agapē, ta tria tauta, meizōn de toutōn hē agapē)" (1 Cor. 13:13). "Abideth [again ménei!] faith, hope, love"—but primarily love. Man's work withstands the fiery eyes of the All-Seeing Judge (see Rev. 2:18), turns out to be genuinely valuable if it is built of faith, hope, and love, and primarily of love. A Christian's entire empirical personality should be woven of faith, hope, and love, and Christian society should be a reified triad of virtues.

This abides. But if a work is not such, it will be burned. The worker will "suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved; yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15).

The Apostle continues his figurative speech. A building built of poorquality material will catch fire, and its builder will not only lose recompense for his work but will himself run the risk of perishing together with the work of his hands. But this latter thing will not happen. The Apostle assures us that "he himself (autos)," i.e., the builder, unlike the work (to ergon), shall be saved, that is, he will be able to escape the building engulfed by fire.

The word sōthēsetai, "shall be saved," has been interpreted in different ways. But, against Chrysostom and ancient Greek interpreters, it is necessary to observe that sōzein means not "to preserve" in general, as, for example, in Gehenna for eternal punishment, as Chrysostom explains (tērēsetai³⁹¹ would then have been used), but precisely "to save" in the good sense of the word. This is also indicated by the opposition of the "work" and "himself", as well as by the expression dia puros, which is far from being identical with en puri, in fire, and is translated as "by fire" or "from fire." Thus, Strabon³⁹² has the expression *autos esōthē dia* nauagias ("himself saved from shipwreck") and Suidas³⁹³ has an analogous expression: dia machairon kai puros riptein chrē, di oxeias dramein (meaning: logchēs). Similarly, Isaiah 43:2 has "kai ean dielthēis meta sou eimi, kai ean dielethēis dia puros, ou me katakauthēis." However, a more common expression, used in votive inscriptions by travelers who had been saved from dangers, an expression that is equivalent to that just examined, is sotheis ek (with the genetive). This expression is quite frequently encountered, for example, in the Ptolemaic inscriptions discovered by Maspero.³⁹⁴

In the passage examined, the adversative de (verse 15) establishes a clear separation between the man "himself" and his "work." The work of every man will be subjected to a trial by fire, in which all that is impure and foul will be burned out, in the same way that gold and silver are purified by fire (Cf. Zech. 13:9; Mal. 3:2-3), in which the mysterious separation of the bad empirical personality from the God-created "image of God" and from the "likeness of God" will occur, i.e., in which the disclosure of this image, insofar as "he himself" (1 Cor. 3:15) has accomplished this, will occur.³⁹⁵ This fire is not punishment or vengeance but a necessary trial, a test, an investigation of how the man used the "foundation" given to him, the Divine condescension. It is a "proof" of the personality. If it turns out that the innermost image of God has not been disclosed in a concrete likeness of God, if the man has buried in the ground the image of God he has been given without using it, without adding to it, without deifying his selfhood, without proving himself, then the image of God will be taken away from his undeified selfhood. If his selfhood is transformed into the likeness of God, then the man will receive a "reward," the inner bliss of seeing in himself the likeness of God, the creative joy of an artist contemplating his own creation.

A foundation is given common to all: the unconditional deification^b of human nature in the person of Jesus Christ. And no one can lay any other

^b See note e on p. 94.

foundation. But the freedom of every man determines his character—what he builds "thereupon." The foundation is the saved point, the beginning of salvation revealed by Christ in each of us. It is the image of God, purified of original sin. In Himself, the Lord showed every man precisely himself as he is, in his incorruptible original beauty. As in a clean mirror, the Lord allowed every man to see the holiness of his own undesecrated image of God. In "Man" or the "Son of Man," the fullness of his own personality is revealed to every man. This provides the "apperceiving mass" for inner seekings; this point of light marks the direction for a wandering conscience. Outside of the contemplation in Christ of oneself and one's brother, one's conscience gropes along, tormented, thrown from side to side. In agony without escape, it wanders and compels one to wander rather than directing one toward a definite goal.

Outside of Christ, neither love of oneself nor love of others is possible, for, if such is sincere and not egotism wearing different clothes (a "beautiful virtue"397), it inevitably leads to epoche, to impotent agony. Conscience itself can err, and the greatest deeds of evil are due to temptation, to perverse impulses grounded in a wrongly directing conscience.³⁹⁸ For us, in empirical human givenness, there is nothing absolute, even conscience. Conscience itself must be checked and corrected against an absolute standard. But the subordination of conscience to a formula, even if given from above, would be the annihilation of the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the person, of his absolute value. The holiness of the person lies precisely in his living freedom, in the being above all schemata. A person can and must correct himself—but not according to a norm that is external to himself, even if it be the most perfect norm. Rather, he must correct himself only according to the way he himself is in his ideal form. The standard for a person must be he himself and only he himself, because otherwise it would be possible to conclude mechanically from what is alien to and outside the person to his life, and to give him norms in this mechanical manner. The uniqueness of every person, his absolute irreplaceability by anything else, requires that he himself be the standard for himself; but in order to be a standard it is necessary to have already attained an ideal state. In order to become a saint it is necessary to be a saint: it is necessary to pull oneself up by one's own hair. This is possible in Christ, Who, in His Flesh, shows to every man God's idea of him. This is possible only through experience, through personal communion, through the unceasing scrutiny of the Face of Christ, through the finding of one's genuine self, one's genuine humanity, in the Son of Man. 399

The foregoing can be clarified by yet another consideration: The philosophical ideal, i.e., the abstract, expressed, communicated ideal, is a universal-human ideal, an ideal for all. But this schema (though it is designed

for all but for this reason external to all) is a deadening Procrustean bed, intended for all but not adapted to anyone. By contrast, a lofty person, a hero, a wise man, even a saint, is (if we take his human perfection) the ideal only of himself, but not a complete ideal even here. For others he is indifferent, for otherwise it would be necessary to imitate blindly another's personality. One might say: "What does it matter to me what is good for Peter or John? I live my life in my own way and follow my own path, marked on the earth by God's finger." The first ideal is necessary or, in its limit, should be necessary, but, as a formal ideal, it is inapplicable to any concrete person. The second ideal is concrete, but it is therefore accidental and not connected with every person. Only the Lord Jesus Christ is the ideal of every man, i.e., not an abstract concept, not an empty norm of humanity in general, not the schema of every person, but an image, the idea of every person with all his living content. He is not a worn-out moral rule, 400 but neither is he a model to be copied.401 He is the beginning of a new life, which, once it is received in the heart from Him, then develops according to its own laws. Not only preserving his personal freedom and distinctive character but reacquiring them as perfected, a man receives life, which transforms or, according to the parable (Matt. 13:33; Luke 13:21), "leavens" his empirical personality, the "meal," according to the image of God in him.

In Christ every man receives a "foundation," the foundation proper to him, the genuine "himself." And if he has built on this "foundation" poorly and not according to himself, what has been built "thereupon" will burn in front of the eyes of the One who embodies in Himself the fullness of his ideal. But, according to the Apostle, despite the destruction of the "work," despite the fire that has engulfed the whole man, "he himself" will be saved. In underscoring the word "despite," I wish to point out the decisive divergence of the view on judgment expounded here from the Catholic doctrine of purgatory, where a man is saved not despite but thanks to the torment of purification. Therefore, according to the Apostle Paul, it is not man in his whole makeup who is saved but only "he himself," his God-created "in himself," while according to the Catholic doctrine the whole man is saved, but only after having rethought his life and changed for the better under the disciplinary punishment of purgatory. The profoundly mysterious and suprarational metaphysical act of the separation of two aspects of being ("in himself" and "for himself") is transformed, in the vulgar representation of Catholic purgatory, into something psychological and completely understandable: justification through torment and education through punishment.

In the next verse (1 Cor. 3:16), the Apostle hurries to explain why "he himself shall be saved." Because you, believers, he writes to the Corinthians, "are the temple of God" and the "temple of God is holy," and the Spirit of God dwells in this temple. What is holy cannot perish, disappear,

or abide in fire. What is given by Christ to man as man cannot perish. Otherwise the *image of God* would perish. But this image *must* abide. The holy abides; man's holy essence is saved. But its "work" can perish for this essence. That work, that result of inner activity which is produced by "he himself" over the course of his life will perish, or rather it will be perishing ceaselessly in the eternal moment of burning. The entire content of consciousness will perish to the extent that it is not from faith, hope, and love. "He himself (autos) shall be saved," the naked God-consciousness without self-consciousness, for self-consciousness without concrete content, without consciousness of one's own self-activity, is only pure possibility. Self-consciousness is consciousness of one's own creativity, one's own activity. And, in becoming separated from "he himself," man's "work," his self-consciousness will become a pure illusion, eternally burning, eternally perishing. It will become a foul dream without a dreaming subject pierced by God's burning gaze, a nightmare seen by nobody. This "work" exists only subjectively, as a naked "for itself." The element of "in itself" is decisively absent in it. For every "he himself," there is absolutely no such "work," no such selfhood, for it is absolutely deprived of objective being. "Selfhood" without "self" is an excruciating mirage that arises in the emptiness of non-being. It is a "weeping and gnashing of teeth," which is not heard by anyone, as though it were an unceasing hallucination of Nothing, not existing for anyone. It is an eternally burning and eternally perishing unreality. It is total metaphysical $m\bar{e}$ on. And all that is real is holy, for, according to the author of The Instruction for the Moral Life (once attributed to Athanasius the Great), "holy is he who is pure of evil and sins." 402 And such precisely is Godcreated reality.

This is something we experience to a certain degree even now. In becoming immersed in sin, we lose the sense of objectively real existence. In becoming immersed in sin, the spirit forgets itself, loses itself, disappears for itself. We hear the testimony of the Church: "The final abyss of sins engulfs me, and my spirit disappears."403 Selfhood stings itself with its sin, but the chief torment consists in the fact that to itself selfhood appears as something subjectless. Selfhood loses firm ground and begins to whirl about, closing up in itself like an eddy of dust in hot air. "Bound by ropes of passions," selfhood is a prisoner of the law of sin. Sin now is no longer just an arbitrary act but the very essence or matter of selfhood, and selfhood is wholly determined by sin. Not seeing anything except the sin that lies at its basis, selfhood can only suffer torment but it cannot tear itself out of the fiery wheel of growing sinfulness. Only the objective contemplation of "itself" (the "he himself" of 1 Cor. 3:15) in the person of Jesus Christ allows selfhood to become conscious of its state and move toward the true path, which has flashed like soundless summer lightning, to move toward the finding of itself.

In 2 Cor. 5:1–3, an idea connected with this is developed: "If our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked."

In the text analyzed previously, it was stated that "he himself" will be saved, but after having lost his "work," his life as a work of art, that temple, if you will, which the person has built for himself, that clothing which the person has put on, having woven it for himself in the course of his earthly life. But when a person with his earthly temple, with his earthly clothing, will come to stand before the flaming eyes of Christ, when he will hear the word of God, cutting like a two-edged sword (see Rev. 2:12), then, if it is unfit, this clothing will, by a mysterious act, catch fire and become separated from "he himself," and the temple will be destroyed. Losing this earthly clothing when he puts on the clothing that is in Christ (Cf. Rev. 3:5; 4:4; 6:11; 7:13, 14), when he puts on his ideal which pre-existed in the body of the Lord, "he himself" can turn out to be naked, will acutely feel his nakedness and poverty, his beggarly state, in the same way that a beggar is "naked" even if he has put on an ermine but borrowed cloak. A beggar is naked in his consciousness, and this nakedness is only emphasized, is only intensified, becomes only all the more noticeable because of the splendor of the clothing given to him but not woven by him, not earned by him. Each one of us begins to be conscious of himself as naked in this life when, at evening prayer, he prays with the words of St. Macarius the Great: "Be merciful to me, a sinner and naked of all good works."404

"Nakedness" and "clothedness" as mystico-metaphysical categories are encountered at every step in the spiritual literature, both Christian and non-Christian. Lucian of Samosata's dialogue "Charon and the Shades" (from the series Dialogues of the Dead405) provides an interesting illustration of this idea of empirical character as the metaphysical clothing of "he himself" and, based on this, the metaphysical nakedness of the sinner after judgment upon him. Before ferrying them to the other world, Charon forces souls to disrobe and to leave all their excess things ("works," according to the Apostle) on the earthly side. Mercury-Psychopompos must keep watch that no soul board the boat who has not cast everything from itself; shades have to discard everything. The lover of women must leave beauty. The emperor must leave his imperial raiment, riches, pride, and contempt for people, the crown and purple, inhumanity, insanity, superciliousness, wrath, and so forth. The rich man loses his trophies of victory and his corpulent body. The nobleman is left without his family tree, without honors and monuments in his honor. The general is deprived of his triumphs and trophies. The philosopher leaves behind

his cloak, all the learned nonsense that clutters up his soul, his ignorance, arrogance, empty words, lies, and sly questions together with his muddled intellectualizing. In other words, he leaves behind the vanity, insanity, and pettiness that consist of gold coins, shamelessness, life without restraint and idleness, deceit, airs of importance, a belief in one's own superiority, and finally, his beard, frowns, flattery, and so on. Face to face with eternity, everyone must take off everything corruptible and become naked. This makes the emptiness of a soul that has lost most of its content understandable.

The idea of rationally unintelligible separation and sundering is encountered in many passages in the Holy Scripture. I will cite only a few.

Thus, the Lord of the parable will return to his house unexpectedly and will "cut asunder" the unprofitable servant, who was made "ruler over his household," and will "appoint him his portion with the hypocrites: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth" (Matt. 24:51). This "cut him asunder" (dichotomēsei auton) is very significant: it is not said that the lord will "kill" or "execute" him; it is not said that he will "chop him into pieces," and so on. Rather, it is said that he will precisely "cut him in two (dichotomēsei)." We find exactly the same thing in Luke 12:46: "and will cut him in sunder, and will appoint him his portion with the unbelievers." Origen interprets this saying of the Savior precisely in this ontological sense: "The Gospel says of evil servants that they must be cut asunder, and part of them must be placed with the unfaithful. In other words, the part that is no longer their own, as it were, must be sent to another place. This saving unquestionably indicates the special kind of punishment of those whose spirit must be separated from the soul."406 Indeed, this must mean the mystical separation of the human being into two, into "he himself" and his "work," especially since it is a question here not of the unfaithful or hypocrites but of God's servants, who did not rule over their household. "He that laveth up treasure for himself. and is not rich toward God" (Luke 12:21), he who is not rich in good works (see 1 Tim. 6:18)—such a one loses his treasure and with it his heart, which is attached to his treasure (Matt. 6:21; Luke 12:34). Every impure thought, every idle word, every evil deed, everything whose source is not God, everything whose roots are not fed by the water of eternal life and is inwardly condemned because it does not conform with the Ideal which is in Christ and because it is incapable of receiving the Spirit—all this will be torn out of the formed empirical person, out of human selfhood. The Lord said, "every plant, which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up" (Matt. 15:13). Christ's forerunner, John the Baptist, also preached the necessity of spiritual fruit-bearing: "And now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees: therefore every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire" (Matt. 3:10). But until this judgment, the chaff planted by the enemy is allowed to grow freely together with the wheat, and the barren fig tree is allowed to be as green as a fruit-bearing tree.

Such (though voluntary) cutting off, or uprooting, of the sinful part from the empirical person is necessary even in this life, before this part infects all the other parts. This is like the amputation of a gangrenous member. Thus, regarding lust, it is said: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell" (Matt. 5:29-30. Cf. Matt. 18:8–9). At the service of the "Week of the Prodigal Son," when the soul suddenly awakens from its sinful hibernation, when it recalls its heavenly homeland, and, having scrutinized itself, suddenly, as if in a flash of lightning, understands that it has corrupted itself and that it is one great sinful sore—during this week of the anticipation of God's Dread Judgment we receive in church this same idea of separation, clothed in the image of the winnowing of the grain from the chaff. All that I have done turns out to be illusory, and there is nothing solid. The refined images of the sticheron unroll before us:

Having sowed sin in a sinless, living land, having harvested with the sickle the ears of laziness, and tied the sheaves of my acts, I did not spread them on the threshing floor of contrition: but I implore Thee, eternal God Who created us, scatter the weeds of my works with the wind of Thy mercy, and preserve the wheat of my soul, holding me meanwhile in Thy heavenly grange, and save me.⁴⁰⁷

At the first week of Lent, when each and all must become monks; when for inner work, i.e., for the regeneration of self, "the favorable time has come"; when "a light-creating time that the Father of lights has given comes," i.e., a time of the creation of light in one's entire person—during this great time of universal monasticism, the sinful soul with loud wail implores Him Who tore apart even the Church veil for its sake:

We cry:

Tear apart the woeful vestment of our passions, so that we can put on the Divine garment.⁴⁰⁸

Even in this life the evil, lustful side of selfhood must be "cut off" and "cast away." Even in this life the "chaff of works" must be winnowed.

Even in this life "the woeful vestment of passions" must be torn apart. The sinful "work," separated from "he himself," is cast out of God's domain, out of being, and is pushed to the edge of being, into the agony of eternal annihilation, into the region of the icy and fiery second death, into "outer darkness," the darkness "outside" of God about which Scripture speaks so often. The "unprofitable servant" (Matt. 25:14-30) who did not put the talent received by him to the exchangers but returned it to his Lord, i.e., an honest man but one who did not create a lofty empirical personality on the Divine foundation, is deprived by the Lord of even that which was given to him. And then the Lord commands that the servant be cast "into outer darkness," where "there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth," i.e., agony and impotent fury which is accessible to no perception, for it is "outside" of perception and is nobody's. For that valuable thing that the servant possessed, his talent, remains in the Lord's hands, and only his unprofitable selfhood, unfit for the Kingdom, is (like the guest without the wedding garment in the parable of the wedding feast, Matt. 22:12-13) cast into outer darkness. Both Jesus Christ's decisive saying about the eternity of torment for people who do not love (see Matt. 25:31-46) and the Bridegroom's saying to the foolish maidens who "took no oil" of deified flesh with them (Matt. 25: 1–14) (for the spiritbearing person full of grace is deified flesh), and therefore were left outside, outside the festive chamber, both sayings have as their aim the mathematically precise expression of how the selfhood of the condemned man perceives the judgment, of his subjective experience of this judgment, not of the metaphysical state of affairs. These savings refer not to the domain of being but to the domain of non-being, which exists only for itself. For selfhood cast out of the Kingdom it could not be otherwise, for the entire self-consciousness of wicked will is cast out, into the fiery darkness of the black and nonluminous fire of Gehenna.

That is how it is subjectively. But objectively, for the Existent One, God, and for the existent ones, the righteous, "he himself" was saved, having passed through a moment of fiery surgery, but he was saved naked, in the state of the pure potentiality of self-consciousness. This moment of terrible seeing of the Holy Face of Christ, Who burns selfhood the way fire burns chaff, is engraved forever as a fixed idea in selfhood, which is no longer creative, for it does not have the substantial foundation of "he himself." And the entire further fate of this illusory selfhood is determined by the fixed idea of its own sin and the fiery torment of the Truth. Neither exists *objectively*; both are purely subjective. But, not having creativity, since it does not have "self," or substance, selfhood is nevertheless wholly filled with them and cannot even in thought abstract itself from them, stand above them, for a *creative* act is necessary for this, which is also why selfhood cannot annihilate itself. Selfhood's being is exhausted by its "psychic content." Selfhood corresponds to the "soul" as it is

viewed by the empirical school of psychology. Selfhood is only a psychic phenomenon without a noumenon, a frozen appearance without what appears. Somewhat analogous to this is the consciousness of a man to whom a posthypnotic suggestion has been made. Henceforth selfhood is forever the illusorily existing, self-conscious idea of self-assertive sin and torment. In the next age the sowing wind of sins will reap a tempest of passions, and one who is caught up in the vortex of sin will not stop being whirled about by it and will be unable to escape from it. Even his thoughts will not be able to escape from it, for there will be no dispassionate point of reference. Selfhood is now given to itself blindly, for it has blinded itself by having despised purity of heart. The horror lies precisely in the fact that insane selfhood, selfhood that has lost its mind, will not be able to understand what is happening to it: all is only "here and now." Dostoevsky represents this thought artistically in a dialogue between Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov, who has plunged to satanical depths and become corrupted to the depths of his heart:

"I do not believe in life after death," said Raskolnikov. Meanwhile, Svidrigailov sat pensively.

"But what if there are only spiders or something of that sort there," he suddenly said.

He's crazy, Raskolnikov thought.

"We always conceive of eternity as an idea that cannot be understood, as something enormous, enormous! But why should it necessarily be enormous? And suddenly, instead of all this, imagine that all there will be is a single small room, something like a country bathhouse, covered with soot, and with spiders in all the corners. You know, sometimes, I conceive all of eternity to be something of this sort."

"Can it really be that you don't conceive anything more comforting and more just than that?" Raskolnikov cried out, his voice betraying inner torment (before this, he did not wish to converse with Svidrigailov).

"More just? How do we know, perhaps that is more just, and, do you know, I would in fact deliberately arrange it like that," Svidrigailov answered, smiling strangely.

Raskolnikov was embraced by a sensation of cold when he heard this grotesque answer.⁴⁰⁹

Such is Gehenna: the sole reality in an own consciousness and *nothing* in God's consciousness and in that of the righteous. Do we feel any sorrow about cut fingernails or even about amputated limbs? So, the righteous feel no sorrow about eternally burning selfhoods, which exist just as little for them as the unknown thoughts of other people exist for us. No sorrow can be felt about what is essentially inaccessible to anyone's per-

ception. Selfhood has received what it has desired and what it continues to desire: to be a kind of absolute, to be independent of God, to assert itself against God. To selfhood is given this independence, this absolute negative freedom of egotism. It desired to be alone, and it became alone; it desired isolation, and it became isolated. Henceforth, neither God nor anything else except it itself will affect it. Selfhood is "like God." But since it has no creativity (all creativity is in God and only in God), it is a slave to itself in its accidental content. It is possessed by the finite.

The thoughts revealed here are also contained in Mark 9:43–49, but with a certain addition important for us. This passage reads:

- 43. If thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched:
 - 44. Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.
- 45. And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched:
 - 46. Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.
- 47. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hellfire:
 - 48. Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.
- 49. For everyone shall be salted with fire, and every sacrifice shall be salted with salt.

Here, the "work" of "he himself" is the *body*. The unprofitable part of the body, corresponding to the combustible material of the building (see 1 Cor. 3:13), is the offending member. It is better to pluck it out or cut it off in time than to subject the whole body, i.e., the whole empirical person, to danger. And the undying "worm" of this offending member, i.e., the worm of sinful self-consciousness, will eternally eat away at the cutaway member. The unceasing flame of pain from separation with the body will constantly devour it.

Historically, the image of the "undying worm" is explained in the Talmud, according to which the souls of sinners are punished by having worms devour their dead bodies. In the treatise *Berachoth* it is said: "A worm is just as tormenting for a dead man as a pin in the flesh is for a living man. Sorrow and grief greatly burden a soul when it sees that its body—once its vessel and refuge—is devoured inwardly and destroyed by a worm, so that even a perfectly just man is afraid of such agony."

The "work" is threatened by eternal destruction, the eternal agony of the second death. Thus it will be, for "every one" (i.e., "he himself"; cf. "every man" in 1 Cor. 3:10) "shall be salted with fire," i.e., will acquire

through fire a purified being, incapable of decomposing or being devoured by worms, while for a rotting member such salting is death. And what earlier was designated by the Apostle as the deprivation of award ("he shall suffer loss") or the deprivation of clothing ("so . . . we shall not be found naked") is characterized here as a maimed state, as the deprivation of a member. This is the imperfection of self-consciousness to the highest degree, with a will that is called "satanical." This is an imperfection that is equal to the zero of "being for itself." The latter is possible in the case of the total falling away from the Life-giving Spirit, in the case of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, i.e., in the case of conscious opposition to the Truth, whose Bearer is the Holy Spirit: "All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven unto men. And whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come" (Matt. 12:31-32). Denial of the Truth as the Truth leads to the complete separation between "he himself" and "selfhood," i.e., to the death of the soul, the second death, just as the separation between the soul and the body is the death of the body, the first death. "He which converteth the sinner from the error of his way shall save a soul from death" (James 5:20), and it is therefore necessary to pray for him; but if a man deliberately and consciously goes to his death, if his sin is "a sin unto death" (1 John 5:16, 17), then even prayer is vain.

The Word of God is the sword that will cut the human being asunder (Heb. 4:12; Cf. Rev. 1:16: "out of his mouth went a sharp twoedged sword"). God's gaze here is the fire that annihilates every sin (Rev. 1:14; 2:18; 1:5): the word-sword and the gaze-flame pierce into the most hidden depths of creation; "and his tongue [is] as a devouring fire" (Is. 30:27). The image of burning is constantly repeated in the language of Scripture, and in this image it is impossible to see a simple, haphazard comparison. On the contrary, the notion of burning is accompanied by an essential sign: the sign of eternity. "To burn" but not to be "consumed"—that is "eternal burning." If for the existent one, for "he himself," the eternity of torments consists in their instant that is absolute according to content, the instant when sin and God's gaze touch (and they cannot touch for more than an instant), then for the nonexistent this eternity is an unceasing continuation into bad infinity, an extension, absurd and nonexistent-in-itself, of the dying of evil selfhood into the infinitude of purely inner, no-longer-restrained lust. Being an evil absoluteness and a total independence from everything, as selfhood wants it, and at the same time not having creative activity, this selfhood is deprived of both external and internal motives to stop, to put a limit to its lust. Left to itself, selfhood becomes its own slave, and, in the naked self-identity of the sinful I, it whirls senselessly like a vortex of dust, eternally impotent

and never stopping in the darkness of nonbeing and torment. "Ye shall be as gods" has finally been achieved!

Who if not pagans would know about the *illusoriness* of existence beyond the grave and about the bad infinity of the torments of Gehenna? Not knowing during life the liberation from the power of this vortex of selfhood, from the agonizing work of Gehenna, they expressed this experience with an astonishing plasticity in many of images of hell. "The very punishments are expressed in such a form," observes an investigator of Greek ideas of life after death, "that more than anything else they point here to the vanity and the sterility of the eternal efforts of the one punished to attain some goal most important for him, a sterility that clearly implies the vanity of all human efforts and strivings during man's earthly existence."

The Danaids, condemned after death for the murder of fifty men, in Hades eternally and fruitlessly carrying water into a bottomless, neverfilled barrel; Ochnos with an ass ceaselessly eating a rope, the fruit of his ceaseless labor (according to Bachofen, 412 these symbols have a sexual significance, the first of female receptivity, the second of male productivity, and if that is really the case, the images of the Danaids and Ochnos become particularly instructive); the bound Tityus whose liver is ceaselessly being devoured by a vulture and is ceaselessly growing back (the same thing happens to Prometheus); Ixion whirling in a fiery wheel of insatiable passion⁴¹³; Tantalus, tormented by thirst and hunger, but only teased by the sight of cold water that runs away from him and tree branches with golden fruits that rise too high for him; Sisyphus, vainly rolling a heavy rock up a mountain, a rock which at the very top breaks away and starts rolling back towards the plain; the "apparition" of Hercules with a stretched bow, suddenly looking back, with the constant intention of shooting, 414 and so on—these are images that are ever-important for the ascetic, images whose content shows us by way of contrast the kind of gift the Christian has received from the Lord.

Even more graphic is the Hindu expression of the bad infinity of passion in Gehenna and its insatiability in the image of hellish monsters, the pretas. Buddhists say that the pretas are eternally hungry monsters with thick heads, furious looks, and enormous stomachs which are never filled, with members thin as a skeleton's, naked, overgrown with hair, with lips and mouths thin as the eye of a needle. They hunger and thirst eternally. Not more than once in a hundred-thousand years do they hear the word "water" and when they find it it turns into filth before them. Some of them devour sparks of fire, others devour corpses or their own bodies, but they cannot be sated because of their narrow mouths. "It appears," remarks Bishop Chrysanthus, "that in these pitiful beings the Buddhist imagination wished to embody the notion of that thirst for being which leads to passion and serves as the cause of the degenerations

themselves—this evil of life. The eternal thirst for being is never slaked."415

The idea of the bad infinity of this burning in the fire of Gehenna is clearly expressed in John 15:5–6: "I am the vine, ye are the branches," says the Lord. "If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch [not bringing forth fruit; see 15:4–5], and is withered; and men gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned." He who does not abide in Jesus Christ will be cast forth and will be withered, i.e., will be subjected to the mysterious cutting away from the Root of Life and, therefore, being deprived of the juices of being, of the Holy Spirit, he will also lose the creative function of growth, self-creation in Christ. He will become deadened and wither in mono-ideism, frozen in the eternal contemplation of sin and torment. Heretofore we have been in the domain of being. But now we approach the necessary consequences of the process, which now occurs at the edge of being: branches are gathered and cast into the fire, and they burn.

In the textual sense, one can explain the present time of these forms as a "presens sententiae," i.e., one can interpret the passage under consideration as the general idea of the constant connection of phenomena, the idea of "in general." But even if this were the case, this "in general," like every "in general," is only an expression of bad infinity proper to the phenomenon, i.e., the expression of some long and infinitely excruciating "now."

For the cast-away selfhood, the process of casting-away is an eternal, frozen "now," which never becomes the past. For itself, the selfhood is eternally being cast out of the Kingdom, cast into the fire, where it is burned, although neither the casting-away nor the fire exists and they are seen by selfhood in a mere dream. All is good, all is perfect, all is holy, and God is all in all. But evil selfhood has become frozen in a terrible and disgusting vision. Proud anger arouses and incenses selfhood. In impotent fury and torment, with weeping and gnashing of teeth, selfhood shakes its fist, and at whom? At God and the righteous. But neither selfhood nor its torment exists, and the former subject of their torment—"he himself" has long forgotten that he once had an eye that offended him, an eye that he plucked out and cast away from himself. Only phantasmagoric "dreams of shadows" and dark "shadows of dreams" swarm about in Gehenna, to use Pindar's eloquent words. It would be foolish to think that pre-Christian ideas of life after death were a complete invention. Jews with their idea of sheol, Greeks with their Hades, and other peoples spoke the truth about what they knew, but they only knew—if darkly existence outside of God, the falling-away from God. That is why mankind without grace was, is, and will be metaphysically characterized by what Euripides thought of death. In his eyes death was the total annihilation of him who before was called man. And he who before birth was

nothing is again by dying nothing more—in terms of personal existence—than nothing:

to mēden eis ouden reipei,416

i.e., to mēden, apparent, illusory being or half-being, grace-less and therefore half-real existence, passes into pure nonbeing, into pure nothing, into ouden. This is the person's sense of himself. As far as concepts are concerned, the belief in the soul's immortality was widespread of course. But what is significant is precisely the fact that this concept of existence after death becomes filled with the experience of its illusoriness and emptiness. This is precisely gehennic being. Such is also the experience of modern pagans. A sinner's thoughts, they say, "are an echo of his gloomy soul. The vibration of these thoughts forms dark, painful currents above him in space."417 "Hell is the home for the insane of the universe, where people will be persecuted by memories,"418 a place of excruciating and insatiable desires. The soul is in agony like an enflamed and thirsting throat, but there is no satisfaction. Thus, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, the piercing cry of the rich man tears the ears: "Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this flame" (Luke 16:24).

The idea of purifying fire passes like a scarlet thread throughout the entire New Testament. But let me now direct your attention to Matt. 3:11. The context before verse 11 is as follows: Pharisees and Sadducees come to John the Baptist (verse 7). John points out to them the need for repentance, the need to cast away from themselves all that is offensive, in order to avoid "the wrath to come." And he threatens them with a certain *fire* (let us designate it by the letter A) into which "every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit" is cast. This is the same thing that in other places was called a fruitless branch, unfit clothing, a building made of bad material, and so on. John also threatens them with an "axe," which is equivalent to the "twoedged sword" in another place.

Repentance is to be followed by a new purifying process: "I... baptize you with water unto repentance: but he that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear; he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, and with fire" (let us designate this fire by the letter B). A "fan" [as an instrument of separation and purification, it has roughly the same meaning as the axe and sword] "is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat [= "he himself"] into the garner [the "Heavenly Jerusalem," a "habitation," etc.]; but he will burn up the chaff [= fruitless branches, etc.] with unquenchable fire" (let us designate this by the letter C).

What is the nature of this fire? Fire A = fire C as burning that consumes what has already been cast away, what has been expelled into "outer darkness," like chaff during winnowing. Both fires consume what is in-

compatible with being in God, what does not have the density of being, what is expelled from the interior of the Life of the Trinity as a cork is pushed up out of water. But fire B appears to have totally different properties. Clearly, this is not the inextinguishable fire of torment but a purifying fire, a fire that separates what is God's from what is absolutely outside of God. In other words, fire B is the same fire that completes the baptismal process, separating "he himself" from unnatural, un-Godly accretions on top of it. It is the fire that salts every sacrifice (see Mark 9:49). What is the nature of this fire? It is not given in baptism. It is never spoken of in connection with the actual rite of baptism, and only the Apostles were baptized by tongues of fire. The Spirit of Christ, coming to sinful creatures, will be that fire of trial which will purify everything, save everything, and fill everything with itself. But that which is the instant of purification (fire B) for "he himself" will be the fire of torment (fires A and C) for sinful selfhood. Both of these fires are different aspects of one and the same Divine revelation, the revelation of the Comforter to creation. The eternal bliss of "he himself" and the eternal torment of "selfhood"—these are the antinomically conjugate sides of the final, or Third, Testament. Thus, the Revelation of the Eternal Truth is revealed in the double aspect of salvation and perdition, light and darkness, spirituality and Gehenna.

An important *agraphon* or nonscriptural saying of the Savior has been preserved in which this duality of God-revelation is wholly clear. In this *agraphon* the Lord says: "He who is near Me is near fire, whereas he who is far from Me is far from the Kingdom." In other words, One and the Same Lord gives the Kingdom and burns everything that is unworthy. For the worthy, the Spirit of Christ is the Kingdom, while for the unworthy this Spirit is a fire.

We find this agraphon in Origen's Commentaries on Jeremiah (preserved in the Latin translation by St. Jerome) and in Didymus' Commentaries on the 88th Psalm. Since both Origen and Didymus were Alexandrians, one can postulate the influence of some local source, especially since no other church writer refers to this agraphon. One can further postulate that this source was the locally venerated Gospel of the Egyptians.

Origen and Didymus give roughly the same interpretation of the Savior's words as we gave above. Here are Origen's words:

"The Savior says: 'He who is near Me is near fire, whereas he who is far from Me is far from the Kingdom.' He who is near Me is near salvation as well as being near fire. And he who listens to Me but distorts what he has heard, that one will become a vessel prepared for perdition, because he who is near me is near fire. And if someone, being afraid of the fact that he who is near me is near fire, steps far away from me in order not to be near fire, then this one has thus stepped far away from the Kingdom. And just as an athlete who is not entered in a competition is not afraid of the whip but also does not

expect the crown; but one who has entered his name is whipped if defeated and crowned if victorious, so he who enters the Church—listen, O catechumen—and approaches the word of God is one who has entered the competition. If he does not compete as required, he will be beaten with whips that do not beat those who are not entered at the beginning. But if he fights craftily to avoid blows and punishments, not only will he be spared injury but he will receive the incorruptible crown of glory."⁴¹⁹

The view of Didymus the Blind († 396) is similar: "Imposing punishments on his enemies, the Lord is terrible. For if anyone approaches him owing to the fact that he has received the Divine teaching, then by his sinfulness he turns out to be near this fire. It is for this reason that the Savior says: 'He who is near Me is near fire, whereas he who is far from Me is far from the Kingdom.' And now, therefore, He says to those who do not heed his commandments that He is 'terrible and great' for those who turn away from His virtue."

Such is the dual action, or "polarization," of grace. The heart of the matter is the all-too-well-known truth that God is not only good but also terrible, terrible precisely because of His unbearable goodness, this "scourge of love" for everyone who violates His Holy Truth. Just as one and the same flame lights and warms some while burning and exposing others with its light, so the Triradiant Lamp is "light for some and fire for others, depending upon what matter and what qualities it encounters in each person." For some, God's grace makes burning heat feel "like dew," while for others, it "burns" even in the cool of the day. If "our belly cleaveth unto the earth" (Ps.44:25), then every ascent is painful, for it tears the "belly" from the "earth," tears the "earth" out of our heart. The sun that shines for the clear-sighted soaring Eagle blinds the underground mole whose eyes are half-atrophied from lack of use. Thus it is sung in church:

Night dark to the unfaithful but illumination for the faithful, O Christ, by the sweetness of Thy words.⁴²⁴

The idea of the "polarization" of grace is expressed most clearly and consistently in the Office before the Holy Communion. Here, in essence, a single idea serves as the foundation: "Thou art the fire that burns what is unworthy." The garment of worldly vanity, worn indecently to the wedding feast, can turn out to be the shirt of Deianira. Thus, we read the following in the parable of the called and the chosen: And "when the king came in to see the guests, he saw there a man which had not on a wedding garment: And he saith unto him, Friend, how camest thou in hither not having a wedding garment? And he was speechless. Then said the king to the servants. Bind him hand and foot, and take him away, and cast him into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth" (Matt.

22:11–13). The palace of the wedding feast is the medium of the Spirit; the garment is the empirical person, the binding of hands and feet is the deprivation of creative activity. Thus, grace is a source of illumination for but causes the blinding of others. This ambivalence of the power of grace is also expressed by the figure of the "stone." "The stone which the builders refused is become the headstone of the corner" (Ps. 118:22 = Matt. 21:42 = Luke 20:17). This stone is the basis of the equilibrium of the whole building of the Church, ⁴²⁵ of the whole medium of spiritual life or salvation. "Whosoever shall fall upon that stone shall be broken: but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder" (Luke 20:18 = Matt. 21:44).

Finally, how is the view expounded here on the existence after death of sinners related to the usual views, on the one hand, and to the Origenistic views, on the other? In other words, how do this thesis and this antithesis, which together form the antinomy of Gehenna, enter into the view expounded? I think that this view is an antinomic synthesis of the two. It is not a moderation or weakening of the thesis and antithesis, but rather their strengthening and intensification. Both are brought to their extreme of development, are taken in their idea.

The sequence of the development of the two views can be represented visually in the form of two columns. The view formed in the synthesis would be their architrave.

The first group of ideas begins with the idea of the absolute character of evil: "All are condemned; all will perish." That was approximately the view expounded in Russia by Konstantin Leontyev. 426c The next stage is the popular representation of hell, where sinners lick red-hot frying pans and boil forever in pots filled with tar. 427 This view evolves into the sub-

^c Konstantin Leontyev (1831–91) has been called a Russian Nietzsche. George L. Kline writes that "[f]or Leontyev, aesthetic values were decisively superior to moral, social, or economic values. An early statement by a character in one of his novels dramatizes the point: 'A single century-old, magnificent tree is worth more than twenty faceless men.' Much later, in criticizing European technology, Leontyev added: 'intensification of movement does not in itself indicate intensification of life. The machine runs but the living tree stands firm." (G. Kline, in the article "Leontyey, Konstantin Nikolayevich" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy [New York, 1967], Vol. 4, p. 436). Leontyev attacked what he saw as "a gradual grinding down of the brilliance and intensity of earlier times under the massive pressure of modern mediocrity, reinforced by the egalitarian drift of advanced technology" (ibid.). He attacked "European secular humanism, 'anthropolatry,' and the utilitarian-egalitarian mania democratica progressiva as being destructive of hierarchy, unity in diversity, the 'despotism of form' . . . and the free creativity of strong individuals" (ibid.). He attacked an individualism that was "bourgeois, security-minded, self-enclosed, and egalitarian," and defended one that was "aristocratic, risk-seeking, 'open,' and hierarchical" (ibid.). Despite all their similarities, Leontyev and Nietzsche did diverge on one important issue, as Kline points out (see "The Potential Contribution of Classical Russian Philosophy to the Building of a Humane Society in Russia Today," p. 10, a paper presented at the Conference on Russian Thought and Culture, University of Oregon, May 2, 1994). Leontyev repudiated Nietzsche's Ferstenliebe ("love for the high culture of the remote historical future") and instead defended Nachstenliebe (love of one's neighbor).

tler representation of the *inner* source of the torments of hell, of agony due to a too-late repentance and to one's distance from God. That is the view of some ascetics. Finally, all the torments reduce to the "scourge of God's love" and to repentance, 428 to the shameful feeling of one's unworthiness, of the undeservedness of bliss. 429 But some of the Mount Athos^d ascetics believe that this is just a light shadow of summer clouds that will glide away and disappear from the spiritual horizon. This is one group of views.

The second group also begins with the affirmation that everything human is indifferent, but it sees everything not in the black tones of demonism but in the rosy tones of pantheism. The adherents of this position maintain that, in essence, everything human is so shallow that everyone is right, and everything is good. Vulgar Origenism (of which, by the way, the "adamantine" Alexandrian is not at all guilty) has its source in this state of indifference. But, according to such Origenism, the doctrine of hell contains a secret, and "clever people" understood this Divine slyness long ago. This slyness consists in the fact that, in reality, there is, "of course," no hell and never will be. God will forgive everyone and is now "frightening" sinners only to make them reform. ⁴³⁰

Next in the sequence is true Origenism, according to which the torments after death serve to educate persons and partly as retribution for their sins. Having passed through a succession of many existences in many worlds, the soul is finally reformed and receives forgiveness. The doctrine of purifying fire in both Gregories—Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa leads to an even higher stage. The torments after death are only a necessary surgery, reforming the soul. As a rope drawn through a narrow aperture is cleaned of dirt, so a soul, in being subjected to torments, is freed from vices. This very same Gregory of Nyssa presents torments in an even more subtle form, that is, as an accidental consequence of purification, as a secondary phenomenon in the process of purification, like pain during an operation, like the unpleasant taste of medicine.

And so, we have described two series of progressively refined views. It is easy to remark that they have one and the same deficiency: they both *rationalize* the mystical process of punishment and purification, so that, according to the law of identity, sin is represented as either the very substance of the soul (the first series of views is of the "Protestantizing" variety) or as purely external in relation to the soul (the second series is of the "Catholicizing" variety). But neither view can be accepted. A man with

^d Mount Athos is the greatest monastic community in the Eastern Church. The peninsula off the coast of Greece that terminates in Mount Athos has long been the property of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The first settlement was the lavra founded by Athanasius the Athonite in 961. There are now twenty virtually independent monasteries there, though matters of common concern are settled by a council.

evil will can in no wise be forced to change this will. But as long as he does not change it, he will not be reformed. Sin cannot be removed from a man without touching his inner essence (contrary to the second series). But, on the other hand, we cannot imagine a man who is absolutely and thoroughly corrupt, for this would mean that God's creation has not succeeded. The image of God cannot perish (contrary to the first series). Only one conclusion is possible from this, a conclusion which was drawn by us before, i.e., antinomy.

Thus, if you ask me, "Will there in fact be eternal torments?" I would answer "Yes." But if you were also to ask me, "Will there be universal restoration in bliss?" I would again say "Yes." The two are thesis and antithesis. I think that only the view expounded here satisfies both the spirit and the letter of the Holy Scripture as well as the spirit of patristic writing. But, being inwardly antinomic, this view requires faith and absolutely does not fit into the plane of rationality. It is neither a simple "yes" nor a simple "no." It is both "yes" and "no." It is an antinomy. This indeed is the best proof of its religious validity.

The antinomy of Gehenna is not alien to the universally human, popular consciousness. Thus, a profound expression of this consciousness is found in the Odyssey in the verses:⁴³⁶

Ton de met eisenoësa biën Heraklëeiën, eidölon autos de met athanatoisi theoisin terpetai en thaliëis, kai echei kallisphuron Hebe. paida Dios megaloio kai Herës chrusopedilou . . .

[Finally, I saw mighty Hercules there, that is, only his airy apparition, while he himself with the gods on radiant Olympus was partaking of the sweetness of bliss near his blossoming wife Hebe, daughter of Zeus and golden-sandaled Hera]. 437

This apparition of Hercules, like the frozen vision of a terrible dream, is eternally aiming his bow. But this is not Hercules "himself" but only "his airy apparition," since the hero had sinned before the superhuman world.

Around him rose the tumult of the dead, like birds that scatter everywhere in terror; and he, like dark night, gripping his bare bow and with an arrow on his bowstring, glared menacingly, like one about to shoot. Around his chest he had a giant belt of gold embossed with horrifying things . . .

.... As soon as he returned my gaze, he knew just who I was.
And as he wept he offered these winged words:

"Odysseus, man of many wiles, divine son of Laertes, you are saddened by the fate you bear, a destiny like mine when underneath the sun I lived my life. "438e"

Thus, there was already in Homer a dim conjecture or dark recollection suggesting that an "eidolon," an "apparition" of a man can be in Gehenna, while autos, "he himself," can be in the world above. This Homeric distinction between "he himself" and an "apparition" has a curious parallel in the distinction between a man's "name" and his "soul." After receiving some alms, an old woman of Sergiev Posad once said to me: "God remember so-and-so and his soul." In other words, she expressed the wish that both the man "himself," represented by his name, and "his soul" be remembered. That is, the old woman thought that they could be separate in the existence after death. One could find analogies to this in the religious ideas of the most diverse nations and times.⁴³⁹

BEFORE ending this letter, let me remind you, with a sense of deep gratitude, of an incident in my personal life, when I understood that there is an undying worm and an unfading fire, and when I perceived with my soul that there is repose and the coolness of peace.

An evil July passion had been barking ceaselessly at my heels like a dog. My thoughts and feelings had been swept round in a whirlwind. The fire of Gehenna was ignited in my soul. "Passions," says St. Macarius the Great, 440 "are a burning fiery flame and the flaming arrows of the Evil One." An unbearable burning kept making me lose my mind. And losing myself, I would either lie down on the floor before the icon of the Savior or, in despair, I would surrender my soul to the destructive simoom. "There is an impure fire," says the same Saint, 441 "which inflames the heart: runs through all the members, and incites people to obscenity and thousands of evil deeds." In vain I tried to say to my heart: "Don't eat, *ma khar*." The red-hot feelings spun round more and more rapidly. It became more and more difficult to beg the Lord for mercy.

I saw that I was a slave, that I had no freedom. But I could not cast off my slavery, and what frightened me most was that I might soon stop being conscious of this slavery. Dully, hopelessly, I was tracking the course of this fall that was hanging over me like a thunderstorm cloud. Neither day nor night gave me respite; I had no peace, no rest, not even for a moment. In vain I tried to follow the counsel of St. Isaac the Syrian: "If you do not have the strength to control yourself and to fall on your face in prayer, then cover your head with a cloak and sleep until the hour of darkness passes for you, but do not leave your cell." "442/I could neither

^e From The Odyssey of Homer, translated by Allen Mandelbaum, p. 238.

f Isaac the Syrian (d. c. 700) wrote extensively in Syriac, mostly on ascetic subjects. His

sleep nor eat. And it was only in front of others, gathering up all my self-possession, that I tried to assume a calm appearance; but I saw how with each day my cheeks became thinner. In a word, the fiery "wheel of existence"⁴⁴³ had captured my soul and was rushing it toward doom. At that moment I would have been happy to die, to perish sooner: I would accept any end as long as this torment would cease! And you? You, meek as an angel, tolerated my caprices, tried to lend me courage. I remember how you made the sign of the cross over me, how you sang in a quiet voice:

Virgin, Mother of God, rejoice, Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with Thee . . .

With unwavering patience you tried to chase the evil spell away and would sing my favorite hymn:

The angel cried to the One full of grace: Pure Virgin, rejoice . . .

Saturday came. I was almost beside myself when you led me to vespers. But, after about a quarter of an hour, I felt that your prayers had been heard. It was as if a little cloud had covered the furious sun of perdition. A freshening wind blew from somewhere; I was surrounded by coolness and quiet. The silvery tops of thick clouds, like snowy peaks, pierced the azure. The whirling dust columns of wicked thoughts were blown away. "The lust ceased completely, faded and withered," as Macarius the Great says.444 Something solid as a cliff, unshakable as Very Truth, was revealed in my soul. I recovered; my courage returned to me; and I cried with agitation through the service. As if this could describe it! I think that those saved from a simoom do not feel the way I, healed from my passion, felt. My soul became like a birch tree in the spring, like a still-transparent dewdrop after a storm in May. Like the dew of virginal life, like a drop of fragrant myrrh, quietly dripping on the earth, the help of the Spirit came down to me, and my inflamed members were soothed and unbent in a new peace. And then with broad streams the force of grace flowed into my very core, a tranquilizing coolness for the soul. In the cool quiet of the spring sunset, eternity sang an exalted hymn to the Most Pure Virgin, the "Source" 445 of all purity. I felt myself torn from the fiery whirlwind, and when "sovereign freedom" returned, all temptations seemed distant, negligible, and pitiful to me. I myself and my terrible Tempter seemed almost laughable.

I acquired the desired *katapausis*. I came to know what *makarios* means.

writings are intended not for beginners on the ascetic path, but for those who have already gone far. He writes most often about the final and highest stages of ascesis, about the limits of the spiritual path.

But it was through you, my Friend, that I received my peace, through you, my Friend, that I was saved from the undying worm. It was by your friendly prayers that I saw the "spiritual dawn" of triumphant Heaven. To use the expression of Isaac the Syrian, the soul began "to flower with the spirit." And there clearly rose in my consciousness the words of this same teacher about the necessity of temptation:

"Pray that the Angel of chastity does not step away from you, that sin does not raise fiery war against you, and does not separate you from this Angel. But be prepared to accept with your soul bodily temptations, and swim across them with all your members; and fill your eyes with tears so that your Guardian does not step away from you. For without temptations, God's plan cannot be seen; it is impossible to acquire daring before God; it is impossible to learn the wisdom of the Spirit; there is also no possibility for Divine love to become firmly rooted in your soul. Prior to temptations, man prays to God as *someone who is foreign* to God. But when he enters into temptations out of love of God but does not permit changes in himself, then he is set before God as having God as his Debtor, as it were, and as a genuine friend. For, in fulfillment of God's will, he has fought a battle with God's foe and defeated him."

In temptation we acquire ourselves. In victory over passion we are conscious of ourselves as free for the first time. In the accomplished triumph over sin we make our empirical nature supraempirical. Not accepting the *de facto* givenness of a bad thought which, although it is in us, is not ours, 448 we overcome the law of identity, make our I not the *de facto* I but the spiritual I which is in God; we make the Truth itself. Through temptation, I proves itself, which hitherto had been given to I only blindly. And the Truth becomes I's "Friend," a "Friend" not only given to I but living in I. Thus, theoretical skepticism can be overcome only through the actual triumph over the fire of Gehenna that is ready to break out in our entire being. In order to see the "Pillar of the Truth," it is necessary to tame Gehenna, it is necessary to destroy the "Pillar of God-hating Malice." 449

This letter began with the admission that I have seen the second death, and it ends with a confession regarding the fire of Gehenna. These are examples of the empirical data on which the doctrine of Hell expounded here has been built.



Claeriscit aetere claro. It shines in the clear sky.

x. Letter Nine: Creation^a

....

THE last connecting thread with the earth has been broken. The gravestone presses on my breast. Everything is a matter of indifference. A series of gray, hopeless days will stretch into the future. There is not a single ray of light. Everything is dim.

In the past I lived by hope. Hope alone gave strength. Hope alone was the source of life. Now there is nothing. Nothing. Nothing. . . .

They were sawing logs in the neighboring yard, and the sound was thick, like the sound of cream being whipped or like the sound of sour cream being mixed in an earthenware pot. It was as if clods of earth were hollowly striking a coffin lid. Unbearable!

I took a walk in the cemetery. In passing I read on a cross:

The ashes of a saintly soul rest beneath this holy abode. The bell of the universe will ring and we will see each other.

"The ashes of a saintly soul"! Lord, here too, there are dead souls. Farther, farther, to the edge of the cemetery, to a hill with planted birches and to the ditch! Farther, to rendezvous with the setting sun, into the golden grain field!

^a See note a on p. 106.

Whiskered barleycorns shone, all bent to the north. The unripe springcrop silvered as if covered with silver-woven brocade. The winter-crop whitened. The rye was pale and dry; heavy ears were leaning down. A regular, rhythmical wave passed through the fields. And, having run up to my feet, the wave broke. Again and again, the wind struck the whitened fields, waiting for the reaper. Again and again, the rhythmical waves ran through the fields, and, again and again, they broke at my feet.

I remembered a hot July day. I was sitting in a garden beneath acacias. Everyone else had left the tea table but I remained alone, with a book and an unfinished glass. A thick battalion of flies surrounded every drop of sweet tea or jam. The ripened pods of yellow acacia kept cracking open, forcefully scattering their round seeds, which struck the leaves. Sometimes a seed struck the glass, the saucer, or the bowl with jam. And a melodious crystal ringing sound would be produced. Rustling, the dried pods would fall. I sat for hours, listening to the rustling, those ringing sounds, and the dry crackling of the pods: the mysterious births of trees were occurring, and new-born seeds, tearing themselves away from the maternal womb, saw God's light for the first time and began to live an independent life. What would become of them? Now the parental concern about them had ended. The acacia had ripened, which means that the rye too was ripe. They always ripen together. Sprouts of new life were everywhere.

The sun was setting, and it set. The day ended. Upon the trees, flocks of crows were preparing for the night's sleep. The sky looked like mother-of-pearl; red and yellow, it appeared to be woven of a multitude of cumulus clouds. And the cloud edges were tenderly violet, amethyst. Against the fiery field of the burning sky, one could clearly see the tops of bell-towers in neighboring villages. The villages looked slapped together, like birds' nests. Some sort of pole appeared to be stuck into the very sky. The yeasty aroma of ripe rye was borne in by the wind. I was recollecting something familiar, something eternally familiar, familiar from distant eternity, eternally dear, and beckoning.

But the sky was paling and fading, like the lips of a dying woman. The sky was dying and, with it, all hope for a better future. All good aspirations and expectations were fading and losing color like the cheeks of a dying woman. From the horizon, a sorrowful tune was barely audible:

The final time, the final hour, the final meeting. Soon we will not see you. Close is the parting.

A thick, impenetrable black cloud covered the sky and hung like a heavy curtain above the horizon. It had grown dark. What remained was only a narrow strip of aquamarine, postsunset sky, abutting the earth with a thin golden rim. The strip narrowed and paled. Finally, the heavy, "cut out" edge of a thick cloud had shut out this last glimmer, the way the lid of a coffin is closed shut.

And I stamped my foot angrily: "Are you not ashamed, unhappy animal, to whine about your fate? Are you not able to free yourself of subjectivity? Are you not able to forget yourself? Can you not (O shame!) understand that you have to surrender to the objective? The objective, standing outside of you, standing above you, will it not take you over? Unhappy, pitiful, stupid! You whine and complain as if someone is obliged to satisfy your needs. Yes? You cannot live without this and without that? Well, what of it? If you cannot live, then die, let your blood flow out, but live by the objective. Don't descend to contemptible subjectivity, don't seek conditions of life for yourself. Live for God, not for yourself. Be hard, be tempered, live as objective, in the pure air on high, in the transparent air of the peaks, not in the suffocating valleys, where chickens dig in the dust and pigs wallow in the mud. Shameful!"

Objectivity does exist. It is God's creation. To live and feel together with all creation, not with the creation that man has corrupted but with the creation that came out of the hands of its Creator; to see in this creation another, higher nature; through the crust of sin, to feel the pure core of God's creation . . . But to say this is to posit the requirement of a restored, i.e., a spiritual, person. Once again, the question of asceticism arises.

For it is not fasts and other bodily exercises, not tears and good works that are the goods of an ascetic, but a personality restored in its integrity, a personality that has regained its chastity. "Nothing," says St. Methodius, "is evil by nature. Things become evil by the mode of their use (*tēi phusei kakon ouden esti, alla tēi chrēsei ginetai kaka ta kaka*)." ⁴⁵⁰

There is in man no reality that is evil. But the false use of powers and capabilities, i.e., the perversion of the order of reality, is evil. By contrast, integrity, or chastity, consists, according to St. Ambrose of Milan, "in inviolate and undamaged nature (*pudor virginis est intemerata natura*).⁴⁵¹

Evil is nothing but spiritual distortion, and sin is all that leads to such distortion. But the presence of this distortion of the personality requires a kind of spiritual orthopedics, an orthopedics that is the "narrow way" of asceticism as envisaged by the holy fathers. One contemporary bishop argues that "asceticism as the collection of certain kinds of limitations and restraints for the achievement of moral perfection was necessary not because Christianity requires this. No, Christianity requires of man only positive, moral development. But sinful man turns out to be wholly incapable of living directly as this Christian ideal demands, and he is compelled to have recourse to various measures to suppress in himself the

accumulated sinful content of life, 'to eat the bread of heaven in the sweat of his face,' as ascetics say." 452

Spiritual life is the salvation given by the Lord Jesus Christ, while asceticism is the path to this salvation. But then, in order to understand not only the task set before ascesis but also its special essence, it is necessary to examine that arrangement of vital organs which alone can be justly called an *order*, i.e., man's integrity, chastity.

One can approach the clarification of this order from different sides, but here is apparently the simplest path, or at least the most clear-cut one.

Man is "given" to us in various senses. But, first and foremost, he is given bodily, as a body. The human body—that is what, first of all, we call a man.

But what is a *body*? We call a body not the matter of the human organism, understood as the matter of the physicists, but the form of the human organism. And we mean not the form of the body's outer contours, but the body's structure as a whole.⁴⁵³

It is possible that the Russian word *telo* (body) is related to the word *tselo*⁴⁵⁴ (whole), i.e., that it signifies something whole, intact, *integrum*. According to A. S. Khomyakov, ⁴⁵⁵ *telo* derives from the Sanskrit root *tal*, *til* (to be full, fat, i.e., healthy or strong according to the ancient view).

Similarly, the Greek $s\bar{o}ma$ has the same root as the words saos, soos (healthy, whole); $s\bar{o}os$, $s\bar{o}s$ (successful, healthy, saved); $s\bar{o}kos$ (strong, healthy); $sao\bar{o}$, $s\bar{o}z\bar{o}$ or rather $s\bar{o}iz\bar{o}$ (I heal, cure, save); $s\bar{o}$ - $t\bar{e}r$ (savior, healer). Juxtaposing $s\bar{o}ma$ with $s\bar{o}t\bar{e}r$ and with $s\bar{o}z\bar{o}$, we can say that these words relate to one another as the result or instrument of an action (energema, effectus, vis) relates to the actor (ho energen) and to the process of the action (energe \bar{o}). And since the ending $t\bar{e}r$ is equivalent to the ending $t\bar{e}s$, one can write the following complex relation: $s\bar{o}ma$: $s\bar{o}t\bar{e}r$: $s\bar{o}z\bar{o}=poi\bar{e}ma$: $poi\bar{e}t\bar{e}s=ktisma$: $ktist\bar{e}s$: $ktiz\bar{o}$ ktl.

Thus, *sōma* signifies something passive, some integral, intact product.

The body is something whole, something individual, something special. This is not the place to prove that individuality permeates every organ of the body, and that there is thus some connection (a connection that is completely certain, though one that may be ungraspable by the formulas of characterology as a science), some correspondence, between the subtlest features of the structure of the organs and the smallest windings of personal character. The features of the face; the shape of the cranium; the lines of the palms and feet; the shape of the hands and fingers; the timbre of the voice, which expresses the subtlest features in the structure of the voice organs; handwriting, which embodies the subtlest features of muscle contractions; taste and idiosyncrasies, which show precisely what materials and stimuli the particular organism requires, i.e., what it lacks, and so on and so forth—here, everywhere behind

impersonal matter a unified person looks at us. This unity is manifested everywhere in the body. Therefore, the more we reflect on the concept of the "human body," the more insistent becomes the necessity of going from the ontological periphery of the body to its ontological center, i.e., to that body which unifies this manifold diversity of organs and activities, to that body without which one can apply to all these organs not the notion of *homoousia* but only the notion of *homoiousia*. This *root of the unity of the body*, this *body in the body*, this body *par excellence*, is the body that concerns us here. What we usually call the body is not more than an ontological surface, and the mystical depth of our being lies beyond this shell. For, in general, all that we call "external nature," all "empirical reality," including our "body," is only the interface between two depths of being: the depth of I and the depth of not-I. Therefore, it is impossible to say whether our "body" belongs to I or to not-I.⁴⁵⁷

What can we say about the structure of our true body? Let the shell that marks its contours, let the empirical "body" indicate the organs and structural features of the true body.

What we first notice is a symmetry of the upper and lower parts of the body: the so-called homotypy of the "upper" and "lower" poles. A man's bottom is the mirror image of his top, as it were. The organs, bones, muscular, vascular, and nervous systems, and even the sicknesses of the upper and lower poles, as well as the effects of drugs on them, turn out to be polarly conjugate. But if this is the case, does not this correspondence mean that the ontological center of the body is not one extremity or another but the center of the homotypy, i.e., the middle part of the human body. What is this middle part? Even a superficial view points to the natural division of the human body into head, chest, and stomach. And each of these parts, taken as a whole, can be seen as a single organ. Digestive and reproductive functions are concentrated in the stomach area; feeling is concentrated in the chest; and, finally, the life of consciousness is concentrated in the head.

The nervous system, the system that in the empirical plane is most directly our body, has its centers in these three organs, and (insofar as one can speculate about this, given the current state of our knowledge) these centers are precisely centers of the activities indicated above. However, the important thing here is the fact that the life of each of these organs—head, chest, and stomach—can be deepened by an appropriate training, and then a person becomes a mystic of the respective organ. The correct development of all three organs under the domination of the organ with which the human person is preeminently associated, i.e., the chest, is normal mysticism, and it is attained only through the gracious medium of the Church. All other mysticisms, even if they result in a deepening, disrupt the equilibrium of the person, for, incapable of being nourished by grace, the seed of the soul—sprouting not into the interior of the Holy Trinity

but somewhere to the side—dries up and perishes. Such is the mysticism of the stomach, i.e, the mysticism of the orgiastic cults of antiquity and modernity, and, in part, of Catholicism. Such also is the mysticism of the head, or yoga, which is widespread in lands of the East, especially in India, and which has been introduced to the European world by various occultists and, especially, theosophists.⁴⁶⁰

Only the mysticism of the human center, which makes man accessible to grace and nourishes his core, corrects the personality and allows it to grow from measure to measure. All other mysticisms necessarily disrupt the already shaky equilibrium of life and ultimately pervert the nature of sinful man.

The danger of false mysticism lies precisely in the fact that the more conscientiously a person who has fallen into this mysticism tries to work on himself, the worse it will be for him. Only the foulest fall can force him to come to his senses and to begin to destroy what he has so painstakingly built. Just as a wayfarer who has taken the wrong path will diverge further from his goal the more he hurries, so an ascetic who has deviated from the path of ecclesiality will perish from his asceticism. It is not for nothing that spiritual elders warn novices: "Do not fear any sin, do not even fear fornication; fear nothing. But fear prayer and ascetic feats."

Thus, church mysticism is the mysticism of the chest. But, since ancient times, the center of the chest has been considered to be the heart, or at least the organ bearing this name. If the chest is the center of the body, the heart is the center of the chest. And, since ancient times, the entire attention of church mysticism has been directed at the heart.

P. D. Iurkevich⁴⁶¹ begins his famous essay on the heart with the following words: "He who reads God's word with the proper attention will easily notice that, in all the holy books and in all divinely inspired writers, the human heart is viewed as the center of the whole bodily and spiritual life of man, as the most essential organ and as the proximal seat of all human powers, functions, impulses, desires, feelings, and thoughts, with all their directions and nuances." One cannot agree with those who in texts mentioning the word "heart" see "an accidental figure of speech, which does not appear to have been governed by a specific thought." The heart is not an allegory but a tautegory. 462 "A simple reading of the holy texts, if only we do not reinterpret them according to our prejudices, directly convinces us that the sacred writers definitely and in full awareness of the truth recognized the heart as the center of all the phenomena of human bodily and spiritual life."463 "The sacred writers knew of the great significance of the head in man's spiritual life. Nevertheless, we repeat, they saw the center of this life in the heart. For them the head was, as it were, the visible top of that life which is primordially and directly rooted in the heart."464 Holy Scripture conveys "the wholly determinate idea

that the head is the organ that is *intermediate* between the integral essence of the soul and the influences that it experiences from outside or from above, and that here the head is the governing authority in the integral system of psychic actions."⁴⁶⁵

It is clear from this that the goal of the ascetic life, chastity or integrity, is defined as purity of heart. "Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me" (Ps. 51:10) cried the Psalmist and, after him, cries every believer. As is customary with Hebrew parallelism, the second half of the prayer is a synonymic intensification of the first: "renew" is equivalent to "create"; "in me" is equivalent to "within me"; "right" is equivalent to "clean"; "spirit" is equivalent to "heart." The conclusions obtained can be confirmed by linguistics. The heart is the center of our spiritual life, and to be spiritualized is to organize one's heart, to organize it appropriately, to integrate one's heart into a state of chastity.

In the Indo-European languages, 466 the words that express the notion of "heart" indicate by their root the notion of centrality. The Russian serdtse (like the Belorussian serdtse, the Ukrainian serdtse, the Czech srdce, the Polish sierce, etc.) is a diminutive of the noun serdo. This root forms the Old Slavic sredo; the Old Russian sered and sered' (middle), serede (in the midst of); the Russian sereda (middle), sreda (milieu), serednii (middle), sredstvo (means), po-srednik (intermediary), serdtsevina (core), etc. They all express the idea of being situated or acting "inside," "between," in contradistinction to being situated "outside," "beyond the limits" of some region. Thus, the heart signifies something central, something inner, something in the middle, the organ that is the core of a living being, both in its location and in its activity. This etymology explains the usage⁴⁶⁷ of the word serdtse in senses that do not have anything in common with its anatomical sense or with its moral or psychological senses. "Common folk often refer to the epigastral cavity, above the stomach, where a large center of nerves is located, as serdtse."468 Such a usage is also common in the Bible and in the ancient literatures of various peoples. The meaning of this usage becomes more profound when we remember that the solar plexus of the sympathetic nervous system located in this region is considered by occultists to be the nerve center of mystical activity, 469 while positivist physiologists consider it to be the center of various organic functions, such as the secretory function, etc. 470

The word "heart" sometimes has the sense of inner core, womb, innards, so that one hears people say "heart of the earth" instead of the core of the earth, "heart of a tree" (cf. the French coeur d'un arbre), and "heart of a pen" in the sense of their midlayer. Similarly, one hears the expressions "heart of an apple," i.e., its core; "heart of a tree," i.e., its central core, rising like a vein from its root to the very top; "heart of rock," when the structure of the core is different from that which surrounds it; and "heart of salt," rock salt (Iletsk), in which pure crystals, transparent as glass, have a nestlike structure; a siliceous pebble in a cretaceous formation is called a "heart" in the Kazan

dialect. A *serdechnik* (core) is any rod inserted in a bore or a hole; a bolt going through the bolster and axle of a cart, forming a pivot for the whiffletree; a pin, a stud, a cock; an iron rod with a sphere for forming a cavity when casting hollow artillery shells; and soft iron that acts as an electromagnet when it is inserted in a coil, as in dynamos (an "electromagnet core" or an "armature core").

Let us now consider the Semitic languages, especially Hebrew. In the Russian translation of the Bible, the word *serdtse* conveys the notion expressed in Hebrew by *libb*, corresponding to the Assyrian *libbu*, the Aramaic *liba*, the Ethiopian *lebe*, the Arabic *lubb*, etc., or by *libab* (*libeb* in the Aramaic).⁴⁷¹

These words derive from the root *lbb*. But the verb *labab*, encountered only in the forms *niphal* and *piel*, is not used in the form *qal*, so that one can only conjecture about the basic meaning of the root *lbb*.⁴⁷² True, the hypotheses that have been advanced do not exclude one another, and can be united. This unification can be achieved most naturally if we take as its basis Fürst's⁴⁷³ hypothesis, which is the most probable one, in that it has a parallel in the etymology of the Indo-European words which signify "heart."

According to Fürst, the verb *labab* has as its primary sense a transitive one: to wrap up, envelop, cover. Its secondary sense is an intransitive one: to smolder, to burn, to be consumed by fire, to become red-hot. The transitive sense is confirmed by parallels with Arabic, where *jalava* means to cover, from which one gets *jalav*, skin, fur, shield, and *laffa* (equivalent to the Hebrew *lapha*) means *convolvit*, be rolled up. It is also confirmed by the Syrian *laf*, to cover, from which we get *elibe*, eyelids, i.e., skins, covers, etc. From this it is clear that the verb *labab* could really have meant *pinguis fuit*, "he was fat," as Gesenius⁴⁷⁴ indicates, for to be fat precisely means to be *surrounded*, to be enveloped by fat as it were. In the same way it is also clear that the verb considered could have had the sense of a "firm attachment to something, the way a vine holds fast to a tree." From this we get the verbs "to encircle, to wrap around."⁴⁷⁵

The Hebrew word *libb* derives precisely from this transitive sense of the verb *labab*, and it therefore signifies something covered, surrounded by organs and parts of the body, and therefore hidden in the depths of the body. This word therefore signifies what is central, the *center* of the body, the central organ of the body. The other explanations are related to this. The heart is "fat" in the sense that it is surrounded by layers of the body. The heart is "entwined," again in the sense that it is something inner enveloped by the chest, etc. Therefore the Arabic word *lubb* is used concerning the core of a nut or almond covered by a shell or pulp; '*lubub* is the seed of a fruit (cf. "halva," a sweet made of crushed nut cores⁴⁷⁶); *labab* and *labbag* signify the chest cavity (*Brustknöchen*). The Hebrew *libb*, the Arabic *lubb*, etc. therefore signify the most inward point, at the firm core.

This etymology of *libb* provides a good explanation of why Scripture sometimes speaks of the "heart" as the central (in terms of significance or location) region of the inanimate beings of the world: e.g., "the midst [heart] of heaven" (Deut. 4:11); "the heart of the sea" (Ex. 15:8, Moses' Song of Gratitude); and "in the midst [heart] of the seas" (Jonah 2:3).

Purification of the heart gives communion with God, and communion with God rectifies and orders the whole person of the ascetic. Spreading over and permeating the whole person, the light of Divine love also sanctifies the boundary of the person, the body, and, from there, radiates into the nature that is outside the person. Through the root by which the spiritual person reaches into the heavens, grace also sanctifies all that surrounds the ascetic and flows into the core of all creation. The body, that common boundary of man and the rest of creation, unites them. Thus, if, having fallen from God, man dragged down with him all of creation and, having perverted his own nature, perverted also the order of all nature, then, restored by God, he brings the original accord and harmony back into creation, which "groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now" (Rom. 8:22); and "the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God" (Rom. 8:19). Man is connected by his body with all the flesh of the world, and this connection is so close that man's fate and the fate of all creation are inseparable.

After all, God concluded his covenant not with man only but with all of creation.⁴⁷⁷ In God's covenant with Noah (Gen. 9), this idea is repeated several times with all possible definiteness:

- 8. And God spake unto Noah, and to his sons with him, saying,
- 9. And behold, I establish my covenant with you, and with your seed after you;
- 10. And with every living creature that is with you, of the fowl, of the cattle, and of every beast of the earth with you; from all that go out of the ark, to every beast of the earth.
- 11. And I will establish my covenant with you; neither shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of a flood; neither shall there any more be a flood to destroy the earth.
- 12. And God said, This is the token of the covenant which I make between me and you and every living creature that is with you, for perpetual generations:
- 13. I do set my bow in the cloud, and it shall be for a token of the covenant between me and the earth.
- 14. And it shall come to pass, when I bring a cloud over the earth, that the bow shall be seen in the cloud:
- 15. And I will remember my covenant, which is between me and you and every living creature of all flesh; and the waters shall no more become a flood to destroy all flesh.
- 16. And the bow shall be in the cloud; and I will look upon it, that I may remember the everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the earth.

17. And God said unto Noah, This is the token of the covenant, which I have established between me and all flesh that is upon the earth.

What is remarkable here is the complete identity of the formula of God's covenant with mankind and the formula of His covenant with the rest of creation.⁴⁷⁸ These are not two different covenants but *one* covenant with the whole world, viewed as a single entity headed by man. The word "covenant"—*berit*—is repeated several times in these ten verses, and it is encountered in the Bible also in those passages where God's covenant with man is spoken of.⁴⁷⁹

If the perversion of human nature entails the perversion of all of creation and the ordering of man entails the ordering of creation, there arises the question of the concrete features of this reintegrated creation, i.e., of those first fruits of the paradisal state which the ascetic attains even now, in this life, prior to the universal transformation of the world. But in order to understand more clearly the essence of this earthly paradise of the true Christian ascetics, this mysticism of the heart, it is necessary to remember that the perversion produced by false mysticism, the shift of the center of human existence, can be of two types. It can be the mysticism of the head, the mystical hypertrophy of the mind, nourished not by grace from the heart but nourishing itself independently, by satanical pride, and attempting to grasp all the mysteries of heaven and earth by false knowledge. Or it can be the mystical hypertrophy of organic life, the mysticism of the stomach, which receives the springs of life not from the spirit-radiating heart but from demons, through foulness. In both cases the person is not whole; he is fragmented and perverted, without a center. A genuine Christian ascetic is distinguished from mystics of the first type by restraint of a proud mind. He is distinguished from mystics of the second type by inhibition of a lustful stomach. All that a genuine Christian ascetic lives by arises in him not arbitrarily in one separate organ or another, but in the living center of his being, in the heart, and it arises there under the gracegiving action of the Holy Spirit, the Comforter. Having arisen at the center of the whole being purified by grace, the vital movement naturally (not unnaturally as in the case of pseudo-mystics) spreads over the vital organs, and for this reason they all act in harmony. 480

The genuine Christian ascetic is essentially connected with all of creation and does not despise anything that belongs to creation. But, in his case, in his feeling for creation, there is no lust. He penetrates deeply into the mysteries of heaven and earth and is not deprived of their knowledge, but, in his knowledge of the mysteries, there is no pride. The bad infinity of unrestraint, both in the material world and in the intellectual world, is absolutely expelled from him, for it is cut at its very root, in the heart. His is an incorruptible body and an incorruptible mind. And even non-

spiritual people receive from this ascetic the strength for a better relation to creation.

An ascetic who is filled with spirit soars above nature, as it were. Macarius the Great says: "Who among the strong, wise, or reasonable, abiding still on earth, ascended to heaven and there did spiritual works, contemplating the beauty of the spirit? But now someone who has the appearance of a beggar, who is extremely poor and abject, and who is even completely unknown to his neighbors, falls on his face before God and, guided by the Spirit, ascends to heaven and with unflagging confidence in his soul delights in the miracles that he finds there."481 And according to Nicetas Stethatos, "when someone has communion with the Holy Spirit and comes to know His power through His ineffable action and fragrance in him, which is sensibly revealed even in the body, then such a one cannot remain within the limits of nature; he does not feel hunger, thirst, or other needs of nature."482 He is transformed, and all the properties of his nature change. Again, Macarius the Great says: "He who has grace has another mind, another sense, and another wisdom than the wisdom of this world."483 He is a monk. And monasticism is nothing but spirituality, and spirituality can be nothing but monasticism. And, here, the whole world becomes different for the monastic consciousness. Nicetas Stethatos says: "the nature of things changes according to the inner disposition of the soul."484 "He who has attained true prayer and love does not discriminate between the righteous and the sinful, but loves all equally and does not judge, even as God makes the sun shine and the rain fall equally on the just and on the unjust."485 Blessing the universe, the ascetic everywhere and always sees in things God's signs and God's letters. For him, all creation is a ladder on which the angels of God descend to the earthly vale. All that is of this vale of tears is an image of what is on high. All of nature is a "book" for him, as St. Anthony the Great said.486

Let us try to clarify the above propositions by means of certain historical examples.

However, I scarcely think that I can definitively delineate the interrelationship between Eternal Truth and the empirical givenness surrounding us. There is such an abundance of material here that I do not know how to begin, which typical examples to choose. One can do nothing more than sketch the subject with just a few strokes of the pencil. But I do not pursue even approximate fullness.

I will begin with a proposition that probably goes counter to contemporary views, especially the views of some who consider themselves to be defenders of the religious significance of creation.⁴⁸⁷ This is the proposition that creation received its religious significance only in Christianity, that only with the advent of Christianity was room made for the "sense of nature,"⁴⁸⁸ for love of man, and for the science of creation that comes

out of that. "Modern natural science, however paradoxical this may sound, has its origin in Christianity," says E. du Bois-Reymond. 489

"All is full of gods." ⁴⁹⁰ That is the basic proposition of paganism. It may seem strange, but I will nevertheless say that this proposition sounds atheistic and acosmic at the same time. As St. Athanasius the Great says, "polytheism is atheism, and a multiplicity of principles is an absence of principle." ⁴⁹¹

All is full of gods. But, first of all, what, in itself, is this "all"? If we take the limit toward which the whole non-Christian worldview tended, if we take this word in its tendency (only its limit or tendency is something determinate, discussable, verbally expressible), then "all" is only a phenomenon, a phenomenon deprived of genuine reality. It is an appearance, a "skin," to use Nietzsche's expression. ⁴⁹² It is a beautiful form, and only that. But in it itself there is nothing. Or, rather, it has no "self." All is a soap bubble that is resolved into a drop of dirty water. Outside of a consciousness full of grace, there is no perception of a person. For this reason, all is half-real and, under close scrutiny, melts into nothing. ⁴⁹³

"But," it is said, "even though it does not have value in itself, even though what has value in it is only our aesthetic perception of it, only naked subjectivity, nevertheless there is a god in it." But is it a god? Is it not a demon who is hiding behind the beautiful form? Is it only the later polemic with Christianity, and it alone, that gave to the word *daimon* its modern, negative sense? Of course not.

For antiquity, these numerous demonic beings were, above all, terrifying, just as even now they are terrifying and demonic for every consciousness without grace, in every non-Christian religion, just as the "spirits" of the spiritists and the numberless "deities" of northern Buddhism are terrifying. Fear and trembling surrounded man. The very gods were demonic, and the connection with the gods, re-ligio, was essentially reduced to deisidaimonia, to the fear of gods, or rather, to the fear of demons. And out of this came the striving to magically control hostile demons.⁴⁹⁴ Timor fecit primos deos, and ancient man secretly felt that he was worshipping not gods but demons. As is the case today, religion without grace has always fatefully degenerated into black magic. We feel this without fail in every religion without grace, and only one who has not experienced a single religion concretely can speak of "religion in general," of religion as something homogeneous. Faith with grace and religion without grace, however much they might have in common in their ideational content and in their cult, are so heterogeneous and so mutually impenetrable in the states of soul that correspond to them, that it even seems inappropriate to call both by the single name "religion."

But even one who has not experienced this qualitative heterogeneity of religion without grace must, at least in the abstract, recognize the demonic character of mankind without grace. Otherwise, neither the openly depressed state nor the "tragic optimism" of this mankind without grace can be explained. For what is this "optimism" but the forced smile of a slave who is afraid of showing his master that he is afraid of him, because this could arouse his master's wrath, the forced smile of a slave who is afraid of arousing wrath by his very fear, who is afraid of his own fear. The forms are beautiful, but is it a secret for ancient man that "beneath them Chaos moves"?^b

Only the idea of Fate, which is essentially hostile to the demon gods, glimmered perhaps in dim remembrance of what had been lost or in a premonition of the monotheism to come in the remote future.

Shackled with fear, ancient man could direct all his energies at the "skin" of things and at the reproduction of this "skin." The character of ancient art shows that ancient man did not at all love the "soul" of things and was afraid of getting beneath the "skin," for there he found chaos and terror. Being unprotected, he would turn for help to one of his demons. And, then, out of fear, he would attempt "to hide under his blanket and sleep." "Better not to look"—that is the slogan of an ancient culture that tried to forget itself in "optimism," the optimism of an opium-eater or hashish-smoker. Here, only a formal science is possible: geometry, astronomy in part, and so on. But real science is impossible, for how can one investigate chaos, and who would dare to pierce it with a scrutinizing gaze? Man's boldness irritates and worries demons. They do not trust his curiosity and do not like it when he attempts to open what they have shut off from his gaze by a gold-woven veil of beauty. Even Aristotle's independent mind did not venture far beyond this fundamental element of ancient religion. Love between gods and man, as between heterogeneous beings, is impossible, asserts the Stagirite. 495 Love is impossible! That is the consciousness that antiquity had of its God-understanding. And if, later, Roman philosophy (Cicero, Seneca, et al.) attempted to say something different, it thereby unquestionably left the ancient religious soil and betrayed the spirit and primordial principles of the ancient God-idea. It is very possible that, in this philosophy, the light from the East begins to shine.

Two feelings, two ideas, two presuppositions were necessary for the possibility of the appearance of science: first, a feeling and idea whose content was the lawlike *unity of creation* (in contrast to the caprice of demons, filling "all"); second, a feeling and idea which affirmed the *genuine reality of creation* as such. Only these two feelings and ideas made it possible to pierce the reality of creation with a fearless, direct gaze, to approach this reality with trust, and to love it joyously.

Theologically speaking, it was necessary to introduce two dogmas in man's consciousness: the dogma of the Providence of One God and the

^b A verse from a poem of Tyutchev's.

dogma of the creation of the world by a Good God, i.e., the dogma of the giving of its own, independent being to creation. The providence of God and the freedom of creation form, in their antinomy, *one* dogma, the dogma of God's love for creation, a dogma that has its foundation in the idea of God as Love, i.e., the idea of the Triunity of Divinity. This antinomy, in all its decisiveness, is the foundation of modern science. Without this antinomy, there is no science. Thus, if previously it was demonstrated that the dogma of Trinity is the first principle of philosophy, here it is revealed that this dogma also serves as the rule for the development of science.

These two ideas, upon which the existence of science depends, were (especially the first) contained in the Old Testament.

Christopher Sigwart says that "the monotheism of the Judaic and the Christian religion created a fruitful soil for the idea of an all-embracing science that investigates the general laws of the world. In fact, what form could the idea that heaven and earth are embraced by one thought and that man is called to understand this thought take if not the form of faith in one Creator, Who created heaven and earth, Who created man in His image and likeness? In what form could one express with greater relief the idea that nothing is accidental and that the things in the world do not intersect on twisted paths by the will of blind chance than in the form of the idea of Providence, without which a hair will not fall from a man's head?" 496

The unity of creation is not an indifferent unity of chaotic elements but an organic unity of orderedness. That is the precondition of science. This has been understood by Jewish interpreters of the Word of God. "Know," Maimonides says at the end of the 12th century, "that the entire universe, that is, the highest sphere with everything it contains, is nothing but an individual whole, like the individuals Simeon and Reuven, and that the difference between entities found in it is like the difference between the organs of a human individual. And just as Reuven, for example, constitutes an individual person, who is made up of different parts, that is, muscles, bones, blood vessels, different organs, liquids, and gases, so the universe consists of spheres, four elements, and the compounds composed of them." Further, Maimonides elaborates in detail his analogy between the microcosmos and the macrocosmos. "Thus," he summarizes his discussion, "it is necessary to view the universe as a single living individual, moving by means of a soul that is contained in it. Such an idea is very important, for, first of all, it leads, as we shall see below, to the proof of the unity of God. Second, it shows us that the One really creates the one "497

It is clear that such views on the essence of the world should favor the study of nature. Jewish thinkers even demand such study. To the question, Are we obliged to try to know the unity of God through

investigation? Rabbi Behai, who lived at the end of the 11th century and at the beginning of the 12th century, answered, "Anyone who is capable of investigating this subject, as well as similar intellectual subjects, must investigate it insofar as his cognitive powers permit. Anyone who refrains from this deserves censure and is considered to be among those who are remiss, both in doctrine and in practice. The essence of this investigation consists in the penetration into the signs of the Creator's Wisdom, manifested in his creatures, and in the weighing of these signs in the soul, in accordance with the cognitive powers of the investigator. For if the signs of wisdom were expressed equally in all creatures, they would be clear for all and everyone, and both a thinking man and an ignorant man would be equal in their knowledge of them. But wisdom, being in ground and principle one and the same, is expressed differently in different creatures, just as the rays of the sun, which in their essence are one and the same, acquire different colors in different glasses, and just as water acquires different colors from the different colors of the plants contained in it. That is why we must investigate the Creator's creations from the small to the great in order to discover in them the signs of wisdom hidden in them. That is why we must penetrate into them and meditate on them to receive a more or less clear understanding of them."498

If the universe were uniform, this would point, in Rabbi Behai's opinion, to the mechanical and unfree character of its cause. On the contrary, the diversity of the universe, contained in unity, suggests a single, free, creative Will. But if the properties of God are reflected in the properties of the universe, "the investigation of creation as the only path to knowledge of the Creator's wisdom is prescribed to us by reason, writing, and tradition. By reason because it convinces us that man's superiority over other animals consists in the God-given ability to know, comprehend, and assimilate the signs of Divine wisdom that are hidden in the whole of the universe. This is indicated by the saying: '[He] teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and maketh us wiser than the fowls of heaven' (Job 35:11). Therefore, if a man gains insight into the principles of Divine wisdom and investigates the signs of the latter, he will be superior to the animals inasmuch as he actualizes the possibility of knowledge given to him. If he refrains from investigating these principles, not only is he not higher than the animals, he is very much below them, as it is said: 'The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib: but Israel doth not know, my people doth not consider' (Is. 1:3). That this is prescribed to us by the Bible is clearly seen from the following sayings: 'Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things' (Is. 40:26). 'When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which thou hast ordained' (Ps. 8:3). 'Have ye not known? have ye not heard? hath it not been told you from the beginning? have ye not understood from the foundations of the earth?' (Is. 40:21). 'Hear, ve deaf; and

look, ye blind, that ye may see' (Is. 42:18). 'The wise man's eyes are in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness' (Ecc. 2:14)."499

Rabbi Behai also refers to the Talmudic treatise *Sabbat*, ⁵⁰⁰ in which it is said: "He who is capable of calculating the motion of the stars and does not calculate it, about him the Scripture says: 'And the harp, and the viol, the tabret, and pipe, and wine are in their feasts: but they regard not the work of the Lord, neither consider the operation of his hands' (Is. 5:12)." Man is even obliged "to calculate the motion of the heavenly lights," says Rabbi Behai, referring to Deut. 4:6. "Thus," he concludes, "sufficiently proven is our obligation to investigate created things in order—from the signs of wisdom manifested in things—to derive proofs of God's existence and other principles of religion." ⁵⁰¹

Thus, leading representatives of the monotheistic conception see in monotheism the condition of the possibility of science, and they consider scientific inquiry a necessary expression and manifestation of their convictions. "On the contrary, the appearance of science is impossible under the dominion of polytheism," 502 for "polytheism predisposes man to the disunification and isolation of phenomena, reverses the movement of his thought, and hinders the development of knowledge."503 "In countries dominated by polytheism, great men can sometimes appear who, by the powerful soaring of their minds, have become liberated from the polytheistic notions of their country and discover, to a greater or lesser degree, the regularity and unity of the phenomena of nature. But their concepts and views cannot take root, and they remain without any effect on other minds. For this reason they do not have any effect on the development of knowledge. The reason for this is that, in polytheistic countries, the direction of minds is wholly opposite to the direction of science. Polytheism aspires to the disunification and disassociation of the phenomena of the world, whereas science aspires to their unification and generalization. Polytheism directs minds to attribute every phenomenon to a particular cause, while science teaches them to reduce a multitude of phenomena to a single cause. But monotheism, teaching people that everything in the world has as its principle one supreme being, must, as we showed above, inevitably lead to science."504

Five classes of facts confirm the proposition that there is no science without monotheism:

- (1) "among no nation that has espoused polytheism do we encounter the development of knowledge";
- (2) "in ancient pagan Greece there was nothing akin to what we call the development of knowledge; philosophical ideas had no influence on the nation";
- (3) "as soon as the Arabs adopted Islam, i.e., as soon as monotheism took root, they were possessed by an aspiration to knowledge and soon became the most enlightened nation in the world at that time";

- (4) "dispersed over the face of the earth and enduring all possible troubles and persecutions, Jews nevertheless showed, everywhere and always, an aspiration to knowledge";
- (5) "intellectual development began in Europe when monotheism took root with the introduction of Christianity." 505

Ancient thought approached the foundation of science to the extent that it became "atheistic," as it was said then, i.e., to the extent that it threw off the yoke of demon-fear and had a premonition of monotheism. 506 The succession of minds inheriting the philosophical throne, i.e., Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, approached science to the extent that they came to comprehend monotheism. But, after Aristotle, the thread of science was fraved by the appearance of pantheistic and polytheistic tendencies. It is also noteworthy that the free-thinking school of Epicurus, like, in general, free-thinkers of all epochs and nations, did not advance any creative principles in the domain of science. And if Lucretius affirms with pathos about Epicurus that he "potuit rerum cognoscere causas,"507 this, of course, is only the high-falutin rhethoric of atheism: one can perceive less natural-scientific knowledge in Epicurus than in anyone. The flower of Greek science is Aristotle. He died in 322 B.C., but for three-hundred years after his death natural science did extremely little, if we do not take into account purely formal or descriptive disciplines such as geometry and astronomy. 508 Why? Because there were impeding forces in the spiritual climate of antiquity.

An author I have already cited says: "One can justly say that the Greeks and the Romans did not have natural science. Despite their apparently highly promising beginning, they turned out to be incapable of further development. To be sure, in the millennium separating Thales and Pythagoras from the fall of the western Roman Empire, individual thinkers reveal an unusual depth. Aristotle and Archimedes unquestionably belong among the greatest teachers of mankind. In addition, at one time the school of Alexandria appeared to have assured constant progress in the domain of natural science. But nothing more clearly demonstrates the cessation of the study of nature among the ancients than the simple fact that four-hundred years after Aristotle (a gap equal to the period of time between Roger Bacon and Newton) a Pliny could appear, that collector of critically unverified information. This is tantamount to Herodotus and Tacitus changing places." 509

I know you will ask me: Why did the first Christians not create a science? Because they did not have the time or the energy for it, just as, in general, a Christian who has devoted himself wholly to ascesis has no time or energy for science, even if he is the only one with the necessary prerequisites for true science. Later, this development of a Christian science was hindered by purely historical obstacles, obstacles that, in general, would not allow science to develop under any religious faith. But

having said all this, we must concede that early Christianity, which was high and pure, was nevertheless poor in words in comparison with what was possessed by the ascetics. In the early Church, people did not yet have time to reflect upon and divide their experiences, and life ran by too rapidly to allow the faithful to be occupied with science. Their life-feeling was too eschatological to allow them to be occupied with the transitory image of "this world," which appeared to be on the verge of collapsing. But the idea of Providence as God's direct government of the world's life was vital and intense even here. Like the author of the 104th Psalm, the early Christians contemplated with pious joy the unity and harmonious order of the world: "O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches" (Ps. 104:24). This musical theme permeates the entire mood of the first Christians.

Listen, are not the words of St. Clement of Rome a magnificent development of this theme:⁵¹⁰

"... let us gaze closely at the Father and Creator of the whole world and reflect upon His magnificent and superb gifts of peace and His good works. Let us gaze at Him with our mind and look with the eyes of our soul into His long-suffering will. Let us think how meek He is toward His whole creation. The heavens, shaken by His command, subject themselves to Him in peace. Day and night they run the course appointed for them, without interfering with one another in anything. The sun and the moon, as well as the stellar processions, according to his command, in harmony, without any deviation, revolve within the limits appointed for them. The pregnant earth, according to His will, produces superabundant food at certain times for people and beasts, and for all living things upon it, without delaying and without changing anything decided by Him. The unfathomable depths of the abysses and the ineffable decisions of the nether regions are constrained by the same commands. The basin of the boundless sea, gathered together by His workmanship into its reservoirs, does not pass the bounds set around it, but acts as has been determined for it. For He said: 'Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further: and here shall thy proud waves be stayed' (Job 38:11). The ocean impassable for men, and the worlds beyond it, 511 are balanced by the same commands of the Lord. The seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter succeed one another in peace. The winds in their proper season fulfill their mission without disturbance. And the inexhaustible fountains, created for enjoyment and health, unfailingly give their breasts for the life of men. Finally, the smallest of living beings form their communities in harmony and peace. All these things the Creator and Lord of all has commanded to be in peace and harmony, doing good to all, and primarily to us, who have taken refuge in His mercy through our Lord Iesus Christ, to Whom be the glory and the majesty for ever and ever. Amen."c

^c This translation is based on that of Bishop Lightfoot. The edition used is *The Apostolic Fathers*. Revised Greek Texts with Introductions and English Translations. Edited by J. B. Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer (Grand Rapids, Mich.) 1987 (reprint of the 1891 London edition). The passage quoted is on p. 66 of this edition.

Yes, this is a development of an ancient theme of the Old Testament, but how many new depths there are here! In the Old Testament, attention is directed to what appears to violate the normal course of nature, and what in popular books is called by the name "miracles of nature." Here, on the contrary, attention is directed to lawful order in the everyday, to the universality of Logos. In the Old Testament we are shaken by turbulence; here we are drawn by peace. In the Old Testament, the power of God is praised in noisy inspiration; here, His meekness and patience are glorified in quiet hymns. In the Old Testament, nature appeared and disappeared at the beck of its Creator; here, nature is subject to its own laws, given by the Creator and Father and common to the entire universe and even to unknown trans-oceanic worlds. 512 In a word, attention passed from elemental force to the reasonable and lawful order of nature. The perception of nature became more inward, sincere, and heartfelt.

And the farther we go, the more deeply we perceive the inner side of nature. Clement of Alexandria's famous "Hymn to Christ the Savior" (devoted, by the way, not to nature but to humanity) is full of a new idea of creation, a calm and unshakable confidence in the fact that, without God's will, not even a hair of a man's head will fall. Here is the hymn:

Tamer of wild onagers, Wing of chicks flying correctly, Unshakable Helm of the young. Shepherd of royal lambs! Gather all Thy innocent children to praise sacredly, to sing sincerely with pure lips Thee, Lord of children—Christ! King of Saints. Sovereign Word, Giver of the Supreme Father's Wisdom. Stronghold of sufferers, Lord of eternity, **Iesus**, Savior of the mortal race! Shepherd and Worker, Helm, Bridle, Heavenly Wing of the Sacred herd! Fisher of men, saved by Thee, catching pure fish with sweet bait

in the hostile waves of the sea of impurity! Lead us, Shepherd, who are reasonable sheep! Lead us, Holy One, King of immaculate children! Lead us on Christ's path. Thou art the heavenly Way, the eternal Word, the limitless Age, the eternal Light, the Font of mercy, the Source of virtue, Immaculate Life of the singers of God—Christ Jesus! Heavenly milk of Thy Wisdom issuing from the sweet nipples of the Virgin full of grace! We, Thy children, with gentle lips fed, with the gentle breath of the Maternal breasts filled. simple songs, innocent hymns, to Christ the King sing together in holy reward for the teaching of life. We exalt simply the sovereign Youth. You, chorus of peace, children of Christ, saintly people, sing all together the God of peace!⁵¹³

This set of monotheistic ideas about Providence and about the lawful order of creation is repeated in the entire later patristic literature, but mainly with the nuance of apologetics, i.e., as something for "outsiders," for "strangers." But when it is addressed to the initiated, to a close, intimate circle before which it is possible to bare the whole soul, this literature becomes loving not only in relation to the Creator but also in relation to creation itself. An infinite acute pity and a trepidation of reverent love for the whole "Adam, the first born" stings the ascetic's heart as soon as

he has cleansed it of the crust of sin. When dirt is washed from the soul by a prolonged ascesis, by a prolonged detachment, by a prolonged "attention to oneself," then, to the renewed and spirit-bearing consciousness, God's creation is revealed as an original, suffering being, as a beautiful but dirt-stained being, as God's prodigal child. Only Christianity has given birth to an unprecedented being-in-love with creation. Only Christianity has wounded the heart with the wound of loving pity for all being. If we take the "sense of nature" to mean a relation to creation itself, not to its forms, if we see in this sense more than an external, subjectively aesthetic admiration of "the beauties of nature," this sense is then wholly Christian and utterly inconceivable outside of Christianity, ⁵¹⁴ for it presupposes the sense of the reality of creation. But this sense of nature has been born and is being born not in the souls of "moderate," protestantizing, omnirationalizing homoiousians but in strict ascetics and restrainers of rationality, in homoousians.

This relation to creation became conceivable only when people saw in creation not merely a demonic shell, not some emanation of Divinity, not some illusory appearance of God, like a rainbow in a spray of water, but an independent, autonomous, and responsible creation of God, beloved of God and capable of responding to His love. By contrast, representations that appear to elevate creation by attributing absolute independence to it actually turn it into nothing. Apart from God, creation has only imaginary independence and autonomy, and therefore only imaginary free self-determinability. Creation as such is an utter nothing, and reality is possessed only by demons or the "substance" lying at the base of this nothing, an unknown and pitiless substance. But these demons and this substance, which, in themselves, do not have the self-grounding of trinitarian love, are not absolute and therefore, once again, are only imaginary, or illusory. Every worldview outside of Christianity is acosmic and atheistic in its deepest essence. For these worldviews, there is neither God nor the world.

"God cannot stop being God just as a triangle cannot make the sum of its angles unequal to 180 degrees." Divine egoism—that is what would turn God into a demon. By contrast, the Christian idea of God as Essential Love, as Love inside Himself, and therefore also outside Himself; the idea of God's humility, of His self-abasement, manifested first in the creation of the world, i.e., in the placing of autonomous being alongside Himself, in the gift to this being of the freedom to develop according to its own laws, and therefore in the voluntary limitation of Himself—this idea for the first time made it possible to recognize creation as autonomous and therefore morally responsible to God. In the ancient world, there could be no idea of the moral responsibility of creation to God, because there was no idea of the freedom of creation. Christ brought the idea of God's humility to its ultimate limit: God, entering into the world, casts off the image of his glory and puts on the image of His creation (see Phil. 2:6–8).

He subordinates himself to the laws of creaturely life.⁵¹⁶ He does not violate the world order. Nor does He not strike the world with lightning or deafen it with thunder, as pagans thought (recall the myth of Zeus and Semele). He only burns like a meek light before the world, drawing to Himself His sinful and weary creation, not punishing it, but calling it to wisdom. God loves His creation and is tormented for its sake, is tormented by its sin. God extends His arms toward His creation, implores it, calls it, awaits His prodigal son. And mankind, the head of creation, is responsible to God for creation, just as man is responsible for man.

Of course, the dogmatic idea is expressed imprecisely here. But this is done intentionally, in order to represent experiences in a rougher and therefore more clear-cut form.

The longing for the salvation and renewal of creation, the excruciating sense of free responsibility for creation, the acute pity for creation, the profound consciousness of one's powerlessness, a powerlessness that is a result of sin and impurity, all this pierces the ascetic's soul, to the secret source of tears. But we who are redeemed and have received everything from God but are buried in sin often do not even see the world through this sin, although "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life; for God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved" (John 3:16-17); although Christ, at the most solemn moment of His earthly life commanded his disciples to "go . . . into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature" (Mark 16:15); although we have "the hope of the gospel . . . which was preached to every creature which is under heaven" (Col. 1:23); although "the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him, who hath subjected the same in hope, because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit the redemption of our body." (Rom. 8:19–23).

"Love of nature ... But what about asceticism, the escape from nature?"—we can hear the objection of worldly people. In response, I affirm in advance that worldly literature has never understood the spirit of Christian asceticism, and that this literature has called Christian asceticism superficial and unjustifiable. When worldly writers write about spiritual exercises, their words are, in the overwhelming majority of cases, pitifully meager. But this is partly because of the lack of skill of their ecclesiastical opponents and partly because it is impossible to speak about ascetic experience outside of the experience itself. This leads to a situation in which the substantial differences between Christian asceti-

cism and the asceticism of other religions, especially the Hindu religion, are usually not recognized. To be sure, it is not difficult to "prove" the identity of the one and the other by comparing certain individual words and selected savings. But anyone who has penetrated into the heart of the two asceticisms knows that there is nothing more opposed than they. One asceticism is a flight, the other is a capture. One is gloomy; the other is joyful. One is based on the bad news of the evil that reigns in the world; the other is based on the good news of the victory that has defeated the evil of the world. One gives superiority, the other holiness. One emanates from man, the other from God. One despises creation, although it is involuntarily attracted by its evil, and attempts to acquire magical powers over it; the other is in love with creation, although it hates the sin eating away at it, and the ascetic does not need magical powers, because graceendowed creation will remove the voke of sin's heteronomy and will be able to live as it is in itself, in accordance with its originally given mode of being. For one kind of asceticism, all is illusory and only outwardly appears to be beautiful, while inwardly it is foul and full of rot. For the other kind of asceticism, all is full of reality, and visible beauty is only "dung" and corruption compared to what is concealed in the recesses of God's creation. For one kind of asceticism, creation is slavishly attached to its cause. For the other kind, creation is freely self-determined in relation to the Creator and Father. For one kind of asceticism, death is a constitutive element of creaturely life. For the other kind, it is an unintelligible, accidental phenomenon, already cut at the root by Christ. One kind of ascetic flees in order to flee, and hides; the other kind flees in order to become pure, and triumphs. One closes his eyes to creation; the other attempts to let the light enter them to see more clearly. There is nothing more opposite than these two kinds of asceticism. Despair and triumph, desolation and joy—that is the fundamental difference. 517

The more profound the ascesis is, the more clearly and sharply will these distinctive elements of the Christian relation to creation in general and to man in particular be defined. A Christian who does not fully accept ascesis, who has not trained himself in the school of asceticism; a Christian who continues to remain "of this world"⁵¹⁸; a Christian who is incapable of being and does not seek to be "above the confusion of the world"⁵¹⁹—such a Christian can blaspheme against God's creation, can frown with disgust at and be repelled by various natural phenomena of creaturely life. Consider: who is repelled by marriage more than the intelligentsia? Is not Tolstoy's *Kreutzer Sonata*, that typical product of the intelligentsia, ^d foul and blasphemous? Does not the look, full of conde-

^d The Russian intelligentsia is a phenomenon *sui genesis*. It can be likened to a monastic order, but where the religious zeal or piety has been replaced by revolutionary ardor. The intelligentsia was always in opposition to the government; it was always conformist in adopting radical ideas and life-styles; it often believed in free love, despised the family,

scending aversion and foulness at the same time, that people of a "scientific" worldview cast at the body deny the body in its mysterious depth, in its mystical root? Asceticism is not accepted because its fundamental idea—the idea of deification, ⁵²⁰ the idea (let me be bold enough to use a term damaged by heretics) of the holy body—is not accepted.

When the intelligentsia reproaches the church's understanding of life with metaphysical dualism, it does not notice that it dumps the falsity of dualism from itself onto the Church.⁵²¹ Meanwhile, patristic theology reveals with ultimate definitiveness the truth that eternal life is the life not of the soul only but also of the body. Thus, according to St. Gregory of Nyssa, "he zōē autē ou tēs psuchēs esti monon, alla kai tou sōmatos." ⁵²² Not only the "soul of a Christian" becomes a "coparticipant in the Divine nature." ⁵²³ But so does his body. A man is united with God both in spirit and body, as Symeon the New Theologian says: "homo Deo spiritualiter corporaliterque unitur." ⁵²⁴ And so on. Purification of the heart opens the eyes to the world above and thereby organizes the whole man. The soul is sanctified and the body is sanctified; to a holy soul is joined a holy body.

The pillars of the church's understanding of life, St. Irenaeus of Lyons, St. Methodius of Olympus, St. Athanasius the Great, St. John Chrysostom, and many others, express this idea so clearly and hold so firmly to it that any reader who has been looking at ascesis with the eyes of secular writers, of writers who speak about ascesis either in ignorance or with evil intent against the Holy Church, cannot fail to be astonished.

The idea of the holy body . . .

Fasts serve this idea, and for the same inner reason that it rejects fasting, the intelligentsia is ashamed of eating. Members of the intelligentsia are sincere in this, and the horror is that they are sincere. They can neither eat nor (especially) partake. They do not even know the meaning of the word "partake," nor the meaning of holy food. They do not "partake" of God's gift; they do not even "eat" plain food. Rather, they "gobble up" chemical substances. Only a naked, animal "physiological function" is performed, a function which is excruciatingly shameful. And members of the intelligentsia are repelled by, are ashamed of, this "function." They are ashamed but they do it. That is why a member of the intelligentsia eats cynically, and why he marries cynically, defiantly, injuring his own sense of shame and that of others. The soul experiences not calm and peace but agitation and heaviness, the first sign of a soul without grace, ungrateful to life, rejecting God's priceless gift, and proudly wishing to re-create all of being the way it wants.

thought that art should serve a utilitarian purpose; it was honest, self-sacrificing, naive, ignorant of Russian realities. It believed in the primacy of reason over spirit; indeed, it denied spirit and was thoroughly antireligious. Historically, the intelligentsia came into being at the end of the 18th century and lasted into the 20th century, where it was wiped out by the revolution that it had yearned for and embraced.

In order to demonstrate how different the Church's attitude is from the intelligentsia's aversion or insensitivity to the world, let us cite several canons that refer to the life of the body. These are church rules that establish the relation of believers to the body. Let me mention that this kind of Church consciousness is expressed not by eudaemonists but by ascetics and champions of the idea of asceticism.

Here are the rules of the Holy Apostles:

Rule 5. A bishop, presbyter, or deacon should not chase away his wife under the pretext of piety. If he chases her away, he will be excommunicated. If he remains adamant, let him be excluded from the priesthood.

Rule 51. If any bishop, presbyter, deacon, or any other member of the clergy, distance himself from marriage, meat, or wine not because of the ascesis of abstinence but because of aversion, having forgotten that all this is good and that God, in having created man, created man male and female, he commits blasphemy and slanders creation. Either he will reform or he will be excluded from the priesthood and excommunicated from the Church. The same holds for the laity.⁵²⁵

The rules of the local Council of Gangra are even stronger. According to Zonar and Balsamon, 526 "the council in Gangra in the Metropolia of Phaphlagonia was held after the first Nicaean council, against a certain Eustathius and his followers, who, slandering lawful marriage, said that no one who is married can hope for salvation from God. Both husbands and wives believed this. Husbands chased away their wives, while wives left their husbands and wished to live chastely, but, finding the unmarried life unbearable, fell into adultery. The followers of Eustathius taught much else that was against Church tradition and custom, kept the church donations, and the women wore men's clothing and cut their hair. They also preached fasts on Sunday, while rejecting fasts established in the church. They were averse to meat and did not wish to pray or to receive communion in the homes of married people. They had an aversion to married priests and despised as impure places where the relics of martyrs were found. They condemned those who had money but did not give it away, as if salvation were hopeless for them. And they preached and taught much else. Thus, against them the holy fathers gathered in council and expounded the rules appended below . . . "

Here are some of these rules:

Rule 1. If anyone condemns marriage and has an aversion to a faithful and pious wife who couples with her husband, or condemns this wife as one who cannot enter into the Kingdom, let him be under anathema.

Rule 4. If anyone says about a presbyter who has entered into marriage that he is not worthy to serve communion, let him be under anathema.

Rule 9. If anyone is a virgin or abstains, avoiding marriage, not because of the intrinsic goodness and sanctity of virginity but because he has an aversion to marriage, let him be under anathema.

Rule. 10. If anyone who is a virgin for the sake of the Lord claims he is superior to one who is married, let him be under anathema.

Rule 14. If any wife leaves her husband and desires to go away because she has an aversion to marriage, let her be under anathema.⁵²⁷

And so on. Similar anathemas were placed on those condemning silk and beautiful clothing, on those with an aversion to meat, and on those who arbitrarily choose to fast on Sunday, and so on.⁵²⁸

Here are examples of how the Church views God-given life and its manifestations. The rationalist intellectual who lives by homoiousia "loves" in words the whole world and considers everything "natural." But in practice he hates the whole world in its concrete life and would like to destroy it, in order to replace it with the concepts of his rational mind, i.e., with, in essence, his self-assertive I. And he has an aversion to all that is "natural," for the natural is alive and therefore it is concrete and cannot be stuffed into a concept. But the rationalist intellectual wishes to see only the artificial everywhere, to see everywhere not life but formulas and concepts, his own formulas and concepts. The 18th century, which was the century of the intelligentsia par excellence and which was not unjustifiably called the "Age of Enlightenment" (an "enlightenment" of the intelligentsia type, to be sure), set as its goal: "Everything artificial, nothing natural!" Artificial nature in the form of manicured gardens, artificial language, artificial mores, artificial (revolutionary) statecraft, artificial religion. The ultimate in this striving for artificiality and mechanicity was attained by design by the greatest representative of the intelligentsia, Kant, in whom—from his habits of life to the highest principles of his philosophy—there was nothing natural, and could be nothing natural. If you will, this mechanization of all of life has its own-horriblegrandiosity, the spirit of the fallen Lucifer. Nevertheless, all these contrivances are, of course, supported only by whatever creativity they can steal from God-given life. And one must say the same thing about the contemporary improvers of Kant.

A genuine Christian ascetic views life in a wholly different way. Although he considers the existing order not "natural" but a perversion of nature, he nevertheless loves the world with a true love and he mercifully

tolerates the dirt that has settled on the world, covering it with his meekness. To use the words of Abba Thalassius: "Loving all men, he loves nothing human," 529 i.e., nothing proper to sinful humanity. In developing the saintly Abba's thought in accordance with the wisdom of the holy fathers, one could say that, in loving all of creation, he loves nothing "creaturely," i.e., nothing proper to fallen creation. One must not have an aversion to anything or be irritated by anything. One must not even be irritated by oneself and one's weaknesses. 530 Equanimity of soul, not excluding saintly anger sometimes, but without irritation, nervousness, hysteria—that is the constant mood of the ascetic. He lives in a measured and peaceful way, the progress of his ascesis resembling the movement of the sun through the heavens. 531

The higher the Christian ascetic ascends on his path to the heavenly land, the brighter his inner eye shines, the deeper the Holy Spirit descends into his heart—the more clearly then will he see the inner, absolutely valuable core of creation, the more intensely then will pity for the prodigal child of God burn in his soul. And when the spirit descended on the saints in their highest flights of prayer, they shone with blindingly radiant love for creation. The Mother of Heaven Herself told one of her chosen that "to be a monk is to devote oneself to prayer for the whole world." ⁵³²

Asceticism as a historical phenomenon is a direct continuation of charismatism. In essence, ascetics are late charismatics while charismatics are early ascetics. The spirit-bearers are indisputably related to the ascetics that we find the most striking examples of a feeling that I can only call the being-in-love with creation.

That is why in "The Great Canon of our venerable father Andrew of Crete and Jerusalem," i.e., at the moment of utmost repentance and self-flagellation, where the ascetic aspect of Orthodoxy reaches its highest peak, conscience flagellates us with the memory of the crime against the body:

O, how I have competed with Lamech, the first murderer, having killed the soul like a man, the mind like an adolescent, the body like my brother, as the murderer Cain did, by my lustful urges.⁵³⁴

That is one of numerous wails of a repenting soul. The corruption of the creaturely organism is considered a great sin, and the body is called a brother, just as, many centuries later, Francis of Assisi called his body "brother ass," and just as St. Seraphim of Sarov called the flesh "our friend." "One should not," St. Seraphim said, "do ascetic exercises with-

out measure. One must strive to make our friend—our flesh—faithful and capable of virtue."

This is the same idea that, in another tonality, appears in the burial service:

I cry and weep when I think of death and see our beauty created in the image of God grotesque now and wordless, without form. 535

Or also:

I cry and weep when I think of death, and see lying in the grave our beauty created in the image of God grotesque now, without glory, without form. 536

Or:

O miraculous thing! What is this mystery? How will we be delivered to death? How will we be linked to death?

Or:

I am the image of Thy ineffable glory, and I bear the sores of sin. 537

What is this beauty created in the image of God? From the hymn just cited, it is clear that it is the same beauty that lies grotesque "in the grave," without form, corrupt. Our body is in fact this beauty, this image of ineffable Divine glory. Let us mention that this—liturgical—understanding of the image of God is characteristic of the Russian people and was expressed most spectacularly in the unanimous struggle of Russians against the shaving of beards. This understanding of the image of God is also confirmed in the patristic literature. Thus, Tertullian and St. Augustine saw the image of God, man's likeness to God, precisely in the human *body*.

These passages are chosen nearly at random. One could write a whole book about the idea of the body as an absolutely valuable principle in the liturgical literature. At present, we still do not have a liturgical theology, that is, a systematization of the theological ideas contained in our liturgy. But the Church's living self-consciousness is precisely there, for the liturgy is the flower of Church life and also its root and seed. What richness of ideas and new concepts in the domain of dogmatics, what abundance of profound psychological observations and moral guidance could be

gathered here even by a not very diligent investigator! Yes, liturgical theology awaits its creator.

God and the world, spirit and flesh, virginity and marriage are antinomic with respect to each other, are in a mutual relation of thesis and antithesis. This antinomic character may be almost unnoticeable for superficial religious perception. The thesis and antithesis are essentially reduced to zero here. A man who has not experienced struggle and who has not traveled the ascetic road understands the inner beauty neither of the thesis nor of the antithesis. Thus, for superficial faith, debauchery is something like marriage, and marriage differs little from debauchery; the two converge at some sort of semimarriage and semidebauchery. It is not by chance that this religiously superficial world in one of its parts is called, and in another must in all justice be called, not "light" and not "darkness" but half-light. The entire intelligentsia, in its mystical essence, is precisely a "demi-monde," or at least has the "demi-monde" as its master setting the tone. This is the inevitable life-feeling of "earthened" souls.

As a person is spiritualized, the beauty of one or the other side of the antinomy is emphasized in the consciousness. The antinomy becomes more acute. The thesis and antithesis become more and more incompatible in the rational mind. And, for the higher religious consciousness, the antinomy turns out to be an inwardly unified and inwardly integral spiritual value. Whatever half of the antinomy the spiritualized ascetic takes, its polarly complementary double will become established in the consciousness with a power that is directly proportional to the religious elevation of the ascetic. In particular, only true virginity is capable of understanding the whole significance of marriage. A height is measurable only from a height; a mountain grows in the eyes in proportion to the ascent to the opposite peak. In the same way, one can understand the holiness of marriage and its qualitative difference from debauchery only from the height of a chaste consciousness. Only a true virginity, a virginity full of grace, understands that marriage is not an "institution" of civil society but has its origin in God Himself. On the other hand, only a pure marriage, only a conjugal consciousness full of grace, makes it possible to understand the significance of virginity. Only a married man understands that monasticism is not an "institution" of the ecclesiastical-juridical order but has been established by God Himself, and that monasticism differs qualitatively from the exasperation of the unmarried. The same thing goes for other aspects of the life of the body.⁵⁴¹

Let us pass now to the general question of creation. Here, we have the same antinomy. Let us present several specific examples of this antinomy.

^e There is an untranslatable pun in this passage. *Svet* can mean both [radiant] "light" and "world" (as in the world of society); thus, *polu-svet* can mean "half-light" or "half-world" (*demi-monde*).

Consider Origen. He was an ascetic who was called "Adamantine" for his ascetic acts and spent only four obols (about 15 kopecks) a day, and that in expensive Alexandria. He was an ascetic who often kept vigils and observed severe fasts. He was a spiritualist of spiritualists, and even castrated himself, as rumor has it, for the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven. The *rationalistic* complement to all this would be hatred of creation. But that is not the way it is in the living antinomicalness of life. Listen to Origen! (Let me only mention that, in Origen's view, the celestial lights are the bodies of angels, who have voluntarily agreed to submit themselves to vanity in order to serve the cosmic process and universal restoration):

"Look now"—the philosopher-ascetic nearly cries in the ecstasy of prayer—"look now, to these beings [celestial lights] who are subject to vanity not willingly but by the will of the Subjecter, and who are found in the hope of the Promise—is it not possible to apply the following exclamation of Paul: '[I have] a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better' (Phil 1:23). At least I think that the Sun could say the same thing: '[I have] a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better'. But Paul adds: 'Nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you' (Phil. 1:24). And the sun really could say: 'To remain in this celestial and radiant body is more needful for the sake of the revelation of the sons of God.' The same thing should be thought and said about the moon and stars. Let us now see what is this freedom of creation and the liberation from slavery. When Christ surrenders the Kingdom to God and the Father, then these animate beings, together with the whole Kingdom, will be surrendered to the government of the Father. Then 'God will be all in all.' But these beings belong to all. Therefore, God will be in them as He will be in all."542

Let us offer one more example: "Let not the sun go down upon your wrath" (Eph. 4:26), wrote the Apostle Paul to the Ephesians. Consider the profound explanation that St. Anthony the Great gives to the Apostle's words: "Not only upon wrath but upon all your sins, for the sun can condemn you for your daytime act, for an evil thought." 543

Consider the Abyssinian saint Yafkerana-Egzie of Gugubena, 544 "a most pure and radiant star," as he is called in his *Life*. We read the following in his *Life*: "In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, we begin with the help of our Lord Jesus Christ to write the life and ascetic acts, the labor, and the abstinence not only from bread and water, but also from idle words, deadening the soul. And let us remember the abundance of patience shown to people; but what he did secretly, who knows this except his Creator? We will tell the goodness of our Abba Yafkerana-Egzie, exceptional in works. We will not tell the half of this but [will describe only] what has come to the tongue or chanced before the eyes, as the Book of Proverbs says: 'There is a sea the length, width,

and depth of which are unknown, and a bird came called the Ewit, the smallest of all birds. She flew down and drank from this sea.' O beloved, can the sea be exhausted by the drinking of a bird? In the same way, the life of this abba-monk cannot be exhausted, this evangelical star; the head of bright stars; meek in heart, whose tear was ever close to his eye for God's love; this lamenter for all, for people and animals and even for worms." "Truly," it is said elsewhere in the Life, "we have our father Yafkerena-Egzie, who prays for us, and not for us alone, but for the whole universe: for the emperor and the metropolitan that God give them Orthodox faith; for Christians that they observe this faith; for pagans that they be converted; and that mercy be given to all creation." "And he was honored by kings, the makuanens and the seums, for his poverty and asceticism. He was frightening to them like a frightening lion. All who came to him, he comforted to the good. To all his house was open." His ascetic acts were the most severe. "He fasted day and night." "He rejected this world in order to acquire the other world; he shut his ears in order not to hear an idle word; he shut his eyes in order not to see vanity, desiring to see the face of Jesus, the Heavenly Bridegroom, and to hear distinctly His sweet voice. He stopped speaking to people, for he was subjugated by love of God," and with visitors he communicated only with signs or by means of the alphabet. "Then," the Life continues, "he took upon himself harsh ascesis, work, vigil, prayer, bowing, frequent fasting with prayer, where his tears cascaded like streams of water. He took upon himself abstinence and silence. The bones grew visible beneath his flesh; the skin of his head became harder; his eyes grew dim from a multitude of tears; his feet became heavy from much standing; and he became emaciated from the forgetting of food and drink. Brothers, this was in the open, but what he did secretly no one knows except his Creator. In this harsh ascesis, he spent six years. Then he went to the land of Hamla and climbed a mountain called Aifarba. He lived there for a year, eating plants of the desert, fruits of the trees, and roots." In his further life, "his food was three measures a year not of bread but of fruits of the grass, and who knows except his Creator whether he ate or did not eat?" For three years he did not drink water [note that in the heat thirst is particularly excruciating]; instead, he quenched his thirst by dipping three stalks of a certain plant into water and then squirting this water into his mouth during dinner. "On days when it rained, he would clean a stone and would drink from it the little that flowed off." "Yet another act of spiritual ascesis: He would fast for forty days, excluding Saturdays, not partaking of anything, not leaves, nor water. Thus he spent three fortyday periods. Comprehend, man, if you have a mind: three times forty. Is this not 120 days? And this, as I said, he did not one year but three years." "Yet another act of spiritual ascesis: he bowed 7,000 times an hour, like

a wheel, and the number of bows was 42,000. He did not know a three-day fast but only four-day and five-day fasts, and would also fast for seven days at a time." Once he settled on "the island of Galila, where there were no people, but where there was a desert. He lived there in fasting and prayer and in tears for three years, glorifying God. He abstained for three years, and he did not have a helper in the chopping of wood, or in the drawing of water, or in consolation. He arranged his life there like one without flesh."

Such are the acts of ascesis of this lamenter for worms, this prayer for creation. Here, is a highly significant tale, which makes manifest the Saint's attitude toward creation.

"Listen again," invites the Life, "to something of the magnificence of this exceptionally pious Abba Yafkerana-Egzie, this most venerable star. In those days there was a monk, a saint of God, by the name of Zacharias. He lived on the island of Galela, where the Saint Abba Yafkerena-Egzie once lived. They perceived each other with spiritual eyes and loved each other greatly. Once they agreed: 'Let us meet on Lake Azaf, I coming from Guegueben, you from Galela, in order to rejoice together in the magnificence of God.' And they named a day. And, here, the exceptional Yafkerana-Egzie got out of bed in Dabra Guegueben and put on his sandals. And the two of them went, as on dry land, over the lake by the power of their Lord God, and they met in the middle of the lake and embraced spiritually. Abba Zacharias removed his sandals and shook the dust from them, Abba Yafkerana-Egzie also removed his sandals and found a little moisture on them. He showed his sandals to Abba Zacharias: 'My beloved brother, why are my sandals wet, but I see that you are shaking the dust from yours? Tell me, I ask you, my beloved.' Abba Zacharias answered and told him: 'Father, get up. Let us pray to our Lord God to reveal to us why there was moisture in your sandals.' Hearing this, Abba Yafkerena-Egzie said, 'Yes, let it be as you say.' They got up together and prayed. After the prayer, Abba Zacharias said to Abba Yafkerana-Egzie: 'Father, this is granted to me not for my excellence, but for the greatness of your prayer. Your sandals are wet because you hid some barley seeds so that birds would not eat them, whereas God is merciful and provides for all creatures and gives them to eat. That is why there was moisture on your sandals.' Hearing these words, Abba Yafkerena-Egzie told Abba Zacharias: 'Pray for me, father.' And they stayed in conversation till midday, and then returned to their monasteries. The excellent Father Yafkerena-Egzie stopped hiding barley seeds from the birds and continued praying about this matter. A few days later Abba Yafkerana-Egzie got out of bed, and put on his sandals as before. The two brothers had agreed spiritually that they would meet on this day. And Abba Zacharias rose from his bed on the island of Galela and put on his sandals as before.

And they both walked on the lake as on dry land, and met at the previous place. And they took off their sandals, shook off the dust, and no moisture was found on the sandals of the saintly Abba Yafkerana-Egzie . . . "

This story is just one of a great multitude found in the *vitae* of the ascetic saints. Nearly all of them depict the life of the saint in the midst of nature, "with beasts," how wild beasts obey him, and how he cares for them. Frequent are the miracles of the subjugation of animals and their service of saints. "He lived with beasts." These few words, so often encountered in the *vitae* of the ascetic saints, these four words express the whole essence of a new, reconciled, restored life together with all of creation. This is true "chiliasm," about which the contemporary defenders of the false chiliastic idea do not even dare to dream. But, because of insufficient space, I will not present any examples. Such examples can be found in abundance in the *vitae* of the saints and in pateriks.

Consider Hermas, the Roman charismatic and ascetic of the 1st century and the beginning of the 2nd century. His *Shepherd* is written entirely in ascetic-eschatological tones. But here too, the rigor of abstinence is combined with amazing, profound boldness in the experience of beauty.

Hermas begins his Shepherd in this way: "The master, who reared me, had sold me to one Rhoda in Rome. After many years, I met her again, and began to love her as a sister. After a certain time I saw her bathing in the river Tiber; and I gave her my hand, and led her out of the river. So, seeing her beauty, I reasoned in my heart, saying, 'Happy were I, if I had such a one to wife both in beauty and in character.' I merely reflected on this and nothing more. After a certain time, as I was journeying to Cumae, and glorifying God's creatures for their greatness and splendor and power, as I walked I fell asleep. And a Spirit took me, and bore me away through a pathless tract, through which no man could pass; for the place was precipitous, and broken into clefts by reason of the waters. When then I had crossed the river, I came into the level country, and knelt down, and began to pray to the Lord and to confess my sins. Now, while I prayed, the heaven was opened, and I saw the lady, whom I had desired, greeting me from heaven, saying, "Good morrow, Hermas.' And, looking at her, I said to her, 'Lady, what doest thou here?' Then she answered me, 'I was taken up, that I might convict thee of thy sins before the Lord.' I said to her, 'Dost thou now convict me?' 'Nay, not so,' said she, 'but hear the words that I shall say to thee. God, Who dwelleth in the heavens, and created of nothing the things which are, and increased and multiplied them for His holy Church's sake, is wroth with thee, for that thou didst sin against me.' I answered her and said, 'Sin against thee? In what way? Did I ever speak an unseemly word unto thee? Did I not always regard thee as a goddess? Did I not always respect thee as a sister? How couldst thou falsely charge me, lady, with such villainy and uncleanness?' Laughing she saith unto me, 'The desire after evil entered into thine heart. Nay, thinkest thou not that it is an evil deed for a righteous man, if the evil desire should enter into his heart? It is indeed

a sin and a great one too,' saith she; 'for the righteous man entertaineth righteous purposes. While then his purposes are righteous, his repute stands steadfast in the heavens, and he finds the Lord easily propitiated in all that he does. But they that entertain evil purposes in their hearts bring upon themselves death and captivity . . . ' As soon as she had spoken these words the heavens were shut; and I was given over to horror and grief. Then I said within myself, 'If this sin is recorded against me, how can I be saved? Or how shall I propitiate God for my sins which are full-blown? Or with what words shall I entreat the Lord that He may be propitious unto me?' While I was advising and discussing these matters in my heart, I saw before me a great white chair of snow-white wool; and there came an aged lady in glistening raiment, having a book in her hands, and she sat down alone, and she saluted me, 'Good morrow, Hermas.' Then I grieved and weeping, said, 'Good morrow, lady.' And she said to me, 'Why so gloomy, Hermas, thou that art patient and good-tempered, and art always smiling? Why so downcast in thy looks, and far from cheerful?' And I said to her, 'Because of an excellent lady's saying that I had sinned against her.' Then she said, 'Far be this thing from the servant of God! Nevertheless the thought did enter into thy heart concerning her. Now to the servants of God such a purpose bringeth sin. For it is an evil and mad purpose to overtake a devout spirit that hath been already approved, that it should desire an evil deed, and especially if it be Hermas the temperate, who abstaineth from every evil desire, and is full of all simplicity and of great guilelessness."546f

Such is the transgression of the great abstainer and spirit-bearer Hermas, who spent his days, as we see, in fasts and prayers. This is before the acquisition of the fullness of the Spirit; the Tower of the Church has not yet been fully built. But here, in a new vision, Hermas sees—as a prophecy of the future—the Tower of the Church in a finished form. The ascetic purification of the world has been completed; the fullness of time has been realized. The shepherd shows the Divine Building to Hermas. Here, Hermas prophetically looks into the future and describes the attained purity of creation. Here is a picture of the future, full of unpretentious elegance: 547

The Shepherd who was serving as Hermas' guide "desired to go away. But I"—Hermas tells us—"caught hold of his wallet, and began to adjure him by the Lord that he would explain to me what he had showed me. He saith to me: 'I must rest for a little while, and then I will explain everything to thee. Await me here till I come.' I say to him: 'Sir, when I am here alone what shall I do?' 'Thou art not alone,' saith he; 'for these virgins are here with thee.' 'Commend me then to them,' say I. The shepherd calleth them to him and saith to them: 'I commend this man to you till I come,'

^f All the translations given here of passages from *The Shepherd of Hermas* are adapted from Bishop Lightfoot. The bibliographical information on the edition used is given in note *c* on p. 207.

and he departed. So I was alone with the virgins; and they were most cheerful, and kindly disposed to me, especially the four of them that were the more glorious in appearance. The virgins say to me: 'Today the shepherd cometh not here.' 'What then shall I do?' say I. 'Stay for him,' say they, 'till eventide; and if he come, he will speak with thee; but if he come not, thou shalt stay here with us till he cometh.' I say to them: 'I will await him till evening, and if he come not, I will depart home and return early in the morning.' But they answered and said unto me: 'To us thou wast entrusted; thou canst not depart from us.' 'Where then,' say I 'shall I remain?' 'Thou shalt pass the night with us,' say they, 'as a brother, not as a husband, for thou art our brother, and henceforward we will dwell with thee; for we love thee dearly.' But I was ashamed to abide with them. And she that seemed to be the chief of them began to kiss and embrace me; and the others seeing her embrace me, they too began to kiss me, and to lead me round the tower, and to sport with me. And I had become as it were a younger man, and I commenced myself likewise to sport with them. For some of them began to dance, others to skip, others to sing. But I kept silence and walked with them round the tower, and was glad with them. But when evening came I wished to go away home; but they would not let me go, but detained me. And I stayed the night with them, and I slept by the side of the tower. For the virgins spread their linen tunics on the ground, and made me lie down in the midst of them, and they did nothing else but pray; and I prayed with them without ceasing, and not less than they. And the virgins rejoiced that I so prayed. And I stayed there with the virgins until the morning till the second hour. Then came the shepherd, and saith to the virgins: 'Have ve done him any injury?' 'Ask him,' say they. I say to him, 'Sir, I was rejoiced to stay with them.' 'On what didst thou sup?' saith he. 'I supped, Sir,' say I, 'on the words of the Lord the whole night through.' 'Did they treat thee well?' saith he. 'Yes, Sir, sav I.'"

Such is the victory over sin that lives in the flesh. Such is the innocence that crowns ascesis. But this innocence is the illumination and spiritualization of sex, not its sexless and unilluminated removal: the blossoming of sex, not castration. This victory, this innocence, this holy illuminated state is achieved through the acquisition of the Spirit—in communion with mysterious maidens, representing the gifts of the Spirit. The fullness of virginity is found only in the fullness of the Spirit, that is, *at the end* of the ascesis of all of ecclesial humanity, in the deified body of creation. The preliminary fullness of innocence is found only in the preliminary fullness of the Spirit, that is, at the end of the ascesis of an individual Christian, in the deified flesh of a saint. A holy relic (understanding this word both literally and symbolically) is the dry, leafless, and as if dead seed of a holy body: "It will not come to life if it does not die." According to the higher, spiritual law of identity, self-affirmation lies in self-

negation, whereas, according to the lower, fleshly law of identity, self-negation lies in self-affirmation. Just as a phoenix, building a fire of death for itself like a nest, is reborn in the flame, so the flesh is resurrected in the flery rejection of itself, because this fiery baptism is only the side of spiritual renewal that is turned toward sin. There is no other way. And indicating to Hermas that the image of higher purity revealed to him is an ideal that is attained not through gradual approach, not through continuous development, but through discontinuous rejection of selfhood, the Church insists in advance on abstinence and even prescribes to Hermas that henceforth he live with his wife as with a sister⁵⁴⁸ (an ascetic act that was very common among the early Christians but which—owing to abuses that had crept in—was eliminated in its original form and later took the form of monasticism).

The virginal purity represented by Hermas is an ideal, just as the fullness of the Holy Spirit is an aspiration. But the highest peaks of saintly humanity are already illuminated by the rays of the Coming Light, the Apocalyptic Christ. By ascesis these peaks have acquired the Spirit, and in the gifts of grace of the Comforter they find strength for the higher love of creation. These are "chosen vessels of the Spirit," vessels full of grace to the rim." Hermas himself represents a purity unattainable for men without grace. Perhaps St. John Chrysostom⁵⁵¹ and St. Athanasius the Great had similar relations to kindred female souls. Let me also mention St. Seraphim of Sarov and Theophanus the Recluse.

Consider the miraculous Abba John, the father superior of Mount Sinai, who lived in the 6th century. His *Ladder*, especially the first half, is capable of turning an unprepared and disorderly heart to stone with icy horror. Let me mention the 5th Sermon, where the "Dungeon" with its most severe self-torments is described. The 15th Sermon has the title: "On incorruption and immaculateness and on chastity, which corruptible mortals attain by ascesis and intense labors." Here, in a series of measures directed toward isolation, the prejudiced or inattentive reader can find the most abundant material to prove that asceticism is slow self-castration. ⁵⁵³ Perhaps, one cannot find in the whole ascetic literature another selection of such plausible proofs of this. But this John, the most severe of the severe, hurries to express his secret aspirations, conveying with enthusiasm the almost-realized end of the ascetic way.

"Someone told me," says John, 554 "of the extraordinary and highest limit of immaculateness. For someone, in looking at beauty, highly glorified the Creator for it. And from one look at it, he became immersed in God's love and in the source of tears. And it was amazing to see that what was the slough of perdition for one, for another supernaturally became a crown." Climacus adds: "If such a one has always in such feelings become habituated to this manner of action, he has been resurrected as incorruptible prior to the universal resurrection."

The goal of ascesis, as is well known, is to attain the incorruptibility and deification of the flesh through the acquisition of the Spirit. Therefore, this incorruptibility is, in the eyes of the most severe of the ascetic writers, not an inner castration of the ascetic, not an ataraxy, and not an indifference, but a higher responsiveness to the beauty of the flesh, the ability to be moved to tears, to cry from delight at the sight of a beautiful female body. Excruciating ascesis and inspired delight turn out to be antinomically coupled in the question of sex, as in other questions.

Climacus says further: "The same rule will also guide us with respect to chants. Both worldly and spiritual songs will cause lovers of God to experience joy and love of God and tears. For lovers of pleasure, it is exactly the opposite." 555

Thus, the goal of the ascetic's strivings is to perceive *all* of creation in its original triumphant beauty. The Holy Spirit reveals itself in the ability to see the beauty of creation. Always to see beauty in everything would be "to be resurrected before the universal resurrection," to have a foretaste of the last Revelation, that of the Comforter.

This "someone" to whom John Climacus refers is St. Nonas, ⁵⁵⁶ bishop of Edessa from 448, then bishop of Heliopolis, and finally bishop of Edessa from 457 until his death in 471. Bishop Nonas founded in Edessa the first hospital of the ancient world. The woman mentioned in the passage cited was at that time by no means a saint; on the contrary, known by all of Antioch, where Nonas chanced to be at the time, she was the prostitute Pelagia, called Margarita, the Pearl, because of the poshness of her life. There is a detailed account of her meeting with Nonas in the "Life of our saintly mother Pelagia, who was formerly a prostitute," written by an eyewitness, the deacon of the church of Heliopolis, Jacob. ⁵⁵⁷ Unfortunately, this story is too long to reproduce here, and thus we will cite only the beginning:

"The saintly archbishop of Antioch, for certain needs of the church, had gathered together eight bishops from neighboring cities. Among them was Nonas, a saintly man of God, my bishop, who had come from Heliopolis and taken me with him. He was a righteous man and a perfect monk from the monastery of Tavenisiot who was elevated to the episcopate because of his virtuous life. When the bishops were assembled in the church of the saintly martyr Julian, they desired to hear an edifying sermon from Nonas and they all sat near the church doors. Nonas began his sermon by saying what was useful and salvific for those who listened to him. And while all were astonished by his saintly teaching, a certain woman of the unfaithful passed before the church doors. She was a prostitute famous in all of Antioch. She walked with great pride, wore very expensive garments, and was adorned in gold, rare stones, and pearls. She

was surrounded by a crowd of richly attired young men and women, wearing collars of gold. Her face was so beautiful that no man of the world could get enough of the vision of her beauty. As she passed before them, filling the air with perfume, the bishops saw her walking so shamelessly, her head uncovered, her shoulders bared. She closed her eyes and, with a light sigh, turned her face away as from a great sin. As for the blessed Nonas, he looked at her long and attentively until she was forced to hide herself from his eyes. And then he turned to the bishops, and said: 'Do you not love the great beauty of this woman?' As they did not answer, Nonas bent his head and, crying, collected his tears in his handkerchief and then moistened his cheeks. Sighing from the depths of his heart, he then asked the bishops again: 'Do you not savor her beauty?' They were still silent. Nonas then said to them: 'Verily, I have learned much from her, for the Lord will place this woman at His terrible judgment and will condemn us with her. What do you think? How many hours this woman spends in her room, washing and dressing herself, taking all thought and care to appear the most beautiful woman of all in the eyes of her temporary admirers. But we who have in heaven the immortal Bridegroom, Whom the angels desire to see, do not concern ourselves with adorning our damned soul, which is completely bad, naked, and shameful. Let us try to wash our soul with the tears of repentance, and to adorn it with the beauty of virtues, so that it is presentable to the eyes of God and is not humiliated and rejected at the marriage of the Lamb."

Love of creation is expressed even more powerfully in the greatest representatives of Orthodox asceticism, St. Macarius the Great and Isaac the Syrian, true pillars of the Church. Both describe states of the highest ascent and the greatest spirituality. Rationalistic argumentation might lead one to conclude that this is a mere soaring in empty space, the boundless and great Nothing of non-Christian mystics. But no. One finds the greatest concreteness and fullness here. Here, consciousness sees creation in its wholeness and its eternal content, with the trembling aura of all-triumphant, incorruptible beauty.

St. Macarius the Great went through an ascesis that seems to surpass human powers, and barely sustained life in his body. His pupil Evagrius, suffering from thirst, once asked his master for permission to drink some water. The love-abundant elder answered him: "Be grateful that you are in shadow; many are deprived even of that comfort. It is now twenty years that I eat, drink, and sleep no more than is needed to sustain life." Indeed, he himself partook of food only once a week. When he chanced to partake of food with hermits, and those offered him wine, the saint did not refuse, but later, for one cup of wine drunk, he did not drink water for an entire day. His poverty and renunciation of property were so extreme that he advised against having even those books from which others could receive edification. And he himself helped thieves carry things out of his

cell. His immeasurable love and meekness toward everything are too well known to mention.⁵⁵⁹ But here is what the saint himself says about the moments of pneumatophany:

"Those worthy of becoming children of God and of being born from above from the Holy Spirit, and having Christ in themselves, illuminating them and giving them peace, are led by the Spirit in diverse ways, and grace invisibly acts in their hearts as a source of spiritual peace. Let us borrow the images of visible pleasures in the world to show to some degree the presence of grace in the soul. There are times when they [bearers of the spirit] become joyous as at a king's feast, rejoicing in ineffable merriment. At other times they are like a bride finding peace in communion with the bridegroom in divine peace. At times they are like bodiless angels, feeling their bodies to be so light; at times it is as if they are inebriated from strong drink, made merry and drunk by the Spirit in the inebriation of the Divine mysteries of the Spirit. At times it is as if they sorrow and lament for humankind and, praying for the whole Adam, raise a cry and wailing, burning with the love of the Spirit for mankind. At times they are enflamed to such rejoicing and love by the Spirit that, if it were possible, they would embrace all men in their flesh, without distinguishing the evil from the good. At times they so humble themselves before every man in the humility of the Spirit that they deem themselves to be worse than and more insignificant than all. Or they are constantly maintained by the Spirit in ineffable joy . . . At times a soul finds peace in great silence and quietude, abiding solely in spiritual delight and unutterable peace and well-being. At times, the soul is instructed by grace in a certain knowledge and in unutterable wisdom and knowledge of the Unfathomable Spirit, but it is impossible to express this with tongue and lips. At times a man becomes like one of the people [i.e., like everyone]. For when a soul approaches the perfection of the spirit, completely purified of all passions and united and fused with the Comforter Spirit through ineffable communion, and when, having merged with the Spirit, it is deemed worthy of becoming a spirit, it becomes wholly light, wholly an eye, wholly a spirit, wholly peace, wholly joy, wholly love, wholly mercy, wholly goodness and meekness."560 The same experiences are expressed even more strongly by an even stricter ascetic, ⁵⁶¹ St. Isaac the Syrian: ⁵⁶²

"The perfection of the whole ascesis consists in the three following things: repentance, purity, and the perfecting of self. What is repentance? Leaving what has passed and sorrowing over it. What is purity? The heart feeling pity for every creature. What is the perfecting of self? The depth of humility, that is, leaving all visible and invisible things [the visible is the sensuous; the invisible is the mental] and not caring about them."

"Another time he was again asked, What is repentance? And he answered: A contrite and humble heart. He was asked, What is humility? And he answered: A profound, voluntarily accepted dying to everything.

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And he was asked: What is a pitving heart? And he said: The heart's ardor felt for all of creation, for people, birds, animals, demons, and all creatures. And in his remembrance and contemplation of them, his eyes shed tears. From the great and strong pity that has grasped the heart, and from great constancy, his heart is filled with loving kindness, and he cannot bear or hear or see any harm or even small pain in creation. And owing to this, hourly with tears he prays for those without words, and even for the enemies of the Church, and for those who do harm to him, that they be purified and preserved. And he prays 'for every thing that creepeth upon the earth' with great pity, which is excited in his heart without measure, according to the likeness with God in this. The sign of those who have attained perfection is such: being burned at the stake ten times a day for their love of people would not satisfy them, just as Moses told God: 'Yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written' (Ex. 32:32). And as St. Paul says: 'For I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh' (Rom 9:3). And also: '[I] now rejoice in my sufferings for you' (Col. 1:24), gentiles. And other apostles for their love of the life of people received death in all manner of ways. The highest degree of all this taken together is God and the Lord. For love of creation, he let His Son die on the cross . . . " In another place, Abba Isaac relates the following: "They also tell of Abba Agathon, that he said: 'I would desire to find a leper, to take his body and to give him mine.' Do you see what perfect love is?"563

Thus, "purity is the heart feeling pity for every creature," and "a pitying heart is the heart's ardor felt for all of creation," when what is revealed to it is that side of every creature which is worthy of total love and which is therefore the eternal and holy side of every creature. And this includes "enemies of the Truth," that is, demons. Repentance leads to humility of the heart, i.e., to its dying to everything, the destruction within it of evil selfhood and the lower law of identity. The heart is purified of the filth that has separated it from God and from all creation. And separated by ascesis from separation, the heart becomes chaste. That is, it becomes a heart that selflessly perceives the beauty of creation, and it becomes enflamed with love for all creation. Putting greater or lesser emphasis on the various stages of this path, all ascetics say the same thing. But, of course, fullness of purity is something potential, not something given. But every time an ascetic has risen to some extent on the "ladder of paradise," the "sense of nature" emerges powerfully. Do you remember what Theophanus the Recluse said about the purifying significance of creation?⁵⁶⁴ But I will not present his words; I will do something better. I will present an excerpt from the notes of a pilgrim.⁵⁶⁵

"As I go about," writes the pilgrim, "I constantly say the prayer of Jesus, which is more precious and sweeter to me than anything else in the

world. I have no cares; nothing concerns me: I wish to avoid looking at all vain things; and I always wish to be in solitude. By habit I desire to do one thing only: to say the prayer constantly, and when I say it, I am very joyful. God knows what is happening to me. . . . Around this time I was reading my Bible and I felt that I was beginning to understand it more clearly, not as before when much seemed incomprehensible to me and I was often in doubt. When I began to pray with my heart, all that surrounded me appeared delightful to me. Trees, grass, birds, earth, air, light, all things seemed to tell me that they exist for man and show God's love for man. And all things pray and sing the glory of God. And from this I understood what the Philokalia calls 'knowledge of the words of creation,' and I saw a way in which I could speak with God's creatures. I also came to know through my own experience what paradise is and how the Kingdom of God is revealed in our hearts." "For a month," continues the pilgrim, "I slowly went my way and felt deeply how edifying good living examples are. I often read the Philokalia and confided all that I have said to a blind man of prayer. His edifying example instilled zeal, gratitude, and love of God in me. The prayer of the heart gladdened me to such a degree that I did not suppose there was anyone on earth happier than I, and I doubted whether there could be greater or better joy in the Kingdom of Heaven. Not only did I feel this inside my soul, but all outward things appeared delightful to me and all drew me to love and thank God. All was kindred to me; in all I found the image of the name of Jesus Christ."

In other words, all creation was revealed to our pilgrim as an eternal miracle of God, as a living being praying to its Creator and Father. Such a perception is highly typical for our pilgrims, and its individual features are embodied in many works of art. Sec. 267

I have presented just a few examples from a large number of documents to clarify the relationship between ascesis, the virginity of the soul, the bearing of spirit, love-pity for creation, and the being-in-love with creation. But I hope that these examples have clarified this relationship, this bridge leading the ascetic to the absolute root of creation, when, washed by the Holy Spirit, separated from his selfhood through self-purification, he has found in himself his own absolute root—that root of creation which is given to him through coparticipation in the depths of Trinitarian Love. A new question necessarily arises now: How is creation thought in itself? This is the question of Sophia.



Omnia conjungo. I unite all.

XI. Letter Ten: Sophia^a

....

It was then that I began to live a solitary life for the first time: I moved into a small lonely house. I was alone. I had no furniture, not even a bench to sit on; a clock was the only thing in my room. I sat on some sort of crate and did my work on it. Cold, emptiness, not enough to eat . . . It was especially frightening in the evenings. It would grow dark, and rain would begin to fall, rapping on the iron roof. Then suddenly the rain would beat down strongly, drowning out the crisp knocking of the pendulum. The rain would fall in sobs. The roof would sob in ultimate despair and cold desolation. The rain would beat down like clumps of frozen earth falling on the lid of a wooden coffin. The sensation I had was of my chest being open and of the cold rain flowing straight into me, into my

^a "References to Sophia or sophiology are apt to appear mysterious, puzzling, and obscure" to the non-Russian, writes Frederick C. Copleston (*Russian Religious Philosophy: Selected Aspects* [Notre Dame, 1988], p. 81). "Such references would presumably seem less obscure to a devout member of the Russian Orthodox Church, who was aware of, say, the icons of St. Sophia at Novgorod and Kiev, not to speak of the dedication of the great basilica at Constantinople. But for most westerners reference to sophiology, if it suggests anything at all, is likely to conjure up the idea of some obscure esoteric doctrine, a product of theosophical or gnostic speculation, peripheral to the Christian faith or even a superfluous addition thereto. For Solovyov [see note c on p. 432], however, the idea of Sophia was connected with that of Godmanhood, and Sergius Bulgakov roundly asserted that sophiology is nothing but the full elucidation of Godmanhood" (ibid).

In his poem "Three Meetings" (Part 3, stanzas 17–21), Solovyov describes three visionary experiences that he had of Sophia, the Wisdom of God. He first saw her when, as a boy

weary and sorrowing heart. This cold autumn rain brought on desolation and fear. In the whole house there were only two living beings: the clock and I. And a fly would sometimes buzz powerlessly in the window, black like a maw. But I was glad to see even a fly.

Sometimes, calming myself, I would begin singing with a timid voice a sad song I had heard from a blind man:

On a mountain top or looking into an abyss's deeps, Where on earth do I not sorrow? I search only for Thee, Eternity My little grave, my little grave, my everlasting little house. The yellow sand is my bed. The stones are my neighbors. The worms are my friends. The moist Earth is my Mother. Mother, thou, my Mother, Receive me into eternal rest. Lord have mercy.

What was that? Who knocked at the gate? I would take the dim wall lamp off its hook, put on my galoshes, and go to draw open the bolt in the vestibule. In the yard there would be darkness and slush. I would listen—

of nine, he was present at the liturgy in a church in Moscow. In 1875 he saw her again while doing research in the British Museum. He heard a voice telling him to go to Egypt, which he proceeded to do. There, awakening after having fallen asleep in the desert, he had his third visionary experience of Sophia:

The fragrance of roses wafted from earth and heaven.

And in the purple of the heavenly glow With eyes full of an azure fire Your gaze was like the first shining Of universal and creative day.

What is, what was, and what ever will be were here Embraced within that one fixed gaze . . . The seas And rivers all turned blue beneath me, as did The distant forest and the snow-capped mountain heights.

I saw it all, and all of it was one, One image there of beauty feminine . . . The immeasurable was confined within that image. Before me, in me, you alone were there.

O radiant one! I'm not deceived by you. I saw all of you there in the desert . . . In my soul those roses shall not fade Wherever it is that life's billows may rush me.

Copleston points out that "this vision of cosmic beauty was a source of inspiration for symbolist poets such as Alexander Blok and Andrei Belyi, an inspiration that found expres-

again a knock. "Right away. I'm coming right away." I would descend to the gate down slippery steps. "Who's there?" Silence, then once again—a knock. "Who's there?" I would draw open the bolt in the gate. I would open it, but there would be no one. Having to return alone made the room even more desolate. How many times I went out in response to the knocks. How many times I opened the gate. How many times only the wind entered as my guest.

I could neither work nor pray from desolation. Nothing would enter my head. I placed my last hope in looking at the icon of the Savior and the clay lamp burning in front of it. A sudden gust of wind would gloomily shake the iron roof. The wind shaking the three birches outside the window filled the soul with fright.

It was there, in that deserted hut, those lonely evenings, that I had a powerful memory of the deceased *starets* Isidor. Full of grace and made beautiful by grace, he gave me the most solid, the most undeniable, the purest perception of a spiritual person I have had in my entire life. What previously had fluttered only in dreams was now tangible and visible before me. The spiritual world had become palpably more real than the world of flesh. Henceforth every experience, every new impression was checked against this experience of the spiritual world, this most certain of all experiences. And I suddenly wanted to get to the bottom of my thoughts and feelings surrounding the image of *starets* Isidor; I suddenly wanted to comprehend the beauty of spiritual life.

sion in, for example, Blok's 'Verses about the Beautiful Lady' " (Copleston, op. cit., p. 83). In fact, Belyi, Blok, and Vladimir Solovyov's young nephew Sergei Solovyov created a kind of order of Sophia, became knights of Sophia.

Copleston further points out that Solovyov "saw his visionary experience as a call to explore the idea of total-unity and to work for the regeneration of mankind. The concept of Wisdom or Sophia came to play a conspicuous role in his developed metaphysics, being used to elucidate the relationship between God and the world" (ibid).

Solovyov's sophiology was further developed and often transmogrified in the ideas of E. N. Trubetskoi (1863–1920), Florenksy (in the present book), and Father Sergius Bulgakov (1871–1944). Bulgakov's sophiology is the most comprehensive and profound yet developed. He introduces his sophiological concept in *The Philosophy of Economy* (1912), elaborates it in the *Unfading Light* (1917), and fully develops it in *The Lamb of God* (1933), *The Comforter* (1936), and *The Bride of the Lamb* (published posthumously in 1945).

V. V. Zenkovsky points out that in order to understand the history of the sophiological problem it is necessary to distinguish three aspects: (1) pre-Christian sophiological theories, especially in the mystical movements in Hellenism; (2) gnostic sophiological theories; and (3) Christian sophiology, elements of which appear in the patristic writings, in various heretical and semiheretical positions, in recent philosophy beginning with Jacob Boehme, and especially in modern Russian philosophy, beginning with Solovyov. (see A History of Russian Philosophy, trans. George L. Kline [New York and London, 1953], Vol. 2, p. 841n). Zenkovsky further points out that sophiology can be thought of as being the combination of three themes: (1) the theme of "nature-philosophy," a conception of the world as a living whole, and the related question of the "world soul"; (2) the theme of philosophical anthropology, linking man and the mystery of his spirit with nature and the Absolute; and (3) the theme of the divine aspect of the world, linking the ideal sphere in the world with what is "beyond being," in Plotinus' expression (ibid., p. 841).

A spirit-bearing person is beautiful, beautiful in a two-fold way. This person is beautiful *objectively*, as an object of contemplation for those who are around. This person is also beautiful *subjectively*, as the focus of a new, purified contemplation of what is around. In a saint the beautiful original creature is revealed to us for contemplation. For the saint's contemplation, the original creature is separated from its corruption. Ecclesiality is the beauty of new life in Absolute Beauty, in the Holy Spirit. That is a fact. ⁵⁶⁸ But this two-fold fact cannot fail to provoke reflection, cannot fail to raise the question: How is one to understand this holy, this beautiful aspect of creation? What is its objective nature? What is it metaphysically?

But before answering these questions, it is useful to make one qualification. The single and integral object of religious perception disintegrates in the domain of rationality into a multiplicity of aspects, into separate facets, into fragments of holiness, and there is no grace in these fragments. The precious alabaster has been smashed, and the holy myrrh is greedily sucked in by the dry sands of the red-hot desert. This was shown previously with reference to the rational antinomies of dogma; now it will be a question of fragments that are not explicitly antinomic with respect to one another, since they represent not what is *opposite* but only what is different. Each of these logical facets of immediate experience is rationally very different from the other facets, and logically each facet is in no wise connected with the others. For only integral experience indicates to each facet its place. The relationship between the individual aspects is synthetic, not analytic, and it is given only a posteriori in the form of revelation, i.e., as a fact of spiritual experience. However, the latter appears in experience not only as a fact, not only as an intuition, but also as a discursion, because its being is perceived as a creative act of the Triune Truth itself. The actually given synthesis of the separate aspects of the object of faith finds its justification—the justification of its necessity—in the everlasting Light of the Holy Trinity. But neither the justification of the synthesis nor the synthesis itself is subject to rational derivation.

This can be clarified by an example. Can one who is completely ignorant of geometrical bodies have a concrete idea of a body if only plane figures—points, lines, and parts of a plane, bounded by some contour or other ("plane shreds"⁵⁶⁹)—are present before him? Can you and I imagine that a four-dimensional space can be generated on the basis of three projections of this space on three-dimensional space?⁵⁷⁰ Knowing two colors only in their separation, can one imagine what will come of their mixing? It is the same way in the domain of faith. This throws me into a state of great perplexity. In fact, if one does not construct a *complete* system of concepts, if one does not expound a *finished* schema for experiences (and I am precisely in such a position), then it is practically impossi-

ble to decide what should be said and what should not be said, what should be said first and what should be said after. For one order or another of concepts is not a *genuinely logical* order; rather, it is always only conventional, more or less convenient. Separate concepts are *mechanically* attached to one another. When a religious object enters into the sphere of rationality, what is most appropriate is the conjunction "and." For it is impossible to say what is given first and what is given after in the eternal being of what is experienced. Here, all is one. Psychologically, one thing emerges earlier, another thing later, depending on many personal conditions. It is difficult for me to decide for another person what sequence will be easier for him to observe. In writing this, I realize that I am scattering myself, for I cannot say *at once* all that is crowding together in my consciousness.

Hitherto, I have attempted—with reference to several concrete examples—to delineate the main theme of my foregoing letter, namely, the perception by ascetics of the eternal roots of all creation by which creation is anchored in God. But the perception of the eternal as such is, in the cognitive aspect, the seeing of a thing in its inner necessity, in its meaning, in the reason of its existence. Contemplating the absolute value of creatures, the saintly ascetic sees the reason of their objective being, their Logos. And since secondary reason is conceived as actually existent only insofar as it is rooted in the Absolute Reason, insofar as it is nourished by the Light of the Truth, the reason of a thing is, from the point of view of a creature, the act by means of which a creature is liberated from its selfhood and goes out of itself, the act by means of which a creature finds its foundation, as self-emptying, in God. In other words, the reason of a thing is, from the point of view of a creature, love of God and the vision of God that comes from this. This reason is a particular idea of God, a conditional idea of the Unconditional. But, from the point of view of Divine being, the reason of a creature is an unconditional idea of the conditional, God's idea about a particular thing—the act by which God, in the ineffable self-abasement of His infinitude and absoluteness, with all the Divine content of His Divine thought, condescends to think about the finite and limited—introduces the meager semi-being of the creature into the fullness of being of the interior of the Trinity, and gives to this creature self-being and self-determinability. That is, He places the creature on the same level as Himself, as it were. From God's point of view, the reason of a creature is God's kenotic love for creation. Entering by an indescribable act (in which the ineffable humility of Divine love and the incomprehensible boldness of creaturely love touch each other and cooperate) into the life of the Divine Trinity, which stands above order (for the number "3" does not have an order), this love-idea-monad, this fourth hypostatic element brings about, with respect to itself, a difference in the order (kata taxin) of the Hypostases of the Holy Trinity. And the Holy Trinity condescends to this correlation of Itself with Its own creature and therefore to the determination of Itself by Its creature, thereby "emptying" Itself of absolute attributes. Remaining all-powerful, God treats His creatures as if He were not all-powerful. He does not compel His creatures, but persuades them. He does not force; He asks. Remaining "one" in Themselves, the Hypostases make Themselves "other" in relation to creation. This is revealed both in the character of providential activity in each individual life and, preeminently, in the three successive Testaments for the world in its wholeness. In other words, these three Testaments are, at the same time, revealed figuratively and preliminarily in the personal life of a monad, i.e., ontogenetically, and fully recapitulated in the history of all of creation, i.e. phylogenetically.

But, dear friend, forgive me for these crude and hateful pincers and scalpels with which it is necessary to prepare the most delicate fibers of the soul. Only do not think that my cold words are metaphysical speculation, "gnosticism." They are only poor schemata for what is experienced in the soul. That monad about which I speak is not a metaphysical essence given by logical determination. Rather, it is experienced in living experience; it is a religious given, determined not *a priori* but *a posteriori*, not by the pride of construction but by the humility of acceptance. True, I am compelled to use a metaphysical terminology, but in my speech these terms have not a strictly technical sense but a conventional or rather a symbolic one. They have the significance of colors by means of which inward experience is painted.

Thus, I have spoken of a "monad," i.e., a certain real unit. Logically and metaphysically, this monad as such should be opposed to other monads, should exclude them from the sphere of its "I," or, having lost its separateness, it should be captured by them and should merge with them into an indistinguishable, elemental unity. But, in those spiritual states which we are discussing, nothing loses its individuality. All is perceived as inwardly, organically connected, as welded together by the free ascesis of self-renunciation, as an inwardly unitary, inwardly integral being, as a multi-unitary being. All is consubstantial and all is heterohypostatic. Not a simply given, elemental, factual unity unites all things but a unity effected by an eternal act. This unity is a moving equilibrium of hypostases, and it is similar to a dynamic energy equilibrium established between radiating bodies that constantly exchange energy. This is fixed motion and moving rest. Love eternally "empties" and eternally "glorifies" every monad. Love takes the monad out of itself and establishes it in itself and for itself. Love eternally takes away to give eternally. It eternally kills to give life eternally. Unity in love is that which takes each monad out of the state of pure potentiality, i.e., spiritual sleep, spiritual emptiness, and amorphous chaos, and therefore that which gives the monad reality, actuality, life, and vigilance. A monad's purely subjective, isolated, blind I

empties itself for another monad's Thou and, through this Thou, I becomes purely objective, i.e., proved. Perceived by a third monad as proving itself through the second monad, the first monad's I acquires itself as proved in the third monad's He. That is, the first monad's I completes the process of self-proof and becomes "for itself," thereby receiving its "in itself," for the proved I is the objectively perceived "for another" of this "in itself." From a naked and empty self-identity (I!) the monad becomes an act full of content, an act that synthetically connects I with I (I = I), i.e., an organ of a single Entity. 571

God's love, which flows in this Entity, is the creative act by which this Entity acquires: (1) *life*, (2) *unity*, and (3) *being*. Not a fact but an act, this Entity's unity is a mystical derivative of its life, while its being is a derivative of its unity. True being is a substantial relation to another and movement out of itself, both as giving unity and as flowing from the unity of being. But every monad exists only insofar as it allows Divine love to approach it, "for in him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17:28). This is the "Great Being," not that to which Auguste Comte prayed, but one that is truly great: It is the actualized Wisdom of God, *hokhmah*, *Sophia*. 572

Sophia is the Great Root of the whole creation (cf. *pasa hē ktisis* [Rom. 8:22]). That is, Sophia is all-integral creation and not merely *all* creation. Sophia is the Great Root by which creation goes into the intra-Trinitarian life and through which it receives Life Eternal from the One Source of Life. Sophia is the original nature of creation,⁵⁷³ God's creative love, which is "shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given unto us" (Rom. 5:5). For this reason, the true I of a deified person, his "heart," is precisely God's Love, just as the Essence of Divinity is intra-Trinitarian Love. For everything exists truly only insofar as it communes with the God of Love, the Source of being and truth. If creation is torn away from its root, an inevitable death awaits it. Wisdom itself says: "For whoso findeth me findeth life, and shall obtain favour of the Lord. But he that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul: all they that hate me love death" (Prov. 8:35–36).

With regard to creation, Sophia is the Guardian Angel of creation, the Ideal person of the world. The shaping reason with regard to creation, Sophia is the shaped content of God-Reason, His "psychic content," eternally created by the Father through the Son and completed in the Holy Spirit: God thinks *by things*. ⁵⁷⁴

Therefore, to exist is to be thought, to be remembered, or, finally, to be known by God. ⁵⁷⁵ They whom God "knows" possess reality. They whom God does "not know" do not exist in the spiritual world, in the world of true reality, and their being is illusory. They are empty, and in the Triradiant Light it becomes clear that they do not exist at all, that they only appeared to exist. In order to exist one must "be known by

God" (cf. John 10:14 and Matt. 7:23).⁵⁷⁶ One who exists in Eternity "knows" in Eternity, but that which he "knows" in Eternity⁵⁷⁷ appears in time at a single, definite moment. God, the Supratemporal, for Whom Time is given in all its moments as a single "now," does not create the world in Time. But, for the world, for creation, which lives in time, the creation of the world is necessarily linked with definite times and seasons.

The question may be asked, Why is it linked precisely with these times and seasons, and not with others? In my opinion, this question is based on a misunderstanding, namely, on the confusion of cosmic Time with time in the abstract. Cosmic Time is a succession and, as a succession, it imparts the character of successiveness to all that has succession.⁵⁷⁸ In other words, cosmic Time is an internal organizedness each term of which is necessarily situated where it is situated. The succession of everything else, which occurs through (mathematically speaking) its "correspondence" with this fundamental, succession-generating, "taxogenic" series, must also be organized. The correspondence between moments of Time and phenomena occurs owing to the inner kinship of each given moment of Time and each given phenomenon. The essence of a given moment also contains the fact that this moment is connected by correspondence with such-and-such and such-and-such phenomena. And once such a correspondence has been established, to ask why a phenomenon arose at some particular time and not at some other time is as meaningless as to ask why 1912 comes after 1911 and not after 1915.

But one must speak wholly differently about time in the abstractness of rationality. For rationality rips away the external form of Time from its inner anatomical structure. Rationality takes the form of succession but removes from this form the content of succession. What results is an empty, indifferent schema of succession. To be sure, in this schema one can transpose any two successive moments, yet, owing to the impersonality of these moments, what is obtained does not differ in any way from what it has been obtained from.⁵⁷⁹ When this essentially meaningless concept is passed off as Time, the following absurd question must certainly arise: Why did God create the world so many thousands of years ago, and not at some other time? This is the error committed by the famous Origen, 580 among many others. God created the world for us when it was appropriate for the world to be created. That is the answer to such questions. Without citing various patristic texts in support of the conception of Time⁵⁸¹ expounded here (this would lead us too far afield), I will mention only the testimony of St. Gregory of Nazianzus.

Prior to the creation of the world, outside the essence of the Holy Trinity, "the World-generating Reason also considered, in His mind's great representations, the images of the world formed by Him, this world which was generated later, but, which, for God was present even then. Everything is before God's eyes: what will be, what was, and what is now.

For me such a division is set by time: that one thing is ahead, another thing behind. But for God all merges into one, and all is held in the arms of the Great Deity." 582

"Of the worlds," says the same holy father, in another place, "one was created first. This is another heaven, the habitation of the God-bearers, contemplated by reason alone, the radiant habitation. Into this habitation, the man of God will subsequently enter, when, having purified his reason and his flesh, he becomes a god. But the other world, the corruptible one, was created for mortal men, when both the splendor of the celestial lights that preach God by their beauty and grandeur and the royal palace for the Image of God had to be established. But these two worlds were created by the Word of the great God." 583

"We," says Clement of Alexandria as well, "already existed before this world, because our creation was decided by God long before our actual creation. Before our creation we therefore existed in the thought of God, we who later turned out to be intelligent creatures of the Divine Word. Thanks to Him, we are very ancient in our origin, because 'in the beginning was the Word." 584

But let us return to the question of Sophia.

She is the Eternal Bride of the Word of God. Outside of Him and independently of Him, she does not have being and falls apart into fragments of ideas about creation. But in Him she receives creative power. One in God, she is multiple in creation and is perceived in creation in her concrete appearances as the ideal person of man, as his Guardian Angel, i.e., as the spark of the eternal dignity of the person and as the image of God in man. To speak of this Divine "spark" is impossible here, for this would require us to make a survey of virtually all mystical teachings. I will limit myself to mentioning the name given to this Divine light in the Apostolic Epistles. This, for an individual man, is his "building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens" (2 Cor 5:1), the "house which is from heaven" (2 Cor. 5:2) in which man will be clothed when his "earthly house" is destroyed. The "earthly house" will necessarily be destroyed, not because it is on earth but because it is of earth (epigeios), i.e., because it is corruptible in its essence. And although that house is now "in the heavens (en tois ouranois)," not this is essential for it, but the fact that it is a house "from heaven (to oikterion hemon to ex ouranou)," i.e., what is important is its nature, not its location. The earthly and heavenly houses are opposite according to their nature, not according to their location. In hell there is pure fleshliness, although hell does not have to exist on earth (indeed, the Lord's Earth will not tolerate hell on itself⁵⁸⁵). In heaven, there is pure spirituality, though a saint can approach it even in life. The ideal aspect will be revealed in illuminated creation, in transfigured man. The earthly "hovel (skēnoma)," i.e., the corruptible empirical character, is also mentioned in the Apostle Peter (2 Peter 1:13, 14), while the opposite character, the ideal one, is called "an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven . . ." (1 Pet. 1:4). These are the "everlasting habitations (aioniai skēnai)" (Luke 16:9) or types of spiritual growth about which the Lord Jesus speaks in the parable of the unjust steward.

The combination of these "many mansions," these ideal images of the that which exists, makes up the true house of God (Heb. 3:6), in which man is a steward (1 Cor. 4:1-2), and often a dishonest steward, turning the House of the Lord into a "house of merchandise" (John 2:16). "In my Father's house are many mansions" (John 14:2), says Jesus Christ. Individual mansions, like the cells of a honeycomb, make up the House of God, the Holy Temple of the Lord, or, in an expanded version of the same image, the Great City, Holy and Heavenly Jerusalem (Rev. 21:2, 10; Heb. 12:22, etc.). The Holy Spirit lives in this City and shines on it (Rev. 22:5), and the keys to the City are possessed by the bearers of spirit, 586 who know the mysteries of God (Matt. 16:17-19; Rev. 3:7-9; Matt. 18:18, etc.). On the ontological plane, the fall of creation consisted in the expulsion from the heavenly house, in the lack of conformity between the empirical disclosure of the likeness of God and the heavenly image of God: "the angels which kept not their first estate . . . left their own habitation" (Jude 1:6). The abandoned conformity is achieved anew only in the Holy Spirit. For this reason this City of God, or Kingdom of God, has itself only in the Original Kingdom of God, in the Holy Spirit, just as this Wisdom has itself only in the Original Wisdom of God, in the Son, and this Motherhood has itself only in the Original Parenthood, in the Father. Permeated with Trinitarian Love, Sophia religiously, not rationally, almost merges with the Word and the Spirit and the Father, as with the Wisdom and the Kingdom and the Parenthood of God. But, rationally, Sophia is wholly other than each of these hypostases.

Many mystics have written about Sophia. Extremely self-assured but partly just is Vladimir Solovyov's rather harsh judgment of these mystics in his letter to Countess S. A. Tolstoy, dated 27 April 1877 and written in Saint-Petersburg: "Mystics offer many confirmations of my own ideas, but no new light. Furthermore, almost all of them have an extremely subjective, and therefore driveling, character. I have found three specialists in Sophia: Georg Gichtel, Gotfried Arnold, and John Pordage. All three had personal experience that was almost the same as mine, and that is the most interesting thing. But in theosophy *per se* all three are rather weak, follow Boehme, but are inferior to him. I think that Sophia got involved with them more for their innocence than for anything else. As a result, only Paracelsus, Boehme, and Swedenborg are important here, so that a very wide arena remains for me. I have come to know the Polish philosophers to some extent. Their general tone and aspirations are very sympathetic, but, like our Slavophiles, they have no positive content." 587

Keeping this in mind and wishing to remain within the limits of Church ideas, I will save the analysis of mystical writings for a more special work. I will limit myself here to the presentation of a single excerpt clarifying the idea of Sophia. This excerpt is extracted from a manuscript of our remarkable mystic Count M. I. Speransky, having the title *Homoousios: The First World*, and probably written in 1812–1814.⁵⁸⁸ The manuscript that interests us, along with many others, is stored in the Imperial Public Library. I take the excerpt presented here from the not-yet-published *Materials Toward the Study of M. I. Speransky's Mysticism* by A. V. El'chaninov. Here is this excerpt, which is the more instructive for us because Speransky received a theological and Orthodox education and has an authoritative, though perhaps hasty, confirmation of his Orthodoxy from Bishop Theophanus the Recluse.⁵⁸⁹

"Like the woman [i.e., Eve], this first woman was not created and not born. She was constructed (aedificata) by separation of part of the Son's own being, and this is the first and original separation, the first sacrifice of obedience offered to the Father, the first degree of that abasement (eximinationis) which later was brought to death itself and death on the cross. The name of this woman is Sophia. She is the knowledge that the Father and the Son have. She is the contemplation of their desire, the mirror in which Their Glory is reflected. In relation to the Father, she is His daughter, for she constitutes part of His Son. In relation to the Son, according to the law of Fatherly love, she is His sister. In relation to the law of generation, she is His bride. In relation to future births, she is the mother of all that is outside God, for she herself is the first external being. The Son transferred the organization of the law of being to the woman. For Himself, He left only the law of love. Just as Eve, by sharing in the glory that was originally in Adam, acquired the right to be the mother of all who live on earth, so the eternal Eve, by a similar sharing in the heavenly seed, became the mother of all who are in heaven. But those who are born, what are they? Gods. For, first of all, their seed at the beginning is divine. Secondly, this seed would be fruitless if the power of the Son as the husband did not overshadow their mother as the wife. In this way the world of original spirits arose—the types and images of all future creatures. And the chorus of bodiless Angels cried 'Glory to God in the highest' when the earth did not vet exist."

This excerpt has rather strong pantheistic overtones. Expressions like "the separation of part of the Son's own being" are, of course, not Orthodox. But when they are excluded, the basic idea of the excerpt contradicts neither Biblical teaching nor patristic interpretations of the latter.

The idea of Sophia-Wisdom existing before the world, of the Heavenly Jerusalem, of the Church in its heavenly aspect, or of the Kingdom of God as the Ideal Person of Creation or the Guardian Angel of Creation, or of the Hypostatic System of the world-creating thoughts of God and the True Pole and Incorruptible Aspect of creaturely being—this idea is widely scattered throughout all of Scripture and the patristic works. But I will not cite all this, and this for two reasons. First, part of this evidence

has already been analyzed in a special work on the Church. Secondly, the remaining material is intended for a special work on Sophia. Thus, in this present work, which is of a *general* nature, I will limit myself to a few examples.

Thus, in the parable of the Last Judgment, the Lord Jesus says: "Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand. Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world" (Matt. 25:34). 590 This is one example, but one could cite other passages from the Gospel in which the Kingdom of God clearly has the significance of a reality existing before the world and transcendent. A striking example of such passages is the revelation to John the Divine in which he "saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband" (Rev. 21:2), and the subsequent description of "the bride, the Lamb's wife" (Rev. 21:9), and of "the great city, the holy Ierusalem, descending out of heaven from God" (Rev. 21:10). This passage is reminiscent of but not identical to the words "then [that is, in the last days] the city that appears as a bride will appear, and the land which is now hidden will be seen" (2 Esdras 7:26). We will not multiply examples.⁵⁹¹ It is sufficient to mention that there is even a special current in Biblical theology according to which the Kingdom of God has the exclusive significance of a transcendent, supramundane realm that will descend catastrophically to the earth on the last day. And one need hardly mention that this is the dominant idea of Hebrew apocalyptics.592

Like an echo of the same concepts, the Eucharistic prayers of the *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* contain the words: "Remember, Lord, Thy Church. Free it from all evil and perfect it in Thy love. And gather it, sanctified, from the four winds into Thy Kingdom, which Thou hast prepared for it, because Thine is the power and the glory for ages of ages. Let grace come and this world pass." ⁵⁹³

In the so-called "Second Epistle of St. Clement of Rome to the Corinthians," which in fact is the sermon of an unknown preacher (probably some charismatic), a sermon written in Corinth before the mid-2nd century,⁵⁹⁴ the idea of the preexistence of the Church resounds powerfully and distinctly:

"Wherefore, brethren," the unknown author teaches us, "if we do the will of God our Father, we shall be of the first Church, which is spiritual, which was created before the sun and moon; but if we do not the will of the Lord, we shall be of the scripture that saith, 'My house was made a den of robbers' (Jer. 7:11 = Matt. 21:13). So therefore let us choose rather to be of the Church

^b This translation is adapted from that contained in *The Apocrypha*, an American translation by Edgar J. Goodspeed, 2d edition (New York, 1959). [Henceforth cited as the Goodspeed translation.]

of life, that we may be saved. And I do not suppose ye are ignorant that the living Church is 'the body of Christ' (Eph. 1:22-23): for the scripture saith, "God made man male and female" (Gen. 1:27). The male is Christ and the female is the Church (to arsen estin ho Christos, to thelu he ekklesia [14:2]. The words arsen and thelu indicate precisely difference in gender). And also the Books and the Apostles plainly declare that the Church existeth not now for the first time, but hath been from the beginning [14:2]. For she was spiritual, as our Jesus also was spiritual, but was manifested in the last days that he might save us. Now the Church, being spiritual, was manifested in the flesh of Christ, thereby showing us that, if any of us guard her in the flesh and defile her not, he shall receive her again in the Holy Spirit: for this flesh is the counterpart and copy of the spirit [14:3]. No man, therefore, when he hath defiled the copy, shall receive the original for his portion. This therefore is what he meaneth, brethren: Guard ve the flesh, that ye may partake of the spirit. But if we say that the flesh is the Church and the spirit is Christ, then he that hath dealt wantonly with the flesh hath dealt wantonly with the Church. Such a one therefore shall not partake of the spirit, which is Christ. So excellent is the life and immortality which this flesh can receive as its portion, if the Holy Spirit be joined to it [literally: glued to it]. No man can declare or tell 'the things which God hath prepared' (1 Cor. 2:9) for his elect."595c

In this extract, Iesus Christ, in the aspect of His Divinity, is identified with the Holy Spirit, so that it is as if we get a Divinity with two Hypostases, with the Third replaced by the Church. But this "bi-unitarism" (a consequence of insufficient verbal and logical separateness of concepts combined with an uncorrespondingly profound religious insight) demonstrates only the bond by which the ideas of Spirit, Christ, Church, and Creation, as well as certain other ideas (which we will discuss later), are joined for the immediate religious consciousness. It is remarkable that, in this "Epistle," which, in the general structure of its thought, is kindred to the Shepherd of Hermas, written, according to Zahn, 596 around the year 100, the Hypostases of Spirit, Son of God, and Church are either clearly differentiated or are just as clearly identified. Thus, in Parable the Ninth, the Angel of Repentance who guides Hermas announces to the latter: "I wish to show you all that was shown to you by the Holy Spirit, who conversed with you in the image of the Church: That Spirit is the Son of God."597

But it would be an extreme misunderstanding of religious psychology to see in this identification a mere confusion. This is far from being the case. The more direct and inspired is the life of the believer, the more integral and homogeneous will his faith be. Separate aspects of faith disintegrate atomistically only for scholastic theology, but, in living life,

^c From Bishop Lightfoot's translation. The bibliographical information on the edition used is given in note c on p. 207. The cited passage is from pp. 91–92.

these aspects, each retaining its independence, become so closely interwoven that one idea imperceptibly evokes another. For a scholastic theologian, it is easy to say that the concepts Church, Holy Spirit, and Son of God are different: easy, because in his consciousness they are only concepts. But for a believer for whom all of these are realities that cannot be experienced independently of one another, realities that are interpenetrating and interconnected; for a believer who perceives them in their living givenness; for whom the Church is tangibly the body of Christ, the fullness of the Spirit sent by Christ; for such a believer, it is painful to make sharp divisions and separations, for they cut through living flesh. The speech of faith is in no wise like the speech of theology, and faith clothes its knowledge of dogmatic truth in a symbolic garment, in figurative language, which covers the higher truth and depth of contemplation in consistent contradictions.

In the *Shepherd of Hermas*, which we have already mentioned, the Church is represented in two aspects: as a pre-worldly entity and as an entity being built in the world.

In its pre-worldly aspect, Hermas saw the Church in the figure of a woman clothed in a brilliant garment. First, this Woman appeared as old, then as younger, and finally as altogether youthful:

"Now she was seen of me, brethren," says Hermas "in my first vision of last year, as a very aged woman and seated on a chair. In the second vision her face was youthful, but her flesh and her hair were aged, and she spake to me standing; and she was more gladsome than before. But in the third vision she was altogether youthful and of exceeding great beauty, and her hair alone was aged; and she was gladsome exceedingly and seated on a couch." 598

Worthy of attention is the following passage, which gives a verbal and literal expression to that which is felt throughout the whole *Shepherd*, namely, the idea of the preexistence of the Church:

"Now, brethren, a revelation was made unto me in my sleep by a youth of exceeding fair form, who said to me, 'Whom thinkest thou the aged woman, from whom thou receivedst the book [in the second vision], to be?' I say, 'The Sibyl.' 'Thou art wrong,' saith he, 'she is not.' 'Who then is she?' I say. 'The Church of God,' saith he. I said unto him, 'Wherefore then is she aged?' 'Because,' saith he, 'she was created before all things; therefore is she aged; and for her sake the world was framed.'" 599

But in the first vision it is said about God: "God, Who dwelleth in the heavens, and created out of nothing the things which are, and increased and multiplied them for His holy Church's sake." 600

This is the first aspect of the Church, the *heavenly-aeonian* one. In the second aspect, the *historical* one, Hermas saw the Church in the figure of a tower being built on the waters of baptism by youths representing the primordial angels. The tower is supported by women who symbolize the

chief virtues of Christianity. The stones for the building of the Church were Christians. Serving as the building blocks, those stones were joined together so forcefully that the whole tower appeared to be cut from a single block of stone.

But since it is not my task here to unfold the doctrine of the Church, I shall, without elaborating, indicate only that the two aspects of the Church, despite their obvious separateness, have in Hermas' consciousness an essential connection. These two aspects are in no wise what modern enemies of the Church tend to call the "Mystical Church" and the "historical church," where the former is extolled in order to (and almost exclusively in order to) abuse the latter. No, these aspects are one and the same entity, but seen from different points of view: from the point of view of the unifying, preexistent, heavenly, mystical form; and from the point of view of the unified empirical, earthly, temporal content, which is deified and eternalized in the unifying form. But this unified content is not accidentally connected with the unifying form, but grows into and is transubstantiated in this form. The separateness of the symbolic images is therefore only an indication of the difference between the two points of view. The first view is downward, as it were, from the heavens to the earth, whereas the second view is upward, from the earth to the heavens. Here is what the text itself says:

"Hear thou the explanation of the tower; for I will reveal all things unto thee," the Church in the guise of the Aged Woman tells Hermas. "The tower which thou seest building, is myself, the Church, which was seen of thee both now and aforetime."

Thus, indisputably Orthodox texts that were once even part of the New Testament canon speak definitively of the Church as an aeon existing before the world. In the same way, the works of St. Athanasius the Great indicate that it is necessary, in accordance with Orthodoxy, to speak of our being "prefigured" in God, i.e., once again, of some sort of preexistence. This is indisputable. But on the other hand it is just as indisputable that gnostic aeonology was condemned by Orthodoxy, as was the idea of the preexistence of the soul that was expounded by the origenists. 602 It is clear from this that the very concept of "preexistence," as historically surrounded by dubious speculation, became condemnable. However, for us there remains in full force the idea that, if the concept of preexistence was originally Orthodox, then by the essence of the matter it could not stop being such, although, according to church economy, in order to avoid stumbling blocks, it was—in the thick of the battle more prudent to avoid it. Even now, the Church reminds us of this idea during the liturgy. In fact, does not the touching prayer (Cf. John 1:9) "Christ, true light, who lights and sanctifies every man that comes into the world . . ." refer to those who are to be born in this world, who "go" into this world, but who, even before they arrive here, are illuminated and sanctified by the light full of grace? Thus, even now, the idea of preexistence is not foreign to the Church.

But, in what way, let us ask ourselves, does the Orthodox idea of preexistence differ from the gnostic idea? "Antiquity" and "perfection" are just as closely connected for the philosophical views of ancient times as "perfection" and "futurity" are for the views of the modern period. If the word "forward!" now excites a pleasant trepidation in the majority of people, the word "back!" was once just as significant for the past. Therefore, in the language of the age when the theory of regress was dominant, the word "antiquity" had a two-fold meaning. First, it meant chronological antiquity, and, secondly, it meant qualitative superiority, 603 just as, in the language of our time, the "future" (as in the expressions "the future social order," "future science," "future technology," etc.) signifies, first, the movement of life in time, the appearance of new events, and, second, perfectionment. Therefore, when antiquity spoke about the "preexistence" of the Church, the soul, and so forth, the logical accent could fall either upon the chronological primacy of the Church with respect to the world or of the soul with respect to actual human life, or upon the higher value of the Church and the soul in comparison with the world, with this corruptible life. In other words, "preexistence" was either the banner of a certain rationalistic theory, for which the Church, the soul, and so forth were not more than *fleshly* givens existing before the world; or it was a symbol of spiritual experience that revealed in the Church, in the person, and so forth a higher reality than this corruptible world. In fact, what does it mean "to exist chronologically before the world?" It means to be in a certain temporal relationship with the world, i.e., to be homogeneous with the world. Those who spoke of the chronological "preexistence" of the Church, the person, and so forth, inevitably took away from them their spirituality, their supramundaness, their special higher nature. They brought the Church, the person, and so forth down from Eternity into Time, even if a very ancient time, even if an infinitely ancient time. They subordinated the Church and the person to the laws of corruptible being and devalued that "for which the world was created." Among the many heterotemporal phenomena of the world they thus included some that were older. But do years make the holy holy? Such was the speculation (condemned by the Church) of the pseudo-reason of the gnostics, the origenists, and all those who desired to think of the spiritual in a fleshly way.

On the contrary, when they spoke of the "preexistence" of the Church, the person, and so forth, the Orthodox meant precisely the fullness of the reality contained in them. For the Orthodox, the Church, the person, and so forth were *res realiores*, and that was the whole thing. If, in conformity with the philosophical views of the age, it was constantly maintained that the most valuable is the most ancient, then the Orthodox, agreeing only

conditionally, said, in effect: "If, in philosophy, it is recognized that res realior is thereby res anterior, then we do not argue; rather, we agree, in your language, to speak also of chronological primacy. However, remember: if the philosophy of the future will recognize that res realior is necessarily res posterior, then we (and do not accuse us of inconsistency) will say that the Church, the person, and so forth 'post-exist.' In essence, we wish to speak only about that which is in our experience and is uniquely important for us. That is, the Church, the Image of God, and so forth are fuller in being than the world, the empirical character of things, and so forth. But just as a person is conceived in the world at a specific chronological moment, so, at a specific moment, the Church empirically appeared in the world—became incarnate, was born of the Lord Iesus Christ. 604 Before that moment both the person and the Church existed only in Eternity; they did not exist in Time. Therefore, it is just as absurd to ask whether the Church existed in the chronological sense before the Birth of Christ (to ask, for instance, whether the Church existed 10,000 years before the Birth of Christ) as it is to ask whether some John or Peter existed 100 years before his own birth. 'To exist' in the sense which interested the heretics is to exist in Time, i.e., in the midst of the world. But, in the world, no Church existed before a specific moment of time, just as no specific person exists before a specific moment of time—just as there was no incarnate God before a specific moment of time. Such are the facts. But if philosophy nevertheless recognizes that every value, being ens realius, inevitably must be ens anterius, then, in harmony with philosophy, we will again speak of the preexistence of the Church, the person, and so forth."

This is the idea contained in the Church's condemnation of the heretics' fleshly, rationalistic conception of "preexistence." From this it is clear that, if the Orthodox are allowed a certain degree of freedom to follow philosophical currents, then, for the modern reader, it is necessary to isolate the philosophical terminology from the Orthodox ideas of preexistence and, by transforming this terminology into a modern philosophical equivalent, to give a new garment to the spiritual experience of fullness contained therein. If such freedom is not recognized, then it would be necessary to take these doctrines with qualifications and clarifications roughly of the type made by us above.

Let me direct your attention to yet another feature that essentially distinguishes the text examined above from gnostic writings. Hermas' entire book is permeated with the spirit of ascesis and purification. All the visions, injunctions, and revelations from which the fabric of the book is woven are, in the final analysis, a justification of ascesis. By looking attentively, one can notice that all the requisite virtues are nuances of a single, chief virtue, which, in contrast to fragmentedness and motley distraction, could be called integrity, or chastity, of soul, simplicity.⁶⁰⁶ This

virtue makes it possible to be meek, kind, and pure, and gives the strength to perform acts of ascesis without vacillations and doubts, but also without inner self-assertion, self-glorification, and self-love. This greatest and most fundamental virtue is attained through deep immersion into oneself, or repentance, which is why the Angel of Repentance⁶⁰⁷ is Hermas' guide. The ascetic ground of spiritual life is also clearly expressed in the figure of the seven women supporting the tower, where each successive woman is the daughter of the preceding one. These are Faith, Abstinence, Simplicity, Innocence, Modesty, Knowledge, and Love.⁶⁰⁸ In particular, *The Shepherd* puts special emphasis on chastity. Herein lies the most profound difference between Orthodox mysticism and heretical mysticism. The latter is always possessed by a spirit of debauchery and corruption.

Let me mention again that *The Shepherd* begins with the condemnation of Hermas for having thought about a certain young girl: "Happy were I, if I had such an one to wife both in beauty and in character. This alone," adds Hermes after being reproached, "I thought, and nothing else. After a certain time, I was walking with such thoughts, and was glorifying God's creation [This girl? Or the whole world in general, but in connection with the thought of this girl?], thinking how magnificent and beautiful it is." But she appeared to him in a vision and began to reproach him before the Lord; but he was so innocent in his consciousness that he did not know what bad thing he had done, and therefore from the reproaches he became sad and began to cry.⁶⁰⁹

Hermas' book ends with the repeated indication that the seven virgins (i.e., virtues) will live in his house, i.e., in his flesh, only under the necessary condition of purity. In the copy of the secret book obtained from the Aged Woman representing the Church, Hermas reads the following: ... herein is thy salvation, in that thou didst not depart from the living God, and in thy simplicity and thy great continence. These have saved thee, if thou abidest therein; and they save all those who do such things, and walk in guilelessness and simplicity. These men prevail over all wickedness, and continue unto life eternal. Blessed are all they that work righteousness. They shall never be destroyed."

What does salvation consist in? It consists in being a stone in the tower that is being built; it consists in real unity with the Church. Not only is this indicated in a multitude of separate passages in *The Shepherd*. It is also the basic theme of the entire work. Salvation lies in *consubstantiality* with the Church. But the higher, supramundane unity of creation, which is unified by the grace-giving power of the Spirit, is accessible only to one who is purified in ascesis and who is humble. The ontological substantiality and objective significance of *humility*, *chastity*, and *simplicity* as supraphysical and supramoral forces that make all of creation a consubstantial Church in the Holy Spirit are thus established. These forces are revelations of the other world in this world, of the spiritual in the tempo-

ral and spatial, of the heavenly in the earthly. They are the guardian angels of creation, descending from heaven and ascending from creation to heaven, as it was revealed to our forefather Jacob. And if we continue the comparison, the "ladder" should represent the Holy Mother of God. But this is a subject for later discussion.

We also find a doctrine of Sophia in the ascetic saint of the 4th century who defended and ascetically grounded the idea of the bearing of spirit and the deification of creatures more powerfully than anyone else. It will be sufficient to say further that by his *Life of Anthony* he lifted the monastic spirit and perhaps pushed the entire stream of church history into the ascetic channel. I speak, of course, of Athanasius, Saint and the Great.

Repeatedly returning to the interpretation of words from the Proverbs that are famous in the history of the Arian disputes, i.e., where Wisdom says of itself, "The Lord created me (in Greek: *ektise me*) in the beginning of his ways for his works" (Prov. 8:22), and attempting multifariously to explain this "*ektise*," which is a stumbling block for the Arians, Athanasius takes Wisdom to mean very different things in different passages in his works: the Human Nature of Christ, His Body, the Church, or the side of the creaturely world that faces eternity. But this difference is only an apparent difference, for all the enumerated ways of interpreting the word "Wisdom" are, in fact, one and the same Sophia as the Divinely instituted unity of the ideal determinations of creation. They are one and the same Sophia but perceived from different points of view. They are the integral nature of creation.

Let me reveal to you in greater detail how Athanasius understands this ideal aspect of creaturely being:

"Even though the only-begotten and original Divine Wisdom creates and founds all, in order that what was created not just exist but exist worthily, God willed that His Wisdom descend to creatures. Thus, in all creatures in general and in each of them separately there was placed a certain imprint and likeness of Her Image, and that what was brought to being turned out to be a wise work and worthy of God. And since in us and in all works [even the devil—says St. Athanasius in another place—was "an imprint of the likeness"612], there is such an imprint of the created Wisdom, the true and founding creative Wisdom, receiving upon Herself what belongs to Her Imprint, says of Herself: 'The Lord created me . . . for his works.' That which Wisdom who exists in us would say, the Lord Himself calls His own, as it were. And although He as the Creator was not created, He, by reason of His created Image in works, says this, as it were, about Himself. And as the Lord Himself said: 'he that receiveth you receiveth me' (Matt. 10:40), because in us is His imprint, so, although not being in the ranks of the created, since His Image and Imprint are created in works, as if He Himself were this Image, he says: 'The Lord created me in the beginning of his ways for his works.' The imprint of Wisdom is placed in works, as I have said, so that the world would know in Wisdom its Creator, the Word, and, through the Word, the Father. And this is the same thing that Paul says: 'Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them. For God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead' (Rom. 1:19-20). Therefore, the Word is, in essence, not a creature. That which is said in the Proverbs refers to the wisdom existent and named in us. If [the Arians] do not believe even this, then let them say themselves, Is there in creatures some wisdom or not? If not, then why does the Apostle condemn, saving: 'For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God' (1 Cor. 1:21)? Or if there is no wisdom, then why in Scripture do we encounter many wise men? For 'a wise man feareth, and departeth from evil' (Prov. 14:16), and 'through wisdom is an house builded' (Prov. 24:3). Meanwhile, Ecclesiastes says: 'A man's wisdom maketh his face to shine' (Ecc. 8:1), and chastises the foolhardy: 'Say not thou, What is the cause that the former days were better than these' (Ecc. 7:10). And if, as the Son of Sirach says about Wisdom, the Lord poured it out upon all His works with all flesh, and bestowed it liberally upon those who loved him (Ecclesiasticus 1:10), and this kind of pouring out is a feature of the essence not of the Original and Only-Begotten Wisdom but also of the Wisdom whose image is in the world, then how is it improbable that this creative and true Wisdom, Whose imprint is Wisdom and Knowledge poured into the world, as we have just indicated, says about itself as it were: 'The Lord created me for his works'? For not the grounding Wisdom is in the world but that created in works, according to which 'the heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handywork' (Ps. 19:1). But if people assimilate this Wisdom, they will know the True Wisdom of God. They will know that they are truly created in the image of God."613

There can be no doubt that the creaturely Wisdom about which this excerpt speaks is, in Athanasius' view, in no wise limited to only a psychological or epistemological process of the inner life of creatures. This Wisdom is the *metaphysical* nature of creaturely being. Wisdom in creation is not only activity but also substance; it has a substantial, massive, material character. This becomes even more clear in an expressive comparison made by Athanasius. 614 He represents creation as a city whose building is charged by the king to his son. In order, by his father's authority, to protect the structures from vandalism and to leave a memory of himself and of his father, the prince inscribes his name on every building. If, after the end of the construction, the prince is asked, How is the city built, he will reply: "Reliably, because, in accordance with the king's will, I am represented on each building; my name is created in these buildings. In saving this, he does not say that his essence is created, but his image, because of his name." In the same way, True Wisdom, i.e., Logos, responds to those who are astonished by creaturely Wisdom, i.e., Sophia: "The Lord created Me for His works because My Image is in them; that is the degree of My descent in creation." Athanasius' comparison is not a

complete invention. Let me mention the common historical custom of writing the name of the builder on a building or the even more astonishing custom of the Babylonian kings of stamping each brick of the buildings they built with the name of the builder king. But in order to understand both the true meaning of this custom and Athanasius' comparison, which is based on this custom, we must keep in mind the ancient idea of a *name* as a real idea-force, which shapes things and mysteriously governs the core of their deepest essence.⁶¹⁵

Thus, in inscribing his name on the buildings, the prince of Athanasius' comparison thereby introduces, according to the conception of the ancients, a new mysterious essence into the being of these buildings, gives a mystical power to the buildings.

Athanasius uses his comparison again later on, directly mentioning the Church.

"Again one should not be amazed," he says "if the Son speaks of the Image that exists in us as of Himself. And when Saul persecuted the church, in which was His [the Lord's] Image and Likeness, He spoke as if He were persecuted Himself: 'Saul, why persecutest thou me?' (Acts 9:4). True Wisdom, Logos, says 'created,' so to speak, from the point of view of 'Wisdom imprinted in the world and in works,' from the point of view of 'His Likeness,' as if the 'very Imprint of Wisdom that exists in works' said this about itself." "Original Wisdom is creative and its Imprint is stamped in works as the image of an image. The Word calls it the beginning of the ways, because such wisdom becomes a certain beginning and the beginnings of God-knowing, as it were. Seeing this creaturely Wisdom in the world and in himself, man attains True Wisdom, and from this Wisdom he ascends to the Father (John 14:9; 1 John 2:23)."616 The words "When he prepared the heavens, I was there" (Prov. 8:27) are paraphrased by Athanasius in this manner: "All received being by Me and through Me. And since it is necessary to imprint Wisdom in works, then, although in essence I abided with the Father, however, by condescension to creatures, I imprinted my image in works with reference to them, so that the whole world would be as one body, not in disharmony, but in agreement with itself. For this reason [continues the holy father] all those who, according to the Wisdom given to them, consider creatures correctly in their minds are capable of saving: 'They continue this day according to thine ordinances' (Ps. 119:91). But those who were not zealous about this will hear: Ifurther Athanasius cites Rom. 1:19-25, about knowledge of God obtained through profound contemplation of creation]. And they will be ashamed, hearing: 'For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe' (1 Cor. 1:21)."617

The creaturely Sophia, God's imprint in creation, is "the image and shadow of Wisdom." ⁶¹⁸ But realized, imprinted, in the empirical world in time, Sophia, although she is creaturely, precedes the world. She is a

supramundane hypostatic collection of divine prototypes of that which exists. In affirming this, St. Athanasius refers in this affirmation to the words of the Apostle Paul:

"Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ: According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself" (Eph. 1:3–5). "Thus," says Athanasius, "how did He choose us before we received being if we were not, as He Himself said, prefigured in Him?" ⁶¹⁹

Further, Athanasius explains that this prefiguring of us in the Lord, this our eternal root, serves as the basis of the possibility of "eternal life" for us. 620 Such is the view of the Divine side of creation held by Athanasius, who stood farther away than anybody else from the pantheistic mixing of creation with Creator. He devoted his entire life to the definitive condemnation of heretics who were attempting to erase the boundary between Creator and creation. That is why Athanasius' testimony is of incomparable importance for us.

The dogma of the consubstantiality of the Trinity, the idea of the deification of the flesh, the demands of asceticism, the longing for the Comforter Spirit, and the recognition that creation has an incorruptible, supramundane significance—these are the leitmotifs of Athanasius' dogmatic system. These leitmotifs are so closely interwoven that one cannot hear one without discovering in it all the others. The entire present book is also built on these leitmotifs, so that one can truly say that it comes out of the ideas of St. Athanasius the Great.⁶²¹

Sophia takes part in the life of the Trihypostatic Divinity, enters into the interior of the Trinity, and enters into communion with Divine Love. Since Sophia is a *fourth*, creaturely, and therefore nonconsubstantial Person, she does not "form" a Divine Unity. She "is" not Love, but only enters into communion with Love. And she is allowed to enter into this communion by the ineffable, unfathomable, inconceivable humility of God.

As the *fourth* Person, she, by God's condescension (but in no wise by her own nature!), introduces a distinction in relation to herself in the providential activity of the Hypostases of the Trinity. And, being for the Triune Divinity one and the same, she, in herself, is different in her relation to the Hypostases. The idea of Sophia acquires one shade or another depending upon toward what Hypostasis we predominantly direct our contemplation.

From the point of view of the Hypostasis of the Father, Sophia is the ideal *substance*, or ground of creation, the power or force of the being of creation. From the point of view of the Hypostasis of the Word, Sophia is the *reason* of creation, the meaning or truth of creation. From the point

of view of the Hypostasis of the Spirit, Sophia represents the *spirituality* of creation, its holiness, purity, and immaculateness, i.e., its beauty. This triune idea of *ground-reason-holiness*, becoming fragmented in our rational mind, appears to the sinful mind in three mutually exclusive aspects: *ground*, *reason*, and *holiness*. Indeed, what does the ground of creation have in common with its reason or holiness? For a corrupted mind, i.e., for the rational mind, these ideas can in no wise be united into an integral image. According to the law of identity, they are impenetrable here for one another.

Furthermore, with reference to economy, Sophia has yet another series of new aspects, which fragment the unified idea of Sophia into a number of dogmatic concepts. First of all, Sophia is the beginning and center of redeemed creation, the Body of the Lord Jesus Christ, i.e., creaturely nature as received by the Divine Word. Only by co-participating in Him, i.e., by having our nature contained in or injected into the Body of the Lord, do we receive from the Holy Spirit freedom and mysterious purification. In this sense, Sophia is the pre-existent Nature of creation, purified in Christ, or the Church in its heavenly aspect. And insofar as the Holy Spirit is the source of the sanctification of the earthly side of creation, of the empirical content, or "garment," of creation, in this sense, Sophia is the Church in its earthly aspect, i.e., the combination of all persons who have already begun the ascesis of restoration, who have already entered with their empirical side into the Body of Christ. And since purification occurs through the Holy Spirit, Who reveals Himself to creation, Sophia is the Holy Spirit to the extent that He has deified creation. And the Holy Spirit reveals Himself in creation as virginity, inner chastity, and humble immaculateness—in these chief gifts that Christians receive from Him. In this sense, Sophia is Virginity as the power on high that gives virginity. The bearer of Virginity, the Virgin in the strict and exclusive sense of the word, is Mary, Virgin full of grace, filled with grace (Luke 1:28) by the Holy Spirit, Full of His gifts, and, as such, She is the True Church of God, the True Body of Christ. The Body of Christ came out of Her, after all.

If Sophia is all of Creation, then the soul and conscience of Creation, Mankind, is Sophia *par excellence*. If Sophia is all of Mankind, then the soul and conscience of Mankind, the Church, is Sophia *par excellence*. If Sophia is the Church, then the soul and conscience of the Church, the Church of the Saints, is Sophia *par excellence*. If Sophia is the Church of the Saints, then the soul and conscience of the Church of the Saints, the Intercessor for and Defender of creation before the Word of God, Who judges creation and divides it in two, the Mother of God, "Purifier of the World," is, once again, Sophia *par excellence*. But the true sign of Mary Full of Grace is Her Virginity, the beauty of Her soul. This is precisely Sophia. Sophia is "the hidden man of the heart, in that which is not

corruptible, even the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit" (1 Pet. 3:4). She is the true ornament of a human being, permeating all of his pores, shining out in his gaze, spilling out with his smile, rejoicing in his heart with an ineffable joy, reflected in his every gesture, surrounding a man, at moments of spiritual uplift, by a fragrant cloud and radiant nimbus, raising him above "the world's confusion," so that, remaining in the world, he becomes "not of the world," supramundane. "The light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not" (John 1:5)—such is the supramundane character of the spirit-bearing beautiful person. Sophia is Beauty. "Whose adorning (in Greek: kosmos)," the Apostle Peter addresses women, "let it not be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or putting on of apparel: But let it be the hidden man of the heart, in that which is not corruptible, even the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, which is in the sight of God of great price" (1 Pet. 3:3-4). Only Sophia is essential Beauty in all of creation. Everything else is only tinsel and the superficial smartness of clothing, and this illusory glitter will be taken away from the person in the trial by fire.

Those are some of the aspects of Sophia in their interrelationships. Let us examine these aspects in greater detail.

Purity of heart, virginity, chaste immaculateness is the necessary condition for seeing Sophia-Wisdom, for acquiring sonhood in Heavenly Jerusalem—"the mother of us all" (Gal. 4:26). It is clear why this is so. The heart is the organ for the perception of the heavenly world. The primordial root of a person, his Angel, is perceived through the heart, and through this root a living link is established with the Mother of the spiritual person, with Sophia, understood as the Guardian Angel of all creation, of all creation consubstantial in love, received through Sophia from the Spirit. In Sophia, a person is given perception of God as Love, a perception that gives bliss: "Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God." (Matt. 5:8) They shall see God by their purified heart and in their heart. Purity given by the Holy Spirit cuts away the excrescences on the heart, bares the eternal roots of the heart, clears the paths by which the ineffable Light of the Trihypostatic Sun penetrates into the human consciousness. And then the whole inner being, washed by purity, becomes filled with the Light of absolute knowledge and with the bliss of the clearly experienced Truth. 622

"One who is pure in heart," says St. Gregory of Nyssa, "will not see in himself anything except God." 623

Grace flows in broad streams into all the purified pores of the heart. "What comes from grace has joy, peace, love, truth," says St. Macarius the Great.⁶²⁴ In other words, from the subjective point of view, Sophia is perceived as the intermediary of joy and is therefore identified with Joy. Purity of heart is bliss; virginity of soul is joy and even a certain

merriment. "A certain merriment is one of the features of chastity," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus in his *Gnomic Couplets*. 625

But if virginity of soul is a necessary condition for the perception of the Heavenly Jerusalem, the reverse is also true: Only "the touching of other worlds," 626 the penetration down to the spiritual roots of being, and the gracious contemplation of oneself in God can give the power of virginity. To be virginal, it is necessary "to discern one's nature in the Heavenly Jerusalem," to see oneself as a son of the Common Mother, who is pre-existent Virginity.

"Do you desire, brother, to be a virgin?" asks the author of the *First Epistle on Virginity*, which dates from the third century and was once attributed to St. Clement of Rome. "Do you know," he continues, "how much toil and labor there are in true virginity? Do you know how to wage the battle correctly? Do you fight armed with the power of the Holy Spirit, having chosen for yourself this ascesis in order to win a radiant crown? Do you discern your nature in the Heavenly Jerusalem?" (cf. Gal. 4:26).⁶²⁷

One should not be surprised by this contradiction between thesis and antithesis, that is, between the propositions: virginity is the source of the contemplation of Sophia and the contemplation of Sophia is the source of virginity. This is only a particular case of the great antinomy between God's grace and human ascesis, an antinomy expressed decisively in each question of God's economy, from the destinies of whole nations to the most ordinary acts, without even mentioning sacraments. But for me, at this moment, the only important thing is to establish the continuity and indivisibility of the idea "virginity-contemplation." It is this continuity that explains why the insistence with which *purity* is spoken of in the ecclesiastical literature is proportional both to the amount of space devoted to the idea of *charismatism*, the bearing of spirit, deification (whatever it is called in different ages) and to the emphasis on the absolute value of creation.

I repeat again and again and will not tire of repeating that Christian asceticism and the absolute valuation of creation, virginity and the bearing of spirit, the knowledge of Divine Wisdom and love of the body, ascesis and knowledge of absolute Truth, the distancing of oneself from corruption and love *are antinomic sides of one and the same spiritual life*, sides that are just as inseparably connected as the opposite sides of a regular decagon. When I spoke above of the contemplation of creation in its unity and the idea of Sophia according to the wisdom of the patristic literature, I insistently pointed out this connection and I do not think that it is now necessary to repeat the examples presented then. I will recall only the tone of that discussion with the words of St. Isaac the Syrian: "Pray that the Angel of your chastity does not step away from you, that

sin does not mount a fiery attack upon you, and separate you from this Angel. And prepare yourself to receive bodily temptations with your entire soul, and overcome them with all your members. And fill your eyes with tears to keep your Guardian from stepping away from you."628

Man's Divine prototype, his Guardian Angel, is preeminently the guardian of man's purity, of his integrity, chastity. This prototype is the Angel of chastity, and therefore "the foul smell of lustful thoughts and grotesque dreams is not tolerated by God's holy Angels." 629

Almost every ascetic work develops the notion of the connection between virginity and humility, as well as the notion of lustful thoughts as a consequence of pride and the egotistical self-assertion of the I. This observation of the holy fathers is fully explained by the foregoing observation that chastity, as the higher freedom above one's wicked thoughts, is a power of grace that acts only through the Christian's self-surrender to God. By contrast, egotistical self-separation from God leads to enslavement by such thoughts, i.e., by impurity, and makes man a "self-idol," as the *Great Canon* of Andrew of Crete says. Here, again and again, we return to the basic idea of the difference between the spiritual and fleshly laws of identity. The spiritual law of identity makes me, contemplated by me in God, the *ideal* of myself, whereas the fleshly law of identity makes me the *idol* of myself.

The type of genuine purity is the Most Pure and Most Blessed Mother of the Lord, Humble in Her eternal purity, Pure in Her unchanging humility. In Her, the Bride of the Holy Spirit, eternally purified by Him, is the living source of the world's purity, "the ever-flowing Source of reason." In Her is the spring of living water, satisfying every thirst and extinguishing in the soul the fire of Gehenna; therefore to Her the Church cries out: "Purifier of the world, O Mother of God" and "Purification of the whole world." For it is She who "chases away the dark horde of our passions and lusts." It is She who is "the pillar of fire, shielding us against the temptations and stumbling blocks of the world," "the pillar of fire, in the midst of the darkness of sin showing to all of us the way of salvation." It is She who "saves us from the fire of passion with the dew of Her prayers." If the Lord is the Head of the Church, then Meek Mary, "the Dispenser of God's grace," is truly the heart of the Church, through which the Church dispenses to its members Life, Eternity, and the gifts of the Spirit; She is the true Giver of Life, 630 the true "Life-bearing Source." For Mary is the "perfectly immaculate Lady," "the only pure and blessed one," "full of grace," "the only incorruptible and good dove." She is the Living Symbol and Beginning of the world in the process of purification, the *Purifying One*. She is the *Burning Bush*, embraced by the flame of the Holy Spirit, the living preliminary appearance of the Spirit on earth, the type of pneumatophany. Just as the Spirit is the beauty of the Absolute, so

the Mother of God is the Beauty of the Creaturely, "the glory of the world." And She is the ornament of all creation: "Having adorned themselves in Thy divine Praise, those born of earth rejoice," for beauty perceived in the heart is joy. And the beauty of the world, contemplated by it in fear and trembling, is the Joy of the World, its Joy Surpassing All Yearning, its Lovingkindness, its Comfort and Consolation, its Sweet Kiss, by which the World Below kisses the World Above. This is the Joy of All Joys, as St. Seraphim instructed us to call the icon Lovingkindness, the very same icon that was the only one in his cell and before which he was saved. 631 The Mother of God is Joy and the "Intercessor for the joy of the world." In contemplation of heavenly Beauty, She is the Comfort of Sorrow, Joy for All Who Sorrow, Consolation in Pains and Sorrows. She is the Ardent Defender, the Search for Those Who Are Lost, the Comfort of Sinners, the Softening of Cruel Hearts. She Watches Over Sorrow; She is Ouick To Listen, the Listener, the Deliverer of Those Who Suffer, the Merciful Healer. She is the Guardian Angel of the world. She is the Protection spread over the world "broader than the clouds," the world's Odigitria, or Guide, with a pillar of fire or cloud leading the world to the Promised Land, into "eternal life." She is the Impregnable Wall protecting the world, the world's Deliverer. She is "the strong Defense of the Universe." By and through her, all creation rejoices and all humankind rejoices. Do we not sing:

"In Thee, Virgin Full of Grace, rejoices every creature, the chorus of angels, and all humankind, sanctified temple and verbal paradise, virginal praise . . . In Thee rejoices, Virgin Full of Grace, all creation, Glory to Thee."

The Mother of God is the most beautiful flower of earth, the *Unfading* and *Fragrant Flower*. She is the Bearer of Sophia, the "Animate Heaven" and the "Intelligent Heaven," the *Heaven Full of Grace*, that is, the World on High, the Heavenly Jerusalem, imprinted in the Most Holy soul of the Virgin. Does not the Church say:

"Truly thou hast appeared like heaven on earth, greater than the heaven above, unwedded Virgin, for from thee has come the Sun that lights the world, commanding the Truth."

This most intimate connection between the idea of the Mother of God and the idea of the Heavenly Jerusalem is also seen in the juxtaposition in the Paschal hiermos:

Shine, shine
O New Jerusalem:
For the glory of the Lord
has illuminated thee.
Exult now
and be merry, Sion.

And Thou, Most Pure One, Mother of God, rejoice In the resurrection of the One to Whom Thou gavest birth

About certain ascetics, the Most Holy Virgin says, upon appearing to them: "This one is of our kind." What profoundly significant words! This means that there is some special "kind," the kind of the Mother of God, and to this kind belong the ascetic saints. What is this kind? The kind that is predisposed to virginity of the soul. The men or, more precisely, the earthly angels who are the members of this mysterious kind shine, from their very youth, with a meek light of otherworldliness and immaculateness. Even in the mother's womb they are marked by a special organization of the soul. They are removed, as it were, from under the law of sin. They come to us directly out of Eden, as it were, like the children of the primordial sinless couple. They achieve without effort what others achieve in the sweat of their faces. Without struggle they are perfected and ascend from power to power, as a fragrant flower blossoms. Without wandering, from their very conception, they go with firm step to "the prize of the high calling" (Phil. 3:14). They are the "eunuchs born from their mother's womb" (Matt. 19:12). Such, for example, was John the Divine. Such were the saints of Athos, John Cucuzel and Athanasius, 634 and the saints Sergius of Radonezh and Seraphim of Sarov. An astonishing example of such immaculateness was presented to the world by the Mother of God in the person of a starets of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, the hiero-schema-monk Parthenios, who from his very childhood had absolutely no knowledge of impure passions and struggles of the flesh. He did not even know any temptations from them. 635 Such was the elder of the Gethsemane Hermitage, Isidor. 636 Thus, there is a special kind of the Mother of God (although not every saint is of this kind); there is a higher type of spiritual organization, a holy (though this does not yet mean sinless) person. In a word, what we have here is the sophianic character of the soul, flowing from the Source of Purity. Who is the Source of Purity? Who is the Pillar of Virginity? The Most Holy Mother of God. 637

That is why these angels in the flesh, these monks by nature, these flowers of the world are conscious of themselves as the specially chosen of the Most Pure Virgin. That is why they specially venerate Her and receive grace-giving aid and signs from Her. When one reflects on their relation to the Most Pure Virgin, it becomes clear that what is primary in Her for them, for their consciousness, for their love, is not the fact that She is the Mother of God, but her Everlasting Virginity, She Herself. Therefore, such a one of the elect of the Mother of God as St. Seraphim had in his cell

only a single icon. Of whom? It is natural to think that since there was only one icon it would have been that of the Savior. But it was an icon of the Mother of God, and this icon did not even have on it the Savior. This was the icon called *Lovingkindness*. The same could be said about other virgin saints. 638 They honor in the Mother of God the Bearer of Sophia, the Manifestation of Sophia, and feel that their spiritual organization comes precisely from Sophia. St. Seraphim even demanded, besides the confession of the Godmanhood of Jesus Christ, that one specially confess the Everlasting Virginity of the Mother of God. 639 Just as there are corrupt kinds and even corrupt nations, there are also pure kinds. In the corrupt kinds and nations, the features of edenic purity have been obliterated. In the pure kinds and nations, something of the original beauty remains. All creation is corrupted, but in some the corruption is deeper than in others. There are the pure par excellence, fragments of the shattered primordial world, as it were, whose image has been distorted less than that of other creatures. These are those who honor Everlasting Virginity, and the first among them, the Bearer and Center of edenic purity, is the Ever-Virgin Mother of God.⁶⁴⁰

The Mother of God combines Sophianic, i.e., angelic, power and human humility. She combines the "good will of God toward mortal men" and the "boldness of mortal men toward God." The Mother of God stands at the boundary separating creation from the Creator, and since what is intermediate between the two is utterly unfathomable, the Mother of God is also utterly unfathomable. She is "a height that cannot be scaled by human thoughts." She is "a depth that cannot be plumbed even by angelic eyes." She is "higher than the heavens" and "vaster than the heavens."641 She is "more honored than the Cherubim and incomparably more glorious than the Seraphim." She is the "Queen of the Angels."642 About her it is said: "Thou hast appeared Pure and Most Honored above the fiery-eyed Seraphim." Bearer of purity, Manifestation of the Holy Spirit, Principle of spiritual creation, Source of the Church, the supra-angelic "Maiden Bride of God" stops being One of many in the Church. Even in the Church of saints, she is not prima inter pares. She is special, She is the exclusive center of Church life. She is the heart of Jesus. She is the Church, Nicholas Cabasilas, the Archbishop of Thessaloniki, one of the most esteemed interpreters of the Divine liturgy (he lived in the 14th century), who arrived at empirical knowledge of the mysterious depths of the Divine service, says that "if anyone could see the Church of Christ in the very form in which it is united with Christ and participates in His flesh, he would see it as nothing other than the body of the Lord."643 But if he were to look here at the Most Holy and Most Blessed Virgin Mary, he would see Her as nothing other than the heart of Christ. She is the center of creaturely life, the point at which earth touches

heaven. She is the Chosen One, the Queen of Heaven, and, *a fortiori*, the Queen of Earth:

Elected by the Eternal King above all creation, Queen of heaven and earth . . . We offer thee worthy veneration with thanksgiving, faith, and heartfelt tenderness.

She has *cosmic* power.⁶⁴⁴ She is "the sanctification of all earthly and heavenly elements," "the blessing of all the seasons of the year." She is the "Empress of all." She is the Queen of the World, which is why every believer cries:

We have no comfort but Thee, Queen of the world, Hope and Intercessor of the faithful.

Here I have cited haphazardly remembered expressions of liturgical literature. To give a systematic review of the unsurveyably abundant content of the liturgical literature would constitute the task of a whole science, a science which—alas!—we do not have at all. I have attempted to convey to you how I understand this literature. Perhaps I am in error? It would be good if you could indicate to me how I err. But, in any case, that would not change the general trend of my thought, because what has been said about the Mother of God is said more for personal reasons than as a strict necessity in the development of my ideas.

Nevertheless, I would not like to end this letter without presenting some of the data on which my conviction has grown. For my aim is to clarify the Church consciousness for myself, and there is nothing more alien to the goals of my work than the desire to expound "my" system. Let me say it more decisively: If my work contains some views that are uniquely "mine," that is only because of the shallowness of my thought or my ignorance or my lack of understanding. In addition to the liturgical creativity of the Church, the data I have in mind consist of the patristic literature and iconography. Let me begin with the patristic literature.

There has come down to us in Latin translation a remarkable text with the title: "To John, saintly elder, Ignatius and the brothers who are with him." According to tradition this text represents a private letter from St. Ignatius of Antioch to the Apostle and Evangelist John the Divine, who, as is well known, was the adopted son of the Most Holy Virgin Mary. In the first lines the author of the text expresses his sorrow and that of his friends regarding John's delay in coming. It is clear from the context that John had promised to come to Ignatius' community together with, it appears, the Mother of God, but for some reason he was delayed. It appears that this caused certain difficulties in the community for the author of the letter (perhaps, some members of the community had the intention of independently going to Jerusalem for a speedier meeting with

the Apostle), and the author is trying to persuade the Apostle to hasten in fulfilling his promise.

Further it is said:

"Also, many of our women desire to see Mary, Mother of Jesus, and intend [volentes] every day to run to you to touch her breasts that fed the Lord Jesus, and to ask Her Herself about something more mysterious of Hers. And also Salome, to whom you are disposed, the daughter of Anna, who was Her guest in Jerusalem for five months, and some others who know her personally convey that She is full of all grace and all virtues [eam omnium gratiarum abundam, et omnium virtutum], is like a virgin fruitful with virtue and grace. And, as they say, in persecutions and sorrows, She is joyful: when needy She does not complain; She is grateful to those who insult her; She rejoices at pains; She sympathizes with those who are unhappy and persecuted, and is not slow to come to their aid. And She distinguishes Herself [enitescit, shines] against the deleterious manifestations of sins, stepping forth as an Intercessor in the struggle for faith. She is the Teacher of our new faith and repentance; and She is the helper of all the faithful in all pious works. She is devoted to the humble, and becomes even more devoutly humble for those who are devout; and for a long time She has been glorified by all though the scribes and pharisees revile Her. Moreover, many say much else about her; however, we do not dare believe everything or report it to you. But as those who are worthy of belief tell us, Mary Mother of Jesus combines human nature with the nature of angelic holiness [in Maria, matre Iesu, humanae naturae sanctitatis angelicae sociatur]. And such a rumor [haectalia] has shaken up our insides (viscera) and provokes us to desire strongly to see [desiderare aspectum] this—if one can call it so—Heavenly sight and most holy miracle [hujus . . . coleistis prodigii et sacratissimi monstri]. Please attempt to satisfy our desire, and remain healthy. Amen."645

Another letter bears the title "To John, saintly elder, his Ignatius." This letter too is recognized by tradition as a letter of St. Ignatius of Antioch to the Apostle John. This letter begins with the following words:

"If I can, I would like to come up to you, to the Jerusalem region, and see the faithful saints who are there, especially the Mother of Jesus, who is called admirable for the universe and desired by all (*universis admirandam et cunctis desirabilem*). Who would not receive pleasure to see Her and speak with Her, Who gave birth to the True God, if only he is a friend of our faith and religion?" ⁶⁴⁶

And further the discussion concerns the Apostle James, who, "as they say, bears a strong resemblance to Christ Jesus in face, life, and manner." Ending the letter, the author asks John to hurry with the visit.

Although the text that I intend to present here has almost no *direct* connection with my task, I cannot refrain from conveying these infinitely dear lines from the correspondence of St. Ignatius with the Most Holy

Virgin. Try to imagine concretely what this means: a note written by the fingers—"light as a dream"—of the Meek and Blessed One! How much the very brevity of the note says about the quiet silence of the One Who, in domestic life, in everyday society, was for the Apostle Peter the paragon and highest embodiment of the incorruptible beauty of the "meek and quiet spirit" (1 Peter 3:4)—Who even now is "the faith of those who ask for silence," as believers refer to her. It is said that "perhaps" this correspondence is apocryphal. I do not argue—I know nothing . . . But, after all, only "perhaps." But perhaps the opposite is true. For there remains "what if," and the value of this "what if" infinitely multiplies the "perhaps." I ask that you try to understand to some degree that feeling which makes this letter (even if it in fact may be apocryphal) infinitely dear to me, dear to the secret depths of my heart. For even the slightest belief (and no one has in fact proved that the letter is inauthentic!) that She sat down at a table, smoothed out her clothes, and with Her own hand wrote this fragrant letter, compels one almost to cry, so moved is one, and calms for a long time the agitation of the soul. How happy we are that we have these lines that give joy to the heart! But let me present the letters themselves.

Here is what Ignatius writes to the Virgin:

"To the Christbearer, Mary, from Her Ignatius:

You should have strengthened and consoled me, a new convert, a disciple of your John. About your Jesus I found out what is astonishing to say, and I am amazed at what I have heard. And from you—who has always been close to and connected with Him and knowledgeable in His mysteries—I desire with all my soul to acquire knowledge about what I have heard. I had written to you earlier and had asked you then about the same thing. Be healthy; and the new converts who are with me are strengthened from you, through you, and in you. Amen."⁶⁴⁷

Here is the Latin translation of the answering letter from the Mother of God:

"Ignatio dilecto condiscipulo, humilis ancilla Christi Iesu.

De Iesu quae a Ioanne audisti et didicisti, vera sunt. Illa credas, illis inhaereas; et Christianitatis susceptae votum firmiter teneas, et mores et vitam voto conformes. Veniam autem una cum Ionanne, te et qui tecum sunt visere. Sta in fide, et viriliter age: nec te commoveat persecutionis austeritas; sed valeat et exsultet Spiritus tuus in Deo salutari tuo. Amen."648

Or:

"To Ignatius, beloved fellow disciple, humble servant of Christ Jesus:

Of Jesus what you have heard and found out from John is true. Believe this, hold to this; and guard unshakably the vow of Christianity taken upon yourself, and make your habits and life conform to this vow. As for me, I will come together with John to visit you and those who are with

you. Stand firm in faith and act like a man, and do not be troubled by the severity of persecution; but may your spirit be strong and rejoice in your saving God. Amen."

This appears to me an inappropriate place to discuss the authenticity of this letter. Let me only comment on two expressions which have been considered to be borrowings from the Gospel of Luke and the First Epistle to the Corinthians, with the latter in fact written after the dormition of the Holy Virgin. Supposedly this undermines the authenticity of the letter. But there is a great misunderstanding here.

The first suspect expression is: *Sta in fide, et viriliter age*: "stand firm in faith and act like a man." It has been asserted that this expression is a borrowing from 1 Cor. 16:13: "Watch ye, stand fast in faith, quit you like men, be strong." But, in the first place, the two expressions are so simple and natural that there would have been no need at all for the Virgin Mary to have read Paul's Epistle to write her letter. Secondly, there is not even that much similarity between the two expressions. Thirdly, if one is to speak of borrowing, it is not known whether the Apostle might not have wanted to give to his own speech the authority of the words of the Mother of God. Fourthly and finally, there is an analogous exhortation in the Septuagint (Ps. 31:24). The most natural supposition (if one has to suppose a borrowing at all) is that both the Holy Virgin and the Apostle Paul "borrowed" their exhortations from the Psalms, which every Jew knew by heart, and they in particular.

The second suspect expression is: Exsultet spiritus tuus in Deo salutario tuo: "may your spirit exult in your saving God." Here a parallel with Luke 1:47 has been asserted: "And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour." Let me repeat: Does one have to suppose a borrowing in the case of a such a simple expression? But if one does suppose it, then in the first place, one has to remember that Luke is repeating here a hymn that had been sung long before by this very same Virgin Mary, so that the Mother of God is only repeating in her letter that which She had said long ago and which She probably had remembered more than once and repeated to Herself and to others. Secondly, the hymn of the Mother of God in Luke 1:47 has a parallel passage in 1 Sam. 2:1.

One can also indicate internal features that support the authenticity of the two letters cited above or at least their antiquity. Specifically, one notes the complete absence of dogmatic formulas and the absence of outwardly grand epithets applied to the Mother of God. Also characteristic is the expression "Your" (i.e., the Mother of God's) Jesus, which would sound strange in the mouth of a man who thinks with dogmatic distinctness about the Person of Jesus Christ. The brevity of the two letters, the absence of rhetorical amplifications, and certain traits of everyday life also make it probable that they are authentic.

The powerful and indelible impression that the Virgin Mary made on those who saw Her is described expressively in a remarkable document, known as the Epistle of St. Dyonisius the Areopagite to the Apostle Paul. Here is what is said in this Epistle, describing the Areopagite's visit to the Mother of God:

"I confess before God, O glorious teacher and guide, that it appeared improbable to me that there could be a being so abundantly full of Divine power and amazing grace besides the Supreme God Himself. But I saw not only with my psychic but also with my spiritual eyes that which no human mind can perceive. Yes! Yes! I saw with my own eyes the Godlike and Most Holy higher than all the heavenly spirits-Mother of our Christ Jesus. I was made worthy of this by the special grace of God, by the blessing of the chief of the Apostles, and by the unfathomable goodness and mercy of the Most Holy Virgin. Again and again I confess before the omnipotence of God and before the most glorious perfection of the Virgin, His Mother, that when John, the chief apostle and the highest prophet, shining in his earthly life like the sun in the heavens brought me before the Godlike and Most Holy Virgin, I was illuminated not only outwardly but also inwardly by such a great and immeasurable Divine light, and, around, there flowed such amazing aromas and fragrance, that neither my feeble body nor even my spirit could bear such miraculous signs and sprouts of eternal bliss. My heart grew weak, my spirit grew weak in me from her glory and Divine grace. God born from her virgin womb is my witness that if your divine commandments and laws were not yet so fresh in my memory and newly enlightened mind, I would consider her the true God and would bestow upon her the worship that should be given to the True God alone. Man cannot come to know greater bliss, honor, and glory than that bliss which I experienced in seeing the Most Holy One. I was then utterly happy! I thank the Most High, Merciful God, the Divine Virgin, and the glorious Apostle John, and you too, supreme presbyter and head of the Church for doing me the greatest of good deeds."649

But perhaps better than in any dogmatic affirmations the sophianic character of the Mother of God is seen in descriptions of Her outward appearance.

According to the tradition preserved by the Church historian Nicephoros Callistos, the Mother of God "was of medium height or, as some say, a little taller than medium height; Her hair was golden; Her eyes were lively, with pupils the color of olives; Her eyebrows were arched and moderately black; Her nose was long; Her lips were like flowers, full of sweet talk; Her face was neither round nor angular but somewhat oval; Her hands and fingers were long." 650

According to the tradition passed down by St. Ambrose of Milan, "She was a Virgin not only in body but also in soul; She was humble in heart, circumspect in words, prudent, of few words, a lover of reading . . . hardworking, and chaste in speech. Her rule was to insult no one, to wish everyone well, to honor old people, not to envy equals, to avoid boasting, to be sensible, to love virtue. When, even by the expression of Her face, did She ever offend her parents? When was She ever in disharmony with Her family? When was She

ever prideful before a modest man, when did She ever laugh at a weak man, when did She ever turn away from a poor man? There was nothing severe in Her eyes, nothing imprudent in Her words, nothing improper in Her actions: Her bodily movements were modest, Her manner of walking was even, Her voice was calm; so that Her bodily appearance was the expression of Her soul, the personification of purity."651

And, according to Nicephoros Callistos, "in conversation with others, She maintained propriety, did not laugh, was not indignant, especially did not show anger; completely artless, simple, she did not think at all of Herself, and, far from being pampered, She was distinguished by complete humility. As for Her garments, She was content with their natural color, which is evidenced by the holy veil She wore. In brief, a special grace was manifested in all Her actions." 652

The boundless grace of the Virgin Mary, Her radiant sophianicity, is indicated figuratively by a great many saintly teachers of the Church. In the liturgy, nearly half of the prayers are addressed to the Mother of God. In iconography, a great many of the icons are of the Mother of God. Both in the iconostasis and in the liturgy, the Mother of God occupies a place that is symmetric and as though equivalent to the place of the Lord. To Her alone we address the prayer: "Save us."653 But if from living experience given by the Church we turn to theology, we feel that we are transported to some new domain. Psychologically, one has the undeniable impression that scholastic theology does not entirely speak about the Same One Whom the Church glorifies. The scholastic doctrine of the Mother of God is incommensurable with Her living veneration; the scholastic understanding of the dogma of everlasting virginity lags behind the empirical experience of this dogma. Liturgy is the heart of Church life. Therefore, it is very natural to ask oneself what this liturgical glorification means. It is natural to seek the *reason* of the experience that is reflected in the patristic writings.

We find an attempt to answer these questions (to be sure, a timid attempt) in St. Ambrose's writings on virginity and marriage.⁶⁵⁴ He interprets the virginity of the Ever-Virgin as a phenomenon of a special Grace, belonging to Her alone, as derivative of the gift of chastity. And since the new thing brought into the world by Christianity, i.e., the essence of the Church, consists precisely in chaste purity, it is clear that the Center and Source of this gift is identified with the Church. Furthermore, the Mother of God is not only chaste but possesses chastity. Chastity has a heavenly nature. Therefore, one must recognize in the Virgin Mary a kind of special connection with Heaven, a kind of heavenliness. Here, without considering the morally edifying purpose of the works of Ambrose, let us remark that a kind of ontology is always felt behind his moral concepts. Although the names "Church," "Heaven," and "Virgin Mary" are not synonymous, they are ontologically almost interchangeable.

But let us present several excerpts from the writings of Ambrose:

"Beautiful is Mary," he exclaims, "who presented the sign of Holy virginity (egregia igitur Maria, quae signum sacrae virginitatis extulit) and raised to Christ the holy banner of immaculate purity (intemeratae integritatis)."655 The Virgin Mary is unfathomable in Her superiority with respect to all of nature. She is higher than nature. "It is asked: Who can encompass with human mind That One Whom even nature could not subject to its laws? Who with a natural word can express what is higher than the order of nature? From heaven She called forth that which She imitated on earth. And not undeservedly the image of heavenly life was adopted by Her Who found for Herself a Bridegroom in heaven. Having traversed the clouds, the heavens, the angels, and the constellations, She found the Word of God in the very bosom of the Father and with Her whole soul became attached to Him."656 "She had so much grace (gratia) that not only could She preserve the gift of virginity (*virginitatis gratiam*) in Herself but She could also call forth the appearance of immaculateness (integritatis) even in those at whom She looked."657 And further, St. Ambrose cites as an example the virgin John the Baptist, "whom the Mother of God prepared as with the special oil of Her presence and the fragrance of Her chastity when he was only three months old." He also cites the example of the virgin St. John the Divine. "For this reason I am not amazed," adds Ambrose, "that this one to whom was revealed the habitation of the heavenly sacraments spoke of the Divine mysteries more than the other Evangelists. 658 "O riches of Mary's virginity! She became red-hot like a fired clay vessel and like a cloud spilled Christ's grace on the earth"659—exclaims Ambrose. This grace is spiritual rain extinguishing the fiery passions of the body and cooling the inner thoughts⁶⁶⁰; it is the gift of a virginal life. From Mary's life "as from a mirror there shines the image of purity and the beauty of virtue (species castitatis et forma virtutis). In this, you [i.e., virgins] can find for yourselves examples for life: here as on a drawing are depicted precepts of purity."661 "She is the image of virginity; Her life is a science for everyone."662 Furthermore, immaculateness is all, the whole essence of ecclesiality. "Immaculateness begot even the angels. In fact, he who has preserved immaculateness is an angel; he who has corrupted it is a devil. The very name of religion comes from it. A virgin is one who links herself to God; whereas a harlot is one who begot the gods."663

Thus, that which makes a man a member of the Church is received by him from the Mother of God. But after all, this grace—as is usually said—is given to us by the Church. What then, in this case, is the relation of the Virgin Mary to the Church? Mary is in fact the bearer of the Church. What the prophet foretold about the Church is "wholly applicable" to the Most Holy Virgin, 664 and is not only "applicable" but "under the image of the Church" is directly "prophesied about Mary."665 St. Am-

brose interprets the whole of the Song of Songs either with reference to the Church⁶⁶⁶ or with reference to the Mother of God, or with reference to both at the same time; and in interpreting certain passages of the Song of Songs with reference to the Church, he directly, without further qualifications, places a "hence" and draws a conclusion about the Virgin Mary.⁶⁶⁷ The Church is the Virgin just as the Virgin is the Church. "The Church is beautiful among virgins, for She is an immaculate virgin (virgo sine ruga)."668 Virginity is precisely ecclesiality. Even in the Old Testament (Ex. 15:20)—says Ambrose, clearly playing on the name "Mary"— Mary was the "image," "the little prototype of the Church (Ecclesiae . . . specimen)."669 Christ is the Bridegroom and Husband of the Church; the "bridegroom of virginal purity (sponsus virgineae castitatis)" 670; "the fatherland of chastity in heaven (patria castitatis in coelo)."671 The Church is "a virgin thanks to chastity, but a mother thanks to the fact that it brings forth progeny (Ecclesia . . . virgo est castitate, mater est prole)."672 Such is the Mother of God and "Her incomprehensible superiority

with respect to all of God's creation."673

But this "incomprehensible superiority" is not exhausted and cannot be exhausted by descriptions and representations. An artist's image of the "Unwedded Bride," refracted as in a crystal prism in the artist's work, projects on a given epoch only one kind of ray of grace even if the artist is illuminated from above; iconography gives a multitude of different aspects of the sophianic beauty of the Virgin Mary. Every legitimate icon of the Mother of God, every "revealed" icon, i.e., an icon that is accompanied by signs and miracles and that has been approved and confirmed, so to speak, by the Virgin Mother Herself, that She has confirmed in its spiritual authenticity, is an imprint of only *one* of Her aspects, a luminous spot on the earth from only one ray of the Virgin full of grace, only one of Her iconographic names. Whence the existence of a multitude of "revealed" icons and whence the seeking to venerate different icons. The names of some of these icons express in part their spiritual essence, and I have already cited some of these typical names for icon-aspects. Other names are rather accidental, for they have their origin in places or events outwardly connected with the icon; the significance of such an icon is perceived only in immediate contemplation, and to present its name here would not make any sense. I must, however, explore a certain especially important iconographic subject, known under the name "Sophia, the Wisdom of God." I will examine the available material in detail in a special article; here, I will make only the most cursory survey of the material, though I hope that even this brief survey can provide the body (the "apperceiving mass") for the ideas of spiritual contemplation noted earlier.

The icon of Sophia, the Wisdom of God exists in many variants, and this alone proves that sophianic iconography was imbued with a genuine religious creativity, emanating from the soul of the people, and was not a mere external borrowing of iconographic forms. But to understand the inner content of this creativity, it is necessary to look at these versions not separately but together, for they are particular aspects of a *single* idea.

The aim of our sketch is to clarify the *idea* of Sophia, however Sophia may have been called in different ages. We therefore have little interest in comprehensively clarifying the term "Sophia" itself in its diverse ideational content. Of course, there is no doubt that often the holy fathers of the church understood the word Sophia to mean the Word of God, the Second Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. The same thing must be said about liturgical prayers and hymns. To try to demonstrate this generally known proposition by quotations would be like breaking down an open door. If, in general, we have been considering only the special *idea* of Sophia, now, in addition, we limit the field of our attention to the data of *iconography*, because what is called "Sophia" by the holy fathers of the church in no wise always coincides with the content of this name in iconography, which is from a considerably later period. On the other hand, the iconographic "Sophia" is no wise always discussed by the fathers under this name.

In any case, one must necessarily consider together the principal, most typical variants. Removing certain very rare and isolated variants, ⁶⁷⁴ we see that there are three typical variants, while the others have forms that are subsumed in the forms of these three basic ones. These three types can be characterized as (1) the type of the Angel, (2) the type of the Church (sometimes called the Sophia of the Cross), and (3) the type of the Godbearer. Alternatively, they can be characterized according to the cities where the best examples of these three types of icons are found: (1) the *Novgorod* Sophia, (2) the *Yaroslavl* Sophia, ⁶⁷⁵ and (3) the *Kiev* Sophia. But before drawing conclusions about their religious essence, we must describe the icons of these three types.

The most ancient and remarkable version is that of Novgorod. The Novgorod Cathedral of Sophia was founded by Prince Vladimir in the year 1045 and consecrated in 1052. According to ancient tradition the church icon is recognized to be a copy of a Constantinople icon, and it is probably contemporary with the construction of the cathedral. Sylvester, the priest of the Moscow Cathedral of the Annunciation directly refers to both of these traditions in his "Petition," presented to the Council in 1554:

"Just as the pious, orthodox, and great prince Vladimir had himself received baptism in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in Korsun, and having come to Kiev, commanded all to be baptized, and then the entire Russian land was baptized; and in the beginning from Constantinople a metropolitan was sent to Kiev, and Bishop Joachim was sent to Novgorod; and the Great Prince Vladimir ordered that a church of stone be built in Novgorod, Saint Sophia, the Wisdom of God, according to the Con-

stantinople custom; and the icon of Sophia, the Wisdom of God, was then painted after the Greek type."676

And from the year 1542 we have direct news of the icon of Sophia. The Chronicle states the following: "The Wisdom of God had pardoned a woman whose eyes were sick." 677

Thus, the icon of Sophia is, at least in content if not in execution, one of the oldest Russian icons. The content of this sacred icon of Novgorod is as follows: the central figure of the composition is an angelic figure in an imperial dalmatic and also wears barmy and an omophorion. Her long hair does not curl but falls on her shoulders; her face and hands are of a fiery color; on her back are two large fiery wings; she wears a golden crown in the form of a crenelated wall. In her right hand is a golden caduceus; in her left hand is a rolled-up scroll, pressed to the heart; around her head is a golden nimbus; above her ears is a ribbon (toroki) holding back her hair and freeing her ears for better hearing. This is Sophia. She is represented as sitting on a double cushion which lies on a magnificent golden throne that has four legs and is supported by seven flamelike pillars. Sophia's feet rest on a large stone. The whole throne is placed inside a golden eight-cornered star, situated on a background of sky-blue or greenish concentric rings, speckled with golden stars. Sometimes, however, the eight-cornered star is absent. On the sides of Sophia, on their own pedestals, reverently stand, to the right, the Mother of God, to the left, John the Precursor. Sometimes (for example, on the outer fresco of the sanctuary of the Moscow Cathedral of the Dormition), Mary and John, by the attraction of attributes, are also represented with wings. Both of them have nimbuses, but they are not golden (at least sometimes) but green-blue. The Mother of God holds in Her hands (and sometimes has in her womb) a greenish sphere with stars, in which is found the Infant Savior, surrounded by a six-cornered star. In His left hand the Savior holds a scroll, while His right hand makes an orator's gesture (earlier this was taken to be an onomastic blessing). John makes the same gesture with his right hand, while his left holds an unfurled scroll with the inscription: "Repent, etc." Above Sophia is the All-Merciful Savior, belted, with a cruciform nimbus. This figure is placed inside a six (?) cornered star, surrounded by a starry background. Higher one finds a starry ribbon-shaped rainbow. In the middle of it is situated a four-legged golden altar with the instruments of the Lord's passion and with a book, the so-called "preparation of the altar." On the sides of the altar are Angels with knees bent, six in number, three on each side. Sometimes, there are only four Angels, but then above the altar is depicted God the Father, sitting with raised arms on a throne with a semi-cylindrical back. The head of God the Father is surrounded by an eight-cornered nimbus, and the corners are, alternately, red and green. On the sides of this throne are



Icon of Sophia, Novgorod.

placed yet two more Angels with knees bent. Finally, the whole composition is sometimes surrounded by a wreath of (12) separate compositions, predominantly from the life of the Mother of God.⁶⁷⁸

Before attempting a definitive interpretation of this icon, let me note certain details that suggest an explanation.

Sophia's wings clearly indicate that she has some special closeness to the world on high. The fiery character of the wings and body are an indication of fullness of spirituality. The caduceus (not a "rod with a cross" and not with "Christ's monogram," at least in the majority of cases) in the right hand is an indication of theurgic power, of *psychopompia*, of mysterious power over souls. The rolled-up scroll in the left hand, pressed



Icon of Sophia, Wisdom of God, in the Tret'iakov Picture Gallery.

to the organ of higher knowledge, the heart, indicates knowledge of shrouded mysteries. The imperial ornamentation and throne indicate imperial power.

The crown in the form of a city wall is the usual symbol of the Earth-Mother in her various forms, expressing perhaps her protection of mankind as a whole, as a city, as *civitas*. The stone (and not a cushion!) beneath her feet indicates the solidity of the support, unshakeableness. The *toroki* or ribbon behind the ears, freeing them for better hearing, indicate acuteness of perceptions, openness to inspirations from above. The ribbon is an iconographic symbol designating the organ of Divine hearing. The virginity of the Mother of God before, during, and after the birth is represented, according to tradition, by *three stars*, two on Her breasts and one on Her forehead.

Finally, the heavenly spheres, full of stars, surrounding Sophia indicate Sophia's cosmic power, her rule over the whole universe, her cosmocracy. The turquoise or sky-blue color of this environment symbolizes the air, then the heavens, and then the spiritual heavens, the world on high, in the center of which lives Sophia. For the color sky-blue attunes

the soul to contemplation, to detachment from the earthly, to quiet longing for peace and purity. This blue of the heavens, this projection of light on darkness, this boundary between light and darkness is a profound image of heavenly creation, i.e., an image of the boundary between Light rich in being and Darkness-Nothingness, an image of the Intelligent World. That is why blue is the color that is natural to Sophia and, through Sophia, to the Bearer of Sophia, the Ever-Virgin.

Moreover, the Savior, Sophia, and the Mother of God are clearly distinguished in this composition. Sophia is placed below the Savior, i.e., in a subordinate position, and the Mother of God is placed before Sophia, once again in a subordinate position. The Savior, Sophia, and the Mother of God are therefore in sequential hierarchical subordination. The distinction between nimbuses is also an indication of their inequality. Sometimes, moreover, Sophia, in later icons, also has a cruciform nimbus. An example of this can be found on the outer sanctuarial fresco of the Moscow Cathedral of the Dormition, from the 17th century. It is unquestionable that Sophia's cruciform nimbus is a mixing of iconographic attributes, a phenomenon of attraction. But this mixing is highly typical: Even though Sophia is an independent figure in iconography, she is clearly so closely connected with Christ and (as we shall see later) with the Mother of God that she can, through attraction, adopt their attributes and thereby, almost merge with the One or the Other, so to speak. A certain kinship between the three Persons is also sometimes revealed in the fact that they are all portrayed with wings. An example of this is their portrayal on the just-named Moscow sanctuarial fresco and on the sanctuarial fresco of the Kostroma Cathedral of the Dormition.

I now turn to the *second* sophianic type, to the Yaroslavl variant, dating from the 16th to the 17th centuries.

This is what we see on a fresco of the Yaroslavl Church of St. John Chrysostom: Under a baldachin supported by six pillars is a covered altar, behind which, as the seventh pillar, is depicted a Crucifix. Before the altar stands King Solomon, wearing an imperial dalmatic and crown. We can conjecture that this is Solomon by the book he is reading, in which we can read the words: "Wisdom hath builded her house, she hath hewn out her seven pillars; She hath killed her beasts; she hath mingled her wine; she hath also furnished her table" (Prov. 9:1-2). Or perhaps this is just a priest, for this passage from Proverbs is the theme of the whole composition. Each of the pillars has two inscriptions: Baptism and the Third Council; Chrismation and the Second Council; Penitence and the Fourth Council; Priesthood and the Sixth Council; Marriage and the Seventh Council; Unction and the Fifth Council; the cross bears the inscription Holy Communion and the Fourth Council. The whole baldachin rests on a rising base, and on the three steps of the latter is written: "The foundation of the Divine Church of the Old and New Testaments is




Fresco, Yaroslavl Church of St. John Chrysostom.

the blood of the martyrs, the preaching of the apostles, the blood of the prophets, apostolic teaching, Christ, the rock of faith, upon which rock I shall build my Church." Higher, above the colonnade, is written: "Christ, the Head of the Church"; and on the architrave: "And establish seven pillars." Higher, above the covering of the baldachin, there sits on a throne with a double cushion the Mother of God with arms raised in prayer and surrounded by an assembly of angels bearing lances. Above Her head is represented the Holy Spirit, from Whom seven rays—seven grace-giving—descend upon the Mother of God. As can be seen from the inscriptions, these are: wisdom, reason, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and the fear of God. Still higher is God the Father in the clouds,

with arms raised, sitting on a throne with cushions (or perhaps this is Christ?). At the margins of the icon are ten groups of saints in clouds: hermits, martyrs, male and female, the venerable, the righteous headed by Joachim and Anna, confessors, bishops, kings and princes, prophets headed by John the Baptist, and the apostles headed by the Apostle Paul. Beneath these choirs of saints, below, are placed six groups of ordinary people (not saints) with the inscription: "Rally all peoples"; they are not in the clouds but on earth, and they bend their knees before the colonnade. The general sense of the composition is obvious. This is *the Church* as a whole, with all its spiritual powers and foundations. Although the composition as a whole bears the title "Wisdom hath builded her house, she hath hewn out her seven pillars," it would be very difficult to establish precisely to which of the Persons depicted the name Wisdom refers: God the Father, the Spirit, the Mother of God, or the Crucified Christ. If to Christ, then it is in His relation to the building of salvation, that is, once again in connection with all other elements of the composition.⁶⁸¹

There are other variants of the "Sophia of the Cross." These variants, common in Novgorod, are distinguished by the fact that the Mother of God stands to the side of the baldachin, to the right, while to the left stands, in all probability, John the Baptist. Three Apostles stand behind each. The covering of the baldachin is crowned by a sharp point, and striking it, the way lightning strikes a lightning rod, is the central one of the rays emanating from a semicircle that bears the inscription: "Holy Spirit." Higher yet is Christ on a throne, depicted as the All-Merciful Savior. Judging by this variant, one can surmise that in the variant described above as well it is Jesus Christ and not God the Father (as N. Pokrovsky asserts) Who is found above the baldachin. It would then be natural to think that the Crucifix inside the baldachin represents the crucifix that is found behind the altar. In other words, it is an icon, not Christ.

Without considering other versions of this iconic composition, I shall now pass to the Kiev Sophia. There are many analogies here with the Yaroslavl Sophia. The Kiev Sophia is characterized by the following: On a seven-step ambo is set a seven-pillar baldachin, under which stands the Mother of God. In Her left hand is the Infant, in Her right hand is a caduceus (I am primarily describing the icon of the Optina hermitage) or sometimes a Latin cross. Under her feet is the lunar sickle, resting on a cloud. On the cornice of the rotunda is the inscription: "Wisdom hath buildeth her house, etc.." Each pillar has three inscriptions: (1) the name of a spiritual gift, (2) its symbolic representation, and (3) the appropriate text from Revelation. On the steps of the ambo are the names of the seven virtues, while on the step of the virtue "faith" are seven prophets. Above the rotunda is God the Father (?), while above Him is the Holy Spirit. Around this are the seven archangels⁶⁸³: to the right, Michael with a flam-



The Kiev Sophia.

ing sword; Uriel with lightning; Raphael with an alabaster vase containing myrrh; Gabriel with a lily; Selaphiel with a rosary; Jegudiel with a wreath; and Barachiel with flowers on a white veil.⁶⁸⁴

The most remarkable of such sophianic compositions is the one we find in the iconostasis of the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, "the mother of all Russian churches." This church icon is evidently of late origin, from the middle of the 18th century. But its composition goes back to the 16th century if one is to judge by an exact copy of this icon in the Tobolsk Cathedral, painted at the time it was built, i.e., at the time of the Patriarch Filaret. This composition, as in general the entire iconography of

southern Russia, was painted under an obviously Roman Catholic influence (the head of the Mother of God is uncovered; above her head, two Angels hold a crown; the cross in her hand is a Latin one; behind her there is a colonnade, etc.). The Mother of God depicted in the icon holds in her right hand a flowering rod with a snake-shaped handle, i.e., a caduceus, or perhaps a bishop's staff; in her left hand, She holds a Latin cross. Christ is depicted in her womb; His right hand "blesses," while His left hand holds a globe. The Mother of God has two unfurled wings; beneath her feet is the lunar sickle, lying on a seven-headed serpent. 686 It should be noted that the composition of this icon is far from being identical with that of its frame. 687

The composition of the Kiev Sophia therefore appears to be a variant of the type of the Crowned Mother of God, a syncretic union of the crowning of the Mother of God and the Bride in the Apocalypse.⁶⁸⁸ In other words, the Mother of God is illuminated here by a double light: that of the Earthly Church and that of the Heavenly Church. "In our opinion," affirms A. I. Kirpichnikov, "the type of the crowned Mother of God had originally the same symbolic significance as the figure of the Orant in representations of Christ's Ascension: the Orant uncrowned and on earth is the earthly church, while the figure of the woman on clouds with a crown on her head is the triumphant heavenly church."689 It is also pointed out that, in the West, the symbolic Byzantine representation acquired a historical interpretation and then reached us with a double meaning. But even apart from these inferences from the genesis of the composition, it is not difficult to see that this composition is closely connected with Revelation. The lunar sickle, the seven-headed serpent, and the apocalyptic texts and apocalyptic symbols on the pillars would by themselves be sufficient to confirm this proposition. But this proposition is further justified if I remind you that in the lowest tier of the iconostasis, which is apparently contemporary with the icon, one can see four more icons on obviously apocalyptic themes. These are small medallions, which are hard to discern behind the screen. Of particular interest is the one that is situated directly below Sophia-Wisdom. This is a complex composition, comprising the Woman clothed in the sun, the Mother of God, the Archangel Michael, the Beast leaving the abyss, etc. 690

A question can and must arise: Where in the Cathedral of Sophia is that which gives it its name? Where is its most sacred object? The answer to this is, of course, simple or at least seems simple. This most sacred object is the palladium of Kiev, the famous and miraculous "Impregnable Wall." But, with all the ease with which this *formal* answer is given, an attempt to give a more detailed answer leads to difficulties. In fact, what and whom does this painting represent? It is usually said that it is the Mother of God. But the absence of the Infant, the raised arms, the whole posture of the body make the "Impregnable Wall" resemble representa-

tions of the orants of ancient Christian iconography to such a degree that it becomes unquestionable that in the "Impregnable Wall" the Mother of God is represented as a orant, expresses the same idea as the ancient orants. This idea is, I repeat, the idea of the Church. ⁶⁹¹ Scholars go even further than the affirmation made here. Thus, in the opinion of N. P. Kondakov, ⁶⁹² the "Impregnable Wall" is a monumental representation of the Church, while in the opinion of Kryzhanovsky, ⁶⁹³ it is a representation of the immaterial house of Sophia, the Wisdom of God. Other scholars are of the same opinion. ⁶⁹⁴

These are the three types of sophianic iconography. To interpret them is to understand the one spiritual Principle common to all of them, owing to which they bore the same name and were venerated as an expression of one idea. Of course, our forebears did not have a perfectly distinct idea of this common Principle; they did not know it in an "answering way," to use Dostoevsky's expression. But by no means can one accept that this common principle did not exist at all, that the indistinctness was in the experiences themselves. For the iconographic subject analyzed here was in its time a widespread (perhaps even a very widespread) religious phenomenon, and, in any case, it was well loved and national.⁶⁹⁵ To suppose its appearance *ex nihilo* from a religious vacuum would be absurd. The aspects of this common Principle are noted separately by different scholars. What are those aspects?

Sophia (here it was the Novgorod Sophia that was being considered) was seen to be a personification of an abstract property of God, an attribute of His wisdom—not, however, of the Personal, or Hypostatic, Wisdom of God, but of wisdom in abstracto. This interpretation is correct in the sense that Sophia is not a Hypostasis in the strict sense and is not identical with Logos. Personifications of natural elements, cities, and places, as well as of moral and dogmatic notions, and so forth, were wholly possible in Christian iconography. This is demonstrated by the generally known fact of the existence of personifications of the Sea, Mountains, the Wind, Snow, the Desert, Heaven and Earth, the Cosmos, the Jordan, the Sun and Moon, Night and Morning, Heavenly Substance, Depth, Hell, the Red Sea, Egypt, Nazareth, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Melody, Power, Arrogance, Repentance, Youth, Dikaiosune kai Eleeimosunē, Virtues, Prophēteia, Sophia, the Synagogue, the Church, and so forth on a multitude of icons, miniatures, frescos, etc. 696 Constantine the Great erected three temples in Constantinople. These temples were built in honor of Wisdom (Hagia Sophia), Peace (Hagia Eirene), and Power (Hagia Dunamis). Later they were transformed into the temples of St. Sophia, St. Irene, and the Holy Heavenly Powers. In the history of pagan Rome there are many similar examples of temple-building to honor abstract concepts, but one should not rush to the conclusion that Constantine "consecrated his temples to ideas and in particular to the idea of Divine Wisdom without this concept referring to the Son of God." More plausible is Professor A. P. Golubtsov's suggestion that these consecrations, neutral between pagans and Christians so to speak, were a tactical measure by which the Emperor imperceptibly introduced Christianity, while those who wished to stand outside the church gates could see in Wisdom, Peace, and Power nothing more than personified concepts.⁶⁹⁷

Whether or not this was the case, people do not live by abstractions, and there happened what had to have happened. One began to seek concrete representations for Sophia. Justinian's temple of Sophia was consecrated to the Incarnate Word of God: the feast of consecration was December 22-23 and the feast of title was evidently Christmas. Just as unquestionable is Sophia's religious connection with the Mother of God, revealed in liturgical practice and in the religious worldview of our forebears. 698 The single experience was even then ambiguous for the rational mind, which vacillated between the Savior and the Mother of God. The liturgical ritual undeniably demonstrates this. As early as the 16th century, our homegrown Russian theologians failed in their attempt to give a rational definition of the idea of Sophia: "Some say that the Church of St. Sophia was consecrated to the Most Pure Mother of God, whereas others say that this name is unknown in Russia and that one can have no knowledge of this Wisdom."699 But even western visitors to Constantinople evidently did not know to whom the temple of Sophia was dedicated. At least in their description of the Sophia of Constantinople, they were decidedly silent about the subject that occupies us.⁷⁰⁰ One of the crusaders, Robert de Cléry, a participant in the capture of Constantinople, recorded in his chronicle an item that is strange at first glance: "Or vous dirai du moustier Saint Sainte Souphie comme fais il estoit (Sainte Souphie en Grieu, ch'est Sainte Trinités en franchois") ["I shall now tell you about the temple of Saint Sophia, how it is made (St. Sophia is in Greek the same thing that the Holy Trinity is in French)"].⁷⁰¹ Thus, divergent views of Sophia existed even in the deep past. These divergent views have been transmitted to modern scholars. For some scholars, Sophia is the Word of God or even the Holy Trinity. 702 For others, she is the Mother of God. For still others, she is the personification of Her Virginity. For others still, she is the Church. For yet others, she is mankind in its totality, the Grand Être of Auguste Comte.

Should one recognize these interpretations as irreconcilable? To be sure, as *rational concepts*, the Word of God, the Mother of God, Virginity, the Church, and Mankind are mutually incompatible. But if we turn to the corresponding *ideas*, this incompatibility will cease to exist. Our preceding—metaphysical—analysis of the matter at hand already demonstrated the mutual connection between these ideas. Without considering each of them separately,⁷⁰³ I will present several old-Russian commentaries, which give a subtle synthesis of the different aspects of Sophia.⁷⁰⁴

Here is the inscription on the icon of Sophia in the iconostasis of the Cathedral of the Dormition at the Trinity-Saint-Sergius Lavra:⁷⁰⁵

"The image of Sophia, the Wisdom of God, expresses the purity of the ineffable virginity of the Most Holy Mother of God. This Virginity has a fiery face and a ribbon above her ears; she has a royal crown on her head, and above her head there is Christ; and higher up the heavens are depicted. Commentary: The fiery face shows that virginity is worthy of being a habitation for God, while the fire means that God consumes in fire the bodily passions and illuminates the virgin soul. The fact that there are ribbons above the ears as well as the fact that angels also have them signifies that the virginal here is equated with the angelic. The ribbons signify the descent of the Holy Spirit. On her head she wears an imperial crown. This shows how her humble wisdom rules over passions. Above her head is Christ, for the head of Wisdom is the Son, the Word of God. He loved the Virginity of the Most Holy Mother of God and Her humble Wisdom and willed to be born in flesh from Her. The heavens signify that the virgin soul desires always to be in heaven. The sash around her shoulders signifies the rank of elder and priestess. In her hand is a scepter which signifies imperial rank. The wings of the eagle and of fire are for high-soaring and prophecy; this bird, as soon as it sees a hunter, soars higher. Thus, lovers of virginity cannot easily be caught by the hunter devil.⁷⁰⁶

In her left hand is a scroll in which are inscribed the unfathomable and ineffable mysteries of God: God's acts are accessible neither to angels nor to men. Her garment of light and the throne upon which she sits signify another future light. The seven pillars are the seven gifts of the Spirit proclaimed by the prophet Isaiah. Her feet rest upon a rock, for Virginity is firmly grounded in her confession of faith in Christ, calling to God: "Set me firmly on the rock of faith." Those who guard virginity come to resemble the Holy Mother of God. This is what John the Baptist loved: he became worthy of baptizing Christ, our God. This is what John the Divine loved: he became worthy of resting upon the bosom of Christ. For God, without flesh and without body, rejoices in the purity and chastity of the soul. Virgins will be led to the king in her train, it is said, and her faithful will be led in joy and merriment. These virginal souls will be led in the train of the Holy Mother of God into the king's temple to Her Son our God. Amen."

Other explanations do not differ significantly from this one, and, in the essential things, they can be considered identical. But I shall permit myself to cite a few passages from them owing to the fact that they are little known.

Thus, in one manuscript we read the following (let me note that C stands for *Commentary*, while Q stands for *Question*): "Commentary on Sophia, Wisdom of God. The church of God Sophia Most Holy Mother of God. C: the soul of virgins of an ineffable virginity. Purity is the truth of humble wisdom. Q: she has Christ above her head. C: for the head of wisdom is the son word of God. O: the clouds that extend above her. C: lower the heavens,

descend, descend into the pure virgin. For those who love virginity become like the Mother of God. For She gave birth to the son and the word of God Jesus Christ. Those who love virginity give birth to words of virtue, they teach the unreasonable by the word. The Baptist loved it, for in baptizing he showed that the rule of virginity was a rigorous life in God. O: virginity has a virginal face of fire. C: the fire is divinity, which consumes corruptible passions, which illuminates the pure soul. O: over her ears she has a ribbon like the angels. C: a pure life is equal to the angels; this ribbon is the receptacle of the Holy Spirit. Q: on her head she has an imperial crown. C: humble wisdom reigns over the passions. O: a belt is tied around her loins. C: this is a figure of antiquity and of the priesthood. Q: she holds a scepter. C: imperial dignity. She has fiery wings. C: high-soaring prophecy; the clear-seeing bird, loving wisdom, flies higher as soon as it sees the hunter. Thus, those who love virginity are hard to catch by the hunter devil. In the left hand is a scroll with writing. C: Knowledge of unfathomable mysteries. She wears garments of light and sits upon a throne. C: This represents the repose of the future world. She has her foundation on seven pillars. C: These represent the seven gifts of the spirit. . . . And I will be there and my servant will be there."^{707d}

We find a similar, if somewhat abbreviated, commentary in an illustrated manuscript of the *Apocalypse*, 708 with the epigraph: "On Sophia, the Wisdom of God copied from a local icon which is in Great Novgorod." This commentary begins with the words: "Of the Church of God Sophia the most holy Virgin Mother of God . . ." and ends with: "Upon this rock, he said, I will build my church. And he also said, set me firmly upon the rock of faith." This is very important. It is clear that the discussion of the superiority of celibacy to marriage and the sharply ascetic, Manichean, tone found at the end of the document just presented is a *later* addition, if it is permissible in this case to draw inferences about the redaction of a manuscript from the antiquity of the manuscript. Let me add that folio 72 has apocalyptic miniatures on sophianic themes.

In the 17th-century manuscript *The Alphabet Book* or, more precisely, *Dictionary with Commentaries in Alphabetical Order*, we once again find a "Commentary on the icon of Saint Sophia, the Wisdom of God. Sophia the church of God, the most pure Virgin Mother of God, that is, the virginal soul, the purity of ineffable virginity, etc." ⁷⁰⁹

We also find several similar commentaries in the library of the Trinity-Saint-Sergius Lavra. Thus, for example, in an manuscript of the Book of Revelation with commentaries, for example, in an manuscript of the Book of Revelation with commentaries, for example, in an manuscript of the Book of Revelation with commentaries, for the find: "Words chosen from different passages of numerous books. First discourse on wisdom. The purity of inexpressible virginity, the truth of humble wisdom has Christ above her head." On folio 150, we find a commentary on three verses, under the title: "In Saint Sophia there is a cell of Solomon, son of David, made of precious stone, and upon it are inscribed three verses in Hebrew and Sa-

^d I have abridged this passage somewhat.

maritan letters . . . " On a page at the front of the book, we find the exlibris: "This is the holy Revelation of John the Divine and Evangelist, which contains an office with commentaries and other numerous appendices, which are immeasurably wise. This book was written by Zosimos, metropolitan of all of Russia" [Zosimos was metropolitan from 1491 to 1494].

In another manuscript, of the 16th century, we find a "Sermon on Sophia, the Wisdom of God. Principle of the Church of God, Sophia, the most pure Virgin Mother of God . . ."⁷¹²

The close connection between Sophia and the Mother of God is also clearly represented in liturgical hymns. Thus, the Moscow Church of Sophia, near Lubianka square, has a special office of St. Sophia. In the ikos of this office, celebrated on August 15, mention is made of the virginal soul of the Mother of God as the Church and Sophia: "... the protectress of the world, the all-immaculate Bride, the Virgin, I dare to praise; Her virginal soul Thou hath called Thy Divine Church, and for the sake of the incarnation of Thy Word, Thou hath named Her Sophia, the Wisdom of God... Thou hath represented Her face as fiery; from Her issues the fire of Thy Divinity, that is, Thy only-begotten son."

Certain parts of this office, that is, the lessons of the Old Testament, the stichera in the Great Vespers and the stichera sung at vespers are taken from the office of the Dormition. What is remarkable is that this borrowing is intentional and concludes with the following qualification: "These stichera and the rest are written for the feast of the Dormition of the Most Holy Mother of God, since She is the animate church of wisdom and the Word of God, named Sophia."⁷¹⁴ In other words, it is once again affirmed that Sophia is indeed the Mother of God, the temple of hypostatic wisdom, of the Word of God.

Also noteworthy is the fact that Sophia is celebrated on the Birthday of the Mother of God (in Kiev) or on the day of the Dormition (in Vologda).

This is one class of interpretations of Sophia. In other interpretations, e.g., in the *Original Collection of Count Stroganov*, Wisdom is directly called the Son and Word of God.⁷¹⁵ In the same way, in the aforementioned Office of Sophia, Sophia is sometimes virtually identified with God the Word.⁷¹⁶

Such is the interpretation of Sophia by our forebears. Obvious at once is how different its tone is from that of the interpretation of the Byzantine Greeks. Occupied with *theological speculation*, Byzantium received Sophia in the aspect of her speculative-dogmatic content. In the interpretation of the Greeks, Sophia is primarily an object of *contemplation*. Our forebears, having received ready-made dogmatic formulas from Byzantium, attached their souls to ascesis and immaculateness, came to love the purity and sanctity of an individual soul. And then Sophia turned to their consciousness her other side: the aspect of *chastity* and *virginity*, the

aspect of spiritual *perfection* and *inner beauty*. Finally, our contemporaries, dreaming of the *unity* of all creation in God, directed all of their thought toward the idea of the mystical Church. And Sophia turned toward them her third side: the aspect of the Church. We find this in Feodor Bukharev, Dostoevsky, Solovyov, the "neo-Christians," the Catholic modernists, and so on.⁷¹⁷ These are currents that find a symbolic expression in the icons of Sophia. What is Sophia today?

Vladimir Solovyov said the following in his speech of 1898 on Comte: "This Great, royal, and feminine being, who, being neither God, nor the eternal Son of God, nor an angel, nor a saint, receives veneration both from the culminator of the Old Testament and from the Mother of the New Testament—who is this being if not that very true, pure, and full mankind, the higher and all-embracing form and living soul of nature and the universe, eternally united and uniting itself with Divinity in the temporal process, and connecting with Him all that is? It is unquestionable that this constitutes the full meaning of the Great Being that Comte partly felt and was partly conscious of, and that our forebears, pious builders of temples of Sophia, wholly felt but were not conscious of at all." In brief, Sophia is the Memory of God, in the holy depths of which is all that is and outside of which is Death and Madness.

Such are the three aspects of the idea of Sophia. There exists a remarkable image that combines all three aspects: the fresco in the vestibule to the right of the entrance to the Kostroma Cathedral of the Dormition. In a series of successive medallions, one below another, are represented: God the Father; Jesus Christ; Sophia (with the inscription Jes. Chr.); the Mother of God (of the type of the Sign) in an eight-cornered star; and finally the Church represented by the holy Altar, alongside which stands the Apostle Peter, and then an assembly of prophets and saints. In short, the whole mystical chain of the economy is represented here. This image is highly interesting and it is regrettable that there is no photograph of it.

There is an analogous relationship of iconic subjects in the outer sanctuarial paintings in the same cathedral: In the center we find the Holy Trinity; to the left of the Holy Trinity we find the Mother of God sitting on a throne; to the right we find Sophia, of the Novgorod type. Above Sophia are four angels; along her sides are the Mother of God, John the Baptist, and assemblies of saints.

The three main aspects of Sophia-Wisdom and the three types of the interpretation of Sophia take turns predominating at different times and in different souls. The soaring of theological contemplation, the ascesis of inner purity, and the joy of universal unity—this trinitarian life of faith, hope, and love, is fragmented by the human consciousness into separate aspects of life and receives its unity only in the Comforter. But we must not forget that the power and meaning of each of these aspects reside only in this unity. Only in the overcoming of fleshly rationality does there

emerge, like a snowy peak from the bluish darkness of morning, "The Pillar and Ground of the Truth."

The question is: Under what conditions of life does the ascesis of this self-overcoming grow? These conditions consist in showing the soul its preliminary, partial overcoming of fleshliness and thereby drawing it to ascesis.

Sophia, the true Creation or creation in the Truth, is a preliminary hint at the transfigured, spiritualized world as the manifestation, imperceptible for others, of the heavenly in the earthly. This revelation occurs in the personal, sincere love of two, in friendship, when to the loving one is given—in a preliminary way, without ascesis—the power to overcome his self-identity, to remove the boundaries of his I, to transcend himself, and to acquire his own I in the I of another, a Friend. Friendship, as the mysterious birth of *Thou*, is the environment in which the revelation of the Truth begins.



Faustum praelium. Happy battle.

XII. Letter Eleven: Friendship

....

Distant Friend and Brother!

The snowstorm swirls in endless circles, covering the window with a fine snowy ash and beating against the window glass. A hill of frosty dust has settled on the bush in front of the window, and this snowy pyramid grows with each advancing hour. The paths are asmoke: when you try to go outside, a snowy smoke bursts out from beneath your feet. The air vent wheezes; wind gusts extract moans from the stove pipe. Again and again the snow-white eddies whirl about. The winter decoration has been torn from the trees, and the trees stand with bare outstretched branches, rocking back and forth.

You listen to the noise in the pipe, to the wheezes of the vent. The soul becomes still in dim recollections (or premonitions?) and seems to dissolve in the noises. It is as if you yourself are turning into the whirling snowstorm. The window is already half-covered. A twilight half-darkness has begun to reign in the room. A fluid, bluish shadow lies on the room's objects. I attend to the icon-lamp; the golden bundle of rays becomes brighter. I light a fragrant candle of amber-yellow wax before the Mother of God. We brought this candle from *there*, that is, from where you and I wandered together. I throw several grains of incense into the clay censer with glowing coals and blow on them. Smoky filaments stretch out in all directions. They intertwine and are mixed in a blue billowing cloud.

Let the window be covered by the snow. It's good when that happens. The lamp inside burns more brightly; the incense is more fragrant; the flame of the fragrant candle is more even. Again I am with you. Every day I remember something about you, and then I sit down to write. Thus, from day to day, my life slides toward "the other shore," so that I could look at you at least from there,

by love having defeated death and by death having defeated the passions . . .

Today there is constantly in my memory that frosty and snowy day when you and I were walking to the Paraclete hermitage. We were walking through the forest. A path had hardly been made through the deep snow, and we kept getting stuck. Nevertheless, we got to the hermitage. Those few days feel like an entire lifetime. Fasting, the common prayer before the large crucifix. We would rise at night; it was cold. In the darkness we would reach the church with difficulty—through snow-banks. Descending beneath the earth, we would stumble. It was half-dark in the church, as in a sepulchre. Do you remember the ancient monk, utterly bent, the one who was like St. Seraphim? Do you remember Father Pavel, the young monk who killed himself with fasting, the one who took communion with us? Even then it was obvious that he did not have long to live. He did in fact die soon after this-from extreme abstinence. You and I took communion together. That was the seed to everything that I now have. For it is not for nothing that our Abba Isidor told us so many times (only now, after his departure, do I begin to understand the secret meaning of his repeated, persistent words): "A brother helped by a brother is as strong as a fortress" (Prov. 18:19). That is what I wish to elucidate to some extent in the present letter.

The spiritual activity in which and by which knowledge of the Pillar of the Truth is given is love. This is love full of grace, manifested only in a purified consciousness. It can only be attained by a long (O how long!) ascesis. In order to strive to attain love—unimaginable for creatures—it is necessary to receive an initial impulse and then to be sustained in one's further motion. Such an impulse is the so common and so rationally incomprehensible revelation of a human person, a revelation that manifests itself as love in the receiver of the revelation: "Love," Heinrich Heine says, "is a terrifying earthquake of the soul." Here, I use the word "love" not in the same sense as before⁷¹⁹ (in Letter Four) but also in the same sense as before, because this love is not the same as that love, though it is nevertheless a foreshadowing of that love, the expected love. Love shakes up a person's whole structure, and after this "earthquake of the soul," he can seek. Love opens for him the doors of the worlds on high, whence drifts the cool of paradise. Love shows him "as if in a light dream" the radiant reflection of the "habitations." For an instant love pulls off the cover of dust from creation even if only at a single point, and reveals

the Divinely created beauty of creation. Love makes it possible to forget about the power of sin, takes us out of ourselves, says an authoritative "Stop!" to the torrent of our selfhood, and pushes us forward: "Go and find in all of life what you have seen in bare outline and only for an instant." Yes, only for an instant. And returning to itself, the soul longs for the lost bliss, is tormented by the sweet remembrance, as the poet said:

I remember a miraculous moment when you appeared before me, like a fleeting vision, like a genius of pure beauty.^a

Now a choice confronts the soul: either to submerge itself in the sin that eats away at the person or to adorn itself with heavenly beauty.

Beyond the moment of eros in the Platonic sense of the word, *philia* is revealed in the soul—the highest point of earth and the bridge to heaven. Constantly revealing in the person of the loved one the glimmer of primordial beauty, *philia* erases, if only in a preliminary and conditional way, the bounds of selfhood's separateness, which is aloneness. In a friend, in this other I of the loving one, one finds the source of hope for victory and the symbol of what is to come. And one is thus given preliminary consubstantiality and therefore preliminary knowledge of the Truth. It is upon this peak of human feeling that the heavenly grace of *that* love descends. But in order to have a clear idea of the nuances of the Concepts mentioned here, it is necessary to elucidate the content of the Greek verbs of love. Only the language of the Greeks directly expresses these nuances.

The Greek language has four verbs that describe different aspects of the feeling of love: *eran*, *philein*, *stergein*, and *agapan*:⁷²⁰

- (1) *eran*, or *erasthai* in poetical language, means *to direct a total feeling at an object*, to surrender oneself to an object, to feel and perceive for it. This verb refers to passionate love, to jealous and even sensual desire. Consequently, *erōs* is a general expression for love and its passion, as well as for love's desire.
- (2) philein conforms most of all to the Russian liubit' in its general meaning, and is opposed to misein and echthairein. The nuance expressed by this verb of love is an inner inclination toward a person induced by intimacy, closeness, common feeling; therefore, philein refers to every kind of love of persons who have some sort of intimate relationship. In particular, philein (with or without the addition of tōi stomati, i.e., with the lips) signifies the outward expression of this intimacy, to kiss. As finding its fulfillment in the very closeness of the lovers, philein includes the element of satisfaction, of self-satiety; according to the explanation of ancient lexicographers, philein means "to be satisfied with something, to seek nothing more." But on the other hand, as a naturally developing feeling, philein does not have any moral or, more precisely, moralistic

^a From Pushkin's poem to A. P. Kern.

nuance. *Philia*, *philotēs* signifies a friendly relation, a tender expression of love, which refers to the inner disposition of the lovers. In particular, *philēma* is a kiss.

- (3) stergein signifies not a passionate love for or inclination toward a person or thing, not a beckoning to an object which determines our striving, but a calm and permanent feeling in the depths of the loving one. Owing to this feeling, the loving one recognizes the object of love as intimately connected with him, and in this recognition the loving one acquires peace of soul. This verb of love refers to organic relation, the relation of kith and kin, a relation that not even evil can destroy. Such is the tender, calm, and confident love of parents for their children, of a husband for his wife, of a citizen for his country. The derivative storgē has a meaning that conforms with stergein.
- (4) agapan indicates rational love, which is based on a valuation of the loved one, and which is therefore not passionate, ardent, or tender love. About this love we can give an account to ourselves in our rational mind, because in agapan there are fewer sensations, habits, or direct inclinations than convictions. In the common usage of the verbs of love, agapan is the weakest and is close in meaning to such verbs as to value, to respect. And the greater the place that is occupied by the rational mind, the smaller will be the place occupied by feeling. Then, agapan can even mean to "value rightly, not to overvalue." Since a valuation is a comparison, a choice, agapan includes the concept of a free, selective directing of the will. It would be interesting to clarify the etymon of the word examined; however, attempts at an etymology of the root agapao have, unfortunately, not yielded any decisive or even stable conclusions. According to Schenkel, agapaō is related to agamai, "I am amazed," "I am enthusiastic," and perhaps to age, "amazement," "astonishment"; to aganos, "worthy of amazement," "noble"; to agallo, "I glorify," "I decorate"; to gaiō, "I am proud," "I rejoice"; to ganomai, "I rejoice," "I am merry"; and to the Latin gau, gaudium, guadere. 721 If this is really the case, then agapan evidently means "to have one's joy in something." But there are other explanations. According to Prellwitz, agapan comes from aga (or agan), i.e., "very," and from the root pa, entering into paomai, "I take," "I acquire," so that agapan means "to take very much" (sehr nehmen) in the sense of readily, greedily.⁷²² However, Prellwitz's hypothesis is refuted in the further investigations of Brugmann, Fick, and Lagerkranz. In sum, E. Boisacq, the author of the most recent etymological dictionary, declares that the etymology of agapaō is "obscure." 723

The derivative *agapēsis* signifies love in general, without sensuousness or cordiality, while *agapēma* signifies a favorite object.

The relationship between the four verbs of love is such: *agapan* resembles *philein* in many ways, but, since it refers to the rational-moral side of psychic life, it does not include the idea of a spontaneous act coming directly from the heart, an act that would reveal an inner inclination;

agapan is deprived of the nuances of *philein* connoting "to do willingly," "to kiss" (a kiss, after all, is a "spontaneous," direct expression of feeling), "to become accustomed to doing." Aristotle⁷²⁴ characterizes this difference between *philein* and *agapan* by the following comparison of the two verbs: "kai ho philos tōn hēdeōn, to te gar philein hēdu (oudeis gar philoinos mē chairōn oinōi) kai to phileisthai hēdu phantasia gar kai entautha tou huparchein autōi agathon einai, ou pantes epithumousin oi akisthanomenoi, to de phileisthai agapasthai estin auton di auton, i.e., a friend is a pleasant thing. It is, after all, pleasant to love (thus, every lover of wine enjoys it) and it is also pleasant to be loved. For here too one sees that he [the loved one] has the good that all who perceive it desire; to be loved (*phileisthai*) is to be appreciated (*agapasthai*) for oneself," i.e., the loved one is appreciated not for some reason outside himself but precisely for *himself*.⁷²⁵

Thus, *philein* is an inclination associated with the loved person himself and is produced by life in intimacy and by unity in many things. By contrast, *agapan* is an inclination associated not with the person himself, but rather with his features, with his properties, and therefore it is a somewhat impersonal, abstract inclination. Therefore, *phileisthai* can be explained through *agapasthai* by the addition of *auton di heauton*. *Agapōn* has in view the properties of a person; *philōn* has in view the person himself. The former gives itself an account of its inclination, calculates and weighs; while for the latter the inclination is revealed spontaneously. Therefore, *agapan* has a moral tint, while *philein* does not have any moral tint, for *philein* is spontaneous love, not free by its nature, *amare*, while *agapan* is love as the direction of will determined by the rational mind. This is free love, *diligere* (in particular this latter aspect receives emphasis in Biblical usage), and *agapan*, *proaireisthai*, and *diōkein* are therefore used synonymously by Aristotle.⁷²⁶

As for the relation between *philein* and *eran*, they too are similar in content in many ways; however, *eran* refers to the affective, sensual, and pathological side of love, while *philein* refers to inward attachment and intimacy.

Finally, *storgē* does not signify a passion that erupts, *erōs*,⁷²⁷ a personal inclination, *philia*, or a warm valuation of a person's qualities, *agapē*. In short, it does not signify a feeling arising in a man as a distinct person. Rather, it signifies attachment, gentleness, and cordiality (innate in man as a member of mankind) in relation to persons with whom there exist habitual, deep-rooted, subpersonal ties: *storgē* is preeminently a generic feeling, a feeling directed at mankind, while the others, i.e., *erōs*, *philia*, and *apagē*, are personal.

In sum, the following features can be noted in philein:

(1) immediacy of origin, based on personal contact, but not conditioned by organic ties alone; naturalness.

- (2) deep insight into the person himself, and not only a valuation of his qualities.
- (3) a quiet, cordial, nonrationalistic character of feeling, but, at the same time, one that is not passionate, not impulsive, not unrestrained, not blind, not turbulent.
 - (4) closeness, a closeness that is personal and deeply inward.

Thus, the Greek language distinguishes four categories of love: the surging $er\bar{o}s$, or sensuous, passionate love; tender, organic $storg\bar{e}$, or the love of kith and kin, attachment; the dry, rational $agap\bar{e}$, or the love of valuation, respect; and cordial, sincere *philia*, or the love of inward acceptance, personal insight, friendliness. But in fact, none of these words expresses the love of friendship that we are considering in the present letter, a love that combines the aspects of *philia*, $er\bar{o}s$, and $agap\bar{e}$, a love the ancients attempted to express in some degree by the compound word *philophrosunē*. In any case, the most suitable word here is *philein* with its derivatives. Let us therefore clarify the etymon and usage of *philos* as compared with synonyms of the same root.

Philos derives from the pronominal root *SFE* (which in Russian gives *svoi*, "own"), which is the origin of four synonyms:

- 1) Fetēs or etēs,
- 2) hetairos,
- 3) philos,
- 4) idios.

Consequently, *ph-i-l-o-s* essentially signifies someone who is one's "own," close. But other derivatives of the root *SFE* signify "own." What nuance differentiates *philos* from each of them?

- 1) The Homeric *Fetai* are the persons one meets frequently, the persons one has much common business with. One could render *Fetai* by the collective *znat*' in the Voronez' dialect, i.e., the circle of those whom one knows (Russ. *znat*' = "to know").⁷²⁸ This is the same as the Old Church Slavonic *znaemye*, as for example in Ps. 88:18: "Lover and friend has thou put far from me, and mine acquaintance [*znaemye* in the Old Church Slavonic] into darkness."
- 2) In Homer, *hetairoi* signifies allies, those who join in a common enterprise; therefore, Aristarchus already explains *hetairoi* through *sunergoi*, collaborators. *Etes* is a more ancient form of the word *hetairos*; its content is not limited by a suffix. *Hetairia* and *hetaireia* signify an alliance.

A synonym of *hetairos*, the Old Russian *tovar*, i.e., *tovarishch* (comrade) and its diminutives *tovarish* and *tovarush*, derives, according to S. Mikutsky, 729 from the root *var*, to cover, to close up, and properly signifies defense, defender. The Old Russian *tovar*, *tovary*, i.e., camp, military encampment, signifies defense. The Magyar *var*, fort, fortification, also properly signifies

defense. As for the particle *to*, it is a demonstrative pronoun which is found in the Russian *to-pyrit'sia* (to bristle up); the Lithuanian *toligus* (cf. *ligus*), equal, even; the Polish *tojad* (cf. the Russian *iad*, poison), a poisonous plant; the Czech *roz-to-mily*, very dear. This *to* is probably identical with the demonstrative article used in Bulgarian and even now can be found in certain northern dialects of Russian, especially in the Kostroma dialect.

3) *philos* is a friend, one with whom we are connected by mutual love; *philia* is friendship. The relation between *philos* and *hetairos* is as follows: one is always well disposed toward *philos*, for, in the absence of this well-disposedness, *philos* stops being *philos* for us. By contrast, *hetaroi* are friends of occasion, who are our friends only because we are pursuing with them some common goal. Thus, if *philos* and *hetairos* are compared, the former signifies a person with whom we are intimately linked by love, while the latter signifies only a comrade (*tovarishch*). Sometimes *hetairos* even signifies only a political ally, a member of the same party. *Hetairoi* are linked by a temporary, external, accidental connection, whereas *philoi* are linked by an indissoluble (or what should be an indissoluble) internally necessary, spiritual connection. In this sense, the following equation is correct: *philos* = *pistos hetairos*, a friend is a faithful comrade, faithful unto the end and in all. Therefore, *peirasthai philōn*, to put friends to the test, is a sign of mistrust and deficiency of friendship.

The ancient grammarians already spoke of this distinction between hetairos and philos. Thus, according to Ammonius, "hetairos and philos are different. Philos is also hetairos but hetairos is not completely philos. Therefore, Homer says of the wind (Od. 11, 7): 'Inflating the sails of a true comrade.' And, on the other hand, one usually calls philoi all those who mutually observe the obligations of friendship, whereas hetairoi are, in general, those who live and work together—en sunētheia kai en sunergiai."

4) Finally, the word *idios* signifies "one's own," in opposition to that which we have in common with many, i.e., *koinos*, *dēimosios*, and so forth; *idios* signifies peculiarity, i.e., a person or thing in opposition to others, having their own nature.

Such is the natural, human meaning of the verbs of love and their derivatives. But the Holy Scripture, having adopted some of these verbs, gave them a new content, filled them with spirit, and saturated them with the idea of Divine love full of grace. In Scripture, the internal energy of the word has become inversely proportional to the human energy that was connected with the word in the classical language.⁷³⁰

The words *eran* and *erōs* are virtually absent from the books of the Old Testament (in the Septuagint), and they are completely excluded from the books of the New Testament. One should note, however, that the terms *erōs* and *eran* have found a place in ascetic writings. Such mystical fathers as Gregory of Nyssa, Nicholas Cabasilas, Symeon the New Theologian,

et al.⁷³¹ use these terms to designate the higher love for God. In particular, Symeon the New Theologian has a long work about the love for God which is even entitled *Erōtes*, i.e, "Eroses." In the Holy Scripture, *philein* was filled with spirit and came to express Christian relations of love, based on personal inclination and personal communion. Finally, the formerly colorless and dry *agapan* was filled with spiritual life, and in the newly formed, expressly Biblical *agapē* it began to express profound universal love, the love of higher, spiritual freedom. In some cases *philein* and *agapan* are almost interchangeable; in other cases they are differentiated. Thus, when it is a question of the commandment of love for God and for one's neighbors, the word *agapan* is always used; however, concerning love for enemies, only *agapan* is used, never *philein*. On the contrary, *philein* and *agapan* are alternately used to denote the Lord's intimately personal love for Lazarus (John 11:3, 5, 36) and His relationship with his Beloved Disciple (John 20:21; Cf. 13:23, 19:26, 21:7).

The New Testament usage of *agapan* can be summarized in the following way:

(a) agapan occurs in all cases where it is a question of direction of will (Matt. 5:43, 44; 1:9, etc.), as well as where inclination rests on a decision of the will, on the choice of the object of love (Heb. 1:9; 2 Cor 9:7; 1 Pet. 3:15; John 13:19; John 12:43; John 21:15-17; Luke 6:32). In order to understand anything of the Lord's conversation with Peter (John 21:15– 17), so decisive for justifying the claims of the Catholics, we must take account of the different meanings of the two verbs of love. By his twiceuttered question, the resurrected Christ indicates to Peter that he violated friendly love—philia—for the Lord and that henceforth one can demand of him only universal human love, only that love which every disciple of Christ necessarily offers to every person, even to his enemy. It is in this sense that the Lord asks: "agapais me?" The meaning of the question is clear. But in order to express it in our language, one would need to expand the text, perhaps in this way: "Once you were accounted My friend. But now after your renunciation of Me, it does not pay even to speak of friendly love. But there is another love which must be offered to all people. Do you have at least that love for me?" But Peter does not even want to hear such a question, and keeps speaking of the authenticity of his personal, friendly love: "Philo se"—"I am your friend." That is why he was "grieved" when, despite this twice-uttered insistence on his philia for the Lord, the Lord agreed to speak of this kind of love only in the third question, which was probably posed in a tone of reproach and mistrust: "Phileis me?—Are you My friend?"

At first the Lord did not speak of friendship at all, and Peter received His question calmly. Peter was so certain of his universal human love for the Lord and so confident that there could be no question concerning this love as far as he was concerned, that he did not even consider it necessary to answer the hidden, immeasurably delicate reproach in these words—

the figure of silence. Perhaps he even did not understand or did not want to understand the Lord in this sense. So it was twice. Then the Lord disclosed His hidden thought and spoke directly of the love of friends. That is what grieved the Apostle: "He was grieved, because, the third time, Jesus said to him 'Are you my friend?' (John 21:17a). The ear hears tears in his halting answer: "Lord! You know everything, You know that I am Your friend—su gignōskeis hoti philō se" (John 21:17b). Keeping in mind the fact that the words agapan and philein are not identical, one can scarcely understand this conversation as a restoration of Peter's apostolic dignity. It is difficult to admit such a meaning if only because Peter did not behave worse (even if not better) with regard to his Teacher than the other apostles. Thus, if Peter lost his apostleship, the other apostles are no different in this respect. Furthermore, nowhere is it seen that he was excommunicated from the "twelve" as an apostate. On the contrary, he does not ascribe any extraordinary guilt to himself; nor do the others. But what Peter really needed was the restoration of friendly, personal relations with the Lord. For Peter did not reject Iesus as the Son of God, did not say that he was renouncing faith in Him as the Messiah (that was not even demanded of him). Rather, he had injured the Lord as a friend injures a friend, and therefore he needed a new covenant of friendship. In other words, the passage analyzed here does not at all concern events of ecclesiastical economy (whether they are understood as the restoration of Peter in apostleship or as the bestowing upon him of extraordinary powers). It exclusively concerns this Apostle's personal fate and life. This passage is edifying, but it is not dogmatic, and Roman Catholics therefore underscore it in vain. The foregoing discussion explains why the Evangelist considered it possible to place the 21st chapter outside the frame of the exposition. It is clear that he did not see in it something indisputably important, but that could not be the case in its Roman Catholic interpretation.

- (b) agapan is used where there is selection and, as negative selection, the not taking into account, eligere and negligere (Matt. 6:24, Luke 16:13, Rom. 9:13). Thus, ho uios mou agapētos (Luke 9:35; cf. Matt. 12:18) has its parallel in Is. 42:1. (This passage is rendered as ho eklektos mou in the Septuagint.)
- (c) agapan is also used where it is a question of free—not organic—pity (Luke 7:5; 1 Thess. 1:4, etc.).
- (d) Finally, *agapan* refers to the historically revealed relation between Christians.

As for *agapē*, it is a word that, as we have said, is wholly alien to the extra-Biblical, ancient secular language.⁷³² It signifies a love that, through a decision of the will, selects for itself its object (*dilectio*), thus becoming a self-negating and passive self-surrender *for* and *for the sake of* the object. Such sacrificial love on a secular basis is known only as a fleeting feeling, an inspiration from another world, not as a determination of life-

activity. The Biblical *agapē* therefore has features that are not human and conditional but Divine and absolute.

This quartet of words of love is one of the greatest jewels in the treasury of the Greek language, and it is hardly possible to survey with a single glance all the advantages offered to the understanding of life by this perfect instrument. Other languages cannot flatter themselves with anything even remotely similar in the domain of the idea of love. This results in endless and useless talks and frictions, as well as the need to invent at least a surrogate of the Greek quartet, which is done by using *several* words to create a term equivalent to a *single* Greek word.

Such complex terms are offered by Arnold Geulincx in his *Ethics*, which appeared in 1665.⁷³³ He posits the following four types of love:

Amor affectionis: love of feeling Amor benevolentiae: love of benevolence Amor concupiscentiae: love of attraction Amor obedientiae: love of respect

In comparison with the Greek words the relationship would be roughly such:

Amor affectionis = philia Amor benevolentiae = agapē Amor concupiscentiae = erōs Amor obedientiae = storgē

Geulincx also recognizes the formal possibility of a *fifth* type of love, which he calls *amor spiritualis* and which he defines as a bodiless being's passive love, a pure spirit's love passion. But he does not recognize this abstract love as something wholly real, which is probably why he does not introduce it in the final classification of the types of love. As for us, we are ready to admit that, perhaps, there is a special life that is characteristic of a bodiless, "astral" (but not thereby spiritual) organization, and that it may find its realization in phenomena of mediumistic ecstasy among spiritists, khlysts, certain mystics, and so on. But this state has been investigated little, and we do not need it for our purposes: I will permit myself to refrain from a special examination of this state here.⁷³⁴

Let us present a scheme that summarizes Geulincx's views of love. (Let us note that some slight contradictions in the following table result from the fact that there are two versions of the *Ethics*. The text of the *Ethics* was written in 1665, whereas the Notes were written in 1675.)

I. AMOR DILECTIONIS
(Love of Feeling)

est quevis humana mente suavitas;
(is every sweetness in the human soul);

it is not a virtue itself but a certain accidental reward for virtue, which just as often accompanies virtue as abandons it.

II. Amor Effectionis
(Love of Action)

est quodvis firmum propositum
(is every firm intention);

it is not only the firm intention of carrying out what reason considers necessary, but in general it signifies any firm intention of carrying out anything—even injustice or revenge. It equals *amor respectu finis cui*, love directed toward a goal. It is often provoked by *amor affectionis*, but this concerns intemperance (*intemperantia*).

(Neither of these forms of love⁷³⁵ constitutes a virtue; virtue can exist both with and without the first; although without the second there can be no virtue, the latter is nonetheless primary with respect to *amor effectionis*.)

Ia. Amor Sensibilis Seu Corporalis, qui est Amor Passio aut Amor Affectionis.

(Sensuous or Corporeal Love, which is Love-Passion or Love of Attraction)

Since the human soul is connected with the body, this love-passion is "the total, single, and unique delight of the soul": its various names are *Laetitia*, *Deliciae*, *Jucunditas*, *Hilaritas*, *Gaudium*, *Jubilum*; it is that which is delightful in *Desiderium*, in *Spes*, in *Fiducia*; it is love-passion. It is neither bad nor good, but rather an indifferent thing (*res indifferens*), *adiaphora*. It is sometimes produced by love of actions (*amor effectionis*); this frequently happens when one practices virtue.

Ib. Amor Spiritualis,
(Abstract Love)
qui est approbatio quaedam
(which consists in a kind of approval).

In the forefront here is that approval with which we approve our own actions owing to the fact that they conform to reason or the supreme rule (suprema regula). But this abstract love (amor spiritualis) is considered almost nothing—pro nihilo fere ducitur; for men are addicted to their own sensuousness—addicti sunt suis sensibus.

IIa. AMOR OBEDIANTIAE. (Love of Respect).

This love "constitutes virtue." What is virtue? Virtus est propositum faciendi quod jubet Ratio. Virtue is the intention of doing that which reason commands. Therefore, virtuous love is Amor quiddam, qui nempe

firmum propositum faciendi quod Recta Ratio faciendum esse decreverit—a love that has expressed the firm intention of doing that which the just reason considers obligatory.

IIb. Amor Benevolentiae aut benefacientiae.

(Love of Benevolence or Beneficence)

In general it has no relation to virtue. In relation to God, it cannot fail to be shameful and criminal, for, if we experience it, we place ourselves above God and desire to be more worthy than He.

IIc. Amor Concupiscentiae. (Love of Desire)

It has even less relation to virtue.

A religious society is connected and held together by a double bond. The first part of this bond is personal connection, which goes from person to person and is based on the feeling of the members of the society that other members, as autonomous units, as monads, have a supra-empirical reality. The second part is the mutual perception of members in the light of the idea of the whole society. In this case, the object of love is not a single person taken by himself but all of society projected on a person. For ancient society, these two bonds were eros as the personal force and storge as the principle of kith and kin. The first of these two principles served as the metaphysical foundation of social being. On the other hand, the natural soil for a Christian society as such became philia in the personal domain and agapē in the social domain. Both forces are spiritualized and transformed, are saturated with grace, so that even marriage, the preeminent repository of storge, and ancient friendship, the preeminent repository of *eros*, were painted in Christianity in the hues of spiritualized agapē and philia.

If one reads consecutively three dialogues with the same title, the *Symposium* of Xenophon, that of Plato, and that of St. Methodius of Olympus, ⁷³⁶ this ennoblement and spiritualization of the concepts of love stand out with startling plasticity. And this comparison is made the more graphic by the fact that all three dialogues are written according to the same literary scheme and each succeeding dialogue is a conscious ascent over the preceding one. These three dialogues can be likened to stories of a single house built at different heights but having similar arrangements of rooms. Xenophon examines animal life; Plato examines human life; St. Methodius examines angelic life. Thus, preserving the type of organization that is proper to his nature, man ascends higher and higher, to "the prize of high calling" (Phil. 3:14), and spiritualizes all the life-activity of his being.

The *agapic* aspect of a Christian society finds its embodiment in the early Christian ecclesia, ⁷³⁷ in a parish, in a monastic cenoby (*koino-bia* = communal living). Feasts of love or *agapes*, ⁷³⁸ culminating in a clearly mystical, even mysterial, co-partaking of the Sacred Body and Precious Blood, are the highest expression of this agapic aspect. This blossom of ecclesial life contains the source that nourishes all other life-activity of the ecclesia, from the everyday torment of the mutual bearing of burdens to bloody martyrdom. Such, then, is the agapic side of life.

By contrast, the philic side is embodied in relations of friendship. These relations blossom in sacramental adelphopoeisis and the co-partaking of the Holy Eucharist, and are nourished by this partaking for co-ascesis, co-patience, and co-martyrdom.

The agapic and philic aspects of church life, brotherhood and friendship, run parallel to each other in many ways. One could indicate a number of forms and schemes that appertain equally to both domains. On the basis of a possible (if unlikely) etymology, one could say that a brother (*brat* in Russian) is a taker (*bratel*') of the burden of life upon himself, ⁷³⁹ one who takes (*beret*) upon himself the cross of another. Whatever the origin of the word, a brother is, in essence, one who takes a burden upon himself. But this is precisely what a friend does too. On the other hand, if a friend (*drug* in Russian) is another (*drugoe*) I, can one not say the same thing about a brother?

At points of their highest significance, at their peaks, the two currents, brotherhood and friendship, strive to merge fully. This is easy to understand, for the communion with Christ through the sacrament of the Holy Eucharist is the source of all spirituality. Nevertheless, these two currents are irreducible to each other. Each is necessary in its own way in the church economy, just as and in connection with which personal creativity and the continuity of tradition are both necessary, each in its own way. The combination of these currents yields a dual-unity, but not a mixing, not an identification. For a Christian, every man is a neighbor, but far from every man is a friend. An enemy, even a hater and a slanderer, is a neighbor, but even a loving person is not always a friend, for the relations of friendship are profoundly individual and exclusive. Thus, even the Lord Jesus Christ calls the apostles His "friends" only before parting from them, only on the threshold of His agony on the cross and death (see John 15:15). The presence of brothers, however loved they may be, does not therefore remove the necessity of a friend, and vice versa. On the contrary, the need for a friend becomes even more acute from the presence of brothers, while the presence of a friend includes the necessity of brothers. Only if they are insufficiently strong can agapē and philia appear to be almost the same thing, just as only an impure marriage "resembles" impure[!] virginity, whereas in its limit marriage forms an antinomically coupled pair with the limit of virginity. But the more glorious and beautiful is "the opened flower of the soul," the clearer and more certain will be the antinomic character of the two sides of love, their dual conjugacy. In order to live among brothers, it is necessary to have a Friend, if only a distant one. In order to have a Friend, it is necessary to live among brothers, at least to be with them in spirit. In fact, in order to treat everyone as oneself it is necessary to see oneself at least in one person, to feel oneself in him; it is necessary to perceive in this one person an already achieved—even if only partial—victory over selfhood. Only a Friend is such a one agapic love for whom is a consequence of philic love for him. But for philic love of a Friend not to degenerate into a peculiar self-love, for a Friend not to become merely the condition of a comfortable life, for friendship to have a depth, what is necessary is an outward manifestation and disclosure of the forces that are given by friendship. What is necessary is agapic love for brothers. In the overall church economy (where persons are "three measures of meal" [see Matt. 13:33] and the Church is a "woman"), philia is a "leaven," while agape is the "salt" that keeps human relations from spoiling. Without the former there is no ferment, no creativity of church humanity, no movement forward, no pathos of life, whereas without the latter there is no incorruptibility, collectedness, purity, or wholeness of this life. There is no conservation of orders and rules, no harmony of life.

In its foreshadowings of future Christianity, antiquity pushed to the fore both sides of church life. There is, of course, no need to give examples. It is more useful to sketch with two or three strokes how later thought viewed friendship (I mention friendship, because how later thought viewed brotherhood is sufficiently known and does not need to be discussed⁷⁴⁰).

The mystical unity that is revealed in the consciousness of friends permeates all the aspects of their life, makes even the everyday golden. It follows that, even in the domain of simple collaboration, simple camaraderie, a Friend acquires a value greater than his empirical value. Assistance to a Friend acquires a mysterious hue that is dear to the heart; profit from this assistance becomes sacred. The growth of what is empirical in friendship transcends itself, stretches toward the heavens, while its roots plunge into the subempirical depths of the earth. Perhaps (rather, not perhaps but of course) herein lies the reason for the insistence with which both the ancients and the moderns—Christians, Jews, and pagans—praised friendship in its utilitarian, pedagogic, and everyday aspects.

"Two are better than one; because they have a good reward for their labour. For if they fall, the one will lift up his fellow: but woe to him that is alone when he falleth; for he hath not another to help him up. Again, if two lie together, then they have heat: but how can one be warm alone? And if one prevail against him, two shall withstand him; and a threefold cord is not quickly broken" (Ecclesiastes 4:9–12). This is with regard to

mutual aid in life. But friends also educate each other by mutual friction and adaptation: "Iron sharpeneth iron; so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend" (Prov. 27:17). The very closeness of a friend is joyous: "Ointment and perfume rejoice the heart; so doth the sweetness of a man's friend by hearty counsel" (Prov. 27:9). A friend is a support and protection in life: "A faithful friend is a sure shelter; whoever finds one has found a rare treasure. A faithful friend is something beyond price; there is no measuring his worth. A faithful friend is the elixir of life, and those who fear the Lord will find one. Whoever fears the Lord directs his friendship in such a way that as he himself is, so his friend becomes" (Ecclesiasticus 6:14–17).

A spiritual value is clearly placed on friendship in these practical utilitarian considerations on the profit and pleasure of friendship, and this spiritual valuation becomes even clearer and more distinct if we remember the obligations connected with a friend. A true friend is recognized only in misfortune: "A friend loveth at all times, and a brother is born for adversity" (Prov. 17:17). One should be faithful to a friend: "Thine own friend . . . forsake not" (Prov. 27:10), says the Wise One, while the Son of Sirach expresses the same thought more fully: "Do not desert an old friend; the new one will not be his match. New friend, new wine; when it grows old, you drink it with pleasure" (Ecclesiasticus 9:10, 14-15). Assistance to a friend is a "worthy offering to the Lord" (Ecclesiasticus 14:11). Also, "be kind to your friend before you die, treat him as generously as you can afford. Do not refuse yourself the good things of today, do not let your share of what is lawfully desired pass you by" (Ecclesiasticus 14:13– 14). Also: "Do not forget your friend in your soul, and do not forget him in your wealth" (Ecclesiasticus 37:6).

Friends are linked in an intimate unity: "there is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother" (Prov. 18:24). Therefore, a friendship cannot be destroyed by anything except by a blow directed against the very unity of the friends, by what strikes at the heart of the Friend as a Friend, by betrayal, mockery of the friendship itself, of its holiness. "The man who pricks the eye makes tears fall, and the man who pricks the heart makes it show morbid feeling. The man who throws a stone at the birds scares them away, and the man who abuses a friend destroys a friendship. Even if you draw the sword against your friend, do not despair, for there is a way to regain your friend; if you open your mouth against your friend, do not be afraid, for there is such a thing as reconciliation. Only abuse and arrogance, and a secret and treacherous blow can cause your friend to take to flight" (Ecclesiasticus, 22:19–22). "The man who tells secrets destroys confidence and will not find a friend to his soul. If you love your

^b The Jerusalem Bible translation has been modified here to fit the Russian.

^c The Goodspeed translation has been modified here to fit the Russian.

friend, keep faith with him, but if you tell his secrets, do not pursue him. For sure as a man loses his dead, you have lost your neighbor's friendship, and as you let a bird out of your hand, you have let your neighbor out, and you will never catch him. Do not go after him, for he is far away, and has made his escape like a gazelle from a trap. For you can bind up a wound, and be reconciled after abuse, but for the man who tells secrets there is no hope for reconciliation" (Ecclesiasticus, 27:16–21).^d Finally, higher trust and higher forgiveness must belong to a friend. Having heard that your friend has done something, "question him; perhaps he did not do it; or if he did, let him not do it again. Question your friend, perhaps he did not say it; or if he did, let him not say it again. Question a friend, for often there is slander, and you must not believe everything that is said" (Ecclesiaticus, 19:13-15). The greatest trust that can be bestowed upon a man is to believe in him despite condemnations of him, despite evident facts that testify against him, despite all that speaks against him. The greatest trust that can be bestowed upon a man is to accept only the judgment of his conscience, his words. The greatest forgiveness consists in acting as if nothing had happened, in forgetting what had happened. Such a trust and such a forgiveness must be offered to a friend. That is why a friend is the being who is closest to one's heart. That is why the Bible, wishing to indicate the inner closeness of Moses to God, calls him the "friend" of God (Ex. 33:11; James 2:23). The Bible also shows the realization of this ideal of friendship in living reality. I have in mind the extremely touching friendship of David and Jonathan, depicted in just a few words, but for that reason almost painfully touching: "Written as if for me," everyone thinks.

"... the soul of Jonathan was knit with the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul ..." (1 Sam. 18:1). "Then Jonathan and David made a covenant, because he loved him as his own soul. And Jonathan stripped himself of the robe that was upon him, and gave it to David, and his garments, even to his sword, and to his bow, and to his girdle" (1 Sam. 18:3–4). "Then said Jonathan unto David: Whatsoever thy soul desireth, I will even do it for thee" (1 Sam. 20:4). "... thou hast brought thy servant into a covenant of the Lord with thee: notwithstanding, if there be in me iniquity, slay me thyself" (1 Sam. 20:8). "Jonathan ... loved him [David] as he loved his own soul" (1 Sam. 20:17). "David ... fell on his face to the ground, and bowed himself three times: and they kissed one another, and wept one with another, until David exceeded [i.e., wept more]" (1 Sam. 20:41).

The tremendous moans of the 88th Psalm break off with a wail—for a friend. Words can be found for all other sorrows, but the loss of a friend

^d The Goodspeed translation has been modified here to fit the Russian.

^e The Goodspeed translation has been modified here to fit the Russian.

and dear one is beyond words. It is the limit to sorrow, a kind of moral vertigo. Loneliness is a terrible word. "To be without a friend" has a mysterious relation to "to be without God." The deprivation of a friend is a kind of death. "O Lord God of my salvation, I have cried day and night before thee. . . . For my soul is full of troubles: and my life draweth nigh unto the grave. I am counted with them that go down into the pit; I am as a man that hath no strength: Free among the dead, like the slain that lie in the grave, whom thou rememberest no more: and they are cut off from thy hand. Thou hast laid me in the lowest pit, in darkness, in the deeps. . . . Mine eye mourneth by reason of affliction: Lord, I have called daily unto thee, I have stretched out my hands unto thee. . . . I am afflicted and ready to die from my youth up: while I suffer thy terrors I am distracted. Thy fierce wrath goeth over me: thy terrors have cut me off. They came round about me daily like water: they compassed me about together. Lover and friend hast thou put far from me, and mine acquaintance into darkness."

In his Psalms, the Prophet King builds a bridge from the Old to the New Testament. Thus, his friendship with Jonathan also rises above the level of the utilitarian friendship of the Old Testament and anticipates the *tragic* friendship of the New. The shadow of deep, inexorable tragedy lay upon this Ancestor of Christ. Owing to this shadow, *honorable* earthly friendship became infinitely deepened and infinitely sweet for our heart which has the Gospel. We have come to love tragedy: "the sweet arrow of Christianity makes our heart ache," as V. V. Rozanov says.

The *agapē-philia* antinomy was first remarked in books of the Old Testament. Perhaps this antinomy was also dimly foreseen by the Greek "Christians before Christ." But it was first fully disclosed in that Book in which the antinomy of spiritual life was revealed with insane clarity and salvific acuteness: the Gospel.

Equal love for all and each in their unity, concentrated in a single focus of love for several, even for one in his separation from the general unity; disclosure before all, openness with everyone, together with esotericism,

f A protean giant of the Russian Silver Age, Vasily Rozanov (1856–1919) was a powerful philosopher of generation and sex (before D. H. Lawrence), a rebel who came out against the monastic-Byzantine interpretation of the gospels, and then even against Christianity itself, in the name of Living Life (a favorite concept of Dostoevsky's). But he always felt cozy within the Russian Orthodox Church and never stopped thinking of it as his home. Rozanov became especially close to the Church in the early part of the second decade of this century, a period when Florensky became one of his dearest friends.

Rozanov boldly and insistently exposed the hypocritical nature of the liberalism of much of the Russian intelligentsia. He liked to show himself off as an "immoralist," violating generally accepted ethical norms and shocking the reader with the nakedness of his inner world. He was a destroyer of traditional literary forms, a "completer and culminator" of the old literature. Metaphysician and mystic, Rozanov was interested, first and foremost, in the imperceptible, the unheralded, the undocumented." His rapt attentiveness to the "unclear and unfocused world" allowed him to discover a new way of viewing ordinary things, to acquire a strikingly unusual vision of life and the history of civilization.

the mystery of the few; the greatest democratism together with the strictest aristocratism; "absolutely all are the elect" together with the elect of the elect; "preach the gospel to every creature" (Mark 16:15; Cf. Col. 1:23) together with "neither cast ve your pearls before swine" (Matt. 7:6); in brief, agapē-philia—such are the antinomic dualities of the Good News. The power of the Gospel is accessible to all, does not need an interpreter. But this power is also thoroughly esoteric; not one word in the Gospel can be understood correctly without the "tradition of the elders," without the interpretation of spiritual guides, successively handing down the meaning of the Gospel from generation to generation. The Book clear as crystal is at the same time the Book with seven seals. All are equal in a Christian community and, at the same time, the whole structure of the community is hierarchical. Around Christ there are several concentric layers, of increasingly greater and more profound knowledge as He is approached. On the outside are external "crowds of people"; then, the secret disciples and adherents, such as Nicodemus, Joseph of Arimathea, Lazarus and his sisters, the women who follow the Lord, and so forth; then, the chosen, the "seventy"; then, the "twelve"; then, the "three," Peter, James, and John; and finally "one," "whom Jesus loved" (John 13:23; 19:26; 20:2; 21:7, 20). Such is the characteristic structure of the sacred community of Christ's disciples. We could also mention sermon by parables, the limiting of the circle of witnesses to one concentric layer or another, the explanation of a parable in private.

"And his disciples asked him, saying What might this parable be? And he said, Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God: but to others in parables: that [let the reader understand!] seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand" (Luke 8:9–10).

Nevertheless, if this and much else indisputably proves the esoteric character of Christianity,⁷⁴¹ not a smaller quantity of (well-known!) data proves its completely exoteric character. Exotericism and esotericism are not rationally compatible. They are reconcilable only in the most profoundly mysterious Christian life, not in rationalistic formulas and rational schemes.

The *friendly*, *philic* structure of the *brotherly*, *agapic* community of Christians characterizes not only the hierarchic and philarchic relation of its comembers to the center, but also the smallest fragments of the community. Like a crystal, a Christian community is not fragmented into amorphous, noncrystallized homoeomeric parts. The limit to fragmentation is not the human atom that from itself relates to the community, but a community molecule, a pair of friends, which is the principle of actions here, just as the family was this kind of molecule for the pagan community. This is a new antinomy: the person-dyad antinomy. On the one hand, the separate person is everything; on the other hand, he is

something only where there are "two or three." "Two or three" is something qualitatively higher than "one," although it is precisely Christianity that has created the idea of the absolute value of the separate person. The person can be absolutely valuable only in absolutely valuable communion, although one cannot say that the person is prior to communion or that communion is prior to the person. The primordial person and primordial communion, which rationally are seen as excluding each other, are given as a fact in Church life. They are given together and at the same time. And if in the *emergence* of the one or the other we cannot conceive their ontological equivalence, we are even less capable of conceiving them as ontologically unequivalent in actualized reality. The spiritual life of a person is inseparable from his preliminary communion with others, but the communion is incomprehensible without an already-present spiritual life. This connectedess of communion and spiritual life is expressively indicated in the Holy Book.

Having called "twelve" disciples, the Lord sends them to preach "by two and two," and this sending forth by "two and two" is connected with the giving of "power over unclean spirits," that is, with the charisma—above all—of chastity and virginity: "and he called unto him the twelve, and began to send them forth by two and two; and gave them power over unclean spirits" (Mark 6:7).

The sending of the "seventy" signified the same thing; having chosen "seventy," the Lord also "sent them two and two" (Luke 10:1). Here, He gave them the gift of healing (Luke 10:9) and the power over devils (Luke 10:17, 19, 20). These texts of Mark and Luke also contain an implied hint at knowledge of the mysteries of the Kingdom, even if only a partial knowledge. For, here, the disciples are being sent to preach, and preaching presupposes such knowledge. It is also not by chance, one must suppose, that John the Baptist sends two of his disciples to Christ when it is necessary to look spiritually into the Person of Iesus and to determine if He is Christ (Matt. 11:2). But it is necessary to point out that the passage "he sent two of his disciples, and said unto him (pempsas duo ton mathētōn autou eipen autōi)" is corrected by another interpretation of the text⁷⁴³ to read: dia ton matheton autou, i.e., "he let it be known to him through his disciples." But this correction, even if it has textual justification, does not change the meaning, for the number two is confirmed by Luke 7:19: "And John calling unto him two of his disciples sent them to Jesus, saving . . . (kai proskalesamenos duo tinas tōn mathētōn autou ho Ioanēs epempsen pros tou Kurion legōn)."

Thus, the knowing of mysteries, i.e., the inward-directed bearing of spirit (like the doing of miracles, i.e., the outward-directed bearing of spirit, or, more briefly, the bearing of spirit in general), is based on the abiding of the disciples two by two. "Two" is not "one plus one," but something essentially greater, something essentially more manifoldly sig-

nificant and powerful. "Two"⁷⁴⁴ is a new compound of spiritual chemistry, where "one plus one" (the leaven and meal of the parable) is transformed qualitatively and forms a third thing (the leavened whole).

This thought, unfolded, passes like a scarlet thread through the entire 18th Chapter of Matthew. Here I will note only a few links of the chain of thoughts.

As regards the conversations of the disciples about the brother who has sinned, the Lord indicates that they have the power to bind and to loose (Matt. 18:18). But since the essence of this power lies in spiritual knowledge of the mysteries of the Kingdom, in the perception of the spiritual world and God's will, ⁷⁴⁵ the inner accent of Matt. 18:18 is placed on reminding the disciples of their *gnosis*, of their *spirituality*. Furthermore, in Matt. 18:19, the Lord paraphrases His thought, as it were, translating what he has just said into other concepts, but leaving untouched the inner meaning of what He said: "Again I say unto you (*palin amēn legō humin*) [i.e., "once again," "I repeat"], That if two of you shall agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven. For (*gar*) where two or three (*duo ē treis*) are gathered together in my name (*eis to emon onoma*), there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. 18:19–20).

The knowledge of mysteries or, more particularly, the power to bind and to loose is again—palin—the co-asking of two who have agreed on earth as touching anything, i.e., of two who have fully humbled themselves the one before the other, who have fully overcome contra-dictions, contra-thoughts, and contra-feelings to reach consubstantiality the one with the other. Such co-asking is always fulfilled, says the Savior. Why is this so? It is because the gathering of two or more in the Name of Christ, the co-entering of people into the mysterious spiritual atmosphere around Christ, communion with His grace-giving power⁷⁴⁶ transforms them into a new spiritual essence,⁷⁴⁷ makes of two a particle of the Body of Christ, a living incarnation of the Church (the Name of Christ is the mystical Church!), ecclesializes them. It is clear that Christ is then "in the midst of them." He is "in the midst of them" like a soul in the midst of every member of the body that it animates. But Christ is consubstantial with His Father, and therefore the Father does what the Son asks. The power to bind and to loose is based on a symphony of two on earth about every work. It is based on the victory over selfhood, the possession by two of one soul. And this possession is understood now not as conditional and limited but as perfect and unbounded. But in the first place, one can seek to attain this on earth, but it is not attainable unconditionally. Secondly, the measure of attainment is also the measure of humility. Directly in response to what the Lord has explained ("then came" [Matt. 18:21]), the self-assured and impetuous Peter asks Him: "how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? till seven times?" That is, he wishes to

know the norm and limit of forgiveness (seven is the number of fullness, completion, perfection, limit⁷⁴⁸). But this "till seven times," this limit of forgiveness, would precisely indicate the fleshly limitedness of the one forgiving the sin. It would indicate absence of true spiritual love in him. (A wholly different matter is the forgiveness of the sin against the Holy Spirit, against the Truth Itself.) It would be a variant of selfhood. Relations that are limited to any extent by a multiplicity of forgiveness do not have any Christian force. These are nonspiritual relations. That is why the Lord answers the Apostle in this way: "I say not unto thee, Until seven times: but, Until seventy times seven" (Matt. 18:22), that is, without any limit, without end, wholly and with perfect mercy (for "seventy times seven" signifies not finiteness but perfect fullness, actual infinity).⁷⁴⁹

Thus, to condemn a man for a sin against the one who condemns him, one must stand not on a human but on a Divine height. One must know the Divine mysteries. Condemnation would consist in the fulfillment of God's will. But the mysteries of the Kingdom can be known only in perfect love, reaching among two a symphony in all things. (A particular case of this is *starchestvog*). At present this symphony cannot be realized by human efforts. It can only be in the process of realization, in infinite humility before one's friend, in the forgiveness of sins against one "until seventy times seven."

The Lord's enigmatic⁷⁵⁰ parable about the "unjust steward" (Luke 16:1–8) expresses the same idea of forgiveness as the basis of friendship. The rich man of the parable is God, rich in creativity, while the steward is man. Man is placed as the caretaker of God's estate, of the life that has been entrusted him, of the powers and capacities that were given to him to be fulfilled, to be multiplied (cf. the parable of the "talents"). But he squanders his life, does not fulfill his creative capacity, wastes God's estate, and God demands that he give an account. Man must abandon everything that he imagines he possesses and that, in fact, has only been entrusted to him. He will be deprived of all the outward powers that he used in life, then of the body with its organs, and finally of the soul's organization, which will be consumed in the fire of judgment. He will become "naked" and "poor." He will be put "outside" the house of God, for the lord tells him: "thou mayest be no longer steward" (Luke 16:20).

The steward understands that his position is hopeless, for he lived only on God's estate, not on his own. He understands that he does not have and cannot have any of his own creativity of life. "Then the steward said within himself, What shall I do? for my Lord taketh away from me my stewardship: I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed. I am resolved what to do that, when I am put out of the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses" (Luke 16:3–4). Thus, being expelled from God's house, he wants

^g See note f on pp. 8–9.

to assure himself a place if only in the houses of other people, i.e., in souls, in prayers, in the thoughts of other people—in the memory of the Church. What measures does he take to be remembered, to be received in others' houses? "So he called every one of his lord's debtors unto him, and said unto the first, how much owest thou unto my lord? And he said, An hundred measures of oil. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, sit down quickly, and write fifty. Then said he to another, And how much owest thou? And he said, an hundred measures of wheat. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and write fourscore" (Luke 16:6-7). In other words, the unjust steward forgives part of what the lord's debtors owe. In his consciousness, he forgives their sins before the Lord. Moralistically, juridically, legally, this act is a new transgression against the Lord. This act is "unjust," for "justice" is the application of the law of identity and, "justly," one should speak of a debtor (especially of a debtor to someone else) as a debtor, not as of a non-debtor, and of each debt (especially of a debt to someone else) as it is, not as it is not. Legally, it is, in general, impossible to forgive a sin. But, in any case, it is by no means possible to forgive a sin not against oneself but against God. But, in spiritual life, this "injustice" is what is required: conscious of oneself as guilty before God, as a debtor before God, as sinning against God and needing God's forgiveness, one must also forgive others their sins, reduce the measure of their guilt. Yes, we have no "right" to forgive what constitutes a sin not against us but against God—what touches not us but God. It even seems highly natural that, zealously guarding God's glory, one should call attention to the guilt of other people, one should underscore that we "do not sympathize" with their sins, that we are almost ready to consider God's debtors our own debtors. But "the lord commended the unjust steward, because he had done wisely; for the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light" (Luke 16:8). By unjustly forgiving the sins of others, we justify ourselves, the unjust "children of this world," more than we could justify ourselves as the just "children of light" by justly condemning the sins of others. But this must be done privately, individually, secretly with each sinner. His sin will truly be covered in order really to reduce it in one's consciousness, and not merely to show one's generosity toward others. Such an open forgiveness would not only fail to reach its target; it would not only fail to cover the sin of one's brother. It would even provoke in others the temptation to sin: "Whatever I do, I'll be forgiven."

This parable represents the Orthodox understanding of the canons as opposed to the Catholic understanding. According to the latter, a canon is a norm of ecclesiastical law that must be fulfilled and the violation of which must be compensated by a "satisfaction." By contrast, according to the Orthodox understanding, canons are not laws but regulative symbols of the church society. Canons have never been fulfilled perfectly,

and one cannot expect that they will ever be fulfilled exactly. But they should always be kept in mind, so that we remain clearly conscious of our guilt before God. "Here, remember," the Holy Church says to its children as it were, but to each privately, in secret, "remember how one should be and what should justly happen to you because you do not satisfy God's justice. But your guilt is reduced not because you are good, not for your merits, but because God is merciful, long-suffering, and infinitely full of grace. So, be humble, and do not condemn others when they are guilty, even if you see their guilt just as undeniably as if it were a promissory note."

The property of the lord in the parable is all good and all just. But the steward, to forgive part of the debts of the lord's debtors, essentially took for himself from the lord's estate the part of the debt that was forgiven and gave it from himself to the debtors, as it were. The debt that he forgave the debtors was, *in relation to him*, an illegitimate property, a "mammon of unrighteousness" (Luke 16:9). For, in itself, no property is righteous or unrighteous, legitimate or illegitimate. It simply is, and it is good.⁷⁵² But every property, in relation to the person who possesses it, is legitimate or illegitimate, righteous or unrighteous. And, for the steward, the lord's estate that he wasted, first on himself and then on others, and that he therefore viewed as his own was a "mammon of unrighteousness" in both senses.

In the same way, we do not have the possibility of paying off a sin by using the capital of God's mercy, of God's goodness. And, for us, if we appropriate it, this possibility is a "mammon of unrighteousness." But since, even without this, we constantly squander this "mammon" on ourselves in all ways, on the paying off of our sins, then the only thing left to us (as a measure in case we are separated from these riches of God's mercy) is to assure for ourselves a place in the hearts of other people, in the "everlasting habitations." And then the Lord will perhaps praise our resourcefulness. This assurance of a place for ourselves is nothing else but the creation of relations of friendship. This is how the Savior Himself explains the parable: "And I say unto you, make to yourselves friends by the mammon of unrighteousness [philous ek tou mamona tēs adikias]: that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations" (Luke 16:9).

I return now to the idea that friendship "by two and two" was realized among Christ's disciples and that this relationship of "by two and two" was expressed in the fact that the disciples were sent "by two and two" for preaching. For them, this friendship was a vital work, not a transitory and accidental collaboration of fellow travelers and fellow workers. This stability of dyadic relations is clearly indicated by the firmly established association of apostolic names in pairs. "Enumerations of the apostles

exhibit a clear intention of saying the names in pairs, which was probably the way they were sent by Christ to preach, to spread the Gospel during the Lord's lifetime,"⁷⁵³ affirms a well-known exegete.

If this is the case, then one can propose that these pairs are not accidental but are held together by something stronger than external considerations relating to the convenience of executing a common work together. In fact, three of these pairs are defined by relations of kin, blood, and even brotherhood. These are the pairs:

Andrew and Peter, sons of Jonah; James and John, sons of Zebedee; James and Judas Simon(?) Lebbaeus-Thaddaeus, sons of Alphaeus.

With three other pairs, the external priming for the formation of the spiritual connection is the kinship of characters: perhaps unity of world-feeling or worldview, or certain traits in the lives of these apostles before or after they became followers of Christ. These pairs comprise:

Philip and Nathanael Batholomew; Matthew Levi and Thomas Didymus; Judas (Simon) Iscariot and Judas(?) Simon Canaanite-Zelote Cleopas(?).⁷⁵⁴

Finally, one can add two more pairs:

Timothy and Paul; Luke and Silas.

Such a connection between charismatic gifts and the friendship of two is expressed with great clarity in popular legends, which, in general, frequently "distort" the historical facts in favor of a higher truth and meaning of the tale. According to the popular consciousness, the gift of healing is given only to pairs of the Lord's followers, not to separate, "aphilic" persons isolated from one another. Therefore, as Mommsen and then A. P. Shestakov pointed out, the healer apostles, as well as healer saints in general, usually appear in pairs in folk tales. Here are examples: The Apostles Peter and John and Peter and Paul. The Saints Cosmas and Damian, Cyrus and John, Panteleimon and Ermolaus, Samson and Diomedes, Triphonus and Thalaleus, and Mucius and Anicetas.

This pairedness of spirit-bearing persons is unquestionable. And whatever the initial stimuli to their friendship, one must conclude that the gifts the friends received in their friendship necessarily led to the mysterious pairing of their persons. The distribution by pairs was already noticed by ancient exegetes.

Thus, according to St. Jerome, "Two by two are called and two by two are sent the disciples of Christ, for love does not abide with one, which is

why it is said: Woe unto the solitary (Bini vocantur, et bini mittuntur discipuli Christi, quoniam caritas non consistit cum uno. Unde dicitur: Vae soli)."⁷⁵⁸

St. Augustine says: "As for the fact that he sends them two by two, this is the sacrament of love, either because two is the commandment of love or because no love can exist between fewer than two (quod autem binos mittit, sacramentum est caritatis, sive quia duo sunt caritatis praecepta, sive quia omnis caritas minus quam inter duos esse non potest)." 759

The sacrament of love, sacramentum caritatis, is the highest motive for the life two by two; the word caritas is probably put here for want of a more exact Latin term for the true love of friends. But there is also a lower motive, inasmuch as people are weak, have need of external support from a friend and of a restraint against temptations: here a friend is also necessary, even if only as a witness, who can in time pull one away from a fall. Thus reasoned St. John Chrysostom in the 14th chapter of his Commentaries on Genesis and St. Gregory of Nazianzus in Discourse 17. The very presence of another person is capable of dissipating the tension of a sinful thought. St. Seraphim of Sarov was not eager to counsel people to live in the desert. He says by way of explanation: "In a monastery, monks struggle with hostile powers as with doves; in the desert they struggle with them as with lions and leopards." This aspect, the aspect of mutual watching-over, has been particularly etched in the consciousness of monks, especially Catholic ones. But this topic is outside the scope of my work.⁷⁶⁰ I will only remark that our Orthodox prohibitions against monks taking solitary walks, St. Seraphim's prohibition against his disciples living alone, and so on also apply here.

The kind of importance that the Lord placed on *friendship* is shown by the parable of the unjust steward. It is remarkable that, in this parable, there is no mention of charity from the "mammon of unrighteousness," of alms to the poor. No, the immediate goal is not philanthropy but the acquisition of friends for oneself, friendship: "And I say unto you, Make to yourselves friends by the mammon of unrighteousness" (Luke 16:9). St. Clement of Alexandria was among the first to direct attention to this passage. He says: "The Lord did not say 'Give' or 'Offer' or 'Be charitable to' or 'Help.' He said: 'Make to yourselves friends,' because friendship is expressed not only in giving but also in perfect self-sacrifice and prolonged co-habitation." ⁷⁶¹

The mystical unity of two is a condition of knowledge and therefore of the appearance of the Spirit of Truth that gives this knowledge. Together with the subordination of creation to God-given inner laws, and with the fullness of chastity, this unity corresponds to the coming of the Kingdom of God (i.e., of the Holy Spirit) and the spiritualization of all creation. A remarkable tradition has been preserved in the so-called Second Epistle of St. Clement of Rome to the Corinthians:

"When the Lord Himself was asked by someone: 'When will Thy Kingdom come?'—He answered: 'When two will be one, and the exterior will be like the interior, and the male together with the female will be not male and not female.' "762

Clement interprets this enigmatic agraphon in the following way: "'Two are one' when two would speak the truth to each other and when one soul would unhypocritically be in two bodies. And 'the exterior will be like the interior' means that [Christ] calls the interior the soul and the exterior the body. Thus, in the same way that your body appears, thus also your soul will be made manifest in your beautiful acts (*en tois kalois ergois*). [NB: Clement says *kalois*, beautiful, not *agathois*, good.] And 'male with female is not male and not female' means that a brother in seeing a sister should not think of her as a woman, nor should she think of him as a man." "When you do this"—he says—"the Kingdom of My Father will come." "764

But this interpretation, a highly probable one, refers more to the external psychological side of the Kingdom to Come and does not penetrate deeply into the ontological conditions under which such a life of the soul will become possible. It appears to me that the agraphon speaks clearly enough for itself; all one has to do is to take it as it is. But what is important for me now is only the first term of the agraphon, i.e., "when two will be one," i.e., an indication of a friendship brought to its culmination. And, here, friendship is understood not so much from the point of view of actions and feelings, i.e., *nominalistically*, as from the point of view of the metaphysical basis upon which perfect unity of soul is possible, i.e., *realistically*.

The holy fathers often repeat the idea of the necessity—along with universal love, agapē—of individualized friendship, philia. While the former must offer itself to every man despite his uncleanness, the latter must be careful in choosing a friend. For one grows intertwined with a friend; one receives a friend, together with his qualities, into oneself. In order that both do not perish, what is needed is careful selection. "Ouk estin ouden ktēma beltion philou, ponēron andra mēdepou ktēsēi philou, i.e., there is no acquisition better than a friend, but never choose an evil man as your friend," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus. 765 In another place he lavishly spends all the best words to give an accurate assessment of the importance of friendship. "A faithful friend cannot be replaced by anything," he begins, addressing St. Gregory of Nyssa, "and there is no measure to his kindness. 'A faithful friend is a strong protection' (Ecclesiasticus, 6:14) and 'a fortress' (Prov. 18:19). A faithful friend is a treasure with a soul. A faithful friend is more precious than gold and a multitude of precious stones. A faithful friend is 'a garden inclosed,' 'a spring shut up' (Song of Songs 4:12), which are temporarily opened and temporarily used. A faithful friend is a haven of repose. And if he is distinguished by prudence, he is the more precious. If he is learned with all-embracing learning, as our learning once was and as it should be, this is so much the better. And if he is a child of light (John 12:36) or a 'man of God' (1 Tim. 6:11), or one who comes 'near to the Lord' (Ex. 19:22), or 'a man' of the best 'desires' (Dan. 9:22), or one worthy of such a name that is used by the Scripture to distinguish high and godly men, men of heaven, then this is a gift of God and is clearly greater than our worth." ⁷⁶⁶

Once a friend is chosen, the friendship with him has, according to Gregory of Nazianzus, features of unconditionality. Gregory says: "I posit a limit to hate, not to friendship, for hate must be moderated, but friendship should not know any bounds." ⁷⁶⁷

In what is this limitlessness of friendship expressed? It is chiefly expressed in the bearing of the *infirmities* of one's friend, without limit, in mutual patience, mutual forgiveness. "Friendship bears all that it suffers or hears."⁷⁶⁸

The interests of friends merge. The property of one becomes the property of the other, and the good of one becomes the good of the other.

"For when one among good ones [i.e., a monk] experiences something good, then, owing to the ties of friendship, there is common joy among all of them." 769

"Unity of thought comes from the Trinity, since, by nature, the main characteristic of the Trinity is unity and inner peace." 770

Thus, Abba Thallassios echoes St. Gregory: "Love, constantly extended toward God, unites the lovers with God and with each other." In another place, he says more definitively: "Only love unites creatures with God and with each other in unity of thought." 772

Similar thoughts were expressed by other fathers. Let me present several excerpts taken at random. St. Basil the Great sees communion as the profoundest organic need of people: "Who does not know that man is a meek and sociable animal, not a solitary and savage one? Nothing, after all, is so proper to our nature as to have communion with one another, to need one another, and to love those of one's own kind (*kai agapan to homophulon, qui ejusdem sunt generis*)." 773

Between lovers the membrane of selfhood is torn. And, in a friend, one sees oneself as it were, one's most intimate essence, one's *other* I. But this other I is not different from one's own I. A friend is *received* into the I of the lover, is profoundly agreeable (*priatnyi* in Russian), or acceptable (*priemlemyi*), to the lover. A friend is admitted into the organization of the lover, is not alien to him in any way, is not expelled from him. The loved one (a *priatel*'⁷⁷⁴ [friend but also one who is "received"] in the original sense of the word) is received by his friend and nestles, like a mother's child, beneath his heart. Thus, the Poet says (though about something somewhat different):

There is darkness here, but heat and cries there. I roam as if in dream, feeling only one thing vividly:
You are with me and all of you are in me.⁷⁷⁵

The soul's reception (priatie) of a friend's I unites two separate streams of life. This living unity is achieved not as the enslavement of one person by the other, and not even as the conscious slavery of one person in relation to the other. Nor can a unity of friends be called a concession. It is precisely a unity. One feels, desires, thinks, and speaks not because the other spoke, thought, desired, or felt in the same way, but because both feel one feeling, desire with one will, think one thought, speak with one voice. Each lives by the other, or rather, the life of the one and the other flow from a common center, one in itself, placed by the friends above themselves by a creative act. Therefore, the different manifestations of this center are always harmonious by themselves. Yes by themselves—not through a straining of feeling, or will, or thought, or verbal formula taken as a principle of unity. Whether it be a verbal formula or a system of such formulas giving a program, this is nevertheless a homoiousian unity or alliance, which is not at all the same thing as a homoousian unity or a unity in the strictest sense of the word.⁷⁷⁶

Friends define their friendship not in the plane of semi-illusory and wingless phenomenality (the "psychic" domain) but in the noumenal depths. Therefore, friends form a dual-unity, a dyad. They are not they, but something greater: one soul.

According to Marc Minutius Felix, his friend Octavius loved him so ardently that in all important and serious matters and even in all trivial matters, even in amusements, their desires agreed in everything. "One could think that the two of them shared one soul."

It cannot be any other way, for friends, affirms Lactantius, "could not be linked by such a faithful friendship if the two did not have one soul, one thought, one will, and one opinion."

A common life is a common joy and a common suffering. Friendship involves not co-rejoicing and co-suffering, but rather the more profound states of consonant rejoicing and consonant suffering. The states of the former type go from the periphery of the soul to its center and refer to those who are comparatively more remote from us. But the joy and suffering of those who are very close to us, arising in the very center of our soul, are directed from there to the periphery: this is not the reflection of an alien state, but one's own consonant state, one's own joy and one's own suffering. Aristotle, with reference to suffering, was among the first to note this difference of experiences.⁷⁷⁹ And Euripides, in his tragedy *Herakles*, gives us an artistic demonstration of such a difference,

comparing the sufferings of Amphytrion and Herakles and Amphytrion and Theseus. 780

But if intimate ties are, in general, favorable for consonant experiences, the ground that is preeminently suited to them is friendship: according to St. Maximus the Confessor, "a faithful friend considers the misfortunes of his friend to be his own, and bears them together with him, suffering unto death." For, in general, the distinctive advantage of love, according to St. Nilus of Sinai, is that it unites everyone, unto the most inward disposition of the soul. Owing to such a unity, everyone transmits his sufferings to all others, while receiving from others their sufferings. Feryone is responsible for everyone else and everyone suffers for everyone else.

Being united thus, by their essence, and forming a rationally unknowable dual-unity, friends enter into a unity of feeling, will, and thought that completely excludes divergence of feeling, will, and thought. But, being *actively* posited, this unity is not at all a mediumistic mutual-possession of persons, not their immersion in an impersonal and indifferent (and therefore unfree) element of the two. This unity is not a dissolution of individuality, not its depreciation, but its raising, consolidating, fortifying, and deepening. This is true all the more certainly for friendship. In friendship, the irreplaceable and incomparable value and originality of each person is revealed in all its beauty. In another I, a person discovers his own actualized potential, made spiritually fruitful by the other I. According to Plato, the loving one gives birth in the loved one.⁷⁸³ Each of the friends obtains a foundation for his own person, finding his own I in the I of the other. "He who has a friend," says Chrysostom, "has another self."

In another place, Chrysostom says: "The loved one for the loving one is what he himself is. The nature of love is such that the loving one and the loved one constitute not two separate persons but one man." 785

Separateness in friendship is only crudely physical, exists only for vision in the most external sense of the word. Therefore, in the sticheron for the day of the Three Bishops, on January 30, one sings of them, who lived in different places, as "separated in body but united in spirit." But in communal life even the bodies become one, as it were. Thus, the hieroschema-monk Anthony of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, in describing the death of the Archimandrite Meletios, writes: "For more than thirty years we were in the closest communion of friendship; and during the last three years we became like one body and one soul."

The power and the difficulty of friendship lie not in the fireworks of the ascesis of the moment but in the constantly burning patience that lasts a lifetime. This is the quiet flame of holy oil, not the explosion of a gas. Heroism is always only an ornament, not the essence of life and, as an ornament, it necessarily has a theatrical side. Taking the place of life,

heroism inevitably degenerates into greasepaint, into a pose of greater or lesser verisimilitude. The truest heroism lies in friendship and in what animates it. But, here too, heroism is only a flower of friendship, not its stalk and not its root. The heroic squanders; it does not gather. The heroic always lives off something else, is nourished by juices acquired through everyday toil. Here, in the darkness of everyday life, the subtlest and gentlest roots of friendship are concealed, acquiring true life. They are not visible to any gaze, and sometimes they are not even suspected by anyone. But they nourish the life given in the present, whereas the open flower of heroism, if it is not a barren flower, will produce only the seed of another, future friendship.⁷⁸⁷

The love of friends refers not to separate spiritual high points, not to the meetings, impressions, and holidays of life, but to all of life's reality, even to banal, everyday experience. The love of friends requires attention to oneself precisely where the "hero" lets himself go utterly. If it has been said that no man is great for his valet, or rather that no man is a hero for his valet, this is because one is a hero and the other is a valet. For heroism does not express the essential greatness of a person but only dons it for a while. For a valet, heroism remains only itself. But, in friendship, it is the other way around. Every external act of one friend seems to the other insufficient because, knowing the friend's soul, he sees how every action fails to conform to the inner greatness of his friend's soul. As for heroes, some are amazed by them, others ignore them; some are carried away by them, others hate them. But a friend is never amazed by his friend and is never indifferent to him. He is not fascinated by him and does not ignore him. He loves, and for love precisely this soul, uniquely this beloved soul, is infinitely dear and priceless, outweighs the whole world with all its temptations. For philia knows a friend not by his outward pose, not by the dress of heroism, but by his smile, by his quiet talk, by his weaknesses, by how he treats people in ordinary human life, by how he eats and sleeps.

One can deliver speeches rhetorically—and deceive. One can suffer rhetorically. One can even die rhetorically and deceive with one's rhethoric. But one cannot deceive with everyday life, and the true test of a soul's authenticity is through life *together*, in the love of friends. Any person can accomplish one or another act of heroism. Anyone can be interesting. But only my friend can smile, speak, and comfort as he does, no one else. Yes, no one and nothing in the world can compensate me for his loss. The revelation of a person begins in friendship, and therefore real, profound sin and real, profound saintliness begin in it too. One can tell a great lie about oneself in many volumes of writing; but one cannot utter even the smallest lie in living communion with a friend. "As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man" (Prov. 27:19). The relationship of the everyday and the heroic is like the relationship

between the features of a face and chance specks of light reflected on it. These specks can produce an effect but they do not touch what is dear or repulsive for us in the face, what is attractive or hateful. Friendship is indeed built on these half-shadows, defining the features of the face, on smiles, simply on life—on that very same life where love or hate gains definitive hegemony. Take away from a man his heroism and he will remain what he is. Attempt to remove from him in thought his deep saintliness or deep love, his secret life and secret sin, expressed in every gesture, and nothing will remain of this man, similar to what happens if hydrogen is removed from water.

This final disintegration of a man, this fractional distillation, is wholly accomplished by the Holy Spirit, at the end of time. But here and now this disintegration can be accomplished through a man who loves as a friend, for only he will indicate to us our hidden treasure. Here, once again, the metaphysical nature of friendship is revealed. Friendship is not only psychological and ethical in nature but, first and foremost, ontological and mystical in nature. In all ages, all the profound contemplators of life viewed friendship in this way. What is friendship? Self-contemplation through a Friend in God.

Friendship is the seeing of oneself with the eyes of another, but before a third, namely the Third. The I, being reflected in a friend (Russ. *drug*), recognizes in the friend's I its own other (*drugoe*) I. The image of a mirror naturally comes to mind here, and, indeed, this image has been knocking on the door for many centuries beyond the threshold of consciousness. Plato uses it. According to the greatest of those who know, Plato's Socrates, a friend sees himself "in a loving one, as in a mirror." And, after almost two dozen centuries, Schiller echoes him almost exactly: "Posa saw himself in this beautiful mirror [i.e., in his friend Don Carlos] and rejoiced at his own image." This acquisition and recognition of oneself in a friends's consonant feeling is concretely represented in Carlos' words to Philipp:

How sweet, how good in a beautiful soul to transform oneself; how sweet it is to think that our joy paints the cheeks of our friend, that our sadness presses on another breast, that our sorrow makes other eyes wet.⁷⁹⁰

But even before Plato, Homer remarked about friendship that "divinity always leads like to like"⁷⁹¹ and acquaints them (Plato refers to this passage in *Lysis*). Nietzsche, following Schiller, affirms that every man has his *metron* and that every friendship is two persons but one common *metron*, or that, in other words, friendship is *the identical order* of two souls.⁷⁹²

But a friend is not only I but also another I, another for I. However, I is unique and everything that is other with respect to I is already not-I. A

friend is I that is not-I. A friend is a *contradictio*, and an antinomy is interwoven with the very concept of a friend. If the thesis of friendship is identity and similarity, its antithesis is non-identity and non-similarity. I cannot love what is not I, for then I would admit in myself something foreign to myself. Nevertheless, in loving, I desire not what I myself am. Indeed, why do I need what I already have? This self-contradictoriness of friendship is disclosed by the young Plato in *Lysis*, and it is revealed anew by Schiller.

"Love," he says about friendship (in contrast to what was cited above), "arises not between two souls who make the same sound but between souls that sound in harmony." Also: "With satisfaction," writes Julius to his friend Raphael, "I see my feelings in my mirror, but with ardent pleasure I devour your higher feelings, which I lack." ⁷⁹³

An exchange of essence, a mutual fulfillment, occurs in love. "When I hate," affirms Schiller by the hand of his Julius, "I take something away from myself; when I love, I am enriched by what I love." Love enriches; God (*Bog* in Russian), having perfect love, is Rich (*Bogatyi*). He is rich with His Son, Whom He loves. He is Fullness.

Similarity and nonsimilarity, or oppositeness, are equally necessary in friendship, forming its thesis and antithesis. In the Platonic dialectic this antinomic character of friendship is removed, or rather, it is covered by the concept of ownness, combining thesis and antithesis. Friends, according to Plato, "are by nature own to each other (oikeioi)," in the sense that one is a part of the other, fulfilling the metaphysical insufficiency of the other's essence and therefore homogeneous with the other. But neither the logical notion of ownness nor the equivalent mythical concept of the androgyne, everlasting in its plasticity, can fill the chasm between the two pillars of friendship, for this concept and this image are, in fact, nothing else but an abbreviated designation of the antinomy of I and not-I.

Friendship can also be compared to consonance. Life is a continuous series of dissonances. But through friendship they are resolved. In friendship, social life acquires its meaning and conciliation. Just as a strict unison does not give anything new, whereas tones that are neighbors but of different pitch are combined into sounds intolerable to the ear, so it is in friendship: an extreme closeness in the structure of souls but with the absence of identity leads to constant jolts, to sudden dissonances intolerable in their unexpectedness and unpredictability, disturbing like a blinking light.

Here, in the concept of consonance, we once again have an antinomy, for the consonant tones must be somehow equal but, at the same time, different. But whatever the metaphysical nature of friendship, friendship is an essential condition of life.

Friendship gives people self-knowledge. Friendship reveals where and how one must work on oneself. But this transparence of I for itself is

attained only in the life-interaction of the loving persons. The "together" of a friendship is the source of its strength. St. Ignatius of Antioch, indicating the mysterious, miracle-working power received by Christians from life-together, wrote to the Ephesians concerning the cenobitic life: "Thus, try to gather together more closely to thank and glorify God. For when you are close together in one place, then the powers of Satan are defeated and the perdition he provokes is removed in the unity of your faith. There is nothing better than the peace in which all war ends between heavenly and earthly things."⁷⁹⁷

This passage clearly indicates that the "together" of love must not be limited solely to abstract thought but necessarily requires palpable, concrete manifestations, including physical closeness. It is necessary not only to "love" one another but also to be close together, to attempt, as much as possible, to come closer and closer to one another. But when are friends closest to each other, if not when kissing? The very word for "kiss" in Russian (potselui) is close to the Russian word for "whole" (tselyi), and the Russian verb for "to kiss" (tselovat'sia) signifies that friends are brought to a state of wholeness (tselostnost') or unity. A kiss is the spiritual unification of the persons kissing. The very word for it, philēma. Moreover (as we have already mentioned), philein, with the addition of tō stomati (with the lips) or without it, means "to kiss."

It is necessary to live a common life, it is necessary to illuminate and suffuse everyday life with closeness, even outward, bodily closeness. Christians will then acquire new, unheard-of powers. They will overcome Satan, cleansing and removing all of his impure powers. That is why St. Ignatius writes to St. Polycarp, the bishop of the Church of Smyrna and thus of the whole Church: "Labor together, try together, run together, suffer together, rest together, be awake together, as God's stewards, guests, and servants." ⁷⁹⁹

Perhaps, having before his spiritual eyes these words of his departed Teacher, St. Polycarp of Smyrna taught the Philippians: "He who has love—*agapēn*—is far from all sin." 800

Here again, the basic idea is repeated. Love gives special powers to the loving one, and these powers overcome sin. They cleanse and remove, to cite Ignatius, the power of Satan and his perdition.

This is also affirmed by others who know the laws of spiritual life. Thus, Father Feodor, the starets of the Svir Monastery, spoke persuasively but quietly in the manner of a father before his death:

"My fathers! For the sake of the Lord, do not part from one another, for now in this time of great troubles, it is difficult to find many people with whom one can exchange a word according to one's conscience." 801

These words are extremely remarkable. For they do not tell one not to be wrathful, not to be angry with one another, or not to quarrel with one another. No, they clearly tell of the necessity of being together, of being together outwardly, bodily, empirically, in everyday life.

And the Church considered (and considers) such a life-together to be so absolutely necessary, so essentially connected with the best in life, that even over the deceased we hear Her voice: "It is good, it is beautiful for brothers to live together." At the grave of someone dear to me, this sigh concerning friendship entered my heart. I had the thought that, even when all business with life has ended, one remembers with ardent desire the ideal of friendship, life together. There is nothing now. There is not even life itself! Nevertheless, a longing for the communion of friends remains. Does it not follow that friendship is the last word of the *properly human element of the Church*, the apex of humanity? As long as man remains man, he seeks friendship. The ideal of friendship is not innate in man, but *a priori* for him.⁸⁰² It is a constitutive element of his nature.

John Chrysostom⁸⁰³ even interprets all of Christian love as friendship. In the self-sacrifice of the Apostle Paul, in his readiness to throw himself even into Gehenna for the sake of those he loved, Chrysostom sees the "flaming love" of friendship.

"I desire," he says, "to present an example of friendship. Friends, friends in Christ, are dearer than fathers and sons." Further, he mentions the example of the first Christians of the Jerusalem community, depicted in Acts, 4:32, 35. "Friendship," Chrysostom continues, "is when one does not judge himself to be his own but to belong to his neighbor, and meanwhile considers his neighbor's property to be foreign to himself; when one protects the life of another as if it were his own, while the other pays him in the same coin!" Chrysostom considers the absence of such friendship to be the sin of mankind and the source of all troubles and even heresies. "But where, it will be asked, can one find such a friend? Nowhere! Because we do not want to be such, but if we did so want, it would be possible and even very possible. If this were in fact impossible, Christ would not have commanded it and would not have spoken so much of love. Friendship is a great thing, but no one can understand how great. No word can express it; it can only be found out through personal experience. The failure to understand this produced heresies; it makes the Greeks Greeks even today," and so on.

Communal life, the life of the parish, requires being-together, coabiding. But this "co" refers even more to the life of friends, where concrete closeness has a special force; and here this "co" acquires an epistemological significance. This "co," understood as the "bearing of one another's burdens" (Gal. 6:2), as mutual obedience, is the vital nerve of friendship and its cross. Therefore, experienced people have repeatedly insisted on this "co" over the whole course of church history.

Thus, speaking of the life of monks two by two, Thomas of Canterbury cites the folk proverb: "Miles in obsequio famulum, clericus socium,

monachus habet dominum," i.e., "for a warrior a novice is a servant; for a cleric he is a comrade; for a monk, he is a master."

Yes. And every friendship, like Christian life in general, is in this sense monasticism. Each of the friends uncomplainingly humbles himself before his life-companion, in the same manner as a servant before his master. The French proverb is fully justified here: "Qui a compagnon, a maître (who has a companion has a master)." This is what the obedience of friendship, the bearing of one's Friend's cross, consists in.

Faithfulness to a once-established friendship, the indissolubility of friendship, as strict as the indissolubility of marriage, firmness to the end, unto the "blood of the martyrs"—that is the fundamental commandment of friendship, and the whole force of friendship lies in the observance of this commandment. There are many temptations to turn away from a Friend, to remain alone or to start new relationships. But a person who has broken off one friendship will break off another, and a third, because he has replaced the way of ascesis with the desire for psychic comfort. And psychic comfort will not be achieved, cannot and should not be achieved, in any friendship. On the contrary, ascesis lends strength to a friendship. When one builds a wall, the more water one pours on the bricks, the stronger the wall will be. It is the same with friendship: the more tears one sheds because of friendship, the stronger the friendship will become.

Tears are the cement of friendship—not all tears but only those that are shed because love cannot express itself and because of the pain caused by the friend. And the more friendship there is, the more tears there will be. And the more tears there are, the more friendship there will be.

Tears in friendship are the same thing as water in a fire at an alcohol distillery: the more water one pours, the higher the flame will rise.

And it would be a mistake to think that tears come only from a deficiency of love. No, "there are seeds that sprout in our soul only under a rain of tears shed because of us. And these seeds bring forth beautiful flowers and healing fruits. . . . And I do not know if I could love anyone who would not make anyone cry. Very often, those who love the most strongly cause the most suffering, for who knows what tender and shy cruelty is usually the restless sister of love. Love seeks proofs of love everywhere, but who is not inclined to find these proofs first in the tears of the loved one? . . . Even death would not be sufficient to convince the loving one if he decides to hear out the demands of love, for the instant of death seems too brief for the intimate cruelty of love. Beyond death there is room for a sea of doubts. Those who die together do not die, perhaps, without anxiety. Here, long and slow tears are needed. Sorrow is the main food of love, and every love that is not nourished, at least a little, by pure sorrow, dies like a new-born that is fed like a grown-up. It is necessary—alas!—that love cry, and, very often, at the same moment that the sobs are released the chains of love are forged and tempered for all of life." 804

Sooner or later the inner closeness of persons, the closest intertwining of two inner worlds, manifests itself. "Before, I loved thee as a brother ..., But now, I do respect thee as my soul," says one of Shakespeare's heroes.^b Previously, the relationship was superficial, external; now it has plunged down to the mystical roots of friends. The communion of souls occurs now not in phenomena but deeper. According to the Russian proverb, a friend is not dear because he is good but good because he is dear. Every outsider seeks mine, not me, whereas a friend wants not mine but me. The Apostle writes: "I seek not yours, but you" (2 Cor 12:14). An outsider looks for the "work," whereas a Friend looks for me "myself." An outsider wants "yours," receives from you, from your fullness, i.e., a part, and this part disappears in the hands like foam. Only a friend, wanting you, however you are, receives in you all, fullness, and is enriched by it. To receive from fullness is easy: it is to live on someone else's account. And to give from fullness is not difficult. But to receive fullness itself is difficult, for it is first necessary to receive a Friend himself, and to find fullness in him. But a Friend cannot be accepted without our giving ourselves, but to give oneself is difficult. A superficial and peripheral gift requires a superficial and peripheral payment, whereas a profound and central gift requires a profound and central giving. Therefore, give to outsiders from your fullness, from yourself, with a generous hand; do not be a miser in what is yours. But give your meagerness, yourself, only to your Friend, secretly, but not before your Friend tells you, "I ask not for yours but for you; I love not yours but you; I cry not about yours but about you."

When the revelation of each in each begins among friends, the whole person becomes transparent in all his fullness to the point of the friends' being able to see what is hidden, to the point of clairvoyance.

"In every friendship that is of some duration," says Maurice Maeterlinck, "there comes a mysterious moment when we begin to distinguish, so to speak, the precise place of our friend in relation to the unknown that surrounds him, the attitude of fate toward him. From this moment on he really belongs to us. An infallible knowledge, it appears, was born in our soul without cause the day when our eyes were opened in such a way, and we are certain that a certain event that apparently is lying in wait for a certain person will not be able to overtake him. Henceforth, a special part of the soul reigns over the friendship of even the dimmest beings. A sort of transposition of life occurs. And when we accidentally meet one of those whom we have come to know thus, and speak with him about the falling snow or about women who are passing by, there is in each of us

^b Prince Henry, in Shakespeare's 1 Henry IV, Act 5, Scene 4.

something that greets the other, examines, questions without our knowledge, is interested in coincidences, and speaks about events that are impossible for us to understand."805

But this interpenetration of persons is the task, not the given, in a friendship. When this interpenetration is achieved, it is in the nature of things that friendship become unbreakable and faithfulness to the person of the Friend stop being an ascesis, because it cannot be violated. In the absence of such a higher unity, faithfulness is, as the church consciousness has always considered it, something necessary not only for the preservation of friendship but even for the very life of the friends. The keeping of a friendship gives everything, while a betrayal is a betrayal not only of the friendship but even places in jeopardy the very spiritual existence of the unfaithful one, for the souls of the friends had already begun to grow together.

There is a passion that lies in wait for friendship, a passion that can instantly tear apart the most sacred of ties. This passion is rage. It is what friends must be most afraid of. One psychologist says: "Nothing so unrestrainedly destroys the effect of prohibitions as rage, because its essence is destruction and only destruction, as Moltke characterized war. This property of rage makes it an invaluable ally of any other passion. The most valuable pleasures are trampled by us with cruel joy if they attempt to restrain the explosion of our indignation. At this time it costs nothing to destroy a friendship, to reject old privileges and rights, to tear any relations and ties. We find a kind of cruel joy in destruction, and what bears the name of weakness of character is apparently reducible, in the majority of cases, to the inability to sacrifice one's lower 'I' and everything that seems dear to it." 806

I would like to cite two tales taken from *vitae* that clarify the Church's view of the necessity of remaining faithful to a friendship.

A tale entitled "Of two brothers in spirit, of the deacon Evagrius, and the priest Titus," which was very widespread and popular in its time, recounts how the love of friends was destroyed by a fit of anger and what were the terrible consequences of this destruction. This tale is depicted, to edify the community, on the vestibule wall of the church of the Zosimos hermitage, near the Trinity-Saint-Sergius Lavra. Here it is:

There were two brothers in spirit at the Pechersk monastery, the deacon Evagrius and the priest Titus. Between them was a great and sincere love, and all were amazed by their spiritual unity and immeasurable love. The devil, who hates goodness and always roars like a lion, seeking to devour someone, created hostility and hatred between them. They did not want to see each other's face, and kept away from each other, although the brothers implored them many times to mend their friendship. When Evagrius was in church and Titus approached him with a censer,

Evagrius fled the incense, and when he did not do so, Titus passed by without censing him. And for a long time they remained in the darkness of sin: Titus served without asking for forgiveness, while Evagrius took communion while in a state of anger, for the enemy had armed them. It happened that Titus fell gravely ill and lay in despair. And he cried even more over his loss. He sent for the deacon with supplication to tell him: "Forgive me, brother, in the name of God, for I had toward thee an insane anger." The latter cursed him with cruel words, and the monks, seeing that Titus was dving, forcibly compelled Evagrius to take leave of his brother. When the sick man saw his brother. he fell to earth at his feet crying, and said: "Forgive me, father, and bless me." The other, pitiless and cruel, refused and said before all of them: "I do not want to have any forgiveness with him, neither in this world nor in the next." Then he escaped from the hands of the brothers and fell; they wanted to raise him but he was dead. They could not straighten his arms or close his lips; it was as if he had been dead for a long time. Meanwhile, the sick man got up a little later as if he had not been sick at all. The monks were terrified by the sudden death of one and the sudden healing of the other. And, with many tears, they buried Evagrius, his mouth and eyes open and his arms extended. They asked Titus what had happened. He confessed to the monks: "I saw angels who stepped away from me and who cried over my soul, while demons were rejoicing in my anger. And then I started to ask my brother to forgive me. When he was brought to me, I saw an implacable angel who held a fiery lance, and when he did not forgive me, the angel struck him and he fell dead. Then the angel held out his hand to me and set me on my feet." Abba Jacob said: "As a lamp lights a dark chamber, so the fear of God enters a man's heart, enlightens him, and teaches him all of God's commandments."807

In order to clarify what I call faithfulness to friendship, I will present the tale of the blessed John Moschus about two Jerusalem ascetics who were friends. Here is this fragrant flower from the artless and graciously simple *Spiritual Meadow*.⁸⁰⁸

This is what Abba John the Hermit, called the Fiery One, said: I heard the following from Abba Stephen the Moabite: Once we were in the monastery of the great cenobite St. Theodosius. There were two brothers there who vowed that they would part from each other neither in death nor in life. Even though they were the pillars of the community, one of the brothers was attacked by lust and, not having the strength to withstand the struggle, told his brother: "Let me go, brother! Because lust is

defeating me, and I aim to go into the world." His brother began to admonish him and said: "No, brother, do not spoil your labor." The other brother answered him: "Either go with me so that I could do the deed or let me go." The brother, not wishing to let him go, went with him to the city. Then the brother who had yielded to the struggle entered a prostitute's den, and the other brother, standing outside, began to sprinkle some earth on his head and to lament powerfully. When the one who had been with the prostitute came out, having done the deed, the other brother told him: "What good, my brother, did you gain from this sin? Did you not rather harm yourself? Let us return to our place." The other told him: "I can no longer return to the desert. But you go. I'll remain in the world." But when, after many efforts, he nevertheless did not succeed in persuading his friend to follow him back to the desert, he too remained in the world, and both began to work to feed themselves.

It was at this time that Abraham, a splendid (kalos) and humble pastor who had recently founded his monastery of so-called Abrahamites and who later had become the Archbishop of Ephesus, was building his monastery, the so-called monastery of the Byzantines. Having gone away, both brothers began to work there and to receive payment. And the one fallen in lust would take the payment of both, go every day to the city, and spend it on debauchery. The other fasted every day and took great silence upon himself. When doing his work, he did not speak with anyone. The masters, every day seeing him not eating, not speaking, but always in contemplation, mentioned him and his saintly way of life to Abba Abraham. The great Abraham called the laborer into his cell and asked him, "Where are you from, brother? And what is your occupation?" He confessed to him everything, and told him: "For the sake of my brother, I bear everything, so that God, seeing my sorrow, will save my brother." When he heard this, the divine Abraham told him: "And the Lord gave to you your brother's soul!" As soon as Abba Abraham let the brother go, and he left the cell, there appeared before him his brother, exclaiming: "My brother, take me to the desert, so that I will be saved." He immediately took him to a cave near the holy Jordan, and shut him in the cave, and a short while later, having advanced greatly in his spirit toward God, the friend who was shut in the cave passed away. His brother remained in the same cave in accordance with the vow he had made, so that he too would pass away there.

Here are some more features of friendship, sketched by life itself. After the death of one dear to me, I acquired his diary. Among many other of life's difficulties, the deceased had been tormented by this tragic character of friendship, by this necessity of sacrificing one's soul for one's friend, or, more precisely, by the apparent meaninglessness of such a sacrifice. And it appears to me that there was much mutual misunderstanding. It also appears to me that the deceased did not succeed in humbling himself to the end. But to clarify my thought, to give a concrete idea of friendship, his notes are valuable material. I present several fragments, gathered almost at random, from different places in this diary, almost in their raw form:

M. is still asleep. He is resting from the matins and the liturgy. But my thought constantly returns to him and chases sleep away. M. troubles me. What do I do for him? What do I give him? He is sick—in body and soul. He is bored, his soul is empty. And I have not yet given him a single grain of content. And I know this well-I must answer for him before God. I do not even know how to care for my neighbor. For the Gospel has revoked the metaphysical understanding of a neighbor according to which a "neighbor," ho pelas, is a relative, that is, a man bound not by visibly spatial ties but by other ties, more ontological ones. And the Gospel has established the geometrical understanding of a neighbor. A "neighbor, ho pelas," is one who is near, pelas, at one's side. And the one with whom you have been thrown together, the one near whom you happen to be, is the one you should take care of. And if you have abandoned one friend, what guarantees your faithfulness to someone else? There is no reason to soar to suprastellar heights. Enough platonism! M. is my neighbor, for he is the nearest to me, in the same room with me. But Lord! Teach me what I should do to give him peace and joy, so that he would acquire Thy peace through me.

Should I pray that you feel good or that you be good? I pray for the latter, my Friend and Brother, and I suffer with your suffering.

Maikov says somewhere:

If you wish to live without struggle, without storm, Without knowing the bitterness of life, to ripe old age, Do not seek a friend and do not call yourself anyone's friend

You will taste fewer joys, but also fewer sorrows!

Yes, but the important thing here is this "if." In my opinion, not only is the rhythmic alternation of grief and joy with a friend infinitely more valuable than an even and peacefully flowing life

ⁱ Apollon Maikov (1821–97) was a minor poet.

in solitude, but I would not trade even continuous grief with a friend for continuous solitary joy.

There are things regarding a man about which not he himself but his friend must be concerned. But if the friend does not want to be concerned? Then, no one should be concerned. If a friend is indifferent to his own doom and that of his friend, then doom must come. One must fall, without counting on mercy or surcease. Today, it's drunkenness; tomorrow, it's something else; the day after tomorrow, it's another thing altogether; the day after that, it's something else; the day after that, it's something else again; and so on and so forth. From day to day, the soul is destroyed. From day to day, the soul is emptied. From day to day, life becomes more meaningless. And there is no hope for daylight, no hope for anything at all that is better. There is no hope for purity. Lower and lower, More and more fleshly. I pity him and do not dare stop him. One must perish with him. One must fall with him. Time passes—the hours, weeks, and months. Strength fades; health fades. Everything fades. Nothing remains. Not only is there no hope for a better future, there is complete certainty that the worst will happen. And it will go on this way: everything will become worse and worse. An emptied soul. A soul becoming earthy. The gravestone presses on the breast. And, added to this, falsehood: "You're asleep. I'll go and chat." All this is falsehood. And M. was right to say: "Don't stick your nose in." I tried. I stuck my nose in, and I'm perishing, and I can't help anyone. "I tasted a little honey, and now I'm dying." I must depart. Before, I was restrained by the thought of God. But now the chain is twice as strong, out of pity. I pity M. What will become of him? How will he get along without me? And I endure. Nevertheless, I must depart.

Lord, my God! Is that all life is? The life of an average, weak, ordinary man. Is that what life is? Lord Jesus! Can it be that this is all that life is? Lord! Teach me what to do, how to revive M., how to pull myself away from sin and torpor. I am frightened, O Lord! I am frightened for myself and for others. I am frightened for a human soul. One way or another, I must depart either into death or into a monastery. Into the desert, Lord, into the desert take me, drag me by force, if I cannot do anything with myself or with M., or with anyone. I have not done anything with myself. How can I help another? And I know that M. started sliding downhill the moment he saw that I couldn't handle myself. Perhaps, this would have happened even without me, but it would have happened later. But regardless of how I try to reinterpret the reality, I, and I alone, am to blame.

They say: "this is trivial." Yes, this is trivial. That is trivial. Let it be so. But, in this case, it is natural to pose the question: What is positive, what is good? What is there that is not trivial? Nothing, nothing, nothing! The problem is precisely that all of life is rubbish, that in all of life there is nothing good. Better a life full of sin with the consciousness that it is full of sin than a pit and emptiness, than this indifference to holiness and sin, God and the devil, than this "stony absence of feeling."

M. is clearly avoiding serious conversation, either about objective things or about things that concern us personally. Essential problems need to be solved. He delays, does not want to decide, but if you yourself attempt to reach some decision, he becomes angry and irritated. One has reached the dead point. He shows tenderness only when you assent to his despair, and to your own despair. But only make a peep against this, and he throws a fit or pouts for days on end. And I, I also, pout, because I do not know what I am to do, how I am to be. Lord! Lord! Help my ineptitude! My sin! My ignorance! My despair and M.'s despair! He does not want to think about anyone or anything, although by nature he is not at all an egotist. If I say "People are sleeping in that room" [in other words, don't go in], he'll say: "Well, so what? What affair is it of mine?" Well, let it be. It is as if I am complaining about someone. One must pray more. That's what.

Sexual abstinence, if it is not accompanied by an excited state, is not harmful physiologically or, in any case, not especially harmful. And in the occult and mystical respect, it even serves to develop new capabilities. But abstinence connected with a state of excitedness, i.e., with the imagining that one can transcend oneself through sex, is harmful, and the more vivid is the imagining, the more harmful such abstinence will be. The soul becomes foul and rots, in the same way that the body perishes. Perhaps the chief harm is from a constant lack of satisfaction. Should one not say the same thing about the transcending of oneself through the communion of souls—in friendship? For marriage is "two in one flesh," while friendship is two in one soul. Marriage is unity of flesh, homosarchia, while friendship is unity of souls, homopsuchia. Solitude, if it does not have as its inseparable companion the constant thought of a friend, is not harmful and is even useful in some respects, e.g., in the ascesis of silence. But the imagining of friendship in solitude has a harmful effect, a particular harm for a person. A particular person is depleted and dies when, desiring and thinking of friendship, he is compelled to spend a lot of time in company, to socialize without real friendship, to imagine that he really is transcending himself when he is not really transcending himself, and to act as if this were a real self-transcending. Not obtaining spiritual satisfaction but eternally running after it and near it, one teases oneself with the dream of one's imagination, and one's spiritual powers are spent on this dream.

Is this not the case with me? But even if it is the case, I cannot, do not dare, must not leave M. Let there be nothing, and let a spiritual (and perhaps not only a spiritual) grave await me! But I will not leave him. If it is necessary to perish, then we shall perish together. We could not live together; so let us perish together.

With this let us end the excerpts from the diary.

FRIENDSHIP gives the loftiest joy but it also demands the strictest ascesis. Every day, hour, and minute, ruining my soul with sorrow for the sake of my Friend, in joy I acquire this soul restored. Just as agapē toward a person gives birth to philia toward him, so here too, in friendship, sovereign agapē is embodied in philia as in a living medium. Divine, agapic love transubstantiates philic love, and on this summit of human feeling, like clouds brushing against the twin-peaked Ararat, the heavenly swirls above the earthly: "Greater love (agapēn) hath no man than this, that a man lay down his soul for his friends" (huper ton philon autou) (John 15:13). The greatest agapic love is realizable only in relation to friends, not in relation to all people, not "in general." The greatest agapic love consists in the laving down of one's soul for one's friends. But it would be extremely simplistic to interpret this to mean that one dies for them. Dying for friends is only the final (not the most difficult) step on the ladder of friendship. But before dying for one's friends, one must be their friend, and this is achieved by long and difficult ascesis. One of Ibsen's heroes says: "One can die for the life's task of another but one cannot live for the life's task of another." But the essence of friendship lies precisely in the losing of one's soul for the sake of one's friend. This is the sacrifice of one's entire organization, one's freedom and calling. He who wishes to save his soul must lay down all of it for his friends, and his soul will not live again if it does not die.

Friendship is necessary for an ascetic life, but it cannot be realized by human powers and requires assistance. And so, how can one characterize, psychologically and mystically, the natural striving toward unity of friendship? By means of what does friendship acquire grace-giving assistance and by what is the decision taken reinforced for the consciousness? What bond binds friendship so that it stops being subjective wanting and becomes objective will? For, in order always to overcome one's selfhood, in order to mend a thousand times the connecting fibers of friendship,

inevitably torn as a result of the sin of the friends and external influences, there has to be some memento, something concrete with which the inner decision to bear everything, to the end, would be associated. Also needed is a mysterious current of energy which constantly renews the first, dazzling time of friendship.

Traditionally, there have been two such reinforcements of friendship: (1) the "natural sacrament" (may the reader forgive this inappropriate combination of words) of the pledging of brotherhood; and (2) the gracegiving office of adelphopoiesis, akolouthia eis adelphopoiesin or eis adelphopoiia, which grew out of this "sacrament" as from a fruitful natural soil. Here I will analyze neither the one nor the other, for such an analysis would take us far from the domain of theosophy and personal religious experiences into ethnology and liturgics. 809 Let me only note that the pledging of brotherhood consists, in essence, of a real unification through an exchange of blood and names (and sometimes even an exchange of shirts, clothes, and weapons), or through co-partaking of sacred food, a vow of faithfulness, and a kiss. (Not all these elements have to be present at the same time in the given concrete form of the pledging.) The pledging of brotherhood clearly corresponds to a natural religious consciousness. On the other hand, in the office of adelphopoiesis, the exchange of blood and co-partaking of sacred food are replaced by Holy Communion, by the co-partaking of the Blood of Christ, while the exchange of names is replaced by the exchange of crosses, which corresponds to the exchange of Christian names. The half-ecclesiastical, halfpopular rite of adelphopoiesis is accomplished through an exchange of crosses, a vow of brotherly love and faithfulness before an icon in church, and by the brothers' alternately holding a burning candle during the Cherubic Hymn.

There are different versions of this rite, but its chief elements are as follows: (1) the brothers to be are positioned in the church before the lectern, upon which rest the Cross and the Gospel; the older of the two stands to the right while the younger stands to the left; (2) prayers and litanies are said that ask that the two be united in love and that remind them of examples of friendship from church history; (3) the two are tied with one belt, their hands are placed on the Gospel, and a burning candle is given to each of them; (4) the Apostle (1 Cor 12:27 to 13:8) and the Gospel (John 17:18–26) are read; (5) more prayers and litanies like those indicated in 2 are read; (6) *Our Father* is read; (7) the brothers to be partake of the presanctified gifts from a common cup; (8) they are led around the lectern while they hold hands, the following troparion being sung: "Lord, watch from heaven and see"; (9) they exchange kisses; and (10) the following is sung: "Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!" (Ps. 133:1).

Sometimes the exchange of crosses is added to this. But it is possible that this exchange had not become an essential part of the rite because the brothers to be could exchange crosses even before the rite. Along with the communion together, this exchange is the most important ideational element of the rite, first as a sign that the brothers will bear each other's cross and, second, as a rite that gives to each of the "named brothers" a memento of self-renunciation and faithfulness to his friend.

What is adelphopoiesis? The profound thinker N. F. Fyodorovⁱ saw it as a kind of liturgy. "The rite of adelphopoiesis," he says, "is wholly like a liturgy. It ends with the partaking of the presanctified gifts. Such features of this rite as the engirdling of the participants in the union with one belt, the circling of the lectern during the troparion 'Watch from heaven and see, and visit Thy vine, and, approve it, for Thy hand has planted it' are not used in the liturgy. Is this not because the church walls serve, so to speak, as a belt linking all those present, while the church processions signify unifications in the course of life and in the common work?"810 These considerations are very remarkable. But, in connection with them, Fyodorov thinks that the rite of adelphopoiesis was separated from the liturgy as the "essence of the liturgy of the cathecumens" precisely when church life became secularized and when the union of all men began to be replaced by particular unions."811 It is very permissible to doubt the correctness of such a diminution of this rite. What is precisely of essence here is that church life is antinomic, that is, that it does not consist in a rational formula. And, in the aspect considered, church life can be reduced neither to unions that are only particular nor wholly to a union that is only general. The fact is that both the one and the other, both the general and the particular, irreducible to each other, are equally necessary in church life, and are united in the process of life. Thus, for example, marriage is also a type of liturgy, an analogue of the communal liturgy and not a falling away from it, for one cannot conceive that first there was a "group marriage," a "general" wedding ceremony, and that only subsequently, with secularization of Church life, did monogamy begin. The same thing holds

^j Nikolai Fyodorov (1828–1903) was a highly original thinker in whom, as V. V. Zenkovsky characterizes it, "genuine Christian inspirations are unexpectedly combined with motifs of naturalism and an 'enlightenment' faith in the power of science and the creative potentialities of man" (A History of Russian Philosophy, trans. George L. Kline [New York and London, 1953], Vol. 2, p. 588). Fyodorov's principal idea, as expounded in his main work, The Philosophy of the Common Task, was that man should aid God in the work of resurrection by developing technological means to raise from the dead all the people who have ever died. Fyodorov hated death, and felt that the greatest desire of men should be to bring back those whom they had loved and lost. Thus, men should develop and implement whatever means necessary to bring back the dead. It is this sort of "active Christianity" that Fyodorov sees to be the "common task" of humanity, a task whose commencement will already begin to overcome the "unbrotherly" man-is-a-wolf-to-man relationship that has dominated mankind throughout history. With the abolition of death, the ultimate goal is the transfiguration of mankind, and, indeed, of the entire universe.

for adelphopoiesis. Thus, if we follow Fyodorov's thinking to its natural conclusion, it turns out that marriage too, along with other sacraments and rites, must be considered a separation from the liturgy, a product of the corruption of general church life. An obvious error!

However, Fyodorov's idea, even though it is expressed incorrectly, is in itself correct. Of course, Fyodorov is right: In the Church there cannot be anything that is not pan-ecclesial, just as there cannot be anything that is not personal. In the Church, there is no "Privatsache," just as there is nothing in it of impersonal "law." Every phenomenon of church life is pan-ecclesial in its meaning, but it has a center, a point of special application, where it is not only stronger but even qualitatively wholly other than in other places. Take marriage as an example.

The marriage of a member of the Church is, of course, the business of the whole universal Church—not in the sense that when one of the members marries all of the other members marry his wife, but in the sense that, for everyone, this event has a certain spiritual significance and is not something indifferent. For each member, the wife of a brother becomes not just anyone but precisely the wife of the brother. Moreover, for one member she becomes simply a wife, but for the other members she becomes the wife of their brother. This is a distinction not only in degree but also in quality, even though both the one and the other have ecclesial significance. Thus, marriage embraces the husband and wife most proximally and in a quite special manner ("we are wed"), but it embraces the other members of the Church in a wholly other manner ("they are wed"). The same thing must be said about the liturgy. The liturgy embraces the members of a parish community in a quite special manner ("we pray," "we take communion"), but it embraces all other members of the church in a wholly other manner ("they pray," "they take communion"). In the same way, a certain phenomenon can embrace several communities: an eparchy or several eparchies, and so on. But church life is always never merely "in general" nor merely "why should we concern ourselves with others?" It is never merely a "social phenomenon" nor merely a "Privatsache." It is always universal and general in its significance and always personal and concrete in its application and appearance.

All we have said above holds also for adelphopoiesis. Just as agapic love must be accompanied by philic love, which is irreducible to but inseparable from agapic love, so liturgical offices of the agapic and philic unions, which are irreducible to each other, must coexist. And it is clear that, just as the two forms of love are analogues of each other, so the corresponding rites of the communal liturgy and of adelphopoiesis are also analogues. But being analogues, i.e., being based on a single pattern, they are not at all derivable from each other. This can be compared with the structure of an organism. A hand is formed on the same pattern as a foot; the two are analogues; and the upper part of the body is an analogue

of the lower part. Nevertheless, the feet are just as necessary as the hands, and the lower part of the body is just as necessary as the upper part. They are not only not replaceable by each other, but one cannot function normally without the other. The general principle of organization is realized in particulars, and the particulars are permeated by the principle of unity. But a concrete diversity and a unifying pattern of organization are also needed. It is this way in Church life too: the general principle, love, lives not only agapically but also philically, and creates a form for itself—not only the communal liturgy but also the adelphopoiesis of friends.

But here the question naturally arises, What power assures the unmergeability of heterogeneous phenomena? What maintains the equilibrium of the principle of the particular and the principle of the general? What spiritual activity, without preventing particular philic phenomena from being pan-ecclesial, at the same time protects their particularity? It is unquestionable that there must be such an activity; otherwise, the Church would not have spiritual equilibrium. This is clearly seen in connection with the following examples: Since the wife of a brother must, for every man, be the wife of a brother, but only the wife of this particular brother and not the wife of every man, there must be some kind of spiritual activity that places her in a wholly particular relation to her husband and continuously assures the uniqueness of this relation.

In the same way, since, for each member of the Church, the friend of a brother *must* be the friend of a brother, but only the friend of this particular brother, not the friend of everyone, there must necessarily be a force that orders and maintains the individuality of the union of friends. Together with a uniting force that takes one outside individual existence, there must be an isolating force, which sets a limit to diffuseness and impersonality. Together with a centrifugal force, there must be a centripetal one. This force is *jealousy*, and its function is to isolate, separate, delimit, differentiate. If this force did not exist, there would be no concrete church life with its specific order. Instead, we would have protestant, anarchistic, communistic, Tolstoyan, etc. mixing of all with all. We would have total formlessness and chaos. The force of jealousy is alive in both friendship and marriage, in an eparchy as well as in a local parish or a monastery. It is alive everywhere.812 Everywhere it is necessary to have definiteness of connections and constancy of unions, be it with a friend, a wife, a *starets*, a pastor, a bishop, a metropolitan, or a patriarch. In other words, everywhere there must be not only love but also jealousy. There must be jealousy toward friend, wife, congregation, brothers, eparchy, or local church. We must now get a deeper insight into this concept, which is so important but usually so little explored.



Mersus ut emergam.

I immerse myself in order to emerge.

XIII. Letter Twelve: Jealousy

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IT SEEMS to me that it has become undeniable that the discussion of love in general and of friendship in particular, and of the two in their concrete vitality, almost inevitably raises the question of a phenomenon intimately connected with them: *jealousy*. It is scarcely disputable that, in practice, this question is of primary importance. But I doubt whether the majority of thinkers are sufficiently conscious of its *theoretical* importance. In the philosophical literature, the concept of jealousy has been swept far away, and rarely does one deign to glance at it. That is why I think it is necessary to probe more deeply into the concept of jealousy. On the basis of what was said at the end of the last letter, I suggest that the clarification of this concept will, in turn, serve to clarify the concept of friendship and love.

And so, what is jealousy?

In the well-worn usage of the intelligentsia, jealousy is understood to be a vice or, at least, unquestionably a moral deficiency, something shameful and worthy of ridicule. The intelligentsia is accustomed to seeing pride, vanity, self-love, suspiciousness, and mistrust as the basis of jealousy, in a word, anything at all except a moral advantage. This view of jealousy especially characterizes the century that was the century of the revolutionary intelligentsia *par excellence*: the eighteenth. And jealousy was especially condemned where enlightenment rationality reigned more intolerantly than anywhere else: Paris.

"Pride and vanity make as many people jealous as love," said Boiste. "The love of the jealous resembles hate," testifies Molière. "Jealousy

comes more from vanity than from love," affirms Madame de Stael. "In jealousy there is often more vanity than love," indicates La Rochefoucauld. "Crude jealousy is mistrust of the loved object; delicate jealousy is mistrust of oneself," argues someone else. "The most jealous of all lovers are those who love glory," observes Trublet. "A jealous person is an infant who is frightened by monsters created in the darkness of his imagination," opines Boiste. "A jealous person spends his life searching for a key to a mystery whose revelation destroys his well-being," notes Oxenstierna. Schleiermacher or Grillparzer clothes this thought in a play on words: "Die Eifersucht mit Eifer sucht, was Leiden schafft,"814 that is, "jealousy zealously seeks what gives suffering," or "what is passion," for what one hears is "Leidenschaft." Thus, a pun is formed which can be conveyed roughly by "jealousy jealously seeks what is passion." "Of the ailments of the mind, jealousy is that whose food is the greatest number of things but whose medicine is the least number of things," affirms Noël. "Jealousy has a lynx's eyes," says Bellamy. Thus, love and jealousy are incompatible. "When self-love predominates over jealousy, love has lost its power," affirms Lengret. "Jealousy extinguishes love as ash extinguishes a fire," says the Queen of Navarre. "Strong passions are above jealousy," we read in La Rochefoucauld.815

This somewhat diffuse and popular understanding of jealousy found a finished and psychologically motivated form in the lapidary definition of jealousy given by Spinoza: Jealousy is love full of hate for the loved object and envy toward another who is loved by the love object. Here, Spinoza very aptly uses the figure of the mixing of two liquids, when, interpenetrating, they become turbulent and turbid, which is designated by the term *fluctuatio*. So it is with jealousy: Love and hate, in mixing, form *fluctuatio*, a "turbulence" of the soul, owing to which the consciousness becomes turbid and opaque.

Jealousy, according to Spinoza, is precisely such a "fluctuatio of the soul," occurring from both love and hate, accompanied by the idea of a third of whom the soul is envious: "Hoc odium erga rem amatum Invidiae junctum Zelotypia vocatur, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam animi fluctuatio orta ex Amore et Odio simul, concomitante idea alterius, cui invideret." 816

Here are the arguments by which Spinoza arrives at his classic definition of jealousy: Love, he says, strives to achieve reciprocity, and even the most perfect reciprocity. Every diminution and every loss experienced by us in this regard are felt to be a self-diminution, to cause great pain. The most perfect reciprocal love is all-engulfing love: we wish to possess it fully, it is our supreme happiness, which we do not wish to share with anyone. If a loved being loves someone more than us, we feel ourselves to be unhappy without limit. The cause of our unhappiness is the object of our hate. We will therefore hate the loved one, because he deprives us of

his reciprocity, and we will envy the one who enjoys this reciprocity. A love therefore arises that simultaneously hates and envies, and this love is jealousy. This passion is particularly powerful if our happiness has been usurped by another. And the more powerful is the past happiness, the more intense will be the jealousy, and the latter, if it is not tamed by some other force, will darken our entire soul. The power of hate for a loved object is directly proportional to the power of the preceding love.⁸¹⁷

Here are the most important relevant theorems:

Prop. XXXV. "Si quis imaginatur rem amatum eodem vel arctiore vinculo Amititiae quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi jungere, Odio erga ipsam afficiebatur, et illi alteri invidebit." That is: "If one imagines that the thing he loves is found with someone else in the same or a closer relation of friendship than that by virtue of which he possessed it alone, then he will be possessed by hate toward the loved thing and envy toward the other individual."

Prop. XXXVI. "Qui rei, quam semel delectatus est, recordatur, cupit eadem cum iisdem potiri circumstantiis, ac cum primo ipsa delectatus est." That is: "One who remembers a thing from which he once received pleasure will desire to possess it under the same circumstances as when he enjoyed it the first time."

Prop. XXXVII. "Cupiditas, quae prae Tristitia vel Laetitia, praeque Odio vel Amore oritur, eo est major, quo affectus major est." That is: "A desire arising as a result of dissatisfaction or displeasure, as a result of hate or love, is the stronger, the greater these affects."

Prop. XXXVIII. "Si quis rem amatam odio babere inciperit, ita ut Amor plane aboleatur, eandem majore odio, ex pari causa, prosequetur, quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset, et eo majori quo Amor antea major fuerat." That is: If one has begun to hate a thing that he loved, so that love is completely destroyed, then, for the same reason, he will feel toward it a greater hate than if he had never loved it, and the greater his former love, the greater the hate felt now.⁸¹⁸

According to the popular conception, jealousy is a harmful and ugly growth on love. The causes of jealousy are alien to the essence of love, and therefore it is usually believed that jealousy can be eliminated from love. Spinoza sees a closer connection between love and jealousy. For him, jealousy is not an accidental companion of love but a faithful shadow that appears on the screen of the soul's life every time love is illuminated by the loved one's betrayal. Or, more precisely, jealousy, according to Spinoza, is a necessary *equivalent* of love, appearing when relations take a turn for the worse. Love does not disappear but is transformed into jealousy. Nevertheless, a love without jealousy is conceivable in Spinoza's analysis. The condition for this is perfect reciprocity, so that jealousy, although it is necessary psychologically under certain conditions, acquires in Spinoza's eyes a negative valuation as *animi fluctuatio*,

a darkening of consciousness, an untameable passion. For Spinoza, jealousy in love is not love. Therefore, as heterogeneous with respect to love, as non-love (although it is in a causal relation, a relation of equivalence with love), jealousy is condemnable. Thus, Spinoza too, in sum, agrees with the well-worn, popular understanding of jealousy. How did this happen?

To answer this question, let us remember the lifeless and reified character of Spinoza's entire philosophy. Not having the category of the person, Spinoza cannot distinguish between love for a person and desire for a thing. He confuses love and desire, or, more precisely, he replaces the former with the latter. Everywhere in Spinoza we see the impersonal res amata, which must be translated as "a thing desired," for a thing cannot be loved. Yes, res amata. But nowhere is there mention of a loved person: only to a person can the epithet "loved" be applied. True, in contemporary society, we frequently hear "I love jam," "I love cigars," "I love to play cards," and so forth, but for any healthy person it is clear that this is either a perversion and darkening of consciousness or a violence done to language. "Jam," "cigars," "cards," and so forth cannot be loved; they can only be desired. But the correlate of desire is hate with envy, which is why Spinoza, in the original notion of love, places such a stress on this condemnable element of hate with envy. However, as love is not desire, so the combination of hate with envy is not jealousy, although true jealousy does have the same relation to what Spinoza thinks jealousy is as true love has to desire. To understand jealousy in its proper nature, one must even connect it more intimately with love. One must introduce it into the very heart of love, and, having underscored the personal nature of love, one must disclose that jealousy is love itself, but in love's "alter-being." One must disclose that jealousy is a necessary condition and inevitable side of love, but a side that is turned toward sorrow, so that to destroy jealousy would be to destroy love. In the same way, desire always contains hate with envy.

To demonstrate this, one must first remove from jealousy the element of condemnation that burdens it. Jealousy has so often been confused with certain reprehensible forms of its manifestation, that even the words "jealousy" and "jealous" have become words of condemnation.

To see the essence of jealousy in suspiciousness, petty self-love, mistrust, ill will, malice, hate with envy, and so forth is just as wrong as to posit the essence of love in the deprivation of freedom, in partiality, injustice, and so forth, or to see the essence of justice in coldness, hardness of the heart, cruelty. Suspiciousness, hate with envy, and so forth are all bad, reprehensible, egotistical *manifestations* of jealousy, produced by the confusion of love with desire. Meanwhile, two series of historical data hint at the neutral character or even the positive, good, necessary character of jealousy. First, the nation with the purest God-consciousness, the

chosen Jewish nation, knowing and understanding the love of God more clearly than any other nation, insistently, constantly, and unhesitantly speaks of God's jealousy. The whole Bible is saturated and permeated with God's jealousy, and it is impossible to ignore this fact.

Secondly, the nation of the purest humanity, the genius-nation, the Greeks, knowing and understanding human love in all its forms better than any other nation, also has the trait of jealousy as its most fundamental trait, as its most typical and inalienable trait. In his sketches for the meditation "We are philologists," Nietzsche, among three "selected points from antiquity," indicates for development: "The ennoblement of jealousy, the Greeks are the most jealous nation." Once again, one cannot ignore this. If both the purest genius and the purest faith posit jealousy as a positive, necessary force in the essence of love, both human and Divine, this means that jealousy is in fact such and that it is in no wise identical with the secondary passions that accompany it.

But what, in this case, is jealousy itself? It is one of the aspects of love, the foundation of love, the background of love, the primordial darkness in which the ray of love shines. Love is free choice. From many persons, I, by an act of inner self-determination, choose one person and to this person, one of many, I establish a unique relation, become attached in my soul to this person. I wish to view this person, who is ordinary, as extraordinary. I wish to view this person, who is gray and drab, as festive. I wish to view this quite average person as a triumph. This person stands in a crowd, but I summon him and, from the city square, I lead him into the cozy room of my heart. I inscribe this person's image on a gold medallion.⁸²⁰ And this is just, for this image is not a caricature, such as people draw in the majority of cases. It is not even a portrait painted by sages. It is rather an image of the Divine image, an icon. Violating the "validity" of the law of identity, I, by a metaphysical act of self-determination (not by the rational mind, but by my whole being), decide to see in the chosen person (one of many) an exclusive person, who stands out from others. In other words, I make myself in relation to the chosen person such that this person becomes Thou for me. Friendship, I repeat, is exclusive, just as conjugal love is exclusive. "Multiple" is a sign of the imperfection of the object of love as such, a sign of the incompleteness of Thou as Thou. Both multiple marriage and multiple friendship are false in their very idea and must inevitably either pass into something personal (the first into single marriage, the second into single friendship) or become corrupt and decay utterly, the first in lust, the second in greed (that is, from semi-personal they must become thinglike). Aristotle says: "One cannot be a friend to many when one has in view perfect friendship, just as one cannot at a single time be in love with many. This kind of friendship appears to be perfection and, as such, can be directed at only one person."821

But even if one were to say here that there are "many" such beloved Thou's, nevertheless, toward each one the relation, in the case of love, would be as to a unique one. Every love, in essence, has a selective, a selecting power, is dilectio. The loved one is therefore always a selected one, a unique one. It is this that constitutes the personal nature of love, without which we would be dealing with desire whose object is a thing and with indifference as to whether the desired thing is replaced by a thing equal to it. The demand for a numerical identity with the beloved person (even in the absence of a generic identity, i.e., faithfulness to a person even when this person changes⁸²²) characterizes both love and the violation by love of the law of identity. On the other hand, the demand for a generic identity with the desired thing (in the case of indifference to numerical identity, even when this identity is not understood), and therefore the observance of the law of identity, characterize desire. Awareness of uniqueness is the condition of love, even in its most imperfect manifestations. Moreover, even the illusion of love requires, if not uniqueness, at least the illusion of uniqueness, unrepeatability, exclusiveness, even if the loving one's belief that the beloved is unique is as ungrounded as every first love's belief that it is unique in the world and history, as ungrounded as the belief of each of Kant's "uniquely legitimate" heirs and interpreters that he is in fact Kant's unique heir and interpreter, or as ungrounded as the belief of Stirner's "Unique one" that he is unique. Otherwise, even the illusion of love would be absolutely impossible, and only greed, dirt, and death would exist in relationships. The very thought of the possibility of the replacement of one person by another, a thought grounded in the acceptance of homoiousia, i.e., thingness, is a sinful thought, leading to death.

By an incomprehensible act of choice, a person is made unique, is called to the high, or royal, rank of Thou. This person has agreed to this election. He has said "Yes" and placed upon his own head the crown of greatness. What do I want now? Only one thing: that which I had desired, i.e., my own love. I affirm the act of my own love as eternal in value, and I therefore demand that it abide, that it not be voided. This inner conviction expresses itself as the zeal or jealousy that aspires to embody in time its eternal act of the election of the beloved Thou. My wish is that Thou not hinder me in my love, that with respect to me it really be Thou. Let the beloved Thou behave as unique; let it not step down from its pedestal of uniqueness, of chosenness. It makes no difference if the chosen Thou is the most ordinary person in a crowd and for the crowd. But, for me, for the one who chooses, the chosen Thou must be precisely Thou and nothing but Thou. Otherwise, love itself would be impossible; otherwise, the very act of election could not be embodied in time. Otherwise, the "time" of love would not be "the mobile image of eternity,"823 of election. With respect to me, Thou must act as Thou, not as one of many. Thou must wear a royal crown, not a night cap. The consciousness that this is needed from Thou for the very possibility of love entails the desire of realizing this chosenness and then affirming and protecting it. All this taken together will be jealousy.

But what if Thou does not want this? What if Thou stubbornly betrays its freely accepted rank and position? What if Thou, after having said "Yes" to the proposal of a new essence for it (i.e., Thou), shows with its life, shows through frivolousness, stubbornness, or insufficient sincerity in the acceptance of this high rank, that, for it, I am not I? What if, wishing to be Thou, it does not wish to recognize me as me? Then I cannot and should not remain without counteraction. This counteraction is the manifestation of jealousy, jealousy toward my love, i.e., concern about the purity, genuineness, and preservation of my love. The fact that I demand this from Thou in the name of the very possibility of love entails the desire to realize this chosenness, to strengthen and protect it. All this taken together, I repeat, will be jealousy. One of two must hold: Either Thou must recognize this counteraction to itself, this struggle for love, this jealousy and change. Or Thou must renounce its high rank, recognize that it is ordinary, and return from its throne into the gray crowd, from triumph to drab averageness. For me, it is impossible to love and not to be jealous when Thou stops being Thou. That is, I cannot fail to attempt again to make it Thou. Therefore, if my right and duty of jealousy are not recognized, my only recourse is to cast Thou from its throne. I must forget about Thou, stop loving Thou, for only in this way can Thou be freed from the demand of requited love. But Thou has grown into me, has become part of me. To stop loving is to lose a part of myself. To forget is to cut a piece of living flesh from myself. This is what happens when, respecting the freedom of another, one finds it necessary to tear love from one's breast together with one's heart.

Love is boundless. It is limited neither by place nor by time. It is universal. But this universality of love not only does not exclude but even presupposes isolatedness and separateness. 824 For the holiness in one's soul is love's root, and love is possible only insofar as this holiness is alive. To protect the pearl of the soul is to protect love itself. Not to care about the holiness in one's soul is not to care about love. Love is not only universal; it is also limited. Love is not only boundless; it is also bounded. What the Lord said about this is now considered unacceptable; it is thought to be harsh and cruel. But what is most remarkable is that in the "mother of all books," the Gospel, this speech of the Lord's comes right after what He said about not judging one's neighbor and the parable of the beam and the mote in the eye: "Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye" (Matt. 7:5). This thought is met by the antithetical thought, as if a knife blade were directed against a knife blade: "Give not

that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you" (Matt. 7:6). As if clarifying this saying, St. Seraphim of Sarov teaches us: "What is best in the heart we should not reveal without need. Do not reveal the mysteries of your heart to all." 82.5

Thus, on the one hand, "do not judge," but, on the other hand, consider dogs and swine those who are not worthy of having the mysteries of the heart revealed to them. Reveal these mysteries only to certain chosen ones, who are separated from the swine herd. This is an antinomy, and this antinomy is roughly equivalent to the love-jealousy antinomy.

For a rough clarification of what I have said, let me present several more fragments from the previously cited diary.⁸²⁶ This is the record of some real or imagined conversation with a friend:

"You behave yourself in such-and-such a way. You hide; you are secretive; you desire complete self-sufficiency; you are oppressed by confessions, both your own and that of your friend."

"Yes, but do you not know that I act this way always and everywhere?"

"That's not completely true: you scarcely act this way with everyone, always and everywhere. But even if that were the case, for me that is not an answer. 'Friendship' is friendship precisely because something is transmitted to me from another person and something is transmitted to another person from me. Therefore, 'relationships' are relationships precisely because they relate someone to someone else, because they lead one out of the self-enclosedness of egotism and the heart's narrowness, because they 'extend the being' of a person as Spinoza said."

"But—understand me—what if my nature, my very essence, is like that?"

"What of it? *Everyone's* nature is like that, egotistical and narrow. But friendship precisely opens a path to an influx of new reality. The purpose of friendship is that we should not be 'cold eunuchs of the heart.' After all, the state of being a eunuch of the heart is the worst of vices, the most terrible thing that can befall a man."

"But what if I am always a 'eunuch'?"

"In love, our person stops being as it is 'always,' 'everywhere,' and 'with everyone.' The old age, the decrepitude, of the soul passes. The soul is renewed and becomes young."

"But do we not have a relationship? We do manage to stay together somehow."

"This 'somehow' is precisely the problem. If there is no such

^a From a verse of Pushkin's.

relationship as the one I talked about, if the relationship does not 'relate' anyone, and 'ties' do not bind anyone, then there is no relationship at all, and the persons concerned are not in a friendship, not one in the other, but in themselves and by themselves, in self-love. If you remain with me 'as with everyone' and act in relation to me 'as always and everywhere,' this proves better than anything that you know neither friendship nor relationships nor ties. . . . Understand me, it is not your love or not-love that I want, not your friendship or enmity, but simple certainty, so that I would know if it is worth exhausting myself and expending my strength on this field of friendship in hope of a distant harvest, or if I should renounce the thought of a better future, abandon this fruitless, stony field and occupy myself then with my 'own' affairs. But you are deaf, 'attending indifferently to good and evil.' You are silent. How long will this last?"

A heart wounded by a Friend will not be healed by anything, except by Time, and Death. Time removes the heart's wounds, cutting away the stricken part of the heart; it kills in part. But Death annihilates the whole man. To the extent that a man is alive, the wounds that friendship causes in him are unhealable and festering. And he will bear them until he is able to present them to the Eternal Judge.

Look at the Lord's parable about those who are "called" and those who are "chosen" (Matt 22:2-14; Luke 14:16-24). How much hidden bitterness there is in this parable: the infinite bitterness and pain of a heart wounded in its very love. There are those who are loved, who are called. those whom the Lord Himself loved jealously, for whom He did everything, what He did not do for any other people. And what happened? They do not desire to be chosen. They do not desire their own salvation. They do not even desire to show simple delicacy, to answer the call of Love, which is giving them Its supreme gift, making them Its friends. They are indifferent to the love of Love. But then: "Go out quickly into the streets and lanes of the city, and bring in hither the poor, and the maimed, and the halt, and the blind" (Luke 14:21). And when there were still places to be filled: "Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled" (Luke 14:23). A banquet of love which no one will attend, which was prepared for those dear to one's heart, but which turned out to be filled with passers-by from the street!

One should be doing everything, should do everything in friendship to overcome the wall standing between persons. One should not spare one's strength; one should fight strenuously for communion—unto the blood of the martyr, unto death. One should lay down one's life for one's friends,

^b From a verse of Pushkin's.

for the first thing that one's friends should be delivered from is insincerity, coldness, and self-enclosedness. But there is a boundary that one cannot cross. There is a wall that one can break through neither by a forehead nor by a battering ram. And when one comes up to this boundary, when one stands right next to it, then it is necessary to go away. With heart's sorrow, it is necessary to tear the feeling out of oneself, even if this is to tear off a piece of living flesh. One must free oneself from what is impossible, and what is impossible here is to show another person that the impossible, i.e., love, is possible. The world's Savior Himself, when He came to this boundary in the people chosen by God and when He saw the impossibility of conquering this people with love, turned back. "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! Behold your house is left unto you desolate" (Matt. 23:37–38).

From the foregoing analysis of the concept of jealousy we see that there is a profound connection between jealousy and the overcoming of the law of identity, this primordial ground of rationality. It is therefore clear why jealousy, even in its purest manifestations, attracts the sidelong glance of ill-will from rationality, why "good sense" and its natural daughter mockery so eagerly attack jealousy even when the latter is taken *in abstracto*, in principle. Both love and jealousy (this other love) struggle with rationality, and their thrust breaks through rationality's main part, i.e., the law of identity. In this sense, jealousy is profoundly unjust. If, because of its irrationality, jealousy is intellectually condemned as an "absurdity," then this injustice of jealousy, in turn, provokes an indignant moral valuation of it as an "immoral" phenomenon. This is yet another cause of the darkening of the concept of jealousy examined by us.

The data of etymology confirm the conclusions to which we have been led by the metaphysical analysis of the notion of jealousy. In Russian, 827 the notion of jealousy, revnost', is primarily characterized as power, as force, as tension, but not as fear, hate, or envy. Certain authors compare the Russian rev-n-iv (jealous) and its derivatives rev-no-vat' (to be jealous of) and rev-n-ost' (jealousy) with the Latin riv-al-is, riv-in-us (rival) and with the French riv-al, riv-al-is-er, riv-al-it-é. But even if this is the case, it remains unclear what the meaning of the root of this word is. It is not difficult to answer this question. Rev-n-iv, through its Old Slavic form r'v-'n'iv-', is of the same family as rv-en-ie, rev-n-ost-n-yi, rev-n-i-tel' (zeal, zealous, zealot), for, for these latter, the Old Slavic derivatives are r'v-en-i-ie, r'v-a-n', i.e., lucta, battle. Revnost', jealousy, is evidently the same thing as rvenie, zeal; and revnivyi, a jealous person, is evidently the same thing as rvat' or, rather, rvat'sia, to fight in a battle. The Serbian

rv-a-ti has the sense of eniti, while rv-a-ti se has the sense of certare. Here one can note a relationship with the Sanskrit ar-v-an, running headlong, hurrying, and aurva, rapid, on horseback; with the Greek oreFonto, they hurried, o-rou-ei, to hurry, to rush; with the Latin ru-i-t; with the Old Saxon aru and the Old Nordic örr, rapid, ready, on horseback.

Both "to be zealous" and "to be jealous" signify, according to their root, the presence of force, power, a powerful movement toward something. This is the opposite of flaccidity, impotence, weakness. That is why revnovat' is often used in the sense of "forcefully and energetically moving toward something," of "being energetic in some endeavor." Revnovat' chego, according to Dal', signifies "to strive zealously toward something." Thus, one hears: revnuiu znanii, revnuiu nebesnogo tsarstva, revnuite zhe darovanii bol'shikh (I ardently wish to learn, I aspire to the kingdom of heaven, zealously desire high gifts). Revnovat' komy (to be jealous of someone) has the sense of competing, of imitating, of following, or striving ahead headlong, without conceding. Thus, Lomonosov used the locution "revnuite nashemu primeru" (be jealous of our example). And in the same way, one hears: ia vsegda revnoval uspekham ego (I have always been jealous of his successes), and so on. Hence we can conclude decisively that revnost' primarily signifies, as Dal' indicates, "ardor, zeal," and even, essentially, zeal directed toward some "work." In this sense one hears the expressions revnost' po sluzhbe (zeal of service) and revnost ne po razumu (unreasonable zeal). In addition, revnostnyi signifies "most assiduous, diligent, one who takes great care, who gives himself with all his soul to the work." Thus we get the expression: revnostnyi pobornik pravdy (ardent champion of the truth).828

In the same way, the Greek $z\bar{e}los$ or, in the Doric form, zalos, signifies ardor, zalos, also rivalry, hate, and only finally jealousy in the sense that the word commonly has in the language of the intelligentsia, a sense that no nation attributes to it. Accordingly, the verb $z\bar{e}lo\bar{o}$ signifies to seek ardently, to desire strongly. As far as the etymology of these words is concerned, there is such an abundance of hypotheses (all of them artificial) here that it would be perilous to say anything definite. Blue us only indicate that, according to Prellwitz, $z\bar{e}los$ derives from the root jâ, i.e., to be ardent, heftig sein, just as the verb $zete\bar{o}$ signifies to seek to attain some object.

Latin does not give us anything new in this case: *zelotypia*, jealousy, is taken from the Greek, and consequently derives from *zēlos*.

Finally, in Hebrew, both zeal, *Eifer*, and jealousy, *Eifersucht*, are expressed by the same word: *qine'ah*, derived from the Semitic root *qn'*. This trigram does not contain any nuance of the jealousy of the intelligentsia; thus, in Arabic it has the sense of "becoming very red," *hochrot werden*, while in Syrian it means "to be of a dark color," *dunkelfarbig*

sein. Hence, in Hebrew and in other Semitic languages the root qn' signifies "to be zealous, passionate." The word qine'ah signifies, first of all, the passion of love with ardor, then rivalry, as well as jealousy, God's jealousy for His glory.⁸³¹

Another Hebrew word exists that is considered by some⁸³² to be the equivalent of the Russian *revnost': sheqidah*. But even less than *qine'ah* does this word express the notion of jealousy in the specific sense of the world. In fact, this word is derived from the Semitic *ShQD*, which in Phoenician corresponds to the notion of "respecting, honoring, appreciating something—*auf etwas achten*," while in the languages of Mishna and Targums it acquired the sense of "to be zealous—*eifrig sein*."⁸³³

Thus, our general conclusion is that the etymology and the usage of the word "jealousy" and its derivatives unquestionably confirm the previously given metaphysical analysis of the concept of jealousy. That is to say, the condemnation hanging over jealousy is removed completely, and jealousy is recognized as only a necessary expression or, more precisely, only a necessary aspect of powerful love. This clarifies why Scripture so often and so stubbornly attributes jealousy to God. Indeed, it would be wholly incomprehensible how a state reprehensible in itself could be an image of something in the Divine life. For no anthropopathisms will ever enable one to attribute sin, lust, or falsehood to God. If jealousy is attributed to Him, however we understand this Divine jealousy, one can affirm in advance that it is something holy. Therefore, human jealousy is not something intrinsically foul and reprehensible. From the clarifications made here, it is evident that, in this attribution of jealousy to God, one must see not a strained anthropopathism but a precise description of the essence of the matter. For jealousy is an ontological concept, not a psychological or ethical one.

But more than being a necessary aspect of love, jealousy (according to the generalizing interpretation of St. Isaac the Syrian) is a necessary aspect of all that is good in man. Speaking generally, jealousy is the power that realizes good wishes. "He who has good wishes cannot be prevented from realizing them. . . . This occurs for the following reason. Every thought of a good wish, at the beginning of its movement, is followed by a certain jealousy, which is similar in its hotness to burning coals. And jealousy usually guards this thought and does not allow it to be approached by any resistance, barrier, or obstacle, because this jealousy acquires a great strength and an ineffable power of always protecting the soul from frailty or fear as all kinds of difficult circumstances assault it. And as that thought is the power of a holy wish, planted by nature in the soul's essence, so this jealousy is a thought moved by a stimulating power in the soul, a power given to us by God for our use, for the observance of a natural limit, for the expression of the concept of one's freedom by the fulfillment of a natural wish found in the soul. This is the virtue without which the good is not realized. And this virtue is called jealousy, because it moves, excites, and fortifies us. Someone has called this jealousy 'the dog and protector of the Divine law,' that is, of virtue . . . "834"

Further, St. Isaac explains that jealousy is composed of the fear of losing the good and of the striving to hold it. That is why the weakening of jealousy is a bad sign, determined either by a spiritual cooling or by self-reliance and pride, i.e., by a relation to the spiritual good which is not living and personal but proprietary and fleshly, as to a thing that can be placed under lock and key and that, even without being experienced, can be possessed.

Thus, a striving to attain the Pillar and Ground of the Truth is realized and preserved by jealousy, this force of our spirit that is persecuted and held in contempt by the contemporary consciousness.



Propter constantiam. For constancy.

XIV. Afterword

....

Now, at the end of a path that has not been short, it is appropriate to look back and, from the height attained, to survey the path one has taken and the starting point.

There are two worlds, and *this* world falls utterly apart in contradictions—unless it lives by the powers of *that* world. Contra-feelings appear in one's mood, contra-desires in one's will, and contra-thoughts in one's thought. Antinomies split apart our entire being, the whole life of creation. Everywhere and always, there are contradictions! But, by contrast, in faith, which overcomes the antinomies of consciousness and breaks through their all-suffocating crust, a rock-like affirmation is acquired, from which one can strive to overcome the antinomies of the actual world. But how can one approach this Rock of Faith?

The contradictions of feeling compel one to turn to the will. But, here too, one hears the outcries of discordant voices. Then we turn to the rational mind. But it, too, is not whole but disintegrates in antinomies. There are an uncountable number of antinomies. There are as many of them as there can be acts of the rational mind. But, as we have already noted, antinomies are essentially reducible to the dilemma: "finitude or infinitude." This antagonism of finitude and infinitude in the sinful rational mind is an expression of the profoundest contradiction between the fundamental norms of reason itself in its present, fallen state. By its sinful nature, the rational mind has an antinomic cast, for this mind has two

laws, two centers, two axes. That is to say, the statics and the dynamics of the rational mind exclude one another, although the one cannot exist without the other.

On the one hand, in the *static* plane, in the plane of the fixed givenness of concepts, every A is A, and the whole power of thought consists precisely in delimiting every A from not-A, and in holding firmly to this delimitation. In order to think A we must isolate it from everything that is not A, i.e., we must define and delimit A by separating it from not-A. A as thinkable is, by the essence of the matter, something finite. We cannot think a *process* without dividing it into a succession of steady states, into a succession of moments of unchangeability. And we also cannot think a continuum without dividing it into a discontinuous combination of point elements. We divide motion into a series of states of rest, as in motion pictures; we divide a continuum into a multiplicity of further-indivisible elements. This serves as the basis of the eternally true (whatever arguments one might try to raise against them) "paradoxes" of Zeno, e.g., the paradox of the flying arrow, etc. 1937

On the other hand, in the *dynamic* plane, in the plane of striving toward the ground of concepts, i.e., in the plane of definition and proof, every A must have its ground in not-A. The essence of every explanation is precisely in the reduction of A to that which itself is not A, to not-A, for otherwise the explanation would be a tautology. When we ask, "What is A?" we are given the answer "A is B." In other words, A is derived from its self-identity "A = A" and is equated with B, with what is not identical to A.

"To think clearly and distinctly" is to take A to mean precisely A and nothing else. "To explain" and "to prove" is to transcend A in one's thought, to move to B. "To think clearly and distinctly" is to hold firmly to A and not to err from it to not-A. "To explain," i.e., "to define" and "to prove," is to go from A to B, to what is not-A. But in order to go from A to B, one must first establish A as A, i.e., in order "to explain" or "to prove" A, one must first "think it clearly and distinctly." But in order "to think clearly and distinctly," one must understand this A, i.e., one must "explain" it, i.e., "define" and "prove" it; one must establish A as not-A. But for the latter it is once again necessary to establish A as A. And so the process goes on ad indefinitum. One function of the reason presupposes the other, but one also excludes the other. Every nontautological explanation reduces A to not-A. All clear and distinct thinking establishes the identity A = A. The affirmation of A as A and the affirmation of A as not-A are the two fundamental moments of thought. On the one hand, there is the static multiplicity of concepts, for each one of many A's becomes fixed in its opposition to all others. On the other hand, there is their dynamic unity, for each of the many A's is reduced to another, this other to a third, and so on.

The static multiplicity of concepts and their dynamic unity are incompatible. For, on the one hand, the rational mind must hold firmly to the given, i.e., the single and finite, i.e., the limited, while, on the other hand, it must go beyond all givenness, i.e., singleness and finiteness, i.e., limitedness, for every explanation requires an infinite series of explanatory or proving links, each of which violates the self-identity of the concept of what is being explained. This violation of self-identity, I repeat, can never be finished, because every definition requires a new definition and every proof requires a new proof. If we previously defined and proved A through B, the earlier questions are repeated now in relation to B. As soon as an answer is given to them for B, by defining or proving them through C, they are then repeated for C, and so on. Thus, the first of the norms of the rational mind requires cessation of thought, while the second requires an unlimited movement of thought. The first compels the establishment of A, while the second compels its reduction to B. The first is the law of identity, while the second is the law of sufficient reason.

We scarcely need to mention here that, throughout our whole investigation, we have taken the law of identity to mean the combination of the analytic laws of thought, or the so-called logical "law of form," 838 i.e., the law of identity, and its inevitable companions, the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. For all three speak in their different ways about the same thing, i.e., they express (as G. Hagemann indicates), the requirement that "the object of thought be thought as this one, and no other, and that in this object all the determinations that belong to it be combined."839 Or, as W. Wundt remarks, "the law of identity simply signifies the connectedness [Stetigkeit] of our thought." Being "a fundamental law of knowledge," it describes above all "the behavior of our thought in relation to an object."840 Similarly, R. Schubert-Soldern considers the laws of identity and contradiction to be "merely two different sides of the law that all is given in a certain primordial difference, insofar as they emanate from a multiplicity [Vielheit], and that this multiplicity does not exist where difference does not exist."841 One could present yet other confirmations of the view that all three analytic laws reveal a single activity: a disunification, delimitation, and establishment of the object of thought, the statics of thought, a kind of logical jealousy. 842 But let us remain satisfied with what has been said.

One can reduce all the norms of rationality to the law of identity, understood in the sense just clarified, and to the law of sufficient reason, but these fundamental norms are incompatible, and their disharmony destroys reason. The warp of rationality is the law of identity, and its woof is the law of sufficient reason. The fabric of rationality—woven of finitude and infinitude, of bad infinity, limitlessness—is torn to shreds in contradictions. The rational mind needs both of its norms equally; it can operate neither without the principle of finitude nor without the principle

of infinitude. Nor can it operate when both principles are used, for they are not compatible. The norms of rationality are necessary but they are impossible. Rationality turns out to be thoroughly antinomic, antinomic in its innermost structure. Kant's antinomies just barely allow one to look behind the scenes of reason. But, being set forth with full consciousness and against the Enlightenment, with a challenge to the rationalism of the 18th century, they are the great *moral* achievement of the Copernicus of philosophy.

This antinomicalness of the fundamental structure of rationality poses an essential question about reason: "How is rationality possible?" The present work in its entirety is an attempt to answer this question.

How is rationality possible?

The answer to this question went like this: "Rationality is possible not in itself but through the object of its thought, and if, and only if, it has an object of thought in which both contradictory laws of its activity, i.e., the law of identity and the law of sufficient reason, coincide. In other words, it is possible only for a thought for which both grounds of rationality, i.e., the principle of finitude and the principle of infinitude, actually become one." Also, "rationality is possible in the case when, by the nature of its object, the self-identity of rationality is also its alter-affirmation and, conversely, when its alter-affirmation is also its self-identity." Also, "rationality is possible when the finitude conceived by it is an infinitude and, conversely, when the infinitude conceived by rationality is a finitude." Finally, "rationality is possible if Absolute Actual Infinity is given to it." But what is this Infinity? It turns out that such an Object of thought, making thought possible, is the Trihypostatic Unity. The Trihypostatic Unity, the subject of all of theology, the theme of the whole liturgy, and the commandment of all of life, is also the root of reason. Rationality is possible because there is a Triradiant Lamp, and it is possible to the extent that it lives by the Light of this Lamp.

Our further task was to clarify the formal and then the real conditions of the givenness of such an Object, such a Finite Infinity or Consubstantial Trinity. The question of believed faith, *fides quam creditur*, passed into the question of believing faith, *fides qua creditur*, and therefore to the mode of its appearance. Having clarified the "what" and "how" of faith, we faced a new question: that of the conditions of the appearance of faith. "Either/or" characterizes these conditions, in accordance with the *freedom* of the act of faith. "Either" is Gehenna. "Or" is ascesis. "Either/or." Between Gehenna and ascesis *tertium non datur*. But both means are grounded in the dual nature of the subject of faith.

We considered this duality of creation next. But, here, the question became two questions. First we examined the unconditional nature of creation, and then the conditions of life under which the empirical character is worked out. The first question, based on the idea of the image of God in man, comes down to the question of the mystical Church. The second question, based on the idea of the likeness of God in man, is the question of the Church in its earthly and properly human aspect as a medium for each man's accomplishment of his ascesis. The psychological soil for this aspect of Church life is love and friendship, $agap\bar{e}$ and philia.

So moves the consciousness to the "Pillar and Ground of the Truth."

Thus, once again asking ourselves what the Pillar and Ground of the Truth is, we mentally run through the series of answers given here. The Pillar of the Truth is the Church; it is certitude; it is the spiritual law of identity; it is ascesis; it is the Trihypostatic Unity; it is the Light of Tabor; it is the Holy Spirit; it is chastity or spiritual integrity; it is Sophia; it is the Most Pure Virgin; it is friendship; it is, once more, the Church.

To arrive at the Truth, it is necessary to free oneself from one's self-hood, to go out of oneself. But, for us, this is impossible, for we are flesh. But, I repeat, how precisely, in this case, can one grasp hold of the Pillar of the Truth? We do not know and cannot know. We know only that, through the yawning cracks of human rationality, the azure of Eternity is visible. This is unfathomable, but it is so. And we know that "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not the God of the philosophers and scholars," 843 comes to us, comes to our place of nocturnal rest, takes us by the hand, and leads us in a way we could not have conceived of. "With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible" (Matt. 19:26; cf. Mark 10:27). And here, "the truth itself compels man to seek the truth (autē hē Alētheia anagkazei ton anthrōpon alethēian epizētein)." 844 The Triune Truth Itself does for us what for us is impossible. The Trihypostatic Truth Itself draws us to Itself.

GLORY TO THIS TRUTH FOREVER!

LET US WORSHIP THE FATHER,
HIS SON, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT,
THE HOLY TRINITY IN ONE BEING,
CALLING WITH THE SERAPHIM:
"LORD, THOU ART THRICE HOLY!"

AMEN.

Clarification and Proof of Certain Particulars Assumed in the Text to Be Already Proved



In motu quiesco.
I am calm in agitated weather.

xv. Certain Concepts from the Theory of Infinity⁸⁴⁵

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THE words "infinite" and "infinity" are often heard in ordinary conversation. But if one should ask for an explanation of these words, the look one gets in response is full of perplexity. However, if among the general public there exists only a lack of understanding, among people occupied with intellectual work there exists a distorted understanding, and even a perfect muddle. Very powerful and subtle minds have often been guilty of obscurity and imprecision of thought with regard to the concept of infinity. Unfortunately, a lack of space makes it impossible to cite a series of instructive examples, but from our further exposition the reader will easily see who should have been cited here.

The difficulties are due only in part, and even only in a very insignificant part, to the abstractness of the question. Rather the main cause of the difficulties is the tendentiousness of the thinking here, the lack of desire or the inability to view the object of investigation in a straightforward way. One aproaches what is being investigated here with the certainty that it is already known; and imaginary knowledge—to quote G. Cantor, the "horror infiniti" reigning in society—makes itself known.

The chief errors which are constantly made in discussions of the infinite appear owing to the neglect of the fundamental and wholly elementary distinction between *actual and potential infinity*. Therefore we will treat this subdivision in greater detail than we would have liked. For the time being, we will give only a preliminary definition of infinity; we will not take this definition as our basis, for it is not rooted in sufficiently simple concepts, although in itself it is true.

Every *quantum* (or every *kolikoe*, as N. I. Lobachevsky^a prefers to say) can, by its very definition, have a dual character. It can be given and unchangeably and firmly established, fully determined, and then it is that which bears the name "constant." Or it can be indeterminate; it can change, becoming greater or smaller. In this case the *quantum* bears the name "variable." Thus, actual infinity is a particular case of a *constant quantum*, while potential infinity is a particular case of a variable quantum; and in this lies their profoundest fundamental difference, their

^a Nikolai I. Lobachevsky (1793–1856) was the founder, in the 1820s, of the first non-Euclidean geometry, called hyperbolic geometry.

essential oppositeness, if you will. Let us clarify this in a more particular way.

Let us assume that we have a variable and that it varies not just in any way but in a determinate way—precisely in such a way that it becomes greater or smaller than any constant finite *quantum* of the same kind. In every state this variable is finite; but in our understanding the combination of these states differs from the combination of any arbitrarily chosen states. In this sense we say that our *quantum* is a *potential infinity*, since it can become greater than any other *quantum*. Thus, potential infinity does not represent any *quantum* taken in itself, but only a special way of considering a *quantum*, namely, in connection with the character of its special variation. Potential infinity, according to Cantor, is not an idea but only an auxiliary notion; it is *ens rationis* according to Stöckl's apt expression. In short, potential infinity is the same thing that the ancients called *apeiron*, the scholastics called *syncategorematice infinitum* or *indefinitum*, and the modern philosphers call bad or, more precisely, simple infinity, *schlechte Unendlichkeit*.

Thus, this never-finished, potential infinity is a *variable finite* quantity, a *quantum*, rising above all boundaries or, on the contrary, falling below all finite boundaries. Such, for example, are the differentials characterized by Leibniz precisely because of this property as *pure fictions*. In view of this it is clear that to speak of perfect potential infinity—which, according to Cantor, is what Fontenelle did—is a contradiction in terms.

Unfortunately, an uncountable number—a legion—of authorities of all specialties has assimilated this simple truth all too strongly and, having forgotten about the word "potential," has begun with different voices to annnounce that "perfect infinity is something absurd." Relevant here are the ancient aphorism "Numerus infinitus repugnat" and Tongiorgio's affirmation "Multitudo actu infinita repugnat," and similar affirmations. This omission—wholly innocent, it would appear—caused more than one crude error and upon this error, moreover, are based Kant's first "antinomies of pure reason." Also based upon this omission, as we shall see, are the so-called arguments against perfect infinity and many considerations of positivism.

Let us now examine the other kind of infinity: actual infinity. With this we return to our starting point, to the notion of the quantum, precisely the constant quantum, and we shall enrich the content of this notion by a new feature. A certain constant can be such that it is in a series of other constants of the same kind, i.e., is greater than some finite constants and smaller than others. Then this constant too will be finite. But it can be the case that it is not in a series of other constants because it is greater than any finite constant, however great we take it to be. Then we will say that our quantum is an actual infinity, infinity in actu, actualiter, and not only in potentia.

Thus, in his dialogue *Bruno*, Schelling⁸⁴⁶ brilliantly shows that every concept is an infinity, because it unites in itself a diversity of representations, which is not finite; but since the scope of a concept is, in essence, fully determinate and given, this infinity can be nothing else but an actual infinity. Every judgment and every theorem⁸⁴⁷ bear in themselves actual infinity, and in this lies the whole power of logical thinking, as Socrates indicated.

Let us take examples that are more concrete. Turning to space, we can affirm that all points inside a certain closed surface form an actually infinite set. In fact, each of these points is fully determinate, which means that all of them are also fully determinate; but their number exceeds each of the numbers of the series $1,2,3\ldots,n\ldots$ and is greater than each of these numbers. In the same sense we can say that the powerfulness of God is actually infinite, because it, being determinate (in God there is no change), at the same time is greater than all finite powerfulness.

The idea of actual infinity is expressed very graphically by the author of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, a book attributed to St. Dyonisius the Areopagite. He writes: "And, in my opinion, worthy of careful meditation is what the Scripture says about the Angels, that there are thousands of thousands of them, and multitudes of multitudes, multiplying by themselves the numbers that we have as largest. Scripture thereby clearly shows that the types of celestial beings *are uncountable for us*, because the blessed host of supramundane minds is without count. This host surpasses the small and insufficient calculus of the *numbers used by us*, and can be precisely determined only by their supramundane understanding." 848

In the concept of actual infinity considered here it is not difficult to recognize what the ancients knew by the name *aphōrismenon*, the scholastics knew by the name *kategorematice infinitum*, and modern philosphers know by the name of *positive*, *proper* infinity. As Goethe expresses it, "this is a closed infinity more in harmony with man than the starry sky," 849 with the latter understood, of course, precisely as the possibility of aspiring farther and farther, without ever being able to achieve a synthesis and to find peace in the whole.

Here we encounter a new consideration. For potential infinity to be possible, limitless change must be possible. But, after all, what is necessary for the latter is a "domain" of change, which itself cannot change, since in the contrary case it would be necessary to require a domain in which the domain changes, etc. However, this domain is not finite and, hence, it must be recognized as actually infinite. Hence, *every potential infinity already presupposes the existence of an actual infinity as its super-finite limit*⁸⁵⁰; all infinite progress already presupposes the existence of an infinite goal of the progress; all infinite perfecting requires a recognition of infinite perfection. One who negates the actually infinite in any respect

thereby negates potential infinity in the same respect, and positivism has in itself elements of its own decomposition, i.e., positivism is poisoned by the products of its own activity.

From the definition of actual infinity unfolded above, one can conclude that this infinity can be conceived in two modifications. *First*, being greater than any finite *quantum*, it itself can turn out not to have another *quantum*, also infinite, which would be greater than it; in other words, here it turns out to be *incapable* of being less than something else. This is actual infinity, incapable of increase, an *absolute maximum*; in general as well as in Cantor, it is called the *Absolutum*. *Secondly* (and this has not been noticed by those who speak of infinity), from the definition of absolute infinity there emanates the possibility of its second modification. Actual infinity can have above it other *quanta* greater than it itself; then it will be capable of increase, will be an increasable actual infinity. In order to avoid once and for all this muddle of words and lengths, Cantor gives it the name *super-infinity*, *Überendlichkeit*.

From these formal considerations let us pass to real ones. We encounter actual infinity or at least can hope to encounter it in three different domains. First, insofar as actual infinity is realized in a higher perfection, in wholly independent, extra-worldly being, in a word, in Deo sive natura naturante, with the latter expression being understood by Cantor not in the sense of pantheism but in the orginal sense given to it by Thomas Aquinas and other theologians. Here, the infinite is an absolute maximum and is the same thing that was called the Absolutum or absolute infinity. Secondly, actual infinity can be presupposed in concreto, in the dependent world, in creation, in natura naturata. Here, Cantor calls it the Transfinitum. Thirdly and finally, actual infinity can be in abstracto, in the spirit, insofar as the spirit has the possibility of knowing the *Trans*finitum in nature, and to a certain degree, the Absolutum in God. In this latter case, infinity is called symbols of the infinite. In particular, if it is a question precisely of knowledge of the Transfinitum, these symbols acquire the name of transfinite numbers and transfinite types. The two latter forms of infinity are increasable infinities.851

XVI. A Problem of Lewis Carroll and the Question of Dogma (see p. 46)

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A way out of the doubts indicated in the text on p. [46] is represented from the purely formal-logical point of view by a particular case of a logical problem proposed by Lewis Carroll. For a greater understanding of the step we take when we believe in the Truth, it is useful to examine *in abstracto* the mental processes corresponding to the act of faith, i.e., to solve the aforementioned logical problem in its general form. This problem is formulated thus: "q implies r; but p implies that q implies not-r; what should be concluded from this?" 852

Using ordinary language, although onesidedly narrowing the problem to some extent, we can convey it in the following expressions:

"The truthfulness of a judgment or a concept r follows with necessity from the truthfulness of another judgment or another concept q; but a certain third judgment or a certain third concept p is such that from its truthfulness there necessarily follows that r cannot follow from q, as was stated before, but that from it there necessarily follows the negation of r, not-r; what can be concluded from this combination of premises?"

At first it might appear that it is a question of the resolution of some extraordinary and artificially concocted difficulty, which has no significance for life. But that is far from being the case.

Lewis Carroll's problem is not a "concocted" one but is evoked by a real need. But what is most interesting is that the very author of the problem, in theoretically solving it, committed the same error that is usually committed when it is solved in practice. This is his argument: "If q implies r, then it is impossible that q could imply not-r; hence, p includes the impossible and is therefore false." But Carroll's conclusion is erroneous, for it is possible that it is not p that is false but q, including at the same time r and not-r, i.e., two contradictory judgments or concepts.

Thus, a conclusion from common sense does not give a determinate, rigorously logical solution. On the contrary, symbolic logic makes it possible to obtain such a solution by very elementary transformations. We will do them presently, but first we will symbolically write down the conditions of the problem. Evidently the first condition of the problem is:

$$q \subset r$$
 (I),

and the second is:

$$p \cdot \subset \cdot q \subset -r$$
 (II).

But the first inclusion (I), when the signs are reversed, yields:

$$-r \subset -q$$
 (I'),

and the second (II), after the inclusion of the second part $q \subset -r$ is replaced by the equivalent sum $-q \cup -r$, yields:

$$p \cdot \subset \cdot -q \cup -r \tag{II'}$$

By replacing -r in (II') with its inclusion in (I') -q, we get:

$$p \cdot \subset \cdot -q \cup -q \tag{III},$$

i.e.,

$$p \cup -q$$
 (IV),

which yields the correct solution of Carroll's problem.

The above solution was obtained semisymbolically. Using only symbols, the solution is as follows:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} q \subset r : \cap : p \cdot \subset \cdot q \subset -r \ \big| \subset \big| \ -r \subset -q : \cap : p \cdot \subset \cdot -q \cup -r \\ \big| \subset \big| \ p \cdot \subset \cdot -q \cup -r : \cap : -r \subset -q \ \big| \subset \big| \\ \big| \ p \cdot \subset \cdot -q \cup -q \ \big| \subset \big| \ p \subset -q \end{array} \right.$$

What is the meaning of the solution obtained (IV)? The meaning is that the truthfulness of p entrains the negation of q, i.e., in other words, that it is impossible to affirm q insofar as, at the same time as, if p also is valid. This, however, means neither that p is absurd as Carroll supposed nor that q, including a contradictory consequent, is absurd, as, in the name of common sense, Couturat supposes it possible to affirm. $p \subset -q$ is a solution that satisfies both the first and the second condition of the problem, recognizing their truthfulness and value, while the solution from common sense satisfies neither the first nor the second condition, for it declares at least one of them a mere absurdity and, hence, only a misunderstanding. Expressing it figuratively, one could consider that condition (I) is the testimony of one witness while condition (II) is the testimony of another. An arbitrating judge—common sense—interfering in this dispute, superficially announces that either the testimony of the second witness (owing to his affirmation of p) or the testimonies of both (owing to the affirmation of q by both) are nonsense, rubbish, absurdity. With these words "nonsense," "rubbish," and "absurdity," common sense does not say that one of the disputants is lying or in error; in that case, an actual verification of the testimonies of both would be required. Not at all; common sense merely says that the words of at least one of them are meaningless, and therefore do not deserve any verification, refute themselves. Thus, common sense not only does not give a correct solution, but it does not give any solution at all, for it says: "either one or both speak nonsense." But, more than that, without giving a solution, it restrains the disputants from investigation, from a verification in fact of their affirmations, for there is no reason to investigate in fact what is absurd formally. Then, both witnesses, injured by this result of the case, turn to a more authoritative judge—to symbolic logic. This judge, having examined the case, pronounces a fully determinate judgment: $p \subset -q$, i.e., in other words, without injuring either of the disputing sides with the reproach of meaningless testimony and even recognizing the rightness of both, the judge affirms that neither can speak of q at those times and under those conditions when p is in force. In the presence of p, q is revoked; but in all other cases, it is in force. The first side, affirming the condition (II), is right; but the second side, affirming the condition (III), is also right. But both sides should realize that the usual, everyday, ubiquitous q stops being such under special conditions, precisely under the condition p.

In order to clarify these abstract considerations on p, q, and r, let us replace these signs with concrete data, i.e., let us solve some example problems thought up by me *ad hoc*, since I could not find any ready-made ones.

Example 1: "The sky is blue; at sunset the sky is red; what can be concluded from this?"

Let the "sky" be q; let "blue" be r; let "at sunset" (i.e., "when it is sunset," "if it is sunset," "sunset" used adjectively) be p; and finally, let "red," i.e., "not blue," be -r.

Symbolically the conditions of our example can be represented thus:

$$q \subset r : \cap : p \subset \cdot q \subset -r$$
 (IV),

that is, our example really turns out to be a particular case of Carroll's problem. By the judgment of common sense it would turn out that either the expression p, "at sunset," is meaningless, i.e., that not only are there no actual sunsets, but that even purely logically they are impossible and inadmissible; or that q is absurd, i.e., that the very concept of the "sky" is internally contradictory and there can be no "sky." The answer of symbolic logic gives (IV, V):

$$p \subset -q$$

that is, that although the "sky" and a "sunset" are completely possible, and, if conscientious observers demonstrate their reality, they do in fact exist, nevertheless, "in the case of a sunset," an observer does not deal with the "sky," does not observe the "sky," but deals with something else, not with the "sky." For example, if one attempts to give a positive answer, the observer then sees the sun, although through the atmosphere, through the "sky."

The essential importance of this answer hardly requires proof. It is sufficient to recall, if nothing else, the explanation of the "sky" given by the Ramsay-Tyndall dust theory, in order to understand that here symbolic logic takes us *in medias res* of the scientific work of the physicist. 854

Example 2: "A rationalist says that the contradictions of the Holy Scripture and of the dogmas prove their non-divine origin, whereas a

mystic affirms that in a state of spiritual illumination these contradictions precisely prove the divinity of the Holy Scripture and the dogmas. The question is, What conclusion should be drawn from these declarations?"

Again, let "the contradictions of the Holy Scripture and the dogmas" be q; let "non-divine origin" be r; let "the state of spiritual illumination" be p; and finally, let "divinity, i.e., not-not-Divinity" be –r. Then again, the conditions of this collision will be expressed by the formula

$$q \subset r : \cap : p \cdot \subset \cdot q \subset -r$$
 (IV'),

i.e., it is again disclosed that our example fits Carroll's scheme. Therefore, by solving the problem the way common sense wants, we would arrive at the conclusion that either p or q is meaningless, i.e., either "spiritual illumination" is meaningless and impossible or it is an absurdity to speak of the "contradictions of the Holy Scripture and the dogmas." In the first case the declaration of the mystic would be meaningless, while in the second case the declaration of both the mystic and the rationalist would be meaningless. The answer of symbolic logic (IV, V) once again gives: $p \subset -q$, i.e., both the rationalist and the mystic are right. Neither "the contradictions of the Holy Scripture and the dogmas" nor "spiritual illuminations" contain anything absurd and therefore if both an honest rationalist and an honest mystic refer to them, they do in fact exist. But that which is a contradiction, and an unquestionable contradiction, for the ratio, stops being a contradiction at the highest level, is not perceived as a contradiction, is synthesized. And, then, in a state of spiritual illumination, there are no contradictions. Therefore, there is no need to try to convince a rationalist that there are no contradictions: they exist, they are unquestionable. But a rationalist must believe a mystic when the latter states that these contradictions turn out to be a higher unity in the light of the Sun that does not set, and then they precisely show that the Holy Scripture and the dogmas are higher than fleshly rationality and, thus, could not be thought up by man, i.e., are Divine. This is the same conclusion at which we have arrived in the present work.

xVII. Irrationalities in Mathematics⁸⁵⁵ and Dogma (see p. 45)

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One can clarify with a simple example the fact that superrational synthesis—which dogma is—is not something utterly unknown and unexpected in science. It is realized very often; take for example the construction of so-called *irrational numbers*.

According to the original definition, a "number" is a whole number, and then a rational number, i.e., a fraction. However, the solution of certain geometrical problems often leads to a relationship of quantities e.g., segments—that is not expressible by number. Arithmetical operations corresponding to these acts are impossible, for a corresponding combination of arithmetical symbols would be devoid of any meaning. What, for example, is the meaning of the square root of 2? It means that, and only that, in the course of the solution process, we have encountered a wall. We sought a certain number but it turned out that there is no number that could satisfy the conditions of the problem: the square root of 2 is a symbol of arithmetical impossibility. Why? Because, in general, the square root of a signifies such a number x which, being squared, yields a, i.e., a number which satisfies the equation: $x^2 = a$. But it is easy to prove that there is and can be no such number x whose square would be equal to 2. The same sort of thing holds in geometry. We can, for example, attempt to determine by how many times one segment is longer than another. In some cases we will define this as "by how much," i.e., we will find a number characterizing it; while in other cases there is no such number, and then the question "by how much" is meaningless. Thus the diagonal of a square cannot be said to be longer or shorter than a side of that square by any amount. A diagonal and a side are incomparable in terms of "by how much." They are "incommensurable." Whatever number we take to characterize this relationship will prove to be unsuitable. If a side has its number, a diagonal does not have it, and vice versa. Between the two is a kind of abyss, which numbers cannot cross. The length of a diagonal is transcendent (I use this word in a general sense, not as a mathematical terminus technicus) with respect to the length of a side. This fact was first discovered by Pythagoras; as is well known, this geometer himself was horrified by the profundity of the fact he had discovered and by its consequences. For this fact has caused irreparable damage to all rationalism.

Such combinations of symbols as the square root of 2 were known in the Middle Ages as "numeri ficti," "fictitious numbers," or—in the Liber abaci of Leonardo of Pisa, circa 1202—"numeri surdi," "deaf numbers," and were not at all considered as numbers. It was in the Arithmetica integra of Michael Stifel, published in Nuremberg in 1544, that they first acquired the conventional significance of numbers and the corresponding name "numeri irrationales"; however, Stifel declared that "an irrational number is not a true number." And even now many textbooks of algebra state with utmost seriousness that even though it is not possible to extract the square root of 2, nevertheless, etc.

In the circle of those operations which arithmetic knows, there is no way out of this difficulty. These operations lead to a result that does not have meaning if their circle is not broken; but if it is not broken, the given combination violates the integrity of the circle itself, producing internal destruction and devastation. And, in general, rational operations lead to combinations that have no place amongst their producers and therefore demand the destruction of the rational domain in order to be born into a new, hitherto unseen and unthought-of world. The way out, in algebra, is achieved only by the creation of arithmetical essences that are transcendent with respect to the given circle of operations, which essences are inexpressible in finite symbols, but are postulated by these symbols, ground them, and give them a new, higher meaning. However, as soon as we wish to think these new arithmetical essences in terms of the old essences, as soon as we wish to pour new wine into old bottles, we get the decomposition of the symbol of the new essence into constituent elements that are mutually incompatible in the domain of the old concepts, and the very essence evaporates.

Let me explain more definitely the heart of the matter. For a long time irrational "numbers" were a murky absurdity, which everyone used unconsciously as a practical necessity but which no one tried to explain to himself. But in the 1870s a way out of this situation became an urgent necessity. The question had become ripe, and an answer to it was given at almost the same time by several investigators, among whom the most important were G. Cantor, K. Weierstrass, Ch. du Méray, E. Heine, R. Dedekind, G. Korsak, S. Pincherlé, O Biermann, J. Tannery, M. Pasch, B. Russell, etc. The constructions proposed by the various investigators were independent of one another and therefore—which is very understandable—differed significantly in their outward aspect. But in essence they all said the same thing. Therefore I shall consider only one of these constructions, the method of G. Cantor, that same Cantor about whom you and I spoke many times, in the expansiveness of the slowy waving corn field, near the birch grove, and at home, in front of the burning stove. And do you remember? Sometimes, having awakened at night, we became drawn into quiet talk, and the time glided by imperceptibly, till the hour struck by the bell tower reminded us of the approaching morning . . .

In order to understand Cantor's construction, one must forget all that one has heard about irrational numbers, and hold in one's mind the fact that it is necessary to create a *wholly new* object of thought.

Cantor takes an infinite set of numbers a_1 , a_2 , a_3 , a_4 , a_n , a_{n+m} , ordered in such a way that after each number is the number closest to it and before each number (except for the first number in the sequence) is the number that precedes it most closely. This series of numbers is viewed by Cantor as a single object α . Let us symbolically designate this by enclosing the whole group within brackets, so that

$$\alpha = (a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots, a_n, \dots, a_{n+m}, \dots)$$

This signifies that α is nothing else but an infinite group, conceivable in unity.

In certain cases the numbers a_1 , a_2 , a_n , can turn out to be such that the series α "will converge," as they say, that is, it will have the following property: however small the value of σ that is taken, there will always be found an n so large, i.e., a term or an element a_n so distant, that the difference between it and any subsequent term a_{n+m} —however large this m—will in absolute value (i.e., without paying attention to the sign of the difference) be less than σ . This can be symbolically represented as: $|a_{n+m} - a_n| < \sigma$, where σ is arbitrarily small.

In other words, the more distant any term a_n , the smaller the difference between it and all terms following it; moreover, this difference can be made arbitrarily close to zero, although, generally speaking, it never becomes zero. Such for example is the group of numbers:

$$\alpha = \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{4}, \frac{7}{8}, \frac{15}{16}, \frac{31}{32}, \dots \frac{2^{n}-1}{2^{n}}, \dots \frac{2^{n+m}-1}{2^{n+m}}, \dots\right).$$

In fact, for this group the absolute value of the difference between the (n+m)th and the nth term is:

$$\left| \frac{2^{n+m} - 1}{2^{n+m}} - \frac{2^n - 1}{2^n} \right| = \left| \frac{2^m - 1}{2^{n+m}} \right| = \left| \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2^m}}{2^n} \right|$$

The greater the value of m, the smaller the value of $\frac{1}{2^m}$, and therefore the greater the value of the numerator. But it is always < 1, for which reason the whole difference will be $<|\frac{1}{2^n}|$. It is clear that, however small a certain prescribed number σ , one can always find an n so large that $|\frac{1}{2^n}| < \sigma$ and therefore, *a fortiori*, that the difference between the (n+m)th and nth terms, i.e.,

$$\left| \frac{2^{n+m}-1}{2^{n+m}} - \frac{2^n-1}{2^n} \right|$$

will be $< \sigma$.

But let us return from this particular example to the general theory. Thus, if in general the group α satisfies the condition of convergence, "converges," then the series is called a fundamental series, *Fundamental*reihe, and the whole group, as a single object α , is called an *irrational* number.

Thus, irrationality, in the domain of finite, rationality-based arithmetic, is meaningless from the point of view of "numbers," i.e., numbers in the proper, finite sense, obtained as the combination of a finite number of elementary symbols (1,2,3,4,5, ... n, ...). No combination of these elementary symbols, finite, immanent to rationality, can yield an image of irrationality or even something "resembling" it. Irrationality is absolutely transcendental, absolutely unfathomable for the rational domain. And once and for all, conclusively and unalterably, one must reject the intention of representing irrationality in the form of a finite combination of rationalities.

But by using rational symbols as a formless matter, we can, by means of wholly new constructive definitions, introduce a new ordering essence in the qualityless (as a whole) aggregate of rational numbers. Then an irrational number will be imprinted and embodied in this "matter." Every rational number in isolation, every element, every atom of this aggregate in itself, in its original meaning, does not have anything in common with the whole embodied in it, just as the aesthetic idea of a statue does not have anything in common with the crystals of marble that make up the statue, or just as the meaning of a poem does not have anything in common with the sounds of the words that compose it. But their infinite (or, more precisely, superfinite) combination fully represents this whole, this idea. In Cantor's fundamental series, which expresses, embodies, represents, and is, by definition, the irrational number α , each of the elements $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \ldots$ (as long as we only *enter* into the domain of irrationalities) does not have anything in common with α , and it is even absurd to ask in what interrelationship are found these essentially incomparable symbols, of which α is transcendental for every a, (where i = 1,2,3, . . . n, ...). But the combination of numbers a, linked by the property of convergence and the definition of "actions" on α as a single object, accurately represents this transcendent essence of α . Subsequently, when α is fully investigated, it turns out to be possible to transpose all a_i in the form of α , although it is impossible, inversely, to transpose α in the form of a.; then there is established the concept of "resemblance" between a and α , although this "resemblance" is only the resemblance of a hint, not of a tautegory. This means that, although α is transcendent for all a, is "incomprehensible" from the point of view of a, nevertheless all a are immanent for α , thoroughly transparent for it. One can even say that from the point of view of a, one cannot see those transcendental roots of a, that transcendental illumination of a, which, however, is clear and evident from the point of view of α .

Immanence and transcendence in the domain of the essences of reason are similar to those in the domain of the essences of ontology: God is transcendental for the world from the point of view of the world, but the world is not transcendental for God; rather, it is wholly permeated with Divine energies. α and a_i are *different*, but if α is viewed in the series of all a_i , one can see that the difference or resemblance between a_i and α itself changes with change in i. From the formally legalistic or rational point of view, according to the law of identity, a_i does not resemble α ; but for immediate consciousness, a_i can *hint at* α , and, moreover, it is more transparent or more murky depending on the value of i. Moreover, I ask that attention be directed to the fact that here I am only expounding *general results*, not the theory itself.

From the concept of the equality of two irrationalities— α and another analogous to it, β —obtained by different processes, it is established that a finite part of the symbols a_i can be thrown out of α , that from the group $(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n, \ldots)$ it is possible to choose and remove an infinite group, that it is possible, finally, to carry out a pairwise transposition of an infinite number of elements of a_i —if only the structure of the series does not change, if only the elements are not mixed in such a way as to be capable of returning to the old arrangement by specific pairwise transpositions; but nevertheless α will not change. Moreover, even very different combinations $(a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots, a_n, \ldots)$ and $(b_1, b_2, b_3, \ldots, b_n, \ldots)$ can express one and the same number α ; wholly different signs can express one and the same rational essence.

Thus, having encountered an impossible combination of symbols, we were absolutely incapable of solving the problem. We collided against a wall, against the limitedness of the arithmetical essences themselves embodied in the given signs. Only two choices remained: either to renounce the problem itself or to rise above the plane of thought which operates with "finite" symbols, to introduce a new idea, the idea of actual—i.e., synthetic—infinity, and, with its aid, to create by a special creative act of the spirit a wholly new thought-essence: irrationality.

Was there a sequence of derivations here? Of course not! We effected a *leap*, a discontinuity in development; we introduced something *essentially new*. We did not have to introduce it; we could have confined ourselves to those essences which are given, i.e., to "finite" essences. We could have devoted ourselves to the positivistic sterilization of the reason and could have found peace in the impossibility of transcending the given symbols. We could also have risen to the heights. But this would have required an exertion of will and an ascesis of the reason: a wholly specific effort and humility before the object of investigation would have been required for the creation of symbols of irationality. The creation of a new essence requires *free* ascesis. The freedom of this act is expressed in the fact that to us is given the possibility either of staying with what is old and "good" or of rising to what is new and "better." The ascesis of this act

consists in the fact that "natural forces"—the inertia and self-satisfaction inherent in the mind—push the mind to stagnate in the old, the finite, the "known." It is necessary to overcome the self-satisfaction of the rational mind, to rip apart the magic circle of its finite concepts, and to go out into a new medium—into the medium of the superfinite, which is inaccessible to and absurd for the rational mind. Such is the ascesis of reason in arithmetic.

However, it would be the greatest of errors to see in this ascesis something exclusive and standing alone. Contemporary mathematics is entirely built on the concept of limit and limit process, with which one must deal explicitly each time the idea of infinity appears explicitly and without the silent participation of which one cannot take a step in the building of science. Irrationalities, certain hints at the theory of which have been made here, are only the simplest and generally known case of a limit process; there also exists a multitude of other, similar applications of the basic concept of the overcoming of finiteness. Thus, a transcendental analytic function cannot be expressed by any finite number of elements, while, with respect to an algebraic function, Weierstrass found that it can always be expressed by any finite number of elements. But the principle of the overcoming of finiteness appears then and it turns out, according to Poincaré's theorem, that "every analytic function can be defined by a countable set of elements B(x-a)."856 Thus, an analytic function has the same relation to an algebraic function that an irrational number has to a rational one.

To this domain of the overcoming of finiteness belong the extremely interesting—from the epistemological and ontological points of view—investigations of the features of the convergence and divergence of infinite series in connection with the question of the increase and decrease of functions and the theory of definite integrals. Here the "ideal functions" of P. du Bois-Reymond can, in a certain sense, be equated with irrational-ities—not among numbers or functions but among integrals. The investigations of N. Abel, N. V. Bugaev, P. du Bois-Reymond, E. de Borel, G. Hadamard, Poincaré, and others, ⁸⁵⁷ despite the specificity of the problems posed and the methods used, have an enormous significance for philosophy, and one can only be astonished at the fact that almost no application of them has been made. ⁸⁵⁸

xvIII. The Concept of Identity in Scholastic Philosophy (see p. 59)

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THE concepts of numerical and generic identity examined in the text have been neglected in modern philosophy but were differentiated in scholastic philosophy. Here is a summary of the pertinent definitions employed by the representatives of scholastic philosophy:

Generice, *specifice*, *numerice*. It is most frequently a question of distinctions between things.

That is distinguished *generically* which is not similar in any univocal predicate, as for example substance and quantity. Whence come the higher *genera* of things, of which there are ten and which are called *predicaments*.

That is *specific* which is similar in some univocal genus but which is subsumed under different genera, as, for example, a man, a lion, a stone, etc. Therefore, intermediate genera differ, strictly speaking, not generically but specifically.

Finally, only number distinguishes (solo numero differunt) individuals who are subsumed under the same genus and who therefore differ neither generically nor specifically but only in the sense that they belong to the nature of their species (sed tantum distinguuntur secumdum ea quae sunt naturae speciei adjuncta⁸⁵⁹), for example, Socrates and Plato. We said "only number" since one says in general that number distinguishes that which can be counted as distinct, in which sense one also distinguishes individuals of different species, as, for example, Alexander and Bucephalus.

The *species* distinction is called *formal*, since it derives from what is formal (*appellatur etiam formalis*, *quia fit secundum id quod est formale*⁸⁶⁰). The *numerical* distinction, on the other hand, is also called *material* (*materialis*), for matter is the principle which gives rise to multiple individuals of the same species. ⁸⁶¹

The three types of distinctions correspond to three types of unities: "unitas generica, specifica, numerica. Since the one designates an indivisible entity (ens individuum), there will be as many unities as differences. And things differ either in genus, as for example a stone from a man⁸⁶²; or in species, as for example a lion from a horse; or in number, as for

example Peter from Paul. Thus, there exist three unities: that which negates division according to genus is called generic; that which negates division according to species is called specific; that which negates numerical divsion of species is called numerical or individual. Hence, the one according to genus (unum genere) is that which is similar in the framework of the same generic notion (ratione). The one according to species is that which is similar in the framework of the same definition. That which is one according to both genus and species is also called formally one (formaliter una), i.e., up to and including the essential concept (quoad essentialem conceptum). Finally, all that which is unique (singularia) or individual is one according to number. Only individual unity is real unity, for in the nature of things only the unique (singularia) exists. Generic or specific unities, if one does not add individual unity to them, are not perfect unities from the viewpoint of things (a parte rei), but only negations of diversity. Thus, for example, the nature of Peter and Paul is called one and the same nature not because it posits one and the same essence but only because it negates specific diversity. Therefore, St. Thomas Aquinas says: 'That which is indivisible with respect to some genus or some species is not called simply one (simpliciter unum), but is called one either according to genus or according to species, but that which is simply indivisible is simply one, i.e., one according to number (unum numero).'863 Further, that which forms a numerical unity or that by means of which one thing difers from another in the same species is called the principle of individualization."864

But despite this sufficient clarity in the differentiation of the notions of various types of unity and differences, scholastic philosophy too (especially during its transition to modern philosophy) was not unacquainted with the tendency to reduce numerical unity to generic unity and to identify the identity of individuals with the equality of the corresponding singular classes. This tendency is marked in Francisco Suarez (1548–1617).⁸⁶⁵

Suarez says: "Numerical unity is called the state of real existence which nature has from the point of view of a thing existing in individuals (*in singularibus*), and it is also called the state of contraction, as if through it nature, or the essential concept of a thing, contracts into indivisibles and individuals, and from this comes numerical unity which is precisely possessed by things as they exist from the point of view of the thing (*vocatur existentiae realis quem habet natura a parte rei in singularibus existens, et vocatur etiam status contractionis, quasi per illum natura, seu essentialis rei conceptus, ad individua et singularia contraheretur, et hinc exsurgit unitas numerica, quae rebus nimirum convenit, ut a parte rei existunt)."*

Thus, numerical identity is only a "state of contraction." It is not a primary fact of the self-positing of the person but a product of a certain evolution (even if logical!) of the nature of a thing, which at the outset is

impersonal. It is not "nature" that is posited by the self-positing person, but the person who is posited by "nature." This representation of numerical unity as a "contraction" of the general essence into a singular thing graphically illustrates the nature of the philosophy of things, for which numerical identity is the equality of singular classes, while the individual is identified with its own singular class. According to this conception, it is sufficient to contract the size of a class to obtain a *singular class*, i.e., an individual, which is nothing else but the *status contractionis* of a general concept.

This is the Western, *Catholic* view of life. But we have already seen to what extent the *Orthodox* understanding of life is alien to this philosophy in the depths of which lies the category of things and which is decisively opposed to the idea of the person, just as the whole structure of Catholicism (representing the practical side of this impersonal view of life) is opposed to the recognition of the person and his needs.

XIX. The Concept of Identity in Mathematical Logic (see p. 60)

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IT IS NOT unexpected that the tendency to exclude from the sphere of science all discussion of numerical identity is most clearly expressed where the scientific method is in general most rigorous and exact, namely in the modern mathematical logic or the so-called logistic. Here, in the "calculus of classes," the identity of individuals is defined wholly rigorously as their combined belonging to each class to which each of them can belong solely, i.e., in other words, as the possibility, for any combination of traits of a single individual, to find a corresponding and equal combination of traits of another individual. It is clear that here numerical identity is replaced by specific identity. This substitution is made even more significant by the fact that, in mathematical logic, one rigorously distinguishes an individual from a singular or special class corresponding to it and that, in "the calculus of relations," an important axiom is postulated according to which each pair of given individuals has a special relation which does not obtain between any two other individuals, i.e., a relation that is proper only to *this* pair. Despite these fine distinctions, the identity of individuals is wholly decomposed in modern science into a combination of common traits, so that the real character of an individual as a carrier of its traits, in contrast to its *formal* character, once again is merely asserted but is not expressed. This demonstrates one more time that numerical identity can be postulated or asserted only symbolically, but is not defined, formulated, or expressed logically.

After these general comments, let us briefly recall how the above-noted definitions are expressed in the signs of logistic.

As is well known, what first strikes the eyes here is a decisive distinction of the relations of "implication" and "inclusion," i.e., the inclusion of a judgment or class into another judgment or class, from the operation of the subordination of an individual to a class or, correspondingly, to a judgment. \subset is the sign of both implication and inclusion, while ϵ —in relation to a class—is the sign of the operation of the establishment of a correspondence (ϵ is the abbreviation of *esti*); and ϑ is the sign of the same operation in relation to a judgment. This distinction, marked by different signs, is extremely important. However, ordinary language confuses these two types of relation (i.e., implication/inclusion is confused with the operation of correspondence) by using the copula *is* in both cases. Logi-

cians had identified them for a long time, and Peano was the first to pinpoint the difference, and that only with the aid of a symbology that he invented.

In order to make clearer the differences between the operations of inclusion and correspondence, let us take, for the example, the common syllogism:

Major: Every man is mortal. Minor: Socrates is a man.

Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

The copula of the major premise is \subset , as is usually thought, but the copula of the minor premise is by no means \subset (as the overwhelming majority of logicians think) but ϵ . In fact, the major premise establishes the relation of the classes "mankind" and "mortality," while the minor premise establishes not a relation of classes, but the relation of the individual "Socrates" to the class "mankind," to which "Socrates" belongs. Thus, the major premise is unquestionably an *implication* (as is usually considered), but the minor premise is not an implication but the subordination of an individual to a class, and precisely of the first type. Hence, the formula for this syllogism can be written as:

$$a \subset b \cdot \cap \cdot x \in a : \subset : x \in b$$
 (I)

and not as the formula of the usual, typical syllogism which establishes the relation between classes:

$$a \subset b \cdot \cap \cdot c \subset a : \subset : c \subset b$$
 (II).

It is scarcely necessary to point out the substantial difference between the formulas (I) and (II).

One should not think that the symbols \subset and ε , which have a very different logical and ontological significance, can be confused with impunity from the *formal* point of view, for purposes of logistic-calculation mechanics, and that Peano's fine distinction of concepts has no "pragmatic" significance for calculation technique. This is far from being the case, for the very properties of the two relations, i.e., \subset and ε , are substantially different: the relation \subset , as establishing a link between *homogeneous* essences or terms (classes, judgments), is *transitive*, whereas the relation ε , as establishing the link between inhomogeneous essences (class and individual), is expressly *intransitive*: if a \subset b and b \subset c, it is clear that according to the formula

$$a \subset b \cdot \cap \cdot b \subset c : \subset : a \subset c$$
 (III),

and $a \subset c$; but from the fact that $x \in y$ and $y \in z$, it does not follow that $x \in z$, for if x as an individual is subordinated to the class y and class y as an individual is subordinated to class z, then z will be in relation to x *the class of classes*, and not simply a class; and consequently z cannot count

x among its elements, in its extension. The extension of z is made up of individuals-*classes*, which, for z, are now indivisible, undecomposable.

By inattention to the intransitivity of the relation ϵ , based in turn on the confusion of ϵ and \subset , sophisms are frequently constructed which are far from easy to refute in a formal and appropriate way. Such, for example, are certain sophisms in Plato's "philosophical comedy" *Euthydemus*, ⁸⁶⁶ e.g.:

"Gold is gold and cannot not be gold; a man is a man and cannot not be a man. Hence"—this is roughly what Socrates says to Euthydemus—"your father Chaeredemus too cannot be a non-father. Thus, he is a father to all, and not only to people, but also to horses and to other animals. In the same way, your mother is the mother of all, the mother of hedgehogs too. Hence, you are the brother of calves, puppies, and sucking pigs."

Further: "You have a dog, and he has puppies. Then he is a father, and he is yours; hence, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers."

Further: "You beat your dog; hence, you beat your own father," and so on.

Or, here is another example, from Hippias Major⁸⁶⁷:

"Each of us two, who now speak together, is one, and if it is true that each of us is one, each must also be odd. Hence, we too must also be odd when we are together. But if that is not the case, if the two of us together are even, then each separately is also even," and so on.

The reasoning here follows the following scheme:

Chaeredemus (individual) ϵ your father (class); your father (an individual) ϵ father (class); father (class) = a being who engenders (class); those who engender hedgehogs, sucking pigs, etc. (class) \subset beings who engender (class).

But it is clear that, as a consequence of the intransitivity of the operation " ϵ ," one cannot conclude from the given premises that:

Chaeredemus ϵ a being who engenders hedgehogs, etc.

In the same way, from the premise that

Peter (an individual) ϵ apostle (the class of apostles),

apostles
$$\begin{pmatrix} \text{an individual;} \\ \text{the historically} \\ \text{known group of} \\ \text{apostles.} \end{pmatrix} \epsilon "12" \begin{pmatrix} \text{the class of all objects} \\ \text{twelve} \\ \text{in number.} \end{pmatrix}$$

it does not at all follow that

Peter
$$\epsilon$$
 "12,"

i.e., that Peter is also "twelve," and not "one." 868

Thus, the foregoing unquestionably confirms that, even from the purely formal point of view, an individual is fundamentally different from a class, even from a singular class, contrary to the opinion of nominalist logicians who attempt to interpret a class not as a unique, self-contained volume of thought but as a combination of individuals; and contrary to the efforts of positivist logicians who desire to destroy the autonomous nature of the individual and reduce it to a sum of traits, i.e., to a singular class. A "special" or "singular" class must be strictly distinguished from a singular individual entering into its extension: otherwise one could express such a class x by the formula:

$$x \in x$$
 (IV),

which, as we have seen, is meaningless, for " ϵ " is the sign of a relation between *different* and even *heterogeneous* terms, not the relation of a term to itself. The singular class formed from the singular element "x" is therefore conventionally denoted by a special sign, i.e., ιx , which should be read as: "equal to x." Here the symbol " ι " is the abbreviation of the Greek *idios*, equal. This symbol ι is formally defined by the equation:

$$\iota \mathbf{X} = \mathbf{y} \ni (\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{X}) \tag{V},$$

i.e., ιx is a symbol of such a class y which (ϑ) justifies the propositional function (with the variable y) y = x. Then, by applying to both parts of this equation the operation $y \in X$, which subordinates the element-individual y to the equal classes ιx and $y \ni Y = X$, and remembering that the operations $y \in X$ and $y \ni Y \ni X$ mutually cancel each other, we find:

$$y \in \iota x \cdot = \cdot y = x$$
 (VI),

i.e., the equality of the two symbols " $\epsilon \iota$ " and "=", so that

$$\epsilon \iota \cdot = \cdot =$$
 (VII).

It follows that, even though the formula (IV) is incorrect,

$$X \in t X$$
 (VIII),

(for x = x), i.e., that the individual x always belongs to its singular class

If, on the contrary, "a" is a singular class, then its single element cannot be expressed through "a," but must be expressed through a special symbol, which contains the inverted symbol 1, namely through 1a, which should be read as: "the a." In general, the symbol " ι " transforms an individual into its singular class and, conversely, the symbol "1" transforms a singular class into an individual, so that we have two equivalent equations:

$$a = \iota x$$
 and $x = 1a$ (IX).

Symbolically, this can be expressed as:

$$a = \iota x \cdot = \cdot x = 1a \tag{X}.^{869}$$

All that we have said until now is completely just, for the substantial distinction between a singular class and an individual has served as our foundation. But an individual is introduced here solely by a *symbol*, without definition. Therefore, this is an obvious stumbling block for rationalism. Attempts are made to avoid it in the following way:

A singular class is defined as a class consisting of one sole individual. But what is the number "one"? And what is an "individual"? Mathematical logic, "selon l'habitude des mathématiques, 870 does not define an individual but only the identity of individuals. Of course, what is important here is not this imaginary "habit of the mathematical sciences," but only the impossibility of defining an individual as a super-rational reality. Meanwhile, the attempt to define the identity of individuals makes it possible to replace the question of real numerical identity with the question of the formal similarity of traits, that is, to replace reasoning (impossible!) about indviduals with reasoning about concepts of individuals, i.e., about classes. This replacement is done consciously, and it is profoundly significant, especially after one has decisively distinguished between individuals and classes.

Thus, "one hears that two individuals k and l are identical if the latter belongs to each class in which the former participates." Symbolically, this definition is expressed by the formula:

$$k \equiv 1 : = : k \in a \cdot \subset_a \cdot 1 \in a$$
 (XI).

Here, \equiv is the sign of identity; the index a next to \subset signifies that the implication is just for every a that satisfies the inclusion $k \in a.^{872}$ Let it be noted that "an identity of individuals is logically distinct from an equality of classes, just as the individuals k and l are distinct from the singular classes lk and ll."873

How should one understand this formula? Only as the definition of the sign of identity. The formula (XI) says that when we encounter a graphic combination of lines and letters, a little picture $k \equiv l$, never before seen and which in itself is meaningless, then now, once and for all, we desire, we require, we demand that it signify nothing else but an abbreviated, conventional expression of the following implication which we already understand:

$$k \in a \cdot \subset_a \cdot l \in a$$
 (XII)

or, more precisely, an expression of a set of several implications with all possible values of the variable a, whose field of variation is defined by the function $k \in a$, i.e., by $k \equiv l$ we wish to signify an abbreviation of the expression:

$$\prod_{k \in a} (k \in a \subset l \in a)$$
 (XIII),

where Π is the sign of the logical mulplication of all the multipliers obtained for all possible values of a. It is this system of implications, which

speaks *only* of the relation of the belonging (ϵ) of the individuals k and l to the classes a, that we agree to call the identity of individuals. But what an individual is, we still do not know logically; we do not have the *concept* of an individual, and hence we only posit its term purely symbolically as a sign of something (anything at all, but only not of a class, a judgment, or a relation) that can be in a relation of "identity." By identity we mean a certain complex formula in the relation of this "something" to classes.

Let us repeat that here we see most clearly the impotence of logical thought in the face of concrete, i.e., individual, being; and the pitifulness (a necessary pitifulness!) of rationality's attempt to replace individual being with rational-like—but not rational—terms.

The question of the definition of the *singularity of a class* also remains open. How, in fact, can one define in rational terms that the class ιa is singular, i.e., that it contains only *one* element, that there is only *one* a? This is achieved through an indication of *two* properties of the class ιa : first, that it in general has elements, i.e., that it is not a null class; and secondly, that if there were two such elements, namely x and y, they would be identical. That the class ιa is not null is expressed by the negative formula:

$$a - = \Lambda \tag{XIV},$$

i.e.,

a "is not"
$$(-=) \Lambda$$
 (XIV'),

where Λ is the sign of a null class, or, in a more convenient, positive form:

$$\exists a$$
 (XV),

i.e.,

"there exists an a"874

so that

$$a = A \cdot = A \cdot = 3a$$
 (XVI).

Thus, the singularity of the class ιa is expressed by the formulas:

$$a \mathrel{-=} \varLambda : x \in a \cdot y \in a \cdot \subset_{x,y} x \equiv y \tag{XVII},$$

or

$$\exists a \cdot x \in a \cdot y \in a \cdot \subset_{x,y} x \equiv y$$
 (XVIII), ⁸⁷⁵

i.e., this implication remains true for any x and y belonging to the class ι a. One scarcely has to indicate that all that we have said about the logical definition of identity is valid also for this definition of singularity, for singularity is only a particular case of identity, i.e., identity with itself, self-identity.

Turning finally to the *logic of relations*, we must naturally decide the question of the relation between individuals. This domain of mathemati-

cal logic considers it an axiom that there always exists a relation between individuals, the individual itself, that which appears proper to individuals. The axiom states the following: "between two given individuals there exists a singular relation, which does not exist between any two other individuals." However, this *singular* relation is also explained (as one could have expected) in a formal sense, not in a real one. This becomes clear from the clarifications that follow this axiom: These clarifications are of the following type: "From the point of view of extension this axiom is evident, for the pair considered is sufficient to define a relation *distinct* from all others. From the point of view of content one can say that if one examines the ensemble of all relations which exist between two given individuals, then that very same ensemble does not exist between any other pair of individuals; in other words, if a certain pair has *all* the relations of another pair, then these two pairs are identical, which can be expressed as:

$$\mathbf{x_1} \mathbf{R} \mathbf{y_1} \cdot \mathbf{c_R} \cdot \mathbf{x_2} \mathbf{R} \mathbf{y_2} : \mathbf{c} : \mathbf{x_1} \equiv \mathbf{x_2} \cdot \mathbf{y_1} \equiv \mathbf{y_2}$$
 (XIX)."876

Here, the sign \subset_R indicates that the *complication* of the left part is valid for *any* relation R linking \mathbf{x}_1 and \mathbf{y}_2 .

Thus, the individual, i.e., concrete, relation is once again decomposed into a series of general (i.e., abstract) relations: the series of all abstract relations entering into the composition of a given concrete relation. But besides the ontological meaninglessness of this kind of equating of the concrete to a sum of abstractions, there arises the question of the legitimacy of such a definition even fom the purely formal point of view. It is based after all on the concept of "all" relations between a given pair of elements. Without mentioning the fact that the very concept "all" is not yet defined in mathematical logic, especially when it refers to a superfinite group, it is doubtful whether one can in general define the concept of a group of all relations not between clases but between individuals. But this is precisely what requires proof, for it is not at all evident (or hardly admissible in general) that a transfinite group of abstractions can exhaust a concreteness. If a concreteness can in fact be viewed from a formalrational point of view, it can, without doubt, be introduced in formal speculations not otherwise than in the form of a *limit*, i.e., as an *absolute* maximum. But the concept of such a maximum has not yet been developed, if we neglect the completely unknown attempt of Archimandrite Serapion. Moreover, it is unclear whether such a concept can in general be applied to individuals. For concrete individuals possess *creativity*, are capable of creating absolute, unforeseen relations, which are not part of any group, however large, of already existing relations. In short, they surpass any antecedent concept that one has of them. To cite Bergson, "la vie déborde l'intelligence"—"life transcends rationality." And that is always the case.

xx. Time and Fate (see p. 143)

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EXISTENCE in time is essentially a dying, the slow but irrevocable approach of Death. To live in time is to submit oneself inevitably to the Predator. Life equals dying. And Death is nothing else but a more intense, more effective, more attention-drawing Time. Death is instantaneous time, while Time is prolonged death. Fate, which weighs on everyone, is not something external to life; it is not correct to think that the thread of life moves along, gaining strength and growing, until it is suddenly, randomly, cut with the scissors of death by the cruel Atropos, one of the parcae. It is not the case that black Death attacks luminous Life from outside; rather, life itself conceals in its depths the pitilessly growing embryo of death. Living we die; dying we live. Dying is the *condition* of life, just as the low temperature of the cooling system is the condition of the functioning of a locomobile. A cradle is a cradle, i.e., the bud of life and not merely a small bed, precisely because it is a grave. There is no present without the past; there is no life without death. Death is interwined with the act of birth, and that which is born is perishable. In the Zend-Avesta, man is called "Mortal life." Birth and Death are the poles of what one can call (depending on one's taste) Life or Dying; or, more precisely, Fate or Time. And this Time, this Fate, consists, once again, of polarly conjugated Birth and Death; and so it goes, on and on, down to the ultimate elements of life, to the smallest manifestations of life's activity.⁸⁷⁷

Analogously, it is impossible to separate in a magnetized strip the north pole from the south; moving from the first, where the "north" is the most intense, we imperceptibly pass to the second, where the "south" is the most intense. If we break the strip in half, the ends of the halves will then have a north and a south pole; but their intensities will not equal those of the poles of the unbroken strip. If we then break those halves in half, we will get the same thing. And so, becoming attenuated as the number of parts increases, the magnetic force will become manifested in a multitude of north and south poles, and the pairs will always be inseparable; and there is no end to this conjugacy of the poles of the magnet fragments.

In the same way, Time, however it is divided, always remains *time*, ⁸⁷⁸ i.e., a file, a series, a movement: it always has a beginning and an end, a past and a future, an appearance and a cessation, a birth and a

death. And life too, connected with Time, is essentially *such* and cannot be otherwise.

The fate that weighs on us is Time. The very word "rok" (fate) has a temporal sense. For some Slavonic tribes the word signifies "year," i.e., 12 months⁸⁷⁹; it has the same sense in Russia in southern and western provinces.⁸⁸⁰

In Czech it can mean a definite period of time; it can also mean time in general and, in particular, an hour.⁸⁸¹ The Russian *s-rok* (term) has retained the temporal sense of its root *rok*. In ancient Russian, *rok* has the sense of a definite time, a term, a year, an age; and finally the sense of "fate."⁸⁸²

Rok, rokovoi (fatal), derive from reshchi, to say, i.e, they signify something that has been or is in the process of being declared. According to its root, Rok is declaration. In Czech the word rok signifies speech, word, and hence bethrothal, agreement. 883 In the same way, the word "sud'ba" (fate, destiny) is linked with the notion of judgment; according to Miklosich, 884 the theme *san-dha explains the Greek sun-ti-thē-mi, i.e., to link, to designate by mutual agreement. From the same root dhā one gets the Greek de-mi(d)-s, law, justice.

We find the same thing in Latin. Fatum derives from fa-to-r or, in a more usual form, for, fatus sum, fari, i.e., from the root fa (the Sanskrit bha), and it signifies to speak. Fatum is once again something that is declared. 885 In what sense can Fatum be called a Declaration? According to the Roman belief, the gods—especially Jupiter—establish the lot of men with their declarations, which reveal their will to men and are called fatum or fata. What a god has declared is the fatum of both an individual man and of entire peoples, cities, etc. 886 Thus, "vox enim Jovis fatum est—the voice of Jupiter is fate"887; "fatum esse quidquid Juppiter dixerit—fate is all that which Jupiter declares."888 Thus, "fatum autem dicunt esse quidquid dii fantur, quidquid Juppiter fatur—they call fate all that which the gods declare, that which Jupiter declares."889 And then, fatum, by a device common to Roman thought, 890 is personified and viewed as a special deity, as Fatum. Furthermore, the fullness of divine definitions is symbolized by the figure of Tria Fata, equated with the Greek Trissai Tuchai.891 Finally, in a further process of personification, the neuter is replaced by the more personal masculine or feminine, and Fatum, under the influence of Greek religion, becomes Fatus or Fata.

Epitaphs mention *Fatus meus* and *Fatus suus*, i.e., *Fatus* is viewed as a divine being proper to each individual and guiding his fate. *Fatus* of this kind recalls the ancient Roman *genius*, this ideal double of phenomena and individuals. And then *Fata* might have corresponded to *junon*, i.e., the feminine genius. 892

The Roman *Fatum*, just like the Russian *Rok*, is intertwined with the idea of *time*. Like Time, *Fata* determine fate in a strict order, so that one

can speak of *fatorum ordo*, ⁸⁹³ and *fatorum series* ⁸⁹⁴; they are just as irreversible and inexorable as Time, the "*irreparabile Tempus*" of the Poet: what they have determined cannot be changed. ⁸⁹⁵ *Fata* are pronounced with the birth of a man, for they mark out his fate, for they are *Fata scribunda*. *Fata* give a man spiritual gifts and prescribe the number of years of his life; they prescribe the end of his life; in particular, they are the cause of an untimely end. Like Time, *Fata* are mercilessly powerful; they are "*violenta Fata*." ⁸⁹⁶ "*Nil prosunt lacrimae nec possunt Fata moveri*—tears do not help at all, and the Fates cannot be moved," says an epitaph. They are "*crudelia Fata*"; they kill and rob. *Fata* are the deities of death. ⁸⁹⁷

But if that is the case, then how is *Fata* distinguished from Time. It is not. And in fact, in many epitaphs the words *Fatum*, *Fata*, and *Fatus* are clearly used as synonyms of *Aetas* and *tempus*: One epitaph says: "*Noli dolere, amica, eventum meum; properavit Aetas: hoc dedit Fatus mihi*—do not sorrow, my friend, about my destiny; Time was in a rush; this is the gift Fate gave to me."

"Hunc Fatus suus pressit, vixit annis XII—this one was bent by Fate; he lived 12 years," says another epitaph.

Also: "Noli dolere, mamma, faciendum fuit, properavit Aetas, Fatus quod voluit meus; noli dolere, mater, factui meo, hoc Tempus voluit, hoc fuit Tempus meus—do not sorrow, mama, it had to happen, Time was in a rush, my Fate wanted this; do not sorrow, mother, about my end, Time wanted this, it was my Time." Here Tempus clearly replaces Fatus, which demonstrates that they are equivalent.

Or finally: "Nolite dolere eventum meum, properavit Aetas; hoc dedit Fatum mihi—do not sorrow about my destiny, Time was in a rush: this is the gift Fate gave to me." 899

xxI. The Heart and Its Significance in the Spiritual Life of Man According to Scripture (An extract from P. D. Iurkevich's article⁹⁰⁰) (see p. 195)

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THE heart is the center of the psychic and spiritual life of man. Thus, man's determination to perform one act or another is conceived and born in the heart; diverse intentions and desires arise in the heart. It is the seat of the will and of volitions. These acts, desires, and determinations are illustrated by the following expressions: "I gave my heart to seek" (Eccl. 1:13); "Daniel purposed in his heart" (Dan. 1:8); "and it was in the heart of David" (1 Kings 8:17). The following expressions illustrate the same thing: "My heart's desire" (Rom. 10:1); "as he purposeth in his heart" (2 Cor 9:7; cf. Acts 11:23). Ancient Israel had to bring offerings for the construction of the ark, "whosoever is of a willing heart" (Ex. 35:5), "and they came, every one whose heart stirred him up" (Ex. 35:21). One who has expressed his desires has said "all that [is] in [his] heart" (1 Kings 10:2). When we do something willingly, that means that we have "obeyed from the heart" (Rom. 6:17). One whom we love, to that one we surrender our heart, and, conversely, that one we have in our hearts: "my son, give me thine heart" (Prov. 23:26); "ye are in our hearts" (2 Cor. 7:3); "I have you in my heart" (Phil. 1:7).

The heart is the seat of all the cognitive acts of the soul. Reflection is "the preparation of the heart" (Prov. 16:1), the advising of the heart: "I consulted with my heart" (Neh. 5:7). To perceive "with the heart" is to understand (Deut. 8:5); to perceive "with the whole heart" is to understand wholly (Josh. 23:14). He who does not have a "heart to perceive" does not have "eyes to see and ears to hear" (Deut. 29:4). When the heart becomes leaden, a man loses the ability to notice and to understand the most evident phenomena of Divine Providence: "make their ears heavy and shut their eyes" (Is. 6:10). In general, "every man thinks in his heart" (Gen. 6:5). A wicked man has "a heart that deviseth wicked imaginations" (Prov. 6:18). The false prophets "prophesy . . . the deceit of their heart" (Jer. 14:14); "they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord" (Jer. 23:16). Thoughts are "the counsels of the

hearts" (1 Cor. 4:5). The word of God "is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. 4:12). That which we firmly remember and imprint in our souls, we introduce and inscribe into our hearts: "therefore shall ye lay up these my words in your heart" (Deut. 11:18); "set me as a seal upon thine heart" (Songs 8:6); "Mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart" (Luke 2:19); "write them [words of wisdom] upon the table of thine heart" (Prov. 3:4). All that comes into our mind or into our memory comes "into our heart." In the kingdom of glory the righteous who suffer for truth and faith will not remember the former heavens and earth, nor will they come into the heart (Is. 65:17); "neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him" (1 Cor. 2:9).

Since the word is the manifestation or the expression of thought, it issues "from the heart" (Job 8:10); "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" (Matt. 12:34). And since reflection is the conversation of the soul with itself, one who reflects carries on this inner conversation in his "heart": "I communed with mine own heart" (Eccl. 1:16); "I said in mine heart" (Eccl. 2:1); "that evil servant shall say in his heart" (Matt. 24:48).

The heart is the center of diverse feelings, trepidations, and passions of the soul. The heart experiences all the degrees of joy, from happiness (Is. 65:14) to jubilation before the face of God (Acts 2:46); all the degrees of sorrow, from a mood of dejection—when "the passion of the body afflicts the heart" and when "the dejection of a man afflicts the heart" (Prov. 25:20, 21)—to crushing grief, when a man cries in the sorrow of his heart (Is. 65:14) and when he feels that his "heart trembleth, and is moved out of his place" (Job 37:1); all the degrees of enmity, from jealousy and "bitter envy" (Prov. 23:17) to furious anger in which a man gnashes his teeth (Acts 7:54) and from which his heart is consumed with the desire for vengeance (Deut. 19:6); all the degrees of discontent, from the care which "troubles" a man (Prov. 12:25) to the despair in which he "renounces" all strivings (Eccl. 2:20); and finally, all kinds of fear, from pious fear (Jer. 32:40) to crushing horror and confusion (Deut. 28:28). The heart melts and is tormented by anguish (Jer. 4:19). Depending on the type of suffering, it is "like wax" (Ps. 22:14), it is "withered" (Ps. 102:4), it is "hot" and burns (Ps. 39:3; Ps. 73:21), or it is "broken" (Jer. 23:9; Ps. 147:3). In dejection a man is "fearful and fainthearted" (Deut. 20:8). From compassion a heart is "turned" (Hosea 11:8). The divine word of grace acts in the heart like a "devouring fire" (Jer. 20:9); the heart catches fire and burns when the ray of the divine words touches it (Luke 24:32).

Finally, the heart is the center of man's moral life. All the moral states of man are united in the heart, from the most elevated mystical love of God, which cries: "God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever" (Ps. 73:26), to that pride which, deifying itself, lifts up its heart and

says "I am God" (Eze. 28:2). Suffering different moral infirmities, the heart is darkened (Rom. 1:21), becomes fat (Is. 6:10), hardened (Is. 63:17), stony (Ez. 11:19), inhuman, bestial. There is an "evil heart" (Jer. 16:12), a vain heart, a "foolish heart" (Rom. 1:21). The heart is the origin of all that is good and evil in the words, thoughts, and deeds of man; it is the good or evil treasure of man: "a good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil" (Luke 6:45). It is the table on which is written the natural moral law; thus, pagans "show the work of the law written in their hearts" (Rom. 2:15). On this table is also written the law of grace: "Hearken unto me, the people in whose heart is my law" (Is. 51:7), says the Lord. "I will put my law [the law of grace] . . . in their hearts" (Jer. 31:33). The word of God is "sown in the heart" (Matt. 13:19); the conscience has its seat "in the heart" (Heb. 10:22). Christ dwells in the heart by faith (Eph. 3:17), and He gives "the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts" (2 Cor. 1:22). "And let the peace of God rule in your hearts" (Col. 3:15); "because love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit" (Rom 5:5). For the light of grace "hath shined in our hearts" (2 Cor. 4:6). But on the other hand, the devil puts evil designs into the heart of the sinner (John 13:2), fills his heart with lies (Acts 5:3). To inattentive listeners of the word of God, "Satan comes to take away the word that was sown in their hearts" (Mark 4:15).

As the center of the corporeal and diverse spiritual life of man, the heart is called the origin or source of life: "keep thy heart with diligence, for out of it are the issues of life" (Prov. 4:23). It is [?] "the wheel of our birth" (James 3:6), whose revolution encompasses our entire life. Thus, it comprises the most profound part of our being: "the heart is deeper than all things, and who can know it?" (Jer. 17:9). The external manifestations of word, thought, and deed never exhaust this source; "the hidden man of the heart" (1 Pet. 3:4) is open only to God: "he knoweth the secrets of the heart" (Ps. 44:21). The state of the heart expresses the entire state of the soul (Ps. 51:10; 84:2). Man must give his heart to God in order to become faithful to Him in thought, in word, and in deed: "my son, give me thine heart" (Prov. 23:26) is what God's wisdom calls out to man.

XXII. An Icon of the Annunciation with Cosmic Symbolism (see p. 255)

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In discussing the cosmic aspect of the Mother of God, I cannot silently pass by the rather enigmatic icon of the Annunciation that I "found" in the church of the village of Novinskove in the Nerekht district of the Kostroma province. I say "found" because this icon was in a state of neglect and lay on a windowsill covered by a layer of dust and dirt so thick that the image could not be seen at all. I noticed this icon during my confession, and for some inexplicable reason it attracted my attention. And so at the first opportunity I returned to this village and applied myself to cleaning and washing the icon. After about two hours of work, there appeared on the recessed golden field of the icon a finely detailed image with a multitude of the most intricate features and figures, rendered very painstakingly; there must have been more than 150 figures. Judging by the composition, this icon dates back either to the end of the 17th century or to the beginning of the 18th century. It is about $5 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$ vershoks in size^a but let me point out that I give this information, along with the rest of the description, chiefly from memory, three years after I examined the icon. True, I attempted to photograph it, but the inconvenient photography conditions and an unsuitable camera prevented this intention. Therefore, I append here a sketch of the icon, which for the most part is done from memory after three years.

The composition of the icon has three elements: dogmatic, church-historical, and cosmological. The latter element is not only the most interesting for us, but occupies the central place in the icon; it is this element which constitutes the icon "itself," while all the rest is clarifications and deepenings. What do we see here, in this nucleus of the icon? The first thing to catch the eye is a *vermilion* ring speckled with *golden stars*. In this ring is inscribed a rhomboid figure with concave sides. At its center is placed an equilateral triangle with an All-Seeing Eye, surrounded by a nimbus. At the sides of the rhomboid figure are placed four symbols for the seasons of the year with corresponding inscriptions: a bare branch covered with snow signifying winter; flowers signifying spring; an ear of grain signifying summer; and fruits (?) signifying autumn. Finally, in the gaps between the rhomboid figure and the ring, opposite the symbols of

^a Approximately 22 × 15.5 centimeters.



the seasons, are twelve small circles with the signs of the zodiac; these circles are arranged in groups of three in accordance with the seasons of the year. The background of each group corresponds to the season to which it refers. Thus, the winter signs of the zodiac are represented on a background of branches covered with snow; the summer signs are represented on a ripe field; the spring and autumn signs are represented on a green landscape.

Closest to this central part of the composition is a representation of the Annunciation placed at the sides of the circle described above. To the left (for the viewer) of the circle is a candlestand with seven burning candles, while above it is an archangel in the clouds. To the right of the circle and symmetrically with respect to the candlestand, there is placed a very indistinct image whose meaning I could not decipher; while above this image is the Virgin. Above Her, and to the right is a nimbus and in it there is

something like a face (the sun?), while to the left there is a circle with the Paraclete, flying upward.

Finally, in the upper part of the icon, amid clouds and assemblies of angels and saints, God the Father (?) is represented and before Him angelic figures are kneeling. The nimbus emanating from Him appears to be completed partly by three concentric figures composed of tiny angelic heads with spread wings; and it appears partly to pass further, through them. These angelic figures are drawn, accordingly, on a background of three colored rings: the inner ring is green, the middle ring is pink; the outer ring is sky-blue.

What does this original composition signify? Without attempting to explain it (a separate careful study would be required for that purpose), I will hazard the guess that this work is an illustration of the phrases of the acathistus: the Mother of God is "the sanctification of all the earthly and heavenly elements,"901 "the blessing of all the seasons of the year,"902 for the moment of the Annunciation, when creation in the person of the Mother of God received Divinity, contains all of Eternity and Eternity contains the whole fullness of the times and seasons. Cosmically, the feast of the Annunication is the feast of the vernal equinox; whereas at the present time the celebration of the Annuciation is held thirteen days from the equinox, 903 in the 2nd century the equinox was celebrated on March 24, i.e., it was the feast of spring. And just as the moment of vernal equinox contains, as in a seed, the whole fullness of the cosmic year, so the feast of the Annuciation contains, as in a bud, the whole fullness of the church year. Further, both the cosmic year and the church year are images of the ontological year—the fullness of the times and seasons of the whole history of the world. The whole history of the world is contained in the Virgin Mary, and the Virgin Mary is wholly expressed in the moment of the Annunication.

It is precisely this infinitely full moment, this moment of the fullness of being, that is visibly represented by the icon described here.

XXIII. On the Methodology of the Historical Critique (see p. 262)

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THE century of the historical critique, the 19th, changed the character of the attacks of unfaith against the Church by transferring the battle from the field of philosophy to the field of history. The authenticity or inauthenticity of a historical document becomes a major object of passionate disputes in the 19th century. But the very acuteness of these disputes compels one to think that the common tacit premise of the disputing sides was the presupposition that one's opponent could be convinced, that one or the other of the opinions would sooner or later inevitably come out on top, and that this victory would have the necessity of an "objective" scientific theorem and be independent of the general convictions of the disputing sides. This *historical rationalism*, i.e., the belief in the rational provability of historical theses, is, of course, not more than a methodological naivete. It is based on inattention and an uncritical attitude toward the notion of "probability" and its derivatives, especially toward the notions of "mathematical expectation" 904 and "moral expectation,"905 developed formally in the theory of probability and constituting explicitly or implicitly the fundamental notions of any historical science.

In effect, it is insufficient to say "I know." It is also necessary to define the degree of one's knowledge, to characterize the "quantity of knowledge."906 In other words, according to Laplace's apt phrase, the common sense with which historical science is usually satisfied must be "translated into calculation"907 so that we acquire for the first time the possibility of consciously assimilating our knowledge. Thus it is clear that, being conscious of the incompleteness of our knowledge, we should try to clarify its measure to ourselves. The 19th century was marked at its very beginning by the critique of knowledge, whereas the 20th century is producing a critique of the *methods* of knowledge. The result of this critique is that at the present time it is no longer necessary to explain in detail the idea expressed some time ago by the brilliant Stanley Jevons: namely that "almost every problem in science takes the form of the balancing of probabilities"908 and that consequently there cannot be any rational certitude with regard to any solution of the a posteriori sciences, but only some degree of likelihood. The passage from effects to causes and from facts to their genesis is always *only* probable and this probability is determined by the laws discovered by Bernoulli, Chebyshev, and others. Only infinite experience could give certain knowledge; the probability in our knowledge is a reflection of the potential infinity of experience. This holds for physics, for astronomy, for chemistry, and especially for the historical disciplines.

However, in these disciplines the problem is posed in a special way. In effect, science is concerned here not with a thesis that is more or less indifferent for spiritual culture but with a spiritual *value*, in the preservation or demolition of which everyone is more or less interested. Therefore, we do not have the power, or the right, to consider some hypothesis concerning a historical given without regard to the value that our heart attributes to this given. Therefore, when we pose some hypothesis concerning a monument of spiritual culture, we absolutely cannot (and indeed should not) explore it independently of our *valuation* of this monument, even though the valuation itself, in turn, depends on the character of the hypothesis. Of course, there is a pragmatic element in every science, but in the sciences of culture these elements refer not only to the entire worldview but also to each of its parts.

In the natural sciences, certain fundamental propositions are grounded pragmatically; and the consequences flow purely externally, logically from the premises. However, in the sciences of culture, each proposition, each step is worked out in view of a certain final goal. Here we have the same difference as between a mechanism and an organism. In the former, only the general plan is purposive, whereas its parts are joined purely externally. In the latter, there is not a single cell that is not goal-directed, and the organism is thoroughly organized. It might be possible to assess approximately "objectively" the probability of a hypothesis (always only a hypothesis!) concerning the composition of some mineral; but it would be clearly absurd to pretend to an "objective" judgment concerning the authenticity of some relic, concerning the origin of the Holy Scripture, or, even, concerning the date of the writing of Plato's dialogues or Homer's poems. And anyone who imagines that he has irrefutably "proved" anything in these questions has evidently never posed for himself the critical problem of the nature of historical methods. It is necessary to renounce decisively any arguments at all with him until he-at least on an elementary level—studies the theory of probabilities, this "most magnificent of the mind's creations."909

Every judgment and every rational conclusion in the domain of the historical sciences is a judgment with a coefficient of probability. ⁹¹⁰ If a judgment or a rational conclusion is expressed by the formula

$$a \subset b$$
.

then in any case a historical judgment and a historical conclusion should be expressed by the formula

$$a \subset_{p} b$$
,

where the symbol \subset_p signifies implication considered as a function of the parameter p, i.e., the probability of the relation $a \subset b$. Language confirms that the implication has degrees of probability, for it gives a multiplicity of expressions corresponding to different nuances of this implication. For the sake of clarity, let us present some of these expressions in a table, which represents a ladder of steps of the "moral expectation" of some hypothesis, i.e., the spectrum of the degrees of the firmness of our belief or lack of belief in the hypothesis:

·	
+∞	absolutely yes certainly yes undoubtedly
	yes
+	evidently yes
	apparently yes
	probably yes
	seemingly yes
	possibly yes
	perhaps yes
	maybe yes it could be
	it could be
0	I don't know; God knows; yes and no
	maybe no
	as if no
	perhaps no
	possibly no
	seemingly no
	probably no
_	apparently no
	evidently no
	no
	undoubtedly no
	certainly no
_ ∞	absolutely no
	•

Thus, when we study some document, we consider *it itself* as a certain *value* α as well as its *authenticity*, which is never absolute but is always only more or less *probable*; i.e., we study its degree of authenticity, of probability, measured by the coefficient p. However, neither α nor p is given to us separately, for we cannot judge the value of a work independent

dently of the problem of its origin nor can we form a judgment about its origin independently of its value. The quantities p and α are always given to us *together* in real life, in the form of the product p α , which is called "the mathematical expectation." It is this product, denoted as P, which should be the object of the investigation of any conscious critique. The attempt to determine the value of p separately and the value of α separately is a naive dream of the impossible, and of the unnecessary. The essential thing for us is to determine what the importance of P consists in. The value of P is determined either by the importance of p or by the importance of α , or by both at the same time. Here, p is always positive and a regular fraction, i.e., greater than zero and less than unity, for the case of the possible authenticity of a certain work is *never* excluded just as the possibility of its inauthenticity is *never* absolutely excluded. As for α , it extends from $-\infty$ to $+\infty$, so that

0

and

 $-\infty < \alpha < +\infty$.

It is possible that in certain cases instead of the value of α one should take the Bernoulli value⁹¹² or, if it is considered insufficiently exact, some function $\varphi(\alpha)$, so that instead of the "mathematical expectation" P we get the "moral expectation" $Q = p\varphi(\alpha)$ or $Q' = \psi(p,\alpha)$.

However, one way or another, it is clear that in the case of very large values of α , i.e., in the case of a highly valuable monument, even a small probability of its authenticity can nevertheless conserve a substantial mathematical expectation P or moral expectation Q or Q'. We encounter precisely this case in connection with the Letter of the Mother of God we examined earlier. For even if its p were small (but it is, after all, not zero), nevertheless its α is so immeasurably great that the P we get is substantial. And since α is determined not by science but by other activities of the spirit—and in particular the α of spiritual works is determined by the Church—it is clear that, in the final analysis, the Church can give α a value as high as it wants. In other words, only the Church—not science has the power to certify the authenticity or inauthenticity of a monument. And therefore only faith or unfaith in the Church—and hence in its creativity—is decisive for our historical convictions, and therefore determines the entire structure of scientific thought. In science as well as in morality, there are "two paths": the path of faith and the path of unfaith, "and the difference between them is great."

In order to make these considerations entirely concrete, let us clarify them with an analogy. Let us imagine that we own a certain property that someone is attempting to take away from us by legal means, through a trial. However, it cannot be said about any trial that it will necessarily end in favor of the plaintiff, just as it cannot be said that it will necessarily end in favor of the defendant. A trial is a balancing of probabilities, and however little hope the defendant has that the plaintiff will lose the case the possibility cannot be excluded that he will not lose the property that he owns. Thus, if the case has begun, will he really abandon his property because he fears the *possible* loss of the case. And if the probability of keeping his property α is p, then the degree of the firmness p with which he will defend his right to his property will be expressed not at all through p but through p α or through p α 0—through the "mathematical" or "moral" expectation of winning of the case. And meanwhile he will continue to use the property. In the same way, possessing spiritual capital and the properties of spiritual culture, the Church does not renounce them because unfaith has taken it to court. The Church continues to use them, and the degree of its staunchness in the battle for its property is expressed by the value of the mathematical or moral expectation of winning its case.

The burden of proof lies on the plaintiff, and a believer should worry about whether the Book of Genesis was really written by Moses not more than a landowner would worry about whether the land he has inherited was acquired by his great-grandfather or great-great-grandfather. The greater the value of the land, the less he will be willing to forgo his right and therefore the less convincing will be for him the arguments of his opponent. If this value is infinitely great, then even the shadow of a hope, even the most negligible probability of winning the case, is sufficient to make him disregard the arguments that seem all-powerful to his opponent. And who can prove that there is not the slightest hope? Faith is necessarily connected with risk and with fortitude. But that is also the case with science, even natural science.

"Having once made a well-thought-out choice," says Jevons, "the natural scientist has the perfect right to remain unshakeably faithful to his theory. He does not neglect any objection, for there is always the chance that he will encounter a fatal one; he will always have in sight the insignificance of the powers of the human mind as compared to the task that confronts it. He will see that no theory can be harmonized with all the objections, because there can be many causes to prevent this and the very consequences of the theory can have a complexity that research over several generations will not be able to exhaust. If, therefore, the theory exhibits certain astonishing coincidences with the facts, it should not be rejected until at least one decisive divergence with the facts is demonstrated; however, here one should make sure that there is no error in establishing this divergence. Science and philosophy also sometimes require risk." ⁹¹³

In sum, the procedures of the historical critique, which sometimes seem mercilessly logical to the naive mind, are, to the same degree as the con-

victions of the believing heart, actually fact based on faith. In essence, it is not the procedures that are different (they are the same, for the structure of the human mind does not change), but the faiths on which the procedures are based. On the one hand, there is faith in unfaith, faith in this transitory and corrupt world; on the other, there is faith in faith, faith in another, eternal and spiritual world. On the one hand, there is faith in the laws of the world below; on the other, there is faith in the laws of the world above. And every man expresses himself according to his faith, revealing the aspirations of his heart in the apparently objective procedures of proof. "Where your treasure is, there will your heart also be" (Matt. 6:21). And the heart aspires toward the place where this treasure, this value, is, i.e., the entire being is "oriented" toward this value. Therefore, if someone surrenders to the arguments of the historical critique, this does not mean that they are founded but that he has become weak in his faith and that his soul secretly desires this thing it will perish with.

xxIV. The Turquoise Environment of Sophia and the Symbolism of Sky-Blue and Dark-Blue (see p. 271)

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THE significance—indicated in the text—of the circles around Sophia can be confirmed by the symbolism of sky-blue and of colors akin and close to sky-blue. (Let us note here that we will use their names as synonymous, for, strictly speaking, the discussion will concern the color of the sky, and the sky has very different shades—ranging from dark-blue to pale turquoise—in different lands and at different times of the day and year.) Blueness, as is well known, symbolizes air, sky, and therefore the presence of Divinity in the world through His creativity, through His powers. Thus, Philo⁹¹⁴ sees in the sky-blue (*tehelet*, sky-blue, *coeruleus*, hyacinth) garment of the high priest (Ex. 28:5) the symbol of air; Josephus Flavius, 915 explaining the colors chosen for the Tabernacle and the high priest's garment, interprets hyacinth or sky-blue as symbolizing air and the hyacinth tiara as symbolizing the sky; St. Jerome⁹¹⁶ repeats Flavius' explanations. This naturalistic interpretation is naturally linked to a moral interpretation. Thomas Aquinas⁹¹⁷ sees in the color hyacinth the contemplation of heavenly things. Indeed, the Israelites had to place on the borders of their garments "ribbands" of hyacinth "that ye"—said the Lord—"may look upon it, and remember all the commandments of the Lord, and do them; and that we seek not after your own heart and your own eyes, after which ye use to go a whoring: That ye may remember, and do all my commandments, and be holy unto your God" (Num. 15:39–40; cf. Deut. 22:12). Thus, sky-blue is a symbol of that which is opposite to debauchery and the falling away from God—a symbol of spiritual purity and chastity. St. Jerome⁹¹⁸ says that the hyacinth garment of the high priest, representing the color of air, symbolizes the elevation of the heart above earthly things. Thomas Aquinas⁹¹⁹ sees in this garment the image of communication with heaven through works of perfecting. He adds that hyacinth fringes on garments were a symbol of aspiration toward heaven—which must rule all actions. 920

Modern interpretations are similar to these. Thus, according to O. Weininger, "sky-blue is the color of joy and the bliss of higher life. Red is the color of hell, the opposite of the blue of heaven." ⁹²¹

In view of this symbolism of sky-blue, Contemplative Theology is the only one of the seven figures representing the seven heavenly sciences on Simon Memmi's fresco in the Spanish Chapel of Santa Maria Novella in Florence that is depicted in sky-blue and red garments, while Practical Theology is depicted in green garments, Mystical Theology is depicted in white garments, both Polemical Theology and Civil Law are depicted in red garments, and Ecclesiatical Law is depicted in gold and white garments. 922

Moreover, in the same church, on Giotto's (1276–1333) fresco depicting St. Francis of Assisi's renunciation of the world, "the wrathful father is clothed in red, changeable like passion, while the mantle with which the bishop covers St. Francis is sky-blue—symbol of heavenly peace." Let us add that this arrangement of colors is not at all by chance: Giotto is one of the greatest color-symbolists; he not only follows the conventional color-symbolism of tradition but creates new symbols for each painting, which means that he personally experiences them. 923

Again, for the same reason, the dark-blue color of mosaics is particularly suitable for the decoration of churches, for it brings the soul of the praying person into unutterable trepidation. "Extraordinarily and somehow unfathomably deep is the very dark blue color on the ceiling of the mausoleum of Galla Placidia," says a traveler, 924 describing the Ravenna mosaics of the 5th century. "Depending on the play of light penetrating here through small windows, the ceiling amazingly and unexpectedly assumes green, violet, or crimson shades. . . . At the sight of all this magnificence, one involuntarily thinks that mankind has never created a better artistic means for the decoration of church walls. . . . The air shining with dark-blue fire that enshrouds the sarcophagus is worthy of being a dream of flaming religious imagination. Was this not what the artists of stained-glass windows in Gothic cathedrals aspired to attain, but in a different way?"

The most systematic and detailed investigation of the symbolism of colors is that of F. Portal. Portal

"Divine language is directed first toward all people and reveals to them the existence of God; symbolism is the language of all nations just as religion is the property of every family; every father is a king and priest.

"Sacred language has its birth in holy places; it governs the symbolism of architecture, sculpture, and painting as well as cultic rituals and priestly garments; this first materialization confines Divine language under impenetrable veils.

"Then, *profane* language, the material expression of symbols, is the food cast to the nations that have converted to idolatry." ⁹²⁶

Thus, every symbol has three aspects; the same thing must be said in particular about color symbols. "The history of symbolic colors bears witness to this three-fold origin; every nuance has different meanings in each of the three languages—divine, sacred, and profane." 927

In particular, sky-blue, the azure of the heavenly vault, originally signifies—in divine language—eternal Divine truth; then, in sacred language, it becomes a symbol of human immortality, and, thence, it becomes the color of death, the color of grief and mourning. Finally, in profane language it signifies faithfulness. "Thus, from the dogma of eternal wisdom man passes to the perception of his own immortality; dogmas are forgotten, the symbol becomes material, and, in our day, it has only the meaning of faithfulness." ⁹²⁸

According to Portal, color symbolism is based on the derivation of all colors from *light and darkness*. Red, the color of divine love, and white, the color of divine wisdom, directly emanate from Light; yellow, emanating from red and white, is the symbol of the revelation of the love and wisdom of God. Sky-blue also emanates from red and white; it signifies divine wisdom, revealed through life, the spirit or breath of God; it is the symbol of the spirit of truth; it indicates the disclosure of love and wisdom in works; it was the symbol of love and the rebirth of the soul through ascetic acts. In other words, one can note three moments at the base of the symbolism:

- 1. Being in itself [according to the conception developed in our book, this is God in Himself, the Father and the Triunity]; here red and white predominate.
- 2. The revelation of life [according to the conception developed in our book, this is Logos in the world and Sophia]; here the symbols are yellow and sky-blue.
- 3. The effect that is produced by this [according to the conception developed in our book, this is Creation quickened by the Holy Spirit]; here the symbol is the color green. 929

Without touching upon other fundamental aspects of the symbolism of colors, let us pass directly to an examination of Portal's views on the three meanings of the color sky-blue. 930

First of all, Portal speaks of the significance of the color sky-blue in *divine* language. Air and therefore azure, the color of air, symbolize the Holy Spirit, our investigator points out, referring to the tale in the Holy Scripture about the descent of the Spirit (Acts 2) and to the Lord's conversation with Nicodemus (John 3:8). Further, the significance of sky-blue as a symbol of creative divine wisdom is established.

The red-horned *sky-blue* ram of the Hindus which Agni mounts; *sky-blue* Jupiter-Ammon with a ram's horns; the sense of *fire* in the word azure in eastern languages; Zeus considered as ethereal fire by the Greeks, according to Clement of Alexandria—all this indicates, according to Portal, the union of wisdom and love in the supreme deity.

In cosmogonies, divine wisdom always creates the world; therefore God the Creator is always of a *sky-blue* color. Thus, in Hindustan, Vishnu was born of azure, and, when he is depicted as creating the world, he is rendered as having a sky-blue body. In Egypt, the supreme deity, the creator of the universe, Kneph, was painted in the color sky-blue. In Greece [?], azure is the color of Jupiter, the father of gods and people. In China, the sky is the supreme deity, while in Christian symbolism the azure vault is the mantle that covers and envelops Divinity. Eternal Truth made incarnate on earth is also symbolized by azure, as saving and, as it were, re-creating mankind. Among the Hindus, Krishna, in the myth about whom one can find some analogies with the Gospel and perhaps even some direct borrowings, is depicted as having a sky-blue body. In the same way, Ammon, the Divine Word of the Egyptians, was depicted, according to Eusebius, ⁹³¹ in the color azure, and it is thus that he appears on Egyptian images.

Let us now pass to *sacred* language. Here, three sky-blue colors are distinguished: one derived from red, another from white, and one close to black. These colors differ in nuances but merge into one. The sky-blue that is derived from red represents ethereal fire; it signifies heavenly love of truth. In mysteries it refers to baptism by fire. The sky-blue that is derived from white indicates the truth of faith; it refers to the Biblical waters of life or to baptism by the spirit. The sky-blue that is close to black brings us to cosmogony, to the Divine Spirit hovering above chaos; it refers to natural baptism.

These three forms of one and the same color correspond to the three main stages of ancient initiation and the triple baptism of Christianity: by water, Spirit, and fire. These three stages were represented by the colors red, skyblue, and green.

Green, black, and dark-blue (all these are one symbol) indicate a world born in the womb of primordial waters, and the first degree of initiation.

Azure represents the rebirth or spiritual formation of man, while red represents sanctification. The primordial chaos above which the Spirit hovered, the creation of Adam, and the sanctification of the sabbath—that is how the Bible depicts these three stages.

Pagan deities were symbols of the attributes of God and the rebirth of man. Therefore, when Vishnu represents the final stage of rebirth, he is green or dark-blue. Saturn, Memnon, Osiris-Serapis, Kneph-Ammon-Agathodemon-Nilus, Vishnu-Narayana, Krishna, and Buddha were all black or dark-blue; and all of these deities have some relation to water. Krishna is the incarnation

of divine truth, and therefore his body is azure; but, descending into the conditions of human existence, he is subject to the temptations of evil, and Indian symbolism also renders him in the colors dark-blue and black. Plutarch says that Osiris was black in color, for water darkens the substances that it saturates. Under this popular explanation it is easy to grasp the basic idea, i.e., the idea of God setting chaos into motion.

Saturn's statue was made of black stone, and his priests were also black, in sky-blue garments with iron rings.

When a king visited a temple of this deity, his retinue was dressed in skyblue or black. The opposition between these two colors represents the stuggle between life and death in the spiritual state and in the material state, which is disclosed in time; and Saturn is the symbol of Time. The temple and statue of Mercury were made of sky-blue stones; one of his arms was white and the other was black; Macrobius gives him one white wing and one sky-blue wing, while other mythographers give him one white wing and one black wing. Associated with black, sky-blue is the attribute of the initiate, who smashes the gates of spiritual death with the power of the truth; white signifies perfect rebirth.

The myth of the Argonauts, which has a mysterial significance, relates a sacrifice made to Juno and Neptune in the Cyaneae, in the dark-blue narrows between the islands. But Juno-air is the symbol of heavenly truth while Neptune-water is the symbol of natural truth. Neptune was clothed in green, and black bulls were sacrificed to him; a sky-blue bull was sacrificed to Juno. We find smiliar symbols in Christianity as well as among the Chinese, in Lao-Tzu.

Azure, in its absolute significance, represents heavenly truth; that which is true, that which is in itself, is eternal, just as, conversely, that which is transient is false. For this reason, azure was the usual symbol of divine eternity and human immortality, and it has therefore naturally become the color of mourning.

The Egyptian high priest wore a sapphire on his chest, and "this decoration was called Truth," as Aelian⁹³² reports. Furthermore, it is well known that on this stone was inscribed the image of the goddess of Truth or Justice (Heb. Thme'), whose name THM, or THME, signifies in Hebrew justice and truth. The Hebrew high priest wore on his chest a stone which had the same name: Truth, Justice, THMIM. 933 The name sapphire, SPIR, or SPHIR, is formed from the Hebrew root SPR, or SPHR, which means to write, to speak, to glorify, to praise, writer, writing, book. These various names indicate the word, written or spoken speech, the wisdom of God contained in the Sepher of the Hebrews or the Bible. 934 In mysteries, the Egyptian high priest was clad in a sky-blue garment, speckled with stars and encircled by a yellow belt. It is the same with Aaron. This garment is the symbol of the guardians of eternal truth; in relation to people, azure (as we have said) is a symbol of immortality. In Egyptian tombs, sky-blue figurines and amulets abound. This color is the symbol of the soul aspiring toward eternity. In China, sky-blue is the color of the dead, the symbol of souls after death, while red is the color of the living.

In Christian symbolism, Christ in the sepulcher was sometimes depicted with a light-blue face and encircled by sky-blue bands;⁹³⁵ one of the angels

was also painted with a sky-blue nimbus. In the miniatures of certain manuscripts, sky-blue, once again, is the symbol of death. 936

According to Mone, the Virgin after the death of Christ often apears clad in sky-blue; therefore, according to Guigniaut's comment, the priest during Lent is often clad in sky-blue and, before Holy Week, images of Christ are covered (among the Catholics) with veils of the same color.⁹³⁷

In these rites we see the first stage of materialization: the symbol of divine eternity and human immortality becomes an emblem of bodily death. "Skyblue"—says La Mothe-Levayer—"is considered the color of death over a large part of the East, where the mourning garments can only be sky-blue, and where no one would dare to appear at an audience before the king in a garment of so mournful a character, just as no one would pronounce the unpleasant word 'death' in the presence of the king."

These customs show us a symbol that has become fully material. But the final stage of materialization is expressed by *profane* language. The color of the celestial vault, azure, was in divine language a symbol of eternal truth; in sacred language, it was a symbol of immortality; in the language of the people, it becomes a symbol of faithfulness.

Scarabs of sky-blue stone decorated the rings of Egyptian warriors; there are many of them in collections of antiquities; these rings were symbols of the vow of faithfulness given by soldiers. According to Horus Apollo, 939 the scarab was a symbol of courage. The ring on which its image was inscribed and which soldiers were obliged to wear signified, according to Aelian, 940 that all who fought should be men, that is, that they they should remain faithful to the vow taken by them. 941 In heraldry, sky-blue signifies chastity, legitimacy, faithfulness, and therefore a worthy reputation. 942

The theory of the origin of colors from light and darkness is expounded symbolically by Portal as a visible image of religious and theosophical conceptions. Widespread in antiquity, this theory originally was in fact such, but as was the case with other religious symbols as well, this visible image of the world above became self-sufficient, a schema of the world below. In other words, that which before was the signified reality of the other world has now become an abstract auxiliary concept of this world, and that which before was the signifier—i.e., symbolic language, the symbol itself—has now become the signified reality, a sensory representation. The relationship between higher and lower being has become distorted, and the theosophical symbol has degenerated, therefore, into a physical or psychophysical theory. The symbol itself has been corrupted in this way and become crude, while its significance, having become detached from its own body, has become an abstract moralism, allegorically, i.e., conventionally and accidentally, linked to one sensory language or another. Here is an example of how the corruption of spiritual science gave rise to profane science, this prodigal daughter who does not know her own mother.

We find an example of this degenerate religious symbolism as early as Plato, 943 in his scientific theory of the origin of colors from light and darkness. True, one can entirely admit the possibility that Plato is playing the fool for the uninitiated, who cannot be entrusted with the mysteries of the world above. But even if this be the case, this penchant precisely for quasiscientific fool-playing is characteristic of Plato's age: the conditions of the time required it. Later, this quasi-scientific language was conclusively transformed into science and lost any hint of its higher meaning. 944

Being repeated in different variants a multitude of times over the entire history of antiquity and the Middle Ages, this theory finds an echo in Leonardo da Vinci, and there, as always, it arises in connection with direct observations of the artist's eye, sophisticated in distinguishing colors.

"The color white"—says Leonardo—"we shall liken to the light without which one cannot see any color; yellow we shall liken to earth; green to water; blue to air; red to fire; and black to darkness, situated above the element of fire, for there is no matter or dense substance there, which solar rays could strike and illuminate." Blue and green are not elementary colors in themselves. The first is composed of light and darkness, like the blue of the air, which is composed of the perfectly black and the perfectly white." 946

But, as is well known, this theory receives its most magnificent development and most painstaking treatment in Goethe. He shall not expound here Goethe's explanation of the origin of colors from the participation of turbid media. Let us only consider Goethe's clarifications in connection with *the psychology of colors*, that is, the general effects on the psyche that are produced by perceptions of colors. In other words, we shall direct our attention to the psychological foundations of the symbolism of colors, for, of course, a certain color becomes a symbol for us of one idea or another owing to the fact that it provokes in us a foreshadowing of this idea as it were, inclines us to this idea, suggesting something akin to it.

All colors, both in their origin and in their psychic effect, are divisible, according to Goethe, into two groups, *positive* and *negative*.

"The colors of the positive side (*Plusseite*) are yellow, red-yellow (orange), yellow-red (red lead, cinnabar). They produce in one a bold, vital, spirited mood." The colors of the negative side (*Minusseite*) are blue, red-blue, and blue-red. They produce in one an anxious mood, meek and contemplative."

Yellow, according to Goethe, is "the color closest to light," ⁹⁵⁰ the first appearance of light in matter as it were. On the other hand, blue is the subtlest darkness, as if the most transilluminated matter. ⁹⁵¹

"Just as yellow always brings with it light, so, one could say, blue always brings with it something dark." Blue is something incomprehensible. "This color produces on the eye a special and almost inexpress-

ible effect. As a color, it is energy; but it stands on the negative side, and, in its highest purity, it is a Nothing that excites. It is a kind of contradictory combination of excitation and rest in visual perception."⁹⁵³ Blue deepens reality and, creating a perspective of air, spiritualizes what is seen, as it were. "Just as we see the high sky and distant mountains as blue, so a blue surface appears to retreat before us."⁹⁵⁴ The soul finds rest in blue. "Just as we willingly follow with our eyes an attractive object that moves before us, so we willingly peer into what is blue—not because it advances upon us, but because it attracts us to itself."⁹⁵⁵ "Blue gives us the sense of cold and also reminds us of shadows. We know how it issues from black."⁹⁵⁶ "A room with pure-blue wallpaper seems to us spacious perhaps, but, more often, it will seem empty and cold."⁹⁵⁷ "Blue glass makes objects appear in a sad light."⁹⁵⁸ "It is pleasant if blue belongs, to some degree, on the plus side. The green of the sea is rather a caressing (*liebliche*) color."⁹⁵⁹

Goethe's theory of colors has two aspects: psycho-physiological and physico-philosophical. In its further development the two aspects became separated, though hardly to the benefit of the theory. The psychophysiological side was developed by the physicist Thomas Seebeck, 960 by L. Henning, 961 and, in part, by the famous physiologist Johan Müller 962; but the most consistent attempt to ground Goethe's theory physiologically was made by Schopenhauer. 963 From the physico-philosophical side this theory was developed and grounded by Hegel⁹⁶⁴ and, in part, by Schelling. 965 We shall not present their theories; we shall only remark that, according to Hegel, "blue corresponds to meekness, to an expression full of intelligence and the soul's respose, to the sentimental [in the good old sense of the word] tendency, since it originates in darkness that does not produce opposites."966 But whatever the intrinsic value of all of these groundings, they do not give anything substantial for the clarification of the nature of blue as a symbol, and we can refrain from expounding them.

Let us now examine some of the particulars of this symbolism.

Considering the symbolic properties and direct effects on man of these colors, one begins to understand the mysterious power attributed to precious stones, especially sky-blue, dark-blue, and violet ones. For in gems the ancients mainly directed their attention at their color, and it is thus in the color that one must mainly look for their mysterious power. ⁹⁶⁷ This is made clear by the fact that gems that are identical or almost identical in all respects except color have very different mystical and symbolic significances. ⁹⁶⁸ Of the dark-blue and sky-blue gems the most remarkable is sapphire. Indeed, the Middle Ages believed that sky-blue sapphire had the power to cool passions, and therefore, priests and other persons who consecrated themselves to chastity could wear them. ⁹⁶⁹ In the same way, it was believed in antiquity that violet amethyst had the

power to counteract drunkenness, both physical, from wine, and spiritual—whence its name, *amethustos*, from the negative prefix a and $methu\bar{o}$, "I make drunk." 970

Sapphire (Heb. 'even sappr), in whose likeness the throne of the Lord's glory in Ezekiel's vision (Eze. 1:26) was made, signifies in the vision, in all probability, the heavenly firmanent, the sky. But one should not be deceived by the name of this stone: the sapphire of the ancients is not at all the sapphire of modern mineralogy or of the Middle Ages, but rather the azure gem, lapis lazuli, or, in the opinion of some authors, the modern turquoise. The may be that, having in mind Ezekiel's vision, people started to use slabs of lapis lazuli for altars, with the same significance as the sapphire of the vision; the deep blue of this stone resembles the color of the southern sky, while gold sparkles scattered all over it resemble stars. The same significance as the sapphire of the vision; the deep blue of this stone resembles the color of the southern sky, while gold sparkles scattered all over it resemble stars.

Therefore, it is precisely out of this stone that the sphere for the marble group of the Holy Trinity on the tomb of St. Ignatius in Rome was carved.⁹⁷³ The sky-blue sphere signifies in general the celestial sphere, the sky. 974 Here we encounter once again the fundamental significance of sky-blue and dark blue, i.e., their significance as symbols of the sky, and, thence, we encounter all the derivative meanings we mentioned above. But all of these derivative meanings, evidently different for different authors and in different times, are very definitely united in the notion of spirituality. This also does not exclude the significance of sapphire indicated by Joannes S. Geminianus: namely that "contemplatio assimilatur saphyro" (contemplation resembles sapphire), for which, according to Geminianus, there are three reasons. First, the sky-blue color of sapphire, color caeruleus (let us note, in passing, that the very word caeruleus, initially caeluleus, has its origin in caelum); second, its rarity and expensiveness; and third, the absence of luster in it (propter defectum fulgoris). 975 The contemplation of the heavenly, according to the same author, is also likened to the stone zimeth, and also for three reasons, of which the first, once again, is its sky-blue color.⁹⁷⁶

Thus, the sky-blue environment of Sophia signifies air, sky, and the world above. However, it is necessary to elaborate on this general indication. For iconographic symbols are not only emblems; they are also mystical realities of a kind; they are, after all, not bare signs of another world, not algebraic formulas of the spiritual world, but rather garments and pictures of a higher reality. For example, the nimbus on icons of saints is not only a painterly way of saying "St.," but is also an approximate representation of the *real* quality of the spirit-bearing person, his genuine illuminatedness. In the same way, a natural question is raised in the *heart*, which, for the *rational mind*, does not have an unshakeable sufficient reason: namely, "How should one understand the turquoise or greenishturquoise environment of Sophia?"

After all that has been said, it is unquestionable that this is the sky. But are these azure and turquoise colors related to Sophia by abstract considerations and superficial associations of the rational mind, or has a more compelling power of living perception made sky-blue a natural symbol of Sophia? Did a rational "because" operate here, or was the source here an immediate "that is the way it is"? After all, the origin of this attribute of Sophia is usually represented according to the following scheme: The sky represents Sophia; the sky is blue; therefore, to Sophia one can attribute a blue environment.

But it may be that this happened completely differently, according to the following scheme: Sophia is the true Sky; in sophianic experiences the perception of blueness is present; therefore, blue is the natural symbol of Sophia, and hence the Sky—Sophia's symbol—appears blue to us.

In short, Sophia does not appear in a blue environment because the sky is blue; rather the sky is blue because Sophia has a blue environment. Just as the sun's light is the natural symbol of the Trihypostatic Light, so the blue transparent veil is the natural symbol of Sophia. It cannot be otherwise: the spiritual world is more real than the corruptible world; and it is not the higher that is determined by the lower but the lower that is determined by the higher; the properties of the world below are the properties of the world above but darkened with sin and made crude with corruption. Spiritual contemplation, in "revealing invisible things," does not conventionally clothe them in this figurative shell, but incarnates them in a symbolic body, which is conformable to them, though it is also adapted to our—earthly, darkened—capacity of knowledge. Sophianic contemplations, in their immediate, present reality, are characterized precisely by this air-blue, heavenly "body."

There exists an authentic report to Archimandrite Juvenal, later Bishop, from one of the novices of the Kursk Monastery of the Nativity of the Mother of God about his vision. This novice had a vision of heaven and he saw there "a great multitude of people . . . all were in a state of great ecstasy and ineffable joy. And there wafted a fragrant air, fine and pleasant, as though of a sky-blue color. And one of the youths told me"—said the eyewitness—"'behold, this is the peace of people of the world.'"

J. G. Bourgeat tells of one remarkable case: when he was ten, he underwent the experience of dying, and he acquired such clairvoyance that with closed eyes he could see everything that was taking place in his room and in other rooms; he could see through a wall 25 centimeters thick. His soul was in inexpressible agony near his dying body. "Suddenly"—he relates—"a radiant figure appeared before me as if it had just descended from the ceiling with the rapidity of lightning. This figure stopped at the edge of my bed, near the post supporting the drapery. I gradually began to distinguish his head, whose features were revealed with astounding

clarity, while the remaining parts of the body were shrouded in a *sky-blue mist*. I observed this apparition in amazement rather than in fear; on the contrary, this sympathetic and beautiful person attracted me . . . The spirit stood before me all the while. His face more and more clearly expressed compassion for me; I felt drawn to him, but I could not separate myself from my body, which restrained me, paralyzed me, despite a strenuous exertion of my will. Several minutes passed; suddenly a *violet cloud* seemed to surround the vision; then this cloud dispersed, rising upward. All this took place under full illumination, but this illumination almost frightened me." About two months later, the boy recovered and, at the home of one of his relatives, saw the full-length portrait of the figure that had visited him during his illness. "His face had the same expression of meekness and kindness, and he wore a brilliant full-dress military coat." It turned out that this was the boy's great-grandfather, Jean Bourgeat.

In both of these cases, the vision of a sky-blue spiritual atmosphere this mystical air of the world beyond the grave—was granted when the entire organism was in an exceptional state. But in the case of a heightened natural sensitivity or in connection with special psychometric training, the "astral plane" becomes constantly visible. We shall not consider now whether this premature "opening of the senses" 979 is desirable; the fact of the matter is that there is such a state in which luminous shells or "auras" surrounding all bodies become visible. This shell is particularly developed around the human body, and here its color is determined by the spiritual state of the bearer of the aura. According to the investigations of Leadbeater, in his book Man Visible and Invisible, the skyblue color of the aura expresses religiosity, while violet expresses spirituality. 980 "The sky-blue shades of colors are associated"—says R. Steiner⁹⁸¹—"with natures full of worship and devotion. The more a man sacrifices his own I to serve some work, the more significant become the sky-blue shades. And here one encounters two wholly different kinds of people. There are natures with a limited power of thought, passive souls, who do not have anything they could contribute to the stream of world events except their 'kind natures.' Their aura glows with a beautiful sky-blue color. It is such also in many self-renouncing religious natures. Compassionate souls and those who willingly pass their lives in charitable work have this kind of aura. If, in addition to this, these people are intellectuals, then sky-blue and green emissions alternate, or the blue takes on a greenish tint. The distinguishing feature of active souls, in contrast to passive ones, consists in the fact that their blueness is inwardly suffused with light colors. Inventive natures, those who have fruitful thoughts, emit light colors from some inner center as it were. This is observable to the highest degree in those persons who are called 'wise,' and precisely in those who are full of fruitful ideas.... An inventive person, employing all of his thoughts toward the satisfaction of his sensuous passions, emits dark red shades with blue; but he who gives his fruitful thoughts unselfishly to the service of essential interests primarily emits light-red-blue colors. Life in the spirit accompanied by noble devotion and self-sacrifice is manifested in pinkish-red or light-violet tints."

A more attentive investigation of the teaching of the theosophists makes it possible to distinguish three auras in the overall aura. The first aura reflects the influence of the body on the soul; the second reflects the independent life of the soul, which has ascended above sensuousness; and the third reflects "that power which the eternal spirit has acquired over perishable man." In the first aura, "the fear of sensuous impressions is manifested as brown-blue or grayish-bluish colors." In the second aura, "sky-blue is the sign of a pious mood. The closer this mood approaches religious rapture, the more will sky-blue pass into violet. Idealism and a serious attitude toward life, in the highest sense of this word, are displayed as indigo-blue." In the third aura, "sky-blue is a sign of self-renunciation and the desire to sacrifice oneself for all. If this tendency to self-sacrifice becomes so strong that it is transformed into a powerful act of will, expressed in active service of the world, then sky-blue is clarified until it becomes light-violet." "982"

This perception of the sophianic world, strong, but not clear and distinct for the disharmonious consciousness, is given sometimes to poets and to those whose souls—without wilfullness and hospitably open to all, both the pure and the impure—are sometimes capable of receiving, like a chance gift, the contemplation of another world despite their sinfulness. Thus, we find that the description of Olympus in Zhukovsky's^a translation of the *Odyssey* coincides perfectly with the description of paradise presented above:

the light-eyed daughter of Zeus flew once again to Olympus, where the gods, as they say, made their habitation, where the winds do not blow, where the cold rain does not roar, where the winter raises no storms, where the cloudless air spreads its light azure and is filled with shining most sweet—there for the gods in ineffable pleasures all the days flee by. 983

But what is most remarkable in this case is the fact that this "cloudless air [that] spreads its light azure" and this "shining most sweet" are not

^a Vasily Andreevich Zhukovsky (1783–1852) was a major poet, one of Pushkin's important predecessors. His translation of *The Odyssey* is considered to be one of the greatest translations into Russian.

present in the original Greek text but are a creative addition of the sophianic translator-poet, Zhukovsky, an addition evidently coming from his personal experience. What the Greek original says is:

alla mal aithrē peptatai anephelos, leukē epidedromenon aiglē tōi eni terpontai makares theoi ēmata panta.⁹⁸⁴

Not less astonishing in its realism and penetration is a poem dated June 28, which describes with the greatest possible precison what is—undoubtedly—a vivid experience of the Poet:

Is it your blue veil, O woman, whose breath is Consolation, that concealed the tops of the green forest, the apple trees of the orchard, from the gaze bathed in the luminescent ether of prayers, and that made the midday appear laced with *lunar incense*? The sun was already approaching its apex when the eyes that had forgotten the world opened to the valley of tears and hope. The soul's ineffable word had not yet dared open its wings, when before the young eyes there blued the Joy of the Protecting Veil. And the revealed miracle of the invisible temple smoked for a long time, and the blue of the incense covered the emerald glitter. 985

In another poem, of analogous content, "the sky on the earth" is perceived through a *violet* haze. Here is this poem:

Deep mornings of cold summer! Half the sky is clothed in fire of mother-of-pearl.

A touch dark and blue are the invigorating distances. Where is the sting of sorrow? Where is the burden of wormwood?

And the heart is caressed by hands. Above-worldly sounds ring out piously.

As in a carafe of wine, in a fiery liquid on the bottom are amethysts, in the heavenly ether.

Repose is spread like a violet haze. I will go to the crossroads of the agreeable garden. Overgrown with clover are the purple spots! Here perdition is pleasant, immortality is light.

How fragrant with flowers and with aromatic honey! Lips rose-petaled, humbly with my lips

I will touch; and I know Who is looking into my soul: The Queen gazes like the violet distances.

The same image of the *blue* of Horai, the blessed land, characterizes the Japanese; they represent Horai with colors on paintings done on silk called kakemonos. Lafcadio Hearn, an English writer who is a connoisseur of Japan, gives a description of this blue land of bliss, and then he attempts to interpret Japan itself—*ancient* Japan—as Horai. Having become utterly Japanese in the mode of his life and in his thoughts and feelings, Hearn knows how to express the religio-mystical essence of Japanese experiences. And we see with the greatest interest how the *idea of blue* is interwoven in Hearn's description with the sensation of an *atmosphere of souls*, i.e., something like the "Great Being," a relation that we have already mentioned. But let us listen to Hearn:

"Blue vision of depth lost in height—sea and sky interblending through luminous haze. The day is spring, and the hour morning.

"Only sky and sea—one azure enormity. . . . In the fore, ripples are catching a silvery light, and threads of foam are swirling. But a little farther off no motion is visible, nor anything save color: dim warm blue of water widening to melt into blue of air. Horizon there is none: only distance soaring into space—infinite concavity hollowing before you, and hugely arching above you—the color deepening with the height. But far in the midway blue there hangs a faint, faint vision of palace towers, with high roofs horned and curved like moons—some shadowing of splendor strange and old, illumined by a sunshine soft as memory."

This kakemono is called Shinkiro, which signifies Mirage. It is the entrance into Horai, the peaceful habitation, the country of divinity. "... there are wonderful things in Horai; and the most wonderful of all has not been mentioned by any Chinese writer. I mean the atmosphere of Horai. It is an atmosphere peculiar to the place; and, because of it, the sunshine in Horai is whiter than any other sunshine—a milky light that never dazzles—astonishingly clear, but very soft. This atmosphere is not of our human period: it is enormously old—so old that I feel afraid when I try to think how old it is; and it is not a mixture of nitrogen and oxygen. It is not made of air at all, but of ghost—the substance of quintillions of quintillions of generations of souls blended into one immense translucency—souls of people who thought in ways never resembling our ways. Whatever mortal man inhales that atmosphere he takes into his blood the thrilling of these spirits; and they change the senses within him—reshaping his notions of Space and Time—so that he can see only as they used to see, and feel only as they used to feel, and think only as they used to think. Soft as sleep are these changes of sense. . . . "986

That is how Sophia and sophianicity in natural mysticism are perceived by a consciousness that, though sensitive and hospitable, is not spiritual or almost not spiritual. However, in experiences of the purified and organized mind, this sophianic blueness, this amethyst transparence, this blue fragrant joy is revealed with full distinctness.

I shall permit myself, as a theme for further investigation, to make a certain affirmation, a certain conjecture, as yet unverified, namely that the supreme dignity of the Most Pure Virgin Mary, that is, when She is honored for Herself, as the Ever-Virgin, and when She is honored in relation to Christ, as the Theotokos, is symbolized in Her appearances as well by veils and garments of different color. When She appears as the Ever-Virgin, as the first Nun, 987 as the Protectress of virginity, i.e., as the True Virgin, she wears a sky-blue or dark-blue veil. When She appears as the Theotokos, Her veil is purple, the color of royal splendor and spirituality, or red, the color of suffering and ardent love.

Consider, for example, the life of one of the most remarkable representives of this organic virginity, whom his biographer calls, without exaggerating, a "heavenly man" and an "earthly angel," namely the life of our saintly, God-bearing father Athanasius of Athos, who lived in the 10th century. In this life, we read how the brothers supervised by the Father-Superior Athanasius fled from hunger, and how, remaining alone, he, overwhelmed by hunger and without a piece of bread, decided to leave the deserted lavra and to go to some other place. "In the morning"—relates the Life—"with his iron staff, with spirit troubled, Athanasius was walking morosely on the way to Carea. He walked that way for two hours, finally became fatigued, and was about to sit down to rest, when a certain woman wearing a sky-blue airy veil appeared walking toward him. St. Athanasius became embarrassed, and, not believing his own eyes, crossed himself. 'How could a woman come here?'-he asked himself. 'It is impossible for women to enter here.' Amazed by the vision, St. Athanasius walked ahead to meet the unknown woman.

"'Where are you going, Father?' the unknown woman asked St. Athanasius modestly, coming up to him. St. Athanasius looked at the unknown woman from head to foot, looked into her eyes, and, with an involuntary feeling of respectfulness, lowered his gaze. Her modest dress, her quiet virginal gaze, her touching voice, all this disclosed in her a woman of significance." As became clear later on, this was the Virgin Mary Herself, who promised to remain henceforth the Housekeeper of the Laura. 989

It is difficult to imagine that the "transparent sky-blue veil" of the Virgin Mary seen by St. Athanasius or, rather, the sky-blue nimbus, the sky-blue transparent cloud, could have been an accident; in visions of the world above there are no accidents, there is no excess, no deficiency, but all is significant. Furthermore, this detail would not have found its way

into the Life if Athanasius himself had not directed his attention at it. One can, in confirmation of this attribution of the color sky-blue to the Mother of God, point also to the fact that tradition commands (and simple taste considers natural and irrevocable) that liturgies on days dedicated to the Virgin Mary be performed in sky-blue vestments. On the basis of a very ancient tradition, the Most Pure Virgin Mary is also depicted in a sky-blue garment. Thus, the 3rd-century fresco of the "Adoration of the Magi" in the catacombs of Saints Peter and Marcellina on Via Libicana in Rome depicts the Virgin Mary in a white tunic with sky-blue clavi. 990 In the tomb of St. Agnes (4th century), She is depicted in the form of the Unwedded Bride. Her Face is of inexpressible nobility and purity; Her eyes are brown, as is also witnessed by tradition. Her lower garment is brownish (probably purple paint that has faded with time), while the upper garment is sky-blue. 991

Similarly, on the fresco of the tomb of St. Sixtus, the Mother of God is depicted in a red lower garment, while the upper garment is dark-blue. 992 The remnant of the mosaic depicting the "Adoration of the Magi" from the sacristy of the Church of Santa Maria in Cosmodemin in Rome, transferred from the ancient basilica of St. Peter and dating from the very beginning of the 8th century, depicts the Mother of God in a dark-violet garment, covered above by a dark-blue cloak, wrapping the head, shoulders, and arms. 993 On an enamel cross of the 9th century, She is depicted as wearing a dark-blue tunic and a short red cloak. 994 In one of the frescos in the catacomb of St. Syriaca, the Mother of God is represented as an orant. Her lower garment is violet, while Her upper garment is red; Her head is wrapped in a white veil, above which there is a second veil, a blue one. D'Agencourt believes this fresco dates from the 9th-10th centuries. 995 The mosaic image of the Mother of God as orant in the chapel of St. Pietro Crisologo in Ravenna, transferred there after the restoration of the basilica of Ursa and dating from the 10th century, depicts the Mother of God as clad in a dark-blue tunic and maphorion. 996 On a miniature of the "Adoration of the Magi" from a menology of Emperor Basil II, dating from the 11th century, the Mother of God is covered from head to toe in a dark-blue tunic. 997 The praying Mother of God, depicted in an 11thcentury mosaic above the right arch of the main facade of St. Mark's in Venice, is clad in a blue tunic and in a green cloak. 998 The Mother of God on the 11th-century mosaic Impregnable Wall of the Cathedral of Sophia in Kiev is clad in a similar tunic but has a violet cloak. 999 The tunic and maphorion worn by the Virgin in the depiction of the Annunciation in the same Cathedral are dark-blue. 1000 This symbolism also occurs in the later Italian iconography. Thus, both in the iconlike paintings of Cimabue (14th century) and in the mosaic of Tafi the Madonna is depicted as wearing a sky-blue garment. 1001 In contemporary iconography, this tradition is also preserved, as is well known.

It is not surprising that the same symbolism could have been preserved in part in connection with other aspects of the Mother of God as well; without going into detail, I will mention only the dark-blue garment of *Mater dolorosa*, ¹⁰⁰² etc.

In many ancient miniatures, the Mother of God is once again depicited in sky-blue garments, 1003 or in a sky-blue toga above a purple tunic, and then it appears that She is deliberately being likened to Jesus Christ; or on the contrary, She is depicted in a sky-blue tunic beneath a purple toga and, in this respect, She resembles—again not without intention—God the Father. 1004

In western iconography, in those cases when the intent is to depict the Virgin Mary as the Queen of the spiritual Heaven, this subtle hint—the airy-blue garments—is sometimes intensified almost to an explicit image of the visible heaven. She is then depicted as the Woman clothed with the sun, the moon under her feet, and with a crown of twelve stars upon her head. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Her being clothed with the sun was represented as a flaming oval, a gloria of flame surrounding the Virgin. Later painters often add to the twelve stars upon her head a *dark-blue* mantle, speckled with stars. Sometimes this garment is painted green, but once again with yellow stars. Finally, one encounters images of the Mother of God in a pink mantle as well, its color reminding one of the dawn. It is clear that this symbol too stands for the Queen of Heaven. 1006

To Orthodox iconography as well, the disclosure of the symbol of the blueness of the Virgin's garments is not unknown. Sometimes on Orthodox icons as well, the Mother of God is painted in garments speckled with stars. Thus, on an icon portraying the appearance of the Mother of God to St. Sergius of Radonezh the Queen of Heaven is depicted in a purple mantle and in scarlet boots, while Her tunic is *dark-blue and speckled with green stars*. Also worthy of attention is the fact that the Mother of God is surrounded by an egg-shaped golden glory.¹⁰⁰⁷

xxv. Pascal's "Amulet"

• • • • •

AFTER the death of one of the most sincere people who ever lived (it is easy to guess that I speak of Blaise Pascal), there was found in the lining of his *pourpoint* a small, carefully preserved note, which was published by Condorcet under the very unsuitable title "mystical amulet," Amulette mystique. This note was written at the time or even at the instant of Pascal's "conversion," and represents his confession of faith—or more precisely, a contemplation in prayer of the individual moments of spiritual ascent. About this "Amulet" there have been many disputes, but disputes without much result. 1008 This inconclusiveness was due to the very great simplicity of this document, containing such a compression and condensation of life and understanding of the world that some of it even appears to be an incoherent collection of statements. I believe that the thoughts developed in my book and the theory of the growth of types yield the key to understanding this piece of paper which is so full of content and significance. I shall confine myself here to this hint and return later to Pascal's "Amulet." But let me first present the original text, 1009 much of which is understandable even without commentary.

"L'an de grâce 1654.

†

Lundi 23 novembre, jour de St. Clément, pape et martyre, et autres au martyrologe.

Veille de St. Chrysogone, martyr, et autres.

Depuis environ dix heures et demie du soir jusques environ minuit et demi,

Feu.

Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob,

Non des Philosophes et des savants.

Certitude. Certitude. Sentiment. Joie. Paix.

Dieu de Jésus-Christ.

Deum meum et Deum vestrum.

Ton Dieu sera mon Dieu.

Oubli du monde et de tout hormis Dieu.

Il ne se trouve que par les voies enseignées dans l'Evangile.

Grandeur de l'âme humaine.

Père juste, le monde ne t'a point connu, mais je t'ai connu.

Joie, Joie, Joie, pleurs de joie.

Je m'en suis séparé:

Dereliquerunt me fontem aquae vivae.

Mon Dieu me quitterez-vous?

Que je n'en sois pas séparé éternellement.

Cette est la vie éternelle, qu'ils te connaissent seul

vrai Dieu, et celui que tu as envoyé J.-C.

Jésus-Christ.

Jésus-Christ.

Je m'en suis séparé; je l'ai fui, renoncé, crucifié.

Que jen'en sois jamais séparé.

Il ne se conserve que par les voies enseignées dans l'Évangile.

Renonciation totale et douce.

Soumission totale a Jésus-Christ et a mon directeur.

Éternellment en joie pour un jour d'exercice sur la terre.

Non obliviscar sermones tuos. Amen."

Here is a translation of this document, with certain explanatory comments in brackets:

"The year of grace 1654.

[Pascal emphasizes that he lives under grace, that is, where the resolution of epoche is possible.

†

Monday 23 November, the day of St. Clement, pope and martyr, and others of the martyrs. The eve of St. Chrysogone martyr and others. From about ten thirty in the evening to about half an hour after midnight,

[This precision of the date indicates that the fullness of knowledge revealed to Pascal consisted not of reveries or dim sensations, almost undateable because of their formlessness and qualitative indistinguishability from the usual content of consciousness. Rather, it reveals that it was a precisely delineated and therefore qualitatively *new* phenomenon, outside of the usual processes of consciousness.]

Fire

[This is clearly meant to be the fire of doubt, the fire of epoche: in the course of two hours, Pascal was tormented by the fire of Gehenna, and then, after this trial by non-being, the One who is was revealed to him.]

God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,

Not of the philosophers and scholars.

[Truth is a Person revealing Himself in history, not an abstract principle; in other words, Truth is not a thing but personal.]

Certitude. Certitude. Feeling. Joy. Peace.

[Certitude, and therefore the resolution of epoche, is in the

meeting with God-Truth; it is this certitude that gives the satisfaction of feeling—joy and peace, i.e., God satisfies the criterion of truth.]

The God of Jesus Christ.

[The God of Jesus Christ is precisely the Truth—the Trinitarian Unity, for only Christ proclaimed Triunity.]

Of my God and your God.

[But our God is not the God of Jesus Christ, for I am not consubstantial with the Truth, but Christ is consubstantial.]

Thy God will be my God.

[Through Christ I shall come to participate in the life of the Triune, and the Truth becomes my God.]

Forgetting of the world and of all except God.

[And then I shall be "not of the world"; I shall forget what is corruptible, shall become metaphysically free of it, shall be eternal.]

He is found only on ways taught in the Gospel.

[The way to the light of the Truth is ascesis, the ordering of the heart.]

The greatness of the human soul.

[On the way of ascesis is seen the eternal side of the creaturely person—Sophia.]

O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee but I have known thee.

[By my wisdom, with which the world did not know the Father, I have come to know Him—through contemplation of my purified nature, in the Lord Jesus Christ.]

Joy, Joy, Joy, tears of joy.

[In the knowledge of God through a purified heart are joy and bliss, superabundant, overflowing the banks.]

I was separated from Him.

[But the revelation ends; this joy is only a pledge of the future joy, not a permanent feeling. Joy departs, and doubt and longing appear.]

They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water.

[This is God's answer, as it were, to the doubt: "This explains the feeling of longing."]

My God, can it be that Thou wilt forsake me?

[That is to say, "Thou wilt not forsake me as long as I do not forsake Thee." Thus, the decision:]

Let me not be separated eternally.

[By an inner act I decide to adhere to God.]

This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.

[From this moment there begins again the life of the ordinary

consciousness. Pascal speaks about what is necessary, and, further, about the disharmony between what is necessary and what is.]

Iesus Christ.

Iesus Christ.

I have been separated from Him; I fled from Him, I renounced Him, the crucified.

Let me never be separated from Him.

He is conserved only on paths indicated in the Gospel.

[How not to be separated from J.C. is defined, and then means to the ordering of oneself are indicated.]

Total and sweet renunciation.

[Renunciation of selfhood, ascesis.]

Total submission to Jesus Christ and to my director.

[Obedience to a *starets*.]

Eternal joy for a day of ascesis on earth.

[The thought of future goods.]

Let me never forget Thy words. Amen.

Thus, Pascal's "Amulet" is, as it were, the program of a religiophilosophical system, a whole circle of thoughts, which with extraordinary rapidity passed through Pascal's consciousness in a revelation lasting about two hours. Perhaps his Pensées sur la religion are sketches intended to realize precisely this plan. As is well known, the individual pensées were found in total disorder after Pascal's death, and the usual order of their arrangement belongs not to Pascal but to the first editors. An attempt has been made to arrange these thoughts in a different order, which is in greater harmony with Pascal's design. 1010 But it is also appropriate and timely to try to arrange these thoughts in accordance with the "Amulet"; and let me express my decided opinion that a rich and easyto-mine store of precious metals awaits the investigator here. By the way, let me mention that Pascal has a certain kinship with Orthodoxy, and that it is not by chance that A. S. Khomyakov "often called Pascal his teacher."1011 This imposes upon us the responsibility of a particular attentiveness to the profound French thinker.

XXVI. On the History of the Term "Antinomy" (see p. 114)

• • • •

BOTH the significance of a word, its "sememe," and the word used to express a certain concept, i.e., the "morpheme" and "phoneme" of the concept, its *term*, change constantly. It is therefore insufficient to trace the history of only the term or the history of only the concept; both are necessary. Unfortunately, neither the concept of antinomy, which is so important to us in the present work, nor the term "antinomy," which we use so often, can flatter themselves with knowing their genealogies. Both the concept and the term require special investigation, but here we can only briefly indicate some directions toward a study of the latter.

According to the unanimous definition of modern Greek lexicographers, the word *antinomia* signifies that a law contradicts another law or itself; *antinomia* is the internal contradictoriness of a law; the mere violation of a law—*paranomia*—or the absence of a law—*anomia*—is not an antinomy. Thus, according to Sophocles, ¹⁰¹² it is a "conflict of laws"; Skarlatos ¹⁰¹³ says that *antinomia* is "*enantiotēs* (*antiphasis*) *nomou tinos pros allon ē pros heauton*." Anthimos Gazes ¹⁰¹⁴ defines the word *antinomia* as "*enantiōsis tou nomou, hotan dēladē kath heauton antiphasekēi, diorizōn ta auta kai eis enagonta kai eis ton enagomenon*." In modern Greek the sense of the word *antinomia* becomes somewhat diffuse; i.e., it signifies *Gesetzwidrigkeit*, *Widerspurch*, i.e., lawlessness, while *antinomikos* signifies *gezetzwidrig, einander widersprechend*, i.e., lawless, mutually contradictory. ¹⁰¹⁵

One can affirm with a great deal of certainty that this word, from the very beginning, was a juridical term. In any case, it was taken over by jurists very early. At the end of the first century A.D., M. Fabius Quintilianus uses it as widely known: "Proximum est de legibus contrariis dicere, quia inter mones artium scriptores constitit in antinomia duos esse scripti et voluntatis status." 1016

In addition, St. Augustine, ¹⁰¹⁷ also a jurist by education, defines the term "antinomia" as "contentio legum contrariarum" in one of his works at the end of the 4th century. We find that the word antinomia has the same meaning in the Code of Justinian, ¹⁰¹⁸ which was published in 534 and contains legislation from Hadrian up to this year, as well as in such authors as Hermogenus (A.D. 173), Hierocles (A.D. 413), Plutarch A.D. 120), and Julius Victor (4th century A.D.?). ¹⁰¹⁹ It is evident that derivatives such as antinomikōs and antinomikos mean the same thing. ¹⁰²⁰

Even though it was commonly used in law, the term "antinomy" was neglected for a long time by philosophy. Neither Plato nor Aristotle used the term at all. 1021

The term "antinomia" is used by the author of the *Philosophical Dictionary R. Hoclen (1547–1628) "pro pugnantia seu contrarietate quarumlibet sententiarum seu propositionum.*" ¹⁰²²

Scholastic philosophy can hardly be considered to have known it, for the word "antinomy" cannot be found in its dictionaries of terms. 1023

It also does not appear in the large philosophical dictionary of Chauvin (1640–1725), ¹⁰²⁴ which appeared in two editions, in 1692 and in 1713.

It was perhaps Bonnet (1720–93) who introduced it in natural theology, ¹⁰²⁵ taking "antinomy" to mean a contradiction between two equally just laws. ¹⁰²⁶

It was probably Kant who was the first to use this term in philosophy *per se*: the year of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781, can be considered as the year of the birth of antinomy as a philosophical term.¹⁰²⁷

As is well known, Kant taught all the sciences except law. But the structure of his thought and of his entire nature was legalistic. In particular, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in its design, can be thought of as the transference to philosophy of the idea of the juridical trial and even the particulars of the trial procedure. It is not difficult to see that Kant got the term "antinomy" *directly from Roman law*, which lends further support to the conviction that he is the first to use it as a philosophical term.

With Kant the position of "antinomy" as a term became so solidified and its use became so widespread that the study of the further history of the term would be too complex a matter.¹⁰²⁸

xxvII. Estheticism and Religion (see pp. 8, 72, and elsewhere)

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
In the text of the book we have repeated so often the idea of the supremacy of beauty and of the distinctive art making up the essence of Orthodoxy, that, perhaps, it would not be superfluous to separate this religious estheticism from the religious estheticism developed and ardently defended by Konstantin Leontyev. 1029 I shall dare to affirm that these two estheticisms do not, in essence, have anything in common, despite their external similarity. In fact, Leontyev's views of this question can be briefly represented by his own schema, namely: 1030

Mysticism (especially positive religion)	A criterion only for those of the same faith. For one cannot judge a Christian according to the Moslem law, and vice versa.			
Ethics and politics:	Only for man		man	
Biology (the physiology of man, animals, and plants; medicine, etc.)		1 01 01	he whole nic world	
Physics (i.e., chemistry, mechanics, etc.) and esthetics			For everything	

Thus, for Leontyev, "the esthetic character" is the most general feature, whereas for the author of the present book, it is the profoundest feature. For Leontyev, beauty is only a shell, the most external of the various "longitudinal" layers of being, whereas for us beauty is not one of many longitudinal layers, but a force *transversely* penetrating all the layers. For Leontyev beauty is furthest of all from religion, whereas for us it is expressed most powerfully in religion. Leontyev's life-understanding is atheistic or almost atheistic; for us, God is Supreme Beauty, through participation in Which everything becomes beautiful.

For Leontyev, God is the *geometrical* center of the system, almost an abstraction, in no wise the Vital Unifying Principle; for us, He is *Ens realissimum*. Therefore, in Leontyev's life-understanding without grace,

the person is mechanically composed of different kinds of layers of being, whereas, according to the life-understanding of the author of the present book, the person, with the aid of God's grace, vitally and organically assimilates all the layers of being. All is beautiful in the person when it is directed toward God, but all is ugly when it turns away from God. And whereas for Leontyev beauty is almost identified with Gehenna, with non-being, with death, for us beauty is Beauty and is understood as Life, as Creativity, as Reality. If one conditionally accepts Leontyev's terminology, it is in the following schemata that one should represent the graceless and godless estheticism of Leontyev (Prof. V. Zavitnevich even identifies it with materialism¹⁰³¹) and the spiritual and theocentric estheticism of the present book.



xxvIII. Homotypy in the Structure of the Human Body (see p. 194)

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To explicate a remark in the text concerning the homotypy in the structure of the human body, we present the following seven tables. The first five were compiled following Dr. Adrian Péladan, ¹⁰³² while the last two were compiled according to Burt G. Wilder. ¹⁰³³ One could also present a whole series of highly detailed tables produced by Dr. Foltz, ¹⁰³⁴ but lack of space compels us to do no more than mention his name. Observations on this subject made by Ocken, Spix, and others ¹⁰³⁵ are also instructive.

Let me add that, according to A. Péladan, the ancient Egyptians already knew this fundamental law of the polar duality of the human body: the goddess Neith was represented in a pose that clearly demonstrates the homotypical correspondence of the organs of the two poles. ¹⁰³⁶

TABLE I. The Homotypy of Organs

The Pairs	The Lower Pole	The Upper Pole
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	gallbladder liver caecum large intestine kidneys suprarenal bursae ureters urinary bladder and urethra	small intestine spleen and pancreas stomach esophagus lungs thymus bronchi trachea
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	uterus and prostate glandular part of the cervix and prostate mucipares glands of the genital organs ovaries or testes pubis (pili) uro-genital orifice clitoris or glans perineum anus	larynx tonsils salivary glands thyroid chin (beard) mouth tongue upper lip nasal orifice

TABLE II. The Homotypical System of the Skeleton

The Homological Pairs of Vertebrae	The Lower Pole	The Upper Pole
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	5 th caudal vertebra 4 th caudal vertebra 3 rd caudal vertebra 2 nd caudal vertebra 1 st caudal vertebra 5 th sacral bone 4 th sacral vertebra 2 nd sacral vertebra 2 nd sacral vertebra 1 st sacral vertebra 1 st lumbar vertebra 4 th lumbar vertebra 3 rd lumbar vertebra 1 st lumbar vertebra	1 st cranial bone (nasal) 2 nd cranial bone (frontal) 3 rd cranial bone (parietal) 4 th cranial bone (occipital) 1 st cervical vertebra (atlas, carrier) 2 nd cervical vertebra (axis, odontoid) 3 rd cervical vertebra 4 th cervical vertebra 5 th cervical vertebra 6 th cervical vertebra 7 th cervical vertebra 1 st thoracic vertebra 2 nd thoracic vertebra 3 rd thoracic vertebra 4 th thoracic vertebra
16 17 18 19	12 th thoracic vertebra 11 th thoracic vertebra 10 th thoracic vertebra 9 th thoracic vertebra	5 th thoracic vertebra 6 th thoracic vertebra 7 th thoracic vertebra 8 th thoracic vertebra

TABLE III. The Polar Duality of the Muscular System

The Pairs of Homo- logical Muscles	The Lower Pole	The Upper Pole		
	The Upper Lay	yer		
1	musculus latissimus dorsi	musculus trapezius		
2	musculus denticulatus minor inferior	musculus denticulatus minor superior		
	The Deep Lay	er		
3	the sacral-lumbar muscle	the descending cervical muscle		
4	the long dorsal muscle	the transverse cervical muscle		
5	the transverse spinal muscle	the semi-spinal muscle		
The Anterior Side				
6	the large oblique muscle	the large denticular muscle		
7	the small oblique muscle	musculus intercostalis externus		
8	the transverse muscle	musculus intercostalis internus		
9	the large straight muscle	the anomalous sternal muscle		

Table IV. The Polar Duality of the Vascular Systems

The Pairs of Vascular Systems	The Lower Pole	The Upper Pole
1	vascular system above the diaphragm	vascular system below the diaphragm
2	trunk of the brachial- cephalic artery	primitive iliolumbar artery
3	primitive trunk of the carotid artery	internal iliolumbar artery
4	trunk of the subclavian artery	external iliolumbar artery

Table v. The Polar Duality of the Nervous Systems

Homotypical Pairs of Nervous		
Systems	The Lower Pole	The Upper Pole
	Sacral plexus	Brachial plexus
1	9 th dorsal pair	8 th dorsal pair
2	10 th dorsal pair	7 th dorsal pair
3	11 th dorsal pair	6 th dorsal pair
4	12 th dorsal pair	5 th dorsal pair
5	1st lumbar pair	4 th dorsal pair
6	2 nd lumbar pair	3 rd dorsal pair
7	3 rd lumbar pair	2 nd dorsal pair
8	4 th lumbar pair	1st dorsal pair
9	5 th lumbar pair	8 th cervical pair
10	1st sacral pair	7 th cervical pair
11	2 nd sacral pair	6 th cervical pair
12	3 rd sacral pair	5 th cervical pair
13	4 th sacral pair	The last four sacral pairs
14	5 th sacral pair	correspond to the five
15	6 th sacral pair	first cervical ones and to the 12 cranial ones

Table VI. Polarity in Pathology, or Symmetry in Sicknesses

Pairs of Correlative Sicknesses	The Lower Pole	The Upper Pole
1	intestinal hemorrhage	stomatorrhagia
2	intestinal inflammation	inflammation of the esophagus
3	inflammatory organic contriction of the intestines and colon	inflammatory organic constriction of the esophagus
4	cancer of the intestines	cancer of the esophagus
etc.	etc.	etc.

TABLE VII. Polarity in Therapeutics

Pairs of Therapeutically Correlative Organs		nalogously on the
1	of the coccygeal pole	of the cranial pole
2	of the left part	of the right part
3	of the dorsal surface	of the anterior surface

XXIX. Remarks on Trinity (see p. 38)

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THE question of *trinity* was touched upon several times in the text, but only in passing, for its comprehensive examination would require a separate treatise. Leaving this for a more propitious time, we shall sketch out several speculative avenues that may lead to an understanding of the idea of trinity.

1.

We spoke earlier of the essential impossibility of deducing the trine number of the Divine Hypostases, but, nevertheless, we made a kind of attempt at such a deduction. How should one understand this attempt? First of all, it should be understood not as a deduction in the strict sense of the word. We did not at all intend to prove that there can only be three Hypostases, not more, not less. This number is an "infinite fact," apprehended in the everlasting light of the spirit, but not derivable *logically*, for God is above logic. One must firmly remember that the number "three" is not a consequence of our concept of Divinity, derivable therefrom by means of speculation, but a content of the very experience of Divinity, in Divinity's suprarational reality. From the concept of Divinity it is impossible to derive the number "three"; rather, in our heart's experience of Divinity this number is simply given as an element, an aspect of an infinite fact. But since this fact is not merely a fact but an infinite fact, its givenness is not merely givenness, not blind givenness, but givenness with an infinite depth of understanding, the givenness of a limitless mental horizon, 1037

As long as the infinite fact is not given, there can be absolutely no anticipation of it, except a formal one, that is to say, the anticipation that it is a fact and that it is infinite; *a priori* we can say nothing about it. But when it is already given, we can ponder its content and discover its limitless mental horizon. We strive then to peer into its *meaning*, to deepen our understanding of it. But since its *meaning* is infinite, our very understanding of this infinite meaning must unfold limitlessly, 1038 while remaining also infinite in each of its moments. The reasonable nature of infinity consists in the fact that, in it, all is reasonable and all is infinite.

To apprehend the uncreated Light—that is the first step; to see in it *multiple unity* and *unified multiplicity*—that is the second step; to appre-

hend in this unified multiplicity multiplicity as *trinity* is the third step; to understand the meaning of the number "three," its significance, its spiritual distinction from the numbers "two" and "four," etc. is the following step, and so on.

But, again, one should not think that each new step is abstractly derived, logically-rationally deduced from somewhere outside the very contemplation of the Light. Each step is only a concrete division, analysis, differentiation of that which is implicitly contained in the contemplation of the unapproachable Light of the Triphypostatic Divinity. Thus, our "deduction" is only a new way of expressing what has already been expressed—nothing more. Thus, looking from a great height at the bluing distances, we discover in them more and more new details, and then we express them by exclamations of joy and astonishment. But can one call this series of exclamations a "deduction" of this blue abyss of air?

2.

Numbers in general turn out to be underivable from anything else, and all attempts at such a deduction fail completely, and, at best, when they do appear to lead to something, they suffer from *petitio principii*. A number is derivable only from a number, not otherwise. And since the most profound characteristic of essences is connected precisely with numbers, ¹⁰⁴⁰ one comes inevitably to the Pythagorean-Platonic conclusion that numbers are the fundamental, transempirical roots of things, things in themselves *sui generis*. In this sense, one again inevitably comes to the conclusion that things, in a certain sense, are phemonena of absolute, transcendental numbers. But, without going into these complex and subtle questions, we shall only say that the number three, in our understanding characterizing the absoluteness of Divinity, characterizes all that possesses relative self-sufficiency. It characterizes self-contained kinds of being. In a positive sense, the number three appears everywhere as a kind of fundamental category of life and thought.

In *space*, which encompasses everything external and therefore subordinates everything external to its nature, we distinguish three dimensions. Abstractly-logically, it is of course permissible to speak as much as one wants about n-dimensional spaces and to investigate them,¹⁰⁴¹ and then to apply the derived theorems to mechanics, physics, and other domains of science.¹⁰⁴² Nevertheless, a projected n-dimensional space, a concept, and real three-dimensional space, a given, are incomparable, and one can never speak of them as of homogeneous things. Let it even be the case that *perceptions* of n-dimensional space are being developed or will be developed¹⁰⁴³; all the same there will remain a deep chasm between this three-dimensional medium of life natural and common to all and the intricate, momentary, singular perception of n-dimensional space. The spatial

reality with which we deal is three-dimensional and everything that is in space is also three-dimensional. But, let us add, all attempts (which have been numerous and persistent 1044) to *deduce* the three-dimensionality of our space have not led anywhere, and, even after a cursory survey of them, it is not difficult to become convinced that they prove the three-dimensionality of space not otherwise than by *presupposing* this three-dimensionality.

The same thing can be said about *time*. The past, present, and future are a manifestation of the trine nature of time. And this trine character is so essential for time that even abstractly-logically no one has attempted to conceive time with a greater or some different number of subdivisions, as this has been done for space. However, here too, attempts to deduce¹⁰⁴⁵ the trine nature of time do not attain their goal, and the trine character of time remains a mere given. In any case, this trine character has a primordial signifiance. Not only the physical world but also the psychical world is contained in the form of time, and both worlds therefore receive from time their trine character. If this is the case, then, through space and time, everything bears the stamp of the number "three," and *trinity is the most general characteristic of being*.

But not only does being as a whole have a trine character. Every stratum of being, every kind of being has its own special trine character. Without going into detail here, we shall only remark what seems to us most profound ontologically. Three *grammatical persons*, ¹⁰⁴⁶ not more and not less, are a phenomenon common to languages of the most diverse types, and this phenomenon serves as an expression of a fundamental fact of sociology. Perhaps this phenomenon is based on a biological fact, for the most elementary family appears to be trine in nature: father, mother, and child. In fact, since the center and meaning of the family is precisely the child, then, in the case of another child, or in the case of another wife, we have in effect another triad, another family. But in its purest form, the family is limited to the persons of father, mother, and child. Both language and society, therefore, fundamentally have a trine character.

An individual *person* also has a trine character, for he has three, and not some other number, of directions of life-activity—bodily, psychic, and spiritual; and each of the psychic actions is triple in quality, in that it has a relation to the mind, to the will, and to feeling. Whatever psychologists might say against the theory of three psychic capabilities or three powers, it remains unquestionable that everyone perceives an essential difference between mind, will, and feeling, and their irreducibility one to the other. One can probably understand them most correctly as three coordinates of the processes of the psyche, with every actual process necessarily being characterized in all three directions. But even if this were not the case, there would nevertheless be something trine in the organization of psychic life; and even though this fundamental fact of the

trine character of the psyche is not subject to deduction (despite many attempts to make it so subject), it nevertheless remains certain and incontestable. 1047

Looking deeper into the organization of man, we find everywhere the principle of trinity, in the organization of his body as well as in the life of his soul. The *life of reason*, in its dialectical movement, pulsates with the rhythm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and the law of the three stages of dialectical development refers not only to reason but also to *feeling* and to will. 1048 From this it is clear that every product of human reason, feeling, and will in which the artificial dialectical rhythm of its appearance has not been effaced bears inevitably the imprint of a triadic division. Trichotomy, as a device of argumentation, as a mode of classification, as a system principle is too widespread¹⁰⁴⁹ for one to consider it as something accidental; one must suppose that in it we have a manifestation of a trinity that characterizes the soul, although here too we are not able to deduce this trinity. But the number "three" is most essential in religion, in dogma as well as in cult, and even in the superstitious rituals of everyday life. It is difficult to find expressions sufficiently strong to express accurately how widespread is the principle of trinity in the world of ancient religion. "I would like"—says Usener in his essay devoted to the question of divine triads—"to try to give a clearer idea of the extent and importance of this kind of view. Here, I do not claim to say anything new. Phil. Buttmann judged this phenomenon with perfect clarity, and Ed. Gerhard called the divine triad the center of almost all religions. 1050 But it appears to me appropriate to prove—by collecting the scattered traces—that the divine triad is an ancient view that has taken firm root and therefore possesses the power of a motive force of nature." 1051

The material collected by Usener as well as by Neidhardt demonstrates with exceptional clarity the universality of the idea of divine triads. ¹⁰⁵² Usener even recognizes that the widespread tendency ("among the majority, perhaps among all the peoples of antiquity") to see divinity in the form of a triad acted with the force of a law of nature. ¹⁰⁵³

In the same way, the entire cult of the ancient world is permeated by the principle of the *triple* repetition of rituals, by *triple* invocations; the number three, in its direct form or in a potentiated form (i.e., as 9, 12, 27, etc.), is most characteristic for all liturgical acts. But, despite all the unquestionable provenness of the universal religious significance of the number "three" and the overwhelming amount of evidence supporting this significance of "three" (the "most favorite of all the significant numbers," according to Lüttig), attempts to deduce this significance from general principles of knowledge, or at least to explain them culturo-historically, lead absolutely nowhere. ¹⁰⁵⁴

A. I. Sadov is perfectly right when he insists on the primacy of this preference for triads and sees in it an obscure attraction, innate in man, to

the super-sensory world, a dim striving toward the Triune. ¹⁰⁵⁵ But this "explanation" is nothing else but precisely a conscious rejection of an explanation, for it reduces a fact of human culture to the fact of Divine Trinity, which is absolutely not subject to deduction.

Thus, no one has ever said why there are Three Divine Hypostases, and not another number. The non-chance nature of this number, its inner meaningfulness, is felt in the soul, but there are no words that could express this feeling. In any case, we cannot consider successful the numberless attempts to deduce the Trihypostatic character of Divinity. ¹⁰⁵⁶ Let philosophers be consoled and instructed by the fact that they have not deduced or even explained the meaning of the number of dimensions of space, subdivisions of time, grammatical persons, members of the primordial family, layers of human activity, coordinates of the psyche, etc. Furthermore, one feels that there exists some sort of profound connection between all of these trinities, but what sort precisely—this eternally flees the understanding, precisely at the moment when one desires to nail down this almost-located connection with words.

The overwhelming majority of philosphers and those of the church fathers who, like St. Augustine, 1057 were given to philosophical thought, concerned themselves with this question. But what have any of them given? Only analogies, beyond which, once again, there is only felt a more profound kinship; they have given only a likeness. In short, instead of explaining what they wished to explain, they simply multiplied what was to be explained, for they showed that the very same difficulty is also contained in a numberless multitude of objects of thought.

XXX. The Basic Symbols and Elementary Formulas of Symbolic Logic (for reference)^a

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- ∩ logical multiplication
- ∪ logical addition
- V truth
- Λ falsehood
- symbol for an operator that establishes the correspondence between a class and a proposition
- ε symbol that establishes the belonging of an individual to a class
- **■** symbol for numerical identity

^a The original Russian work has more than three pages of symbols and formulas in this section. I have eliminated all the formulas (since there is barely any reference to them in the main text), and I have left only the most important symbols, which, by the way, are all defined in the main text as they are used.

Notes and Brief Comments^a



Ne te quaesiveris extra. Do not seek thyself outside.

^a In translating the notes, I have followed the style of the original with regard to page number, cities, etc. (e.g., S. [Seite] 184 instead of p. 184; Berolini instead of Berlin). My enumeration is slightly different from that of the original, as Florensky skipped or repeated some of the note numbers. There is much "interaction" between the notes, where Florensky refers to previous or later notes; I have used "supra" and "infra" to indicate this. I have used the following abbreviation key:

M.: Moscow

S.P.: Saint Petersburg

PG: Migne's Patrologia graeca PL: Migne's Patrologia latina

VFP: Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii [Questions of Philosophy and Psychology]

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THIS section contains three kinds of notes. The first kind gives the precise coordinates of the quotations in the text. The second kind tries to supplement, clarify, or enrich with secondary particulars the theses of the book. Finally, the notes of the third kind provide bibliographic material to the reader who would like to examine independently some of the questions discussed in this book. In these bibliographic notes I have always tried to indicate the relevant *Russian* literature—first, because Russian bibliographies are rather weak whereas there are numerous bibliographies in foreign languages; and, second, because, in terms of both language and place of publication, the books I have indicated are more accessible to the nonspecialist reader. My aim was not to achieve an all-encompassing bibliographic breadth: only a number of books that would provide a first familiarity with the literature on the subject are mentioned.

I. To the Reader

1. That is how *millions* were called in ancient Russia according to the "small count," i.e., according to the first system of counting, or *billions of millions*, i.e., 10^{18} according to the "great count," i.e., according to the second system of counting, which was employed "in the case of a great count and enumeration."

See V. V. Bobynin, Ocherki istorii razvitiya fiziko-matematicheskikh znanii v Rossii. Ocherk tretii ("Fiziko-matematicheskie nauki v nastoishchem i proshlom") [Sketches of the history of the development of physico-mathematical knowledge in Russia. Sketch Three. ("The physico-mathematical sciences in the present and in the past")], Vol. 1, 1885, No. 3, p. 229.

See also: P. A. Florensky, "O simvolakh bezkonechnosti" [On symbols of infinity] (Novyi Put', 1904, Sept., pp. 191–92).

"Ancient books in the library of the Solovki monastery clearly show that one *t'ma* signified a quantity equal to a 100 thousand, while two were equal to 200 thousand, and so on; one *legeon* was equal to one million; and one *leard* was equal to one billion. The *voron* once signified a trillion in Russia." (P. Schein, *Dopolneniia i zametki k Tolkovomu Slovariu Dalia* [Supplements and notes to Dal"s Dictionary], p. 45, S.P., 1873 "*t'ma*" (*Sborn. Otd. rus. iaz. i slov. Imp. Akad. Nauk*, Vol. 10, No. 8) with reference to F. Lekhner, "*Belomorskaya vera*" [The Faith of the White Sea], *Vest. Estestvozn. Nauk*, 1855, No. 12, p. 307.

2. Many thinkers have argued that life is inaccessible to reason. In particular, in Russia the Slavophiles have insisted on this, especially A. S. Khomyakov and I. V. Kireevsky, and, of the later Slavophiles, D. A. Khomyakov. The reader will probably not fail to notice a substantial kinship between the theoretical ideas of Slavophilism^b and the ideas of the present book. But the supra-rationality of the

^b Slavophilism was a generally religiously Orthodox and politically conservative movement in Russia that had its heyday in the 1830–60 period. As George L. Kline writes, "[i]n their philosophy of history and culture the Slavophiles exhibited a common hostility to

spiritual life (Gk. zōe) about which the Slavophiles spoke and on which the present book is founded must not be confused with the irrationality of the *natural* life as a biological phenomenon (Gk. bios). The inaccessibility of "bios" to the formulas of the rational mind, i.e., the finding that "la vie déborde l'intelligence," is something that Goethe insisted on, and, in our own time, something that Henri Bergson and William Stern discuss powerfully and in detail. See the following works:

Henri Bergson: *Matter and Memory*, trans. A. Bauler, S.P., 1911. By the same author: *Essai sur le données immediates de la conscience*, trans. S. I. Hessen, with an appendix containing Bergson's article "Introduction to Metaphysics," trans. Margarita Grünwald, *Russkaya Mysl*', M., 1910. Also by the same author: *L'évolution creatrice*, Paris, 1907. Russian translation from the 3d French ed. by M. Bulgakov, M., 1909 (This translation is far from satisfactory).

Iu. Kroner, *Filosofiya tvorcheskoi evolutsii* (A. Bergson) [The philosophy of creative evolution (A. Bergson)], in *Logos*, Russ. ed., Bk. 1, M., 1910, pp. 86–117.

B. N. Bobynin, *Filosofiya Bergsona* [Bergson's philosophy] in *VFP*., Ch. 22 (1911), Bk. 108 (III), May–June, and Bk. 109 (IV).

H. Prager, Henri Bergsons metaphysische Grundsanschauung (Archiv für systematische Philosphie), Bd. 16, Hft. 3, 1911).

Le Dantec, Knowledge and Consciousness, trans. Bazarov, S.P., 1911.

William Stern, Person und Sache. Bd. I, Lpz., 1906.

W. Stern, "On the Psychology of Individual Differences: The Essence, Tasks, and Methods of Differential Psychology" in *Vestnik Psikhologii, Kriminologii, Antropologii i Gipnotizma*, 1905, No. 7, pp. 217–41.

On Stern see S. L. Frank, "Lichnost' i veshch: Filosovskove obosnovanie vital-

postmedieval western European civilization. All of them saw Russia as a potential savior of world civilization, destined to overcome the evils that had marred western Europe: fragmenting egoism and individualism, abstract, skeptical rationalism, the devotion to comfort and security" (G. Kline, the article "Russian Philosophy," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [New York, 1967], Vol. 7, p. 261). The leading Slavophile writers were Aleksei Khomyakov (1804–60), Ivan Kireevsky (1806–65), Iurii Samarin (1819–76), and Konstantin Aksakov (1817–60). Of these the most prominent were Khomyakov and Kireevsky.

Khomyakov is considered by many scholars to be the greatest theologian of Russian Orthodoxy in the 19th century. His key idea is sobornost (from the Russian sobirat', to gather, and related to sobor, council), which he "considered embodied in the church as a divinely inspired fellowship" (Peter K. Christoff, the article on Khomyakov in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, p. 335). For Khomyakov, sobornost is community in love, communion in the spirit, the free union of the faithful in the pure heart of the Church. According to V. V. Zenkovsky, Khomyakov conceived of sobornost not as "a 'collectivity' but [as] a Church, i.e., a prime-reality rooted in the Absolute" (see A History of Russian Philosophy, trans. George L. Kline [New York and London, 1953], Vol. 1, p. 204). Kline writes that "Khomyakov's emphasis both on integral reason (razum = Vernunft), as opposed to fragmented understanding (rassudok = Verstand), and on the communal character of the cognitive act was echoed by the other Slavophiles. The exercise of rassudok apart from faith, Khomyakov held, separates men; the exercise of razum—of reason in faith brings men together in a communal consciousness" (Kline, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, p. 261). Kireevsky "defended the doctrine that knowing is only a part and function of man's integral activity in the world, an event in the total life process. His notion of integral knowledge was very close to Khomyakov's notion of integral reason: both involved preconceptual and noncognitive elements" (ibid.).

izma" [Person and thing: The philosophical grounding of vitalism)] in S. L. Frank's collection: *Filosofiya i zhizn': Etiudy i nabroski po filosofii kul'tury* [Philosophy and Life: Studies and sketches on the philosophy of culture], S.P., 1910, pp. 164–217.

For the views of Goethe, in addition to collections of his works, (especially the Stuttgart-Tübingen edition of 1840), see:

Max Heynacher, Goethes Philosophie aus seinen Werken, Lpz., 428 SS. (In the second part of this work, pp. 111–47, are gathered the most important excerpts from Goethe's prose works characterizing his view of life).

H. Siebeck, Goethe als Denker, 2-te Auflage, 1905. 247 SS.

Ch. Schrempf, Goethes Lebenanschauung in ihrer geshicthlichen Entwicklung, 1-te Theil, 1905; 2-te Theil, 1906.

Bel'shovsky, Goethe, His Life and Works, edited by Weinberg, 2 volumes, 1904–1908.

Lewis, The Life of Wolfgang Goethe, trans. under the supervision of Nevedomsky, 1867, 2 parts.

II. LETTER ONE: TWO WORLDS

- 3. Euripides, Medea, Act 3, Scene 10, in a speech of the coryphaeus (Plays of Euripides, trans. I. F. Annensky, vol. 1, S.P., 1907, p. 177). Truth, according to the definition of Nicholas of Cusa, is "intelligibilita omnis intelligibilis," i.e., the understandability of all that is understandable, the intelligence of all that is intelligent, the reason of all that is reasonable (Nicolaus de Cusa, Opera, Basil, 1565, T. I. p. 89b). According to St. Augustine, on the other hand, God is the primary Truth, "stabilis Veritas," stable, fixed Truth (Confessions, XI 10, PL, Vol. 37; cf. On Trinity, 8, PL, Vol. 42, col. 948–50).
- 4. Matthew 11 has a contrast between working knowledge, so to speak, and spiritual knowledge. John the Baptist is contrasted with the people. John, the greatest of men, cannot—with all his deeds—occupy even the least place in the Kingdom of Heaven. But the people are given signs that not only point the way to the Kingdom but nearly compel them to follow this way. And if, despite these adverse conditions, John the Baptist continues to believe in Jesus Christ whereas the people remain in their disbelief, that is, if John the Baptist nevertheless has spiritual wisdom but the people are blind, this only serves to condemn even more those who are spiritually blind. Schematically this parallel can be represented in the following way:

John the Baptist
Only *heard* about the
works of Christ,
and already felt something,
rushed to become informed.
Only questions, being
ready for faith.
An ascetic, John
lives in the desert; does
not allow himself to be bent

The people (of the apostles' city)
The people *sees* a great power,
but remains without feeling
and does not repent.
It does not believe directly,
despite the evidence.

The people receives satisfaction in everything, but is satisfied by nothing.

[John the Baptist] by passions; does not wear soft clothing. He is the greatest of men.

Nevertheless, he is less than can be any man of the people, even the most insignificant. So difficult was it before Christ. [The people of the apostles' city]

It is spoiled and satisfied by nothing.

Nevertheless, each of these blind men, if he sees, will be greater than John, the greatest of men.

So easy it became with Christ.

III. LETTER TWO: DOUBT

5. Vladimir Solovyov, Kritika otvlechennykh nachal [Critique of abstract principles] (1878-1880), XLII (Collected Works of Vladimir Solovyov, Vol. 2, S.P., p. 282). "To the question, What is the truth? we respond: 1) the truth is that which is. However, we say 'is' about many things, but many things, in themselves, cannot be the truth, because. . . . Thus, that which is 2) as the truth is not many but one.... The one as the truth cannot have the many outside itself, i.e., it cannot be a purely negative unity. Rather, it must be a positive unity; that is, it must have the many not outside itself but in itself, or be a unity of the many. And since the many contained by the unity, or the many in one, is the all, it follows that the positive or the true one is the one containing the all or existing as the *unity* of the all. Thus, 3) that which truly is (the true existent), being the one, is at the same time and therefore also the all. More precisely it contains the all, or that which truly is (the true existent) is the all-one. Thus, a complete definition of the truth is expressed in three predicates: existent, one, all.... The truth is the all-one existent. We cannot think the truth otherwise. If we were to remove one of these three predicates, we would destroy the very notion of the truth. . . . We can think the truth only as the all-one existent, and when we speak about the truth, we speak precisely about this, about the all-one existent . . . " etc., etc. (ibid., pp. 281–82). "The all-one idea must be the proper definition of the one central being" (Solovyov, Chteniia o Bogochelovestve [Lectures on Godmanhood] (1877-81), Lecture 5, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 64). "The truth is evident in the fact that the divine principle . . . is not only the one but also the all, not only an individual being but also the all-embracing being, not only existent but also essence" (ibid., p. 67). "That which is as such, or the absolute, originally is that which has in itself

^c Vladimir Solovyov (1853–1900) is widely regarded as the most original, influential, and systematic of the Russian philosophers of the 19th century. He influenced nearly every important 20th-century Russian philosopher, most notably Florensky, Sergius Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdiaev, and S. L. Frank. "His fundamental and essential principle . . . is the notion of *Godmanhood*. . . . Godmanhood provides Solovyov with the necessary link to achieve his philosophical aim, a philosophy of total-unity embracing all aspects of reality and uniting science and philosophy on the one hand and theology on the other in the ultimate synthesis which is reality. In Solovyov's system not only does religion receive a rational basis, but East and West come together, matter and spirit unite" (see *Russian Philosophy*, edited by J. M. Edie, J. P. Scanlan, and M. B. Zeldin, with the collaboration of G. L. Kline [Chicago, 1965], Vol. 3, p. 58). [Also see note a on p. 231]

the positive power of being, and since what possesses is more primary or higher than what is possessed, the absolute first principle must more precisely be called superexistent or even superpotent. It is clear that, in itself, this first principle is perfectly individual. It can represent neither a particular multiplicity nor an individual generality . . . " (Solovyov, Filosofskie nachala tsel'nogo znaniya [Philosophical principles of integral knowledge] (1877), III, Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 307). "Semantically, the absolute (absolutum, from absolvere) means, first of all, what is detached from something, what is liberated, and, secondly, what is final, finished, complete, integral.... In the first [sense] it is defined ... as free from everything, as absolutely unique. In the second sense it is defined as possessing everything. . . . Both senses together define the absolute as hen kai pan" (ibid., 4, p. 318). "There are different kinds of unities. There is a negative unity, isolated and sterile, limited to the exclusion of all multiplicity. It is a simple negation . . . [and] can be designated as a bad unity. But there is also a true unity, which does not oppose itself to or exclude multiplicity, but which, in the calm possession of its inherent preeminence, reigns over its opposite and subordinates its opposite to its own laws. The bad unity is emptiness and nonbeing, whereas the true unity is one being, containing the all in itself. This positive and fruitful unity, rising above all limited and multiple reality, constantly remains that which it is, and contains, determines, and reveals the living forces, uniform causes, and multiform qualities of all that exists. It is with the confession of this perfect unity, producing and embracing all, that the Christian Creed begins, the belief in one God, the Father *Almighty (the Pantocrator)* . . . The truth is one in the sense that there cannot be two truths that are absolutely independent of each other or opposite to each other. But precisely by virtue of this unity, the one existing truth, not admitting in itself any limitation, arbitrariness, or exclusivity, cannot be partial and one-sided, and therefore must contain the grounds of all that exists in a logical system, must be sufficient to explain the all" (Solovyov, Russia and the Universal Church [1889]. Trans. from the French by G. A. Rachinsky. Bk., 3, Ch. 1. ed., Put', M., 1911, pp. 303-5).

These excerpts, cited almost at random, show how deeply rooted in Solovyov was the understanding of the truth as the "all-one existent." There is no doubt that the greater part of his works is devoted to nothing else but a disclosure from every point of view of this concept of all-unity. But we must qualify our use of Solovyov's definition in our work by saying that we take it only *formally*, emptying it of his interpretation. In fact, our entire work, in its antinomian spirit, opposes Solovyov's conciliatory philosophy.

The reader can find a partial bibliography on Solovyov in the collection O *Vlad. Solovyove* [On Vlad. Solovyov], *Put*', M., 1911.

One can find supplements and corrections to this bibliography in G. V. Florovsky's bibliographical note: "Novye knigi o Vladimire Solovyove" [New books on Vladimir Solovyov] in Izvestiya Odesskogo Bibliograficheskogo Obshchestva, fasc. 7; reprinted, Odessa, 1912. But, in turn, these supplements require new supplements. Thus, one does not find in them Michel d'Herbigny's book: Un Newman Russe. Vladimir Soloviev, Paris, 1911. Publication de la Bibliothèque Slave de Bruxelles. Serie A. On pp. xiv—xvi there is a bibliography of interest for Russians, indicating mainly foreign works on Solovyov.

6. "Ego autem dico, quod . . . potest accipi veritas non pro illa adaequatione

aut conformitate, quam importat actus intelligendi ad rem in esse cognito vel cognoscibili ibi praecise sistendo, sed pro illa adaequatione, quam ipsa res in suo esse cognito importat ad se ipsum in sua reali existentia extra... sic intelligendo, quod veritas formaliter est ipsa rectitudo aut conformitas, quam ipsa res ut intellecta importat adse ipsam in rerum natura extra." (Commentaria Gratidei Esculiani ordinis praedicatorum in totam artem veterem Aristotilem [sic]. Venet. 1493, l, Dist. 19, qu. 1 f. CXXVII r. B. [Quoted from Karl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Dritter Bd., Lpz., 1867, S. 318, n. 691]).

- 7. N. V. Goriaev, *Sravnitel'nyi etimologichesky slovar' russkogo iazyka* [Comparative etymological dictionary of the Russian language], Tiflis, 1896, p. 124.
- 8. V. I. Dal', *Tolkovy slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo iazyka* [Dictionary of the living Russian language], 3d ed. under the supervision of I. A. Beaudouin de Courtenay, S.P. and M., 1904, Vol. 3, col. 140 (p. 673 in the 1st ed.).
- 9. Franz Miklosich, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der slavischen Sprachen, Wien, 1886, S. 105.
- 10. S. P. Mikutsky, *Materialy dlia kornevogo i ob'iasnitel'nogo slovaria russkogo iazyka i vsekh slavianskikh narechii* [Materials toward an etymological and explanatory dictionary of the Russian language and all the Slavonic dialects], fasc. I. Warsaw, 1880, p. 47/13.
- 11. Feodor Shimkevich, Korneslov russkogo iazyka, sravnennogo so vsemi glavneishimi slavianskimi narechiami i s dvadtsatiu chetyr'mia inostrannymi iazykami [An etymological dictionary of the Russian language, as compared with all the major Slavonic dialects and with twenty-four foreign languages], Part 1, S.P., 1842, p. 91.
- 12. A. Fomin, merchant of Archangel, "Rospis' slov i rechenii, iz ostatkov drevnego rossiskogo iazyka v Dvinskoi strane sobrannykh i po nyneshnemu obrazovaniu iz'iasnennykh" [Description of words and phrases remaining from the ancient Russian language, collected in the Dvinsky region and clarified for our contemporaries] (Novyia Ezhemesiachnyia Sochineniia, 1787, XI, May, pp. 83–84. Reprinted in Zhivaia Starina, 10th year, No. 3, 1900, Mixture, p. 448). See also: Miklosich, op. cit., S. 105, jes, ist, istov, istov'n; qui verus est, verus.
- 13. Georg Curtius, Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie, Vierter Auflage, Lpz., 1873, S. 373, No. 564.

Walther Prellwitz, Wörterbuch der griechischen Sprache, Göttingen, 1892, S. 85.

- E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, Heidelberg-Paris, 1909, pp. 226–27.
 - N. V. Goriaev, op. cit., n. 7 supra, p. 104.
- 14. Curtius, n. 13 *supra*, SS. 378–79. Also see: D. N. Ovsianniko-Kulikovsky, "*Ocherki nauki o iazyke*" [Sketches on the Science of Language] (*Russkaya Mysl*', 1896, XII, Part 2, p. 21).
- 15. E. Renan, *l'Origine du langage*, 4th ed., p. 129; Russ. trans. in Renan's *Collected Works*, prepared under the supervision of Mikhailov, Vol. 1, p. 43.

The same explanation to these words was given by Gesenius (*Thesaurus philologicus criticus linguae hebraeae et chaldaeae Veteris Testamenti*, Lipsiae, 1835, T. I/2, p. 370: *hawah*; pp. 372–75: *hayah*; pp. 362–63: *habal*).

Gesenius supposes that the initial sounds of the verb *hawal*, as well as *habal*, that is, *hb*, *hw*, 'w, hb, 'b, imitate breathing, which is why a parallelism can be

established between Semitic roots and certain Indo-European ones (for details see Gesenius, p. 303). It is remarkable that this root of *breathing* also acquires the meaning *aspiration*, desire and love.

- 16. Curtius, n. 13 supra, S. 379.
- 17. Concerning this general character of Russian philosophy, see:
- I. V Kireevsky, Collected Works, M., Gershenzon, Put', M., 1911.
- A. I. Vvedensky, "O zadachakh sovremennoi filosofii, v sviazi s voprosom o vozmozhnosti i napravlenii filosofii samobytno-russkoi" [The tasks of contemporary philosophy in connection with the question of the possibility and orientation of an original Russian philosophy] (VFP, XX, pp. 125–57).
- V. F. Ern, "Nechto o Logose, russkoi filosofii i nauchnosti" [A comment on logos, Russian philosophy, and the scientific spirit] (in Ern, Bor'ba za Logos [The Battle for Logos], M., 1911, pp. 72–119).
- V. N. Karpov, in his *Vvedenie v filosofiiu* [Introduction to Philosophy] (1840, pp. 117–20), was perhaps the first to express the idea of the possibility and necessity of an original philosophy in Russia (I use his citations).

Without going into detail, it is sufficient to mention Skovoroda, M. M. Speransky, N. Fyodorov, Solovyov, Archimandrite Serapion Mashkin, Prince S. N. Trubetskoi, A. A. Kozlov, I. V. Kireevsky, A. S. Khomyakov, Iu. F. Samarin, Fr. F. A. Golubinsky, V. D. Kudriavtsev, Archbishop I. Borisov, S. S. Gogotsky, O. M. Novitsky, V. N. Karpov, Leo Tolstoy, P. D. Iurkevich, Archbishop Nikanor, N. N. Strakhov, etc., etc.—to become convinced of the fundamental ontologism of Russian philosophy, and for the majority this is a theistic ontologism.

On the basis of this ontologism, there arises among Russian thinkers a yearning to see their ideas realized, a hunger for the realization of higher truth. This characteristic trait has been remarked even by people who are quite insensitive to the religious spirit of our philosophy. Thus, according to I. Mechnikov, the transfer of Western ideas to the Russian soil is accomplished with an inevitable subjective nuance, "chiefly expressed in the striving to realize theoretical principles in practice" (*Vestnik Evropy*, 1891, Sept., p. 928).

On Russian philosophy let us mention the following works of a general nature. (See also n. 2 *supra*)

Archim. Gabriel, *Istoriia filosofii* [A history of philosophy], Kazan', 1839, Vol. 6.

Ueberweg-Heinze, *History of the New Philosophy*, trans. Ia. Kolubovsky, S.P., 1890.

- A. I. Vvedensky, *Filosofskie ocherki* [Philosophical essays], S.P., 1901. "*Sud'ba russkoi filosofii*" [The fate of Russian philosophy] (= *VFP*, XLII).
- E. Bobrov, *Filosofiia v Rossii: Materialy, issledovaniia i zametki* [Philosophy in Russia: Documents, investigations, and notes], Kazan', 1900; *Literatura i prosveshchenie Rossii XIX v.* [Literature and education in Russia in the 19th century], Kazan', 1902.
- Ia. N. Kolubovsky, "Materialy dlia istorii filosofii v Rossii" [Materials for a history of philosophy in Russia] (VFP, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XLIV).
- M. M. Filippov, "Sud'ba russkoi filosofii" [The fate of Russian philosophy] (Russkoye Bogatstvo, 1894, Jan.).
- V. V. Rozanov, "Zametki o vazhneishikh techeniakh russkoi filosofskoi mysli v sviazi s nashei perevodnoi literaturoi po filosofii" [Comments on the most im-

portant currents of Russian philosophical thought in connection with our translations of the philosophical literature] (*VFP*, III, pp. 1–36 = V. Rozanov, *Priroda v istorii* [Nature in history], 2d ed., S.P., 1902).

Ossip-Lourié, La philosophie russe contemporaine, 2d ed., Paris, 1905 (Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine).

- A. V. Danilovsky, *Istoriia prepodovaniia filosofskikh nauk v dukhovno-uchebnykh zavedeniakh Rossii* [History of the teaching of the philosophical sciences in Russian religious schools], 1912 (in manuscript in the Archives of the Moscow Theological Academy).
- E.L. Radlov, "Bericht über die Arbeiten auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie in Russland" (Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. III, 1890).
- E. L. Radlov, "Ocherk istorii russkoi filosofii" [Essay on the history of Russian philosophy] (in Obshchaia istoriia filosofii [General history of philosophy], Vol. 2, S.P., 1912).
 - 18. W. Prellwitz, n. 13 supra, S. 181: lēthō, lēthargos; S. 14: alēthēs.
 - E. Boisacq, n. 13 supra, 1907, 1-e livraison, p. 43: alēthēs.
- H. Cremer, Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Gräcitat, 8-te Auflage, Gotha, 1895, SS. 109 ff. Rud. Hirzel, Rede gehalten zur Feier der akademischen Preisverteilung am. 24 Juni 1905, Jena, 1905. Its theme is: "Was die Wahrheit war für die Griechen?" See especially Sec. 8, 15.
 - 19. See n. 2 *supra*.
 - 20. Curtius, n. 13 supra, S. 574. On the etymology of vereor see:

Alois Vanicek, Etymologische Wörterbuch der lateinischen Sprache, Lpz., 1874, pp. 153-54.

Alexander Suvorov, *Vocabularium etymologicum linguae Latinae*. A Latin-Russian dictionary, arranged according to roots. Warsaw, 1908, pp. 663–64. Curtius, n. 13 *supra*, SS. 99, 349, 575.

Al. Walde, Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, 2-e umgearbeitete Auflage, Heidelberg, 1910 (Indogermanische Bibliothek, 1, II, 1), S. 820.

Hirzel, n. 18 supra, SS. 57-58

21. Concerning the fact that the *word* was understood by the people in antiquity (and is understood by the people even today) as a kind of mystical reality and, in particular, that the meaning of the expression *eis onoma* in the Holy Scripture is not nominalistic and merely verbal but mystical and metaphysical, see:

Julius Boehmer, Das biblische "Im Namen": Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über das hebräische beshem und seine griechische Äquivalente (in besonderen Hinblick auf den Taufbefehl, Math. 28:19), Giessen, 1898.

Wilh. Heitmüller, "Im Namen Jesu": Eine sprach- und religiongeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Neuen Testament, speziell zur altchristlichen Taufe, Göttingen, 1903.

W. Brandt, "Onoma en de doopsformule in het nieuwe testament," Theolog. Tijdshcrift, 1891, pp. 565-610. I am acquainted with this work only in synopsis.

B. Jacob (Babbiner), Im Namen Gottes: Eine sprachliche und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Alten und Neuen Testament, Berlin, 1903.

Fr. Giesebrecht, *Die alttestamentliche Schätzung des Gottesnames und ihre religionsgeschichtliche Grundlage*, Königsberg, 1901. Given here are extracts from the works of Nyrop, Adrian, and Krell, which are virtually inaccessible to the reader owing to the fact that they have been published in hard-to-find publica-

tions. Moreover, on pp. 45–54 we find a brief exposition (with the sources indicated) of the onomatological theories of Gustav Baur, Herm. Schulz, Riem, Dillman, Kremer, Stad, Smend, Wittihen, and Bömer.

J. Buxtorfius, Lexicon Chaldaicum, Talmudicum et Rabbinicum. Denuo edidit et annotatis auxit Bernardus Fischerus, Lipsiae, 1859. 2 vols. ShM, pp. 1204–14, especially Fischer's note.

Em. Ferrière, *Paganisme des Hébreux jusqu'à la captivité de Babylone*, Paris, 1884, pp. 133-61.

- P. Florensky, *Sviashchennoe pereimenovanie* [Sacred renaming], 1907 (A survey work; currently being prepared for publication).
- P. Florensky, "Obshchechelovecheskie korni idealisma" [The Universally Human Roots of Idealism], Sergiev Posad, 1909 (= Bogoslovsky Vestnik, 1909, No. 2, 3).

A bibliography of other, more fragmentary works on this subject can be found in my work on "sacred renaming." Also see *infra* n. 747.

- 22. Terence, *The Girl from the Island of Andros (Andria)*, I, 1, v. 41: "Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit." (P. Terentii Afri Comoediae ex. rec. Bentleii, nova editio stereotipa, Lipsiae, 1829, p. 29. In the edition annotated by John Minellius, Lpz., 1738, p. 64, the verse that interests us is the 40th). Terence's comedy was staged in Rome between 166 and 160 B.C.; Terence died in 159 B.C. We read the praise of Terence in Cicero, and so we can assume with a high degree of probability that Cicero took the word "veritas" from Terence.
- 23. See H. Merguet, Lexicon zu den Reden des Cicero mit Angange sämmtlicher Stellen, Bd. IV, Jena, 1884, SS. 856–57. Approximately 64 cases of the use of veritas are presented here.
- 24. Carolus du Fresne, Dominus du Cange, Glossarium ad Scriptores mediae et infimae Latinitatis, Editio nova. T. VI, Parisiis, 1736, col. 1492–93.
- 25. Guilielmus Gesenius, *Thesaurus philologicus criticus linguae hebraeae et chaldaeae Veteris Testamenti*, Editio altera. Lipsiae, 1829. T. I 1, pp. 113–14, 114–18.

Wilhelm Gesenius, Hebräisches und Aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament, in Verbinding mit A. Socin und H. Zimmern bearbeitet von Frants Buhl, 12-te Aufl., Lpz., 1895. S. 51, 55.

For details concerning the usage of the word "amen" in the Old and New Testaments, in liturgy, in inscriptions and on papyruses, as well as concerning the mysterious siglum $\varphi\Theta$, see F. Cabrol's essay "Amen" in *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie*, T. I 1, Paris, 1907, col. 1554–73. There (col. 1573) we also find bibliographic information. According to Louis Ginsberg, the word "amen" is perhaps the most widespread word in mankind, for it belongs simultaneously to the Jews, to the Christians, and to the Moslems (ib. col. 1554). The siglum mentioned above is nothing else but the number 99, i.e., the number of the word $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$ or amen. In Cabrol (col. 1571–72), we find:

The word "amen" used as confirmation of a statement that has just been made signifies faith in the *power of the word*, in creativity by the word, in the reality of the word (see n. 2 *supra*). Incantatory formulas have a meaning similar to

"amen," with the difference that the irrevocability of the verbal creativity in these formulas is marked by metaphor and a multiplicity of words. Here are a few examples of such an incantatory "amen": "My word is firm!" "The power of my word will never be diminished!" "May my words be firm and sticking, harder than rock, more sticking than glue and sulfur, saltier than salt, sharper than a rapier, stronger than a broadsword; what is thought shall be done!" "This word is an affirmation and fortification; it affirms, fortifies, and seals . . . and nothing, neither air, nor storm, nor water, will unseal what has been sealed." "For those words of mine my lips and teeth are the lock, and my tongue is the key; and I will throw the key into the sea; stay, lock, in my mouth." "The key to my words is at heavenly heights while the lock is in the depths of the sea—upon the fish known as the whale, and no one can catch this fish and open the lock except me; but whoever catches this fish and opens my lock, let him be like a tree burnt by lightning," etc. (A. Afanas'ev, Poeticheskie vozzreniia slavian na prirodu [The Slavs' poetic views of nature], M., 1865, Vol., 1, pp. 420-23). On incantations the most detailed, mutually complementary, investigations are: L. N. Maikov, "Velikorusskie zaklinaniia" [Great-Russian charms], Zapiski Imper. russ. geografich. ob-stva, po opredeleneniu etnografii, Vol. 2, S.P., 1869. A. V. Vetukhov, Zagovory, zaklinaniia, oberegi i drugie vidy narodnogo vrachevaniia, osnovannye na vere v silu slova: Iz istorii mysli [Incantations, charms, "oberegi," and other forms of popular healing, based on faith in the power of the word: From the history of thought], Warsaw, 1907, fasc. 1-2, 522+VII pp. This work contains a large bibliography, which, however, is not complete and needs to be supplemented.

26. Moisei Bazilevsky, Vlianie monoteizma na razvitie znanii [The influence of monotheism on scholarly development], Kiev, 1883, Part 3, Ch. 1, p. 168, p. 2

27. I report with great joy that the majority of the ideas in the second letter and, to some extent, in the third and fourth letters, originated with the late Archimandrite Serapion (Mashkin). Very many ideas here are taken from his manuscripts, but which exactly—let the reader who is interested in questions of intellectual property decide for himself when the works of Father Serapion are published. As far as I am concerned, the ideas of the late philosopher and my own have turned out to be so kindred and interwoven that I do not even know where his ideas end and where mine begin. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that our common points of departure and comparable kinds of knowledge have led us to similar conclusions.

Until his very death, Father Serapion was profoundly interested in developing a system that would start with absolute skepticism and, embracing all of the fundamental questions of mankind, would end with a program of social activity. Diligent and daring work of the intellect led to a highly original system, which the late philosopher attempted to write down several times. Somewhere among his papers he recalls how even when he was a child he was drawn by the fundamental problems of the origin of the world, of God, etc., and that even then he attempted to put down on paper his solutions to these problems. The first serious such attempt should be considered Fr. Serapion's Kandidat thesis, from 1890–92, when he was 39–41 years old. The second grandiose attempt was his Master's thesis,

dated 1900, when Serapion was the rector of the Znamensky Monastery. This work bears different titles in different places. On the cover one finds: Archimandrite Serapion (Mashkin). An Attempt at a System of Christian Philosophy. This title is crossed out, and beneath it one reads: An Attempt at a System of the Teaching and Work of Jesus Christ (Christian Philosophy). The original title is repeated on the first page, with the epigraph: "And he measured the city with the reed . . . according to the measure of a man, that is, of the angel" (Rev. 21:16–17). As we noted, this work was submitted as a Master's thesis to the Moscow Theological Academy. After having examined it, Professor Aleksei I. Vvedensky returned it with the recommendation that corrections be introduced: in part, to rectify purely external problems with the exposition, e.g., verbosity, repetitions, lack of clarity; and in part, to make substantial changes. Father Serapion began to rework the thesis and, with numerous crossings-out, insertions, restorations of old text, additions, and interpolations of entire notebooks, the manuscript became extremely difficult to read. For some reason he did not resubmit this work as his Master's thesis. Instead, he began a new elaboration of his system, according to a new plan and under a new title: (monk) Zavulon Mashkin. A System of Philosophy. 1904. And on the next page: Archimandrite Serapion Mashkin. A System of Philosophy: An Attempt at a Scientific Synthesis. In two parts. 1903–1904.

This final version is distinguished by a great compression of writing and even sometimes by an elegance of exposition—by that distinctive elegance of rigor with which Spinoza's *Ethics* and the three *Critiques* of Kant are written. Developed *more geometrico*, much more abstract than the previous version, this final version demands of the reader a constant intensity of thought. The demand on the reader is made even greater by a multitude of symbolic formulas, which resemble mathematical ones, embodying in a concentrated form entire metaphysical theories and serving as a basis for further speculations. Unfortunately, this 2nd version was not finished; its 2nd part remains in the form of separate fragments and even in the form of jottings that are barely legible owing to the indecipherability of the handwriting. It is therefore doubtful whether the 2nd part of the 2nd version can be reconstructed.

After Fr. Serapion's death, all of his papers were acquired by the Optina Hermitage. These papers consist of the two final expositions of his system, originals of letters, and some isolated notes, but of these there are very few. Numerous preliminary sketches, notes, and fragments pertaining to the expositions of his system are in the possession of the relatives of the late Archimandrite, the Mashkins. The author of the present book intends to publish what is most valuable in these papers; however, both the external conditions of publication and the preparation of the text for publication present difficulties that are not easy to solve. Meanwhile, I hope to publish a monograph on Fr. Serapion, i.e., a systematic exposition of his views and his biography. There is a definite need for such a monograph: many people who would be greatly interested in his views do not have the ability to understand his writings without assistance.

In conclusion, I would have liked to present a bibliography on Father Serapion, but it is unfortunately limited to my brief article: "*K pochesti vyshniago zvaniia*" [The prize of the high calling] in the first issue of *Voprosy Religii*, M., 1906, pp. 143–73. I must inform the reader, however, that this essay was written before I

was able to gain a more fundamental insight into the life and person of Father Serapion, and therefore my view of Father Serapion is substantially different today.

28. As is well known, formal logic, founded by Aristotle, begins with concepts, and from them it constructs judgments. By contrast, gnoseological logic, especially in the works of G. Rickert, begins with judgments and, using them, establishes concepts (Rickert, Introduction to Transcendental Philosophy: Objects of Knowledge, trans. Shpett, 1904; also: Limits of the Natural-scientific Formation of Concepts, trans. Boden, S.P., 1903). In the first case, concepts are the primary elements while judgments are the secondary ones; in the second case, the opposite is true. Both logics coincide in their monistic understanding of logical elements. On the other hand, symbolic logic, based on the correlativeness and inseparability of judgments and concepts, is essentially dualistic. How is a concept given? Through a judgment. How is a judgment given? From concepts. Consequently, there are no judgments without concepts, and no concepts without judgments; the two are polarly conjugate. Concepts and judgments are elements of thought that, always being together, are distinguished not independently but only correlatively, and, outside their correlation, they cannot be viewed as distinct. A highly interesting consequence follows from this: When we establish one or another formal correlation of concepts and judgments, then, inserting in the correlation the latter in place of the former and the former in place of the latter, we again get the true correlation, which will be a theorem dually conjugate with the first. Thus, in algorithmic operations we do not have the slightest need to know whether we are dealing with judgments or with concepts; the derived formula will be equally valid for both interpretations, so that every formula represents two theorems, one from the calculus of classes, and one from the calculus of propositions.

On this subject see:

L. Couturat, *L'algèbre de la logique*, 1905, Sec. 2, pp. 3–4, and the Russ. trans. with supplement by P. Sleshinsky, Odessa, 1909, Sec. 2, pp. 2–3, and the 1st appendix, pp. I–IV. For further indications see n. 212 *infra*.

In view of the aforesaid, the most justified thing would be not to limit ourselves to the choice of one fundamental term or another, which is what we have done in the text, but simply to write a symbol without its interpretation. However, this position, the safest one, would make the language of our work so barbarous and the book so difficult to read that we would be forced to upset the equilibrium and to give preference to one interpretation or another. We have considered the logico-algebraic algorithm from the point of view of gnoseological logic, i.e., we have considered—at least in words—judgments to be the fundamental act of knowledge. But, though this cuts the range of thought in half, this does not make the thought false and it can always be completed by a "translation" of the text into the language of formal logic. In essence, it would have been necessary to print the text simultaneously in the languages of both logics, in two columns, but this innovation would be tiresome and of little purpose, although it is sometimes used in the algebra of logic.

29. This principle of knowledge has been unanimously expressed—in different formulations—by mystics of all times and lands. Here I have in mind, of course, natural mysticism, without or outside of grace. This principle is expressed

more or less clearly by Indian philosophy in general and the system of yoga in particular, by neoplatonism, by Persian mysticism, by contemporary theosophy and other occult currents, by innumerable mystical currents based on Christianity, and, finally, by different schools of philosophy, especially by recent philosophy, e.g., mystical intuitivism, etc., etc.

Let me indicate some books that will familiarize the reader with the general character of mystical knowing. I will not, however, indicate the literature on Sufism, neoplatonism, and other currents, except for Indian mysticism, as this literature is too specialized, and because I intend to indicate some of it elsewhere.

W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, trans. V. Malakhieva-Mirovich and M. V. Shik under the supervision of S. V. Lur'e, M., 1900.

G. Heffding, The Philosophy of Religion, S.P., 1903.

- Vl. S. Solovyov, *Kritika otvlechennykh nachal* [Critique of abstract principles], XL–XLVI (*Collected Works*, Vol. 2); *Filosofskie nachala tsel'nogo znaniia* [Philosophical principles of integral knowledge] (ibid., Vol. 1); also many articles from the *Encyclopedic Dictionary* of Brockhaus and Ephron (ibid., Vol. 9), etc.
- P. D. Ouspensky, *Tertium Organum: Kliuch k zagadkam mira* [Tertium Organum: Key to the riddles of the world], S.P., 1911.
- M. V. Lodyzhenksy, *Sverkhsoznanie i puti k ego dostizheniiu: Induskaia Radzha-Ioga i khristianskoe podvizhnichestvo* [Superconsciousness and ways to attain it: The Indian Raja-Yoga and Christian asceticism], S.P., 1911.
- P. M. Minin, "Mistitsizm i ego priroda" [Mysticism and its nature] (Bogoslovsky Vestnik, 20th year, 1911, April, pp. 795–817, and May, pp. 85–112); also: "Glavnye napraveleniia tserkovnoi mistiki" [Main directions of church mysticism] (op. cit., Dec., pp. 823–38 ff).
- I. Lapshin, "Misticheskoe poznanie i vselenskoe chuvstvo" [Mystical knowledge and the universal sense] (Collection of essays dedicated to Prof. Emer. V. I. Lamansky on the 50th anniversary of his scholarly activity, S.P., 1907, Vol. 1, pp. 549–641, and also in a separate edition).
- F. Steppun, "*Tragediia misticheskogo soznaniia*" [The tragedy of mystical consciousness] (*Logos*, 1911–12, Books 2–3, pp. 115–40).

Delacroix, Etudes d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme. Les grands mystiques chrétiens, Paris, 1908.

Leuba, "Les tendances fondamentales des mystiques chrétiens" (Revue philosophique, T. 44, 1902).

Récéjac, Essai sur les fondaments de la connaissance mystique, Paris, 1897.

Murisier, Les maladies du sentiment religieux, Paris, 1901.

Ekstatische Konfessionen, gesammelt von Martin Buber, Jena, 1909.

A. Godfernaux, "Sur la psychologie du mysticisme" (Revue Philosophique, 1902, Feb.).

Boutroux, "Le mysticisme" (Bulletin de l'Institut général psychologique, 1902, Jan.-Feb.).

J. v. Görres, Die christliche Mystik, Regensburg, 1836-1842.

Caro, Essai sur le mysticisme au XVII siècle.

Paulhan, "Le nouveau mysticisme" (Revue Philosophique, 1890, No. 11).

A. A. Kozlov, Ocherki iz istorii filosofii: Poniatie filosofii i istorii filosofii. Filosofiia vostochnaia [Essays on the history of philosophy. The concept of philosophy and the history of philosophy. Eastern philosophy], Kiev, 1887.

M. Muller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, trans. from the English by I. Nikolaev, M., 1901.

Archim. Khrisanf (Rostovstev), Religii drevnego mira v ikh otnoshenii k khristianstvu [Religions of the ancient world in their relation to Christianity], S.P., 1873–76, 3 volumes.

Ramacharaka, *Hatha-yoga*, trans. under the supervision of V. Silin, S.P., 1909. "Light on the Way," trans. I. Batiushkov (*Svobodnaia Sovest*', Bk. 1, M., 1906, pp. 140–52); also trans. by E. P., ed. *Posrednik*.

E. P. Blavatskaia [Helen Blavatsky], *The Voice of Silence*, trans. from the English by E. P. Kaluga.

Brahman Chatterji, *India's Hidden Religious Philosophy*, trans. from the 3rd Fr. ed. by E. P. Kaluga, 1906.

Foundations of the Upanishads (Spirit of the Upanishads), ed. Magnitizm Lichnosti.

Aleksey I. Vvedensky, *Religioznoe soznanie iazychestva* [The religious consciousness of paganism], Vol. 1, M., 1902.

Sedir, Fakirism in India or a School of Exercises for the Development of Psychic Abilities, trans. A. V. Troianovsky, S.P., 1908.

Bettany and Douglas, *The Great Religions of the East*, trans. from the English by L. B. Khavkina, M., 1899, with bibliography and subject index.

Rich. Schmidt, *Fakire und Fakirtum in alten und modernen Indien*, Berlin, 1908, with color drawings representing different positions of the body during mystical contemplation.

I. Campbell Oman, *The Mystics, Ascetics and Saints of India*, London, 1905, XV+291 pp. For a review of this book see *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 1906, No. 3 (159), p. 425.

Paul Deussen, Allegemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. I, Lpz., 1824.

C. J. H. Windischmann, Die Philosophie in Fortgang der Weltgeschichte. Erster Theil. Die Grundlagen der Philosophie im Morgenland, Bonn, 1827.

A. Bart, The Religion of India, M., 1897. With a bibliography.

Swami Vivekanda, *The Philosophy of Yoga. Lectures Read in New York in the Winter of 1895–1896 on Raja-Yoga*, trans. from the English by Popov, Sosnitsa, 1896.

The Herald of Theosophy; the collections *Questions of Theosophy*.

A. Besant, Ancient Wisdom, trans, E.P.; also Theosophy and the New Psychology, trans. E.P.

Rud. Steiner, THEOSOPHIA, trans. from the 2nd Germ. ed. by Mintslova. S.P., 1910.

See also n. 149 infra.

30. According to Plato, there are three kinds of being. The first is "identical, is not born and is not destroyed, not receiving into itself another from anywhere and itself not entering into another." In other words, it is absolutely subordinate to the law of identity; it is a property of "thought." The second is "born, always mobile, appearing in some place and then disappearing from there"; it is perceived by "opinion in connection with feeling." The third kind is always a kind of space, not subject to destruction and giving a place to everything that has birth; it is grasped without the intermediary of feeling, by means of a sort of illegitimate judgment—this kind of being is scarcely probable. Looking at it, it is as if we were

dreaming . . . (auto de met anaisthēsias apton logismōi tini nothōi, mogis piston pros d dē kai oneiropoloumen blepontēs . . .). Plato, Timaeus, 52a, b. Platonis Opera ex rec. Schneideri, Vol. II, Parisiis, 1846, p. 219.

A similar thought is developed in another work: "tria de onta, trisi gnōrizesthai tan men eidean, noōi kat epistaman tan d'hulan, logismōi nothōi tōi mēpē kat euthuōrian noeisthai, alla kat analogian ta d'apogennamata aisthēsei kai doxai. Quum haec tria sint, tribus quoque modis cognoscendi: Formam quidem, mente et scientia: Materiam adulterina quadam ratiocinatione (quod videlicet non recta quadam et aequam rei animadversione sed ex proportione quadam et collatione intelligitur). Foetus vero qui ex illis nascuntur, sensu et opinione" (pseudo-Timaeus of Locris: On the Soul of the World, 94b; Divini Platonis Opera omnia quae exstant, Marsilio Ficino interprete. Lvgdv., 1590, p. 553 B). Although ancient publishers placed this writing among Plato's as the original source of the Timaeus, at the present time its authenticity is absolutely denied, and it is not published among Plato's Works. However, Meiners, Tiedemann, Tennemann, and others have recognized it to be a compilation from Plato. It is in this sense that it presents some interest for us, as a paraphrase of some later platonist.

- 31. Goethe, Faust.
- 32. To prove is to generate dialectically what is being proved (cf. Hermann Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntniss, Berlin, 1902). Rationalism is precisely the expression of this tendency—be it the rationalism of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, of the contemporary Marburg philosophers or, finally, of the logistic philosophers. In essence, all of these thinkers are occupied with the same task—that of expelling from the domain of thought all that is not constructed purely logically, i.e., that of rationalizing all of thought. However, it is in the domain of the foundations of mathematics that this "logicization" of science is being executed most consistently and rigorously, through the intermediary link of "arithmetization." However, among all of these thinkers, and among the mathematicians as well, one cannot fail to see that intuition, chased out the door, inevitably flies back through the window. But as a courageous attempt, as an experiment at clearly reducing to the absurd the very principle of the rationalistic, all these currents are highly interesting and instructive.
- 33. A. Afanasiev, *Poeticheskie vozzreniia Slavian na prirodu* [The Slavs' poetic views of nature], Vol. 2, M., 1868, p. 163.
- 34. "To explain the given phenomena one can use only such other things and principles of explanation that are connected with the given phenomena in accordance with already-known laws of phenomena. For this reason a *transcendental hypothesis* in which one would use the pure idea of reason to explain the things of nature would not serve as an explanation, since in this case that which we do not understand to a sufficient degree on the basis of the empirical principles familiar to us would be explainable by means of that which is not at all understandable to us. The principle of this hypothesis would properly serve only to satisfy reason, and not to aid the application of the rational mind to objects. Order and purposefulness in nature must in turn be explained on the basis of the natural foundations and laws of nature. Here even the wildest hypotheses, if only they have a physical character, are more tolerable than hyperphysical ones, i.e., than reference to a divine Creator, assumed for this purpose—hier sind selbst die wildesten Hypothesen, wenn sie nur physisch sind, erträglicher, als ein hyperphysische, d. i. die

Berufung auf ein einen göttlichen Urheber, den man zu diesem Behuf voraussetzt. Indeed, to bypass at once all the causes whose objective reality is at least in possibility accessible to our knowledge through the continuation of experience, and to find peace with a pure idea—is very convenient for reason. This is the principle of lazy reason (*ignava ratio*) . . . " (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason: Doctrine of Method*, Ch. 1, Sec. 3 [ed. B, SS. 800–801], trans. N. O. Lossky, S.P., 1907, pp. 426–27. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, herausgegeben von K. Kehrbach, 2-te Aufl., Lpz., SS. 588–89).

- 35. The terms employed here and further are clarified in:
- P. Florensky, "O simvolakh bezknechnosti" [On symbols of infinity] (Novyi Put', 1904, No. 9); also "O tipakh vozrastaniia" [On types of growth] (Bogoslovsky Vestnik, 1906, No. 7).
- 36. Plato, *Symposium*, 202 A (Ch. 22), *Opera Platonis* ex rec. R. B. Hirschigii. Parisiis, 1856, Vol. 1, p. 680:

"Do we not know that a correct opinion that we cannot confirm by proof is neither knowledge (for how could something unproved be knowledge) nor ignorance (for how could something that relates to what is essential be ignorance)? It is this correct opinion that is probably intermediate between ignorance and knowledge."

- 37. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI (Z), 3 (*Aristotelis Opera*, ed. Acad. Borussica, Vol. 2, p. 1139 b 31): " $h\bar{e}$ men ara epistēmē estin exis apodeiktikē." The word exis comes from the verb echō, I have, and signifies possession. The concept of apodictic judgment can be quite definitely found in Aristotle, in the *First Analytic*, I 1, 24, a 30; cf. *De gener*. II 6, 333 b 25.
- 38. The word *aporia* is formed from *a privativum* and *por*; derived from this latter word are *porein*, to provide, to give; *porizo*, to provide, to prepare, and so forth; peprōtai, given, solved, destined by fate; pepromenos, designated; hē pepromenē, lot, fate; these words define the meaning of our root. However, its kinship with the Latin root par, in the words parare, to prepare, and parere, to give birth (W. Prellwitz, Etymologisches Wörterbuch, SS. 259-60: porien; Benzeler, Greek-Russian Dictionary, Kiev, 1881, pp. 626-27), makes one think that originally the root por contained the idea of provision precisely through birth, but birth as an activity, producing a fruit. From this it is understandable that, for Plato, the idea of the fullness of the productive power, the fullness of the divine creation of the ideal world, is represented in the form of the divinity Poros (Plato, Symposium, 203, B, C, XXIII, Platonis Opera ex rec. R. B. Hirschigii, Parisiis, 1856, Vol. 1, p. 681). For this reason, aporeo, to be without means, to find oneself in a helpless state, to endure need and deficiency, and aporia, a situation without a way out, perplexity, dejection, deficiency, need, etc. (Benzeler, Greek-Russian Dictionary, p. 93), essentially express the idea of sterility, impotence, the absence of the power to give birth. The philosophical terms aporein and aporia, given a relatively external understanding of them, signify an impasse of the mind, mental perplexity, an intellectual dead end, while, for a more profound understanding, they signify impotence of creative thought, an inability to give birth to thoughts, mental sterility. This is made manifest in the mind's inability to use the external organs of intellectual birth, the voice organs, i.e., in the impossibility of expressing a judgment, in aphasia. In the history of thought, Socrates and Plato repeatedly compared philosophical activity with giving birth; however, this is not

a mere analogy. No, the organs of birth and the organs of speech are homotypical to one another [see p. 415 in the present book], and the fruits of their activity, an infant and a thought made incarnate, these fruits of the lower and upper poles, are in some sort of difficult-to-show but indisputable, profound correspondence to one another. That is why to designate the philosophical inability to produce thoughts the ancient skeptics once again chose a word with such a specific nuance.

39. The word *epochē* is derived from the verb *ep-echō*, I have something above something, I hold something above something, I hold something in front of something, I have someone against me, I stand opposite to someone, I am directed against someone, I launch myself against someone; and then: I hold back, restrain, stop, restrain myself, procrastinate, wait, etc. (Benzeler, Greek-Russian Dictionary, p. 270). The later formation epochē signifies a stop, a delay (ibid., p. 293). In philosophy, according to Pyrrho's definition, "epochē is a cessation of thought, as a result of which we neither reject nor establish something" (Sextus Empiricus, The Pyrrhonian Principles, I 10, Sex. Emp., ex recensione Imm. Bekkeri, Berolini, 1842, p. 5, 1-2). According to Ed. Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griechen, 4-te Aufl., herausg. von Ed. Welbmann, T. 3, Abth. 1, Lpz., 1909, S. 505, Anm. 1), the term epochē expresses the same thing as aphasia, akatalēpsia and, later, arrepsia, agnōsia tēs alētheias, etc. But there is no justification to destroy the nuances of thought that are connected with the distinctions between these terms. However, for us, at the present time the historical side of the business is not that interesting, and we can boldly neglect subtleties, whose explication the reader can find in the special literature on Greek skepticism.

For a bibliography on ancient skepticism, and in part on modern skepticism, see:

Fr. Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Achte . . . Auflage, bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Max Heinze, Berlin, 1894, Erster Theil: das Alterthum. Sec. 60, 61, SS. 291–99.

J. M. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, New York, London, 1905, Vol. 3, Part 1, pp. 431–32: Pyrrho; pp. 475–76: Sextus Empiricus; p. 63: Aenesidemus, etc.

Rud. Klussmann, *Biblioteca scriptorum classicorum et graecorum et latino*rum. Die Literatur von 1878 bis 1896 einschliesslich umfassend, Erster Band: *Scriptores graeci*, Lpz., 1909 u.f. See the pertinent authors in the index.

- **40.** The structure of the term *ataraxia* (*a privativum* and *tarassō*, I shake, agitate, confuse, worry, trouble, etc.) is clear. According to Pyrrho's definition, "*ataraxia* is the absence of the agitation of the soul and becalmedness" or "the unrestrainedness of the soul and clarity, gaiety" (Sextus Empiricus, op. cit., I 10, *Opera*, p. 5, 2–3).
- 41. Pyrrho was the founder of Greek skepticism. He not only enunciated the fundamental principles of this teaching but he built his entire life, representing a lofty example of purity and nobility, according to these principles. He was one of the most elevated representatives of the type known as Greek thinker: he was superhuman, insofar as no human agitations and cares had power over him. This circumstance led to the fact that skeptics of all times have seen in Pyrrho their saint, as it were: he has become the patron of the sect of skeptics. . . . He accompanied Anaxarchus when the latter went on the Asian campaign with Alexander's army. . . . In Asia Pyrrho encountered the Hindu gymnosophists, wise men who

had renounced the world, who, naked, lived in the forests; he encountered Hindu magi, ascetics, and saints; these passive and indifferent people, who had renounced life, must have posed an enchanting riddle for our Greek, the son of an epoch yearning for deliverance. "We, Greeks, lose our strength in the chase after happiness, but here, on this side of the sea, happiness is attained in practice. Only by dying for life, only by renouncing the agitated will, can one find delight in the world. What way must our soul choose in order to attain its ideal?" It is in the form of questions of this sort that Pyrrho, immersed in thought, must have seen the fundamental features of skepticism as the solution to the riddle of the world and man. After the end of the Asian campaign Pyrrho returned to his native land, Elis; he led a very modest life there, and enjoyed universal respect. Thanks to him philosophers were freed from taxes, and the Athenians offered him the right of citizenship. A statue of him was erected on the market square of his native town; he was named the high priest. . . . A new moral ideal of life, full of resignation, was the spiritual motive of his entire teaching. . . . All that we know about Pyrrho's character and mode of life proves that he was filled with a profoundly, inwardly grounded indifference to life and the world. There was not a trace of fanaticism in this man; he does not despair, though he is free of all specific yearnings; "nothing sustains him; nevertheless, he stands unshakable" (Brochard, Les sceptiques grecs, Paris, 1887, p. 73). He is a religious skeptic and at the same time a high priest. His doubt is not that of an ardent preacher who is still full of hope; his skepticism is that of a conservator who has lost all hope. He led a quiet and solitary life with his sister, the midwife Philesta; he avoided all honors, never forgetting the words of one Hindu that Anaxarchus cannot teach the truth for he revolves in the palaces of kings. During a dangerous storm at sea, at a moment of general panic, he pointed out a pig that was calmly eating its feed as an example of naive ataraxy worthy of imitation. If during his speech his interlocutor suddenly deserted him, he would calmly finish expressing his thought without becoming angry and without paying any attention to the person who had left him. "He underwent the most excruciating operations without the slightest grimace" (R. Richter, Skepticism in Philosophy, trans. from the German by V. Bazarov and B. Stolpner, Vol. 1, 1910, pp. 62–65, Bk. 1, Ch. 1, II 1). The foregoing represents a recent attempt to reconstruct the "vita" of the skeptic. (For other characterizations of Pyrrho's character, see Brochard and Nietzsche). Without daring to deny this radiant image, although its historical likelihood is not very great, we feel it our duty to mention other figures who bear witness to inner agitation and spiritual turbulence on the basis of epochē. Such is Timon, who wrote many works; Timon who was greedy for mockery, and at the same time loved to eat, and to drink well, and to accumulate money and torment his enemies (Richter, Skepticism in Philosophy, p. 68). Such also is the eternally busy Carneades, whose thunderous speeches made almost a demonic impression (Diodorus, IV, 62; Richter, Skepticism, p. 81). The two of them grounded the skeptical epoche better than Pyrrho, but that by no means helped them acquire true "peace," galēnē, of the spirit. Does this not mean that Pyrrho's detachment, if authentic, can be explained not by *epoche*, but by something else?

42. The point of view expressed in the text can be substantiated by a multitude of data. But for me personally this point of view became vividly evident after a

dream I had. Let me present the record of this dream, made right after awakening, on September 9, 1902:

"I saw in my dream how I was losing my mind. Something alien to my 'I,' some alien will, was creeping into my psychic organism. At times my organism was divided into two active 'I's.' My 'I,' the real one, would then try to resist the alien 'I,' and would sometimes succeed. This was at rare moments when, like a lightning flash, the thought would appear: 'I am losing my mind!' But, in general, the real 'I' would passively, indifferently contemplate the other 'I' (an example of the splitting of consciousness in a dream without objectification on another person). In my dream I was treated by, or rather watched over by, Dr. K.

"Even my body stopped obeying my will. I would walk along and wave my arms in some strange manner, as if they were attached to my shoulders by very weak turning hinges. My legs would jerk in all directions, and my whole body would resemble a mechanism that was coming apart. Finally, I felt that in an instant the final spark of the self-consciousness of the real 'I,' the final glimmer of consciousness of the psychic disorder that was beginning, would be extinguished.

"Here I woke up, and, first mechanically, but then becoming conscious and beginning to understand its meaning, I recited Balmont's verse: I just saw a dream—not all in it was a dream." [Balmont's poem actually reads: I saw a dream, not all in it was a dream, / exclaimed Byron at a black moment].

- 43. Archimandrite [now Bishop] Seraphim (Chichagov), *Letopis' Serafimo-Diveevskogo monastiria* [Chronicle of the Seraphim-Diveevsky monastery], S.P., 1903, p. 114.
- 44. A similar answer concerning the right of going beyond experience is given by Herbart in *Lehrbuch zur Einleiting in die Philosophie*, 5-te Aufl., Sec. 157, S. 192.
- 45. See pp. 351–54 in the present book. Various definitions of infinity, arranged in chronological order, can be found in Rud. Eisler, Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe, 3-te Aufl., Berlin, 1910, Bd. 3, SS. 1566–83, 1973. For the history of the concept of infinity in ancient philosophy, see H. Guyot, L'Infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'à Plotin, thèse, Paris, 1906, XII+260 pp.

Also see:

- D. N. Ovsiannikov-Kulikovsky, "Ideia bezkonechnosti v polozhitel'noi nauke i v real'nom iskusstve" [The idea of infinity in positive science and in realistic art] (Voprosy teorii i psikhologii tvorchestva, compiled and published by B. A. Lezinov, Kharkov, 1907, pp. 50–78). Also by the same author: "Neskol'ko myslei o proiskhozhdenii i razvitii chuvstva bezkonechnosti v chistoi lirike" [Some thoughts on the origin and development of the sense of infinity in pure lyrical poetry] (ibid., pp. 83–117).
- H. F. Th. Beyda, Das Unendliche, was es den Philosophen und was es den Mathematikern bisher gewesen und wie es sich mathematische dargestellt nach einer neuen Erfindung, Bonn, 1880.

Alex. Véronnet, L'Infini, catégorie et réalité, Paris, 1903.

46. An allusion to 3 Esdrae 3:10–12: "Unus scripsit, Forte est vinum. Alius scripsit, Fortior est rex. Tertius scripsit, Fortiores sunt mulieres, super omnia autem vincit veritas."

The idea developed in the text of overcoming absolute doubt by the infinitude

of the truth finds confirmation in Father John Sergiev: "God is an infinite Spirit. What does this infinitude consist of? God is everywhere and in all things. He is higher than all things and is not contained by any creature. And no thought, however fast and bold it might be, can overtake Him in anything. It always revolves only in Him" (Father John of Kronstadt, "Moia zhizn" vo Khriste [My life in Christ]. Supplement to Russkii Palomnik, 1903, Bk. 3, pp. 692–93).

47. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimeni continet Monadologiam physicam (Supplement-Band zu Kant's Werken, Abth. II, Herausg. von J. H. v. Kirchmann, Lpz., 1878, p. 25; Philosophische Bibliotek von Kirchmann, Bd. 76, Abth. II).

Kant, *Physical Monadology. With Preliminary Comments*, trans. P. Florensky, Sergiev Posad, 1905, p. 7 (= *Bogoslovsky Vestnik*, 1905, No. 9).

- **48.** Anselm of Canterbury, *Monol.* I. He also indicates the ideal self-groundedness of God: God is "summa veritas per se subsistens."
 - 49. Thomas Aquinas, Contr. gent. I, 80.
- 50. Georgius Reeb, S.J., *Thesaurus Philosophicus seu Distinctiones et axio-mata philosophica* . . . proposita a J. M. Cornoldi, ed. nova, Parisiis, 1891, p. 111, No. 53, VII.
- 51. Spinoza, *Ethices* pars prima, Defin. III (Benedicti de Spinoza Opera . . . rec. Van Vlotenet and J. P. N. Land, Vol. 1, Hagae Comitum, 1882, p. 39).
 - **52.** See n. 27 *supra*.
- 53. For the sake of graphic simplification, we will write this formula and analogous ones in lower-case letters. But the reader, who will have penetrated into the heart of the matter, will know where upper-case letters are required.
- 54. St. Thallasios of Libya and Africa, On Love, Abstinence, and the Spiritual Life: Fourth Century to the Priest Paul, 81, 84, 91, 93, 95, 97, 98 (Works, 2d ed. of the Kozelskaya Vvedenskaya Optina Pustyn', M., 1894, pp. 64–67).

IV. LETTER THREE: TRIUNITY

- 55. A. A. Spassky, *Istoriia dogmaticheskikh dvizhenii v epokhu vselenskikh soborov* [History of dogmatic currents in the epoch of the ecumenical councils], Vol. 1, Sergiev Posad, 1906.
- A. P. Lebedev, *Istoriia vselenskikh soborov* [History of the ecumenical Councils], Parts 1 and 2 (*Sobranie tserkovno-istoricheskikh sochinenii*, Vols. 3 and 4, S.P., 1904).
- V. Bolotov, *Uchenie Origena o Sv. Troitse* [Origen's doctrine of the Holy Trinity], S.P., 1879.
- V. P. Vinogradov, O literaturnykh pamiatnikakh "poluariantstva" [On the literary monuments of semi-Arianism], Sergiev Posad, 1912 (= Bogoslovsky Vestnik, 1911).
- L'Abbé H. Couget, La Sainte Trinité et les doctrines antitrinitaires, Paris, 1905, 2 vols. (from the series Science et Religion).

^d Father John Sergiev (also known as John of Kronstadt) was a famous religious personality, a sort of Russian Orthodox superstar. People flocked to Kronstadt near Saint Petersburg to see him and ask his counsel. His diary, *My Life in Christ*, is a kind of compendium of spiritual musings for the common man.

F. Ternovsky, *Greko-vostochnaya tserkov v period vselenskikh soborov* [The Greek-Eastern Church during the ecumenical councils], Kiev, 1883.

Bishop Ioann, *Istoriia vselenskikh soborov* [History of the ecumenical councils], 1896.

Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 4-te Aufl.

V. Samuilov, *Istoriia arianstva na latinskom zapade* [History of Arianism in the Latin West], S.P., 1890.

E. Revillout, Le concile de Nicée d'après les textes coptes et les diverses collections canoniques. Paris, 1881 and 1899, 2 vols.

56. A. A. Spassky, see n. 55 supra, pp. 228-31.

57. St. Jerome, 15th Epistle to Pope Damas, 4 (PL, Vol. 22, col. 457 A): "Tota saecularium litterarum schola nihil aliud hypostasim, nisi usian novit." This epistle was written near the end of 376. The entire epistle is highly instructive. Even for an orthodox teacher of the Church, the suprarationality of the formula of three hypostases with the unity of essence was too drastic; the boldness of this formula—unparalleled in the whole history of thought—was sufficient to produce vertigo even in minds accustomed to suprarationality. "Now, woe!" complains St. Jerome. "After the Nicene Creed, after the Alexandrian definitions, the campenses, a branch of the Arians, demand of me a new name: three hypostases. They want to know what apostles transmitted this to us. What new Paul, teacher of the gentiles, taught this? I ask: how, in their opinion, can the hypostases be understood? They answer: tres personas subsistentes. I say in response that that is what we believe, but unity in meaning is insufficient for them; they demand unity in name as well. I do not know what poison can be contained in sounds. We proclaim: He who does not believe in the three hypostases as tria enhypostata, i.e., as tres personas subsistentes, let him be anathema. But since we are not accustomed to using these terms, we are condemned as heretics. But if one takes the word hypostasis to mean essence, usian, does not recognize one hypostasis in three persons, that one is separated from Christ; in this case we, together with you, will receive the stigma of Sabellianism, *Unionis*. Make, I implore you, if you consider it necessary, a definition, and then I will not be afraid of naming the three hypostases. If you command, let there be composed a new doctrine of the faith after the Nicene one. Let us, the orthodox, pronounce the same confession as the Arians. The school of secular sciences does not know another meaning of the word hypostasis, hypostasin, except essence, usian. Who, I ask, with blasphemous lips will speak of three substances, substantias? In God is a one and sole nature, namely that which exists really, una est Dei et sola natura, quae vere est. But since there is one Divine nature and since there is only one Divinity in three persons, in tribus personis Deitas una subsistit, which exists truly and is one nature, whoever under the appearance of piety names three, i.e., three hypostases as three essences, attempts to introduce three natures—quisque tria esse, hoc est, the esse hypostases, id est usias, dicit, sub nomine pietatis, tres naturas conatur asserere. If this is so, then why do we separate ourselves with walls from Arius, when we are bound by our own error? It is sufficient for us to name one substance and three persons, coexistent, perfect, coeternal. If it is fitting, let one not speak about three hypostases, and let one retain one. Let the above-noted belief be sufficient for us. If you deem it correct on our part to name three hypostases with our interpretation, we will not refuse. But believe me, poison is hidden under the honey; the angel of satan is transformed into an angel of light (2 Cor. 11:14). The campenses interpret well the word hypostasis, but when I say that I hold the dogma in accordance with their explanation, I am condemned as a heretic. Why do they so morbidly fix on one word? Why are they hiding behind the ambiguity of speech? If they believe as they interpret, I do not condemn them. If I believe as they confess (perhaps hypocritically), let them permit me to express my thought with my own words. Thus, by the Crucified Salvation of the world, by the Trinitarian consubstantiality, I beseech your blessedness to give me a written response, significant by your authority, about whether one should be silent about the hypostases or name them" (ibid., 3–4. PL, Vol. 22. col. 356–58; Works of Jerome, Part 1, Kiev, 1879, pp. 45–47).

58. A great achievement of Kant was his indication that objects could exist that do not differ according to concept (that is, for reason) but which are nevertheless different. The difference between them is perceived only when they are clearly compared. The right and left hand, a right and left glove, and spherical triangles that are symmetric with respect to the center and equal to each other are examples of such objects. See the following works of Kant:

Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden in Raum [1768] (Kleine Schriften zur Logik und Metaphysik, herausgegeben von Kirchmann, Bd. 33 [5], 3-te Abth., SS. 124–30).

De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis, [1770] par. 15 c (trans. into Russ. by N. Lossky, S.P., 1910, Trudy S.-Pet. fil. o-va, fasc. 6, pp. 20–21).

Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können [1783], 4-te Auflage. Herausgegeben von Karl Vorländer, Lpz., 1905 (Philosophische Bibliotek, Bd. 40), par. 13, SS. 39–41. This edition of the Prolegomena has been critically checked, and is the best.

Prolegomena Toward Any Future Metaphysics Capable of Arising in the Sense of Science, trans. Vl. Solovyov, 3rd ed., M., 1905, par. 3, pp. 46–48. The translation is admirable but the edition is very careless; it even repeats the misprints of the former editions.

Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft [1786], Cap. L, I, Def. II, Scholia III.

It is true that, at first, Kant concluded from this fact that space is not a concept but rather a reality independent of reason, and then that space is not a concept but a form of contemplation. Whatever the case may be, the existence of the facts discovered by Kant demonstrates that objects can exist which are expressly different but such that the difference between them can definitely not be formulated by reason. These objects differ not according to some feature or other, but *ipsa re*, directly. The principle of difference is contained not in the features of being but in the very depths of being. And, for reason, objects can be different only through one another. As is well known, this discovery of Kant's, when applied to chemistry by Pasteur (see: Pasteur, *La Fermentation alcoolique. Son role dans l'étude de la structure de la matière; de l'assymétrie des composés organiques*, trans., S.P., 1894), became the basis of the whole of stereochemistry, and also spread to many other scientific disciplines.

59. A well-known saying of Avvakum. Here is a sample of Avvakum's reason-

ing (from his letter to Deacon Ignatius): "See, Ignatius Solovianin, and believe in the trisubstantial Trinity. Divide equally into three the one substance: the source of divinity flows into three. Do not speak, like Arius, of three unequal substances, but speak of three equal substances or essences. Divide the indivisible equally, the one into three substances or essences. Each has a special seat: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Three heavenly kings sit without hiding: as Peter, Paul, and John the Divine are three who are distinct, so it is fitting to divide the divine into three" (P. Smirnov, "Dogmaticheskie spory v raskole staroobriadchestva" [Dogmatic disputes in the Old Believer schism], in *Pravoslavnaya Entsiklopediia*, edited by A. P. Lopukhin, S.P., 1893, Vol. 4, col. 1154. See also col. 1050 sqq.) One can hardly consider such monstrous false-teaching to be only the verbal error of the insufficiently educated schismatic. His tritheism is an unconscious expression of the general rationalistic spirit that characterized the schism. Bishop (then Archimandrite) Porphiry Uspensky tends to attribute even a *historical* influence to this Arianism. In describing the Church of the Dormition in the Palestinian monastery of St. James the Persian, he mentions a picture he saw representing the seven ecumenical councils: "At the bottom of the picture, in the middle, the heresiarchs are depicted: Arius, Macedonius, and so forth, and near them is a group of monks. It is remarkable that all the heretical monks are depicted with the same cowls that are worn by our Old Believer monks. Were the Russians in the ancient time infected with the Arian heresy? The Orthodox, on the other hand, wear Greek cowls, low and similar in form to ours" (Bishop Porphiry Uspensky, Kniga bytiya moego [The book of my life], 29 Nov. 1843, Vol. 1, edited by P. A. Syrku, S.P., 1894, p. 307).

60. "bapizontes—eis to onoma tou Patros kai tou Giou kai tou Hagiou Pneumatos" (Matt. 28:19). Cf. in the Liturgy of John Chrysostom: "And let us glorify and praise Thy most sacred and magnificent name, Father and Son and Holy Spirit (doxazein kai anumnein to pantimon kai megaloprepes onoma sou tou Patros ktl)."

Similarly, St. Ambrose of Milan, in commenting on Matt. 28:19, says: "It is pointed out that He [the Savior] said: in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. But here one does not take into consideration the fact that He preceded this by saying: *in the name*. He indicated three persons [*tres personas*], but he cited only one name of the Trinity." "Thus, one God, one name, one divinity, one majesty . . ." (Ambrose of Milan, On the Education of the Virgin, 10 67–68; PL, Vol. 16, col. 322).

- **61.** N. Ch. Chel'tsov, *Drevnie formy Simvola very pravoslavnoi tserkvi ili tak nazyvaemye apostol'skie simvoly* [Ancient forms of the Creed of the Orthodox Church or the so-called Apostolic Creeds], S.P., 1869.
 - 62. Spassky, see n. 55 supra, p. 500.

Concerning the fact that Basil the Great was proud of his erudition, see Spassky, p. 484. According to his younger brother, Gregory of Nyssa, "he [Basil] thought highly of his own eloquence, despising all dignities, and considered himself to be above persons of highest rank" (Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Life of Macrina*; PG, vol. 46, col. 965).

- 63. Basil the Great, Epistle 38; PG, Vol. 32, col. 333 A.
- 64. Gregory of Nyssa, The Great Catechism, 3; PG, vol. 45, col. 17 C-D).

- 65. Spassky, see n. 55 supra, p. 267.
- 66. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 20; PG, Vol. 35.
- 67. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 25; PG, Vol. 35.
- **68.** The question arises, how precisely does the idea of Christ's authority arise? How does the mysterious rebirth of the soul occur? I could not address this question without going outside the bounds set for my work, whose object is a theodicy, not an anthropodicy. But I consider it my duty to underscore that this is a gap that I plan to fill in my work *On the Growth of Types*, which I have been planning for a long time. If this is not taken into account, I risk being seen as a Christian without Christ. It is also not difficult to observe that, in my schematic exposition, I omit a discussion of the way of ascesis.
- 69. Theophrastus, *Phys. opin. fr.* 6 a (Laert Diog. IX 21, 22; Diels, Doxogr. graeci, 483).
- 70. V. Nesmelov, *Dogmaticheskaia sistema Grigoriia Nisskago* [The Dogmatic System of Gregory of Nyssa], Kazan', 1889, p. 168.
- 71. Cited in Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, Bk. 5; PG, Vol. 45, col. 688 A.
- 72. These last words are from the Great Canon of Andrew of Crete (Thursday of the first week of Lent, compline, 8th ode, to the Trinity).
- 73. The famous "Credo, quia absurdum" only schematically conveys Tertullian's thought. What he actually said was: "Mortuus est Dei filius, credibile est, quia inseptum est; et sepultus revixit, certum est quia impossibilie est." That is: "That the Son of God died is credible because it is absurd; that, having been buried, he rose is certain because it is impossible." (Tertullian, On the Flesh of Christ; PL, Vol. 2)
- 74. TO THE KNOWN GOD is an inscription on the facade of the western entry to the Cathedral of the Dormition of the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Lavra. Since this entry was built (to replace a porch) in 1781 (see E. E. Golubinsky, Prepodobnyi Sergii Radonezhsky i sozdannaya im Troitskaya Lavra [St. Sergius of Radonezh and the Trinity Lavra founded by him], 2nd ed., M., 1909, p. 207), it can be presumed that this profound inscription was commissioned by the then Archbishop of Moscow, Platon Levshin. Clearly, this inscription expresses his inward understanding of the relation between faith and knowledge. Another, not less authoritative bishop, the Archbishop of Kherson, Innokentii Borisov, remarks wittily: "The near-sighted philosophy of the previous century [i. e., the 18th] had for a time dreamt of breaking this holy union and had forced knowledge to dig a grave for faith, but what came of this attempt at matricide? Holy faith, honored by self-forgetting reason, hid in a depth of the heart inaccessible to this reason, and false knowledge itself remained with its sophistries in the grave dug by it" (Works, ed. Wolf, Vol. 4, p. 275). "True philosophy can exist only in a union with heaven, for true knowledge lives by and is nourished not by earth but by heaven" (ibid., Vol. 10). "We are accustomed to saying the sphere of the sciences, the sphere of knowledge, and to separating it from the sphere of faith; but strictly speaking, there is no sphere of sciences and can be no such sphere. Rather, there exists only a boundless sphere of faith, whose inwardness is divided among the sciences. Knowledge without faith is a middle without a beginning or end; whoever seeks not soulless fragments but a living reasonable whole must therefore necessarily unite knowledge with faith" (ibid., Vol. 4, p. 274). "What in

general is true knowledge, if not a natural daughter of faith? And what is true faith if not the natural end and crown of all grounded knowledge?" (ibid., Vol. 4, p. 156).

- 75. The translation given in the text differs from the usual one, and was corrected in accordance with research done by my respected teacher Professor M. D. Muretov. See: M. D. Muretov, "Znanie otchasti i samopoznanie" [Partial knowledge and self-knowledge] (Bogoslovsky Vestnik).
- 76. Leo Tolstoy, Confession, M., 1907, ed. Posrednik, p. 74. Wholly opposite to Tolstoy's arrogance of reason is the principle of the obedience and crucifixion of reason formulated by Konstantin Leontyev. Leontiev writes: "I am wholly obedient to Orthodoxy. I accept in it not only what is persuasive for my reason and heart but also what repulses me . . . Credo, quia absurdum . . . Let me phrase it differently: I believe also in that which—by human infirmity in general and by the infirmity of my own reason in particular—seems to be absurd. It may not be absurd in itself, but for me it appears to be absurd . . . However, I believe and obey. That is perhaps the best kind of belief. Advice that seems to us reasonable we can accept, say, from any smart peasant. Someone else's thought has impressed our mind with its truth. What is so remarkable about accepting this truth? One subordinates oneself to this truth spontaneously and is amazed only by the fact that it had not come into one's mind earlier. But, believing in a spiritual authority, to subordinate oneself to it against one's mind and against the tastes that have been inculcated by long years of another life, to subordinate oneself arbitrarily and forcibly, against a storm of inner protests, that, to me, is real belief." (K. Leontyev, Otets Kliment Zedergol'm [Father Kliment Zedergol'm], 2nd ed., M., 1882, p. 99).
- 77. Concerning Pascal's "wager on God," where the stake is the illusory delights of earthly life, while the prize is eternal bliss, see:
- B. Pascal, *Pensées*, X, 1 (there are a great many editions of the original text and translations into all languages).

An analysis of this wager and critiques of Pascal's idea can be found in (aside from general works on Pascal) the following special essays:

Sully Prudhomme, "Le sens et la portée du pari de Pascal" (Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 nov. 1890, pp. 285–304).

- L. Dugas et Ch. Riquier, "*Le pari de Pascal*" (*Revue Philosophique*, 25-me an., T. 50, 1900, sep. pp. 224–245).
 - Ch. Riquier, "A propos du pari de Pascal" (op. cit., déc. pp. 650–651).
- J. Lachelier, "Sur le pari de Pascal" (Revue Philosophique, 26-me an., T. 51, 1901, juin).
- P. S. de Laplace, Essai philosophique sur les probabilités. This is the introduction to his Théorie analytique des probabilités, Paris, 1812 (1814, 1820) = Oeuvres, T. 7, Paris, 1886. Russ. translation by A. I. V. under the supervision of A. K. Vlasov, M., 1908, pp. 117, 122. This is essentially a critique of the mathematical form of Pascal's bet conceived by the English mathematician Craig. Laplace's arguments and probably those of Craig suffer from a crude misunderstanding of the idea of eternity.

An idea like Pascal's was expressed before Pascal (1623–1662) by Arnobius († 304), who argues in the following way: Non credimus, inquitis, vera esse quae (Christus) dicit. Quid enim, quae vos negatis vera esse, apud vos liquent, cum

imminentia, et nondum cassa, nullis possint rationibus refutari? Sed et ipse quae pollicetur, non probat. Ita est. Nulla enim, ut dixi, futurorum potest existere comprobatio. Cum ergo haec sit conditio futurorum, ut teneri et comprehendi nullius possint anticipationis attactu: nonne purior ratio est, ex ducibus incertis et in ambigua expectatione pendentibus, id potius credere, quod aliquas spes ferat, quam omnino quod nullas? In illo enim periculi nihil est, si quod dicitur imminere, cassum fiat et vacuum: in hoc damnum est maximum, id est salutis amissio, si cum tempus advenerit, aperiatur non fuise mendacium" (Against the Pagans, II 4; PL, Vol. 5, col. 815 B-816 A); and also by Raymond Sebond (end of the 14th century-1437) in his Theologia naturalis sive liber creaturarum (1487). (Cf. V. Droz, Le Scepticisme de Pascal, p. 71, note.) Renouvier (Philosophie analytique de l'histoire, T. IV, p. 65 et suiv.) saw in this idea the synopsis or even the point of departure of a profound philosophy. This idea was in fact used—in a modified and cheapened version—by William James, first in his lecture "The Will to Believe" (See The Dependence of Belief on the Will and Other Experiments of Popular Philosophy, trans. S. I. Tsereteli, S.P., 1904), and then it was placed at the basis of the philosophical current known as "pragmatism." It is not difficult to see a certain kinship between this current and the tutiorism of the Jansenists; but the now-fashionable pragmatism, having evoked numerous pro and contra in the literature, lacks the grandeur of tragedy and ascesis, and is so comfortable that it has succeeded in creeping into the hearts of the public, who demand only convenient doctrines.

Here is a brief bibliography of works in Russian in which pragmatism is considered:

Charles Pierson, *Grammar of Science*, trans. from the 2nd Eng. ed. by B. Bazarov and P. Iushkevich. S.P., 1911, *Shipovnik*.

W. James, Pragmatism, trans. P. Iushkevich, S.P., 1910, Shipovnik.

- L. M. Lopatin, "Nastoiashchee i budushchee filosofii" [The present and future of philosophy] in his Filosofskie kharakteristiki i rechi [Philosophical characterizations and speeches], M., 1911, Put' = VFP, Bk. 103.
- V. F. Ern, "Razmyshleniia o pragmatizme" [Reflections on pragmatism] in Bor'ba za Logos [The battle for Logos], M., 1911, pp. 1–25 = Moskovsky Ezhenedel'nik, 1910, Nos. 17–18.
- Al. Balaban, "*Pragmatizm*" (*VFP*, 1909, Bk. 99, IV, Sept.-Oct., pp. 574–618). On pp. 574–75 and 598 one finds a bibliography on pragmatism.
- S. S. Glagolev, "Novyi tip filosofii: Pragmatizm ili meliorizm" [A new type of philosophy: Pragmatism or meliorism] (Bogoslovsky Vestnik, XVIII, 1909, Dec., pp. 578–616).
- P. S. Strakhov, "Pragmatizm v nauke i religii (po povodu knigi V. Dzheimsa: "Mnogoobrazie religioznogo opyta)" [Pragmatism in science and religion (in connection with W. James' book: The Varieties of Religious Experience)] (Bogoslovsky Vestnik, XIX, 1910, May, pp. 112–31; June, pp. 295–314).

Lazarev, "Pragmatizm" (Russkaia Mysl', 1909, Oct.).

- M. Eber, *Pragmatism. An investigation of its different forms*, trans. Z. A. Vvedenskaia, under the supervision of M.A. Likharev, with a preface by Prof. Alexander I. Vvedensky, S.P., 1911.
 - I. A. Bermann, Sushchnost' pragmatizma: Novye techeniia v nauke o myshlenii

[The essence of pragmatism: New currents in the science of thought], M., 1911, XII+240 pp.

As for the vast foreign literature on pragmatism, we can find indications of it in the book of James already mentioned, in Al. Balaban's essay, etc. Let us also mention:

André Lalande, "*Pragmatisme et pragmaticisme*" (*Revue Philosophique*, 31-me an., T. 61, 1906, fév., pp. 121–56). This represents a summary of the main teachings of pragmatism.

- J. Bourdeau, "Pragmatisme et Modernisme," Paris, 1909 (Bibliothèque du philosophie contemporaine, F. Alcan).
- P. Hermant et A. Van de Waele, "Les principales théories de la logique contemporaine," Paris, 1909, (Bibl. de philos. cont., F. Alcan), pp. 207–230, on pragmatism.
- Fr. Paulan, "Antipragmatisme et hyperpragmatisme" (Revue Philosophique, 34-me an., T. 67, pp. 611–25).
- A. Schinz, "Antipragmatisme. Examen des droits respectifs de l'aristocratie intellectuelle et de la démocratie" (Bibliothèque de philos. cont., F. Alcan), Paris, 1909.
 - 78. See n. 77 supra.
- 79. Cf. the exclamation of a young girl on her path toward God: "Lord! If Thou existeth, point out to me what truth is, and give me the opportunity of finding it" (see P. Florensky, *Voprosy religioznogo samopoznaniia* [Questions of religious self-knowledge], Sergiev Posad, 1907, Letter II, p. 17 = *Khristianin*, 1907). Also: "Whether I want it or not, save me, Christ, my Savior! Quickly, quickly, save me, I am perishing" (8th morning prayer, to our Lord, Jesus Christ).
 - 80. Macarius the Great, Conversation 7, 3; PG, Vol. 34, col. 525).
- 81. Herzog and Hauck, Realencyclopädie für protestantliche Theologie, 3-te Aufl. Bd. 6, Lpz., 1899, SS. 674 ff, Artikel "Glaube."

For linguistic and philological considerations on the words *vera* and *verit*', see also: A. I. Strunnikov, *Vera kak uverennost' po ucheniyu pravoslaviia* [Faith as certainty according to the teaching of Orthodoxy], Samara, 1887, pp. 35–58. One should keep in mind, however, that the author has the tendency to confuse the concept of "*vera*" and "*verit*" [faith and to believe] with the concept of "knowledge" and to "know."

V. Letter Four: The Light of the Truth

82. Cf. St. Augustine's: "est Trinitas Deus unus, solus, magnus, verus, verax, veritas (God the Trinity is unique, sole, great, true, righteous, the Truth)" (De Trinitate, VII 3 [II], S. Augustini Opera omnia, Editio Parisina altera, T. VIII 2, Parisiis, 1837, col. 1322). Augustine also says that God "est illa incommutabilis veritas, quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur, et ars omnipotentis artificis (God is that fixed Truth that is correctly called the law of all the arts and the art of the omnipotent Artist)" (De vera religione, 57. S. Aurelii Augustini Opera, T. I, secunda editio Veneta, Venetiis, 1756, col. 976).

According to H. Cohen: God is "Zentrum aller Ideen, die Idee der Wahrheit

(the Center of all ideas, the Idea of the Truth)" (System der Philosophie, Bd. II, Ethik des reinen Willens, 1904, S. 417 ff).

We find the same idea of God as the essential bearer and source of all righteousness in the folk understanding of life. Thus, in the repertoire of the wandering bards of Galicia there is a *voianitskaia pisnia*, which is also sung in the Latin rite in Galicia on the "day of the soul," on November 1st, new style, when all the dead are remembered. This hymn goes, in part, as follows:

We praise the one God, The righteous Jesus Christ, both the heaven and the earth are His! . . .

(Mirop, "Voianitskaia pisnia," Kievskaia Starina, 1888, Dec., No. 12, Vol. 23, p. 146), the *righteous* Jesus Christ, that is, the one in whom righteousness lives *par excellence*, in whom is *all* righteousness, the Logos, the True Word of God incarnate, the norm, rule, and source of every righteous work.

83. Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitsky), "Beseda khristianina s magometatinom ob istine Presviatoi Troitsy [Conversation between a Christian and a Moslem concerning the truth of the Holy Trinity], in Collected Works, Pochaev, 1906, Vol. 4, pp. 204–214. Also by the same author: Nravstvennaya ideia dogmata Presviatoi Troitsy" [The moral idea of the dogma of the Holy Trinity], Collected Works, Kazan', Vol. 2, pp. 5–30 = Religiozno-filos. Bibl., XI, Vyshnii-Volochek, 1906. See an analysis of this discourse in: N. F. Fyodorov, Filosofiia obshchego dela [Philosophy of the common task], articles, thoughts, and letters, edited by A. A. Kozhevnikov and N. P. Peterson, Vernyi, 1906, Vol. 1, pp. 33–7, n. 5.

Also see:

- M. M. Tareev, "Evangelie" [The Gospel] (Osnovy khristianstva [Foundations of Christianity], Vol. 2, 2nd ed., Sergiev Posad, 1908).
- N. I. Sagarda, Pervoye Sobornoye poslanie sviatogo Apostola i Evangelista Ioanna Bogoslova: Isagogishesko-eksegetishckoe issledovanie [The first Catholic Epistle of the Saintly Apostle and Evangelist John the Divine: Isagogico-exegetical investigation], Poltava, 1903; by the same author: "Kharakternye osobennosti v raskrytii i izlozhenii sv. Ap. Ioannom khristianskogo ucheniia" [Characteristics of the disclosure and exposition of the Christian doctrine by the Apostle John] (Khristianskoye chtenie, 1904, Vol. 1, No. 6, June).
- B. M. Melioransky, O troichnosti: Razbor kritiki L.N. Tolstogo [On trinity: Analysis of the critique of L. N. Tolstoy] (Reprinted from Tserkovny Golos for 1907, S.P., 1907).

According to St. Augustine, God is "non bonus animus aut bonus angelus, aut bonum coelum; sed bonum bonum." He is "non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni." He is "non hoc et illum bonum, sed ipsum bonum" (De Trinitate VIII 4 [III], S. Augustini Opera omnia, Editio Parisina altera, Parisiis, 1837, T. VIII 2, col. 1323).

- 84. I use here the terminology and classification proposed by Schelling.
- 85. See n. 74 supra.
- 86. An idea developed and fervently defended by Vladimir Ern in his book *Bor'ba za Logos: Opyty filosofskie i kriticheskie* [The Battle for Logos: Philosophical and critical essays], M., 1911, *Put'*.

87. In the Russian literature, S. N. Trubetskoi (see "Metafizika drevnei Gretsii [The metaphysics of ancient Greece], M., 1890 = Collected Works, Vol. 3, M., 1910) was especially interested in the concept of the "going out of oneself." The most work on the concept of the "going of the object of knowledge into" the subject of knowledge has been done by N. O. Lossky, in his book Obosnovanie intuitivizma [Substantiation of intuitivism], S.P., 1906 (as well as in Zapiski ist.fil. fak. Imperatorsk. S.-Pet. Universiteta, LXXVIII). For an exposition of the same views, see his book Vvedenie v filosofiiu [Introduction to philosophy], Part 1. Vvedenie v teoriiu znaniya [Introduction to the theory of knowledge], S.P., 1911, pp. 231–69.

Lossky's book provoked a spirited polemic, which clarified to a significant extent certain disputed questions. Among the articles related to this polemic, let us mention:

- A. Askol'dov, *Novaia gnoseologicheskaia teoriia N.O. Losskogo* [N.O. Lossky's New Gnoseological Theory] (*Zhur. Min. Nar. Pros.*, V, 1906, No. 10, pp. 413–41); also by the same author: *K voprosu o gnoseologicheskom intuitivizme* [Concerning the question of gnoseological intuitivism] (*VFP*, XCVI, pp. 561–70).
- A. Vvedensky, *Novoe i legkoe dokazatel'stvo filosofskogo krititsizma* [New and easy proof of philosophical criticism], S.P., 1909.
- N. O. Lossky, Osnovatel'no li novoe i legkoe dokazatel'stvo filosofskogo krititsizma? [Is the new and easy proof of philosophical criticism founded?] (*Zhur. Min. Nar. Pros.*, 1909, No. 7) [an anticritique of Vvedensky].
- A. I. Vvedensky, *Logika, kak chast' teorii poznaniia* [Logic as part of the theory of knowledge], 2nd ed., S.P., 1912, pp. 207–14, 252–53, 275–87, 356–58 [a recritique of Lossky].
- L. M. Lopatin, *Novaia teoriia poznaniia* [A new theory of knowledge] (*VFP*, XXXVII, pp. 185–206).
- N. O. Lossky, V zashchitu intuitivizma: Po povodu stat'i S. Askol'dova "Novaia gnoseologicheskaia teoriia" N. O. Losskogo i stat'i prof. L. Lopatina "Novaia teoriia poznaniia" [In defense of intuitivism: In connection with S. Askol'dov's article "N. O. Lossky's new gnoseological theory" and Prof. L. Lopatin's article "A new theory of knowledge"] (VFP, XCIII, pp. 449–62).
- N. A. Berdiaev, *Filosofiia svobody* [Philosophy of freedom], M., 1911, Ch. 4, pp. 97–127.
- S. I. Povarin, *Ob "intuitivizme" N.O. Losskogo* [On N. O. Lossky's "intuitivism"] S.P., 1911.
- N. Lossky, *Otvet S. I. Povarinu na kritiku intuitivizma* [Response to S. I. Povarin's critique of intuitivism], S.P., 1911. And other works.

A similar view was held by the glorious Kiev school of historians of thought, allied with platonism and German idealism. A representative of this school is the Rector of the Kiev Theological Academy, Archimandrite Innokentii Borisov, later the Archbishop of Kherson. He says that "only faith destroys the impassable abyss which lies between us and the objects of our knowledge; only faith rips apart the impenetrable veil that hides the being of things" (*Works*, ed. Wolf, Vol. 10).

Of a similar opinion were his friends O. M. Novitsky, V. S. Karpov, S. S.

Gogotsky, I. M. Skvortsov, Mikhnevich, Avsenev, and Amfiteatrov. Of the later representatives of this school let us mention in particular P. D. Iurkevich and—close in spirit to O. Novitsky though not from Kiev—M. A. Ostroumov.

However, no matter how different are the approaches to these conceptions of "going out of" and "going into," their end point is the same. Both metaphors signify the same act of the inner unification of the knower with the known.

88. J. Böhme, Aurora, p. 37 (Schriften, herausgegeb. von U. W. Schiebler, 1831–47, 2-te Aufl., 1861 ff).

John Pordage, another mystic of the 17th century, uses a similar expression: "This Second Number of the Tri-Unity can also be called the Heart of God, since It is His central or most inward birth, the center or seat of His Love, whence this Love eternally flows, and pours itself into the whole Divine Being, and into all that besides Him can be" (*Metaphysica vera et divina*, see n. 126 *supra*), Part 1, Bk. 1, Ch. 5, par. 101, p. 113).

- 89. "There is no way to explain how a monad can be changed in its inner essence by any other creature, since in it nothing can be transposed and one cannot conceive in it any inner movement which could be excited, directed, increased, or decreased inside it as this is possible in complex substances, where changes in the relations between parts exist. Monads do not at all have windows, through which something could enter or leave—les monades n'ont point de fenêtres, par lesquelles quelque chose y puisse entrer ou sortir. Accidents cannot detach themselves or move outside the substances, as the sensible species (species sensibiles) of the scholastics did. Thus, neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from outside" (G. W. Leibniz, Monadologie, 7, Opera philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann, 1840, p. 705).
- 90. For proof of this, see: Louis Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz d'après des documents inédits, Paris, 1901. Note X, sur la définition de l'amour, pp. 567–73.
- 91. Leibniz, Opera philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann, 1840, p. 118; cf. Nouveaux Essais, II, Ch. 20. par. 4.
- **92.** For the references, see Couturat, n. 90 *supra*; the citations in the text are taken from there.
 - 93. Chr. Wolfius, Psychologia empirica, 1738, par. 633.
- 94. Chr. Wolf, Vernünftige Gedanken von dem gesellschaftl. Leben des menschen, 1721, I, par. 449.
- 95. M. Mendelssohn, Abhandlung über die Evidenz in dem metaphisischen Wissenschaften, 1764, 2-te Aufl., 1786, I, 2, 48. (The references of nn. 93, 94, and 95 are from Rud. Eisler, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, 3-te Aufl., Bd. II, Berlin, 1910, S. 712, Art. "Liebe").
- 96. Spinoza's intellectualism passes through his entire *Ethics* and is especially pronounced in its second part. "The soul," he says, "is a thinking thing (*res cogitans*)" (*Ethices*, Pars II, Def. 3, Benedicti de Spinoza, *Opera quotquot reperta sunt*. Rec. J. Van Vloten et. S. P. N. Land, Vol. 1, Hagae Comitum, 1882).
 - 97. Spinoza, Ethices, Pars III, VI.
- 98. Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Human Freedom*, trans. L. Meerovich, S.P., ed. D. E. Zhukovsky, 1908, p. 19. Indeed, Spinoza's favorite word, "thing" [res], appears everywhere in the *Ethics*. He constantly speaks of a hated or loved thing, and even God Himself is called a "thinking thing." It would be useless to present citations, for it would be necessary to

cite nearly every third page of the *Ethics*. However, one cannot consider this predilection for the word "thing" a mere literary manner of the philosopher: in the first place, even a manner of this kind would reveal much, and, secondly, Spinoza always spoke in a generalized way about "love" and "hate" directed at people, objects, states, uniting them under the word "thing."

- 99. This terminology was introduced by Aristotle (*Metaphysica*, X 3, 1054a 32; X 8 1058a 18; VII 11, 1037b 7 (see n. 102 *infra*).
- 100. Destutt de Tracy, *Eléments d'idéologie*, 1803–15, Part III, Ch. I, p. 160 (I cite from Eisler, *Wörterbuch*. Bd. I, S. 543).
- 101. M. Palagyi, Die Logik auf dem Scheidewege, 1903, S. 167 (Eisler, S. 44): "Dieselbe Wahrheit ist es . . . die sich in unendlich vielen gleichlautenden Urteilsakten dargestellen kann."
- 102. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V, 9 (*Opera* edidit Academia Regia Borussica, Berolini, 1831, Vol. 2, p. 1018a, 7–10; *Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles*. Grundtext, Ubersetzung und Kommentar von Albert Schwegler. Tübingen, 1847, Bd. I, S. 107). The French translator J. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire translates this passage in the following way:

"Il s'ensuit qu'évidemment l'identité est une sorte d'unité d'existence, soit qu'il s'agisse de plusieurs êtres distincts, soit qu'il s'agisse d'un être unique, qu'on regarde comme plusieurs. C'est ainsi qu'on dit par exemple qu'un seul et même est identique à lui-même; et alors on considère cet être unique comme s'il était deux êtres au lieu d'un" (Métaphysique d' Aristote, T. II, Paris, 1879, p. 135, Livre V, Ch. IX, Par. 6).

The Russian translators P. Pervov and V. Rozanov translate this definition of identity in the following way: "It is thus evident that the identity is a kind of unity of being when there are many [objects] or when [one] is used as many, for example, when it is said that an object is identical to itself, for in this case it is used as two objects" (*Aristotelia Metafizika*, Fasc. 1, Books I–V, S.P., 1895, p. 160, Books V, IX, 3).

Finally here is the German translation of Albert Schwengler: "Woraus sich ergibt, dass die Einerleiht eine gewisse Einheit ist, entweder von Mehreres dem Seyn nach, oder von Einem, das man aber als ein Mehreres behandelt, wie wenn man z. B. sagt, etwas sey mit sich selbst einerlei man behandelt in diesem Fall das Eine als wäre es eine Zweiheit" (Bd. 2, Tübingen, 1847, Fünftes Buch, Cap. 96, Par. 82).

- 103. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais II, Ch. 27, Par. 9.
- 104. "All possible phenomena"—says Kant—"belong, as representations, to the entire consciousness of self that is possible. But this consciousness of self, as a transcendental representation, has numerical identity necessarily and with a priori certitude, so that without the intermediary of this primary apperception nothing can enter the domain of knowledge. Since this identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of the entire diversity of phenomena, insofar as they must become empirical knowledge, the phenomena are then subordinate to a priori conditions, to which their synthesis (of apprehension) must always conform. [Alle möglichen Erscheinungen gehören, als Vorstellugen, zu dem ganzen möglichen Selbstbewusstein. Von diesem aber, als einer transscendentalen Vorstellung, is die numerische Identität unzertrennlich und a priori gewiss; weil nichts in das Erkenntniss kommen kann, ohne vermittelst dieser unsprünglich Apperception. Da

nun diese Identität notwendig in der Synthesis alles Manningfaltigen der Erscheinungen, sofern sie empirische Erkentniss werden soll, hinein kommen muss, so sind die Erscheinungen Bedingungen a priori unterworfen, welchen ihre Synthesis (der Apprehension) durchgängig gemäss sein muss.]" (Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Text der Ausgabe 1781[A], Elementarlehre, II Th., 1 Abth., 1 Buch, II Haupt., 2 Absch., Par. 113; herausgegeben von K. Kehrbach, Verlag von Ph. Reclam, 2-te Aufl., Lpz., Par. 125; trans. N. O. Lossky, S.P., 1907, p. 93). This "identity of my consciousness at different times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and the connection between them, but it by no means proves the numerical identity of my subject [es its also die Identität des Bewusstseins meiner selbst in verschiedenen Zeiten nur eine formale Bedingung meiner Gedanken und ihres Zusammenhanges, beweiset aber gar nicht die numerische Identität, meines Subjects.]" (op. cit., Elementarlehre, II Th., 2 Abth., 2 Buch, I Hauptst., Ausg. 1781[A], S. 363; Reclam, S. 308; trans. N. O. Lossky, p. 232). "If I wish to know by means of experience the numerical identity of an external object, I must direct my attention to the stable side of the phenomenon, to which, as a subject, everything else as a determination refers, and note the identity of this side of the phenomenon at the time when everything else in it is changing. But I constitute an object of inner feeling, and all time is only the form of inner feeling. Every successive determination of my soul is therefore referred by me to the numerically identical I at any time, i.e., to the form of the inner clear representation about me. The idea that the soul is a person must thus be viewed not as obtained by way of a conclusion but as a fully identical judgment of self-consciousness in time, and this is the cause of the fact that it has a priori significance. In fact, the meaning of this proposition is reducible, strictly speaking, to the fact that during the entire time that I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of my I, and it makes no difference at all whether I say that all this time is found in me as an individual unity or that I, with my numerical identity, am found in all this time. [Wenn ich die numerische Identität eines aussern Gegenstandes durch Erfahrung erkennen will, so werde ich auf das Beharrliche derjenigen Erscheinung, worauf, als Subject, sich alles Uebrige als Bestimmung bezieht, acht haben und die Identität von jenem in der Zeit, da dieses wechselt bemerken. Nun aber bin ich en Gegenstand des innern Sinnes und alle Zeit ist bloss die Form des Sinnern innes. Folglich beziehe ich alle und jede meiner successiven Bestimmungen auf das numerischidentische Selbst in aller Zeit, d. i in der Form der inneren Anschauung meiner Selbst. . . es ist einerlei, ob ich sage: diese ganze Zeit is in Mir als individueller Einheit, oder ich bin, numerischer Identität, in aller dieser Zeit befindlich"] (op. cit., Ausg. 1781[A], S. 362; Reclam, SS. 307–8; trans. N. O. Lossky, pp. 231–32).

105. According to Staudinger, Cohen is "der Altmeister" of neo-Kantianism (see F. Staudinger, "Cohens Logik d. reinen Erkenntnis und d. Logik d. Wahrnehmung," Kantsstudien, 1903, VIII, 1).

106. H. Cohen, System der Philosophie, Bd. II, Berlin, 1902. Erste Klasse, 2, S. 78.

107. The idea of the opposition of living creativity in time and mechanical finality in space or, what is almost the same thing, the idea of the opposition of thing and person, lies at the base of the recent philosophemes of Henri Bergson and William Stern. But in neither of these philosophemes does thought have the power to break through *vitalism*, not mechanical, it is true, but not personal

either. These philosophemes are no more than a vitalistic ontologism, and a proof of this is that even in the more personalistic of the two, in Stern's system, an attempt is made to define the person. This alone is sufficient to convince one of the impersonality of this philosophy. Why has this happened? I think because that, although repelled by thingness, which is inseparably linked with rationalism, these two philosophers have not decided to break openly with the latter. In other words, they have not dared to accept the ascesis of faith. Dissatisfied with rationality, they nevertheless desire somehow imperceptibly and without scandal to slip out of its kingdom, all the while giving the appearance that they are continuing its work. For both philosophers the tragic element is absent, but one cannot overcome rationality "in a friendly manner." And here it turns out in fact that Bergson almost never speaks of the person, and that is the most prudent position, whereas Stern, speckling his book with the word "Person," defines the person. That is, he considers it as something graspable by rationality, and he explains the concept of "thing," this rationality in rationality, by opposing to it the concept of the person. Here is the definition of the person given by Stern: "The person is an existent that, despite the multiplicity of its parts, forms a real, original, and self-valuable unity and, as such, despite the multiplicity of its partial functions, realizes a single goal-directed self-activity. A thing is the contradictory opposite to the person. It is such an existent that, consisting of many parts, does not possess a real, original, and integral unity, and, performing many particular functions, does not realize any single goal-directed self-activity. [Eine Person is ein solche Existierendes, das, trotz der Vielheit der Theile, eine reine reale, eigenartige und eigenwertige Einheit bildet, und als solche, trotz der Vielheit der Teilfunctionen, eine einheitliche, zielstrebige Selbsttätigkeit vollbringt. Eine Sache is das contradictorische Gengenteil zur Person. Sie ist ein solches Existeirendes, das, aus vielen Teilen bestehend, keine reale, eigenartige und eigenwertige Einheit bildet, und das, in vielen Teilfunctionen functionierend, keine einheitliche zielstrebige Selbsttätigkeit vollbringt.]" (L. William Stern, Person und Sache. System der philosophischen Weltanschauung. Erster band: Ableitung und Grundlehre, Lpz., 1909, Einführung, S. 16. The translation of definitions is from Frank [see n. 2 supra], p. 172. Further, Stern [SS. 19 ff.] gives "explanations" of these definitions).

- 108. Bernardi Carevallensis Opera, ed. Mabillon, 1719, De dil. Dei, I, 1.
- 109. N. N. Sagarda, Pervoye sobornoye poslanie sv. An. i Ev. Ioanna Bogoslova (see n. 83 supra).
- 110. Euchologion. En Rōmei, 1754, p. 75. The following citations are also taken from this work.
- 111. See S. I. Sobolevsky, "O znachenii slov 'Premudrostiu vonmen'" [On the meaning of the words "with wisdom let us attend"] (Strannik, 1906, Oct., pp. 586–88).
- 112. A. Almazov, *Istoriia chinoposledovanii kreshcheniia i miropomazaniia* [History of the rites of baptism and chrismation], Kazan', 1884, Ch. 10, pp. 219–40.
- N. Chel'tsov, *Drevnie formy Simvola very pravoslavnoi tserkvi ili tak nazyvaemye apostol'skie simvoly* [Ancient forms of the Creed of the Orthodox Church or the so-called Apostolic Creeds], S. P. 1869.
 - 113. See n. 110 supra, p. 86.
 - 114. One should not understand this equation as a metaphorical one. This is

an indication of the mystical, ineffable light of the Truth, about which see n. 128 infra.

115. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and Resurrection (PG, Vol. 46, col. 96, C).

116. Here we present in full the apostle Paul's Hymn of Love in M. D. Muretov's translation.

I. Prologue

Covet earnestly the best gifts, Yet show I unto you a more excellent way.

II. First stanza.

Though I speak
With the tongues of men
And (even) of Angels,
And have not love,
I am become as sounding brass
Or a tinkling cymbal.

And though I have the gift of prophecy And understand all mysteries, And all knowledge, And though I have all faith, So that I could move mountains, And have not love, I am nothing (It profiteth me nothing).

And though I bestow all my goods, And though I give my body To be burned, And have not love, It profiteth me nothing.

III. Second stanza.

Love suffereth long:

Love is kind. Love envieth not,

Vaunteth not itself, Is not puffed up,

Doth not behave itself unseemly, Seeketh not her own, Is not easily provoked, Thinketh no evil,

Rejoiceth not in iniquity, But rejoiceth in the truth.

Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.

IV. Third stanza.

Love never faileth, But prophecies shall fail, Tongues shall cease, And knowledge shall vanish away.

For we know in part, And we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, Then that which is in part shall be done away.

When I was a child,
I spake as a child,
I understood as a child,
I thought as a child;
But when I became a man,
I put away childish things.
For now we see through a glass darkly,
But then face to face;

Now I know in part, But then shall I know even as also I am known. And now abideth

Faith, Hope, Love, This trinity; But the greatest of these is Love.

V. Epilogue

Follow after Love. And desire spiritual gifts, But rather that ye may prophesy.^e

- (M. D. Muretov, Novozavetnaia Pesn' liubvi sravnitel'no s "pirom" Platona i "Pesn'iu Pesnei" [The New Testament Song of Love in comparison with Plato's "Symposium" and the "Song of Songs"], in Bogoslovsky Vestnik, 1903, No. 11 and No. 12; and separate editions).
- 117. Much has been written on the theme of the difference between altruism and Christian love, especially by the holy fathers. From the modern literature let me mention, almost at random:
- K. N. Leontyev, "Nashi novye khristiane" [Our new Christians] (Works, published by V. M. Sablin, M., 1912, Vol. 8).
- L. A. Tikhomirov, "Al'truizm i khristianskaia liubov'" [Altruism and Christian love], Vyshnii Volochek, 1905 (Religiozno-filosofskaia Bibl., IX).
- M. A. Novoselov, Gumanizm: Ego smysl i znachenie v novoi istorii chelovechestva [Humanism: Its meaning and significance in the modern history of

^e In rendering Muretov's version I have adapted the King James version.

mankind], M., 1912 (op. cit., XXVII); by the same author: *Psikhologicheskoe opravdanie khristianstva* [Psychological justification of Christianity], M., 1912 (op. cit., XXVIII).

A. A. Sokolovsky (Dr. of med.), Religiia liubvi i egoizm [Religion of love and egotism], Part 1, M., 1891.

Archpriest A. M. Ivantsov-Platonov, *Khristianskoe uchenie o liubvi k chelovechestvu sravnitel'no s krainostiami uchenii sotsialisticheskikh* [The Christian doctrine of love for mankind compared with the excesses of socialist doctrines], M., 1884 (in a separate edition and in a collection of the sermons and homilies of Archp. Ivantsov-Platonov under the title *Twenty Years of Priesthood*).

118. On the concept of "kenosis" in a special theological sense with particular reference to Jesus Christ, see:

M. Tareev, *Unichizenie Gospoda nashego Iisusa Khrista* [Kenosis of our Lord Jesus Christ], M., 1901, IX+192+II pp. (this work has a bibliography of this question); by the same author: "*Unichizenie Khrista*" [Kenosis of Christ] in *Osnovy Khristianstva* [Foundations of Christianity], Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Sergiev Posad, 1908, pp. 7–134. This is a somewhat simplified and enlarged version of the former work.

A. Chekanovskii, *K uiasneniiu ucheniia o samoynichizenii Gospoda nashego Iususa Khrista. Izlozhenie i kriticheskii razbor kenotichiskikh teorii o litse Iususa Khrista* [Toward a clarification of the doctrine of the kenosis of our Lord Jesus Christ. Exposition and critical analysis of kenotic theories on the person of Jesus Christ], Kiev, 1910, IV+220 pp.

119. The idea of the "injustice" of individual existence and of death as the process of return to primordial, common being was expressed, in a more or less distinct way, by many Greek philosophers, or, more precisely, it was implicitly assumed by nearly all of them. It was clearly the main idea in that complex totality of ideas that reflected and stimulated the experience of the mysteries. It is highly probable that this idea was of Oriental origin, although it could have been completely autochthonous, for the removal of personal limitation and the drunken rapture of fusion with all being produced by the mysteries were in themselves sufficient to give birth to the idea of the sinfulness of individual existence and of the blissfulness and therefore the primordial holiness of the being outside oneself.

This idea was expressed with particular force by Anaximander. According to Theophrastus' account, preserved by Simplicius, "Anaximander, son of Praxiadus from Miletus, pupil and follower of Thales, affirms that the infinite is the principle (archē) and material cause (stoicheion) of everything. He was the first to introduce the word archē to express the supposition that it is not water, or any other of the so-called elements, but some other kind of infinite nature that makes up all the heavens and all the worlds in the heavens. From this principle all things receive birth and, according to necessity, annihilation, for at a definite time they suffer punishment and retribution for their mutual injustice. He expresses himself in this way, using excessively poetical images (ex ōn de hē genesis esti tois ousi, kai tēn phtoran eis tauta ginesthai kata to chreōn, didonai gar auta dikēn kai tisin allelois tēs adikias kata tēn tou chronou taxin, poiētikōterois outōs onomasin auta legōn)." (Teophrasti physic. opinionum, fr. 2; cited in Simplicii in Aristot. Physic., f. 6r, 36–54. See Hermannus Diels, Doxographi graeci, Berolini, 1879, p. 475).

However, Theophrastus, in his profound account, is far from right when he sees in Anaximander's words "cessively poetical images," though also not completely right is an excessively ontologizing historian of philosophy who affirms, on the basis of a study of Egyptian beliefs, that "among the ancient Greek philosophers the words monos, dikē denote the first space," and that, "for this reason the *adikia* of things is nothing else but their deviation from the first space and *tisis*, retribution, is nothing else but their transformation into limitless space" (O. M. Novitsky, Postepennoe razvitie drevnikh filosofskikh uchenii v sviazi s razvitiem iazycheskikh verovanii [Gradual development of ancient philosophical doctrines in connection with the development of pagan beliefs], Kiev, 1860, Part 2, p. 93, n. 81. On the religion of the Egyptians, see ibid. Part 1, n. 5). Anaximander's general idea is simple: "Untruth is isolation, mutual opposition, separation; truth triumphs in the annihilation of all that is isolated; separate things return to their elements. But these latter are absorbed by the limitless, within which numberless worlds are born and are annihilated" (Prince S. N. Trubetskoi, Istoriia drevnei filosofii [History of ancient philosophy], Part 1, M., 1906, p. 66. Cf. T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, trans. from the 2nd Germ. ed. by E. Gertsyk and D. Zhukovsky, S.P., 1911, Vol. 1, p. 50). But, like all the propositions of the original metaphysics, this idea is a reflection of a concrete mystical psychology and even, more specifically, of Orphic ideas of the soul which arose on the basis of the mysteries. This idea is not a construction of abstract reason. See:

Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, ch. 5: the Orphic-Pythagorean doctrine of the soul, pp. 108 ff.

- S. S. Glagolev, *Grecheskaia religiia* [Greek religion], Part 1, "Verovaniia" [Beliefs], Sergiev Posad, 1909, Ch. 5: the theology of the Orphics, pp. 216 ff.
- Rud. Steiner, The Ancient Mysteries and Christianity, auth. trans. of Das Christentum als mystische Tatsache, Lpz., 2 Aufl., 1910, M., 1912.
- 120. R. Hamerling, *Die Atomistik des Willens*, 1891, Bd. II, S. 164 (I quote from Rud. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, 3-te Aufl., Berlin, 1910, Bd. 2, S. 713).
- 121. The idea of the total separation of values and givens, the obligatory and the present, norms and facts is practically the most characteristic idea of the entire neo-Kantian movement in philosophy, in the narrow as well as in the extended sense of the term neo-Kantianism.
- 122. Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, "From the conversations and precepts of the starets Zosima" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 337).
 - 123. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VIII, 10.
- **124.** Joh. Scotus Erigena, *De divisione naturae*, I, 74 (PL, T. 122, col. 519 B). Here yet another definition of love is given: "Amor est naturalis motus omnium rerum, quae in motu sunt, finis quietaque statio, ultra quam nullus creaturae progreditur motus."
 - 125. See n. 116 supra.
- 126. "The Holy Scripture calls God *light*. According to the usual understanding, this appellation expresses God's purity. But does it not also express God's being? Is not God in fact light, and does His Essence not have something that resembles light?" (Innokentii, Archbishop of Kherson, "O *Boge voobshche, kak uchreditele tsarstva nravstvennogo ili nebesnogo*" [On God in general, as the founder of the moral or heavenly kingdom], *Works*, ed. Wolf, S.P. and M.,

Vol. 10, pp. 255–65). The doctrine of God as ineffable light is encountered in nearly all of the mystics. We find a systematic exposition of this doctrine in the main work of the Englishman John Pordage (1625–98), *Metaphysica vera et divina*, translated into German and Russian under the titles:

Pordädschen's göttliche und wahre Metaphysik, übersetzt von Loth. Vischer, 1725.

Bozhestvennaia i istinnaia metafizika, ili divnoe i onytom priobretennoe vedenie nevidimikh i vechnykh veshchei, otkrytoe cherez D.I.P. [printed secretly in Moscow around 1784–86], 3 vols, 547+600+639 pp. in quarto. This book was confiscated and, according to Sopikov, is extremely rare.

This is what John Pordage teaches: "God is Light (1 John 15); hence, His Essence has space, depth, height, length, and width. For it is impossible to imagine Light that does not have space, whose radiance does not spread around itself, that does not illuminate any place at all, and does not occupy any place with its clarity. One cannot argue to the contrary that God is only metaphorically called Light, for it is said without any ground that the Scripture only metaphorically calls God Light. To the contrary, this is God's most proper name; and if we view His great elevation, and the subtlety and clarity of His radiance, then this external light, which is called corporeal, cannot be called by this name except most improperly, for the Divine Light surpasses it immeasurably far with its radiance and glory, as many testify who have discovered this. And, in this sense, that is, with respect to His Most High Clarity and Radiance, and His all-subtle Being, what is true is that the Spiritual and Divine Light is wholly different from the corporeal or external light, and is of a special kind. However, both have, in this examination of the light, a similar nature and properties. And no one can prove the contrary.

"However, I would like to know what they mean by the name Spiritual Light, if they desire to demonstrate through that nothing else but the loftiness of the radiance and the subtlety of its being. For, in itself, Knowledge alone cannot be called Light. All the devils and the damned have knowledge of many things (and not only the knowledge of single type that remains in them of Divine things); they have substantial and empirical knowledge of their Dark World, and of the things found in it. However, all taken together, they do not have the slightest spark of light. Thus, the Spiritual Light is the true and proper light, according to the common understanding that all men have of it, that is, as of clearly shining clarity. And therefore such a light that all must recognize as something material and as essential perfection cannot be denied to God without infringing on His Glory. This is made even less dubious by the fact that in John's Revelation of Eternal Life it is said; 'And there shall be no night there; and they need no candle, neither light of the sun; for the Lord God giveth them light' (Rev. 22:5). This can be understood only as referring to the True Sensible Light, which will illuminate the eyes of the blessed. It is also unseemly if this external light is called a corporeal being, if by that one means such a thing that has nothing in itself, except that it has the dimensions of height, depth, length, and width, but is without life in itself, and is wholly passive. Rather, Light is Life (cf. John 1:4, 5). Moreover, the light acts from out of its own inner ground, and from out of its own inner force. Consequently, it is Spirit, not body. And as one must eagerly accept this conclusion about the Divine Light, so one must accept it with reference to the external light until it is demonstrated by firm proofs that this light has a wholly other, opposite nature." Further, Pordage refutes certain possible objections to this, but we won't go into the details. Then Pordage says: "Just as God is infinite Being, so He is infinite Light, and infinite space. And just as this day the external Light surrounds everything, embraces everything in itself, and all things live, move and have their being in it, so the Divine light, day and night [for there is no darkness in God but only constant day (cf. 1 John 1:5, Ps. 139:12)], fills everything, permeates everything, and in It we live, move, and have our being. In the innerness of all things It is the ground that carries and holds everything; there is nothing that could be hidden from It. However, by reason of Its all-surpassing subtlety of being it cannot be revealed by the power of creatures, who, instead, in profoundest humility must implore and await Its free and gracious revelation and communication. The Holy Scripture, the treasure trove of Divine Truth, teaches this on almost all of its pages. And this consideration of the Light reveals another weakness of the following objection, when it is said that if to God is attributed Space, then it follows that He can be divided. For divide if you can this external Light of the sun into substantial parts, and show us a particle that could be separated from the whole: confine it in a glass, and preserve it for future use—you will have a most excellent lamp. But if you cannot do this, then admit that the parts that you imagine standing next to one another in Space are found only in your imagination, and the divisibility imposed by you upon them is merely the work of your reason (merum ens rationis) and nothing else. Look at a glass, and observe how dense a body it is, so that the most highly volatile spirits cannot penetrate it, but are confined in it; but observe how easily Light passes through it, and how the Light always abides indivisible there in its wholeness. Thus, how much more irresistibly must the Divine Light penetrate all bodies. But, you will argue, if light cannot be divided such that one part of it will be confined, it can, however, be excluded from many places, and space in its totality can thus be reduced or enlarged. And that this means as much as if it were divided. But in my opinion this cannot be equated with division. Rather, this exclusion brings with it concentration, a greater selfunification of light. And this does not oppose the nature of a *created* being, that it have the power to contract and to expand. And it does not even oppose the nature of an *uncreated* being, to the extent that this is a property of its *secondary* being. The author has clearly found this out from his many investigations" (Bozhestvennaya i istinnaia metafizika, Part 1, Bk. 1, Ch. 12, Par. 1-23, pp. 262-69; see saa).

127. Sunday canon of the 6th tone, 5th hiermos.

Let us remark in passing that this veneration of the light, expressed so clearly in the hymn "Quiet Light," has a very ancient origin. St. Basil the Great mentions precisely this hymn in the year 375: "Our fathers found it meet to receive the grace of the evening light not in silence, but to express their gratitude immediately at its arrival. And we cannot say what is the origin of these speeches of gratitude for the light. At any rate, the people sing an ancient hymn . . ." (St. Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, to St. Amphilochius, bishop of Iconia, 29 73; PG, Vol. 32, col. 205 A).

But who has not experienced even today the calming grace of the "evening light," the incomprehensible meekness and otherworldliness of the rays of the setting sun. This feeling known to everyone is one of Dostoevsky's musical themes, and it always appears in his works in the image of the rays of the setting

sun. Thus, Zosima's words on the eve of his death resonate with an unearthly music: "I bless the rising of the sun every day, and my heart sings to it as before, but now I love its setting even more, its long oblique rays, and, with them, quiet, meek, tender remembrances, dear images from my long and blessed life. . . " and so on. Long oblique rays of the setting sun—that is the symbol of quiet dying, the going over to the other world. As Prince Myshkin observed, the eyes of one condemned to execution were struck by rays of light gleaming from the gilded roof of a cathedral. He looked intently at those rays, he could not tear himself away from them, it began to appear to him that those rays were his new nature, that, over a period of three minutes, he would somehow become fused with them. The prisoner Mikhailov [in The House of the Dead] dies on the evening of a clear frosty day; the intense oblique rays of the setting sun were piercing the green windows of the prison hospital. Three days before her death, as if having a premonition of it, Nellie [in The Insulted and Injured] looks with anguish at the setting sun. Liza in The Eternal Husband dies on a beautiful summer evening, together with the setting of the sun. Raskolnikov meditates on death while looking at the final rosy reflection of the sunset. In The Idiot, the half-insane elderly general tells of the death of his wife on a quiet summer evening with the setting of the sun. In The Adolescent, Kraft, before shooting himself, mysteriously announces that he loves sunsets. Engraved in Alyosha's memory were the oblique rays of the setting sun which he saw when his mother was thrashing in hysteria. Zosima tells of the death of his brother at a clear evening hour, after the sun had set. As in Alyosha's case, a picture from early childhood was engraved in his memory. Remembering it, he seemed to see how the incense was rising, how, above, through the cupolas, rays of light were streaming into the Church of God, and how, rising up to them in waves, the incense was melting. This ray of the setting sun is the symbol of our connection with another world. Makar Ivanovich [in The Adolescent] tells about a merchant who experienced intense grief because he caused a young boy to throw himself into a river and die; this merchant commissioned an artist to paint a picture reproducing that event. In this picture, the artist had a ray descending from the heavens onto the boy, "a single ray of light."

128. "I cast my heart's glance heavenward, toward Thee, O Savior, save me with Thy radiance" (matins, 1st antiphon of the 2nd tone).

The term "illumination," *ellampsis*, as well as terms similar to it, point, without any doubt, to the uncreated Light of Tabor—the energy of the Triune Divinity. Directly or indirectly, this term is associated with the doctrine of this subject which is most clearly and consistently expressed by the hesychasts of Mt. Athos. The highly significant and instructive debates about the Light of Tabor have clarified the foundations of Orthodox epistemology and very significant aspects of Orthodox ontology. That is why I feel it my duty to indicate the literature on this topic, however meager it may be:

Igumen [Rector] Modest, Sviatoi Grigory Palama, Mitropolit Solynsky, pobornik pravoslavnogo ucheniia o Favorskom svete i o deistviiakh Bozhiikh [St. Gregory Palamas, Metropolitan of Salonika, defender of the Orthodox doctrine of the light of Tabor and of the Divine energies], Kiev, 1860.

Bishop Porfiry Uspensky, Vostok khristianskii. Afon. Pervoye puteshestvie v Afonskie monastyri i skity v 1845 g. [The Christian Orient. Mt. Athos. First travels to the monasteries and hermitages of Mt. Athos], Kiev, 1877, Part 1, Sec.

1, pp. 229–62. By the same author: op. cit., *Istoriia Afona* [History of Mt. Athos], Part 3, Sec. 1, Kiev, 1877, Par. 32, pp. 134–44: the hesychastic doctrine. Also by the same author: op. cit., Part 3, Sec. 2 I, S.P., 1892, ed. Imperial Academy of Sciences, under the supervision of P. A. Syrku, Ch. 18, Par. 97–99: the faith and moral state of the monks of Athos; the hesychastic doctrine; the interpretation of the hesychasts of Athos; its fate; and bibliography. By the same author: op. cit., Part 3, Sec. 2 II: *Opravdaniya istorii Afona* [Justifications of the history of Mt. Athos]. Nos. 25–50, pp. 682–861: texts and documents.

F. I. Uspensky, *Sinodik v nedeliu pravoslavia* [Synodicon for the Orthodox week], Odessa, 1890; by the same author: *Ocherki po istorii vizantiiskoi obrazovannosti* [Essays on the history of Byzantine education], S.P., 1892.

Bishop Aleksei, *Vizantiiskie tserkovnye mystiki 14-ogo veka* [Byzantine church mystics of the 14th century], Kazan', 1906.

- I. Sokolov, "Barlaam and the Barlaamites," in the *Orthodox Theological Encyclopedia*, S.P., 1902, Vol. 3, col. 149–57; by the same author: "Gregory Akindynos," op. cit., 1904, Vol. 4, pp. 680–82; also by the same author: "Gregory of Sinai," op. cit., Vol. 4 (also see other names).
- G. Nedetovskii, "Varlaamitskaia eres'" [The Barlaamite heresy] (Trudy Kievskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii, 1873, Feb.).
- P. A. Syrku, *K istorii ispravleniia knig v Bolgarii v XIV veke* [A history of the correction of books in Bulgaria in the 14th century], S.P., 1899.

Karl Krumbacher, Geschichte der byzantinische Litteratur, München, 1897.

Gr. Papamicha*ēl, Ho hagios Grēgorios Palamas, En Alexandriai*, 1911, review in *Echos d'Orient*, 15-e an., No. 97, 1912, Nov–Dec., pp. 528–31; by the same author: "On Stavros' Book," *Nea Siōn*, Vol. 4 (1896), p. 565; also by the same author: *Christianismos kai pneumatismos*, 1912.

St. Gregory Palamas, "Orthodox Confession" (Voskresnoe Chtenie, 1841, No. 3, pp. 17–21).

The chief defenders of the Orthodox doctrine of the Light of Tabor were St. Gregory Palamas, the ecumenical patriarch Philotheos, the Empress Anna, her son the Emperor John Palaeologus, John Cantacuzenos, who reigned with him, and the monk Isidor Boukharis, later the ecumenical patriarch. The opponents of this doctrine were the Calabrian monk Barlaam, the scholar Gregory Akindynos, the ecumenical patriarch John Calecas, and the scholar Grigaras. Their works are collected in the last eleven volumes of the second Greek series of Migne's Patrology.

129. St. Symeon the New Theologian, Seventh Prayer for Holy Communion.

130. With reference to the hard-to-explain expression "ho patēr ton phōtōn" (James 1:17), many exegetes think that here God is called "the source of spiritual light"; that is the opinion of Fromond, Baumgarten, and Stark. But Hoffmann understood that the name ta phōta could signify only the heavenly lights. This latter idea is developed and given in an improved form by Bishop Georgii. "There is nothing strange," he adds "in the fact that God is called the father of lights. It is well known that a similar expression is used in Job 38:28: 'hath the rain a father?' This interpretation is the least artificial one and is accepted by the majority of exegetes," including Rosenmüller, Wiesinger, Hutter, and Scheg. (Hieromonk [now Bishop] Georgii [Yaroshevsky], Sobornoe poslanie sv. Apostola Iakova: Opyt istorichsko-ekzegeticheskogo issledovaniia [The Catholic

Epistle of the Apostle James: A historical and exegetical essay], Kiev, 1901, pp. 129–31).

- 131. "It must be supposed that, in sounds, that which is simple does not possess beauty. However, in a beautiful harmony, every sound, even an isolated one, has its own beauty" (Plotinus, Enneads, I, 6, 1; Plotini Enneades edid. Ric. Volkmann, Lipsiae, 1883, Vol. 1, p. 85; in Bouillet's translation, Vol. 1, pp. 99–100). "An isolated tone perceived by our ear disappears without a trace for our psyche almost immediately after the cessation of the vibration. We do not have the capacity to recognize it, to determine its pitch, to compare it with an isolated tone which we heard a quarter of an hour ago, just as we cannot reproduce it ten minutes later. Only very rare individuals, with exceptional musical talent, have the ability to evaluate approximately an isolated tone, and even they preliminarily reproduce the heard tone with their voice ..." (A. Bernshtein, "Mir zvukov kak ob'ekt vospriatiia i mysli [The world of sounds as an object of perception and thought], in VFP, Bk. 2 [32], 1896, March-April, Sec. II, p. 111). "The elements of a melody, indefinable in isolation, acquire, when combined, new qualities which facilitate their combined appreciation. Evidently, that qualification which is missing with respect to an isolated tone is present with respect to their combination, and, without determining each member, it determines their sequential series" (ibid., p. 112). "Although our ear is capable of perceiving tones with any number of vibrations, their recognition and differentiation are limited by definite relations. Thus, what is important for auditory perception is not so much the absolute number of vibrations of the surrounding air as the relation of the values of the sequentially changing rates of vibrations. In each series of sequential sounds our perception either isolates only those which are related to one another as a series of definite relations between some integers or artificially and approximately reduces the remainder to the same regular series" (ibid., p. 116). "Tones are not remembered by themselves but rather in their relations to rates of vibrations; thought captures not the absolute pitch of each tone but rather their sequence, corresponding to the sequence of the relations of certain integers. An old melody in a new tonality is recognized without error because its remembered form consisted not of a series of tones of definite pitch but rather of a series of relations not changing with the tonalities. The limits to such an identification in the memory are not constrained by any factors; within the limits of the possible perception of the physical scale from the lowest to the highest tones, passing by half-tone from tonality to tonality, infinitely changing its timbre in different instruments, a melody nevertheless remains strictly identical with its remembered form, since it remains mathematically faithful to itself, i.e., to the sequence of its elements. We remember a melody although we cannot always remember what instrument we heard it from." Etc. (ibid., pp. 116–17).
- 132. "Music gives us pleasure, although its beauty consists only in the relations of numbers and the counting of the impacts and vibrations of sounding bodies, repeated after certain intervals—a counting that we do not notice and that our soul constantly carries out" (Leibniz, *Principles of Nature and Grace Based on Reason*, 17; *Selected Philosophical Works*, trans. members of the Psychological Society under the supervision of B. P. Preobrazhensky, M., 1890, p. 336).
- 133. Emerson, "Beauty" (Works, Vol. 1, p. 24, Novyi Zhurnal Inostrannoi Literatury). We find the same thing in other theoreticians of aesthetics.

"Generally speaking, light in appropriate measure, as a stimulus of nervous energy, sufficiently restored by nourishment and rest, as a normal stimulus of nervous activity, is accompanied by a sense of pleasure. Prolonged darkness is positively unpleasant. Leaving a dark cave or rising out of a deep shaft, we rejoice in the light of the day. It appears that this aversion to darkness is instinctive in us; it is observed not only in people but also in animals, as indicated by the restlessness and fear that they experience during a total solar eclipse. A healthy person likes a sensation that is somewhat more pronounced than the usual: we prefer sunny days to cloudy ones, probably because light has a healthy excitatory effect on the entire organism. In general, the quantity of light corresponds to our mood. Therefore, bright illumination is required for festive get-togethers, fancy dinners, theatrical presentations, and balls, while the mysterious twilight of temples is more in harmony with the religious mood of praying persons. The pleasure given by light is heightened by contrast" (A. I. Smirnov, Estetika kak nauka o prekrasnom v prirode i iskusstve: Universitetskie chteniia [Aesthetics as the science of the beautiful in nature and art: University lectures], Part 2, Kazan', 1900, E, pp. 184-85).

"Sometimes a single ray of light compels one to understand the world better than infinite meditations in front of open books in a dusty study" (Guyau, *Art from the Sociological Point of View*, XI).

We also find reflections on the particular beauty of light in St. Basil the Great: "'And God said, Let there be light' (Gen. 1:3). The first Divine word created the nature of light, chased away the darkness, dissipated melancholy, gladdened the world, suddenly gave an attractive and pleasant look to everything. . . . Just as those who cast oil into some depth produce a shine there, so the Creator of all, having pronounced His Word, instantaneously introduced into the world the grace of light. 'Let there be light.' And the injunction became an act. And a substance so agreeable appeared that the human mind cannot imagine a more agreeable one. . . . 'And God saw the light, that it was good, kalon' (Gen. 1:4). Can we say anything sufficient in praise of the light when it already has the Creator's preliminary stamp of approval: 'it is good, hoti kalon'? But if the beauty—to kalon—of a body consists in the mutual symmetry of its parts and in their outward pleasantness of color, then how does the notion of beauty retain its place in light, which by nature is simple and homogeneous? Is it not because to the light is attributed symmetry not with respect to its own parts but with respect to its healthy and pleasant effect on sight. Thus, gold too is beautiful although it is pleasant to the sight and agreeable not because of the symmetry of its parts but only because of its color. Also, the evening star is more beautiful than all the other stars not because of the symmetry of its parts but because its shine falls on eyes in a healthy and agreeable way" (Hexaemeron, II 7; PG, Vol. 29, col. 44-48). We read the same thing in Plotinus: "Is it the proportion of parts to one another and to the whole, combined with agreeable colors, that constitutes the beautiful, as all say, when it is present before the sight? In this case the beauty of a body, if it consists only in the symmetry and in the regular proportion of its parts, could not be found in anything simple. . . . Colors, which are beautiful, like sunlight, for example, but which are simple and do not acquire their beauty from symmetry-are they to be excluded from the domain of beauty? In what way is gold beautiful? And we would not be able to speak of the splendor of virtue if we did not contemplate the countenance of justice and temperance in a light that makes the evening star and the morning star pale" (*Enneads*, I, 6; 1, 4; Plotini *Enneades* edid. Ric. Volkmann, Lipsiae, 1883, Vol. 1, p. 85; trans. Bouillet, Paris, 1857, Vol. 1, p. 99).

134. A modern author characterizes asceticism as the "art of arts" (Gordon Milburn, A Study of Modern Anglicanism, London, 1901, pp. 19–23, as quoted in V. A. Kozhevnikov, O znachenii khristianskogo podvizhnichestva v proshlom i v nastoiashem [The significance of Christian asceticism in the past and in the present], Part 1, M., 1910, pp. 14–15, n. 27 on p. 91). But this characterization is scarcely new. Among the ancient ascetics (e.g., John Cassian, the monks Ignatius and Callistos Xanthopulos, and others) one often finds ascetic discipline called an "art," and even the "art of arts." This is not a metaphor, for, if all art is the transformation of some material, the imprinting in it of a new image of a higher order, what does ascetic discipline consist in if not the transformation of man's whole being? Ideas of this sort, contained in the so-called classical works on asceticism collected in the Philokalia, are also clearly and insistently conveyed in recent ascetic works, including:

Otkrovennye razskazy strannika dukhovnomu svoemu otsu [The way of a pilgrim], 3rd ed., Kazan', 1884 (the author is unknown).

Iz rasskazov strannika o blagodatnom deistvii molitvy Iususovoi [From the tales of a pilgrim about the grace-giving effect of the prayer of Jesus], Sergiev Posad, 1911. (This book was written as a continuation of the preceding work, but it is not known if the two books were written by the same person. There is some reason to think that it was written by the Optina starets Amvrosii, but this is not certain).

Schemamonk Ilarion, Na gorakh Kavkaza. Beseda dvukh startsev pustynnikov o vnutrennem edinenii s Gospodom nashikh serdets, chrez molitvu Iusus Khristovu, ili dukhovnaia deiatel'nost' sovremennykh pustynnikov [On the mountains of the Caucasus. A conversation between two hermit elders about inner unification with the Lord of our hearts through the prayer of Jesus, or the spiritual activity of contemporary hermits], 2nd ed., corrected and much enlarged, Batalpashinsk region of the Kuban, 1910; 3rd ed., Kiev, 1912.

135. The custom of calling collections of ascetic works Philokalias is very ancient. That is how in the 4th century Basil the Great entitled the catenae from Origen. Among various collections of this kind, it is necessary to mention the most complete one, *Philokalia tōn ierōn nēpikōn*, published in 1782 in Venice by John Mauvrocordatus. There is also a five-volume Philokalia in Russian translation (entitled Dobrotolubie) prepared by Bishop Theophanus the Recluse; this version has had four different editions. According to the translator in his introduction to this collection of the sayings of the fathers, "the word 'Dobrotolubie' is used to translate this collection's Greek title, Philokalia, which signifies love of the beautiful, the elevated, the good" (Dobrotolubie, Russ. trans., enlarged, 4th ed., Vol. 1, M., 1905, p. iii). It is already clear from this comment how insufficient and incorrect is the interpretation of the word "dobrotolubie" given by the priest Grigorii Diachenko (Polnyi tserkovno-slaviansky slovar' [Complete Church-Slavonic Dictionary, M., 1900, p. 148). Here is the complete definition that he gives: "Dobrotolubie is the inclination to do good, love of virtue." However, it is indisputable that in the idea of "dobrotolubie," as well as in the Greek philokalia, the dominant element is artistic, aesthetic, not moral. According to Anthim Gazes's explanation, philokalia signifies "agapē pros to kalon, hē tou kalou kai hōraiou e timiou agapē, i.e., love of beauty, or love of the beautiful or precious" (Anthim Gazes, Lexikon Hellenikon, Ekdosis prote. Epistasia kai diorthosei Spuridonos Blante, tomos tritos, En Venetiai, 1816, st. 1036). According to Henricus Stephanus (Thesaurus Graecae Linguae, Post editionem anglicam . . . tertio edid. Carolus Benedictus Hase, Guilielmus Dindorfius et Ludovicus Dindorfius, Parisiis, 1865, Vol. 8, col. 845-47), philokalia is "studium pulchritudinis, quo quis pulcras aut pulcros amat: quo sensu objecta fuit Socrati philokalia, perinde ac si dictum fuisee paiderastia; studium honestatis, rerum honestatum." From this, according to Gazes, is derived to philokalion, phokalion, phrokalion, and phrokalia. A related word, philokalos, is explained by Gazes as "lover of beauty," as "lover of the beautiful, the precious, the fitting," and even as philokosmos, "lover of adornments." In any case, in Xenophon (Cyropedia, 1, 3:3) we encounter the following clarification: "pais on philokalos hedeto tei stolei: the boy, being a lover of adornments, rejoiced in the clothing." Philokalos can also signify ambitious, virtuous, noble, courageous, generous, and then proper in the sense of a man of the world, and even dissolute (Gazes, op. cit.). However, it is hardly necessary to emphasize that these meanings are secondary ones and that they are always based on the root idea of inclination to beauty. Numerous examples of this usage of philokalia are collected in the aforementioned dictionary of Stephanus.

The verb philokaleo has approximately the same meaning, namely (according to Gazes): philos tou kalou eimi, philotimeomai, philokosmeō, etc. (ibid.). And according to Stephanus (ibid.) philokaleō is "pulchritudinem amo, Honestatis sum studiosus aut rerum honestatum." In one of his speeches, preserved by Thucyclides (II, 40), Pericles attests that love of the beautiful, philokalia, love of beauty or good, together with love of wisdom, philosophy, was the fundamental aspiration of the Athenians. "Philokaloumen met euteleias kai philosophoumen aneu malakias," says Pericles. Or, as his words are conveyed by the German translator of Thucydides, Osiander: "we love the beautiful, but with a moderate luxury; we love the sciences, but without becoming enervated because of them." These two fundamental and inseparable tendencies of the ancient soul, philosophy and philokalia, are continued, in a transfigured form, by Eastern Orthodoxy, which has preserved even the ancient terms. As is known, Orthodoxy used the term philosophy to designate the God-contemplating life of the ascetics and the doctrine that justified this life, i.e., dogmatics in general and the dogma of the Trinity in particular; whereas philokalia has come to signify their art, a divine ornament.

Here are some more examples of the usage of philokaleō, taken from Stephanus' dictionary: "Philokalousa kai chairousa tēi poikilia (Plutarch, Moral., p. 1044 C). "Ta peri tēn ekphoran basilikōs ephilokalēde" (Diodor. 20, 37, with a nuance of condemnation). "Malista de pantōn peri paidotrophian philokaloumen—Honestatum colimus circa educationem liberorum" (Joseph. c. Apion. I, 12). "Oi neoi philokalousi malista peri tas enatautha euōchias lamprunomenoi" (Strabo 14, p. 640), i.e., "to be generous in relation to festivals." "Philokalousi peri tēn tōn logōn empeirian" (Dio Chr., p. 253 D). With an infinitive form philokalein signifies contendo, I strive. Thus, "philokalōn Hellenikais phuteiais diakosmēsai ta basileia" (Plutarch. Alex. c. 35), etc. Further, this verb sig-

nifies I smooth, I plane down, I clean, I sweep, I decorate luxuriously. Examples of such a usage are collected by Stephanus. I present only two: "philokalēsas ta tetrapula marmarois" (Ioann. Mal., p. 232, 20); "philokaloumenon tou troullou tēs ekklēsias" (ibid., 489, 19). A highly characteristic example is presented by Henricus van Herverden (Lexicon Graecum supplementorium et dialecticum, Lugduni Batavorum, 1902, p. 874, philokalisai) from a papyrus of 616: "kai oikein kai dioikein kai enpoiein kai metapoiein kai philokalesai [a domain] kath'on an boulēthein tropon kai pasan philokalian en autais poiēsasthai tēn autōi dokousan, kai ampelon en autais anaxai kai lakkous enoruxai" (Kenyon, Late Byzantine Papyri, n. 483, 1). These words can be compared (H. C. Müller, Arch. f. Papyrus. I 3, p. 439) with the Latin formula of Cupatius: "Ea lege ut inserendo, plantando, arando, poliendo, coldeno, meliorum eum et fructuosiorem faciat, etc." That is in fact what philokalic ascetics did, not on a grange but on the domain of their own persons.

136. The Slavonic DOBRÓTA (to kallos, decor, forma, pulchritudo, hē kallonē, species, excellentia, gloria; in Russian: krasa, krasota. "Give power to my beauty" (Ps. 29:8); "the most beautiful, krasen dobrótoiu" (Ps. 45:3), or, in the translation of the Psalter by Ambrosius Zertis-Kamensky (M., 1878), "krasneishii" (most beautiful); according to the translation of Tremellius (Hannoveriae, 1624; Berlin, 1878), multo pulchrior; according to the Russian Synodal version, Ty prekrasnee (Thou art more beautiful). "The king shall desire thy beauty" [dobróta in the Slavonic, krasota in the Synodal translation] (Ps. 45:11); "dobrótu (kallonen, krasu in the Synodal translation) Iakovliu" [the beauty of Jacob] (Ps. 46:5); and "dobrótu ikh," their beauty (gloriam according to Tremellius; glory according to the Synodal translation) (Ps. 78:61). (See Peter Hilterbrandt [of Riazan], An Explanatory Dictionary of the Psalter, S.P., 1898, p. 115).

Similarly, according to Nevostruev, "Dobrotà [?!] [* (kallos) = an attractive appearance, beauty, brilliance, splendor (Gen. 49:21; Deut. 33:17; Ps. 30:8; Prov. 6:25, 31:31; Wisdom 5:16; Ecclesiasticus 3:3, 9:26, 21:22, etc.); inner perfection, goodness, kallonē; value, dignity, glory; magnanimity, pity, mercy (Ecclesiasticus, 31:27); beauty, adornment (Ps. 47:5); beauty, art (canon of 24 June, 6th ode; of 27 June, 1st and 2nd odes; of 10 March, 2nd ode) (Priest Grig. Diachenko, Complete Church-Slavonic Dictionary, M., 1900, pp. 147–48; for details on the same question, see: I. I. Sreznevsky, Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkogo iazyka po pismennym pamiatnikam [Materials for a dictionary of Old Russian according to written monuments], S.P., 1890, Vol. 1.

But whatever may be the secondary meanings of the word DOBRÓTA, it is indisputable that originally it signified precisely beauty, and this primary sense of the word found expression in many documents. Thus, in the *Life of Febronia* we read: "the painter could not express the flowering beauty (*dobrotu*, *zōgraphein*) of her face" (Sreznevsky, Vol. 1, col. 866, with reference to the *Chet'i Minei* for June).

In the anonymous third prayer before sleep, to the Holy Spirit, among other expressions of contrition for the sins of the past day, one finds: "I saw the beauty (dobróta) of another, and my heart was stung by it." It is evident that this heart-

f When Dobrota is accented on the "a," it means goodness. When it is accented on the "o," it means beauty.

stinging "dobróta" is not moral perfection but beauty, for one cannot "see" it, and the stinging of the heart by moral perfection is not only not reprehensible, but is even praiseworthy.

The idea of beauty is undoubtedly the basic idea in the word "dobrota." Words of the same root tend to have the same predominantly aesthetic, not ethical, sense. Thus, dobr, kalos, bonus, hēdus, suavis, amoenus; dobro, kalōs; dobre, kalōs, as, e.g., in Ps. 33:3: "dobre poite [sing well]" (the Russian Synodal translation reads: sing harmoniously) (Hilterbrandt, p. 115). Therefore, as Nevostruev indicates, the word "dobrotvorenie = original beauty (Sunday of All Saints, 4th canon, 3rd ode, 2nd hiermos)"; "dobrotvorets, dobrotvoritel'nyi = kallopoios, maker of the beautiful, communicator of beauty (8 June, 1st ode, 1; 26 Sept., canon to the Mother of God, 1st ode)" (Diachenko, p. 148). Similarly, the word dobropisets signifies a calligrapher (Sreznevsky, Vol. 1, col. 678, with reference to Georges l'Hamartole, 283); dobropobyd'nyi, dobrodnyi, dobrozrachnyi, dobrolichnyi, dobropesn'nyi, etc., etc. (ibid., col. 474–684) also have the general sense of beauty, but not of ethical perfection, not of goodness.

Dobróta corresponds to the Greek $t\bar{o}$ kalon, but neither word should be understood in the sense of something pleasing to the senses: the Greeks did not know this modern notion of material, hedonistic beauty, and, as Grotius noted, the ancient term $t\bar{o}$ kalon includes, besides the usual modern sense of the beautiful, also the sense of the refined, the respected, the elevated (A. Bain, *Psychology*, trans. from the English by V. N. Ivanovsky, M., 1906, Vol. 2).

137. St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Epistle to the Magnesians*, 7, 1 (Funk, *Apost. Väter*, 2-te Aufl., Tübingen, 1906, S. 88, 14–16). The quotation in the text is from memory. Having referred to the actual text, I see that my translation, though still the most likely one, is not obligatory. The passage goes as follows: "One prayer, one mind, one hope in love, in unfathomable joy, i.e., Jesus Christ, *ou ameinon, outhen estin.*" The word *ameinon* could receive the special significance of *kalliteros*, *ōphelimōteros*, *dunatōteros*, *epitēdeioteros*, and even replace the comparative of *agathos* (see Gazes, n. 135, *supra*, p. 240).

But in essence it means neither "better" nor even "more beautiful" but has a more specific sense, i.e., the sense of "more amiable," "dearer," etc. It derives not from *amenion but from the theme *amei-no- (see E. Boisaq, Dict. étymolog. n. 13 supra, p. 52). The Latin amoenus, of the same root, has the same meaning (A. Walde, Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, 2-te Aufl., Heidelberg, 1910, Par. 36), namely anmutig, lieblich, gefällig. Therefore, an exact translation of this passage in Ignatius' Epistle must read as follows: "one joy, i.e., Jesus Christ, dearer than whom there is nothing." It is clear that this interpretation of ameinon is, in any case, closer to "more beautiful" than to "more good." It is a question here not of morality but of the direct, soul-delighting impression from Jesus Christ. This translation of St. Ignatius's words is also confirmed by the Lord's testimony about himself: "Az esm Pastyr dobryi" ["I am the good shepherd"] (John 10:14), where the Church-Slavonic word "dobryi" once again signifies beauty [see n. 136 supra], and not goodness, which the Lord affirms to be the property of the Father (Matt. 19:16–17 = Luke 18:18–19). If the reference to the Church-Slavonic text seems insufficient, let the reader refer to the Greek text, where this idea is manifested even more clearly: "egō eimi ho poimēn ho kalos" (John 10:14), says the Lord of Himself; "Ti me legeis agathon; oudeis agathos ei mē eis ho Theos" (Luke 18:19) or "Ti me erotais peri tou agathou; eis estin ho agathos" (Matt. 19:17), He affirms about the Father.

St. Dionysius the Areopagite also speaks of God as the original beauty. Having received being from True Beauty, nature in all its parts bears the reflection of this beauty: "autē hē hule peri tou ontōs kalou tou Theou hupostasa, kata pasan autēs diakosmēsin tēn kat eidos, apēchēmata tina tēs noeras euprepeias echei, hos esti tou phōtos, to phōtizein—hēlios gar aisthētous ophthalmous phōtizei, kai tōn chrōmaton antilambanesthai didōsi Theos de psuchēn kai tois ekeise kalois epentranizein parechei" (On the Celestial Hierarchy, II: 4; PG, col. 160 A, B). Cf. "Those freed from the prison of this life, if it were fully possible for them to express with tears compassion toward those who suffer, they would weep and cry over those who yet remain in the sorrows of this life, over the fact that they do not see the supramundane and nonmaterial beauties, hoti mē horōsi ta huperkosmia te kai aula kalle, of the thrones and principles, the powers and dominions, and the hosts and assemblies of angels, and the city on high and the heavenly triumph of those who are 'written in heaven' (Heb. 12:23). And Beauty surpasses all this, to gar huperkeimenon touton kallos, this Beauty which, as the true word of God testifies, the pure in heart shall see (Matt. 5:3). It is more excellent than all that is hoped for and higher than all that can be imagined obscurely" (St. Gregory of Nyssa, Sermon to Those Who Lament for Those Who Have Passed from This Life to Eternal Life; PG, Vol. 46, col. 508 A, B; Works, M., 1868, Part 7, pp. 497–98). That is how a holy father repeats Plato's myth of the cave. Cf.: "All the desire of such a one [i.e., of one who has taken a vow of silence], all his heart's exalted love, his entire disposition, aspire toward the supernatural beauty of God, the most blessed beauty, which is called by the fathers the highest of desired objects" (Patriarch Callistos and his companion in asceticism Ignatius Xanthopolos [14th century], Instruction for Those Who Keep Silence, 84; Philokalia, M., 1900, 2nd ed., Vol. 5, p. 401).

Also cf. "One who has approached the limits of passionlessness speculates correctly about God and the natures of things, and from the beauty of creatures, rising to the Creator in proportion to his purity, he receives the emanation of the light of the Spirit. Having good opinions about everyone, he thinks well of everyone, sees everyone as saintly and immaculate, and judges correctly about divine and human things. . . . And seeing the Divine Beauty, he likes to abide piously in divine places of the blessed glory of God, in ineffable silence and joy. And, having been changed in all his senses, in his material body he nonmaterially leads his life among people like an angel" (St. Nicetas Stethatos, *First Practical Century*, 90; *Philokalia*, 2nd ed., M., 1900, Vol. 5, p. 107).

- 138. Macarius the Great, Conversation 17, 3 (PG, Vol. 34, col. 6, 25).
- 139. Ibid., 17, 4.
- 140. Cf. pp. 194–98, 378–80 in the present book.
- 141. Bishop Theophanus the Recluse.
- 142. Dostopamiatnye skazaniia o podvizhnichestve sviatykh i blazennykh otsev [Memorable tales of the asceticism of the saints and blessed fathers], trans. from the Greek, S.P., 1871, p. 320, 1.
 - 143. Ibid., p. 324, 12.
 - 144. Ibid., p. 355, 12.
 - 145. Ibid., p. 372, 12.

146. Ibid., p. 25, 27.

147. "Dukh Bozhyi iavno pochivshii na otse Serafim Sarovskom v besede ego o tseli khristianskoi zhizni s simbirskim pomeshchikom i sovestnym sud'yoi Nikolaem Aleksandrovichem Motovilovym" [The Spirit of God clearly resting on Father Seraphim of Sarov during his conversation about the goal of Christian life with the Simbirsk landowner Nikolai Aleksandrovich Motovilov] (from N. A. Motovilov's manuscript memoir, Ch. VI). This manuscript, discovered by S. Nilus, was published in his book: Velikoe v malom [The Great in the small], 2nd ed., Tsarskoe Selo, 1905, pp. 197–99; there is also a new edition.

148. Concerning the halo in its various forms, its significance, and its origin, as well as concerning images of it, see:

De Waal, *Nimbus* (Kraus, *Real. Encyklopädie der christlichen Alterthümer*, Freiburg in Breisgau, Bd. 2, par. 496–99). A fairly large number of images of the nimbus are found in Vigoroux, *Dictionnaire de la Bible* (for example, see livraison XXXIII, col. 849, Fig. 189; col. 852, Fig. 192). M. Didron, *Histoire de Dieu*, Paris, 1843, pp. 1–146: "*De la gloire*." Here one finds examples of the halo outside of and prior to Christianity. Specifically on the halo in ancient iconography, see:

Johannis Nicolai, In nomine Jesu Disquisitio de Nimbis Antiquorum, Imaginibus Deorum, Imperatorum olim., et nunc Mariae Capitibus adpictis. Anno 1699. 139 pp. L. Stefani, "Nimb i luchezarnyi venets v proizvedeniakh antichnago iskusstva" [The nimbus and halo in works of ancient art], S.P., 1863 (supplement to Vol. 4 of Zapiski Imp. Akademii Nauk, No. 1). With illustrations.

About the origin of the halo as unquestionably signifying light, there can only be, speaking abstractly, two hypotheses. It is either an image of external, physical light or an image of mysterious, "inner," psychic or spiritual light, depending on the degree of the presence or absence of grace in the person seeing or radiating this light. In the first case, one would have to consider the halo an attribute of solar deities or astral deities in general. In the second case, one would have to consider it a graphic stylization of actual perceptions. Otherwise, if the halo is only a decoration or only an attribute, it would be utterly incomprehensible how such a strange decoration or attribute could have appeared in iconography. But it turns out that the halo is an attribute not only of solar, lunar, or astral deities, but of all deities in general. Hence, it expresses not external, physical light but "inner" light. After a careful study of images with halos and of the frequency of their occurrence, an investigator reaches the following conclusion: "After all that has been said, it remains unquestionable that, from the most ancient times to the most recent, what has been considered an essential property of every divine body is that it has been surrounded by an unnatural, blinding radiance; hence, this radiance could in no wise be exclusively an attribute of some specific class of deities. After all this, how could artists imagine, even for a moment, an essential property of divinity in general (against the grain of the popular representation) to be an exclusive property of astral deities? They have never done this: this is clear from the fact that, since they started representing the light surrounding the gods by means of a nimbus, a radiant halo, or a radiant circle, they have done this both for astral and for nonastral deities. Thus, exegetics should not see anything in these attributes except signs of a radiance characteristic of the divine nature in general. If, besides this, a particular property of the deity represented makes it necessary to give a special weight to this radiance, then, of course, exegetics should not ignore this circumstance either. In the nimbus and radiant halo of the deity represented one should in no wise see indications of a relation of this deity to a celestial body even if its original significance had been astral, but at the time to which the work of art refers this significance had disappeared from the popular consciousness, or if the astral significance had been imparted to the deity represented at a later time owing to certain philosophical or mythological considerations, but the monument itself had evidently arisen from another sphere of representations" (Stefani, pp. 12–13). We shall not try to substantiate further the view expressed that a halo is in general not a conventional sign but a symbol, an authentic image of real phenomena of the spiritual world or, in other cases, of the astral world. Such further substantiation would be inappropriate here, since we would have to refer to a four-volume study of mystical phenomena (especially the second volume): J. Görres, Die christliche Mystik, Regensburg, 1837, Bd. 2, Par. 308-96. But perhaps it would not be superfluous to note that, besides the general idea of a halo, even various features of its representation are profoundly realistic: halos of various types represent the mystical phenomenon (or the gracious phenomenon, which is the mystical phenomenon transubstantiated by grace) with all the precision that painting is capable of. After considering what a halo is, it is easy to become convinced that it cannot be represented otherwise than it is. Indeed, a golden disk around the head or an oval around the entire body is the most precise painterly representation of a continuous, homogeneous spherical or ellipsoidal mass of light; and this mass of light cannot be represented in any other way in terms of its color or shape. A halo with a gradual attenuation toward the head is an image of a sphere of light situated at a certain distance from the head. A ring-shaped halo is an image of a thin spherical layer. The Catholic halo, in the form of an ellipse around the head, is—even though it is the least accurate representation—an image of a luminous crown above the head, a crown resembling a polar aurora. A halo made up of radial stripes represents beams of light emitted in all directions from the head or from the entire body. The joining of two halos into one, above the Virgin and the Christ Child, is a superb image of the fusion of two luminous spheres, hollow or solid. Concentric wavy circles around Christ represent waves continuously radiated from Him into space and overtaking one another. And so on. In a word, every halo is an image, not a schema; a symbol, not an allegory; and it could not be depicted in any other way, for it is clear that, projected onto the face itself, these luminous phenomena are almost invisible and therefore unrepresentable. In any case, they are much clearer at their edges, and therefore they are represented to us not in perspective but in sectional view.

149. The best edition of the *Enneads* of Plotinus is by Volkmann: *Plotini Enneades praemisso Porphyrii De vita Plotini deque ordine librorum eius libello edidit Ricardus Volkmann*, Lipsiae, T. I, 1883; T. II, 1884. Complete translations have been done into French (M. N. Bouillet) and Latin (M. Ficinus, F. Creuzer). Selected treatises have been translated into Russian (Malevansky), German (F. Creuzer, J. G. v. Engelhardt, H. F. Müller, Kiefer), English (T. Taylor, T. M. Johnson), and Italian (A. M. Salvini). Let us note that *The Selected Treatises of Plotinus* in Prof. Malevansky's translation were published in *Vera i Razum* in 1898, 1899, and 1900 in the philosophical section.

150. Paganism cannot be viewed as a phenomenon that is completely unre-

lated to true faith. It is not an indifferent phenomenon: it is not areligious and aspiritual; rather it is pseudoreligious and pseudospiritual. It is a distortion, perversion, corruption of the true, primordial faith of mankind and, furthermore, it is an excruciating attempt to rescue oneself from spiritual discord, from spiritual "floundering." Paganism is a spiritual delusion. But just as every distorted image is nevertheless a copy of the original, corresponding to the original in each of its features, even the most particular, the smallest feature, so paganism, even in the most delicate lines of its profile, is a distorted reflection of true faith. The fleshly, sinful, and unclean reason distorted spiritual reality like a crooked mirror. Nevertheless, knowing of the spiritual world from Scripture and the patristic writings, an investigator can become convinced that each of the aspects of true faith is also present in paganism, although distorted almost beyond recognition. Approximately preserving the external side of the true faith, at least coming right up against this external side in the thoughts of its best representatives, paganism placed a fleshly content therein. Pagan faiths are, to use the language of mineralogy, a "pseudomorphosis" of the truth. "Not only the flight of individual philosophies," says a Catholic apologist of Christianity, the Jesuit M. Morawski, "not only the primordial religions of mankind . . . but even that lowly polytheism into which the majority of the nations had later fallen, stand in this kind of relation to Christianity. Even the very idea of multiplying the number of gods evidently comes from the difficulty of knowing God as a solitary, barren being. This is a kind of obscure foreshadowing of the Mystery of the Divine Trinity, which was to be annunciated by Christianity and to resolve this difficulty. Anthropomorphism, theophany on earth, all this is an expression of mankind's longing for God, of mankind's prayer that God approach, that He come down. In other words, it is a yearning for the incarnation of the Word. Worship of the dead, with all its superstition and absurdity, nevertheless involves an elevated principle, and it is also a fragment of our wondrous dogma of life beyond the grave. Bloody sacrifices, even human sacrifices, show that mankind, having an obscure sense or dim memory of the primordial traditions, suspected that it had fallen and needed to be redeemed" (Religio-philosophical Evenings, I-IV; ed. Religozno-filosofskaia Biblioteka, Sergiev Posad, 1911, pp. 81-82. In general, see pp. 66-88: "Fourth evening: Christianity Amid Other Religions." There is also a 2nd edition, M., 1912). The cited book is the first volume of an entire series of apologetic dialogues and consists of the first five dialogues in the work: M. Morawski, Die Abende am Leman. There is a complete Russian translation of this book, but done in unbearably poor Russian, namely: Vechera nad Lemanon, by M. Morawski, Prof. of the University of Jagellon; trans. from the 2nd ed. by B. Gord, Leipzig-Krakow, 1889, pp. 102–38, "Fourth Conversation."

Thus, even the most holy dogma of the Most Holy Trinity was refracted in the pagan consciousness—in the idea of "simultaneous" polytheism (the multiplicity of hypostases) and "successive" polytheism (the self-groundedness of the Absolute by an infinite series of acts). Furthermore, even the number of the hypostases of the Trinity left its trace in the form of the divine triads. But despite all of the external resemblance between these triads and the Trinity, we definitely do not find in them what makes the doctrine of the Trinity a dogma: a *spiritual* suprarational content. All it takes is a cursory survey of these pagan triads to become convinced that, even if they were sustained by the search for the Living Triune

God, they have nothing of the Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity except the number 3. And it is necessary to say this even leaving aside the possibility of the purely historical, random combination of deities in triads. After this, there is no reason to be astonished that virtually only Haeckel, classifying religions according to the number of gods recognized (see *The Riddles of the Universe*), considers it possible to equate the idea of the Triune God with pagan triads. In his scholastically divided and subdivided book *Des religions comparées au point de vue sociologique* (Paris, 1899, p. 205), Raul de La Grasserie distinguishes three types of "religious communities": "(1) *la société particulière entre dieux ou interdivine*; (2) *celle entre les diverses parties de l'esprit humain ou intrahumaine*; and (3) *celle entre les diverses fractions de la divinité ou intradivine*." He indicates further that the triads refer precisely to the type of the "société interdivine," and he presents a whole series of such triads built simultaneously on the schema of the family and the aspects of the sun, i.e., consisting of:

I. the father god, the living or already dead sun;

II. the mother goddess, who represents the sky, space or the dead sun, and is usually simultaneously the wife and mother of the former;

III. the son god, the young god of the rising sun.

He presents several examples of such a triad: (1) In Thebes: Ammon or Ammon-Ra, the rising sun, called Tum when it sets; Maut, his wife, the goddess of the sky; Khons, the rising sun and the ruler of the moon. (2) In Abydos: Osiris, Isis, his wife and sister; Horus, their son, with the same solar significance. (3) In Memphis: Phtah, the nocturnal sun and the god of the dead; Secket, his wife, goddess with the head of a lion, personifying the light of the sun, or Bast, goddess with the head of a cat; and Nofar-Tum or In-hotep, their son, the rising sun. (4) In Konosso: Mentu, Sati, and Khem. (5) In Esneh: Nun, Nebuont, and Hika.

Further, La Grasserie indicates anomalous triads, consisting of a god and two goddesses: (6) Ra with Nekheb, goddess of the South, and Ouadi, goddess of the North. (7) Osiris or Horus with Isis and Nephtys. (8) Nun with Sati and Anonke, hemispheres of the North and South.

Leaving this list to the author's scholarly responsibility, both with respect to its accuracy and the interpretation of the gods and with respect to its completeness, we will only remark that, despite his external reductive method of studying religion and the fact that this method conceals, if not a directly hostile, then at least a profoundly indifferent attitude toward Christianity, and even toward all religion, despite his astonishing insensitivity to concrete religious life and its particulars, La Grasserie indicates (ibid., p. 220) that, although the fusion of gods produces triads, "from this one gets not one god in three persons, as with the Christians, but three gods connected by an agreement—solidarisés—and distributing among themselves the functions of the higher deities. This, consequently, is not yet a trinity, trinité, strictly speaking, but rather a triad, triade, if trinity is taken to mean inner triplicity, triplicité, and if triad is taken to mean external triplicity" (e.g., Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva). This external character of the pagan triads found an appropriate expression in numerous plastic and graphic monuments of the ancient world. For a collection of numerous images of this kind, see: Nikolai Iv. Troitsky, Triedinstvo Bozhestva: Istoriko-arkheologicheskoe issledovanie po pamiatnikam vseobshchei istorii isskustva [The Triunity of Divinity: A historico-archeological investigation on the basis of monuments of the universal history of art], presented at the 11th All-Russian Archeological Congress, in Chernigov; 2nd ed., revised and enlarged, with 65 figures, Tula, 1909. Concerning the essential difference between the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity and the pagan and para-pagan philosophical doctrines of the deity triads, see: S. S. Glagolev, Sverkhestestvennoe otkrovenie i estestvennoe bogopoznanie [Supernatural revelation and natural knowledge of God], Kharkov, 1900, pp. 331-36; by the same author: Ocherki po istorii religii [Essays on the history of religion], Part 1: The Trinity St. Sergius Laura, 1902, pp. 35-36, n. 1: objections against the views of Zimmern concerning the Chaldean deities, presented by him in the brochure Vater, Sohn und Fürsprecher, Lpz., 1896; pp. 42-49: triads of the great Chaldean gods; pp. 103-6: the Egyptian triads and enneads. Aleksei Iv. Vvedensky. Religioznoe soznanie iazychestva: Ocherk filosofskoi istorii estestvennykh religii [The religious consciousness of paganism: An essay on the philosophical history of natural religions], Vol. 1, M., 1902, pp. 698–702: "Trimurti." The author of this study, having indicated the externally eclectic and mechanical way in which the representation of the Hindu Trimurti was formed, decisively insists on the following two theses: "First, in the Hindu Trimurti, in radical and fundamental opposition to the Christian Holy Trinity, the difference between the three deities is not real but purely nominal. . . . The Trimurti is nothing else but a double phantom, a double deception, and a double falsehood of the naive consciousness" (p. 700). . . . "Second, in the Hindu Trimurti the relation between the separate deities has nothing in common with the relationship among the Persons of the Holy Trinity in the Christian doctrine, i.e., with the relationship of fatherhood, sonhood, and procession" (p. 752).

151. "Herrschende Apperzeptionsmasse," "dominant apperceiving masses," is what W. Jerusalem (Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 1903, 3-te Aufl., S. 87) calls "the most easily induced apperceived groups of representations." It is in this sense that Archimandrite Serapion Mashkin calls the formula of a dogma, as the most easily attainable representation for the apperception of spiritual Truth, an "apperceiving mass." But one should not fail to mention that the term "apperceiving mass" is also used in another sense, a much more extended one, namely, to designate the whole mass of phenomena and processes (directly connected with the organization) that facilitate religious experience and define its character in one way or another. "The mass of collateral phenomena, morbid or healthy, with which the various religious phenomena must be compared in order to understand them better, forms what in the slang of pedagogics is termed the 'apperceiving mass' . . . (William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, trans. V. G. Malakhieva-Mirovich and M. V. Shik under the supervision of S. V. Lur'e, M., 1910, Lec. 1, pp. 21–22; also see the note translated on p. 22). In our book the term "apperceiving mass" is used in the first, more narrow sense, and is therefore almost synonymous with Kant's term "schema." Dogmas, the Cross, the Name of Jesus, and the Sign of the Cross are precisely schemata of the human spirit; higher reality is revealed in them, and, as the heart becomes purer, the schematic character of these symbols gains more and more realistic substance. Therefore, the sinful reason tends to the lower limit of these symbols—to pure and illusory phenomenality. By contrast, spiritual reason tends to the upper limit, to unconditional and all-real noumenality. Through these schemata, depending on our inner organization, we see either Nihil Absolutum or Ens Realissimum. In the gap, according to the level of spiritual ascent, is situated the whole path *a realibus ad realiora*. But the way to this ladder is revealed only through the "schema."

- 152. "Ton hagiōtaton tēs oikoumenēs ophthalmon" (St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 25, In Praise of the Philosopher Iron, 11; PG, Vol. 35, col. 1213 A).
 - 153. St. Augustine, Confession, VII, 10; PL, Vol. 32.

VI. LETTER FIVE: THE COMFORTER

- 154. "In betrothal to the future life and kingdom (*eis arrabōna tēs mellousēs zōēs kai basileias*)" (St. John of Damascus, 5th Prayer before Holy Communion; the 6th prayer in the Greek *Sunekdemos*).
- 155. "'Prelest' is the soul's passional tendency to falsehood on the basis of pride" (Archimandrite, later Bishop, Ignatius Brianchaninov, O molitve Iisusovoi [On the prayer of Jesus], The Works of Bishop Ignatius, S.P., 1865, Vol. 1, p. 130). In his works this bishop repeatedly gives a depiction and analysis of the state of prelest'. See especially Vol. 1: "On the Prayer of Jesus."
 - 156. See pp. 242-43 in the present book.
- 157. Tertullian, Adv. Praxeam, 26; PL, Vol. 2. Let me cite as an example: "Hic spiritus Dei erit Sermo. Sicut enim Johanno dicente (Joh. 1:14): Sermo caro factus est, spiritum quoque intelligimus in mentione sermonis . . . nam spiritus substantia est sermonis et sermo operatio spiritus," etc. Tertullian teaches that the Holy Spirit becomes an independent hypostasis separate from the Word only from the moment of the Pentecost (De orat. 25), and, opposing the Divinity of Christ to His Humanity, His flesh, he calls His Divinity the Spirit performing miracles, whereas the flesh experienced hunger, thirst, and miseries (De Carne Christi).
 - 158. Origen, On First Principles I, 3, 1; PG, Vol. 11, col. 145-47.
- 159. St. Justin the Philosopher, 1st Apology, 60; PG, Vol. 6, col. 418–20. Justin refers to the pseudo-Platonic second epistle, which was also alluded to by Clement of Alexandria in the Stromata, V; by Porphyry in Cyril of Alexandria's 1st book against Julian; by Origen in the 6th book against Celsus; by Eusebius in the 2nd book of the Evangelical Preparations, and by others. Proclus in his Platonic Theology (Bk. 2, Ch. 11) reads this passage in the same way as Justin the Philosopher.
- 160. Vasily Bolotov, *Uchenie Origena o Sv. Troitse* [Origen's doctrine of the Holy Spirit], S.P., 1879, p. 364. Also: In Origen's system, "the Spirit's significance in the Trinity is philosophically unclarified; furthermore, it perhaps could not be clarified as long as one attempted to understand the relation between the Persons of Divinity not in the form of the personal life of the spirit, as a process of self-consciousness, but from the point of view of a relation between an essence and its determinations. Thus, in Origen, only the Son represents a real intermediary between God and the world" (Bolotov, *Lektsii po istorii drevnei Tserkvi* [Lectures on the history of the ancient Church], S.P., 1910, Vol. 2, p. 340).
 - **161.** Origen, On First Principles, I, 3, 1; PG, Vol. 11, col. 145–47.
- 162. "Ōrigenēn—andra oude panu ti ugieis peri tou Pneumatos tas hupolēpseis en pasin echonta" (St. Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, 29:73; PG, Vol. 32, col. 204 B).
 - 163. M. J. Denis, De la philosophie d'Origène, Paris, 1884, pp. 177 et suiv.

V. Bolotov, Uchenie Origena o Sv. Troitse, p. 365, p. 374. On Origen's dogmatic system, see: F. Böhringer, Die Griechischen Väter, I. Hälfte, Klemens und Origens, Zurich, 1869. L'abbé Freppel, Origène, Paris, 1868. F. Prat (s.j.), Origène le théologien et l'exégète, 2nd ed., Paris, 1907 (from the series: La pensée chrétienne. Textes et Etudes). "'Origenes' und 'Origenismus'" (Allgemeine Encyklopädie der Wissenchaften und Künste, herausgegeben von Ersch und Gruber, 1834, III, 5, SS. 251-62). Aug. Zöllig, Die Inspirationslehre des Origenes: Einen Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1902 (Strassburger theologische Studien, Bd. V, Hft. 1). "Origen" (Article in the Philosophical Lexicon of S. S. Gogotsky, Vol. 3, pp. 623-28). V. Solovyov, "Origen" (article in the Brockhausen and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, Vol. 22. pp. 141-45). I. V. Popov, Konspekty lektsii po patrologii [Synopses of lectures on patrology], 1907–1908, pp. 122–39; op. cit., M., 1911–1912, pp. 125–82. A. A. Spassky, Istoria dogmaticheskikh dvizhenii v epokhu vselenskikh soborov [History of dogmatic movements in the epoch of the ecumenical councils], Sergiev Posad, 1906, Vol. 1, pp. 85-127. F. Eleonsky, Uchenie Origena o Bozhestve Syna Bozhiia i Dukha Sviatogo i ob otnoshenii ikh k Bogu Otsu [Origen's doctrine of the divinity of the Son of God and the Holy Spirit and their relation to God the Fatherl, S.P., 1879. Father G. Malevansky, Dogmaticheskaia sistema Origena [Origen's dogmatic system], Kiev, 1870.

164. We inevitably get—and this in the most impartial way—such a general impression of the underdevelopment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit from even a cursory examination of the literature on the Holy Spirit. Here are some of the relevant works: Archimandrite [later Bishop] Sil'vestr, Opyt prav. dogm. bogoslov. [An essay in orthodox dogmatics]; N. Bogorodsky, Uchenie Ioanna Damaskina ob iskhozhdenii Sv. dukha, izlozhennoe v sviazi s tezisami bonnskoi konferentsii 1875 goda [The doctrine of John of Damascus on the procession of the Holy Spirit, expounded in connection with the theses of the Bonn Conference of 1875], S.P., 1873; S. V. Kokhomsky, Uchenie drevnei Tserkvi ob iskhoz. Sv. Dukha [Doctrine of the ancient Church on the procession of the Holy Spirit], S.P., 1875; N. M. Bogorodsky, Dukh Sv. Istor.-dogmat. ocherk [The Holy Spirit. A historical and dogmatic studyl, Grodno, 1904; Serg. Astashkov, Iskhozh. Sv. Dukha i vselenskoe pervosviashchenstvo [Procession of the Holy Spirit and universal arch-priesthood], Freiburg im Breisgau, 1886; Adam Zernikov, An Orthodox Theological Study of the Procession of the Holy Spirit from Only the Father, trans. from the Latin by B. Davidovich, Vol. 1: The Patristic Testimony, Pochaev, 1902 [a major old study]; A. A. Nekrasov, "Uchenie Ioanna Dam. o lichnom otnoshenii Dukha Sv. k Synu Bozhiiu" [The doctrine of John of Damascus on the personal relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son of God], Prav. Sob. (1883), No. 4); K. F. Nösgen, Das Wesen und Wirken des Heiligen Geistes, Berlin, 1907.

- 165. Origen, Commentary on John, 5–8; PG, Vol. 11.
- 166. A. A. Spassky, n. 55 supra, p. 439.
- 167. V. Nesmelov, n. 70 *supra*, pp. 266–95. Like many others, Gregory of Nyssa refers to the fact that we are "not taught by the Holy Scripture to call the Holy Spirit the brother of the Son" (*Against Eunomius* II; PG, Vol. 45, col. 559 D). He then proves that procession is not the same as birth, but of course he does not show what the difference consists in. He, who taught more than anyone else about the Holy Spirit, cannot express the personal character of this Hypostasis to

such an extent that even the name of this hypostasis loses here its usually recognized character of a hypostatic property. Gregory says: "I have learned that the very same name in the divinely inspired Scripture is common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For the Son calls both Himself and the Holy Spirit the Comforter. And the Father, by the very fact that He gives comfort, also unquestionably acquires the name Comforter, for, in doing the work of the Comforter, he does not reject the name that belongs to this work" (op. cit., II, 14, col. 552 A).

- 168. What is astonishing is that, even in polemicizing with Eunomius and pointing out the most characteristic feature of Christianity, i.e., faith in consubstantiality, Basil the Great forgets [!] to name the Holy Spirit among the Hypostases: "Although much distinguishes Christianity from pagan error and Hebrew ignorance, in the good news of our salvation there is no dogma more important than faith in the Father and the Son" (*Refutation of Eunomius' Pleading*, II; PG, Vol. 29, col. 620 B, C).
- **169.** *Bol'shoi Trebnik Dopolnitel'nyi*, Ch. 78: The office of the Holy Pentecost, ed. of the Kiev-Pech. Lavra, 1875, Ch. 215, No. 218, 219. It was Prof. V. Popov who drew my attention to this asymmetry of the office.
 - 170. See Letter Eight in the present work.
- 171. "The mode of the procession remains inexplicable (tou de tropou tēs huparxeōs arretou phulassomenon)" (Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit; PG, Vol. 32, col. 152 B). However, a certain hint at an actual "deduction" of the procession, made by Athanasius the Great, is repeated more definitely by Basil: "Why is the Holy Spirit not the Son of the Son? Not because He is from God not through the Son, but so that the Trinity not be considered as infinite multiplicity, that it not be considered to have sons from sons as it is with people. To speak of a son from the Son would be to lead people who hear this to the idea of multiplicity in the Trinity of God. For it would be easy to conclude that from the son was born another son, and that from this other son yet another was born, and so on, until one gets a multiplicity [that is, an indefinite multiplicity] . . ." (Refutation of Eunomius' Pleading, V; PG, Vol. 29, col. 732 B, 734 B).
 - 172. See the following note.
- 173. *The Unpublished Works of Mark of Ephesus*, trans. Avraam Norov from the manuscript at the Paris Imperial Library, S.P., 1860, p. 27 (= *Khris. Cht.*, 1861).
- 174. Gregory of Nyssa, *Catechistic Discourse*, III; PG, Vol. 45, col. 171. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus: To the question, "What is procession?" he answers decisively: "We cannot even see what is beneath our very feet; far be it from us to try to plumb the depths and to judge about ineffable and inexpressible nature" (*Theological Oration*, 5; PG, Vol. 36, col. 141).
- 175. Corderius, publisher of the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, calls mysticism "sapientia experimentalis"—empirical wisdom.
- 176. For example: Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, II (see n. 167 *supra*), col. 559. Also by the same author: *On the Lord's Prayer*, III; PG, Vol. 44, col. 1157–60.
- 177. This idea of the permeatedness of the ancient understanding of the world and life by the category of generation is especially powerfully and insistently developed in many books by V. V. Rozanov.
 - 178. An allusion to a folk belief.

179. I use "logism," as derived from *Logos*, after Ern (see n. 17 *supra*). This author, together with certain ideas of V. S. Solovyov (see n. 5 *supra*), Prince S. N. Trubetskoy, and N. A. Berdiaev, clarifies the positive side of logism. By contrast, the books of V. V. Rozanov powerfully attack the manichean/monastic negative currents parasitic on logism. They expose the abstractness, deadness, and emptiness of the verbalism that in many minds and hearts has replaced communion with the Word. Although Rozanov does not wish to distinguish *abusus* from *usus*, the reader, by making such a distinction, can draw much that is useful from his critique.

180. John Stuart Mill, *The System of Logic*, trans. under the supervision of B. N. Ivanovsky, M., 1900; J. S. Mill (and Taine), *Induction as a Method for the Study of Nature*, trans. N. Khmeleva, S.P., 1866. J. S. Mill "by nature is a sophist, who tangles his reader and himself in a brilliant mixture of facts, citations, and witty locutions" (V. Ia. Tsinger, "*Tochnye nauki i positivizm*" [The exact sciences and positivism], *Univers. Otch.*, M., 1874, p. 65). On Mill's radically sophistic character, see: T. von Brentano, *Ancient and Modern Sophists*, trans. from the French by Ia. Novitsky, S.P., 1886, Bk. 2, pp. 124–87. For a subtle analysis of Mill's sophistries, see L. M. Lopatin, *Polozh. zadachi filosofii* [The positive tasks of philosophy], M., Vol. 1, 1886, Vol. 2, 1891 (there is a 2nd ed.); by the same author: *Philosophical Characterizations* (see n. 77 supra).

181. For a more profound philosophical and historical perspective on the idea of Logos, see: M. D. Muretov, Filosofiia Filona Aleks. v otn. k ucheniiu Ioanna Bogoslova o Logose [The philosophy of Philo of Alexandria in relation to John the Divine's doctrine of Logos], M., 1885; by the same author: "Uchenie o Logose u Filona Al. i Ioanna Bog. v sviazi s predshestvovavshym istor. razvitiem idei Logosa v grech. filos. i iud. teosofii" [The doctrine of Logos of Philo of Alexandria and John the Divine in connection with the preceding historical development of the idea of Logos in Greek philosophy and Judaic theosophy] (Edition of the Works of the Holy Fathers, Bk. 2 and passim); also by the same author: Bog-Slovo i Voskresenie Khristovo (Io 1 1-12) [God the Word and the Resurrection of Christ (John 1:1-2)], M., 1903. V. Solovyov, Dukh. osn. zhizni [The spiritual foundations of life], Part 2 (Works, Vol. 3, p. 319 sq.). There are many other relevant works: Prince S. N. Trubetskoi, Osn. idealizma [Foundations of idealism] (Works, Vol. 2); by the same author: Uchenie o Logose [Doctrine of Logos] (op. cit., Vol. 4). M. Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in griechischer Philosophie, 1872. A. Aall, Gesch. d Logosidee d. griech. Philosophie, 1896. A. Harnack (see n. 55 supra).

182. An allusion to the celebrated book of the inventor of the "logic machine," William Stanley Jevons.

183. These works are most advanced in the domain of the formal investigation of the idea of discontinuity, i.e., in mathematics and in logistic. Their number is so great that there is no possibility of presenting a bibliography here; such a bibliography has been given in my special work "*Ideia preryvnosti, kak element mirosozertsaniya*" [The idea of discontinuity as an element of a worldview], which is as yet only in manuscript. Of works of a generally accessible character let me note the works of the "Moscow school" of mathematicians or of mathematicians who are more or less allied with this school: N. V. Bugaev, "*Vved. v teoriiu chisel*" [Introduction to the theory of numbers] (reprinted in *Matemat. Sbornik* of the

Moscow Mathematical Society, Vol. 25, 2, pp. 334–48); by the same author: "Matematika i nauchno-filosofsk. mirosozertsanie" [Mathematics and the scientific-philosophical worldview] (op. cit., pp. 349–69 = VFP, 1898, Book 45); also by the same author: "Zamech. po povodu stat'i L.M. Lopatina 'O podv. as. sozn.'" [Comments on L. M. Lopatin's article "On the mobile associations of consciousness"] (VFP, Bk. 40). V. A. Alekseev, "Die Mathematik als Grundl. d. Kritik wissensch.-philos. Weltansch.," Scientific Annals of Iuriev University, 1903; by the same author: "Ueb. die Entwickel. d. Begriffes d. höheren arithmologischen Gezetzmässigkeit in Natur- und Geistewissenschaften," Vierteljahrschrift f. wissensch. Philosphie u. Sociologie, Lpz., 1904, Hft. 1; there is an abstract in the Scientific Annals of Iuriev University, 1904; also by the same author: "Matematika, kak osnovanie kritiki nauchno-filos, mirovozzreniia" [Mathematics as the foundation of a critique of the scientific-philosophical worldview], Journal of the Scholarly and Literary Society of Iuriev University, Vol. 7, 1904. P. A. Nekrasov, "Moskovskaia filos. matem. shkola i ee osnovateli" [The Moscow School of Mathematical Philosophy and Its Founders], Mat. Sb. of the Moscow Mathematical Society, Vol. 25, 1, M., 1904, and in a separate edition. L. M. Lopatin, Filos. mirovozzr. N. V. Bugaeva [The philosophical worldview of N. V. Bugaev], Mat. Sb., Vol. 25, 2. P. Florensky, "Ob odnoi predposilke mirovozzreniia" [On a certain premise of a worldview], Vesy (1904), No. 9. V. Ern, "Ideia katastroficheskogo progressa" [The idea of catastrophic progress] (in Bor. za Log. [see n. 17 supra], pp. 234-61). Also see n. 235 infra.

The idea of discontinuity is also making great conquests in the domain of the concrete sciences. Here let us mention the works of Tamann in thermodynamics, leading to the construction of the discontinuous thermodynamic surface; Gibbs's theory of phases; the ideas of Teichmüller; Korzhinsky's theory of heterogenesis; the experiments of Hugo de Vries; the work of the neo-Lamarckians, neo-vitalists, etc. in biology, opening broad horizons of the discontinuous evolution of organisms, their discontinuous adaptation, etc.; psychological investigations of subconscious and superconscious psychic life, disclosing discontinuous changes in consciousness, the discontinuity of creativity, inspiration, etc.

- 184. An allusion to a work by Nietzsche.
- 185. The main representatives of the "new religious consciousness" are D. S. Merezhkovsky, Z. N. Gippius, and D. Filosofov. In different senses and to different degrees, Andrey Belyi (B. N. Bugaev), N. A. Berdiaev, and others are associated or have been associated with this "consciousness."
- 186. Leo Tolstoy was not embarrassed even at Optina Pustyn' to speak of "My Gospel." A colorful tale of this kind about his meeting with K. N. Leontyev is included in Erast Vytorsky's book, *Istoricheskoe opisanie Kozel'skoi Optinoi pustyni* [Historical description of the Optina Pustyn' of Kozelsk], Trinity-St. Sergius Lavra, 1902, p. 128.
 - 187. see n. 164 supra.
- 188. Simon Magus, the Nicolaites, all sorts of gnostics, the Montanists, the Templars, spiritualists, etc.
- 189. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 3, On the Holy Spirit, 10-31; PG, Vol. 37, col. 409-10.
- 190. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 31 (5th Theological Oration), Ch. 15–17; PG, Vol. 36, col. 159–64.

- 191. See p. 242 and n. 591 infra.
- 192. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Lord's Prayer, 3 (see n. 176 supra), col. 1158 C.
- 193. Here, I expound Gregory of Nyssa's doctrine of the Kingdom of the Father and the Anointment of the Son according to Nesmelov, n. 70 *supra*, pp. 279–83.
- 194. Gregory of Nyssa, Against Apollinarius, 52; PG, Vol. 45, col. 1249 D-1251 A.
 - 195. Ibid., col. 1249 B.
 - 196. Ibid., col. 1249 D-1252 A.
- 197. Cf. "The Spirit of the Lord will rest upon him" (Ps. 11:2); "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me" (Ps. 61:1 = Luke 4:18).
 - 198. Gregory of Nyssa, Against Apollinarius, 53; PG, Vol. 45, col. 1252 C.
 - 199. Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, I; PG, Vol. 45, col. 369 D-372 A.
- 200. Gregory of Nyssa, Against the Macedonians, 22; PG, Vol. 45, col. 1329 B.
 - 201. Ibid.
 - 202. Irenaeus of Lyon, Five Books Against Heresies, III 17.
- 203. Maximus the Confessor, Comment on the Lord's Prayer, S. Maximi Confessoris Operum, T. I, Parisiis, 1675, pp. 350. There is a Slavonic translation, published by Optina Pustyn', M., 1853. A similar (though not identical) profound interpretation is given by A. S. Khomyakov, in his letter to Iu. F. Samarin of August 6, 1852: "You spend some time in the world of theologians [Khomyakov writes in a postscript]. Relate to them my conjecture, partly similar, partly dissimilar to that of St. Maximus the Confessor. I have always suspected a special meaning in the first part of 'Our Father,' and here is what appears to me a partial explanation of it. Paul says that the Spirit calls God Father (Abba-Father); Irenaeus says that the Spirit places a crown upon Divinity, calling the Father father and the Son son. In the Creed, as everywhere, to the Son is attributed the Kingdom. Thus, 'hallowed be Thy name, and Thy kingdom come,' etc. means: Be glorified as the principle of the naming Spirit, be glorified as the Father of the Reigning Son, and be glorified as the Self-existing and Self-generating person, the source of all. What is your opinion? It appears to me that this has validity" (A. S. Khomyakov, Collected Works, Vol. 8, M., 1904, p. 271, 13th letter to Iu. F. Samarin).
- 204. Symeon the New Theologian, "Divine Love" (Divinorum Amorum) 1; PG, Vol. 120, col. 507–510.

VII. LETTER SIX: CONTRADICTION

205. Well known is the philosopher Jacobi's conviction that Spinoza's pantheism is the only consistent system of rational philosophy and that every theistic system is therefore inevitably compelled to introduce an irrational element. Later investigators were of the same opinion. "Pantheism," says one of them, "is just as essential a characteristic of every consistent rational philosophy as agnosticism is an essential characteristic of every consistent philosophy of empiricism. A strictly

g Florensky's Biblical references are incorrect except for Luke 4:18.

rational philosophy and pantheism are identical notions" (A. I. Vvedensky, *Vera v Boga, ee proiskhozdenie i osnovanie* [Faith in God, Its Origin and Foundation], M., 1891, p. 209). On pantheism see: Bogoliubov, *Teizm i pantheizm i ikh logicheskoe vzaimootnoshenie* [Theism and pantheism, and their logical relationship], Nizhni-Novgorod, 1899. Jaesche, *Der Pantheismus, nach seine Hauptformen*, Berlin, 1826, 3 Bde. Schuler, *Der Pantheismus*, Würzburg, 1884.

206. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitorium* I, 2; PL, Vol. 50, col. 640; Russ. trans. by P. Ponomarev, Kazan', 1904, pp. 3–4. Kant's "universality and necessity of judgments," as the sign of their objective scientific significance, is probably nothing else but a "vestige" of the ecclesiastical understanding of catholicity, i.e., of *povsemestvennoe* [the universal], according to the translation of Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow (See *Bog. Vest.*, 1912, Dec., p. 685, Letter 8 to Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov).

207. See n. 206 supra.

208. Hermann Cohen, n. 32 supra, Urth. d. Iden., SS. 78-87. Alb. Görland, Index zu H. Cohens Logik d. rein. Erkenntnis, Berlin, 1907.

209. The idea of antinomism is clearly expressed even in special disciplines, e.g., in linguistics: A. Potebnia, Mysl' i iazyk [Thought and language], Kharkov, 1892, 2nd ed. Humboldt, Ueb. die Vershiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbauens (Ges. Wer., T. 6), trans. P. Biliarsky, S.P., 1859. H. Steinthal, Der Ursprung d. Sprache, 2-te Ausg., Berlin, 1858. V. Henry, "Antinomies linguistiques," Paris, 1896 (Bibl. de la Fac. des lettres de Paris, 2). P. I. Zhitetsky, "V. f. Gumbol'dt v istorii filosofsk. iazykoznaniia" [Humboldt in the history of philosophical linguistics] (VFP, 1900, Bk. 51). In mathematics: Christian Cherfils, Un essai de religion scientifique, introduction à Wronski, Paris, 1898, pp. 49-60. H. Poincaré, Science and Method, trans. B. Koren' under the supervision of N. A. Gesekhus, S.P., 1910, Part 2, Chap. 5, Par. 5, pp. 154-55, and Par. 12, pp. 161-63. F. F. Lindes's introduction to the Russian translation of L. Couturat's book Philosophical Principles of Mathematics, trans. B. Koren', S.P., 1913. I. I. Zhegalkin, Transfinitnye chisla [Transfinite numbers], M., 1907, Par. 440, pp. 342-45. Gerhard Hessenberg, Grundbegriffe d. Mengenlehre, Göttingen, 1906 (= Abh. d. Friesschen Schule, Bd. I, Hft. 4), Kap. XXIII-XXIV, Par. 93-99, SS. 621-35. Bern. Bolzano, Paradoxien d. Unendlichen, Lpz., 1851, 2-te Aus., Berlin, 1889, trans. under the supervision of I. V. Sleshinsky, Odessa, 1911. Stolz, "Bern. Bolzano's Bedeutung in d. Gesh. d. Infinitesmalrechnung" (Math. An., Bd. 8, 1881). In theology: the antinomies of Christianity are particularly emphasized by D.S. Merezhkovsky (Collected Works). Also see: Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, III, 7. In physics and mechanics; in metaphysics (see especially the works of Renouvier); in sociology (see certain elements in the works of Kareev); in logic (see n. 28 supra); in ethics: Kant, Critique of the Practical Reason, V; in aesthetics: Kant, Critique of Judgment, Par. 55–57, etc., See nn. 235, 238 infra.

210. Basically, this "*velle credendi*" is a supratemporal act, for it serves as the basis of the general tone of the whole character of the person. But is this supratemporal *velle* revealed in time in the form of a system of necessarily appearing volitions? Do they represent breakthroughs into the world of freedom? Or, finally, is a new, additional self-definition at every moment excluded? For us these questions are not essential if we take as our principle the position of St. Augustine.

211. One finds a remarkable distinction between the notions verit' and verovat' in D. A. Khomyakov, Pravoslavie (kak nachalo prosvetitel'noe, bytovoe, lichnoe i obshchestvennoe) [Orthodoxy (as an educative, everyday-life, personal, and social principle)], M., 1907, pp. 95–96: "In the Russian language there are two words that derive from the same root and express the same notion but convey two nuances of this notion which are not captured in any other language (at least of the Indo-European family), and which have an enormous significance for the precise expression of man's relations to the visible and invisible Church. These words are veriu and veruiu. They correspond to the nouns vera and verovanie. Membership in the invisible Church is determined by the possession of *vera*, while the visible Church requires only verovat'. 'I believe [veruiu] in one God the Father,' and so on. Veriu is not said here, for, in essence, a man can never say to himself that he verit." "Only in Russian is the Gospel saying "veruiu, Gospodi, pomozi moemu neveriiu [Lord, I believe; help thou my unbelief (Mark 9:24)]" fully understandable. The 'father' (of the Gospel story) could apply veruiu to himself, whereas concerning vera he could only pray that it be given to him" (ibid., n. 1). "The mystical Church possesses true vera, whereas the earthly Church, the visible one, possesses and requires only *verovanie*, because, of course, it does not have the means to judge about vera, known only to God" (ibid., p. 96).

212. On logistic, see: V. V. Bobynin, Opyty matemat. izlozheniia logiki [Essays in a mathematical exposition of logic], M., I, 1886; II, 1894. M. Volkov, Logich. ischislenie [Logical Calculus], S.P., 1888. L. Liar, Sovremen. angliisk. logiki [Contemporary english logics], M., 1902. P. Poretsky, Iz oblasti mat. logiki [From the domain of mathematical logic], M., 1902; by the same author: O sposobakh resheniia logich. ravenstv i t.d. [On methods for the solution of logical equalities, etc.], Kazan', 1884. L Couturat, Algebra of Logic, trans. I. Sleshinsky, Odessa, 1909. I. I. Iagodinsky, Genetich. metod v logike [The genetic method in logic], Kazan', 1909, pp. 148-56, 264-82. S. Jevons, The Principles of Science, trans. M. Antonovich, S.P., 1881 (see pp. I-XVII for an outline of the history of symbolic methods in logic and a partial bibliography). H. Poincaré, Science and Method (see n. 209 supra); this includes an interesting but largely unfair critique of logistic, E. Schröder, Vorlesungen üb. die Algebra d. Logik, Lpz., Bd. I, 1890, SS. 709–15, with bibliography; Bd. II, 1891. A. N. Whitehead, *Universal Algebra*, 1898. Bert. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, Vol. 1 (the only one that has appeared). A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, Vol. 1, Cambridge, 1910. B. Russell-Longmans, Philosophical Essays, London, 1910. The works of Schröder, Whitehead, and Russell are essential ones; their listing here corresponds to an increasing order of generalization, i.e., as an exposition of logistic according to the theory of classes, the theory of relations, and the theory of propositional functions. For a simpler exposition of the above-named books see L. Couturat, Les principes des Mathématiques, Paris, 1905; there is a Russian translation. H. Dufumier, "La Philosophie des mathématiques de M. M. Russell et Whitehead" (Rev. de Métaph. et de Morale, 20-e an., 1912, No. 4, juil., pp. 538–66). In order to become acquainted with the Italian school see: Formulaire des Mathématiques, publié par Ge. Peano, T. 2, Torino, 1899; T. 3, Paris, 1901. C. Burali-Forti, "Sur les différentes méthodes logiques pour la définition du nombre réel" (Bibl. du Congrès intern. de philos., Paris, 1901, T. 3, p. 289 sq.). Couturat (see n. 90 supra). Chide, "La logique avant les logiciens" (Revue Philos., 31-me an., 1906, No. 8, août). A. Lalande, "Le mouvement logique" (Revue Philos., 32-me an., 1907, No. 3, mars). G. H. Luquet, "Logique ration. et psycholog." (Revue Philos., 31-me an., 1906, No. 12, déc.). A Rey, "Ce que devient la loqique" (Revue Philos., 29-me an., 1904, No. 6, juin). P. Hermant et A. van de Waele (see n. 77 supra). Hugh Mac Coll, "La logique symbol. et ses applicat." (Bibl. du Congr. intern. de philos., 1901, T. 3, pp. 135–83). W. E. Johnson, "Sur la théorie des équations logiques" (Bibl. du Congr. intern. de philos., pp. 185–99). P. Poretskii, "Théorie des égalités à trois termes" (Bibl. du Congr. intern. de philos., pp. 201–33); by the same author: "Exposé élémentaire de la théorie des égalités log. à deux termes" (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor., T. 8, 1900, mars, pp. 169 sq.); also by the same author: Sept lois fondamentales de la théorie des égalités logiques, Kazan, 1899.

- 213. L. Couturat, Princ. des Math., see n. 212 supra, p. 9.
- 214. Ibid., p. 13.
- 215. Ibid.
- 216. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
- 217. Ibid.
- 218. Euclidean principles, Three Books, trans. F. Petrushevsky, S.P., 1835, pp. 103–5, Book IX, prop. XII.
- **219.** Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhonian Principles*, II, 185–92 and 130–33, n. 39 *supra*, pp. 99–101, 930–31; by the same author: *Against the Mathematicians* VIII, 463–81 and 278 sq. (ibid., pp. 387–91 and 251). Cf. R. Richter (see no. 41 *supra*), p. 127.
- **220.** This method was systematically used by V. Solovyov in his attempt to demolish skepticism: see *Kritika otvlechennykh nachal* [Critique of abstract principles], n. 5 (*Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 341–46).
- **221.** The first confrontation of Pigasov and Rudin: Ivan Turgenev, *Rudin*, II (*Works*, M., 1880, Vol. 3, p. 28 sq.).
- 222. G. Vailati, "Di un'opera dimenticata del P. Girolamo Saccheri (Logica demonstrativa, 1697)" (Rivista filosophica, 1903, Sept.–Oct.); by the same author: "Sur une class de raisonnements par l'absurde" (Rev. de Mét., 1904, Nov.) The references are from n. 213 supra, p. 36, an. 1.
 - 223. Ibid. The formula is taken from Couturat, n. 213 supra, p. 36.
 - 224. Couturat, n. 213 supra, p. 14.
 - 225. Couturat, p. 13.
 - 226. See n. 209 supra.
- 227. G. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, trans. from the 2nd German ed. by E. Gertsyk and D. Zhukovsky, Vol. 1, S.P., 1911, Part 3, I, pp. 239–40.
- **228.** I use the translation of the fragments done by G. F. Tsereteli and appended to the Russian translation of P. Tannery's book *The First Steps of Ancient Greek Science*, S.P., 1902, appendix, pp. 59–66; the text of the fragments has been published by Fr. G. A. Mullachius: *Fragmenta philosophorum graec.*, T. I, Parisiis, 1875, pp. 315–29. H. Diels, *Doxographi graeci*, Berolini, 1879. After the present book had already been written, a Russian translation of the fragments was published by Vl. Nilender (*Musaget*, M., 1910).
 - **229.** See n. 69 supra.
- 230. "Sometimes he [Spinoza] would allow himself, as a small diversion, to smoke a pipe or, when he desired to give his mind a more prolonged rest, he

would catch and set against each other several spiders, or throw some flies into a spiderweb; and the observation of the battle of the insects would provide him with so much pleasure that, in looking at it, he would burst into loud laughter" (I. Colerus, *The Life of B. de Spinoza; Spinoza's Correspondence with His Biography Appended*. Trans. from the Latin by L. Ia. Gurevich, under the supervision of and with notes by A. L. Volynsky, S.P., 1891, p. 20).

- **231.** Justin the Philosopher, *Apol.* I, 46; PG, Vol. 6, col. 397 C; also *Apol.* II, 8; PG, ibid., 457 A.
- 232. The enigmatic word agchibasin, translated as "contradiction" by Tsereteli (see n. 228 supra), is rendered by Nilender as "approach"; he evidently derives it from agchi = eggus, near, and bainō, I go. The ancient lexicographers explain: agchibatēs ho plēsion bainōn and agchibatein eggus bebēkenai. A modern lexicographer voids the dispute, proclaiming the words agchibatein and agchi(s)basiē to be merely erroneous readings, attributed by Suidas to the Ionians and Heraclitus, in place of amphibatein and amphisbasiēn. The reason for the error was, according to him, the writing of anphi instead of amphi (Henr. van Herverden, Lexicon Graecum suppletorium et dialecticum, Lugduni Batavorum, 1902, p. 14). But however this complex question about the fragment "contradiction" might be decided, if this fragment did not exist, "il faudrait l'inventer."
- 233. Nicolaus de Cusa [Nicolaus Chrypffs, i.e., Krebs], *Opera*, Parisiis, 1514; Basileae, 1565. This work dates from 1453.
 - 234. See n. 77 supra.
- 235. William James, A Pluralistic Universe, trans. B. Osipov and O. Gumer under the supervision of G. G. Shpett, M., 1911. L. Shestov, Apofeoz bezpochvennosti [Apotheosis of groundlessness], S.P., 1905. J. H. Boex-Borel (J. H. Rosny ainé), "Le pluralisme. Essai sur la discontinuité et l'hétérogénéité des phénomènes" (Bibl. de philos. cont.; review in Rev. Phil., 34-me an., 1909, No. 12, déc.).
 - 236. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, n. 29 supra, p. 68.
 - 237. Dostoevsky, The Devils.
- 238. For more detail, see P. Florensky, *Kosmologicheskie antinomii I. Kanta* [Kant's cosmological antinomies], Sergiev Posad, 1909 (= *Bog. Vest.*, 1909, No. 4). This work includes a bibliography, but one that must be supplemented. L. Couturat, *De l'infini mathém.*, Paris, 1896, 2-me partie, liv. IV, Ch. IV, pp. 556–80; especially see pp. 556–80, Par. 10–20. F. Evellin, *Infini et quantité*, Paris, 1880. G. Lechalas, *Etude sur l'espace et le temps*, Paris, 1896, Chap. V.
- 239. "Toute la foi consiste en Jésus Christ et en Adam; et toute la morale en la concuspiscence et en la grâce" (Pensées de Pascal, ed. variorum etc., Paris, 1858, p. 354, Chap. 24, 4).
- **240.** Plato, *Hippias Major*, 301 B; n. 38 *supra*, Vol. 1, pp. 753–54. The translation is taken almost exactly from A. N. Giliarov, *Obzor trudov po ist. grech. filos. za* 1892–1896 gg. [Survey of works on the history of Greek philosophy for 1892–1896], Kiev, 1896, p. 11. Less expressive is M. S. Solovyov's translation (*Works of Plato*, trans. Vl. Solovyov et al., Vol. 2, M., 1903, p. 132).
- 241. For a seimasiology of the word *airesis* and a collection of corresponding citations see: H. Stephanus, *Tesauras Graecae linguae*, post. ed. anglicam novi G. R. L. de Sinner et T. Fix, Parisiis, 1831, Vol. I, col. 1025–27: *airesis: electio vel optio*, *dokimasia*, *krisis*; *conditio* (*kalēi airesei: bonis conditionibus*); *gnomē*,

animus, h.e., voluntas et propositum; de studio litterarum (Hellēnikē airesis), consilium, ratio instituti, mores; studium; secta, dogma, quum de philosophis dicitur; opinio de aliquo dogmate firmatum; school of philosophy; dogma pravum de iis, quae ad christianorum religionem pertinent; dogma orthodoxae fidei non consonum. On the notion of airesis also see: V. V. Bolotov, Lektsii po. ist. drev. tserkvi [Lectures on the History of the Ancient Church], posth. ed. edited by A. Brilliantov, S.P., 1910, pp. 348–9, 163.

- **242.** In the article "Heresy" (*Encycl. of Orthodox Theology*, edited by the late A. Lopukhin, S.P., 1904, Vol. 5, col. 489–90) the author justly underscores an element of proud isolation in the later usage of *airesis*; but not as founded is his attempt to prove that this element has *always* been implicit in this word. Cf. Herzog's *Real-Encykl.* Bd. 5, 2-te Aufl.
- 243. Andrey Belyi, *Simvolizm* [Symbolism], M., 1910, p. 30. If the word "understand" is taken in its rational sense as subordination of what is understood to the laws of reason, then God is something utterly un-understandable. "All of our notions of God are nothing else but idols, which are forbidden by the Ten Commandments" (Gregory of Nyssa, Oration 7; PG, Vol. 44, col. 729 B; Russ. trans. Part 2, p. 331). "If, after seeing God, one has understood what he saw, this means that he saw not Him" (Gregory of Nyssa, *The Life of Moses*; PG, Vol. 44, col. 377 B; Russ. trans. Part 1, p. 317). "A word about God is the more perfect the more incomprehensible it is" (Gregory Nazianzen, *Theological Oration*, 11:21; PG, Vol. 36, col. 53 B; Russ. trans. Part 3, p. 29). Etc.
- **244.** In putting together this table I used in part: F. Farrar, *The Life and Works* of Saint Paul the Apostle, trans. from the 19th English edition by A. I. Lopukhin, S.P., 1887, app. XX, pp. 451-59. J. Bovon, Théologie du Nouveau Testament, T. I, Lausanne, 1893, p. 514. Here are several passages, taken at random from the euchologion, in which one sees rather clearly an antinomic composition: "Incarnate in an unmerged union" (Sunday, Troparion of the 4th tone); "Rejoice, Thou who hast combined virginity and child-bearing" (Acathist of the Mother of God); "Virginity unknown to mothers and child-bearing unknown to virgins: in Thou, Mother of God, the two are combined" (Canon of the Nativity of the Mother of God, hiermos 9); "by humility hast thou acquired high things, by poverty hast thou acquired rich things" (Troparion of St. Nicholas the Miracle-worker), etc. The most profound visionaries were inclined to impart to their words an antithetical temper. Thus, we read in the three Theologians: "there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one" (1 John 5:7). "God divides Himself, so to speak, indivisibly, and is combined in separation, because one is in three and three are one" (Gregory of Nazianzus, Works, Part 3, p. 215). "The three persons of Divinity are one God, who divides Himself without separation according to the hypostases and unites Himself without confusion according to the unity of the one nature—all one in the three hypostases and all trine in the tri-essential unity" (Symeon the New Theologian, Orations, fasc. II, p. 104).

VIII. LETTER SEVEN: SIN

245. By "Horai" Cougny (*De Prodico Ceio*, Paris, 1857) understands different "ages," which, according to Gomperz (see n. 227 *supra*, p. 476, n. to p. 365), "is not unlikely." But if that is the case, then Prodicus evidently likens man's life

to the yearly cycle, for *horai* signifies, strictly speaking, the seasons of the year. This analogy is a theme that is very widespread in antiquity.

- **246.** Xenophon, *Remembrance of Socrates*, II, 1, 21–34 (*Works*, trans. G. Ianchevetsky, Kiev, 1876–1877, II, p. 38 sq.) On the fact that Xenophon is retelling this, and even from memory, see ibid., II, 1, 34.
- 247. The theme of the "two paths" has been studied, mainly in art and in particular in connection with painting on vases, by F. G. Welcker, "Hercule entre la Vertu et la Volupté" (trad. d'allem.), Extrait des An. de l'Inst. Archéol., T. 4, p. 379. Two such pictures are reproduced there.
- 248. There are translations into Russian: by K. D. Popov (*Tr. Kiev. Dukh. Ak.*, 1884, Vol. 3, pp. 347–48, and in a separate edition: *Posrednik*, No. LXX, 2nd ed., M., 1906); Fr. Solovyov, (*Cht. L.D. Pr.*, 1886, Jan.-Oct.); Count L. N. Tolstoy, *Posrednik*, No. 588, 1906 (a poor and tendentious translation). The best Russian edition, with translation, notes, parallel texts, and bibliographic index is by A. Karashev: *O novootkrytom pamiatnike "Uchenie dvenadstati Apostolov"* [A newly discovered monument: "The teaching of the twelve Apostles"], M., 1896.
- 249. Obvious variants of *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* are: (1) the Latin fragment *Doctrina apostolorum*; (2) the Epistle of Barnabas, chap. 4, 18–20, XIX, XX; (3) Church canons, Chaps. 1–8; (4) the *Apostolic Institutions*, Bk. 7, Chap. 1–32; and (5) certain passages from Hermas, from Clement of Alexandria, from the *Sibylline Oracles*, from Pseudo-Cyprian, and from Lactantius. The most important of these texts as well as the historical schemata of their historical interrelationships are given by Karashev (see n. 248 *supra*, pp. 31–33 and xcv–xcvi).
- 250. "Hodoi duo eisi, mia tēs zōēs kai mia tou thanatou, diaphora de pollē metaxu tōn duo hodōn" (I, 1). With small variations this phrase is repeated in the monuments mentioned above. See *Doctr. Ap.* 1; Epistle of Barnabas 18: 1, 2; Church can. 4, 1; *Apost. Inst.* III, 12, etc. (Karashev, see n. 248 supra, pp. xiv, iv, xlviii–xlix, lii–liii, lviii–lix). Following this general indication of the duality of the soul there is, in each of the monuments, a detailed description of the two paths, i.e., a catalogue of virtues and vices is given, which in all cases has approximately the same make-up.
- 251. On the pronunciation, meaning, origin, etc. of the tetragram, see the very interesting dissertation of Archimandrite (now Bishop of Astrakhan) Theophanus: Tetragramma ili vetkhozavetnoye Bozhestvennoe imia [The tetragram or the Old Testament Divine name], S.P., 1905. On pp. iv-vii there is a bibliography of the question. Many authoritative witnesses speak of the unreality of evil. Thus: "The soul, being conscious of its freedom, sees in itself the ability to use its bodily members for one thing or another, for the existent and for the nonexistent. The existent is good whereas the nonexistent is evil. I call the existent good insofar as it has for itself models in the existent God. I call the nonexistent evil insofar as the nonexistent is produced by human thoughts" (Athanasius the Great, Oration on the Pagans, 4). Outside—exō—of God's being "there is nothing except vice, he kakia, which, strange though this be, has its being in nonbeing, because vice has its origin in the deprivation of what exists; strictly speaking, what exists is being hētis—en tōi mē einai to einai echei ou gar allē oun en tōi onti ouk estin, en tōi mē einai, pantōs estin." (Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and Resurrection; PG, vol. 46, col. 93 B). "Nothing can abide in being without abiding in that which is; that

which is most properly and primordially is God's being, about which one must necessarily believe that in all entities It is their very abiding" (Gregory of Nyssa, *The Great Catechism*, 32; PG, vol. 45, col. 80 D; Russ. trans. part 4, p. 82). "If there is in a man or in a demon (for simply in nature we do not know evil) some evil, i.e., a sin contrary to God's will, then this evil comes either from man or from the devil" (*Epistles of the Eastern Patriarchs*, Ch. 4). "Sin does not have being in itself, for it is not the creation of God; it is for this reason that one cannot say that it is" (Peter Mogila, *Orthodox Confession*, Part 3, answer to ques. 16). "Consider evil to be exactly like sin, for, strictly speaking, there is no evil in the world except sin, which is transgression of God's law and God's will. As for the things by which God makes us suffer because of our sins, that is, sicknesses, wars, infirmities, and so on, they are called bad with respect to us for they bring sorrows and afflictions to us, by which we are converted. But they are not bad with respect to God, for they have a beneficent virtue. By punishing us, they teach us the good" (Mogila, *op. cit.*, answer to ques. 26).

252. Katavasia, Sunday of the prodigal son, hiermos of the 3rd ode.

253. The Dialogus Miracolorum of Cesar Heisterbach includes a remarkable tale "of a witch carried by demons," which symbolically depicts the relation to the devil as an unnatural relation. "In Haselt, a town of the Utrecht diocese, a certain contemptible woman, when jumping off a barrel backwards, said: 'I jump now from under God's power to under Satan's power!' At once, the devil caught her up, lifted her in the air, and before the eyes of many, in the town as well as outside the town, carried her above the forests, whence she has not returned to this day" (N. Speransky, Ved'my i vedovstvo [Witches and witchery], M., 1906, p. 96). This sacrilegious jump is significant. This contemptible woman probably reasoned in the following manner: "All jump forward, that's the natural order ordained by God; but I'll violate this natural order, and jump backwards, unnaturally, and therefore in an un-Godly way, that is, satanically, and thus I'll give myself to Satan!" She wanted to please the devil and to renounce God, and she achieved her goal. For all three, according to the legend, this simple symbol turned out to be sufficient. Let us mention the following works of a documentary character in which the witches' sabbath and the black mass are described: Bourneville et Teinturier, Le Sabbat des sorciers (Bibl. Diabol.), L. Figuier, Hist. du merveilleux dans les temps modernes, 2-me éd., T. 1, Paris, 1886, introduction. N. Speransky, Ved'my i vedovstvo: Ocherk po ist. tserkvi i shkoly v Zap. Evr. [Witches and witchery: An essay on the history of church and school in Western Europel, M., 1906. Henry Charles Lee, History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages, trans. from the French by A. V. Bashkirov under the supervision of S. G. Lozinsky, Vol. 2, S.P., 1912, pp. 417-528. J. v. Görres, Die christliche Mystik, Regensburg, Bd. 3, 1840; Bd. 4, 1842. J. A. Llorente, Hist. crit. de l'inquisition d'Espagne, trad. de l'espagnol sur le manuscrit et sous les yeux de l'auteur par A. Pellier, 4 TT., Paris, 1817-18. Don Juan Antonio Llorente was the canon of the primatial church of Toledo and the secretary of the inquisition in Madrid; having studied its archives, he published his *History* first in French translation, and then, in 1822, in Spanish (Lee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. viii). In Vol. 3, Ch. 37, Art. 8, pp. 431-61 there is a description of the well-known affair at the beginning of the 17th century that took place in Logrono. According to one writer, "the most complete and colorful description of the sabbath," based precisely on this affair, is contained in Baissac's book Les grands jours de la sorcellerie, Chap. VI. Also see: M. A. Orlov, Ist. snoshenii cheloveka s diavolom [History of human relations with the devil], S.P., 1904. J. Bois, Les petites religions de Paris, Paris, 1894; by the same author: Le satanisme et la magie; also by the same author: Le monde invisible; there is a Russian translation, published in 1912. Mgr. Léon Meurin, S.J., Archeveque de Port-Louis, La Franc-Maçonnerie, synagoque de Satan, Paris, 1893. Domenico Margiotta, Le Palladisme, culte de Satan-Lucifer dans les Triangles maconniques, Grenoble, 1895. Lehman, Illustrated History of Superstitions and Witchcraft from Antiquity to the Present, trans. from the Germ. ed. of Petersen under the supervision of V. N. Lind, M., 1900, pp. 101-28. Despite its apparent objectivity, this book is tendentiously positivistic, and must be used with great caution; it has been analyzed by Chistiakov in Rebus, 1900-1902. G. Freimark, Occultism and Sexuality, trans. from the German by S. Press (the translation is very negligent and full of crude mistakes); on witchcraft, see pp. 263-314. Cognard, Une sorcière au XVII siècle: Marie Anne de la Ville (also see Vest. Int. Lit., 1899, Jan.-May). Kiesewetter, Gesch. d. Occultismus, Bd. II: Die Geheimwissenschaften, 2-te Aufl., Lpz., 1909. G. H. Berndt, Buch der Wunder u. Geheimwissenschaften, 2-te Aufl., Lpz., 2 Bde. Charcot et Richer, Les démoniaques dans l'art (review in Rev. Philos., 1887, 5). Bodin, Démonomanie des sorciers, 1581. The repulsive blasphemous rites of the sabbath and of the black mass that came out of it have been repeatedly depicted in works of literature. In the majority of cases the writers have relied on an attentive study of the original sources; their descriptions are therefore mainly authentic and factual, and not only artistically. Let us mention: D. S. Merezhkovsky, Voskresshie bogi (Leon. da Vinchi) [The risen gods (Leonardo da Vinci)], S.P., 1902. Pshibyshevsky, Sinagoga satany [Synagogue of satan] (Collected Works, with a separate edition in *Univers. Bibl.*, No. 254). Huysmans, Là bas (there are two Russian translations; one, incomplete, was published by Sovr. Probl. in Huysmans' Collected Works, Vol. 1, M., 1912; the other, more complete, was published as a supplement to Vest. In. Lit.).

254. Fr. Blass, *Gram. d. Neu.-Testamentl. Griechisch.*, Göttingen, 1896, Sec. 46, 4, 5, 7, S. 143 ff.

- 255. Ibid., Sec. 47 3, S. 153 (with reference to Wiener, *Gram.* I, Sec. 18 7).
- 256. Ibid.
- 257. Plato, Lysis, 214 D, E; see n. 36 supra, p. 548, 25.
- 258. Plato, Symposium, 189 D-193 D, Chs. XIV-XVI (see n. 36 supra).
- 259. Ibid., 190 D.
- 260. F. Lajard, Recherches sur le culte public et les mystères de Mithra, Paris, 1866, pp. 51, 59.

261. Torah, literal translation by L. I. Mandelstam, 3rd ed., Berlin, 5632/1872. "Dieu donc créa l'homme à son image; il le créa à l'image de Dieu; il les créa mâle et femelle" (Bible, version de J. F. Osterwald, nouv. éd., Paris-Brux., 1900). It would of course be naive to conceive the original androgynism of the human being in the form of the fusion of Siamese twins or in some other externally anatomical way. It is rather a question of the separation of the woman from the being, from the person, of the first man. But (according to certain interpretations) it is also unquestionable that, in him, during his mysterious sleep or ecstasy, a kind of ontological or psychological change occurred, and that his self-feeling after the

creation of his wife from his rib could not remain the same as that before this creation. Archbishop Innokentii says: "here, a rib or bone is not something simple; it signifies an entire half of the being separated from Adam during his sleep. How this happened Moses does not say; it is a secret. The only thing that is clear is that first the entire organism had to be formed, which then separated into two forms, male and female" (O cheloveke [On Man], in Innokentii, Works, n. 126 supra, p. 78).

- 262. This term was common in the ancient world. It was used in different senses by Diodorus, the author of *Theologum Arith*., Plutarch, Irenaeus of Lyon, Athenagorus, Hippolytus, etc.
- **263.** For example, Pordage, Antoinette Bourignon (17th century), and others. According to the Talmud, God created the first man as an androgyne, with two heads and a tail (D. P. Shestakov, *Isslevodaniia v oblasti grecheskikh narodnykh skazanii o sviatykh* [Investigations into popular Greek tales of the saints], Warsaw, 1910, p. 237 and n. 7). *Sanchoniathon* in Eusebius' *Evangelical Preparation*, 21, etc.
- 264. B. Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, New York, 1898, trans. from the English by M. Kolokolov, S.P., 1902, Part 1, XXV, pp. 281, 283, 292, 314. P. Janet, *Neuroses*, trans. S. S. Vermel', M., 1911, Part 2, Ch. III, Par. 5, pp. 274, 275. This is also the opinion of Breyer, Freud, Morton Price. See n. 77 *supra*.
- 265. "Those who live by the soul and who are therefore called people of the soul are half-insane as it were and as if crippled by paralysis" (Nicetas Stetathos, Second Century of Natural Psychological Chapters on the Purification of the Intellect, 6; Philokalia, 2nd ed., M., 1900, Vol. 5, p. 11:2). Saints appear to be typically healthy people even from a psychiatrist's point of view. On the contrary, a disturbance of psychic life, but with mental processes comparatively wellpreserved, is expressed first of all in the degeneration and even the destruction of the moral domain. According to the psychiatrist V. Chiz this moral corruption reaches the point where one experiences an "astonishing inability to understand good and evil." It reaches "a state where the moral law is absent in the soul" (V. Chiz, "Psikhologiia nashikh pravednikov" [The psychology of our saints] in VFP, 1906, Bk. IV (84), Sep.-Oct. and Bk. 5 (85), Nov.-Dec.; also by the same author: "Nravstvennost' dushevno bol'nykh" [Morality of the insane], VFP, Bk. 7, 1891, pp. 122-148). J. Pachen also decisively affirms that the saints are healthy: Psychologie des mystiques chrétiens, Paris, 1911 (review in An. de philos. chrét., 84-e an., 4-e sér., T. 15, No. 2, 1912, nov., pp. 192-93). Also: M. V. Lodyzhensky, Svet nezrimyi [Invisible light], S.P., 1912. S. Apraksin, M.D., Asketizm i monashestvo. Evangel'skie, biologicheskie, i psikhologicheskie ik osnovaniia. Opyt populiarisatsii sviatootech. vozzr. [Asceticism and monasticism. Their evangelical, biological, and psychological foundations. An attempt to popularize the patristic views], Kiev, 1907. See n. 480 infra.
 - 266. Confession.
 - **267.** Almost any work, especially *The Brothers Karamazov*.
- 268. A. L. Volynsky, *Leonardo da Vinci* (*Severnyi Vestnik*, 1897–99; 1st ed. Marx, S.P., 1900; 2nd ed. Kiev, 1909). In particular see Part III, "*Demonicheskoe iskusstvo*" [Demonic art]. Freud (in *Leonardo da Vinci*, Russian trans., M., 1912) even more insistently emphasizes the fundamental corruptness of Leonardo's soul and sees in his art a "sublimation" of sexual feeling, which was not able to find normal outlets and poisoned his entire being.

269. "When intelligent feelings are arranged in their natural order in the soul, and the intellect progresses without error in understanding creatures, rationally explaining their essence and movements, then the soul also sees in their natural order things and persons, as well as the entire being of material bodies. . . . When the soul's powers act not according to their nature, but rise up against one another, then the soul also sees all of this as not being according to its nature: this does not raise the soul now to knowledge of the Creator by its natural beauty but, because of the state of passion in which it finds itself, drags it down into the depths of perdition" (Nicetas Stetathos, 1st Century, 52, Philokalia, p. 95). It is worthy of note that the very phrases "losing one's mind" and "derangement of the mind" indicate that some sort of decomposition of the person is conceived here: that is, part of the person "loses its mind," is "mentally deranged," i.e., experiences a fragmentation of its integral unity, in a word, becomes alien to its other part. If the Russian language represents this psychological and metaphysical aspect in the image of spatial fragmentation, the Romance languages use an image from a domain that is more customary for them, the domain of law. In Latin the term is alienatio (with mentis implied and sometimes even mentioned, as in Pliny), i.e., insanity, psychic disturbance, Geistesstörrung. In French, aliénation mentale, aliéner, aliéné strictly signify, in juridical language, the alienation of certain rights, e.g., property rights. Therefore, Ribot says that, in cases when the personality changes, where all is based on hallucination, "almost all is limited to the alienation of certain states of consciousness which the I stops accepting as its own, which it objectifies and places outside of itself, and to which in conclusion it attributes a special state, independent of itself" (C. Ribot, Les Maladies de la personnalité, trans. S.P., 1886, Chap. III 2, p. 159; cf. p. 160). "We are dealing here with alienation of the person," he says in another place, "since the former person has become alien for the new person, because the individual no longer knows his former life, or, if he is reminded of it, he views it objectively, as something separate from himself." Thus, a certain female patient in Salpetrière called herself "the person who is me" ["la personne de moi-même"] (Ribot, op. cit., Ch. IV 2, pp. 210–11). Such an alienation of part of the personality, be it provoked by one's own curiosity or by an evil power, can be attained more or less deliberately. However, it is very dangerous and often ends in disaster (there are examples of this in Ribot, op. cit., ch. III 2, pp. 160-62). One hardly needs to explain in detail that a morbid state, in general weakening all activity, facilitates the entry of an evil power into a separate part of the I. In some cases, conditions for this may be profound anguish over one who is dead or departed, the yearning for a miracle, and so on, which weaken one's self-defense and provoke one to undertake risky experiments. A dead husband visiting his anguished widow at night; a son or daughter miraculously appearing before his or her parents from some distant land; a fiancé appearing before his beloved, or vice versa; an angel of light descending to a fasting ascetic who has become swollen with pride—all such cases of vampirism and demon-apparition have (according both to popular beliefs and to church tradition) their cost, and one who trusts such a miraculous visitor either goes insane or dies from some unknown cause, or lays his hands upon himself. But in all such cases one can perceive both an objective element (the weakening of the whole organism) and a subjective element, an inner decision to fragment oneself, an assent to the enemy's designs, the acceptance of uncleanness, be it out of curiosity, pride, or lack of humility before God's will. This assent takes the form of a response to the otherworldly temptation, of an agreement, expressed one way or another, to sustain a conversation. Uncleanness is allowed to enter us through our "Yes." That is why popular tradition insistently affirms that one should never answer a mysterious call, which sometimes calls us by name somewhere in an isolated place, especially at midnight or midday; and that one should not ask "Who is there?" when one hears a mysterious knock at the door or window. But if one should even be wary of a conversation with a power that has suddenly appeared without the participation of our will, then how much more dangerous it is to facilitate the apparition of this power by techniques of black magic, which essentially consist of the creation of conditions convenient for the appearance of an otherworldly power and, in particular, of the weakening and disintegration of the personality, of the creation of a hypnotic state. This can be related to mob psychology: a political meeting is not too far from a witch's kitchen and it is understandable that demons enter into the participants of such a meeting. In a simplified and semiconsciously applied form such magical techniques are widespread among spirits, spiritualists, all types of pseudomystics, etc., and are used by them at seances, "feasts of love," and group ecstasies. But as sorcerers from the people always come to a bad end, so it is with all of these consumers of forbidden narcoses. Many have written about spiritism as a spiritual poison. See, for example: Dostoevsky, Diary of a Writer; Volkovich, Spiritizm kak iad intellekta [Spiritism as a poison of the intellect]; J. Bois, Le monde invisible (there is a Russian translation); Lapponi, Hypnosis and Spiritism; Hume (a pseudonym), "How to Evoke Spirits" (The Spiritualist, 1906, pp. 7-8); P. Ruskov, Iz oblasti spiritich. tainodeistvii [From the domain of secret spiritistic rites], 2nd ed., M., 1889 (= Strannik, 1885, No. 12); Igumen Mark, Zlye dukhi [Evil spirits], 2nd ed., S.P., 1902; L. Levenfeld, Somnambulizm i spiritizm [Somnambulism and spiritism], M., 1913; Father Ioann Dmitrevsky, Spiritism, Kharkov, 1910 (= Vera i Razum, 1910); D'iachenko, Iz mira tainstvennogo [From the world of mystery]; Filaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, et al. Léon Denis, Dans l'invisible. Spiritisme et médiumnité, Paris, 1904, 3-me partie, pp. 379 suiv. Recently, important disclosures have been made by Bykovoi, who at one time participated in the group ecstasies of the khlysts, and later actively propagated spiritualism. The falsehood and charlatanism that have grown from the soil of spiritism (especially among mediums) have also been strongly substantiated.

270. From the 5th morning prayer of St. Basil the Great.

271. Janet, n. 264 supra, Part 2, Ch. IV, Par. 3, pp. 282–86, 289, 291, 307–309; by the same author: Neuroses and Fixed Ideas, trans. M. P. Litvinov, S.P., 1903. Störring, Psychopathology with Reference to Psychology, trans. A. A. Krogius, S.P., 1903; there is a bibliography on pp. 281–305. A. Binet, Alterations of the Personality, trans. under the supervision of B. V. Tomashevsky, 1894 (a rare book). Ribot, Illnesses of Memory, 1894; Psychology of Attention, 1894; Will, 1894. N. O. Lossky, Osnovnye ucheniia psikhologii s tochki zreniia voliuntarizma [Fundamental doctrines of psychology from the point of view of voluntarism], 2nd ed., S.P., 1911. I. Dejerin and E. Hockler, Functional Manifestations of Psychoneuroses and their Psychotherapy, trans. V. Serbsky, M., 1912. N. Bogdanov, Nevrasteniia i vnutrennie bolezni [Neurasthenia and inner illnesses] (Varsh. Un. Izv., 1913, I, and in a separate edition). P. Janet, Psychic Automatism, M., 1913.

- 272. Tiutchev, Poems, M., 1899, p. 150.
- 273. Euripides, Medea, Act 3, chorus, antistr.
- 274. Heraclitus, Fragments, 118. The Musaget edition (see n. 228 supra), p. 42.

275. Cf.: "Let all things be done decently and in order (panta de euschēmonōs kai kata taxin ginesthō)" (1 Cor. 14:40). An ontological sense is attached in the text to this social norm of the Apostle Paul. Of course the ontological aspect lies at the base of all the other aspects, including the social one, for without ontology that which is only a *phenomenon* in the material domain cannot exist. The first half of our definition of "orderedness" suggests the well-known definition of Lord Palmerston, who said that "dirt is that which is not in its own place"; it also suggests the application of these words of his to the cleaning of an electrometer by William Thomson, Lord Kelvin: W. Thomson, The Structure of Matter, Russ. trans. B. P. Weinberg, S.P., 1895, pp. 316-17. It is self-evident that this notion of dirt is also ontologized here. A person must be clean, that is, not dirty, that is, there must be nothing in the person that is not in its own place. "The habit of virtue is the restoration of the powers of the soul to their primordial nobility and the unification of the main virtues for action that is proper to the soul by its nature. This does not come to us from outside, but is innate to us from our creation, and through this we enter into the kingdom of heaven, which, according to the Lord's words, is within us" (Nicetas Stetathos, 1st Century of Practical Chapters, 72, Philokalia, p. 101). For an idea akin to the one developed in our book, that is, the idea of the sinful world as "the rearrangement of certain essential elements abiding substantially in the divine world", see V. S. Solovyov, Chteniia o Bogochelovechestve [Lectures on Godmanhood], Lecture 9 (Collected Works, S.P., Vol. 3, p. 122).

276. The Russian notion of the word "law" (zakon) is ontological; it is not juridical and is almost equivalent to the Platonic idea. Law is a norm not of behavior but of being, and it is for this reason that it is a norm of behavior as a manifestation of being. "This joiner will make the table in a more lawful manner (pozakonnee), more solidly," a peasant woman once told me. Here po-zakonnee signifies more conformable to the "idea" of the table. A prestuplenie (crime) is a pre-stuplenie, i.e., a transgression, the crossing of a boundary; it is a stuplenie, a stepping beyond the norm of man's being that is proper to the latter; just as preliubodeianie (adultery) is a sexual act (deianie) that transgresses the norm, that transgresses the law (zakon). Zakon is za-kon, i.e., a boundary, a limit. It is the natural, true delimitation of a phenomenon, and, outside this limit, by transgressing it, a phenomenon comes to follow its "own ways," becomes wayward, not God's, i.e., becomes sinful and corrupt. The idea of mir (the world) is based on the notion of the harmony and unity of parts. The world (mir) is a connected whole, the peace (also mir) of beings, things, and phenomena contained in it. Furthermore, the very words mir (the world) and mir (peace) are etymologically identical, and the difference in spelling^b is of a later original and conventional (Cf. Sreznevsky, Materialy dlia Slovaria dr.-rus. iaz. [Materials toward an Old-Russian Dictionary, S.P., 1890, Vol. 2, col. 147–153). In the notion of mir (the world) the

^h In the old Russian orthography (before 1918) these two words (*mir*-peace and *mir*-world) were spelled with different vowels.

Russian language underscores the elements of harmony, accord. We find the same thing in Greek. The difference is that the Russian people see this harmony in the *moral* unity of the universe, understood by analogy with a human society, as a world-society (*mir-obshchestvo*), whereas the Greek people see this harmony in its aesthetic order, and here the universe is perceived as a perfect work of art. In fact, the Greek *kosmos* derives from a root that gives the verb *kosmoō*, I adorn, which has found its way into the words "cosmetic," "cosmetics," etc. *Kosmos* signifies, strictly speaking, adornment, work of art, etc. Similarly, the Latin *mundus*, the world, which has generated the French *le monde* in the sense of world, universe, properly means adornment, ornament. This is seen from the fact that, in combination with negative prefixes, the same root signifies *dirt* and related notions, which are directly opposite to aesthetic perfection: *immondices*, *immondicité*, *immonde*, *émonder* (see Lajard, n. 260 *supra*, pp. 38, 43, n. 1).

277. Great Canon of Andrew of Crete, 4th ode, 7th troparion.

278. Curtius, n. 13 supra, No. 282, W. id. (Aufl. 2, S. 217 = Aufl. 3, S. 227 = Aufl. 4, S. 241). Cremer, n. 18 supra, S. 80. Benzeler, n. 38 supra, p. 10. W. H. Roscher, Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, Lpz., 1884–90, Bd. I, col. 1778, Art. "Hades"; ibid., col. 1779: other etymologies, false ones. "And it appears to me that the name of hell—tou hadou—in which, as they say, souls are found, signifies, both among the pagans and in Scripture, nothing else but a passage into the dark and invisible (eis to aeides kai aphanes metechousin)," Gregory of Nyssa says through Macrina (On the Soul and Resurrection; PG, Vol. 46, col. 68 B).

279. Plato, Gorgias, 495 B.

280. Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris, 79; 382 F.

281. Homer, Odyssey, XI, 155. These representations of the state of sinners unquestionably have some relation to certain neuroses. Thus, in the case of the neurosis that Dr. Krisbaher has called "la névropathie cérébro-cardiaque," it appears to the sick person that he is "separated from the entire world." His body appears to be surrounded by some sort of isolating medium, which is situated between him and the external world. Here is the testimony of one of his patients: "It was as if an atmosphere of darkness had spread around me. However, I could see very well that it was daytime, and a bright day at that. The word 'darkness' does not convey my meaning very well; it would be more appropriate to use the German word *dumpf*, which suggests something heavy, dense, dim, extinguished. This sensation was not only a visual one but also a tactile one. A *dumpf* atmosphere surrounded me from all sides; I felt it and saw it; it was a kind of layer, a kind of bad conductor that separated me from the external world. I cannot convey how deeply I was permeated by this sensation. It appeared to me that I was transported somewhere very far away from this world, and that I was mechanically pronouncing aloud the following words: 'I am somewhere very far away, very far away'. However, I knew very well that I was not transported anywhere, and I clearly remembered all that had happened to me. But between the moment that preceded my attack and the moment that followed it—there was an infinitely long interval. There was an abyss, equal to the distance from the earth to the sun" (Ribot, Les maladies, op. cit., Russ. trans. A.E. Riabchenko, 1886, Ch. III 1, pp. 149 and 150. Ribot apparently takes this remarkable report from Krisbaher's book De la névropathie cérébro-cardiaque (Paris, 1873). Here we see the embryonic experience of darkness, of separation and removal from reality, the being in the "outer" darkness, in the bad infinity into which the moment of spiritual agony stretches.

- 282. See: D. S. Merezhkovsky, *Sud'ba Gogolia* [Gogol's fate]; *Khristos i Anti-khrist v russkoi literature* [Christ and Antichrist in Russian literature]; *Griadushii kham* [The Coming lout]. S. I. Voinov (Hieromonk Serapion), *Khristianstvo i kul'tura* [Christianity and culture], M., 1911. Dostoevsky and others.
- 283. This sensation of life as stupidity is expressed most powerfully by Flaubert, in *Buvard et Pécuchet* and *La Tentation de Saint Antoine*. Saltykov-Shchedrin, ceaselessly spraying his poisonously stupefying and filthy, vulgarizing spittle on all of reality, belongs to this school, of course, but he differs from Flaubert in that there is little of the artist in him but much hissing and spite. But the "dumbing" of the world, of life, of history, is so widespread as a method of theomachy that one does not know which of its aspects to consider first. Evolutionism, historicism, mechanicism, etc. are all only particular cases of a general method of de-souling and vulgarizing the world, of making it stupid. Among the stupid works on stupidity, let us cite: L. Levenfeld, *O gluposti* [On stupidity], Odessa, 1912. And, to some extent, Tokarsky, "*O gluposti*" (*Vokrug filosofii i psikhologii*, 1896, Nov.–Dec.).
- **284.** Fr. Paulsen, *Mephistopheles* (*Schopenhauer*, *Hamlet*, *Mephistopheles*), trans. Zelinskaia, Kiev, 1902. Briefly but in a lapidary way the Church expresses the same idea in the words "all-laughing hell."
 - 285. Goriaev, n. 7 supra, p. 82.
- **286.** Ibid. I. I. Sreznevsky, n. 276 *supra*, Vol. 1, col. 603–605: *grekh* (sin) and its derivatives. Numerous examples of the use of these words are included.
- 287. A. Döring, Gesch. d. griech. Philos., Lpz., 1903, Bd. I, S. 391. Cf. Xenophon, Memorab. I, 1, 16 and IV, 3, 1. Tselomudrie is "perfect wisdom [mudrost'], both intellectual and moral" (N. F. Fyodorov, "Vopros o bratstve" [The question of brotherhood], Part 4, in Filosofiia obshchego dela [Philosophy of the common task], edited by V. A. Kozhevnikov and N. P. Peterson, Vernyi, 1906, Vol. 1, pp. 314–15. On pp. 314–18 there are many instructive thoughts on tselomudrie and its cosmic significance).
 - 288. Vyacheslav Ivanov, Po zvezdam [By the stars], S.P., 1909, p. 363.
- 289. In opposition to this universally human understanding of shame, gnostic, Manichean, and, in part, neoplatonic movements try to see in shame the admission that some function or other, some organ or other, should not be. We are ashamed, the argument goes, of that which is below our human dignity. These two attitudes, opposed to each other since antiquity, have recently collided in the outlooks of V. V. Rozanov (see especially V mire neias. i neresh. [In the world of the unclear and unfocused] and Semeinyi vopros v Rossii [The family question in Russia], Vol. 1, p. 169 sq.); and V. S. Solovyov (see especially Opravdaniia Dobra [Justification of the Good]. Rozanov's argument, roughly expressed, is that we are ashamed not of the existence of an organ or function, but of their appearance and activity outside of the bounds and limits which constitute the law for a given organ or function. Just as it is natural for the roots of a plant to be in the darkness of the earth and for their flowers to be in the light of the day, so it is natural for some organs to be hidden, and for other organs to be exposed; but it is not possible to conclude anything thence about whether their functions should be or

should not be, about whether the organs themselves are base or not. It is unquestionable that people are very often ashamed not of what is bad but rather of what is clearly good, of their good inclinations, for example. Modesty, bashfulness, silence, profundity of inner life—all this protects itself by shame from being turned inside out, from being exposed. It is this meaning of shame that is indicated by the root of the word in Russian. It is unquestionable that the Russian styd has the same root as the words sty(d)-nu-t', sty-t', pro-sty-vat' [to become cold, to freeze], as well as stud [frozen state], studit' [to freeze], prostuda [a cold], etc. (see Goriaev, n. 7 supra, p. 351). That is, styd is the sense of spiritual coldness that arises from the baring of what should be covered and hidden. If one removes clothing from oneself, both one's bodily and spiritual state will demand the covering of the nakedness: the body will be cold [studno] and the soul will be ashamed [stydno]. But neither the state of the body nor the state of the soul suggests that the body is something that should not be, that it has a base, animal nature, as heretics who are disgusted by the body have always maintained. Solovyov does not lag behind the heretics in this question. On the contrary, it is precisely because the body is sacred that one should not treat it lightly, that one should observe the laws of the body's own being; it is the sense of this sacred character that lies at the base of shame. The same idea is revealed to us by the etymon of the names for shame in other languages. In Greek one finds aidomai (from *aisd-omai), I am modest, timid, ashamed; aidos, modesty, shame; aidimos, modest; these have the same root as the Gothic aistan, to venerate; the Latin aestumare, to value; the Sanskrit ide, I implore, I venerate. Even deeper-lying here is the Sanskrit root yaj, to bring sacrifice (producing also the Greek hagios). Derivatives such as the Old High German era (honor), the Umbrian erus, the Osque aisusis, sacrificiis, and the Greek aidoios (respectful and respected) [Bois, n. 13 supra, Livr. 1, p. 22; Prellwitz, n. 13 supra, p. 7] clearly show that the Greek notion of shame refers not to the sense of something reprehensible but to religious trepidation before certain sacred and perhaps taboo phenomena and organs. That is why the Greek ta aidoia (like the Latin verenda,-orum or the Russian stydlivye chasti) refers not at all to base, shameful, reprehensible organs but rather to organs full of the mysterious power of creating life, organs surrounded by a mystical barrier of veneration, gratitude, and fear, organs in relation to which one cannot be contemptuous and unrespectful. Like all special things, they should have no contact with the ordinary. Shame is the power that protects the mystical parts of the human body from the intrusion of the light of day, which is inappropriate in that sphere. That is the view of different peoples as it is expressed in their languages.

290. Here are several examples of depictions of Satan with a second face, in the stomach area or below: (1) Ms. of Filaret Ikonnik, starets of the Monastery of Solovki, 16th century, min. 16, fig. on the left; Library of the Theol. Acad. of Kazan', No. 85 (new No. 158); reproduced in F. Buslaev, Catalogue of Representations from Illustrated Apocalypses according to Russian mss. of the 16th to 19th centuries, S.P., 1884, No. 101. (2) Ibid., min. 63, fig. on the left; reprod. ibid., No. 109. (3) Perevod of Chudov, 1638, min. 63, fig. on the left; reprod. ibid. No. 117. (4) Ms. of the Moscow Theological Academy, No. 14, 17th century, min. 64, fig. at bottom right, with tongue sticking out; reprod. ibid., No. 173. (5) Ms. of the Moscow Public Museum, No. 3, 18th century, min. 65, devil with a woman's face and hair; reprod. ibid., No. 211a. (6) French ms. of Bibl.

Roy., No. 670, *Hist. du St. Graal*, 15th century, representation of the *Trinity of Absolute Evil*; reprod. in Didron, *Hist. de Dieu*, 1843, p. 521, fig. 135 = N. I. Troitsky, *Triedinstvo Bozhestva* [Triunity of Divinity], 2nd ed., Tula, 1909, p. 75, fig. 58.

291. J. A. Nau, *Le double (La force hostile)*, Russ. trans. S.P., 1904. V.B. Sventsitsky, *Antikhrist. Zapiski strannogo cheloveka* [The Antichrist. Notes of a strange man], S.P., 1908. Valery Briusov, *Ognennyi Angel* [Fiery Angel], M.

292. Dal', n. 8 supra, Vol. 4, col. 772.

293. Ibid.

294. Ibid., Vol. 3, col. 1635.

295. According to a popular expression the Devil is the "nauseating power," that is, a power that induces vomiting (Dal', see n. 8 supra, Vol. 4, p. 816). This popular saying captures the very essence of the impression from impurity: this is not so much fear or horror as a profound, inexpressible, and unimaginable sensation of nausea. All contact with phenomena of magic, even with theories and books on occultism and related currents of thought, inevitably leaves in the soul some sort of filth, a sense of uncleanness, a sense of impurity, aversion, satiation, and nausea. There is a profound, though incomprehensible, connection between the organic sensation of nausea and the residue left behind by the forbidden domain of dark knowledge. One can also adduce here the testimony of ancient exorcists, namely that "les démons sont puants," i.e., that they smell, i.e., are nauseating. Perhaps physical nausea and demon-induced nausea are both rooted in the same centers of the sympathetic nervous system? Perhaps we encounter in magic an excessus a plexu solari, which also characterizes debauchery? It is difficult to say anything definite about this, but the existence of some sort of relationship between the perception of uncleanness, fornication, nausea, and stink is absolutely certain (see Freimark, n. 253 supra; P. Florensky, "O sueverii i chude" [On superstition and miracle] in Novyi Put', 1903, No. 8, p. 120 and elsewhere.). Whatever the physiological basis of this nausea, metaphysically it is quite understandable. The devil—and everything connected with him—is a perversion of the natural order of creation, unnaturalness itself. To receive into oneself, even if without the assent of one's will, something unnatural is to evoke a natural reaction of the whole organism directed toward expelling what has been received an ontological vomiting, the first sign of which (after the fear and horror of the joining, warning one against receiving it) is precisely nausea, the attempt to vomit the uncleanness out of oneself and to restore the natural course of spiritual life.

296. This meaning of the word "legion" will become completely clear if we recall that, in all languages and in all nations, the names of higher-order numbers were originally used to designate an indefinite, unlimited multitude—so great that one does not have the power to count it. Numerous examples of this are collected in: V. V. Bobynin, "Issledovaniia po istorii matematiki" [Investigations into the history of mathematics] (Fiziko-matematicheskie Nauki . . . , Vol. 9 and 10); A. V. Vasiliev, Vvedenie v analiz [Introduction to analysis], 3rd ed., Kazan', 1907, fasc. I, Par. 1–6, pp. 1–10. Also see n. 1 supra: Florensky, pp. 185–95 and Bobynin, p. 229.

297. From the psychiatric point of view all possession is a hysteria or is connected with hysteria, and hysteria is a fragmentation of the personality (see notes 264, 269, and 271 *supra*). From the religious point of view, the chaotic, self-

destroying nature of the unclean power is revealed in hysterical fragmentation. The exorcist Father Surène, an expert in demonism, well known from the story of the possessed nuns of Loudun, saw—after many exorcisms—signs of possession in himself. Here is an account of his psychic state during those times when a demon would travel from the body of the possessed to his body: "I do not have the power to express to you what happens in me during this period and how this spirit is united with mine without taking away my knowledge or the freedom of my soul but becoming nevertheless a second me, as it were. It is as if I have two souls, one of which is deprived of its body and the use of its organs and remains apart as an observer of what the second soul, the intruder, is doing there. Both spirits do battle in the same space, which is the body, and the soul is divided, as it were: in one of its parts the soul is a subject of demonic impressions; in its other part it is a subject of movements that are proper to it or which God gives to it. When, moved by one of these two souls, I wish to make the sign of the cross on a mouth, the other quickly turns my hand away, grips my finger, and furiously bites me. When I wish to speak, it deprives me of words; at mass I am suddenly interrupted; at the dinner table I cannot put a piece of food in my mouth; at confession I suddenly forget all my sins and feel how the devil has made himself at home in me" (Histoire des diables de Loudun, p. 217 sq.; cited from Ribot, Les maladies, op. cit., p. 190). For a representation of the inner world of the possessed, see n. 291 supra. The Russian people know that the unclean power does not have a personality, and that it therefore does not have a face, for the face is the embodiment of personality. The unclean power is impersonal and faceless, and only deceives people when it pretends to be a person. According to the popular saying, "demons don't have a face; rather, they walk around in masks" (V. Dal', Poslovitsy russkogo naroda [Proverbs of the Russian people], 3rd ed., Vol. 8, S.P., and M., 1904, p. 198). From this come innumerable transformations of all kinds (see S. V. Maksimov, Nechistaia, nevodomaia i krestnaia sila [The unclean, unknown power and the power of the Cross], S.P., 1903, pp. 11–12). According to the artistic expression of peasants of the Sarapulsk district of the Viatka province, "in the woods a demon is like the woods; in the field he is like grass; and among people he is like a man" (ibid., 12, n.). We find the same thing among the German people (J. Grimm, Deutsche Myth., Göttingen, 1854, 3-te Ausg., Bd. 2. par. XXXIII, S. 944 ff); abundant information about devilry is given by Caesar Heisterbach in Dialogus Miraculorum; N. Speransky, Ved'my i vedomstvo [Witches and witchery], M., 1906 pp. 95-96; P. G. Vinogradov, Istoricheskaia Khrestomatiya po Sred. Vek. [Historical Chrestomathy on the Middle Ages], Part 2. Pretending to be various things, the devil, however, does not have a personality, although the nonsubstantiality of demons is symbolically perceived by the German people (in its German manner) as the absence of a back (!). "Whatever the devil may appear as," Cesar remarks in this connection, "he usually does not have a back. There is certain knowledge of this. Thus, one young girl to whom the devil was wont to come was speaking of this. It appeared strange to her that he always walked backwards when he left her [let us note that that is also how the unclean power retreats from the cross], and she asked him what this meant. 'Licet corpora humana nobis assumamus, dorsa tamen non habemus (although we assume the human form, we do not have a back)' is how the polite guest explained his behavior" (Speransky, p. 96). A noteworthy fact! But it turns out that this is not a unique case, and that the inner emptiness, impersonality, irreality, meonicity of the unclean power has always been clothed by German mystical perception in the image of backlessness. Cesar's devil shares this physical peculiarity with German wood demons, who, inside, are empty "like a tree with a hollow or like a kneading trough" (ibid., p. 96). The most extraordinary transformations characterize the Greek unclean power (see Shestakov, n. 263 supra, pp. 226–38). In the popular views of the Japanese there is the similar idea that the unclean power (at least one of its types, the Mujina) does not have a face. One of the legends tells how a certain merchant met a Mujina who "had no eyes or nose or mouth," and whose face was smooth "like an egg" (Lafcadio Hearn, The Japanese Tales of Kwaidan, trans. from the Eng. by S. Lorie, Univers. Bibl., No. 469–70, "Mujina," pp. 54–56).

- 298. Nicomachaean Ethics, VII 12, n. 37 supra, p. 1252 b, 7: "to makarion onomakasin apo tou chairein." In cod. Mb we find: "tou malista chairein."
- 299. According to Plutarch (Ed. Oxoniensis, VII, 1) "makarios dicitur a chairein Arist. Nicom. VII. 1" (Dan. Wyttenbach, Lexicon Plutarcheum, Lipsiae, 1843, Vol. 2, p. 532).
 - 300. The quotation is from Schelling, n. 302 infra.
- 301. Having no grounds to assert an etymological kinship, I nevertheless consider it not without interest to point to a coincidence in sound between the word makar and the name of a sort of Barbary incense (i.e., from the coast of Africa, south of Bab-El-Mandeb), that is, Maker or Makar, with the botanic name Bosweillia papyrifera. It is possible that this Makar is identical to the plant maker or makeir, which is exported from the Barbary Coast. This plant is mentioned in the Peripli maris Erythraei, 8 and in Dioscorides (De mat. med. I, 111) (M. Khvostov, Issledovaniia po istorii obmena v epokhu Ellinisticheskoi monarkhii i Rimskoi imperii. I. Istoria vostochnoi torgovli greko-rimskogo Egipta [Investigation into the history of trade in the epoch of the Hellenistic monarchy and the Roman Empire. I. History of the eastern trade of Greco-Roman Egypt], Kazan', 1907, pp. 99, n. 4). If one allows the hypothesis that the word Makar is of Indo-European origin, it is conceivable that the incense is called "blessed" because of some narcotic property.
- 302. Schelling, Einleitung in die Philos. d. Mythologie (Sämtl. W., 2-te Abth. Bd. I. SS. 469–477, 2 Buch, 20 Vorles.).
 - 303. Philol. Zap., 1888, p. 89.
- **304.** One can also point out that, in the dialect of Elea, *ma* is equivalent to $m\bar{e}$, whence the words *mate* and *made* (H. von Herwerden, *Lexicon Graecum suppletorium et dialecticum*, Lugduni Batavorum, 1902, p. 510. The precise references are here.).
 - 305. A word from the dialect of the Kostroma region in the Nerekht district.
- 306. Homer, *Iliad*, II 120, 214; V 759; XIII 627; XV 40; XX 298; 348; Odyssey, III 138; XVI 111.
- 307. Let me take this occasion to give thanks to my friend P. G. Khodzaragov, a native Ossetian, who provided me with guidance in the Ossetic language.
 - 308. akērios in the sense of "de-souled," "dead": Iliad, XI 392, XXI 466.
 - 309. Schelling, n. 302 supra, SS. 472–473. I do not know where Schelling

takes this gloss from. In my edition of Hesychius (*Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon*, curavit Alaur. Schmidt, ed. altera, Jenae, 1867, 868, 35–35) there is only: "kēr perispōmenon kai oudeterōs legomenon hē psuchē."

- 310. Dal', n. 8 supra, vol. 4, col. 1169 (= 1st ed., Part 2, p. 496).
- 311. On the distinction between ou and $m\bar{e}$, see, for example, Dobiash, Essay on the Semasiology of the Parts of Speech and their Form according to the Greek Language, Prague, 1897, VII 7, pp. 471-88. Dobiash comes to the conclusion that "ou is said by the speaker from himself and for himself, whereas $m\bar{e}$ is said in relation to another person, from and for this other person" (p. 482). "Ouk is a negation that the speaker says from himself and for himself, whereas in $m\bar{e}$ he has in view another person, saying it for this other person"; "it is a negation referring to another person in general" (p. 478; cf. p. 478 bis., 479). It is thus clear that ou negates a fact, whereas $m\bar{e}$ is already not a fact but a certain opinion about a fact, a concept, and, uniting with it, forms a "negative concept." It is clear why this latter "requires precisely me, and not ou. For if I, the speaker, define, through some expression like 'cities that are not capitals,' the positive scope of a logical concept, then I, so to speak, address the interlocutor in order that he himself reveal the 'positive' content of that which I describe only from the negative side" (p. 484; cf. 475). Therefore the "negation of a fact" is felt to be a device consisting of two words, i.e., of a particle of negation and the substantive, while the "negative concept," even though it consists of the particle $m\bar{e}$ and the substantive, is felt nevertheless to be one word, with $m\bar{e}$ "playing the role of a negative prefix such as a privativum, etc." (p. 485). That is why the word makar, if one agrees with Schelling concerning its composition, does not designate a simple negation of a fact; rather, it designates something new, an opposite state, and essentially positive. There have been various historical-philosophical clarifications of the distinction between ou and mē; see H. Cohen, Syst. d. Philos., Th. I: Logik der reinen Erkenntniss, Berlin, 1902, SS. 70 ff; Schelling (n. 302 supra); Bergson, "Analysis of the Idea of 'Nothing'" (Rev. philos., 1906, nov. = Creative Evolution, see n. 2 supra). Also see Hegel. The related question concerning "ne" and "ni" in the Slavic languages is discussed by Fr. Miklosich, Die Negation in den Slavischen Sprachen, Wien, 1869 (= Denkschriften d. philos.-hist. Classe d. Keis. Akad. d. Wissenschaft, Bd. XVIII). The ideas of "being" and "nothing" are investigated in detail by G. Teichmüller, in The Real and Apparent World, trans. from the German by Ia. Krasnikov, Kazan', 1913; see especially Bk. 1, Chs. 7 and 8, pp. 172-212, on the idea of "nothing."
- 312. The distinction between *libertas minor*, i.e., *posse non peccare*, and *libertas major*, i.e., *non posse peccare*, was put forward by St. Augustine in connection with his battle against Pelagianism.
- 313. However, the question of the existence of such a notion of positive nirvana in Buddhism remains open. See A. I. Vvedensky et al. (n. 29 *supra*).
- 314. According to Fick, from the root *mak*, to have power, to make, to be capable, are derived the Zend *maç*, powerful, great, broad; *maç-anh*, magnitude; *maç-ita*, large, tall; the Old Persian *mathista*, highest; the Greek *mak-ro-s*, long, tall; *mēk-os = makas*; *makar*, strong, rich, and only then happy, blessed; the Lithuanian *mok-u*, *mok-eti*, to have the power to, to count; *mok-inti*, to learn; *maz-u*, *maz-it*, to teach (Aug. Fick, *Vergleichende Wörterbuch der Indogerm. Sprachen*, 1-te Abth., 2-te Aufl., Göttingen, 1870, SS. 143–44). Related thereto is the root

magh, giving, among other things, the Latin magnus, the Greek megas, etc. (ibid., S. 144; cf. 4-te Aufl., Göttingen, 1891, 1-te Abth., 277, 508). The same opinion is held by Prellwitz (see n. 18 supra, S. 189), Vanicek (Griech. Lat. Etym. Wörterbuch, Lpz., 1877, S. 680), and others. However, besides this opinion, the most widespread one, Pape proposes an etymology that derives makar from chairō (Pape, Griech.-Deut. Wört., 2-te Aufl., Braunschweig, 1857). E. Boisacq (see n. 13 supra, livr. 8-me, 1912, pp. 601–602) abstains from judgment.


- 315. See n. 494 infra.
- 316. Filaret (Drozdov), Metropolitan of Moscow.
- 317. Clement of Rome, Second Epistle to the Corinthians, V, 5 (Die Apostolische Väter, herausgegeben von F. X. Funk, 2-te verbesserte Aufl., Tübingen, 1906, S. 71).
 - 318. Ibid., VI 7 (ibid., S. 72).
 - 319. Ibid., VII, 5, 6 (ibid. S. 72).
 - 320. Ibid., XIX 3 (ibid., S. 78).
 - 321. Ibid., XIX (ibid., S. 78).
- **322.** Prayer from an ancient, Alexandrian, text of the liturgy of Basil the Great (*Ents. Sl.* [Encycl. Dict.], Vol. see 51, p. 208).
 - 323. Vyachelsav Ivanov, n. 288 supra, p. 365.
- **324.** Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, Chorus of the Oceanides (trans. D. S. Merezhkovsky, S.P., 1902).
- 325. Gesenius, *Hebr. Handw.*, n. 25 supra, S. 208 (with a reference to Schwally, ZAW, 11, 176 ff).
 - 326. 4th lucernal prayer (Euchologion, see n. 110 supra, p. 17).
 - 327. 2nd lucernal prayer (ibid.).
- 328. Among the Greeks, after the words of the bishop, during the singing of "Holy God," the body of the deceased is carried directly to the tomb (Euchologion, p. 220). "After the dismissal the eternal memory is proclaimed for the deceased because St. Dionysius speaks of this too, that is of the kissing and the proclamation. About the kissing he says that it signifies our union in Christ, the union of those living with those who have departed. He says about the proclamation that they [the departed] have been united with the Saints and are worthy of their heritage as well as of their faith, and we believe this and sing it; it is also like the consecration of the deceased to God and our prayer for him. Finally, the prayer is, as it were, a gift and the culmination of all; it sends [the deceased] to the joy that he will have in God and gives to God, as it were, the soul and body of the deceased" (Symeon of Salonika, Conversation concerning the Holy Rites and Sacraments of the Church, 333. Writings of the Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church concerning the Interpretation of the Orthodox Liturgy, Vol. 2, p. 534). The names of the deceased "are inscribed in the sacred mementos not because God's memory is manifested like that of men in representing what is commemorated but, as one would piously say, in representing the fact that those who have attained perfection in conformity with God are glorified by God and always known by Him. For, as the Scripture says, 'the Lord knoweth them that are His' (2 Tim. 2:19), and 'precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His saints'" (Ps. 116:15) (Dionysius the Areopagite, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, I, III 9; ibid., Vol. 1, S.P., 1855, pp. 83–84). Cf. ibid., VII, II (ibid., p. 223): On the Commemoration of the Deceased.

- 329. Plato, Symposium, 206B–209, Chs. XXV–XXVII, n. 36 supra. The same view, common to all of antiquity, is developed with even greater insistence by Plato in The Laws: "It is appropriate to marry from thirty to thirty-five years of age, taking into account that by its nature the human race has received immortality as its lot, toward which every man strives with unlimited desire; for every man desires to be glorious and does not desire to lie in a nameless grave. The human race at all times constitutes one family; it continues successively and will continue, and is immortal in this sense. Children are succeeded by children, constitute the continuation of the same race, and preserve its immortality. It is never permissible to deprive oneself of immortal being, and anyone who does not take care of his wife and children deliberately betrays it" (The Laws, IV, 721 b, c, trans. V. Obolensky, M., 1827, pp. 164–65; Opera, see n. 30 supra, p. 330, 35–38).
- 330. Auguste Comte, *Système de politique positive*, Paris, 1852–1854; new ed. 1898. V. Kozhevnikov, *Religiia chelovekobozhia u Feierbakha i Konta* [The religion of mangodhood in Feuerbach and Comte], *Rel.-Fil. Bibl.*, Sergiev-Posad, 1913 (= *Bog. Vest.*, 1913, No. 4 and 5).
 - 331. Cf. n. 416 infra.
- 332. "Asseruit Amalricus (i.e., Amalrich von Bene) ideas, quae sunt in mente divina, et creare, et creari" (cited by Stöckl, Gesch. d. Philos. des Mittelalters, 1864, Bd., I, S. 290; cf. Ueberweg, Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philos. II, S. 224). The Lord Jesus Christ, the Supramundane Reason, is called "Supra-eternal Memory" in the Acathistus to Jesus Most Sweet, ikos 8.
- 333. S. S. Glagolev, "Religiia kak predmet istoricheskogo i filosofskogo izucheniia" [Religion as an object of historical and philosophical study] (Bogoslovskii Vestnik, 1897, April, sec. IV, p. 300); by the same author: Grecheskaia religiia [Greek religion], Part 1, verovaniia [beliefs], Sergiev-Posad, 1909, pp. 100–101.
- 334. S. I. Chatskina, "V Gretsii" [In Greece] (Russkaia Mysl', 1911, VII, July, pp. 71–72). A considerable number of superb moulds from these stelae can be seen in the Moscow Museum of Emperor Alexander III, in room X. In telling about his trip to the Campagna, P. Muratov asks: "Has not Persephone remained even until today the true genius of those places, and is it not her influence that imparts a subtle and mellifluous sorrow to the heart there? The sorrow of the myth of Demeter and Persephone, an ancient sorrow, is the most profound and soul-piercing of all sorrows. In this sorrow there are no comforting tears, none of the hope of Christian sorrow. In its luminous wave there is an inexorable poison. It contains the note of madness, resounding like the melody of a plaintive flute in the noise of the oak-bending wind and in the rustling of the reeds, in the silence of the clearest, the most joyous day" (P. Muratov, Obrazy Italii [Images of Italy], Vol. 2, M., 1912, p. 86).
- 335. Homer, Odyssey, XI, 204–209 (trans. V. Zhukovsky, the *Prosveshchenie* edition, p. 309).
 - 336. Ibid., XI, 218-22 (ibid., p. 310).
- 337. M. Maeterlinck, *The Blue Bird*, trans. B. Bienstock and Z. Vengerova, M., *Univer. Bibl.*, No. 241.
 - 338. Homer, Odyssey, XI, 481–86; n. 335 supra, p. 325.
 - 339. Ibid., XI, 487–91 (ibid., p. 325).
 - 340. A. Pfender, *Introduction to Psychology*, trans. from the German by I. A.

- Davydov, S.P., 1909, Part 2, Ch. 3, Par. 3, p. 294. This definition of memory is almost identical to Th. Ribot's definition: "Memory consists in different degrees of the process of organization confined between two outer limits: a new state and an organic capturing (a stable organic assimilation of earlier states)" (Ribot, *Memory in the Normal and Pathological States*, trans. from the French under the supervision of Obolensky, S.P., 1894, I, 3, p. 68, and II, 3, p. 133).
- 341. Plato, *Lysis*, 275 D (see n. 36 supra). Similarly: Prometheus "gave [to people] creative memory, the great mother of the Muses," as he himself says in Aeschylus (see n. 324 supra): "mnēmēn th'apantōn mousomētor ergatin" (Aeschyli et Sophoclis Trag. et fragm., Parisiis, 1864, ed. Didot, p. 11, v. 461).
- 342. "hoti hēmōn hē mathesis ouk allo ti hē anamnēsis tugchanei ousa" (Plato, Phaedrus, 72 E; cf. D, E; 76 A; Phaedrus 249 C. "Anamnēsis d'estin epirroē phronēseōs apolipousēs" (Laws, V, 732 B), "To . . . zētein . . . kai to manthanein anamnēsis holon estin" (Menon, 81; cf. E, 98A). Also Cf. Phaedrus, 92 D, etc.
- 343. For arguments concerning the chronology of Plato's dialogues and, in particular, for data on stylometry, see Clodius Piat, *Platon*, Paris, 1906; there is a bibliography. Also see Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.*, 4-te Aufl., T. 2, I, Lpz., 1889. For an attempt to interpret Plato's *anamnēsis*, see n. 349 *infra*. For a reconstruction of Plato's religio-metaphysical views see L. Prat, *Le mystère de Platon*. *Aglaophamos*, Paris, 1901. On *anamnēsis* specifically see Zeller, SS. 835 ff.
- 344. As is well known, the significance of transcendental memory for all of knowledge is elucidated by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, in the chapter "on the deduction of pure rational concepts." But the "transcendental," according to Kant, is known not through the capacity of representation, but dialectically or critically, and it is known to us in its very essence. It follows that the transcendental, being such in relation to the experience that it conditions is, in itself, although known to us and even adequate, not a phenomenon but something that does not differ at all from the things-in-themselves that are being chased away. The "transcendental" virtually merges with the "transcendent." On the other hand, "the "transcendent" too, i.e., the objects of metaphysics, things in themselves, are, in the form of the ideas of reason, also conditions necessary for total experience; it does not matter that they are not constitutive but regulative conditions. If, in themselves, the forms of experience turn out to be something transcendent, then the *norms* of experience, in relation to experience, must be recognized as something transcendental. And, once again, now from the side of metaphysics, the "transcendent" virtually merges with the transcendental. For the theory of knowledge, both the "transcendental" and the "transcendent" signify nothing else but that which constitutes the a priori condition of experience. On the other hand, for metaphysics, both the transcendent and the transcendental signify the thing in itself. In neither discipline can one mark a clear boundary between the two terms; to consider one term as belonging only to the theory of knowledge and the other as belonging only to metaphysics is to understand neither metaphysics nor the theory of knowledge. All that we have said here can be graphically represented by the schema presented below. This schema shows that the final condition of experience—the I—is the root of the conditions of experience, both constitutive and regulative, i.e., it must simultaneously be called both transcendental and transcendent. In this sense, one can also say that the proposed schema, from the gnoseological point of view, portrays the structure of experience in its totality,

i.e., the transcendental I, whereas, from the metaphysical point of view, it portrays the structure of the *person* in its complexity, i.e., the transcendent I. In the indicated fusion in Kant of the two elements of the schema, the gnoseological-transcendental and the metaphysical-transcendent, is rooted a highly natural confusion of these terms by Kant himself, who so insisted on the necessity of distinguishing them; the appearance of German idealism beginning with Fichte; and the use of the term "transcendental" in the sense of "transcendent" by Schopenhauer, Hellenbach, du Prélème, Zellner, and others. Cf. Kuno Fischer, *History of the New Philosophy*, Vol. 5, "Im. Kant and His Doctrine," Part 2, trans. under the supervision of D. E. Zhukovsky, S.P., 1906, Bk. 4, p. 545 sq. H. Vaihinger, *Commentar zu Kants Kritik d. reinen Vernunft*, Stutt., 1887, Bd. I, SS. 467 ff.

345. Such a reinterpretation is being carried out by the Marburg school, especially P. Natorp, in *Platos Ideenlehre*, 1903. See an exposition and analysis of this book by V. Zenkovsky in *VFP*. Let us mention that long before the Marburg school an interpretation of Plato in the spirit of transcendentalism was given by P. D. Iurkevich in his thesis, *Razum po ucheniu Platona i opyt po ucheniu Kanta* [Reason according to Plato's Teaching and Experience according to Kant's Teaching] (*Moskovskie Universitetskie Izvestiia*, 1865, No. 5, M., 1866, pp. 321–92). The history of attacks against this speech is recounted in Volynsky's study, *Istoriia russkoi kritiki* [History of Russian Criticism] (*Severnyi Vestnik* and separate ed.).



- 346. Bergson, Matter and Memory, see n. 6 supra, p. 259. Thus, according to Bergson the problem of personality is essentially linked to the problem of memory. But he is not alone in thinking thus. The associationists and herbartians also consider personality "as a series of ideas, the first of which, according to the evidence of memory, is continuously connected with the last. Memory and personality are identified." "The manifestations of the I and memory," says J. S. Mill, "are only two sides of the same fact. I know a long and continuous sequence of past feelings, going back as far as memory will permit, and ending with sensations that I experience at the present moment; all this is connected by an inexplicable link. This series of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I distinguish myself (personality)." On the significance of memory for the unity of the consciousness of self see J. S. Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, trans. N. Khmelevsky, S.P., 1869. Similarly, an analysis of the "wave theory" of William James shows that it identifies personality and memory. See B. Sidis, n. 264 supra, pp. 186-187, 190 and in general all of Ch. 29: "The problem of personality."
- 347. Instructive pages clarifying the significance of memory for the entire structure of the inner life of the spirit—for knowledge, personality, genius, and so on—have been written by O. Weininger in *Sex and Character*, S.P., 1908, *Posev* (= M., 1909, ed. *Sphinx*; this translation is worse, but it is complete). Schopenhauer also spoke of the relation between memory and genius: see *Nachlass*, *Neue Paralipomena*, Sec. 143.
- 348. David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, trans. S. I. Tsereteli, S.P., 1902, sec. II.
- **349.** Fr. Pavel Florensky, "*Predely gnoseologii: Osnovnaia antinomiia teorii znaniia*" [Limits of gnoseology: The fundamental antinomy of the theory of knowledge] (*Bogoslovskii Vestnik*, 1913, Jan.).
- 350. "Mensche, wo deinen Geist schwingst über Ort und Zeit, So kannst du jeden Blick sein in der Ewigkeit" (Angelus Silesius, Cherubinischen Wandersmann, I, 12. Angelus Silesius in seinem Cherubinischen Wandersmann. Eine Auswahl . . . zusammengestellt von Herm. Brunnhofer, Bern, 1910, S. 6). Practically all mystics express this thought. See the following note.
- 351. The relation between time and Eternity has been the object of profound reflections on the part of Plotinus, St. Augustine (Confession and Commentary on Genesis), Basil the Great, both Gregories, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, etc. See: Lapshin, Mist. pozn., n. 29 supra, II, pp. 557–70. Aleksei I. Vvedensky, "Vremia i vechnost" [Time and eternity], discourse at the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, 1900 (= Bog. Vest., 1900, Vol. 3, X, pp. 244–73). S. S. Glagolev, Bessmertie proshedshego [The Immortality of What Is Past], Serg. Posad, 1903 (= Bog. Vest., 1903, No. 2). R. Eicken, Fundamental Problems of the Contemporary Situation of Philosophy and Religion. N.N. Strakhov, "O vremeni, chisle i prostranstve" [On time, number, and space] (Russ. Vest., 1897, Jan.). Chelpanov, (VFP, Bk. XIX). N. Ia. Grot, "O vremeni" [On time] (VFP, Books XXIII–XXV). L. M. Lopatin, Polozhitel'nye zadachi filosofii [Positive tasks of philosophy], M., 1891, Part 2, pp. 308, 305–306, etc.; there is a new edition. A. A. Kozlov, "Svoe Slovo" [His Word], fasc. 3 (dialectical arguments against the reality of time are collected and classified here). G. Teichmüller, The Real and Apparent World, Kazan',

ⁱ The title is missing.

1913, Bk. 2. O. Weininger, n. 347 supra; by the same author: Last Words, M., Sphinx. Vl. S. Solovyov, "Pervoe nachalo teoret. filos." [The first principle of theoretical philosophy] (Works, Vol. 8). Guyau, The Origin of the Idea of Time, Smolensk, 1891 and Works (review by A. A. Kozlov, VFP, Bk. IX, pp. 88–99); by the same author: Art from the Sociological Point of View. M. S. Aksyonov, Transtsendental'no-kineticheskaia teoriia vremeni [Transcendental-kinetic theory of time], Kharkov, 1896. P. D. Ouspensky, n. 29 supra; by the same author: Chetvertoe izmerenie [The fourth dimension], S.P., 1910. James, n. 29 supra. Remigius Stöltze, K. E. von Baer und seine Weltansch., Regensburg, 1897. C. A. Fetzer, Philos. Zeitbegriffe, Tübingen, 1884. Lazarus, Ideale Frage, SS. 181–260. H. Hubert, "La représentation du temps dans la religion et la magie" (H. Hubert et M. Mauss, Mélanges d'histoire des religions. Travaux de l'Année sociologique), Paris, 1909. Döring, "Ueber Zeit und Raum," Berlin, 1894 (Philos. Vortr., 3, 1). Relevant here, in part, is also the "principle of relativity": G. Minkowski, Space and Time, trans. Ia. V. Iashunsky, S.P., 1911. Also relevant is the question of the change of the measure of time during sleep, under the influence of narcosis, etc., and especially in the state before death. See: N. Marin (VFP, 1893, Bk. XVIII and 1895, Bk. XXIV). Tokarsky, O strakhe smerti [On the fear of death] (VFP, 1897, Bk. XL). Carl du Prel, Philosophy of Mysticism, trans. from the German by M. S. Aksenov, published by A. P. Aksakov, S.P., 1895. J. Le Lorrain, "De la durée du temps dans le rêve" (Rev. Philos., 1894, No. 9). Foucault, "L'évolution du rêve pendant le reveil" (Rev. Philos., 1904, No. 11, nov.). H. Piéron, "La rapidité des processus psychiques" (Rev. Philos., 1903, No. 1, janv.). P. Rousseau, "La mémoire des rêves dans le rêve" (Rev. Philos. 1903, No. 4, avr.). H. Piéron, "Contribution à la psych. des mourants" (Rev. Philos., 1902, No. 12, déc.). B-on Ch. Mourre, "La volonté dans le rêve" (Rev. Philos., 1903, No. 5 et 6, juin). Instructive observations on the theme of time have been collected in innumerable works dealing with the effects of narcotics. De Quincey, Baudelaire, Dostoevsky, and others have given artistic representations of moments when the perception of time changes essentially.

352. Goriaev, n. 7 supra, p. 274: memory; p. 211: mnit'. Curtius n. 13 supra, SS. 312–313, No. 429. Prellwitz, n. 13 supra, SS. 200: mimnesko; S. 194: menoma.

353. Goriaev, n. 7 *supra*, pp. 211, 247. Prellwitz, n. 13 *supra*, S. 196. Curtius, n. 13 *supra*, S. 312.

IX. LETTER EIGHT: GEHENNA

354. Ps. 130:1.

355. Symeon the New Theologian, 7th Prayer before Communion.

356. Ps. 51:13.

357. S. Nilus, "Sluzhka Bozhiei Materi i Serafimov" [Little servant of the Mother of God and Seraphim] (included in the collection: S. Nilus, Velikoe v malom i Antikhrist, kak blizkaia politicheskaia vozmozhnost': Zapiski pravoslavnogo [The Great in the small and the Antichrist as an imminent political possibility: The notes of an Orthodox believer], 2nd ed., Tsarskoe Selo, 1905, pp. 151–53 and 162). For a remarkable example of the experience of the "sleepless worm," see the Letters of a Monk of Mt. Athos, Part 1, p. 75. The word "tarta-

rus" signifies "a place of eternal, unbearable cold, to which the souls of sinful people are sent. The Greek word tartaros is lexicographically related to tartario, I shiver from cold, and what is understood by tartarus is an underground abyss, never illuminated or warmed by the sun, where coldness reigns in all its fury" (Lexikon Barinou Phaborinou, Lexicon Anthim Gazē, Ben. Hederichs Lexicon Mythologicum). In the homily of Cyril of Alexandria concerning the soul leaving the body, included in the Sobornik, the penultimate Sunday before Lent, one reads in the beginning: "I am afraid of tartarus, for it is deprived of warmth." Similarly, in the apocryphal tale of the appearance of an angel to St. Macarius of Egypt, one reads: "This is the sleepless worm, and this is what is called tartarus the winter without warmth and the harsh darkness." In the parable of Cyril of Turov about the man in white robes (Monuments of the 12th century, p. 130), one reads: "Do not weaken . . . so that you do not find yourself in the desert of hell . . . tormented by fire and gnashing your teeth, in the outer darkness and tartarus without warmth." In the Life of St. Joseph of Volokolamsk (the 1865 ed., p. 21), Savva of Krutitsk says that the monks of Volokolamsk would stand patiently at the liturgy wearing only their robes, without furs, in the cold church even in the fiercest frosts—each remembering the tartarus without warmth. The Greek word tartaros has often been translated as "storm," but this word was also used in the sense of coldness. Thus, in the ancient Russian instruction on monasticism, published in Dukhovnyi Vestnik, 1862, July (see infra, Materialy . . . , p. 152) one reads: "and here [in hell] there will be inconsolable weeping and gnashing of teeth, the sleepless worm, the storm without warmth." Similarly, one reads in the Life of St. Nikita the Stylite (Ms. Synod. Libr. No. 885, 16th century, f. 416): "after judgment they are condemned to fire, and darkness, and the gnashing of teeth, to the sleepless worm, and to the storm without warmth." K. Nevostruev, "Tartar: Materialy dlia arkheologicheskogo Slovaria" [Tartarus: Materials for an archeological dictionary in Drevnosti. Trudy Moskovskogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva, Vol. 1, M., 1865, Sec. II, pp. 74–75.

358. Léon Hip. Denizart Rivail, who took the name Allan Kardec after his conversion to spiritism, says: "If it could be possible to compel all people to state their most secret thoughts concerning eternal punishment, we would then soon know what the opinion of the majority is. Indeed, the idea of eternal punishment is an obvious denial of the inexhaustible mercy of God" (Allan Kardec, *Qu'est-ce que le spiritisme?* Paris, 1859)

359. See n. 55 supra.

360. From the great litany and the litany of supplication.

361. Love of evil is the most expressive manifestation of the corruptness of human nature, and no one can say that he is completely free of this perversion. Even the most innocent of the human race, children, are not free of evil will, whose manifestation is described, e.g., by Saint Augustine. Recent studies have not only confirmed Augustine's description but have even indicated that it is not strong enough. A survey of children has revealed an astonishing cruelty and blood-lust among many of them (see Ianzhul, "Iz psikhologii detei" [On the psychology of children], Vestnik Evropy, 1900, No. 2), while numerous investigators of questions of sex affirm that many children are unusually corrupt also as regards sensuality. After this, what can one say about adults? Increasing much more rapidly than one's age, sinfulness has love of evil as its sting. Although hidden in the

majority of people, among some this love is stronger and more open. Artists like Poe, Baudelaire, Verlaine, Flaubert, Barbey d'Aurevilly, Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, Péladan, Catullus Mendès, Huysmans, Feodor Sologub, Valery Briusov, Félicien Rops, Odilon Redon, Oscar Wilde, Dostoevsky, Pshibyshevsky, and, to some extent, Hoffmann, and others (I mention the first names that come to mind), in their works, whether of literature or of the graphic arts, provide us with insight into the mysteries of these tendencies. Others, like the Marquis de Sade, Richard III, Alexander VI, Caesar Borgia, et al., by their very lives show what is swarming around at the bottom of all of us. But no one can match, it would appear, the richly gifted and brilliant maréchal de France, Gilles de Laval, Baron de Rais (or Retz, Raiz), who lived in the first half of the 15th century and sacrificed to Beelzebub, Satan, Belial, Barron, and Oriant several hundred children whom he defiled, tortured, and bestially murdered. But no matter how improbably horrible are the crimes of the famous baron, the art of arts, and after it just plain art, have shown clearly that the seed of these very same passions lives in all of us. From the cruelty of an innocent child tearing the wings from a butterfly to the bestial defilement of this very same child, the path is uninterrupted, and no one can say what he might be capable of, what is "absolutely impossible" for him. As soon as the barriers placed by external life to the seeds of evil are removed, these grow into lush fields, unless there is sin-destroying grace. Power, riches, independence from public opinion, expelling fear from the soul of a man without grace, enable the sprouting up of demons about which, at another time, he would be horrified even to think. Thus, when far from their native land, the most cultured nations manifest a rapacious cruelty and disgusting shamelessness, acts of senseless cruelty that overflow the measure of all imagination and, compared to which, the behavior of Gilles de Rais scarcely seems unusual. I do not have space here for a bibliography of this subject. I will limit myself to references to: Huysmans, Là-Bas (this novel includes a study of Gilles de Rais; there are two Russian translations); Petrov, Louis XI ("From universal history"); L'abbe Migne, Encylopédie Théologique, T. 49: Dictionnaire des sciences occultes, T. 2, Paris, 1848, col. 364-365: Raiz. The penetrating gaze of the ancients had already discerned in the soul the "serpent nesting there." At least the old Plato, when he had removed himself sufficiently from Socrates' intellectualism, spoke with complete definiteness about what is now called "love of evil." To the question: "What ignorance can be considered to be the most dangerous?" he answers: "what is most dangerous is when there is no love of that which we consider to be good and beautiful, but when instead there is hate of the good and beautiful; what is most dangerous is to love and venerate what we ourselves consider to be bad and unjust. [Cf. Rom. 7: 15-19]. This contradiction between pain and pleasure I call the most profound ignorance, the most profound because these passions constitute the mob and therefore the greater part of the soul; pains and pleasures for the soul are the same thing as the multitudinous mob in the state. What else can the constant contradiction with knowledge, opinions, reason, with those authorities assigned to man by nature itself, be called except ignorance?" (Plato, Laws, III, 689 A, B, see n. 30 supra, pp. 307–308; Russ. trans., see n. 329 supra, p. 111).

362. E. Tardieu, "Le cynisme: Etude psychologique" (Rev. philos. 1904, No. 1, janv.).

- 363. Paulan, "L'amour du mal" (Rev. Philos., 1887, No. 6). Cam. Bos, "Du plaisir de la douleur" (Rev. Philos., 1902, No. 7).
- 364. Poe, The Imp of the Perverse (Collected Works, trans. K. Balmont, M., Vol. 1, p. 174 sq.).
 - 365. Pascal, *Pensées*, 24, 39; trans. Pervov, p. 235.
- **366.** Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov ("From the Conversations and Teachings of the Starets Zosima." "On Hell and the Fire of Hell, a Mystical Reflection").
- 367. Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haeres., V, 27, 2; Works, trans. P. Preobrazhensky, 1871, p. 656.
- 368. An allusion to the "revolt" of Ivan Karamazov. All the possible "in's" and "out's" of this rebellion, with all their ramifications, are explored by S. N. Bulgakov in *Ot marksizma k idealizmu* [From Marxism to idealism], S.P., 1904; *Dva grada* [Two cities], M., 1911; *Filosofiia khoziastva* [Philosophy of economy], Part 1, M., 1912; *Chelovekobog i chelovekozver*' [Man-god and man-beast], M., 1913.
- 369. It is thus in Kant and in Schopenhauer, as well as in Weininger, see n. 347 supra, and Last words, published by Sphinx. Cf. Daniel Greiner, "Der Begriff der Persönlichkeit bei Kant" (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., Bd. 10, N. F. Bd. 3, 1897, SS. 40–84).
- 370. The expression "outer darkness" (Russ. t'ma kromeshnaia) is a translation of the Greek to skotos to exōteron (Matt. 25:30). The Old Russian kromeshnii or kromesh'nyi, like krom'nyi, signifies outer, exterior. Thus, for example, the Pandect of Antiochus after an 11th-century ms. at the Library of the New Jerusalem Monastery of the Resurrection (M., 1880, 6) states the following: "and especially for the pilgrims who have come from outer (kromeshnykh) lands in order to venerate the holy places, apo tōu exō chōrōn." Of the same root are kroma, a piece of bread (kromka in Russian); krom signifies arx, kremlin, a high city, etc. The preposition krome, or kr'me, signifies extra, without, besides; then, without, exō, against, while the adverb krome signifies outside, to the side, kechōrismenōs, far away, porrō, strangely, xenou (I. I. Sreznevsky, n. 276 supra, Vol. 1, col. 1327–1329, with numerous citations of usage).
- 371. Cf. God is "stabilis Veritas" according to St. Augustine, i.e., the fixed, stable, firm Truth. In order not to be without support it is necessary to fix one's "mind," one's soul, in this firm Truth; otherwise, the Gehennic whirlwind of evil thoughts is inevitable. That is precisely what St. Augustine indicates: "per animam in Deo stabilitam. Quae rursus non per se stabilitur, ser per Deum quo fruitur . . . ipse [vigebit] per incommutabilem Veritatem, qui Filius Dei unicus est," i.e., "with soul firmly fixed in God. The soul is firmly fixed not of itself but by God, whom she enjoys . . .; as for herself, she will be strong with the immobile Truth, who is the only Son of God" (St. Augustine, On True Religion, 25. S. Augustini Opera omnia, Parisiis, 1837, T. VIII, 2, col. 960).
 - 372. Canon of the Great Friday of Lent, 8th ode, by Cosmas of Maiouma.
- 373. See P. Florensky, O tipakh vozrastaniia [On the types of growth] (see n. 35 supra).
- 374. Contemporary satanism and luciferianism produce, even in this life, such a relation to God (see n. 253 supra). The doctrine of Kant and Schelling of the

freedom of the will as the self-creation of the person, i.e., as conditional creativity, has been transformed and strongly defended in the Russian literature by Archimandrite Antonii [Khrapovitsky] in his dissertation: *Psikhologicheskie dannye v pol'zu svobody voli i nravstvennosti* [Psychological data in support of the freedom of the will and morality] (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Kazan', 1900, pp. 489–942; especially see V, Par. 6, pp. 575, 577; IX, Par. 2, pp. 628–29 and 633–34).

- 375. Schaff, History of the Christian Church, I, pp. 162-67.
- 376. Vsev. S. Solovyov, *Sovremennaia zhritsa Izidy* [Contemporary priestess of Isis], S.P., 1904, pp. 44, 59, 77, 193.
- 377. Papus, *The Philosophy of Occultism*, trans. V.V. Troianovsky, S.P., 1908; by the same author: *Practical Magic*, Part 2, S.P., 1908. Leadbeater, *The Astral Plane*, S.P., 1909. J. C. Bourgeat, *Magic*, S.P., 1911; etc.
- 378. Count M. V. Tolstoy, *Khranilishche moei pamiati* [The storehouse of my memory], M., 1893, Bk. 2, p. 52: *Redstock* (the italics are mine).
- 379. F. I. Buslaev, "Izobrazehnie Suda po russkim podlinnikam" [Depiction of the judgment according to Russian originals] in Ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovestnosti i isskustva [Essays on Russian national literature and art], Vol. 2, S.P., 1861; the original is reproduced here. N. V. Pokrovsky, Strashnyi Sud v pamiatnikah vizantiiskogo i russkogo isskustva [The Last Judgment in monuments of Byzantine and Russian art], Odessa, 1887; by the same author: Stennye rospisi v drevnikh khramakh grecheskikh i russkikh [Frescos in ancient Greek and Russian churches], M., 1890.
 - 380. Ps. 103:12.
- 381. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Prebaptismal Catecheses*, 15:23; PG, Vol. 3:3, col. 904.
- 382. Archimandrite (now Archbishop) Sergius, *Pravoslavnoe uchenie o spasenii* [The Orthodox doctrine of salvation], Sergiev Posad, 1895 (there is also a later edition), pp. 171–72. Similarly, to the question "When does a person learn that he has gained release from his sins?" St. Isaac the Syrian answers: "When he feels in his soul that he has come to hate sin completely, with all his heart; and when he clearly sets for himself a direction opposite to his former one" (*Oration* 18 in the Russ. trans. and 84 in the Greek Theotoki ed.; *Works*, 3rd ed., Sergiev Posad, 1911, pp. 76–77).
- 383. P. Florensky, Voprosy religioznogo samopoznaniia, see n. 79 supra, pp. 28–29.
- 384. F. Godet, Commentaire sur le première Epitre aux Corinthiens, T. I, Paris-Neuchatel, 1886, p. 172.
 - 385. Ibid., p. 168.
- 386. "The word is the spark of the soul. . . . My spirit, hurry to eternity." This is contained in the verses of Georgy, the recluse of Zadonsk (*Pis'ma v Boze pochivaiushchiago zatvornika Zadonsk*. Bogoroditsk. monastyria Georgiia [Letters of the recluse Georgy of Zadonsk, of the Mother of God Monastery, who reposes in God], Voronezh, 1860, Part 1, p. 182 = Leonid Denisov, *The Life of Georgy, the Recluse of Zadonsk, of the Mother of God Monastery*, M., 1896, p. 113). The elder Isidor liked to repeat these two verses: see n. 568, p. 51.
- 387. De l'Allégorie, ou traités sur cette matière par Winckelmann, Addison, Sulzer, etc., Paris, 1799, TT. 1 et 2. A. Belyi, Symbolism, n. 243 supra; this work

gives, in the notes, particularly on pp. 461-63, bibliographic indications, although they are far from complete. Rich. Hamann, Das Symbol (Dissert.), Gräfenhainichen, 1902. Ribot, Essai sur l'imagination créatrice, Russ. trans., S.P., 1901. Bréhier, "De l'image à l'idée: Essai sur le mécanisme psychologique de la méthode allégorique" (Rev. Philos., 1908, mai, No. 5). L'Arréat, "Signes et symboles" (Rev. Philos., 1913, No. 1, janv.). R. Eucken, Ueber Bilder und Gleichnisse in der Philosophie, 1880. A. Chide, "La logique de l'analogie" (Rev. Philos., 1908, déc., No. 12). S. Sageret, "L'analogie scientifique" (Rev. Philos., 1909, janv., No. 1). M. Schlesinger, "Die Gesch. der Symbolbegriff in d. Philosophie" (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., 1908, S. 49). Fr. Th. Vischer, "Das Symbol," 1887 (in Philosophischen Aufsätzen, Ed. Zeller gewidmet, 1887). J. Volkelt, Der Symbolbegriff in der neuesten Aestetik, 1876. E. Le Roy et G. Vincent, "Sur l'idée du nombre" (Rev. de Métaphysique et de Morale, 4, 1896, pp. 738-755); developed here is a formal theory of the symbol, where man is only a logician. Ferrero, Les lois psychologiques du symbolisme, 1895. Max Schlesinger, Gesch. des Symbols, Berlin, 1912; an extensive study, with bibliography.

388. Godet, n. 384 supra, p. 167.

389. XVI, 1, 5; Funk, n. 317 supra, S. 8.

390. Godet, n. 384 supra, p. 171.

391. Tereo means, strictly speaking, to watch over, to protect, etc. See Cremer, n. 18 supra, S. 934 ff.

392. See n. 384 supra.

393. Ibid.

394. E. Miller, "Inscr. grecques découv. en Egypte" (Rev. Arch., III-me sér., T. II, 1883, pp. 177-180).

395. O tipakh vozrastaniia, n. 35 supra.

396. "... an expression of some notion or property by the addition of son or daughter signifies an especially profound possession of this property, as if the complete permeation by this property. In particular, the expression Son of Man, in the majority of places, signifies mankind par excellence" (Archbishop Antonii [Khrapovitsky], Syn Chelovecheskii: Opyty istolkovaniia [Son of Man: Attempts at an interpretation], Collected Works, Pochaev, 1906, Vol. 4, p. 217). "The Lord calls Himself the Son of Man as the expresser and preacher of true humanity, i.e., personal holiness, in counterweight to those conditional, political yearnings, that were imposed upon Him by His contemporaries" (ibid., p. 223). This understanding of the Son of Man was also expressed, in many places, by Dostoevsky.

397. That is what Tertullian and some other Christian writers called the pagan virtues.

398. Dostoevsky, Diary of a Writer.

399. This idea is contained, in a distorted form, in Solovyov's *Dukhovnye osnovy zhizni* [The spiritual foundations of life]—in the passage where the author discusses the image of Christ as a "verification of conscience."

400. That is how Protestantism perceives Him; accordingly, Christ dissolves into a moral schema.

401. That is how Catholicism perceives Him; accordingly, the aspiration to "*Imitatio Christi*" arises. If Protestantism makes Christ disappear, a Catholic desires to don the mask of Christ. From this follow the sensuous character of the mass, its dramatism, the open sanctuary (the sanctuary is a stage, the priest is an

actor), the plasticity of the art, the sensuous music, mysticism not of the spirit but of the imagination, leading to stigmatization (it is remarkable that there has been no stigmatization in the East, but the wounds from demons received by the ascetics are evidence that the Eastern saints too were capable of stigmatization; these demons were seen as actual beings, not in the imagination), eroticism and hysteria, etc. From this follow the Catholic mysteries, the processions, all of this acting upon the imagination—theater, spectacle, not contemplation, not mental prayer. Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov writes powerfully about the falsehood of the very idea of "imitating Christ"; he says that Thomas à Kempis' book arose from "spiritual delusion" and from the "beating of the blood" that is not from the gracious illumination of the soul but from the organic excitation of the body. Cf. M. D. Muretov, E. Renan i ego 'Zhizn Khrista' [E. Renan and his Life of Jesus], S.P., 1908.

- 402. St. Anthony the Great, Instructions Pertaining to the Morality of Men, 161 (Khrist. Chtenie, 1821, Part 1, p. 295).
 - 403. Sunday canon, 3rd tone, 6th hiermos.
- 404. St. Macarius the Great, From Prayers Before Going to Sleep. The 4th prayer.
- 405. Lucianus, *Kharon e episkopountes* (Lucianus ex. rec. Car. Jacobitz, Lipsiae, 1836, Vol. 1, pp. 281–305); Russian trans. by G.V.F., S.P., 1884, pp. 97–103, Dialogue 10. Cf. Dostoevsky's "Bobok," with his idea of "let us bare ourselves!"
- 406. Origen, On First Principles, II, 10, 7; PG, Vol. 11, col. 239B: "Separandus ab anima spiritus," etc.
 - 407. Sunday of the Prodigal Son, 1st sticheron.
 - 408. First week of Lent, 2nd ode of the canon of matins.
 - 409. Crime and Punishment, Works, 7th ed., p. 265.
 - 410. Berahot, fol. 18, c. 2.
- 411. A. M. Mironov, "Kartiny zagrobnoi zhizni v grecheskoi zivopisi na vazakh" [Pictures of life after death painted on Greek vases], M. (Uch. Zap. of the Imperial Univ. of Moscow, Historical and Philological Section), p. 215.
- **412.** J. J. Bachofen, *Das Mutterrecht*, 1861, SS. 982, 147, LXXI (there is also a 2nd edition).
 - 413. See n. 411 supra, pp. 180-81.
 - 414. Homer, Odyssey, XI, 572–626; n. 335 supra, pp. 330–33.
 - 415. Chrysanthos, see n. 29 *supra*, Vol. 1, pp. 417–18.
- **416.** Euripides, *Meleager*, fr. XX (537), Fragmenta Euripidis, ed. Fr. Guil. Wagner, Parisiis, 1846, p. 749.
 - 417. "The Spiritualist," 1906, p. 517.
- 418. R. A. Torrey, "Hell: The Certainty of Its Existence," etc. (Audacious Thoughts, 1910, No. 53, p. 1111).
 - 419. Origen, Homily on Jeremiah, XX, 3; PG, Vol. 13, col. 532 A, B.
- **420.** Didymus of Alexandria, *On the Psalms*, Ps. 88:8; PG, Vol. 39, col. 1488 C. D.
- **421.** "Those tormented in Gehenna are struck by the *scourge of love!* And how bitter and cruel this torture! For those who feel they have sinned against love experience a torment that is greater than any that causes terror; the sorrow that

strikes the heart for the sin against love is more terrible than any possible punishment. No one should think that sinners in Gehenna are deprived of God's love. Love is produced by a vision which (and all agree in this) is given to all in common. But love acts in a two-fold manner: it torments sinners, just as here too it happens that people torment one another, and it gives joy to those who have fulfilled their duty" (Isaac the Syrian, *Oration* 19 in the Russ. trans. and 84 in the Greek *Theotoki*; *Works*, 3rd ed., Sergiev Posad, 1911, p. 76).

- 422. Gregory of Nazianzus.
- 423. Sunday canon, 6th tone, 7th hiermos.
- 424. Sunday canon, 7th tone, 7th hiermos. I remember that when I was a student this hiermos was the object of arguments among my comrades: some considered the subject to be "night" whereas others considered it to be "Christ." In the first interpretation the hiermos was paraphrased in this way: "the night, i.e., the time of the liturgy, is not light, O Christ, for the unfaithful, whereas for the faithful it turns out to be an illumination, for at this time they are listening to the divine words." In the second case, the hiermos is paraphrased thus: "Thou, Christ, art a night not light for the unfaithful, whereas for the faithful Thou art an illumination through the sweetness of Thy words." The Greek text shows that the second interpretation is the correct one: Nux apheggēs tois apistois Christe, tois de pistois phōtismos [a mystical term] en trophēi tōn theiōn logōn sou (Eirmoi eis ēchon barun, ōidē e. Eirmologion, ekd. Iōan. Nikolaidou, en Athēnais, 1906, p. 120); the word nux, since it is without an article, is the predicate, while Christe is the subject.
- 425. On *lithos akrogōniaios*, see Ivan Mansvetov, *Novozavetnoe uchenie o Tserkvi* [New Testament doctrine of the Church], M., 1879, pp. 40–41; Hoffmann, *Heil Schr.*, Th. IV, 1, 1870, S. 104. According to St. Theodoret (*Works*, Vol. 7, p. 428), this is the cornerstone, which therefore binds and supports, "joining the two walls of the building." According to St. John Chrysostom, "the cornerstone is what supports the walls as well as the foundation: the whole building rests upon it" (*On Ephesians*, p. 90).
- 426. A bibliography of Leontyev's works and of the literature on Leontyev has been compiled by A. M. Konopliantsev in the collection *In Memory of K. N. Leontyev*, S.P., 1911, pp. 403–424. However, it is necessary to supplement this bibliography with the recently discovered work of Leontiev: "Chetyre pis'ma s Afona" [Four letters from Mt. Athos] (Bogoslovsky Vestnik, 1912, Nov. and Dec = K. Leontyev, Otshel'nichestvo, monastyr' i mir: Ikh sushchnost' i vzaim. sviaz'. [Hermitism, the monastery, and the world. Their essence and interrelationship], Rel.-fil. Bibl., Serg.-Pos., 1912) and Collected Works in 12 volumes, M., 1912.
- 427. D. A. Rovinsky, Russkie narodnye kartiny [Popular Russian images], 1881, Ch. 8.
 - 428. See n. 366 supra.
 - 429. Ibid., 2nd part of the discourse.
- 430. One often hears speeches of this sort, even from simple and very pious people. I recall one very old and respected peasant, 80 years old; while looking at a picture of the Last Judgment, he once told me: "Maybe this won't be our lot, but we can't do without this terror; without it, we would lose God completely." Let

me add that this old man was unusually pious and devoted to the Church. Others simply decide: "The priests have invented it all to increase their income." Or: "It's all a lie. God is kind, He'll forgive us." Or: "What sins do we, in fact, have?" etc.

- 431. Origen, On First Principles, II, 10; PG, Vol. 11, col. 233-240.
- 432. Here we probably have the influence of Origen.
- 433. Gregory of Nyssa, Oration for Those Grieving over Those who Have Left This Life and Gone on to Eternal Life; Works, M., 1868, Part 7, pp. 514–34. Also see the article: "St. Gregory of Nyssa" (Prib. k tv. svv. otsev, Part 20, 1861, pp. 77–92).
- **434.** Ibid. The sinner is also compared to a chunk of iron that is hammered to make it suitable for the preparation of fine objects.
 - 435. Ibid.
 - **436.** Homer, Odyssey, XI, 601–604.
- 437. Verses 602-603 are considered to be absurd by critics, who therefore believe that they were inserted by Onomacritus, who edited Homer at the time of Pisistratus. With reference to this suspicion S. S. Glagolev (The Greek Religion, n. 333 supra, p. 123) observes the following: "When Onomacritus inserted these verses, if he did indeed insert them, he must have had an understanding of them. One must suppose that he admitted the possibility of the dual existence of the soul; in the present case, in hell, this existence was illusory and sorrowful, whereas on Olympus it was real and blissful. Among the mortals Homer names Ganymede and Clitos as abiding on Olympus. Thus, the notion that Hercules could abide on Olympus does not contradict the text of the poems. . . . Hercules essentially differs from the other inhabitants of Olympus in that his phantom is in hell. But although this is related concerning Hercules, the poems do not say that he is alone in being in this situation. This possibility, we suppose, must have been admitted by Greek thought, with its conception of the illusory character of the soul." This intelligent conjecture is of very great importance for the history and philosophy of religion, and I am very glad that I can prove that this explanation is not only a possibility but, in fact, a historical reality. Here is what we read in an ancient philosopher and theologian: "If the soul cannot sin, then how does it come about that it is punished. This opinion utterly disagrees with the generally accepted conviction that the soul makes errors, that it redeems them, that it suffers punishment in Hades, and that it passes into new bodies. Although it appears necessary to choose one of these two opinions, perhaps it is possible to show that they are not incompatible. Indeed, when infallibility is attributed to the soul, this assumes that the soul is one and simple, that one identifies the soul and the essence of the soul (to auto psuchēn kai to psuchēi einai). When it is called fallible, this is because it is assumed to be complex, and that to its essence, autēi, is added another kind of soul, which can experience animal passions. The soul, thus understood, is complex, originating from different elements; and it is this complex soul that experiences passions and makes errors. It is also this complex soul, and not the pure soul, that suffers punishments. It is about the soul considered in this state that Plato says: 'We see a soul as we see Glaucus, the sea god' (Republic, X, ed. Beckeri, p. 497. Turning into a sea god, Glaucus was covered with sea shells, rocks, and sea grass, which made him unrecognizable). And he adds: 'He who wishes to recognize the nature of the soul itself must free it from everything that is alien to it, must in particular consider in it its love for the truth, must see what

things it becomes attached to and by virtue of what affinity it is what it is.' Its life and its works are different from that which is punished, and to separate the soul is to tear it away not only from the body but also from everything that has been added to it. Birth-genesis-adds something to the soul, or rather it forces another form of the soul to arise. But how does this birth occur? When the soul descends, it produces, at the very same moment when it inclines itself toward the body, an image—to eidōlon—of itself. Homer evidently accepted this distinction when he spoke of Hercules, since he dispatches the image—to eidōlon—of this hero to Hades but places him himself in the home of the gods (Odys. XI, 602-605). This at least is the idea that is contained in this dual affirmation, that Hercules is in Hades and that he is in heaven. The poet thus distinguishes two elements in him. Here is the explanation that can be given to this passage: Hercules has active virtue, and because of his great qualities he is considered to be worthy of being elevated to the rank of the gods, but since he possesses only active but not contemplative virtue, he cannot be entirely admitted to heaven. At the same time that he was in heaven, there was something of him in Hades" (Plotinus, Enneads, 1, 1, 12, Plotini Enneades edidit Ric. Volkmann, Lipsiae, 1883, Vol. 1, pp. 47–49; trans. M. M. Bouillet, Paris, 1857, T. I, pp. 48-49). Or, in another passage: "When our body also does not exist, what does the expression 'the soul in Hades' signify then? If the soul has not succeeded in freeing itself of its image, what prevents it from being in that place where its image or shade is? But if it has freed itself from its body by means of philosophy, then only its shade goes to the worse place, whereas it itself remains in the suprasensuous world, without having left anything of itself there. That is the fate of that shade which is attached to the soul (during the earthly life), whereas it itself, if only it succeeds in concentrating within itself the light shining in it, turns wholly to the suprasensuous world and enters there . . . " (Enneads, bk. 4, Sec. 16; Russ. trans. G. V. Malevansky in Vera i Razum, 1899, Vol. 2, Part 1, philosophical section, p. 78; Bouillet, 1861, T. III, pp. 339-40).

This profound passage is rationalized and made shallow by Marsilio Ficino, who interprets "idolum animae" as "vitale spiraculum animae circa corpus, quod in nobis est geminum."

- **438.** Homer, *Odyssey* XI, 601–627 (Russ. trans., see n. 335 *supra*, pp. 331–33).
- **439.** Such are the Egyptian conception of the *khu*, the Hindu conception of the *pitri*, the Parsi conception of the *feruer* or *frauach*, the Greek conception of the *agathodaimones*, heroes, etc., the Roman conception of genii, the Scandinavian conception of the *filgi*, etc.
 - 440. Macarius the Great, Homily 15, 48; PG, Vol. 34, col. 609, Hom. 15, 50.
 - 441. Ibid.
- **442.** Isaac of the Syrian, Oration 38, in Russ. trans. (ed. 1893, p. 409); Oration 57 in the Greek Theotoki edition, p. 345.
- 443. Cf. James 3:6: ho trochos tēs geneseōs. This figure of speech is essential for the language of the mysteries. Numerous parallels to it from the Buddhist literature have been collected by Schopenhauer in *Parega et Paralipomena*, Chap. 15: on religion, par. 179 (*Collected Works*, trans. Iu. I. Aichenval'd, M., fasc. 14, pp. 975–77). It is quite probable that the terminologies of the Buddhists, of the mysteries, and of the apostle James have a common basis: namely, the experience


of the bad infinity of sin. In any case it is unquestionable that the metaphysical superstructure of the transmigration of souls is in no wise contained in the speech of the brother of the Lord.

- 444. Macarius the Great, Hom. 15, 49; PG, Vol. 34, col. 612, Hom. 15, 51.
- 445. Isaac the Syrian, *Oration 5*, p. 37 in Russ. trans; Oration 44 in the Greek, pp. 275–79.
 - 446. Isaac the Syrian, Oration 4, p. 23.
 - 447. Isaac the Syrian, *Oration* 5, p. 30; cf. pp. 28–29.
 - 448. Cf. Plato, Lysis, 217 C-E.
 - 449. See n. 372 supra.

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- 450. Methodius of Olympus, PG, Vol. 18, col. 264A. Cf. ibid., col. 506A. Cf.: "If your soul becomes passionately attached to beautiful bodies and is then subject to the tyranny of passionate thoughts generated by this, do not then suppose that it is these bodies that are the cause of the tempest of passionate thoughts and passionate movements occurring in you. Rather, know that this cause is hidden inside your soul, which, as a magnet attracts iron, attracts to itself harm from people, owing to a predisposition to this and to the evil habit of passion. According to the word of God Himself, the works of God are good, and do not have anything in them that could serve as a basis for the revilement of God's creation" (Nicetas Stethatos, 1st century, 50, see n. 265 supra, p. 95).
- 451. Ambrose of Milan, *De virgin.*, I, VIII, 40; PL, Vol. 16, col. 200; Russ. trans. I, VII, 40.
- **452.** Bishop Feodor (Pozdeevsky), Rector of the Moscow Theological Academy, *Iz chtenii po pastyrskomy bogosloviiu: Asketika* [From lectures on pastoral theology: Asceticism], Sergiev Posad, 1911, p. 21.
- 453. Cf. Th. Simon, *The Psychology of the Apostle Paul*, trans. from the German by Bishop Georgy, M., 1907, pp. 1–5 and sq. P. S. Strakhov, "*Atomy zhizni*" [Atoms of life] (*Bogoslovsky Vestnik*, 1912, Jan. pp. 1–25). We are presented here with an interesting, though highly improbable, translation of and commentary on 1 Cor. 15:51–52. In "we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed *en atomōi*, in the twinkling of an eye," Strakhov considers the word *atomos* to be a philosophical term, meaning "atom," so that the phrase *en atomōi* (usually translated as "rapidly") is taken by him to mean "leads us into the depths of the very substrate of all that exists, into the depths of matter." The entire matter of our bodies will be changed at resurrection down to the smallest atom. V. I. Nesmelov in *Nauka o cheloveke* [Science of man] (2nd ed., Vol. 2, Kazan', 1906) insists on the belief that salvation is salvation not of the soul alone but of the whole man, including his body, and on the essential significance of the body for human life.
- 454. See Iak. Tarnovsky, "Obrazovanie glavnykh suffiksov" [Formation of the main suffixes] (Fil. Zap., 45th yr, fasc. 6, 1909, pp. 4-5): "the transition from 't' to 'ts' in the Belorussian dialect and in Polish gives us a basis for likening the word telo [body] (tselo in Belorussian), to the adjective tselyi [whole]; support is also lent here by the fact that the human body signifies something strictly finished, regularly organized, and not subject to division (individuum); this view corresponds completely to the meaning of the Latin word corpus."

- 455. A. S. Khomyakov, "Sravnenie russk. slov s sanskritskimi" [Comparison of Russian words with Sanskrit ones] (Collected Works, Vol. 5, 4th ed., M., p. 582 = Collected Works, Vol. 3, 1900, p. 582).
- 456. Prellwitz, Curtius, see n. 13 supra; E. Akvilonov, Novozavetnoe uchenie o Tserkvi [The New Testament doctrine of the Church], S.P., 1896, p. 25.
- 457. N. O. Lossky, *Obosnovanie intuitivizma* [Substantiation of intuitivism], 2nd ed. S.P., 1908, III, 2, pp. 77–78. T. Lipps, *Samosoznanie* [Consciousness of Self], S.P., 1903. R. Steiner, *THEOSOPHIA*, see n. 29 supra. G. Rickert, *Introduction to Transcendental Philosophy*, 1904. Fichte, *The Purpose of Man*, S.P., 1905.
- 458. See pp. 415–19. The relationship between the three principles of the human body, having their centers in three of its parts, the stomach, chest, and head, can be schematically represented as the interpenetration of these three systems, but with the greatest intensity of activity in the corresponding part of the body.



- 459. Papus, The Philosophy of an Occultist, see n. 377 supra. Antiquity generally accepted the doctrine of the tripartite body corresponding to the tripartite soul; it is sufficient to mention the teachings of Plato, Aristotle, and others. But this doctrine was accepted even in a later period. Thus, in the Large Panthecte or Kubaras manuscript collection belonging to the Iversk monastery at Mt. Athos, in 1845 Bishop Porphiry Uspensky found hitherto-unknown allegorical poems of Theocrites and in one of them, "The Flute," a curious explanation belonging to John Pediasimos, who lived in the 14th century. That is, he found the following curious indication of the stability of this ancient teaching: "It is worth knowing that nature has shaped three principal bodily receptacles of the tripartite soul, i.e., its mind, feelings, and desires: the skull for the mind, the heart for the feelings, and the liver for desires. But the chief of these is the heart" (Bishop Porfirii Uspensky, Vostok khristianskii. Afon. Pervoye puteshestvie v Afonskie monastyri i skity. [The Christian East. Mt. Athos. First travels to the monasteries and hermitages of Mt. Athos], Part 1, 2nd ed., Kiev, 1877, Ch. 17, pp. 230–31).
 - 460. See n. 29 supra.
- **461.** P. D. Iurkevich, Serdtse i ego znachenie v dukhovnoi zhizni cheloveka po ucheniu Slova Bozhiia [The heart and its significance in the spiritual life of man

according to Scripture] in *Trudy Kievskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii*, 1, 1860, Bk. 1, p. 63.

462. A neologism introduced by Schelling.

463. Iurkevich, n. 461 supra, p. 70. Cf. Th. Simon, n. 453 supra, B. I, pp. 22-24. "That to the heart is attributed such an important role in inward life, that all the functions of psychical-spiritual life are transferred here—is not owing to arbitrariness of word usage but is a result of a naturally grown psychology based on observations" (Simon, pp. 24–25; the explication of this thesis follows.) "Spiritual feeling is found in the heart" (Father John of Kronstadt, see n. 46 supra, Bk. 3, p 773). According to the Kaballah, human being is tripartite. The body, shape or ethereal double and principle of life—that is the first principle, with its subdivisions, bearing the name nefes. The soul, the seat of the will, the foundation of human personality, is the second principle, called *ruah*. Finally, the third principle, the spirit, is called neshama (Papus, The Kaballah, the Science of God, the Universe, and Man, trans. from the French by A. V. Troianovsky under the supervision of N. A. Pereferkovich, S.P., 1910, Ch. 8, p. 158). As has been pointed out, the human person is properly constituted by the organ of will, ruah. "Its seat is the heart, which thus constitutes the root of life; this is the king, melek, the central point of the union of the brain and the liver. . . . The Kabbalah says that, in the word melek, "the heart is the central point between the brain and the liver," as it were, which is explainable by the mystical significance of the letters. The brain, Mu, is represented by the first letter of melek. The liver, KBK, is represented by its last letter, while the heart, LB, is represented by its middle letter" (ibid., Ch. 8, II, p. 178).

464. Iurkevich, n. 461 supra, p. 72.

465. Ibid.

466. Goriaev, see n. 7 *supra*, p. 317. Miklosich, see n. 9 *supra*, SS. 292–293. I. I. Sreznevsky, see n. 286 *supra*, III, col. 338–339: *sereda*, etc.

467. Dal', see n. 8 supra, Vol. 4, col. 130-131, 129-130.

468. Ibid.

469. See n. 377 supra; theosophists, Du Prel (see n. 351 supra), et al.

470. Of works of official science devoted to plexus solaris let us name the following: Maxime Laignel-Lavastine, Recherches sur le plexus solaire, Paris, 1903, III+430 pp., where one finds a complete summary of experimental data and theoretical considerations on the plex. sol. from the point of view of official science. Chapter 5 (pp. 407-428) contains an abundant bibliography of the question, with separate bibliographic indications on the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of the solar plexus. In Russian I am familiar only with Bloch's dissertation: Physiologiia plexus caeliaci, M., 1910; this work has a bibliography. As for the much more interesting, although sometimes fantastic, conceptions that mystical science has of the solar plexus, the reader will find numerous scattered comments in the works of Du Prel and others (for a bibliography of these works, see: Kiesewetter, Gesch. d. neueren Occultismus, 2-te Aufl., besorgt von R. Blum, Lpz., 1909, SS 844 ff.), especially (see n. 351 supra) the theosophists, occultists, etc. There is a Russian bibliography, though an incomplete one, in I. K. Antoshevskii, Bibliografiia okkul'tizma [Bibliography of occultism], 1910; there is also a 2nd, enlarged edition. Leadbeater, The Astral Plane, trans. from the French by A. V. Troianovskii, S.P., pp. 159-175. For the foreign literature, see Papus,

Elementary Information on Occultism, ed. G. I. Pozharov and L. I. Dokman, S.P., 1904, trans. from the 5th Fr. ed., pp. 296–304. The bibliography is omitted in the new, 3rd edition. One will find an index of the indexes in E. Radlov, Sochinenia o magii [Works on magic].

- **471.** Gesenius (see n. 25 *supra*), *Handw.*, 12-te Aufl., SS. 377a and XI, An. The Hebrew word *libah* (Eze. 16:30) is usually explained as an auxiliary form of *leb*; this is perhaps just a copyist's error.
- 472. The degree to which there is uncertainty on this subject is illustrated by an examination of the dictionary of the same author. Thus, Gesenius (see n. 25 supra) in the 3rd ed. of the Dictionary, 1828, leaves the root lbb without explanation; in the Thesaur. of 1839 it is explained through "pinguis fuit"; in the 2nd Latin ed., revised by Hoffmann, it is explained through "cavus fuit"; in the 7th ed. of 1868, revised by Dietrich, this root is related to the notions verbinden, sich winden, convolutus, and so forth; in the 11th ed. of 1890, revised by Mühlau, Volck, and Müller, the principal meaning given to it is haften an etwas, sich fess Anlegen; and in the 12th ed. of 1895, revised by Socin, Zimmern, and Buhl, it is once again left without explanation.
- 473. Jul. Fürst, Hebräisches und Chaldäisches Handwörterbuch über das alte Testament, 2-te Aufl., Lpz., 1863, Bd. I, SS. 655–656.
 - **474.** Gesenius, *Thesauras* (see n. 25 *supra*), Lipsiae, 1839, T. II, p. 738.
- 475. Gesenius, *Handw.* (see n. 25 *supra*), bearbeit. von F. Mühlau und W. Volck mit Beiträgen von D. H. Müller, 11th Aufl., Lpz., 1890, S. 418.
- 476. That is our conjecture. Goriaev (see n. 7 supra, p. 394) relates khal'va and gal'va to the Turkish halva and the Arabic hal'vijat, sweets.
- 477. Archbishop Innokentii even develops the idea that creation bypasses man here and itself enters into a covenant with God, so that animals too, according to Innokentii, have their religion (Innokentii, *Lektsiia pervaia o religii voobshche*, see n. 126 *supra*, pp. 9–12). The same view is held by Prof. S. S. Glagolev, known for his apologetical and religio-historical works; he has repeatedly expressed such views to me during conversations we have had.
 - 478. S. S. Glagolev has drawn my attention to this identity.
- 479. In Scripture, religion is "called the testament, the law, the service of God, the way of Jehovah, or simply the way" (Innokentii, see n. 477 supra, p. 4). That is why one must consider not unexpected the teaching of the Church fathers that the supreme goal of religion, salvation (which consists in deification), is the lot not only of man but of all creation. Thus, Dionysius the Areopagite speaks of the de facto deification of nature to the degree accessible to it (On the Divine Names 9, 5; PG, Vol. 3, col. 912D; ibid., 12, 3, col. 912D; ibid. 12, 3 col. 972A; ibid., 2, 7 col. 645A. The citations are from I. V. Popov, Ideia obozheniia v drevne-vostochnoi Tserkvi [The idea of deification in the ancient eastern Church], M., 1907, p. 33 n. = VFP, 1909). Maximus the Confessor went even further. He extended the ideal of the deification of man to all of nature. Through Christ first man is deified; then through man all of nature will be deified (cit. ibid.). Among recent Russian religious thinkers who have vividly felt this cosmic side of Christianity, one must mention (in addition to Archbishop Innokentii and S. S. Glagolev, who have already been mentioned) Bishop Porfirii Uspensky (see n. 59 supra), V. Solovyov (see n. 5 supra), S. N. Bulgakov, Vyacheslav Ivanov, V. F. Ern, and others.

480. That is why the grace-bestowing mysticism of the heart is a sign of the health and equilibrium of the organism, whereas the false mysticism of the head or the stomach always has as its root or its fruit the sickness of the soul and body. In Christ, "the heart of life," there is complete equilibrium and perfect health, but outside of Christ, that is, outside of Life, there is no health. The psychiatrist V. F. Chiz (see n. 265 supra)—known for numerous works on various literary types and historical figures, in whom he discovers psychic illnesses—considers the Russian ascetic saints (he does not consider the holy fools) to be typical representatives of psychic health and equilibrium. By contrast, few contemporary books on psychopathology do not include excerpts from writings about themselves of saints and mystics outside the Orthodox Church as typical examples of psychic disorder. Of course, the psychiatrists oversimplify the matter when they see only psychic disorder there, but it is unquestionable that this disorder is present. Concerning the pathology of perverted mysticism [prelest'], much material has been collected in a multitude of works of psychology as well as psychopathology and psychiatry. In particular, see D. G. Konovalov, Religioznyi ekstaz v russkom misticheskom sektantstve [Religious ecstasy in Russian mystical sectarianism], Sergiev Posad, 1908. So far only the 1st fasc. of Part 1, XI+258 pp., has appeared (= Bogosl. Vestnik, 1907 and 1908); a large bibliography of the subject appears here. Also: D. G. Konovalov, Psikhologiia sektantskogo ekstasa [Psychology of sectarian ecstasy], Sergiev Posad, 1909, 2nd ed., 13 pp. (= Bogosl. Vest., 1908, No. 12). A. Vertelovsky, Zapadnaia srednevekovaia mistika i otnoshenie ee k katolichestvu: Istoricheskoe issledovanie [Western medieval mysticism and its relation to Catholicism: A Historical investigation], Kharkov, fasc. 1, 1888; fasc. 2, 1898. M. Shaginian, O blazhenstve imushchego: Poeziia Z.N. Gippius [On the blessedness of one who has: The Poetry of Z. N. Gippius, M., 1912, 42 pp. Also see n. 29 supra. On perverse mysticism [prelest'] see The Ascetic Orations of Isaac the Syrian and Gregory of Sinai (Philokalia, 2nd ed., M., 1900, Vol. 5) and works of other fathers collected in the Philokalia of Bishop Theophanus the Recluse, especially in his *Pis'ma o dukhovnoi zhizni* [Letters on spiritual life]; this spiritual sickness is discussed in great detail by Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov (especially see Works, Vol. 1).

- 481. Macarius the Great, Hom. 6.
- 482. Nicetas Stethatos, 3rd century, 38; n. 54 supra, p. 250.
- 483. "He who replaces the activity of his external senses with that of his internal senses, vision with the aspiration of the spirit to see the light of life, hearing with psychic attention, taste with intellectual judgment, smell with mental perception, touch with the bold sobriety of the heart—this one leads an *angelic* life on earth. For people he is and appears to be a man, while for angels he is and is understood to be an angel" (Nicetas Stethatos, 1st century, 8; n. 137 supra, p. 84).
 - 484. Ibid., 52, p. 95.
- 485. Gregory of Sinai told his disciples things that were even more powerful, namely: "He who has been elevated toward God sees as in a mirror, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, all of creation as *luminous*, 'whether in the body . . . or whether out of the body, I cannot tell' (2 Cor. 12:2), as the divine Paul says, until some obstacle hinders his contemplation and compels him to return to himself" (*Afanasii Paterik ili zhizneopisanie sviatykh*, vo sv. Afonsk. gore prosiavshikh [Paterik of Athanasius or the lives of the saints who gave forth light on Mt. Athos], S.P.,

1860, Part 1, p. 356. The Life of Our Venerable and God-bearing Father Gregory of Sinai is taken from Neon eklogion). To the question: "If one has attained purity of heart, what serves as its sign? And how does one know that his heart has attained purity?" St. Isaac the Syrian gives the following answer: "When someone sees all people as good and no one appears impure and defiled to him, then he truly is pure in heart" (Oration 21 in the Greek ed.; 85 in the Russian Works, 3rd ed., p. 96).

486. "To the righteous Anthony [the Great] came up one of the wise men then and asked: 'How do you bear, Father, such a life that is deprived of the comfort brought by books?' St. Anthony answered: 'My book is this created nature. It is always with me, and when I wish I can read in it the words of God'" (Evagrius the Monk, Instructions on the Active Life, 92; Philokalia, 4th ed., M., 1905, Vol. 1, p. 588; PG, Vol. 40.) This thought is afterward repeated countless times by mystics, both those within the church and those outside it. This thought is repeatedly expressed by Maximus the Confessor (ed. Oeler, 105 sq., 152, 162, 212, 242; I 31, 75, 83, 463; I cite from M. D. Muretov). "I was once sitting and looking intently at a garden. Suddenly a curtain fell from the eyes of my soul: before them the book of nature was revealed. This was the book given Adam to read, the book containing the words of the Spirit, like the Divine Scripture. What teaching did I read in the garden? The teaching of the resurrection of the dead!" (Archimandrite, then Bishop, Ignatius Brianchaninov, "Sad vo vremia zimy" [A garden in winter], Works, S.P., 1865, Vol. 1, pp. 97-98). "The world as a work of the living, wise God is full of life: life and wisdom are everywhere and in everything; in everything we see an expression of thought, both in the whole and in all the parts. Indeed, this is a book from which one can learn—though not as clearly as from revelation—the knowledge of God (Father John of Kronstadt, see n. 46 *supra*, Bk. 3, pp. 113-14). "If we, having written some book, know about its entire arrangement and content, about all the thoughts that have been put in it, and when others relate to us the thoughts that are in the book or the plan of the book, we tell them that those are our thoughts, that that is our plan—then how can one take away from God the perfect knowledge of all worlds, of all creatures, of all things in the world with their qualities and states! Is the world not God's book?" (ibid., pp. 665–66). This notion of nature as a book forms the basis of the work of I. A. Th.: Alpha-Omega Gemma Magica, A Brief Explanation of the Book of Nature, According to Its Seven Greatest Pages, in Which One Can Read Divine and Natural Wisdom, Written by the Finger of God, M., 1784.

487. How remarkable it is! Just as, in antiquity, people like the Epicureans who fought against the "superstitions" of religion in the name of rational knowledge did not in fact know anything, and did not try to know anything (Cf. V. A. Kozhevnikov, *Nravstvennoe i umstvennoe razvitie rimskogo obshchestva vo II veke* [The Moral and intellectual development of Roman society in the 2nd century], Kozlov, 1874, pp. 101–102), so, precisely in the same way today, all sorts of ecclesiomachians, breaking off from the Church under the pretext that it "hampers" scientific investigation, or accusing it of a negative attitude toward creation, themselves do not know this creation that they defend, do not study it, and scarcely see in "nature" anything except salon couches and newspapers. Those who specialize in the natural sciences do not live with nature but exert themselves to create for it a prison out of concepts, for such is the essence of the contem-

porary natural science, exposed by its adherents/betrayers, the contemporary neo-Kantians and other gnoseologists, especially those of the Marburg school.

- **488.** Both the psychology of the sense of nature and the history of the development of this sense have been studied extremely little and are insufficiently known. But that which has been done in this direction definitely supports the thesis developed here. Here are several books and articles on this question: A. Bizet, Historical Development of the Sense of Nature, trans. D. Korobchevsky, S.P., 1890. Gr. Olenev, "Chuvstvo prirody v drevnosti" [The sense of nature in antiquity] (Mir, 1910, Jan., No. 4, pp. 286–88). V. F. Savodnik, Chuvstvo prirody v poezii Pushkina, Lermontova i Tiutcheva [The sense of nature in the poetry of Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tiutchev, M., 1911 (on pp. 2-4 there is a bibliography of the question of the sense of nature). Em. Michel, "Le sentiment de la nature et l'hist. de la peinture de paysage" (Rev. de synthèse histor., T. XI, 2, No. 32, pp. 150-64). A. von Humboldt, The Cosmos, trans. Weinberg, M., 1863, II. de Laprade, Le sentiment de la nature avant le christianisme et chez les modernes. Motz, Ueber d. Empfindung d. Naturschönheit bei d. Alten. Caesar, Ueber d Naturgefühl bei d. Griechen. The last three books are cited from Kozhevnikov, n. 487 supra. Comments on this theme are scattered in various works on aesthetics and the history of art, especially painting.
- 489. E. du Bois Reymond, *Cultural History and Natural Science*, trans. from the German under the supervision of S. I. Ershov, M., 1900, p. 29. Cf. "Christianity is unquestionably one of the purest manifestations . . . of the tendency toward culture and precisely toward the continuous creation of the holy" (Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, III, 6, *Collected Works*, *Moskovskoe knigoizd.*, M., 1909, Vol. 2, p. 228).
- 490. This saying is attributed to Thales and is cited by Aristotle in On the Soul, I, 5, 411a, 8.
- **491.** Athanasius the Great, *Oration on the Pagans*, 38, and, in general, see the entire Oration.
 - 492. Nietzsche, The Gay Science.
- **493.** That is why, without grace, the world appears to be a phantom, a "Nothing," shaped by visible reality, truly only a "foenomenon bene fundatum." It is the Maya of India or the $m\bar{e}$ on of the mysteries, of Plato, and, in essence, of the entire ancient understanding of life. A wise man is one who has penetrated beneath the "rough crust of matter" and managed to see there not "the incorruptible royal purple of Divinity," not "the book of revelation," not "the glory of God," not the "wisdom of God," but only emptiness and nothingness.
- **494.** The demonic character of paganism is affirmed by the testimony of many holy fathers and other church writers who knew paganism not by hearsay but from their personal observation, and even from their own sad experience (Justin, Cyprian, Lactantius, Augustine, and others). But worthy of particular attention is the admission of the pagans themselves. Such, for example, is the testimony of the

¹ Florensky is referring here to Vladimir Solovyov's poem "Three Meetings." Cf. the prelude to the poem:

I, not believing the deceitful world, Beneath rough matter's crust, have yet had Tangible proof of the incorruptible royal Purple, have recognized the radiance of divinity. apologist of paganism, Plutarch, who was also a priest of Apollo. "I cannot believe," he says with the lips of the pious Cleombrotas, "that the gods could look with pleasure at how, on days of somber sacrifices, people fiercely tear apart human sacrifices, devour raw bloody meat, subject themselves to harsh fasts, moan and wail, allow themselves filthy, shameless utterances, emit horrible cries. To suppose that this pleases the gods would be a cruel superstition and impiety. But I will say that these feasts and sacrifices were instituted only with the aim of sating and appearing the evil demons, with the aim of averting their wrath." A little before that he says: "We are obliged to recognize and worship demons or genii according to the tradition of the fathers" (Plutarch, On the Disappearance of Oracles, XIV, 417D; Plutarchi Cheroneus. Scripta Moralia, Parisiis, 1839, Vol. 2, p. 508). The theory of the propitiation cult of evil demons was, according to Plutarch, first enunciated by a platonist, the head of the Academy, Xenocrates. "Xenocrates thinks that mighty beings live in the air around us, somber and morose spirits who love this somber cult, that is, self-flagellation, filthy words, and do not do evil to people when they are worshipped in this way" (Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris, XXVI, 361 B; Plut. Scr. Mor., Vol. 2, p. 441). Modern investigators are also often of the opinion that paganism was a cult of demons, and that pagans were possessed by demons. This idea is developed, for example, in the following works of Prince S. N. Trubetskoi, "Religiia" [Religion] (The Encycl. Dict. of Brockhaus and Ephron = Collected Works, Vol. 2, M., 1908, pp. 499-509; "Etiudy po istorii grecheskoi religii" [Studies on the history of Greek religion], (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 434 sq.); "Uchenie o Logose i ego istorii" [The doctrine of Logos and its history] (ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 187-90); Istoriia drevnei filosofii [History of ancient philosophy], M., 1906, Part 1, Chap. 2, 2-4, pp. 30-34. Also see Comte Goblet d'Alviella, L'idée de Dieu, d'après l'anthropologie et l'histoire, Paris-Bruxelles, 1892, Chap. III, p. 103 sq. N. S. Arseniev, V iskaniakh Absoliutnogo Boga [In search of the Absolute God], M., 1900, especially pp. 37-39. The demonism of paganism also explains the fact that healing from the fear of demons and salvation from demons were, in the eyes of the entire ancient world, virtually the main guarantee for the success of the Christian message. On this subject, in addition to the above-named books, see A. Harnack, The Religio-moral Foundations of Christianity in Their Historical Expression: From the History of the Missionary Preaching of Christianity in Its First Three Centuries), trans. A. A. Spassky, Kharkov, 1907, Chap. 3, pp. 60-79 and Chap. 8, pp. 178-94. E. G., "Demonicheskie bolezni" [Demonic illnesses], Khr. Ch., 1912, July-Aug., pp. 775-90. A. A. Spassky, "Vera v demonov v drevnei tserkvi i bor'ba s nimi" [Belief in demons in the early Church and the battle against them], Bogoslovskii Vestnik, 1907, II, 6, pp. 357-91. The idea that fear created the first gods was first expressed by Democritus; at least Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math. XIII, 259) recognizes Democritus to be the first. According to Cicero (De nat. deor. II, 5) Cleanthes was of the same opinion. It is likely that Epicurus and his Roman follower Lucretius borrowed this view from Democritus. There are interesting comments on demon-possession, fear, and the inability to investigate reality in O. Weininger, Last Words (see n. 351 supra), in the section "Culture," pp. 159-61.

495. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, IX, 9, *Opera* (see n. 102 *supra*), Vol. 2, pp. 1158b35, 1159a4; *Magna Moralia*, II, 11, *Opera*, p. 1208b29 sq.; *Eudemian Ethics*, VIII, 3, *Opera*, 1238b27.

496. Chr. Sigwart, The Moral Foundations of Science (Russ. trans. in Vest. Vospit., 1904, No. 9, p. 176) in Kleine Schriften, Bd. II, 1881; 2-te Aufl., 1889. Cf. "There must necessarily exist outside us an intelligence that consists not solely of the ability to understand the truth, but also possesses the power to produce all possible truths from itself. Existing independently, this intelligence must constitute the very essence of the truth, embrace the entire fullness of light, love, and light. Otherwise, nowhere would there be, or could there be, truth or goodness. Otherwise, the foundations of all things, of all knowledge, would be pure nothingness" (Archimandrite, and then Archbishop, Innokentii Borisov, "O bytii Bozhiem" [On God's being], (Khrist. Chten., Part 30, 1824, p. 205). The fact that Innokentii was the author of this anonymous article was discovered and proved by my student, I. M. Uspensky, candidate of the 67th promotion of the Moscow Theological Academy, in his work Filsofsk. vozzreniia Innokentiia, Arkh. Kher. [The philosophy of Innokentii, Arch. of Kherson]. The same idea can be found in the ancients, e.g., "Alētheia dē pantōn men agathois theois hēgeitai, pantōn de anthrōpois" (Plato, Laws, V, 730 C, see nn. 29, 30 supra, p. 335, 24–28).

497. Maimonides, *The Master*, I, 72 (the quotation is from M. Bazilevsky, *Vliianie monizma na razvitie znaniya* [The Influence of monism on the development of knowledge], Kiev, 1883, pp. 15–20. On pp. 15–24 of this work, one finds in its entirety a chapter from Maimonides which interprets the universe as a single being).

498. Rabbi Bechai, *Hab. Galeb.* (On the Obligations of the Heart), Ch. "On the Sincere Service of God" (the citation is from Bazilevsky, pp. 93–94, 95–96).

499. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

500. Sabbat, fol. 150 (ibid.).

501. See n. 488 supra.

502. Bazilevsky, n. 497 supra, p. 13; cf. sq.

503. Ibid.

504. Ibid., p. 39; cf. pp. 44–45.

505. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

506. On the battle with polytheism that went on within the ancient world see P. Decharme, La critique des traditions religeuses chez les Grecs des origines au temps de Plutarque, Paris, 1904, XIV+518 pp. Goblet d'Alviella, see n. 494 supra. Kozhevnikov, see n. 487 supra. Ch. Boissier, The Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, trans. M. Korsak, M., 1878. M. S. Korelin, Padenie antichnogo mirosozertsaniia [The fall of the worldview of antiquity], S.P., 1895.

507. At the beginning of nearly every song of his poem On the Nature of Things, Lucretius glorifies Epicurus and even calls him a god; cf. n. 487 supra.

508. On the natural science of antiquity see Kozhevnikov, n. 487 supra, Ch. II, pp. 93, 206 (the title of the chapter is narrower than its content). Wavell, History of the Inductive Sciences, trans. from the 3rd Eng. ed. by M. A. Antonovich and A. N. Pypin, S.P., Vols. 1 and 2, 1867; Vol. 3, 1869. P. A. Liubimov, Ist. fiziki: Opyt izuchen. logiki otkrytii v ikh istorii [History of physics: An Inquiry into the logic of discoveries in their history], Part 1: The Period of Greek Science, S.P., 1892, V+268 pp. Ferd. Rosenberg, An Essay on the History of Physics, Part I, trans. from the German under the supervision of I. M. Sechenov, S.P., 1883, V+178 pp. Edm. Perrier, Fundamental Ideas of Zoology in Their Historical De-

velopment from Ancient Times to Darwin, trans. A. M. Nikol'sky and K. P. Piatnitsky, S.P., 1896, 302 pp. Chaps. 1–3, pp. 1–29.

- 509. E. du Bois Reymond, see n. 489 supra, p. 41. Kozhevnikov, see n. 487 supra, p. 107. E. Dennert, Christ and Natural Science, trans. from Germ., St.P.
- 510. Clement of Rome, 1 Cor. 19:2:3-20:1-11 (Funk, see n. 317 *supra*, SS. 44-45).
- 511. "Okeanos aperantos anthrōpois kai oi met auton kosmoi" (20, 8). Is this an allusion to America? Is it a premonition of future knowledge, or perhaps a fading remembrance of the past?
- 512. Cf. Kozhevnikov, n. 487 supra, p. 97. M. M. Tareev (Osnovy khristiantsva [Foundations of Christianity], Sergiev Posad, 1908, Vols. 1–4) insists with particular force on the Christian view of the self-legitimacy of the world, and he even makes this concept the cornerstone of his system. But the self-legitimacy and self-grounding of creation are almost subsumed in this system under the general term "freedom of the flesh."
- 513. This follows the somewhat imprecise translation of Filaret, Bishop of Chernigov: *Istorichesky obzor pesnopevtsev i pesnopeniya prav. Tserkvi* [Historical survey of hymnists and hymns of the Orthodox Church], 2nd ed., Chernigov, 1864. Text and commentaries: *Titi Flavii Clementis Hymnus in Christum Salvatorem*, Ed. Ferd. Piper, Gottingae, 1835. On the necessity of correcting this translation, see F. Smirnov, "*The Hymn of Clement of Alexandria*" (*Tr. Kiev. D.A.*, 1879, Vol. 2, pp. 370–72). For text and commentary also see A. S. Uvarov, *Khrist. simvolika* [Christian symbolism], Part 1, II, 5: "Symbolism of the Early Christian Period," M., 1908, posthumous ed., pp. 44–49.
- 514. Kozhevnikov, see n. 487 supra, pp. 96-97. Here we find the following quotations: "Antiquity did not know the enjoyment of nature" (Hervinus, Literaturgesch. I, S. 124); the Church Fathers were the first to place nature above art (Humboldt, Kosmos, II, 30); "the ancients felt plastically, while the Christian world felt in a painterly fashion. The sense of nature among the Greeks apprehended not so much the interaction of things, binding them into an organic whole, as some particularity of things, in order to elaborate it in detail into some similitude or other of a human feature or to personify it in a human image" (Carrière, Art, II, pp. 276-77, Russ. trans.). Schnase is of the same opinion: Gesch. d. bildenen Künsten, II, 129 ff. "In painting pictures of nature, the classical poets were exclusively concerned with a description of the external side of things, and that in its most general features; thus, one does not notice in them even a trace of the profound understanding of the inner life of nature that is expressed, for example, in the works of Shelley . . . " (Kozhevnikov, p. 97, n. 3). "Despite the zealous defense of classicism by its devotees, the majority of those concerned with the question of how interested the ancients were in nature tend to think that, if the sense of nature was not completely alien to the ancient world, then in any case it was less typical of the ancient world than of modern society. There is no reason to suppose that a nation so richly gifted with imagination as the Greeks could have remained completely indifferent to the surrounding nature; nevertheless, from very early times, Greek civilization was formed in such a manner that the sense of nature could not be particularly strong in it. The broadest comparisons easily demonstrate to what extent the classical world preferred to concentrate on

the study of man rather than on the study of nature: how brief and meager are the descriptions of nature among the Greek poets in comparison with their portrayals of human life! How luxuriously the plastic arts, fully corresponding to the ancients' love of humanism, were developed in antiquity, while landscape was completely [the italics are mine: P.F.] unknown to the Greeks and to the Romans. If in the aesthetic and even in the scientific respects, the ancients turned to nature, they were in a hurry to seek in it first of all a reflection of their own favorite human ideal; they constantly strove to study not the independent life of nature, but its analogies and connections with this ideal. Worshipping all that was plastic, ancient thought, when studying nature, concentrated its attention on especially salient phenomena, on those that astonished one by their outer aspect. The grandiose, the tragic, in other words, what is most reminiscent of human passion, is what not only the ancient poets but also the ancient scientists found predominantly interesting in nature. On the contrary, the hidden, immediately undiscoverable forces of inner life and of the transformation of matter are almost incomprehensible to the ancients and do not even interest them. It is not enough to say that the ancients were insufficiently interested in nature; they even looked at it from the wrong point of view. First of all, they tried to bring its phenomena into an exclusive connection with human ideals, and they thus constantly committed errors. Second, they traced only the largest, i.e., the most distinct, facts and, in this way, they learned to neglect the study of the inner forces of nature, in order to direct attention at its outer sides. How attentively the Greek and Roman scientists remarked phenomena that appeared rare, almost miraculous, to them, and how contemptuously they looked upon ordinary physical facts; for example, the discipline of meteorology interested them greatly while the less striking phenomena of light, sound, etc, were deemed almost unworthy of attention. Similarly, ancient botanists and zoologists collected hundreds of anecdotes about foreign oddities of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, but had almost no understanding of their native fauna and flora" (Kozhevnikov, pp. 96-98). However, contrary to the above, the attempt is sometimes made to attribute the sense of nature precisely to the ancient world, e.g., by connecting it with the name of Pliny, while attributing the destruction of the Romantic view of nature to Christianity (see D. S. Merezhkovsky, Vechnye sputniki [Eternal companions], S.P., 1899, 2nd ed. pp. 102-103, Pliny the Younger).

- 515. Cf. "If some churches add that God has adopted a human nature, then, as I have frankly stated, I do not fully understand the meaning of these words. To tell the truth, this seems to me no less strange than if someone had said that a circle had adopted the nature of a square" (Spinoza, *Letter XXI* (LXXIII) to Oldenburg. *Correspondence*, see n. 230 *supra*, p. 148).
- 516. "The Lord has full respect for the nature created by Him and its laws, as a product of His infinite, most perfect wisdom. That is why He usually effects His will through nature and its laws, for example, when He punishes people or blesses them. Therefore, do not ask miracles of Him except in extreme need" (Father John of Kronstadt, see n. 46 *supra*, p. 667).
- 517. P. Florensky, *Antonii romana i Antonii predaniia* [Anthony of the novel and Anthony of tradition], Sergiev Posad, 1907 (= Bog. V., 1907, No. 1). An attempt is made here to compare concretely two ascetic states—nihilistic and Orthodox. Cf. V. A. Kozhevnikov, *O znachenii podviznichestva v proshlom i nastoi-*

shem [The significance of asceticism in the past and in the present], M., 1910 (Rel.-Fil. Bibl., XXII–XXIII = Khr. Cht., 1909). This includes an abundant bibliography. Also see M. V. Lodyzhensky, Sverksoznanie . . . , n. 29 supra; by the same author: Svet nezrimyi. Iz oblasti vyshchei mistiki [The invisible light. from the domain of higher mysticism], S.P., 1912.

- 518. John 8:23, 17:16, 18:36, etc.
- 519. 7th prayer of the morning, hymn of midday.
- 520. On deification see: I. V. Popov, *Ideia obozheniia v drevne-vostochnoi tserkvi* [The idea of deification in the ancient eastern Church], M., 1909 (VFP); by the same author: *Religioznyi ideal sv. Afanasia Aleksandriiskogo* [The religious ideal of St. Athanasius of Alexandria], Sergiev Posad, 1904 (= Bog. Vest.); also by the same author: *Misticheskoe opravdanie asketizma v tvoreniiakh prep. Makariia Egipetskogo* [Mystical justification of asceticism in the works of St. Macarius of Egypt], Sergiev Posad, 1905 (= ibid.). S. Zarin, *Asketizm po pravoslavno-khristianskomu ucheniu* [Asceticism according to the Orthodox Christian Teaching], Vol. 1: 2. Also see Smirnov, n. 533 infra.
- 521. Here is a clear example of the Church's view of the body. When in the year 325 at the Council of Nicaea an attempt was made (probably by Hosea, Bishop of Corduba) to make abstention from their wives obligatory for all clerics, it appears that many were leaning in favor of this proposal. "But against it spoke a man who was highly respected as both a confessor and an ascetic. This was Paphnutius, Bishop of the Upper Thebaid. His voice had the more weight that, because he was the strictest virgin, there could be no suspicion that he was guided by any egotistical motives. His argument was that the Apostle calls marriage 'honourable' (Heb. 13:4), and that consequently there is no justification to demand an unmarried state from all, imposing upon all a burden that can honorably only be borne by a few. This imposition can only bring harm, not good, to the Church by subjecting to dangerous temptations if not the clerics themselves, then their wives. Paphnutius's opinion triumphed, and, as before, the choice between a married and an unmarried life was to be freely made by the clerics themselves" (Soz. I, 23). (Bolotov, Lektsii . . . , n. 241 supra, Vol. 3, S.P., 1912, pp. 142–43).
 - 522. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Peace of the Soul; PG, col. 1049C.
- **523.** Macarius the Great, *Hom.* 44, 9; PG, Vol. 34, col. 785B. Cf. *Hom.*, 49, 3; ibid., col. 813D).
- **524.** Symeon the New Theologian, *Oration* 27; PG, 452D. Cf. ibid., 451, n. 13: *anthrōpos Theōi enoutai pneumatikōs kai somatikōs*. For more detail on this theme see Zarin, n. 520 *supra*, p. 53.
- 525. Rules of the Holy Apostles, of the Ecumenical and Local Councils, and of the Holy Fathers, with Commentaries, ed. Mosk. O-va Liub. Dukh. Pr., M., 1877, p, 7; 95.
 - **526.** Ibid., p. 1005.
- **527.** Ibid. The date of the Council of Gangre has not been precisely determined; it is assumed to have occurred between 340 and 370.
 - 528. Ibid.
- 529. Thalassios, see n. 54 supra. Completely opposite to this Eastern mysticism of the person is the Western mysticism of things: "Dass du nicht Menschen liebst, das thust du recht und wohl, Die Menschenheit ist's, die man im Menschen lieben soll" (Angelus Silesius, see n. 350 supra, I, 163, S. 27).

- 530. John, Barsonuphius, St. Seraphim, Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov.
- 531. Vekhi: Shornik statei o russkoi intelligentsii [Landmarks: Collection of essays on the Russian intelligentsia], M., 1910, 5th ed.; there is a later edition. An entire literature has arisen around Vekhi, an index to which is appended in the most recent edition of this book. N. M. Sokolov, Russkie sviatye i russkaia intelligentsia: Opyt sravnitel'noi kharakteristiki [The Russian saints and the Russian intelligentsia: An attempt at a comparative characterization], S.P., 1907.
- 532. A starets of the Kiev-Pech. Lavra, the hieroschemamonk Parfenii, one of the chosen of the Most Pure Mother of God, who from his very childhood was fragrant with an unearthly freshness, an angel in the flesh, who even in the prime of his youth did not know the battle with the flesh and whose heart was never even touched by sinful thoughts (Skazanie o zhizni i podvigakh startsa Kievo-Pech. Lavry Ieroskim. Parfeniia [The life and acts of the starets of the Kiev-Pech. Lavra, the Hieroschemamonk Parfenii], Kiev, 1898, pp. 13, 19), this most excellent venerator of the Ever-Virgin sought greatly to find out what is the essence of monkhood. And here, when, before her icon, which always was in his cell, he was praying to her that She tell him what is the meaning of monkhood, he heard Her voice, saying: "To be a monk is to consecrate oneself to prayer for the whole world" (ibid., p. 27). Parfenii was born 24 August 1790 in the village of Simonov in the province of Tula, and he died on Good Friday, 1855.
- 533. S. I. Smirnov, *Dukhovnyi otets v drevnei Vostochnoi Tserkvi* [The Spiritual father in the ancient eastern Church], Part 1: "Pervye vselenskie sobory" [The first ecumenical councils], Sergiev Posad, 1906 (= Bog. Vest.). Kozhevnikov, see n. 517 supra; this work contains a bibliography. Holl, Enthusiasmus, Lpz., 1898.
- 534. Complines of Thursday of the 1st week of Lent, canon, 2nd ode, 3rd troparion. Or consider the tender tones in which Tertullian speaks about the body: "The soul is not a prostitute that the bridegroom take her naked. She has her garment, her adornment, and her slave—the flesh. The flesh is the true bride. . . . And no one is so close to you, soul, as the flesh. We must love the flesh more than anything else after God" (On the Resurrection of the Flesh, 63).
- 535. The office of burial is distinguished by the intertwining of two themes: mourning for the corrupted beauty in man and joy in the restored beauty in the Mother of God. In antiquity, these experiences were even more closely interwoven. On the early Christian experience of death, see V. F. Ern, "Pis'ma o khristianskom Rime" [Letters on Christian Rome], Letter 3, (Bogoslovskii Vestnik, 1913, Jan.). G. Boissier, The Catacombs, M., (Rel.-Obshch. Bibl., ser. III). A. von Fricken, The Catacombs of Rome and Monuments of Early Christian Art, M., Part 1, 1872; Part 2, 1877. S. N. Bulgakov, Dva grada [Two cities], M., 1911, Vols. 1 and 2: "Stat'i o pervokhristianstve" [Articles on primitive Christianity]. Among the ancient writers, St. Irenaeus of Lyon vividly expresses the idea of the resurrection and holiness of the body, while, among the modern writers, this idea receives particular emphasis from N. F. Fyodorov.
 - 536. See n. 110 supra, p. 216.
 - 537. Ibid., p. 211.
- 538. "No one can imagine"—a biographer of Peter the Great writes about the reaction to the ukase ordering the shaving of beards—"the great disturbance that was created in the hearts of Russians by his majesty's ukase." "They are ordering

us to shave our beards"—Russians told Dmitrii, the bishop of Rostov—"but we are ready to lose our heads for our beards; let them rather chop off our heads than shave our beards." Numerous revolts provoked by the beard-shaving are known; and severe punishments on the part of the government (in the Astrakhan revolt, 365 men were executed and many were sent to Siberia) did not frighten the defenders of sacred decorousness. The significance attributed to beards in the veneration of saints is evident from the especially large beards of saints depicted on icons. Especially characteristic are the beards of hermits and ascetics (see P. Smirnov, "Bradobritie" [Beard-shaving] in the Orthodox Encyclopedia, n. 242 supra, 1901, Vol. 2, pp. 1005-1022. On pp. 1011-1022 one can find a bibliography of the subject and instructive information. There are very interesting details in F. Buslaev, Istoricheskie ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti i iskus [Historical essays on Russian national literature and art], S.P., 1821, Vol. 10, p. 216-32: "Drevne-russkaia boroda" [The old-Russian beard].) The force of the resistance on the part of Orthodox Russia to Peter's ukase on beard-shaving can be measured by the significant yearly tax levied on beards by Peter, namely 60 roubles for all city dwellers and minor officials; 100 roubles for merchants and tradesmen; 60 roubles for servants of the boyars, postal drivers, and some clerics; 30 roubles for inhabitants of Moscow of all classes; and two coins for every man entering or leaving a city (Complete Collection of Laws, ukase of 16 Jan. 1705). A curious material monument of this struggle for beards, which was beyond the powers of the people, is the "beard token," i.e., a silver or copper token, which was given to those who had paid the beard tax, and which one had to carry. The extreme rarity of such silver tokens indicates that many men could not afford to pay the beard tax. "I have such a token in my collection which is the same size as the silver 20-kopeck piece; one side has the Russian eagle and is stamped 1705, while the other side depicts the lower part of the face, the nose and mouth with whiskers and beard, and bears the inscription: the money has been taken. The copper tokens were of two types: one type resembles the silver coins and there are those on which the Russian eagle has received a stamp (these coins were evidently used twice). The others are rectangular and about the same size and weight as the rouble. They have a simple inscription on one side ('the beard tax has been taken'), while on the margin are the words: 'the beard is a superfluous burden' (Baron Stanislas de Chaudouart, Survey of Russian Money, trans. from the French by V. A., S.P., 1837, Part 1, Chap. 6, pp. 169–70). On the same subject see Aug. Schloezer, History of Coins, Money, and the Mining Industry in the Russian State from 1700 to 1784, Göttingen, 1791, pp. 67, 78. Chulkov, Istor. opisanie Ros. kommertsii [Historical description of Russian commerce], M., 1781, I, p. 698. Chulkov describes yet another type of beard token, but Chaudouart doubts its existence). One can find pictures of the beard tokens in Part II of de Chaudouart's book and in N. V. Migunov, Redkie russkie monety s 1699 do 1912 g. [Rare Russian coins from 1699 to 1912], 4th ed., M., 1912, p. 80. The beard tax is, so to say, the measure of the resistance of the average man. But it is also well known how decisively and inflexibly the beard—and, with it, the idea of the holiness of the body—was defended by many individuals and by various movements in old Russia from the castrating nihilism of the westernizing intelligentsia. A philosopher who was spiritually close to the intelligentsia and who had a strong influence on a typical Russian Westernizer, Ivan Turgenev, let the cat out

of the bag, as it were, and admitted that the war against beards does not have a chance nature: I mean Schopenhauer, with his revulsion toward religion and his squeamish aversion to the body. "A beard, like a half-mask, should not be permitted by the police," he grumbles against human naturalness. "Furthermore, like the sign of sex on the face, it is indecent, which is why women like it ..." (Schopenhauer, Thoughts and Fragments, XIX: "On the Metaphysics of the Beautiful and Aesthetics," Par. 233, n. 1, Collected Works, trans. and ed. Iu. I. Aichenval'd, fasc. 14, p. 766). Yes! nearly all the saints, the majority of great men, millions of honest servants of God's will have worn beards, have seen them as a sign of valor, have considered it reprehensible to shave them off. Many of them actively fought for the right to wear them; let us mention our Slavophiles in this connection (A. S. Khomyakov, Collected Works, Vol. 8: Letters, M., 1904, Letter 15 to A. N. Popov, p. 191; Letter 2 to Countess A. D. Bludova, p. 375). And here, a member of the intelligentsia, himself not of irreproachable morality, felt it proper in his aversion to sex, against which he himself had sinned, to come to the discovery that a beard is indecent, and to demand the intervention of the police (itself an institution that is close in spirit to the intelligentsia) to do battle against beards!

539. Tertullian expresses (true, in works of his montanistic period) a highly original opinion about the body as the image of God. According to him, it was not the case that the Savior adopted man's image; rather, man was pre-imaged by the Creator in the image of the Son of God who was to come into the world. The image of God is the image of Christ that was given to man many years before the coming of Jesus Christ in this image. "'Et fecit Deus hominem, ad imaginem, Dei fecit illum' (Gen. 1:27). Cur non, suam, si unus qui faciebat, et non erat ad cujus faciebat? Erat autem ad cujus imaginem faciebat: ad Filii scilicet, qui homo futurus certior et verior, imaginem suam fecerat dici hominem qui tunc de limo formari habebat, imago veri et similitudo" (Adv. Praxeam, 12; PL, Vol. 2, col. 168A). "'And God said, Let us make man in our image' before He actually created him. He creates him, so to speak, with His own hands because of his superiority, so that he not be compared with the universe. All beings in general, as slaves, were created by a single command, by one gesture of power. But, contrarily, man, as the lord, is created by God Himself. Remember, however, that the flesh, properly thus called, is the same thing that is called man: 'And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground'—'hominem autem memento carnem proprie dici: 'Et finxit Deus hominem limum de terra'. He was already a man, though he consisted still only of dust. 'And breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man (i.e., dust) became a living soul. And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put the man whom He had formed' (Gen. 2:7-8). Thus, man, first being dust, became a full man only later. Why all these truths? So that you see that all the goods predestinated and promised by God to man belong not only to the soul but also to the *flesh*, if not in the commonality of origin, at least preeminently in name. I continue to go toward my goal, without, however, being in a state to give to the flesh that which was given to it by the One Who created it, having clothed it in glory, when dust, this nothing, rested in the hands of God. Without doubt, it was happy even then when God merely touched it. And so? Could not God have created man by touch alone, without all the rest? It is just to say that some great miracle was being prepared when he Himself decided to

work on this matter with such effort. In fact, how many times this flesh felt the touch of God's hands; how many times was it touched, mixed, worked over by Him; how many times it grew in honor and in glory. Imagine that all of God was occupied with this creation. His hands, mind, action, wisdom, providence, and especially love—He uses His entire Being here. What does He do this for? In order to see His Christ through this rough dust—the Christ Who will one day become man, like this dust, who will become the inhumanized Word. The Father begins by addressing his Son with these words: 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. . . . So God created man,' i.e., he created him 'in the image of God,' i.e., in the image of Jesus Christ; hence, the dust in which from that time the image of Jesus Christ in His future life was clothed—was not only God's creation but also His pledge. Why then to vilify the flesh, should one set before us the earth as some rough and contemptible element, whereas if another material were capable of going into the creation of man, one should never lose sight of the worth of the artist, who, having chosen this material, considered it worthy for this purpose, or would have made it so, by merely touching it . . ." etc. (On the Resurrection of the Flesh, 6; ibid., col. 802 B-803 A; and in general see the entire work. In Karneev's translation: The Works of Tertullian, S.P., 1850, Part 3, pp. 63-65). The sense of the holiness of the flesh in Tertullian is even more worthy of attention since Tertullian's error was precisely an extreme severity with regard to the body. This union of extremes of montanistic asceticism, the yearning and search for the fullness of spirituality, and the profound veneration of the body is highly characteristic, but—as we have attempted to show in our work—hardly unexpected. "Begin to love the flesh," Tertullian instructs us, "when it has as its Creator such a superb Artist—incipiat jam tibi caro placere, cujus artifex tantus est" (ibid., 5, col. 801B). But to love the flesh for Tertullian is not at all to ignore its weaknesses; on the contrary, it is to demand the purity of the flesh, the incorruptibility of this image of God, this vessel of His Spirit. "The dust is glorious by the fact that God's hands touched it, and the flesh is even more glorious from God's breath, by means of which it surrendered the rough elements of the dust and received the dignity of the soul. You are not a greater artist than God. If you do not set in copper, iron, or even silver the precious stones of Scythia and India, or the brilliant pearls of the Red Sea, but, on the contrary, adorn them with purest gold of the most excellent work; if for the best wines and perfumes you prepare vessels that correspond to them in quality; if you place fine swords in superb sheaths, then how can you imagine that God would place into some sort of contemptible vessel the shadows of His soul, the breath of his Spirit, the active image of His Word—animae suae umbram, spiritus sui auram, oris sui operam—and condemn them to exile in some abject place?" (ibid., 7, col. 805A). In later theology there is no accepted view of what precisely constitutes the image of God in man. Filaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, in Zapiski, rukovodstviushchie k osnovatel'nomy razumeniu Kn. Bitiia [Notes toward a fundamental understanding of the Book of Genesis], Part 1, 2nd ed., S.P., 1819, pp. 34-38, enumerates various ways to interpret this subject, but without a decisive acceptance or rejection of any of them, and with the recognition that the Bible tale is essentially ambiguous on this question. Archbishop Innokentii of Kherson is in favor of extending the understanding of the image of God to all of man: "Opinions about the image of God differ," he says. "Some extend it to the soul and body, while others limit it to the spirit or soul alone. But the opinion of the former is more correct: the entire man was the image of God, and not some part of him—his soul. But how could the image of the incorporeal Essence be manifested in a body? In the same way as in the spirit. To us this seems strange because we see the body as being too rough. But what it is in itself—whether it is different from spirit or not—we do not know. What if in its essence it is identical with the spirit? In this case, the entire temptation disappears. One can believe that this is the way it actually is, for it is much better to view the essence of man as consisting of some one thing than of two heterogeneous things" (O cheloveke [On man], see n. 126 supra, lecture 2, p. 85). Interesting thoughts on this subject are contained in the Journal of John of Kronstadt and in Kniga bytiia moego [The book of my life] of Bishop Porfirii Uspenskii.

- 540. Saint Augustine, De Gen. contra Manich., I, 17; PL, Vol. 34, col. 186.
- **541.** Among recent writers, this view of monasticism is defended with particular insistence by Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov. But precisely then does it become completely clear that monasticism requires wholly *special* conditions of life and is completely unworldly, so that an "angel in the flesh" cannot interfere in political affairs or even ecclesiastical affairs, as this is stipulated in the 4th rule of the fourth ecumenical council, at Chalcedon.
- 542. Origen, On First Principles, I, 7, Par. 5; PG, Vol. 11, col. 1751-1776. It must be said that the question of the self-castration of Origen is very unclear. Even St. Epiphanius of Cyprus, who does not hide his enmity for Origen, writes about this very obscurely: "About this Origen tells that he thought up something against his own body. Some say that he castrated himself in order not to be worried by lust, not to be excited, and not to be burnt by fleshly passions. Others says this is not so, but that he had the idea of applying to the members in question some sort of drug and of drying them up. Others come up with something else: namely, that he found some sort of herb that has a healing effect upon the memory. We do not completely believe the extraordinary stories about him, even though we felt it necessary to recount them" (On Origen, the 44th, or in the general classification, the 62nd heresy, Ch. 3, Works, M., 1872, Part 3, p. 84). This account makes one think that all the rumors concerning Origen are mere gossip, like that which surrounded Athanasius the Great, John Chrysostom, and others. Such gossip afflicts all extraordinary men. The only thing that can be considered founded is the unprecedented intellectual productivity of Origen and the probably related fact of his total abstinence. But from Origen there really does waft the spirit of castration, as is the case in general for all souls with a rationalistic structure.
- **543.** Cf. *Hymn to the Sun* of Francis of Assisi, who, too, was a severe ascetic. P. Sabatier, *The Life of Francis of Assisi*, trans. from the French, M., 1895, pp. 313, 314, 336, 339; the original Italian text is on pp. 311–312.
- 544. B. A. Turaev, "Nekotorye zhitiia abissinskikh sviatykh" [Some lives of Abyssinian saints] (Vizant. Vremen., Vol. 13, fasc. 2, 1906). The Life of Iafkerana-Egzie is among the collection of manuscripts at the Bibl. Nation. de Paris (former coll. d'Abbadie, No. 56) and is translated into Russian in Turaev's work.
- 545. Thus, St. Sergius of Radonezh (14th century) and St. Seraphim of Sarov (19th century) received bears as guests; Pachomius of Egypt (4th century) and St. Theodora crossed the Nile on a crocodile; others were fed by crows, lions, and so on. The Lord Himself was in the desert "with the wild beasts" (Mark 1:13). Cf. P. Florensky, *Sol' zemli*, see n. 568 *infra*. Cf. in the vita of Francis of Assisi the tale of his meal with Clara, when all present were embraced by the fire of spiritual life

and were sated with it (*Fioretti*, Ch. 15, trans. from the Italian by O. S., *Nov. Put*', 1904, May, pp. 123–124); there is also a separate edition, M., 1913, trans. A. P. Pechkovsky, *Musaget*, pp. 46–49.

546. Hermas, *The Shepherd*, Vision 1:1-8 to 2:1-4; Funk, *Apost. Väter*, SS. 144-146.

547. Ibid.

548. Ibid., Vision II, 2:3; ibid., S. 148.

549. Cf. Acts 9:15.

550. Cf. "Thou hast left us thy most sacred relic, a vessel full and overflowing with grace" (1st prayer to Sergius of Radonezh).

- 551. Even a cursory survey of John Chrysostom's correspondence with Olympiada convinces one that they were linked by a spiritualized love that was much more personal than merely the moral link between a bishop and a deaconess. Of course, the accusations of Chrysostom's opponents that during a liturgy he cried, "I am dying, going out of my mind from love," are absurd, but the above-mentioned correspondence indicates what served as a pretext to this accusation. Olympiada's suffering during Chrysostom's exile, concerns about each other's health, and tidings that one was in a state of well-being sent in order to console and encourage the other—one finds here all the nuances of personal love. This intimacy is brought into greater relief if one makes certain statistical calculations. Thus, in the Russian translation of Chrysostom's correspondence, 17 letters to Olympiada take up 84 pages (=3612 lines), while 17 letters to other persons take up, on the average, 11.9 pages (=511.7 lines). Subtracting the gaps between letters of 4-6 lines, we find that the text of the 17 letters to Olympiada takes up 3544 lines, while the text of the 17 letters to the other persons takes up, on average, 44 lines, i.e., on average, one letter to Olympiada contains 280.5 lines, while a letter to another person contains 26.1 lines. Thus, a letter to Olympiada is, on average, 8 times longer than letters to other persons. This number "8" only serves to confirm the Life of John Chrysostom, where it is related that John "loved Olympiada with a spiritual love, the way Apostle Paul loved Persis, about whom he writes: 'Kiss the beloved Persis, who labored much in the Lord' (Rom. 16:12). And the saintly Olympiada labored not less than Persis. When John, innocent, was chased from his seat, the blessed Olympiada, with other honest deaconesses, cried much about that."
- 552. Sufficient attention has not yet been paid to the tendency of many spiritual fathers to build womens' convents at the apex of their ascesis and deadening of passions. It is sufficient to mention here the names St. Seraphim and the elders Amvrosii of Optina and Barnabas of Gethsemane.
- 553. D.S. Merezhkovsky, *Poslednii sviatoi* [The last saint] (in *Ne mir, no mech* [Not peace but the sword], S.P., 1908).
- 554. John Climacus, *The Ladder*, 15:61 (in Russ. trans.); PG, Vol. 88, col. 893 C-894 A, Grad. XV, 33.
 - 555. Ibid., 15:62; PG, 893 A, Grad. XV, 34.
 - 556. Scholium 33, Ladder, 15; ibid., 916 C.
- 557. Dimitrii of Rostov, *Lives of the Saints*, 8 Oct. (= Lippomanus: *Acta sanctorum*, Vol. 5, p. 225).
- 558. It does not matter if it is called Brahman, Nirvana, Ensoph, Tao, the Good (in Tolstoy), etc.
 - 559. See his Life for 19 Jan.

- 560. Macarius the Great, Hom., 18, 7–10; PG, Vol. 34, col. 640 A–641 A.
- 561. Father I. Chetverukhin, *Svedeniia o prep. Isaake Sirine* [Information about St. Isaac the Syrian] in *Works of Isaac the Syrian*, 3rd ed., Sergiev Posad, 1911.
- 562. Isaac the Syrian, *Oration* 48 in the Russ. trans. and 81 in the Theot. ed., pp. 451–53.
 - 563. Ibid., pp. 454-55.
- 564. Bishop Theophanus the Recluse. Cf. "Being creatures of sense, we must in the good perceive with our senses impressions from sensuous things and through their beauty elevate ourselves to the contemplation of their creators" (Nicetas Stethatos, 3rd Gnostic Century, 72, Philokalia, see n. 137 supra, pp. 155–56).
 - 565. The Way of a Pilgrim, see n. 134 supra, 4th tale, p. 93.
- 566. P. Florensky, "O sueverii" [On superstition], Novyi Put', 1903, No. 8). In this work miracle is considered as the perception of the Divine element of creation; I must present here the qualification that this article was reworked by the editors in the Kantian spirit, and therefore I cannot accept some of the ideas put into it.
- 567. L. Bel'sky, "Kak zemnaia tvar' Bogu molitsia: Rasskaz strannika" [How earthly creation prays to God: The tale of a pilgrim], (Rodnik, 1897, Vol. 2, pp. 900–913).

XI. LETTER TEN: SOPHIA

- 568. For a concrete portrayal of this two-fold spiritual beauty, see Sol' Zemli, to est' skazanie o zhizni startsa Gefsimanskogo skita ierom. Avvy Isidora, sobrannoe i po poriadku izlozhennoe nedostoinym synom ego dukhovnym Pavlom Florenskim [Salt of the Earth, that is, a telling of the life of the elder of the Gethsemane hermitage hieromonk Abba Isidor, collected and reported in an organized way by his unworthy spiritual son Pavel Florensky], Sergiev Posad, 1909 (= Khristianin, 1908, Nos. 10, 11, 12, and 1909, Nos. 1 and 5). Spirituality is the limit of creaturely beauty; beauty approaches this limit to the extent that it passes from the phenomenal periphery of being to its noumenal root and therefore to the extent that it enters into the divine world: beauty comes from the participation of what is from below in what is above; only the beauty of what is above is autonomous. One can establish the following descending scale of the degrees of beauty: Self-beauty or the Comforter > Spirit-bearing > spiritual > admirable > beautiful > comely > charming > pretty > not bad, etc.
- 569. A term introduced by N. V. Bugaev in his articles "Geometriia proizvol'nykh velichin" [Geometry of arbitrary quantities] and "Preryv. geometriia" [Discontinuous geometry].
- 570. In the example cited, I did not consider, of course, the real or imaginary possibility of *change* in the spatial form of perception, as indicated by C. H. Hinton in *The New Era of Thought* and in *The Fourth Dimension*. For an exposition of Hinton's ideas, see P. D. Ouspensky, *Chetvertoe izmerenie* [The fourth dimension], S.P., 1909 and *Tertium Organum*, S.P., 1911.
- 571. To Kant belongs the achievement of clarifying that the "unity of apperception" is not a simple given but a *synthetic* unity, i.e., one that is in the process

of being established. The integrity of the empirical person is, once again, a living integrity, developed by the "art of arts," and not merely given. But, from another point of view, the "unity of apperception" is the unity of the *entire* world. The integrity of the person is the integrity of all creation. But this experience, as well as this creation, is conceived as something organized, as a single organism. Here both gnoseology and metaphysics confront Paul's doctrine of the Church as a single organism, of which each individual person is a member.

572. Even though the word *sophia* is translated as wisdom, by no means does it signify a simple passive perception of the given; by no means does it signify reason, knowledge, or science, etc. Instead, it points quite definitely at creativity (see Prellwitz, n. 18 supra, SS. 294–295), at art, at building, so that in translating the name Sophia into modern language it would be necessary to say [female] Builder, Artificer, Artist, etc. The etymon of the words sophia, sophos, as well as the equivalent Sanskrit dhrobhos, is clarified from the most ancient form, that is, from tFophos, deriving from the root dhvobo; dhvob means "passend machen," "to make suitable," to "adapt," and therefore initially sophos = Tfophos = faber = artificer, master (see Prellwitz, SS. 294–295). In Homer and Hesiod, Sophia and other derivatives of the same root are used in the sense of technical knowledge, i.e., in the sense of the capability of embodying a certain intention in reality. Thus, in Homer we read: "In the same way that a chalk-line directs the cutting of a ship's timber in the hands of an artful carpenter, who has learned his wisdom in obedience to Athena's inspiration, so the battles fought by the two armies were pulled even (all höste stathmē doru nēion exithunei tektonos en palamēisi, daēmomos ho ra te pasēs eu eidē sophiēs hupothēmosunēisin Athēnes" (The Illiad, trans. N. M. Minsky, M., 1896, XV, 410–413; Homerica Carmina, ed. A. Nauck, V. I., lias, pars post., XV, 410-413, Berolini, 1879, p. 73). The Hebrew khokhma or khokma, a word derived from HKhM, has the same meaning in all the Semitic languages: "to be reasonable, wise," and, originally, "to be strong in reason" whence khakam, wise, a wise man. "If in some places [of the Bible] wisdom is portrayed as a state accessible to people, in other places it is attributed only to God, the only possessor of wisdom from all eternity. The key to this riddle of duality must be sought in the Biblical teaching of the human soul as the breath of Divinity (Gen. 2:7; cf. Eccl. 12:7). The Divine faculty of wisdom, as perfect knowledge, is eternal and immeasurable, but, to the extent that man is the image of God, he can—under certain conditions—receive from the Lord this celestial gift . . ." In some places, "wisdom is personified; to wisdom is attributed, as it were, an independent power of action, although a power that depends upon God," that is, "wisdom is personified as God's creative and providential power ..." (A. P. Rozhdestvensky, Kniga premudrosti Iususa syna Sirakhova [The book of the wisdom of Jesus, son of Sirach], S.P., 1911, pp. 2-3). The Old Testament teaching of Sophia is examined by Benkenstein in Der Begriff d. Chokhma in den Hagiographen des Alten Testaments. Inaug.-Dissert. Nordhausen, 1895 (in Sec. 58 there is a bibiliography). V. Solovyov, Rossiia i Vselenskaia Tserkov' [Russia and the Universal Church], see n. 5 supra, Bk. 3, pp. 303–451, especially Chaps. 3-5, pp. 325-353. "How justly in all languages is wisdom distinguished from reason! True wisdom consists in recognizing the rights of reason in theory while trusting it as little as possible in practice. From this contradiction it follows that absolute significance belongs not to the intellectual but to the moral sphere, in which there is no contradiction, for the rules 'do not commit adultery' or 'do not steal more than you have to' are equally good in theory and in practice" (Solovyov, Letter 9 to A. A. Fet, 21 Aug-6 Sept., 1888, *Solovyov's Letters*, Vol. 3, ed. E. L. Radlov, S.P., 1911, p. 118.

- 573. The patristic understanding (especially characteristic of Gregory of Nyssa) of the single "essence" of creation is clarified by Antonii (Khrapovitsky), Archbishop of Volynsk in *Nravstvennaia ideia dogmata tserkvi* [Moral idea of the dogma of the Church] in *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., S.P., 1911. V.A. Troitsky, *Triedinstvo Bozhestva i edinstvo chelovechestva* [The Triunity of Divinity and the unity of mankind], M., 1912 (= *Golos Tserkvi*, 1912, No. 10). It also serves as the foundation in S. Bulgakov, *Filosofia khoziastva* [Philosophy of economy], Vol. 1, M., 1912, in Solovyov's doctrine of the church, and so on. The entire history of the fall, of economy, of redemption and salvation, the doctrine of the sacraments, and so on, receive a real meaning in the light of this notion; outside of it, they are empty formulas.
- 574. Cf. n. 332 supra. This doctrine was stated in a definitive form in medieval philosophy. See Stöckl, n. 332 supra; also by the same author: History and System of Medieval Philosophy, trans. N. Strelkov and I. E. under the supervision of I. V. Popov, M., 1912. G. Eicken, History and System of the Medieval World-view, trans. from the German by V. N. Lin', S.P., 1907. Ch. Jourdain, La Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, Paris, 1858. J. H. Loewe, Der Kampf zwischen dem Realismus u. Nominalismus im Mittelalter, Prague, 1876 (= Abh. d. k. böhm. Ges. d. His. VI F., 8 Bd.). W. Windelband, History of Philosophy, trans. from the German by P. Rudin, S.P., 1898, pp. 241–323. This idea has also been expressed by modern thinkers; see S. S. Glagolev, Po voprosam logiki [On questions of logic], Kharkov, 1910, pp. 215–21.
 - 575. Cf: pp. 143–50 of the present work.
- 576. Bishop Theophanus the Recluse, *Tolkovanie na 1-oe poslavnie k Kor.* 8:3 [Commentary on 1 Corinthians 8:3], p. 266. Cf. p. 47 and n. 75 supra.
- 577. "Neglected in our theological systems and not noticed in particular [by V. I. Nesmelov] are the words of Solomon's Book of Wisdom: 'God made man the image of His eternal being' (2:23). Thus, not only are our intellect and moral demands a miniature image of God, but even *eternity*, i.e., a property precisely of absolute being, has its reflection in the person of man" (Antonii, Archbishop of Volynsk, *Novyi opyt ucheniia o bogopoznanii* [A new attempt at a doctrine of the knowledge of God] in *Collected Works*, Kazan', 1900, Vol. 3, p. 427). "How is the eternal manifested in time (there is no doubt that it is manifested in time)? In order to make this accessible to reason and to annihilate all contradictions, it is necessary to keep thought from fragmentation and to conceive time in its entirety. Then, if time does not become comparable with eternity, it will at least be a nuance of it, since it is a flickering reflection of eternity at rest. Thus, it is not surprising that eternity is manifested in time" Innokenti, *O Boge voobshche* [On God in general], see n. 126 supra, p. 273.
- 578. Bertrand Russell, "L'idée d'ordre et la position absolue dans l'espace et le temps" (Bibl. du Congr. Intern. de Philos., Paris, 1901, T. 3, pp. 241–277). "Il faut d'abord distinguer parmi les séries celles qui sont des positions, et celles qui ont des positions. Les nombres entiers, les quantités, les instants (s'il y en a) sont des positions; les collections, les grandeurs particulières, les événements ont des positions" (ibid., p. 242).

- 579. In other words, "time" has the same relation to "Time" as, in general, Cantor's "Ordnungstypus" has to a "set." This "time" is precisely an order type of Time. On order types, see n. 1 supra and notes 845, 856, and 857 infra.
 - 580. Origen, On first Principles, III, 5:3; PG, Vol. 11, col. 327 sq.
 - 581. See n. 351 supra.
- 582. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 4, On the World (Russ. trans. Vol. 4, p. 229).
 - 583. Ibid., p. 230.
- 584. Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Greeks, I; trans. Korsunsky, p. 64.
- 585. The Deluge, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrha, the sinking of Atlantis, the events on Martinique and in Mexico are examples of how the earth shakes from itself blasphemers and enemies of God.
- 586. These and related questions are treated in detail in the manuscript work, P. Florensky, *Ideia Tserkvi* [Idea of the Church], 1906, especially Ch. 5, Par. 3. Also see Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, Bd. I, Erst. Kap., Sec. 4, SS. 36–38; trans. A. Petrovsky and P. Florensky, pp. 64–66. Smirnov, *Dukh. ot.*, see n. 533 *supra*, esp. pp. 165–71. V. A. Troitsky, *Ocherk iz ist. dogmata o Tserkvi* [Essay on the history of the dogma of the Church], Sergiev Posad, 1912; in the index, see: "the power of the keys," "charismatics," etc. Within certain limits, this view is typical of the Eastern Church, whereas the juridical understanding of confession arose in the West and reached its full maturity there. This view of confession is clearly expressed by Symeon the New Theologian.
- 587. Letters of V. S. Solovyov, see n. 572 supra, Vol. 2 (= Vest. Evrop., Bk. 1, p. 212).
- 588. This manuscript is not dated, but it has a watermark from 1812, and, according to the observation of an investigator of the manuscripts of M. M. Speranksy, watermarks "usually coincide fairly precisely—within a year or two—with the actual year of writing" (A. V. El'chaninov, "Mistitsizm M. M. Speranskogo" [M. M. Speransky's Mysticism], Bogoslovsky Vestnik, 1906, No. 1, p. 99).
- 589. Here are some approving appraisals of Speransky's mysticism: "He depicts the work of the spiritual life and he does this in a very healthy way" (Bishop Theophanus, *Pis'ma o dukhovnoi zhizni* [Letters on spiritual life], 4th ed. M., 1903, pp. 7–8, 10). "He was a man who had developed in himself a full Christian life" (ibid., p. 10), and so on. But since it is based on the ten letters of Speranksy published in *Russkii Arkhiv* for 1870, such an assessment must be considered hasty and insufficiently grounded (see El'chaninov, n. 588 *supra*, pp. 109–110).
- 590. The phrase "ot sozdaniia" [from the creation] is here used to render apo katabolēs. The Slavonic translation has "ot slozheniia" [from the composition]; Luther's German has "Von Anbeginn"; the English has "from the foundation"; the Italian has "dalla fundazione"; Osterwald's French has "dès la création"; Bèze's Latin has the peculiar "a jacto mundi fundamento." The word katabolē is explained by the synonyms: "to kataballein katathesis Plerōmē (epi cheiras) themeliōma enarxis archē, katagōgē," etc. Ek or apo katabolēs signifies "apo kainourgēs, apo themeliou, ex archēs, apo mias archēs" (Lexikon tēs Ellenikēs Chlōssēs suntethen men upo Skarlatou d. tou Buzantiou, echdothen de . . . upo Andreou koromela, en Athēnais, 1852, p. 666). But despite this agreement of the translators, Origen affirms that the word "constitutio", i.e., "composition" or

"creation," which even at that time designated the act of the organization of this world, is an unsuccessful translation of the Greek katabolē. According to Origen, katabolē must rather be translated as "casting down" than as composition or creation; thus the word katabolē is taken to signify the casting down of all creatures in general from a higher state to a lower one: "per katabolē, a superioribus ad inferiora videtur judicari, deductio . . ." (Origen, On First Principles III, 5:4; PG, Vol. 11, col. 329, 328), and "katabolē, quod Latine improprie translatum constitutionem mundi dixerunt; katabolē vero in graeco magis dejicere significat, id est deorsum jacere . . . (ibid., col. 328). Such a translation would, in any case, be an exact etymological equivalent of kata-ballō, i.e., "from above I throw down."

- **591.** P. Florensky's paschal homily "Nachal'nik zhizni" [The head of life] (Sergiev Posad, 1907 = Khristianin, 1907, No. 4) is an attempt to give an artistic religious synthesis of these ideas of the Kingdom of God as a transcendent reality existing before the world. Also see A. Bukharev, Issledovanie o dostoinstve, tselosti i proiskhozdenii 3-ii knigi Ezdry [Investigation into the dignity, integrity, and origin of the 3rd Book of Esdras], M., 1864.
- 592. On the different interpretations of the "Kingdom of God" in the Gospels see N. G. Gorodensky, "Novozavet. uchenie o Tsarstve Bozh. v noveishei bogos. lit. Zapada" [The New Testament doctrine of the Kingdom of God in the modern theological literature of the West] (Cht. v Ob. liub. dukh. pr., Ch. 31, 1894, 2, pp. 747-814). Father P. Ia. Svetlov, Ideia Tsarstva Bozhiia v ee znachenii dlia khrist. mirosozertsaniia [The idea of the Kingdom of God in its significance for the Christian worldview], Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, 1906. M. M. Tareev, Osnovy khr-va [Foundations of Christianity], Sergiev Posad, 1908, Vol. 2. Schmoller, Die Lehre von Reiche Gottes in den Schriften Neues Testaments, 1891. Weiss, Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes, 1892. Issel, Die Lehre von Reiche Gottes in Neuen Test., 1891. J. Bovon, Théologie du Nouveau Testament, Lausanne, 1893-1894. Bern. Weiss, Lehrbuch d. Bibl. Theol. des Neuen Test., Berlin, 1868. J. Holtzmann, Lehrbuch der neutest. Theol., Freiburg i/B u. Lpz., 1897. G. B. Stevens, The Theology of the New Test., Edinburgh, 1901. J. M. King, The Theology of Christ's Teaching, London, 1902. On the question of Judaic apocalyptics see Father A. Smirnov, Messiansk. ozhidaniia i verovaniia iudeev okolo vremen I. Kh. [Messianic expectations and beliefs around the time of Christ], Kazan', 1889. Prince S. N. Trubetskoi, Uchenie o Logose [Doctrine of Logos], Vol. 1, M., 1900 (= Collected Works, Vol. 4). N. N. Glubokovsky, Blagovestie sv. Ap. Pavla [The Gospel of the Apostle Paull, Bk. 1, S.P., 1905. Tareev, op. cit. S. N. Bulgakov "Apokaliptika i sotsializm" [Apocalyptics and Socialism] in Dva grada [Two cities], vol. 2, see n. 368 supra (= Russ. M., 1910, Books 6-7). F. Weber, Jüdische Theologie auf Grund d. Talmud und verwandter Schriften . . ., her. von F. Delitzsch u. Schnedermann, 2-te Aufl. Lpz., 1897.
 - 593. 10, 5; Funk, see n. 136 supra, S. 6.
- 594. Ibid., S. XX. Cf. I. Popov, *Konspekt lekstii po patrologii* [Digest of lectures on patrology], 1911–12, M., p. 13.
 - 595. 2nd Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, 14. Funk, SS. 75–76.
- 596. Th. Zahn, *Der Hirt der Hermas*, Gotha, 1868. Other scholars date this work back to the year 140. Cf. Funk, S. XXXII; Popov, see n. 593 *supra*, pp. 19–20.

- 597. Hermas, The Shepherd, IX, 1:1; Funk, S. 211.
- 598. Vision III, 10:3-5; Funk, SS. 158-159.
- 599. Vision II, 4:1; Funk, S. 149.
- 600. Vision I, 1:6; Funk, S. 144.
- 601. Vision III, 3:3; Funk, S. 125. On the notions of the "mystical church" and the "historical church" and on the unjustified separation of the two among Protestants and people of the "new religious consciousness," see Ern, *Istoricheskaia tserkov*', n. 17 *supra*, pp. 321–28. On the affirmation (and even an excessively catholicizing one) of the element of visibility in the Church on the basis of the Syriac 'edta (emma, 'edta), corresponding to the Hebrew eda, which was probably used by the Savior, see V. V. Bolotov, *Lectures*, n. 241 *supra*, I. *Introduction to Church History*, S.P., 1907, I, 2, pp. 10–13.
- 602. The 1st canon of the 6th Ecumenical Council (or, more correctly, a local council, for, according to Aristene, neither the 5th nor the 6th councils published rules) indicates very precisely that condemnation was applied to people "somaton tinon kai psuchon hēmin periodous kai alloiodeis anapempasantas tais tou nou paraphorais te kai oneirōxesi" or, according to the Slavonic translation, "who by the dreams of an errant mind present shamed to our thought the returns and transformations of certain bodies and souls" (Rules ..., see n. 525 supra, p. 439). In other words, what is condemned here is not the teaching of the supratemporal nature of the human person, but the teaching of metempsychosis and metensomatosis. This condemned idea of the preexistence of the soul in time is undoubtedly of non-Christian origin and is most powerfully expressed in India. V. Miloslavsky, Drevnee iazychesk. uchenie o stranstvovaniiakh i pereseleniakh dush [The ancient pagan doctrine of the wanderings and transmigrations of souls], Kazan', 1873. V. A. Kozhevnikov, "Povesti o perevopl. Gotamo Buddy" [Tales of the reincarnation of Gautama Buddha], Bog. V., 1912, Nov. and Dec.: a chapter—remarkable in erudition and penetration—from his study Buddizm v sr. s kh-vom [Buddhism compared to Christianity], Part 2. Also see F. Laudowicz, Wesen u. Urspr. d. Lehre v. Präexistens d. Seele . . . in d. griech. Philos., Berlin; by the same author: De doctrinis ad animarum praexistiam . . . spectantibus, Lipsiae, 1898; both books contain bibiliographies. By contrast, the words of the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, "I was a gifted child and I received a good soul; and being good, I also entered into a pure body" (8:19-20), appear to affirm the doctrine of the preexistence of the soul. In what sense? See N. N. Glubokovsky, n. 592 *supra*, III, 2, pp. 478 sq; there is also a bibliography.
- 603. For this reason Jewish theology spoke of the higher spiritual values as existing before the world or even as eternal. "Six things precede the creation of the world; among them are such that were created and such about which it was decided before creation; the Torah and the Throne of lordship are among the created" (Bereshit Rabba, 1; Weber, see n. 596 supra, S. 16) (Let us remark in passing that this idea of the preexistence of the Throne of lordship influenced Christian iconography, leading to the very widespread, but not less enigmatic, subject of "the preparation of the throne [altar]," which enters into the sophianic compositions. See pp. 269–70 of the present work.) In other Talmudic treatises, namely, in Pesahim 54a, Nedarim 39b, Yalkut Shimeoni, and Bereshit Rabba 20, a rounder number of such things is named: that is, there are seven of them: the Torah, Atonement, the Garden of Eden, Gehenna, the Throne of lordship, the

Sanctuary, and the Messiah. Here, according to the Bereshit Rabba, the Torah and the Throne of lordship are recognized as created before time, while the Fathers, i.e., Israel, the Sanctuary, and the Name of the Messiah, exist before the world in God's thought (Weber, S. 198). In some places, souls are also recognized as preexisting (ibid., SS. 212, 225). The most significant and influential of these teachings is the teaching of the preexistence of the Torah, which fairly closely resembles the teaching of the Supramundane Wisdom of God. The Torah is the reflection of the Being of God, exists eternally, and is called (e.g., in Vaiikr Rabba 20) "the daughter of God" (for details see Weber, SS. 14-18). She is the law not only of the world but also of the Divine existence, such that God creates Himself through the Torah (ibid., S. 17). Through the Torah the world is created, and the Torah contains the plan of its creation; the goal of the world is thus to realize this plan. Connected with this ontology is the distinct ontological sionocentrism of Jewish theology. The holy place is viewed here as the central point for creation, its origin, in relation to which all else lies on the ontological periphery. According to Ioma 54b, the world is created out of Sion; Sion is the center of creation, while, in Pesikta 25b, the Temple is called the heart of the world. As it is said in Sifre 76b and elsewhere, the land of Israel is the first land that was created, and unites in itself all that is contained disparately in the rest of creation. In the same way, the language of Israel has ontological primacy over all other languages. As is witnessed by Bereshit Rabba 18:31 and Yalkut Shimeoni 52, the creative word was uttered in the holy language, in the language of Sion. The very time of the creation of the world is related to the history of the appearance of the holy nation. Rabbi Eliezer (Rot Gashana 10b) says that the world was created in the month of tishri, for it is in tishri that the fathers were born and died, whereas Rabbi Joshua (ibid., 11a) thought that the world was created in the month of nisan because it is in nisan that the fathers were born and died. Other authorities of Judaism have had other opinions but the character of argumentation is the same among all of them (Weber, SS. 198-199). Perhaps related to this sionocentrism is the opinion that "Adam spoke Syriac" (Genealogy Since the Creation of the World, in a manuscript of the Athos Iversk monastery, the Large Panthecte; Bishop Porfirii Uspenskii, Perv. put. v Afonsk. mon. i sk. [First travels to the monasteries and hermitages of Mt. Athos], Part 1, Sec. 2, Kiev, 1877, p. 204). (Cf. Basil the Great, Homilies on the Hexaemeron, 2:6; PG, Vol. 29, col. 44 B; the Syriac language is very expressive and is especially suitable for the understanding of the Holy Scripture.) The first Christian apologists spoke in the same philosophical language; in their consciousness as well, antiquity was synonymous with superiority, that is, with ontological nobility, and therefore, to the reproach of novelty, to the reproach that "they have existed only since yesterday," they would answer: "we are only apparently a new people; we have existed in a hidden way from the beginning and have come before all the peoples; we are God's original people!" They transfer the fundamental postulates of the Judeocentric understanding of history to themselves. These are: (1) our people is more ancient than the world; (2) the world is created for our sake; (3) it is for our sake that it continues to exist; we are delaying the judgment over the world; (4) the entire world—the beginning, middle, and end—is open to us and clear to us; and (5) we shall participate in the judgment over the world and enjoy eternal bliss. These convictions are scattered throughout various early-Christian writings, appearing even before the middle of

the 2nd century, in sermons, apocalypses, epistles, and apologia. Celsus expresses his contempt for the shameless and ridiculous pretensions of the Christians more furiously on this subject than on any other (Origen, *Against Celsus*, IV, 28; Harnack, see n. 494 *supra*, VI, 1, p. 144). (Cf. Tertullian, *Against the Jews*, 2; PL, Vol. 2, col. 637 B, C, 638 B, C, 639 A, etc.).

604. Methodius of Olympus, Andrew of Caesarea, et al.

605. Origen reasons in the following way about the Hypostases of the Holy Trinity: "When we say 'always' or 'was' or employ some other designation of time, this must be taken both in a simple and in a figurative sense, because all such expressions have a temporal sense, while the objects about which we speak admit a temporal designation only in words, but in their nature they surpass all thought of time" (On First Principles, I, 3, Sec. 4; PG, Vol. 11, col. 150). Thus, what should one say about God: "He was," "He is," or "He will be"? In essence, one should say none of the three. But neither can one say the contrary, that "He was not," or that "He is not," or that "He will not be." "God neither "was" nor "was not"; He neither "is" nor "is not"; He neither "will be" nor "will not be." For all these words express different relationships between Time and that which is in Time; they define the relationship of the moments of Time to "now." But God is not in Time, for to be in Time is to belong to the world. Thus, He cannot be put in a relation to "now," and, therefore, to Him one can apply neither "was," nor "is," nor "will be." But, being part of the world, He does not desert the world. Rather, He appears to the world. His appearances are in Time, and therefore it is not right to say about God that "He was not," "is not," and "will not be." He neither "was" nor "was not," but He also "was" and "was not; He neither "is" nor "is not" but He also "is" and "is not." He neither "will be" nor "will not be"; but He also "will be" and "will not be." In brief, although He is not in Time (for Eternity is not in Time), He is also not outside of Time, for Time is in Eternity. Of all the verbal aspects of the word "to be" that have tenses (e.g., the perfective, which denotes a finished action or state; the imperfective, which denotes an unfinished action or state; and the iterative, which denotes the indefinite repeatability of an action or state), none should be applied to God. But neither should one apply to Him those—conceivable—forms that take the verbal themes in abstraction from Time, i.e., without distinction as to tense. Only a special verbal aspect is applicable to God: the eternal aspect, denoting an action or state not in Time but in Eternity. The Russian language is richer than other languages in that, in general, it has preserved the idea of the verbal aspect (so intrinsic to the ancient languages), and in that it has preserved some of the aspects. But we do not find this eternal aspect in our native language, just as, and even more so, we do not find it in the Western languages. In order to find this aspect, we must turn to the East, namely to the Assyrian language. It had three verbal aspects: (1) the perfective, to denote finished action, i.e., associated with a definite time; (2) the imperfective, to denote an unfinished action, i.e., relating to an indefinite time; and (3) the eternal aspect, to denote timeless or supratemporal action. Western scholars, unaccustomed to aspect and lacking all feeling for it, since it is absent in all verbs expect the Slavonic ones and, in part, in the Greek ones—these scholars attempt to equate these aspects with tenses and call them perfectum, imperfectum, aoristum and, finally, permansivum. But they characterize them in such a way that, for us who have become accustomed to aspects, it is evident that these are by no means

tenses but precisely aspects. And in general, since the Semitic languages are deprived of verbal tenses (and all hebraists admit this, although they still stubbornly speak of *praesens* or *futurum*, of *imperfectum* or *aoristum*), there is little hope of finding them in the Assyrian language. As far as the "*permansivum*" that interests us is concerned, "in its form it corresponds to the *perfectum* of other Semitic languages, while in its meaning it corresponds to the participle used as predicate, separately or accompanied by a pronoun, by the Aramaic languages. . . . It signifies a state without definition of present, past, or future tense. In the *permansivum* the distinctions of persons, genders, and numbers are denoted by means of endings, which are nothing else but abbreviated personal pronouns" (V. Scheil and C. Fossey, *Grammaire assyrienne*, Paris, 1901, Part 2, Ch. 5, par. 107–108. Cf. Joachim Ménant, *Exposé des éléments de la grammaire assyrienne*, Paris, 1868, Part 1, Ch. 5, par. 1 sq., pp. 138–41). It is this eternal verbal aspect that is used to denote the acts of the world above.


606. "The word prostoi [simple] in our language has such a multitude or meanings that one must use it with great care if one desires to be clear. Prostoi means: 1) dumb, 2) generous, 3) frank, 4) trusting, 5) uneducated, 6) direct, 7) naive, 8) crude, 9) not proud, 10) smart but not sly. Try to figure out what this word means! For this reason I don't like it" (K. Leontyev, "o Vl. Solovyove i estetike zhizni" [On Vl. Solovyov and the aesthetics of life], M., 1912, Letter 1, from 24 Jan. 1891, p. 8). Because of this ambiguity of the word prostota [simplicity], it is useful to clarify concretely its higher sense, i.e., as applied to ascetics. And so, who has prostota? "There is humility from fear of God and there is humility from love of God: one humbles himself from fear of God, another from joy. One who is humble from fear of God is accompanied at all times by modesty in all his members, piety of feeling, and a contrite heart, whereas one who is humble from joy is accompanied by great simplicity, a growing and unrestrainable heart" (Isaac the Syrian, Oration 89; 58 in the Theot. edition; Works, 3rd ed., Sergiev Posad, 1911, p. 42). Simplicity is the source and root of purity. "Purity is the forgetting of means of knowing through nature, of means adopted from nature in the world. And to become liberated from these means and to step outside them, here is the limit to this: one must arrive at original *simplicity* and at the original innocence of one's nature, and become like a child, but without the deficiencies of children. Abba Sisoes achieved this to such a degree that he would ask his disciple: 'Did I eat or not?' And another of the Fathers arrived at such a simplicity and almost at a childish innocence, forgetting all that is here, that he would have eaten before communion if his disciples did not stop him; and they would conduct him to communion as they would a child. Thus, for the world he was a child while for God he was perfect in soul" (Isaac the Syrian, Oration 21; 85 in the Theot. edition; Works, p. 97).

- 607. Hermas, The Shepherd, Vision V, 7; Funk, S. 164.
- 608. Ibid., Vision III, 8; Funk, SS. 156-157.
- 609. Ibid., Vision I, 1-2; Funk, SS. 144-146.
- 610. Ibid., Parable X, 3; Funk, SS. 237-238.
- **611.** Ibid., Vision II, 3:2–3.
- **612.** Athanasius the Great, *To Serapion*, I, 26. S. Athanasii Arch. Alexandr. Opera Omnia . . . opera et studio Monachorum Ordinis s. Benedicti, Parisiis, 1798, T. I, 2, p. 675.

- 613. Athanasius, Against the Arians, 2nd Oration, 78-79; ibid. T. I, 1, pp. 545-47.
 - 614. Ibid., 79, p. 547.
 - 615. See n. 21 supra.
 - 616. Athanasius, see n. 613 supra, 80, pp. 547-48.
 - 617. Ibid., 81, pp. 548–49.
 - 618. Ibid., 81, p. 549.
 - 619. Ibid., 76, p. 543.
 - **620.** Ibid., 76–77, pp. 543–45.
- **621.** Cf. I.V. Popov, *Religioz. ideal sv. Afan.* [The religious ideal of St. Athanasius], Sergiev Posad, 1904 (= *B. V.*, 1903–1904); by the same author: *Konspekt*, see n. 594 *supra*, pp. 153–68.
- 622. See n. 573 supra. P. Florensky, Radost' na veki [Joy for Ages], Sergiev Posad, 1907.
 - 623. Gregory of Nyssa, PG, Vol. 46, col. 245.
 - 624. Macarius the Great, Hom. 7:3; PG, Vol. 46, col. 245.
 - 625. Gregory of Nazianzus, Gnomic Couplets, p. 44; PG, Vol. 37, col. 914.
 - 626. Dostoevsky, The Devils.
- 627. Clement of Rome, *Epistles on Virginity or to Virgins*, Epistle 1, Ch. 5 (*Tr. Kiev. Dukh. Ak.*, 1869, Vol. 2, p. 205). According to the Latin translation done by the cardinal of Villecourt from the Syriac, the end of this passage has an entirely different sense, namely: "*Nunc quae te sors beata in coelesti Jerusalem maneat, perpendisti?*" (PG, Vol. 1, col. 390).
- 628. Isaac the Syrian, *Oration 5* in the Russ. trans., 2nd ed., 1893, p. 37 (Theot. = 44, pp. 275–276). Cf. *Oration 9*, p. 54 (Theot. = 7, 656); *Oration 34*, pp. 154, 155–56 (Theot. = 37, pp. 235–36, 238–39); *Oration 57*, p. 294 (Theot. = 57, p. 77).
 - **629.** Ibid., *Oration* 68, p. 347 (Theot. = 2, pp. 12–13).
- 630. The names of revealed icons of the Mother of God are in italics. The other names are taken from church hymns. The icons of the Mother of God are described in numerous works. Let us mention some of them, taking some of the titles from the article of Sergius, Archbishop of Vladimir, "Russkaia literatura ob ikonakh Presviatoi Bogoroditsy" [Russian literature on icons of the Holy Mother of God] in Strannik, 1900, June-July. Archimandrite Ioannikii Goliatovskii, Novoye nebo, s novymi zvezdami sotvorennoye, t. e. preblagosloven. Deva Bogoroditsa s chudesami svoimi [The new heaven, created with new stars, that is, the most blessed Virgin Mother of God with her miracles]; there are numerous editions: 1662, 1667, 1699. G. Sveshnikov, Opisanie iavlenii chudotvornykh ikon Presviatoi Bogoroditsy [Description of revelations of miracle-working icons of the Most Holy Mother of God], 1838. Hieromonk Sergius of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, Izobrazhenie ikon Presviatoi Bogoroditsy [Depiction of icons of the Most Holy Mother of God], 1848, 2nd ed., 1853. S. I. Ponomarev, "Alfavitnyi spisok ikon Bogomateri" [Alphabetical list of icons of the Mother of God], published in Palomnik, 1889. Archbishop Dimitrii, Mesiatseslov [Menology], 1893 and following years. Skazaniia o zemnoi zhizni Presv. Bogoroditsy [Tales of the earthly life of the Most Holy Mother of God], 1897, 7th ed., Panteleimonov monastery on Mt. Athos; to this is appended a bibliography of the Church Slavonic and Russian literature on the Mother of God since 1611. This list has been

expanded by P. S. Kazansky in Velichie Presv. Bogoroditsy i Prisnodevy Marii [Grandeur of the Most Holy Mother of God and the Ever-Virgin Mary], 1845; by the same author: Slava Presvitaoi Vlad. nashei Bogoroditsy i Prisnodevy Marii [The Glory of our Most Holy Queen the Mother of God and Ever-Virgin Mary], 1853; also by the same author: Blagodeianiia Bogomateri rodu khristianskomu chrez Ee sviatye ikony [Beneficent works of the Mother of God performed for Christians through Her holy icons], 1891. Sofia Snessoreva, Zemnaia zhizn' Presviatoi Bogoroditsy [The earthly life of the Most Holy Mother of God], 1891. Rohault de Fleury, La Sainte Vierge, Paris, 1878, 2 volumes.

631. The icon "Lovingkindness" [Umilenie] is remarkable in that the Mother of God is portrayed here without the Infant and even before His conception—at the instant the Archangel brings her the tidings of joy. That is, She is depicted as the Most Pure Vessel of the Holy Spirit. In St. Seraphim's cell, seven candlestands, occupying almost the entire cell, were lit before this icon, and this again signifies the Holy Spirit in Its seven gifts, the seven highest spirits. The plan of St. Seraphim's cell was drawn by N. A. Motovilov (see S. Nilus, Velikoe v malom [The Great in the small], 2nd ed. Tserskoye Selo, 1905, in Sluzhka Bozhiei Materi i Serafimov [Servant of the Mother of God and of Seraphim], IV, p. 110). When he was still a young boy, Motovilov would be taken by his mother to see St. Seraphim in this cell. Once the boy, astonished by the abundance of candles, began to run around and frolic in the cell. His mother stopped him with a reproach, but Seraphim contradicted her: "The Angel of God is playing with the little boy! How can one stop a boy in his carefree games! Play, play, little child! Christ be with you!" (ibid., pp. 110-11). On the fact that St. Seraphim had prescribed that the icon "Lovingkindness" be called "Joy of All joys" (here the Mother of God is compared with the Comforter), see ibid., Poezdka v Sarovskuiu pustyn' [Pilgrimage to the Hermitage of Sarov], XVII, p. 80.



A is the door to the cell. B and C are windows. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are large candlestands with burning candles. 8 is a little table supporting the icon "Mother of God, Joy of All Joys." 9 is the bench on which the Saint slept. 10 is the rock that served as his pillow. 11 is a couch. 12 is the anteroom in which the Saint's casket lay later.

- 632. Epi doi chairei, Kecharitōmeme, pasa hē ktisis, Aggelōn to sustēma, kai anthropon to genos . . . Epi soi chairei, Kecharitomene, pasa hē ktisis doxa soi (Heirmologion, ekdosis Iōan. Nikolaidou, en Athēnais, 1906, p. 208). Epi soi chairei, i.e., rejoices in Thee, Thou art the source and object of joy: chairein epi tini or en tini, to rejoice in something or someone. Remarkable also is the likening of "making joyful" and "giving grace"; this is the same verb, chairo. Thus, one can convey the meaning as: "By Thou, Who hast received the Comforter, creation receives Him . . ." Pasa he ktisis is integral creation, creation as a single organism, but not just "any" creation. Aggelon to sustema is conveyed poorly by the word "assembly" for soustēma—holotēs hē sōma ek pollôn merōn-melōn ē prōsopōn sunistamenon ē sunithemenon, "kosmos" (Anthim Gazes, n. 135 supra, Vol. 3, p. 529)—again, an integral unity, not a sum. Anthropon to genos signifies the human race as something unitary, the prius of every man. Thus, it signifies all creaturely being as a single Entity spiritualized by the Spirit-Bearer. Cf. the picture In Thou rejoiceth: Dionysius Phurnoagraphiotes, Herminia or Instruction in the Art of Painting, 1701–1733, trans. Porfirii, Bishop of Chigirinsk, Kiev, 1868, pp. 155-56, Part 3, V, 11.
- 633. When in 1780 the Mother of God appeared to the youth Prokhor, later St. Seraphim, at a time when he was sick, She told him, pointing out Prokhor to John the Divine: "This one is of our kind." She said these words concerning other saints as well, for example, the 80-year-old starets Archimandrite Paisii in the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra. The hieromonk Ioasaf told about this in an anonymous book: "Zhitie startsa Serafima, Sarovskoi obiteli ierom., pustynnozhitelia i zatvornika [Life of the starets Seraphim, hieromonk of the Hermitage of Sarov, hermit and recluse], S.P., 1863, p. 25 and n. These cases are not exclusive; one could mention others.
 - 634. Paterik of Mount Athos, n. 485 supra, Part 1, pp. 78-135, 171-78.
 - 635. See n. 532 supra.
 - 636. See n. 568 supra.
- 637. The exclamation "Rejoice, pillar of virginity" (*Eir.*, n. 632 *supra*, p. 205) is found in the Acathist of the Mother of God, ikos 10; it was taken from Chrysostom's Oration on the Annunciation (*Chet'i Minei* of Macarius, ff. 602, 604, 616). This exclamation is omitted in the Russ. trans. of Chrysostom's *Works*, S.P., 1896, Vol. 2:2, pp. 854–57.
- **638.** However, one should not look for a necessarily physiological foundation in this spiritual makeup.
 - 639. Nilus, see n. 631 supra, Sluzhka B. M., IX (actually X), pp. 125-28.
- 640. This is the truth about the Mother of God that Catholics have expressed in their crude and rationalistic way in the dogma of the immaculate conception. Cf. Father A. Lebedev, *Raznosti tserkvei Vostoka i Zapada v uchenii Presviatoi Deve Marii Bogoroditsy* [Differences between the Eastern and Western Churches concerning the doctrine of the Most Holy Virgin Mary, Mother of God], Vol. 1: O *neporochnom zachatii* [On the immaculate conception], S.P., 1903, 2nd ed.
 - 641. Canon of Odighitria, 8th ode, Theotokion.

- 642. In the ranks of angels, represent "the Mother of God with outspread arms and inscribe above her: *Mother of God, Queen of the angels*" (Dionysius Phurnoagraphiotes, see n. 632 *supra*, Part 4:1, p. 233).
- 643. Nicholas Cabasilas, Explanation of the Divine Liturgy, 38; Works of the Church Fathers, see n. 328 supra, Vol. 3, p. 385.
 - 644. pp. 381-83.
- 645. Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Apostle and Evangelist John the Divine, PG, Vol. 5, col. 941–944.
 - 646. Ibid., col. 943.
 - 647. Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Virgin Mary, ibid., col. 943-944.
- 648. The Most Holy Virgin Mary, Answering Letter to St. Ignatius, ibid., col. 945-946.
- 649. Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names. I cite from R. de Fleury, n. 630 supra, Vol. 1. Sec. 12, pp. 237–38.
- 650. Nicephoros Callistos took his description from Epiphanius: Letter to Theophilus: on icons. There is a translation of Epiphanius' text in the Great Chet'i Minei of Macarius, ed. 1868, Sept., p. 363 sq.
 - 651. Ambrose of Milan, On Virgins, II, 67.
 - 652. Nicephoros Callistos, see n. 650 supra.
- 653. That is why the acceptance or nonacceptance of the cry "Holy Mother of God, save us!" determines the Orthodoxy or non-orthodoxy of a mind-set (pp. 258–59 of the present text; cf. n. 639 supra). The well-known N. N. Nepliuev, who for a long time was suspected of Protestantism, was completely sincere when he said, aghast, that "this cry 'save us' addressed to a mere woman seemed blasphemous to him." Yes, it would necessarily be blasphemous if the Mother of God were accounted a "mere woman." But She is the Church, and Protestantism rejects the Church. That is the crux of the matter.
- 654. Ambrose of Milan, De virginibus, De viduis, De virginitate, De institutione virginis, Exhortatio virginitatis, De lapsu virginis consecratae (PL, Vol. 16; Works of St. Ambrose of Milan on the Question of Virginity and Marriage, Russ. trans. A. Voznesensky, under the supervision of L. Pisarev, Kazan', 1901.)
- 655. Ambrose of Milan, *De institutione* . . . , V, 35; PL, 314A; Russ. trans. p. 178.
 - 656. De virginibus, I, 3:11; PL, 191C; Russ. trans. p. 6.
 - 657. De institutione . . . , VII, 50; PL, 319A; Russ. trans. p. 184.
 - 658. Ibid., VII, 50; col. 319 A, B; pp. 184–85.
 - 659. Ibid., XIII, 81; col. 325A; p. 193.
 - 660. Ibid. Cf. col. 324C-326A; pp. 193-94.
 - 661. De virginibus, II, 2:6; col. 268C; pp. 31–32 (II, 1:6).
 - 662. Ibid., II, 2:15; col. 210 D; p. 35 (II, 11:15).
 - 663. Ibid., I, 8:52; col. 202C–203A; p. 52.
 - 664. De institutione, XIV, 87; col 326B; p. 194.
 - 665. Ibid., XIV, 89; col. 326C-327A; p. 195.
 - **666.** For example, *Exhortatio* . . ., X, 66; pp. 234–35.
 - 667. Ibid., XV, 93–94; col. 327C–328A; pp. 196–97.
 - 668. Ibid., X, 67; p. 235.
 - 669. De virginibus, I, 3:12; col. 192A; p. 7.
 - 670. Ibid., I, 5:22; col. 195A; p. 10.

- 671. Ibid., I, 5:20; p. 10.
- 672. Ibid., I, 6:31; col. 197C; pp. 14, 15.
- 673. A. S. Khomyakov, *Opyt katekhizicheskogo ucheniia o Tserkvi* [An Attempt at a Catechetical Doctrine of the Church], Sec. 9 (*Collected Works*, Prague, 1867, Vol. 2, p. 18).
- 674. I have in mind the application of the name Sophia-Wisdom to the 12year-old Jesus Christ, teaching in the Temple of Jerusalem ("Ipat'evskii skladen" [Triptych of Ipatiev], Vestn. arkheol. i istor. izdav. Arkheol. Inst., 1885, fasc. 4, pp. 22, tabl. V, 2) and to Jesus Christ passing around the holy bread and chalice (the icon of the prince of Pinsk Feodor Iv. Yaroslavich, 1499–1522, Arkheologicheskii Vestnik, Vol. 1, p. 193, M., 1867). See N. Pokrovsky, Evangelie v pamiatnikah ikonografii [The Gospel in monuments of iconography], S.P., 1892, p. 375. Among the exceptional variants one can mention a miniature from a 12th-century or perhaps an 11th-century manuscript, the Psychomachia of Prudentius, preserved in the palace library of St. Peter in Lyon. The picture that interests us is situated amid a whole series of allegorical miniatures. It portrays Jesus Christ with a cruciform halo, sitting on a segment. The Lord, who is about thirty, has a beard. Extending both hands, it is as if He is handing over a book with his right hand and a scroll with his left. Near Him is the inscription in large letters: SANCTA SOPHIA. According to Didron, this symbol expresses the fullness of understanding given by Wisdom, for the two most common forms of manuscript—Her instruments—are depicted here, namely, the scroll and the book. According to Guillaume Durand (Rat. div. offic., lib. I, cap. III), Old Testament prophets are represented on icons as holding a scroll, while the Evangelists are represented as holding a book, for the latter are assumed to possess perfect knowledge of God and not only figurative knowledge, and a book—since it is larger than a scroll and is capable of encompassing more content—symbolizes perfect wisdom. However, this observation of the Western symbolist is only partly valid, for cases are known where the prophets were depicted with books and where the apostles were depicted with scrolls. For a copy of the miniature we have discussed above, see M. Didron, Iconographie chrétienne: Histoire de Dieu, Paris, 1843, pp. 160-61; fig. 50.
- 675. Bishop Vissarion [Nechaev], in "Ikony i dr. sviashch. izobrazheniia v russk. Tserkvi" [Icons and other holy images in the Russian Church] (in the collection Dukhovnaia pishcha, 2nd ed., M., 1891, p. 284), calls this Sophia Kholmogorskaia [of the mountain].
- 676. "Zhalobnitsa Blagoveshchenskogo popa Selivestra [Bodiansky] Moskovskie sobory na eretikov XVI v. v tsarste Ivana Vasilievicha Groznogo" [Petition of the Annunciation priest Selivester (Bodiansky): The 16th Century Moscow councils against the heretics during the reign of Ivan the Terrible], M., 1847, p. 20, Akty Arkheograf. Ekspeditsii, Vol. 1, p. 248).
 - 677. Novgorod Chronicle, III, the year 7050.
 - 678. Tolstoy, p. 241. Arsen'ev, pp. 263-64. Filimonov, pp. 5-6.

Nikol'sky, p. 291 n. 703 *infra*. There is a description here of the icon on the cover of the Novgorod *Synodik* of the 17th century (Muraviev, pp. 553–54: see n. 703 *infra*). I have also used several icons of the Sophia of Novgorod, i.e., that of the Dormition Cathedral of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra (the first tier of the iconostasis, the 2nd icon to the right of the royal doors); that of the Dormition

Cathedral of Kostroma (the vestibule fresco, at the entrance, to the right and on the outer sanctuary wall—the northern one, which constitutes a remarkable feature of this church); that in the Church Museum of the Moscow Theological Academy; that in the side vestibule of the Trinity Cathedral of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra; that in the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow (No. 54); a fresco of the Moscow Cathedral of the Dormition; an icon in the Church Museum at the Kiev Theological Academy (No. 2570, triptych), etc.

- 679. Dal' (see n. 8 supra, S.P., 1866, Part 1, pp. 384 = 3rd ed., Vol. 4, col. 606) gives another explanation. He relates the word toroki or torotsi not to toroka or toroko (fastener straps behind a saddle) but to torok, which in the Archangel dialect signifies a gust of wind, a squall. Thus, according to Dal' "toroki or torotsi (iconograph.) are a current of Divine hearing, depicted on icons in the form of a radiant beam, a current, rays," though further on the usual definition for toroki is given, i.e., string or ribbon. One can also point out that the adjective torzhennyi or torchennyi means raised upward, twisted (I. F. Naumov, Dopolneniya i zametki k Tolkovomu Slovariu Dalia [Complements to and comments on Dal''s Dictionary]. Supplement to Vol. 24 of Zap. Imp. Ak. N., No. 1, S.P., 1874, p. 37).
- 680. There is another interpretation of these circles: that is, that "concentric circles, or spheres in cross section, which on ancient icons always surround the Savior, symbolized the concentration of all the Divine properties in the First Born, i.e., wisdom, omnipotence, justice, mercy, royal power, forces, glory, etc., which are represented in the form of circles described from a single center. Such properties were also symbolized by three rays around His head, with the name of God: "He who is, ho HOn" (V. Arsen'ev, see n. 703 infra, p. 261).
- 681. N. Pokrovsky, Evangelie v pamiatnikah ikonografii i iskusstva [The Gospel in monuments of iconography and art], 2nd ed., S.P., 1892, pp. 374–375. By the same author: Ocherki pamiatnikov khristianskoi ikonografii i iskusstva [Descriptions of monuments of Christian iconography and art], 2nd ed. S.P., 1900, pp. 426–27, 433.
 - 682. For more detail on this subject see Filimonov, n. 703 infra, pp. 15-18.
- 683. Such is the icon of Sophia found in the Optina Hermitage in the cell of the rector M. This icon is of fine, apparently Italian craftsmanship (I judge by the painting technique and by the inscriptions, Greek and Slavonic, that are made so ungrammatically that they show the iconographer's complete ignorance of these languages). I have also seen something like this icon in the Tiflis Church Museum in the Sion Cathedral, in the apartments of the Metropolitan of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, and elsewhere.
- 684. This is the case for the Kiev icon; on the icon described here not everything can be deciphered owing to the minuteness of the images.
- 685. Father A. Sulotsky, *Opisanie kratkoe vsekh tserkvei, suchestviushchikh v g. Tobol'ske, i prostrannoe Tobol'slogo Sofiiskgogo Sobora* [A brief description of all the churches in the city of Tobolsk and an extended description of the Tobolsk Cathedral of Sophia], M., 1852. There are two icons of Sophia in the Tobolsk Cathedral; one is local, the other is reduced.
- 686. For more detail on this subject see Filimonov, p. 20; Lebedintsev, p. 556 sq.; Orlovsky, pp. 50–52; Bolkhovitinov, p. 16 sq.; Tolstoy, pp. 458–60; Muraviev, p. 553, n. 703 *infra*.

687. The frame is more recent.

688. F. I. Buslaev, Lits. Apok., see n. 290 supra.

689. A.I. Kirpichnikov, "Uspenie Bozhiei Materi v legende i v iskusstve" [Dormition of the Mother of God in legend and in art], Trudy VI Arkheol. s'ezda v Odesse, Odessa, 1888, p. 227.

690.

From this diagram one can see that the entire iconostasis of the Kievan Cathedral of Sophia is suffused with an apocalyptic spirit, and become convinced that the idea of Sophia and her icons have an apocalyptic element. The icons are arranged in the following manner: A is an icon of the Savior; B is an icon of the Mother of God, with the inscription "The Queen standing on my right hand," so that the Mother of God is identified with the "Bride" of Ps 44. C is an icon of Sophia-Wisdom; D is the Emmaeus group, with the inscription "I am among them," i.e., again the enigmatic radiance of the transfigured flesh. A special tone is imparted to the iconostasis by the medallions that are located beneath the above-named icons and that, unfortunately, are hard to see because of the screen. a depicts eight angels near an altar with a burning flame. One of them is pouring a flame from an amphora onto a chain wrapped around his arm. Two other angels receive trumpets from hands extended from a cloud. Finally, the five remaining angels are blowing trumpets; beneath the icon is the legend: "And the smoke of incense rises from the hand of the angel by the prayers of the saints before the presence of God." Revelation 8. b has the legend: "And to the woman were given two wings of a great eagle, that she might fly into the wilderness before the presence of God." Revelation 12. At the top of the icon is portraved the Woman with child. Both extend their arms upward, to the left corner of the composition, where a luminous triangle is depicted. The woman has turned her head to the right, as if praying for the Woman to the right of her, who is standing on the moon. This second Woman has a crown on her head and angels' wings on her back. Her hands are folded in prayer, and her face is directed to the left, either toward the Woman with child or toward the Triangle. In the lower part of the icon is depicted an Archangel bearing a shield and wearing a knight's helmet with plumes; in his right hand he holds something like fiery rays, with which he is striking—situated to the right of him a Seven-headed Beast coming out of the abyss. Beneath the Archangel is a space filled with fire, while to the right of him, i.e., beneath the beast, are dark waves. Finally, beneath the shining Triangle, a Symbol of the Trinity, and above the Archangel is placed some sort of yellow (gold?) image with a vertical inscription. But I could decipher neither the image nor the inscription, because of the screen in front of the icon. Perhaps, it is permissible to make the assumption that this is the heavenly Jerusalem. Let me mention in passing that the Cathedral of Sophia has yet one more sophianic image: a fresco above the doors of the enclosure. Meanwhile, in the Desiatinnaya Church, at the left (northern) boundary at the royal doors which date from the period of Peter Mogila one can find the same sophianic icon of the Mother of God, but without such an inscription and without the surrounding figures; this is a simplification of the composition of the Kiev Sophia.

691. "The figure of the Mother of God, portrayed in colossal dimensions at the end of our apse, stands on a pedestal with arms raised upward. This is the type that is known in Christian iconography by the name orant, and, in scenes of the Ascension, as the image of the church on earth. This double characterization of the female figure on scenes of the Ascension is confirmed by monuments as well. From the scene on the doors of the Church of St. Sabina, where each orant figure is crowned with diademes by the apostles Peter and Paul, to monuments of a later time, e.g., in the Syriac Gospel, we see the same orant figure. On a vase of the city of Monza (6th century), above the head of the orant is depicted a dove, symbolically fusing the scene of the Ascension with the Descent of the Holy Spirit, for a more perfect expression of the triumph of the church remaining on earth. On monuments from the 9th to the 11th centuries, on the sides of the orant we sometimes encounter only the apostles Peter and Paul, as representatives of the church ex gentibus and ex circumcisione; here the orant is taken as a symbol of the church in general (e.g., on the stone cross of the Cathedral of Novgorod). As a symbol of the church, the orant also has other features: on miniatures of the Armenian Gospel of the 10th century of the Monastery of St. Lazarus, to the orant Peter and Paul reverently extend their arms, covered with cloaks, as if to receive blessing. The orant often stands on a pedestal, as is the case here and in the Greek manuscript of the Imperial Public Library No. 105, in the fresco of the Ascension of the Church of Staro-Ladoga, in our cathedral, and elsewhere. Together with scenes where this figure is characterized as the church on earth, we have examples where it is characterized as Mary. Consequently, in scenes of the Ascension the central figure, portraved in one way or another, has the significance of both the church on earth and the Mother of God, or better: of the image of the church concretely given in the image of Mary" (D. Ainalov and E. Redin, Kievo-Sofiskii Sobor: Issledovanie drevnei mozaicheskoi i freskovoi zhivopisi. [The Cathedral of St. Sophia of Kiev: A study of the sncient mosaic and fresco painting], S.P., 1889, VII, pp. 39-40). This Mary-orant figure was reborn and became widespread starting in the year 431, that is, with the Council of Ephesus, "owing to the growth of the veneration of the Mother of God." The praying Mother of God is, strictly speaking, the Virgin Mary while Mary with the Infant is the figure of the Mother of God. The Most Pure Virgin was venerated as the protectress of kings and, in general, as the "Virgin who has raised her most pure arms in our behalf" (ibid., pp. 40 sq.). Thus, the general conclusion is that "the figure of Mary in the scene of the Ascension in the midst of the twelve apostles refers to the historical fact of the foundation of the church; and Mary thus appears here with the hidden symbolic significance of the figure of the earthly church. Isolated as a separate and independent figure from the scene of the Ascension, she acquires a more special character as Intercessor, while preserving her original significance. In such a relation to the cupola composition, as intercessor before Christ the Pantocrator, She is portrayed at the end of the sanctuary apse; in such a relation she was also depicted in the sanctuary apse of the New Basilica. An inscription of a general character, taken from Psalm 46:5, and realized in mosaic above the icon of the Virgin of our cathedral, is referred to Mary according to the literal understanding of the Greek text. The inscription likens her to the Heavenly city from which Christ came to save the world, and reads: O theos en mesōi autēs kai ou s'aleuthēstai: boēthēsei autēi theos hēmera kai hēmera, i.e., 'God is in the midst of her: she shall not be moved; God shall help her, and that day after day.' This inscription affirms the constant presence of God in Her midst, as the earthly church, and expresses unceasing assistance to members of the church, whose intercessor She is. The Mother of God is depicted on a golden background. A splendid purple cloak falls from her shoulders; a blue-violet stole separates into a multitude of folds. We see these garments on the Mother of God very early: she is dressed this way on the doors of the Church of St. Sabina. The cloak has golden reflections; it has a golden braid and fringe; there are three white crosses on her brow and shoulders; there is a gold cross on each cuff. On Her feet are red boots, the sign of an empress: according to the Byzantine custom, persons of imperial origin wore precious red footwear. The pedestal on which the Mother of God stands symbolizes religious veneration: by its means the figure is separated from and elevated above the other figures" (ibid., pp. 41–42).

- 692. N. P. Kondakov, *Vizantiiskie tserkvi* [Byzantine Churches], Odessa, 1886, p. 28.
- 693. A writer of the 14th century, Philotheus, Patriarch of Constantinople, interpreted Wisdom, in the spirit of the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas, as "the general action of the consubstantial and indivisible Trinity (Sophia . . . hē kionē tēs homoousiou kai adiairetou Triados, tēs mias phēmi kai pantodunamou kai asugchetou Theotētos, estin energeia)" (Bishop Arsenius, Three Discourses of Philotheus, Patriarch of Constantinople, Addressed to Bishop Ignatius with an Explanation of the Expression of the Proverb: "Wisdom hath builded her house," etc., Greek text and Russian translation, Novgorod, 1898, p. 103, sq. III, 3). In essence, this interpretation is not too far removed from the conception of Wisdom as the Church.
 - 694. Zapiski Imperial'nogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva, VIII, 254.
- 695. It was the rare fortune of the Russian people to receive Christianity before its national self-definition had been fully achieved. Christianity collides in the Russian people neither with a formulated doctrine nor with the rich cult of some other religion; nor does it find deeply rooted moral habits or state aspirations. The very language, still untainted and flexible, trustingly allows itself to be molded into a vessel of grace. In other words, Christianity was received by the souls of children, and the entire further growth of these souls, and their entire inner organization, were accomplished under the direct guidance of the Church. It is quite understandable that the national spirit, formed in this way, could not fail to be essentially Orthodox. If we add to this the national softness of the Russian character, it becomes fully understandable why Orthodoxy should imprint itself upon this wax with all the features of that message which the spiritual parent of the Russian people, St. Constantine (Cyril in monasticism), had been prepared by Providence to deliver. What constitutes the uniqueness of his spiritual character? His entire life is suffused with sophianic hues. He is not an Egyptian or Palestinian abba, who finds happiness in impoverishment. Rather, he is a man of kingly riches and splendor; with his life he blesses not the cutting-off but the transfiguration of the fullness of being. St. Constantine's deed is characterized not by a sharp turning from sin to purity but by a gracious continuity of growth. His father, a rich and famous lord, Leo by name, and his mother Mary lived piously, fulfilling all of

God's commandments. Constantine—an imperial name—was a seventh son (7 is the number of Sophia). When, after his birth, his mother gave him to the nursemaid, he did not desire to be nourished by foreign milk, but only by his mother's milk (this signifies the blessing of family life). With Constantine's birth, his parents vowed to live like brother and sister, and they lived thus for fourteen years $(14 = 7 \times 2)$ till their deaths. When Constantine was seven years old he saw a dream (signifying mystical sensitivity) and told it to his father and mother in the following words: "A warrior, the strategus of our town, called together all the young maidens of our town and told me: 'Take of them whomever you desire as your helpmate.' I looked at all of them and remarked one, more beautiful than the others, with a shining face, adorned with many golden necklaces and pearls and fine things; her name was Sophia. It is she I chose." The parents understood that to the youth the Lord was giving the Maiden Sophia, that is, Wisdom; they rejoiced in their spirit and diligently began to teach Constantine not only book knowledge but also God-pleasing virtue, i.e., spiritual wisdom. "Son"—they told Constantine with the words of Solomon—keep my commandments and live . . . write them upon the table of thine heart. Say unto wisdom, Thou art my sister (Prov. 7:2–4). Wisdom shines more brightly than the sun, and if you have her as your helpmate, she will save you from much evil." It is well known what successes this youth had in his studies, especially in the study of St. Gregory of Nazianzus. He learned Homer, geometry, dialectics, and philosophy under the guidance of Leo and Photius, the patriarch of Constantinople. He also learned rhetoric, arithmetic, astronomy, the art of music, and in general all the secular sciences, and knew, besides Greek, Latin, Syriac, and other languages. He was given the name the "Philosopher." Although he was educated in the Emperor's court, under the personal supervision of the Emperor, he never forgot his Helpmate. Having rejected a well-born, rich, and beautiful bride, he was elevated to the priestly rank and named the librarian at the Cathedral of St. Sophia. It is from this chosen one of Sophia that Russian Orthodoxy took its beginning. Is it surprising that She who had chosen Constantine to baptize the Russian people and moved him to this deed became, especially in the early period, the special Protectress of the newly baptized infant-nation and that her icon appeared for the first time precisely in Russia and became an object of national veneration? Also not surprising is the fact that churches of the Dormition, Annunciation, etc. were originally churches of Sophia and only later (as A. P. Golubtsov had repeatedly conveyed to me) became associated with specific moments in the life of the Mother of God. On St. Constantine see: O. Bodiansky, Prostrannie ili pannonskie zhitiia Konstantina Filosofa [Expanded or pannonean lives of Constantine the Philosopher] (Cht. v Imp. Obsch. Ist. i Dr. Ros., 1863, Bk. 2, pp. 1–224; 1864, Bk. 2, pp. 225–398; 1873, Bk. 1, pp. 399–534).

696. Pokrovsky, see n. 681 supra; F. I. Buslaev, Istoricheskie ocherki [Historical Sketches], S.P., 1861, Vol. 2: The Illuminated Psaltery of Uglich. E. Redin, "Antichnye bogi (planety) v litsevykh rukopisiakh sochineniia Koz'my Indikoplova" [Ancient Gods (Planets) in the Illustrated Manuscripts of Cosmas Indicopleustes] (Zapiski klassicheskogo otdela Imperial'nogo Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva, Vol. 1, S.P., 1904, pp. 33–43). Several other personifications are mentioned here (Galgala, Jericho, Gaius, Gebol, the Source, Mount Hemskachor, Euresis, Phronēsis, Megalopsuchia, etc.), and then the personifications of

the planets are explored: the moon, the sun, Chronos, Aphoridite, Zeus, Ares, and Hermes.

697. A. P. Golubtsov, *Sobornye chinovniki* [Cathedral Rituals], 1st part, M., 1907, p. 23, note. *Office of Sophia* (see n. 713 *infra*), p. 9, 4th ode, 2nd trop.: "The Wisdom of God, which is the sacrament of providence for all men." In his 9th epistle, Dionysius the Areopagite also interprets Wisdom as Providence.

698. For more detail on this subject see Golubtsov, n. 697 *supra*, pp. 21–24. Cf. *Office of Sophia*, n. 713 *infra*, p. 11, 6th ode, kontakion: "We see the miraculous icon of the Wisdom of God, that of His Most Pure Mother of God."

699. "Skazanii izvestno . . ." (see n. 703 infra), Chap. 14, p. 1.

700. Also silent about the significance of St. Sophia (one would think this is a question that would naturally arise in describing the cathedral) are the 7th century bishop Arkulphos (whose story was preserved in the notes of Adamnanes), a writer of the middle of the 9th century Bernard the Wise, the highly educated Bishop Liutprand, who visited Constantinople twice, in 948–950 and 968–969, and the numerous writers who visited Constantinople up to the end of the 12th century. We also read nothing about this subject in the notes of those westerners who accompanied the armies that conquered Constantinople, and in particular in the notes of the most famous of these westerners—Villehardouin, who described in detail the taking of Constantinople. Northern travelers, whose notes contain curious information about Constantinople, also do not report anything about the fundamental religious idea of this city. Thus, in his *Itinerary*, the abbot Nicholas dismisses the subject with the following comment: "In Maklagard there is a church called Agiosophia, which northerners call Aegisit, and this church surpasses all churches on the earth in structure and size" (Werlauff, Symbolae, 10) and that is all. The appendix to these notes also contains nothing. These are facts that can only cause astonishment! I take this information from I. I. Sreznevsky's report: "Sv. Sofia Tsar'gradskaia po opisaniiu russkogo palomnika XII v." [St. Sophia of Constantinople according to the description of a Russian pilgrim in the 12th century], Proceedings of the 3rd Archeological Conference in Russia, held in Kiev, Aug. 1874, Kiev, 1878, Vol. 1, pp. 105-106. Sreznevsky states that he has examined all the descriptions that he "could find" (ibid., p. 104).

701. Robert de Clary, Li prologues de Constantinoble comment elle fu prise (ed. Cte. de Rian, Li estoires de chians qui conquisent Constantinoble de Robert de Clari en Aminois, chevalier, s. a. p. 67; in the K. Hopf edition: Chroniques Gréco-Romaines inédites ou peu connues, Berlin, 1873, p. 67). For the Picard text of the description of the Cathedral of St. Sophia and its Russian translation, see Sreznevsky, n. 700 supra, pp. 107–108.

702. According to the doctrine of Vladimir Solovyov (See Rossiia i vselenskaia Tserkov, n. 5 supra, Bk. 3, Ch. 3–5, pp. 325–53; especially pp. 326–327, 328, 331–332, 349), Sophia is not only the ideal person of Creation but also the "Substance of the Holy Trinity" (Did not Solovyov mean to say "general energy" or "general grace"?). There is no need to clarify how far this doctrine of a Substance of God that is separate from the Hypostases stands from the orthodox doctrine of Athanasius the Great, firmly resting on the formula: ek Patros, ek ousias tou Patros. Solovyov's rationalism betrays itself precisely in the fact that, for him, the principle and foundation of the all is not living Person, not Hypostasis, and not self-grounding Living Triunity, but the substance from which the Hypostases are

then formed. But, in this case, this substance must necessarily be recognized as impersonal, and therefore thinglike. Solovyov's philosophy, subtly rationalistic in its form, is inevitably a philosophy of things in its content. What Solovyov teaches is unquestionably related to Sabellianism, to Spinozism, and to Schellingism, at least in its first phase. Solovyov's doctrine of Sophia and of the World Soul (for him these two Persons are at times identified and at times distinguished) is elaborated in Volzhsky [A. S. Glinka], "Problema zla u Vladimira Solovyova" [The problem of evil in Vladimir Solovyov], Voprosy Religii, M., 1906, No. 1, pp. 221–97. For a bibiliography see n. 5 supra. To this we must add: Prince E. Trubetskoi, Mirosozertsanie V. S. Solovyova [The World-view of V. S. Solovyov], M., 1913; E. L. Radlov, Vladimir Solovyov, S.P., 1913. Solovyov calls J. Pordage (1625-1698) "a specialist in Sophia." Indeed, Pordage's theosophical system is sophianic not only in its origin; in its content too it is mainly devoted to Sophia, if not directly, then at least indirectly. The revelation he received on June 21, 22, and 23, 1675 was described by him in a small work, whose Russian translation is in my possession: Sofiia Vechnaia Deva Vechnoi Premudrosti, otkryvshaiasia Ioannu Pordechu [Sophia, Eternal Virgin of Eternal Wisdom, revealed to John Pordage]. His theosophical doctrine of Sophia is developed in particular in *Divine* and True Metaphysics (see n. 126 supra), Vol. 2, Bk. 2, Ch. 5, Sec. 3. Par. 44-58, pp. 202-213.

703. For more detail on this subject see the literature on the iconography of Sophia. For the sake of convenience, below I present a bibliography of this literature, albeit an incomplete one (I note with asterisks books or articles that contain drawings pertaining to sophianic iconography): A. I. Nikol'sky: an article in Vestnik Arkheologii i istorii, published by the Imperial Archeological Institute, 1906, No. 17 [I have not been able to find a copy]. A. I. Uspensky, "Ikonopis' v Rossii do vtoroi poloviny XVII veka" [Iconography in Russia up to the second half of the 17th century], Zolotoye Runo, 1906, Nos. 7, 8, 9. E. K. Redin, "Materialy dlia vizantiiskoi i drevnerusskoi ikonografii" [Materials for Byzantine and Ancient Russian iconography], I. "Sofiia, Premudrost' Bozhia" [Sophia, Divine Wisdom], Arkheologicheskie Izvestiia i Zametki, Vol. 1, M., 1893. Count M. V. Tolstov, "Ikony Sofii, Premudrosti Bozhiei" [Icons of Sophia, Divine Wisdom], Dushevn. Chten., 1890, Part 1, pp. 240-41, 458-60. V. Arsen'iev, "O tserkovnom ikonopisanii" [On church iconography], Dushevn. Chten., 1890, Part 1, pp. 263-65. Fr. Bogoslovsky, "Sviataia Sofiia v Velikom Novgorode" [St. Sophia in Great Novgorod], Khristianskie chteniia, 1877, Part 1, pp. 188-89, 191, 201. Count M. V. Tolstoy, "Pis'ma iz Kieva" [Letters from Kiev], Dushevn. Chten., 1870, Part 2, pp. 69-71. Fr. Pyotr Orlovsky, Sviataia Sofiia Kievskaia, nyne Kievo-Sofiiskii kafedral'nyi Sobor [St. Sophia of Kiev, now the Kievan Cathedral of Sophia], 2nd ed., 1901. Sakharov, Issledovaniia o russkom ikonopisanii [Studies on Russian iconography], Bk. 2, pp. 30–34. P. G. Lebedintsev, "O sv. Sofii Kievskoi" [On St. Sophia of Kiev], in Proceedings of the Third Archeological Conference, held Kiev in 1874, Vol. 1, Kiev, 1878. Fr. P. L. Lebedintsev, "Sofiia Premudrost' Bozhiia v ikonografii Severa i Iuga Rossii" [Sophia, Divine Wisdom in the iconography of the north and south of Russia], Kievskaia Starina, Vol. 10, 1884, Sept., pp. 555-67. *G. D. Filimonov, "Ocherki russkoi khristianskoi ikonografii: Sofiia Premudrost' Bozhiia" [Essays on Russian Christian iconography: Sophia, Divine Wisdom], Vestnik Obshch. drevne-russkogo isskusstva

pri Moskovskom Publichnom Muzee, Nos. 1-3, 1874, M., pp. 1-20. "Skazanie izvestno, chto est' Sofei premudrost' Bozhiia i Skazanie o Sviatoi Sofii v Tsaregrade" [Relation on Sophia, Wisdom of God and Relation on Holy Sophia in Constantinople] (ibid., Materialy, pp. 1-17). A. P. Golubtsov, Sobornye chinovniki i osobennosti sluzbby po nim [Cathedral rituals and features of their offices], M., 1907, pp. 13-32 sq. *N. V. Pokrovsky, Evangelie v pamiatnikakh ikonografii preimushchestvenno vizantiiskikh i russkikh [The Gospel in monuments of iconography, especially Byzantine and Russian ones], S.P., 1892, p. 374 sq. *Metropolitan Evgenii Bolkhovitinov, Opisanie Kievosofiiskogo Sobora i Kievskoi Ierarkhii [Description of the Cathedral of St. Sophia of Kiev and of the Hierarchy of Kiev, Kiev, 1825, p. 16 sq. F. I. Buslaev, Istoricheskie ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti i isskustva [Historical essays on Russian national literature and artl, S.P., 1861, Vol. 2, pp. 294–98. Fr. Konstantin Nikol'sky, Anafematstvovanie, sovershaemoe v pervuiu nedeliu Velikogo Posta [Anathematization pronounced the first Sunday of Lent], S.P., 1879, Appendix, pp. 291 sq. Vladimir Solovyov, *Ideia chelovechestva u Avgusta Konta* [Auguste Comte's idea of humanity], IX, (Collected Works, Vol. 8, S.P., pp. 240-41). *E. M. Kuz'min, "Ikona sv. Sofii i ob'iasneniia ee" [The Icon of St. Sophia and explanations of it], Vestnik Teosofii, 1909, I, pp. 1-3 [this is an attempt to interpret Sophia in the spirit of theosophyl. Fr. F. I. Titov, "Slovo v den' Rozhdestva Presviatoi Bogoroditsy: Ob istinnoi Premudrosti Bozhiei, sv. Sofii i o zabluzhdeniakh sovremmennoi teosofii" [Oration on the Nativity of the Mother of God: On the true St. Sophia, Divine Wisdom, and the errors of contemporary theosophy] in *Trudy* Kiev. Dukh. Akad., 1910, Oct., 10, pp. I-VII (this is written contra the preceding article). Bishop Vissarion, "Ikony i drugii sviashchennyie izobrazheniia v russkoi tserkvi" [Icons and other holy images in the Russian Church] in the collection Dukhovnaia Pishcha [Spiritual nourishment], 2nd ed., M., 1891, pp. 284–86. A. N. Muraviev, "Drevnosti i simvolika Kievo-Sofiiskogo sobora" [Antiquities and symbolism in the Cathedral of St. Sophia of Kiev] in Supplements and Published Works of the Holy Fathers, Part 18, M., 1859, pp. 553-54. M. Didron, Iconographie chrétienne: Histoire de Dieu, Paris, 1843, pp. 160-61. Further bibliographic indications can be found in the sources cited above.

704. I cite only part of the materials, some of which are in manuscript. Of the published materials let me mention: Skaz. izvestno... (see n. 703 supra), pp. 1–5; On the Icon of Sophia, Wisdom of God, Copied from a Local Image, which Is in Novgorod the Great (from a ms. of the Synodal Library, which contains the Commentary on the Psalms of Athanasius of Alexandria, No. 238). See Buslaev, Ocherki, n. 703 supra, pp. 297–98; A. V. Gorsky and K. I. Novostruev, Description of the Manuscripts of the Synodal Library, Sec. 2, p. 74; Nikol'sky, Anathem., n. 703 supra; Fr. P. Florensky, "Sluzhba Sofii" [The Office of Sophia], n. 713 infra; M. Smentsovsky, Tserk.-ist. mat., n. 713 infra.

705. The iconostasis of the Cathedral of the Dormition of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra (see n. 678 *supra*). The Cathedral was consecrated on Aug. 15, 1585. The text presented here was copied by me several years ago. However, during the last restoration of the Cathedral, the icon was restored and set in a frame that covered the inscription and almost the entire ancient image; as far as I remember, this frame does not completely match the image. The punctuation in the text is my own.

706. Here the text written to the left of Sophia (from the observer's point of view) ends, and the text to the right begins.

707. Sbornik polem., kanon., i istor. statei [Collection of polemical, canonical, and historical articles], in the Library of the Moscow Theological Academy, No. 10 (175), fol. 199 (verso)–201 of the volume; or fol. 82 (verso)–84 of this ms., written in cursive writing.

708. Apokal. tolkovyi v litsakh [Illustrated Apocalypse, with commentary], commentary of Andrew, Archbishop of Caeserea, in the semi-ustav of the 16th century, then in cursive; ibid., No. 11 (16); Supplement, fol. 96.

709. *Kniga Alfavit* [The Book of the Alphabet], in the small semi-*ustav* of the 17th century; ibid., No. 36 (230), fols. 232–251.

710. For more information see *Description of the Slavonic Manuscripts of the Library of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra*, M., 1878, Part 1, pp. 89–90; Part 3, p. 214.

711. *Apok. tolk*. [Apocalypse with commentary] by Andrew of Caeserea with suppl., fol. 147, in the semi-*ustav* of the 15th century, in the Library of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, No. 122 (1829).

712. Sbornik [Collection], in the semi-ustav of the 16th century; ibid., No. 788 (1649); Slovo sv. Sofii [Oration on St, Sophia], p. 220.

713. "Sluzhba Sofii Premudrosti Bozhiei" [Office of Sophia, Divine Wisdom], published (from a manuscript belonging to the Moscow Church of Sophia, on Lubianka) by Father P. Florensky, Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, 1912, p. 42 (= Bogoslovsky Vestnik, 1912, No. 2). Also see Bishop Vissarion, Ikony ..., n. 703 supra, p. 286, n. 1. The author of the office of Sophia is unknown. It had already existed at the beginning of the 18th century. Around November 1707, the brothers Ioannikii and Sophronii Likhud corrected the office and rewrote the prologue, the stichera, and the canon in honor of Sophia. The Metropolitan Job sent this work to the corrector of the Moscow typography, Feodor Polikarpov, "to look at it and to correct it to make it beautiful" (Stroev, "Biblicheskii slovar'" [Biblical dictionary], pp. 190, 191; Strannik, 1861, Bk. 1, p. 125). The troparion and kontakion of Sophia, corrected by the Likhuds, "with a description of the icons and of the cathedral in Novgorod, as well as of its builders" are mentioned in the catalogue of the books of Metropolitan Job (Opis' Arkhiva Sv. Synoda [Catalogue of the Archive of the Holy Synod], Vol. 1, App. VIII, p. xcv). However, the new office did not please everyone, and Ioannikii Likhud wrote a response "to the criticism concerning the newly compiled office of Sophia, Divine Wisdom" (Opis' Arkhiva Sv. Synoda, Vol. 1, App. VIII, pp. xciii, xciv) (I draw this information from M. Smentsovsky, Brat'ia Likhudy [The Likhud Brothers], S.P., 1899, pp. 349-50). In September 1708, Ioannikii Likhud finished a new work: "Solemn Oration on Sophia, Divine Wisdom." This work is partly a historico-archeological treatise and partly a dogmatic one. The author's goal is to explain who built (and when) "the very great, famous and celebrated temple [of Constantinople], which bears the name of Sophia, Divine Wisdom . . . and who gave it such a name and why the Wisdom of God and the Father . . . is represented on the altar and painted on the icon as being afire, with the wings of an eagle, with a crown and a sceptre, and as wearing ecclesiastical garments, and with other diverse signs." Judging by the conclusion of this oration, one is led to think that it was pronounced from the church lectern, as an edifying sermon (Smentsovsky, Brat'ia *Likhudy*, pp. 364–367. A summary of the oration is given here. The actual text, from ms. No. 244 at the Moscow Rumiantsev Museum, was published in Smentsovsky's book: *Tserkovno-istoricheskie materialy* [Documents of Church history], S.P., 1899, pp. 5–32). Let me take the opportunity to thank N. L. Tunitsky for pointing out to me that the Brothers Likhud are the authors of the office of Sophia.

- 714. Office of Sophia, n. 713 supra, p. 6.
- 715. Nikol'sky, *Anath.*, n. 703 *supra*, p. 292. Buslaev, *Ist. och.*, n. 696 *supra*, Vol. 2, p. 297.
- 716. Office of Sophia, 1st ode of the canon, 3rd troparion: "With all our heart we seek the Divine Wisdom that became incarnate in the Most Pure Virgin," etc.
- 717. More than anyone else it is necessary to mention here the mysterious figure—standing completely apart—of A. N. Schmidt.^k
- 718. Vladimir Solovyov, "Ideia chelovechestva u Avg. Konta" [Auguste Comte's Idea of Humanity], IX, (Collected Works, Vol. 8, S.P., pp. 240–41). As a supplement to what has been said above, let us remark that the wings of the Forerunner [John the Baptist] signify that "he is a divinely illuminated person, transported to the lofty rank of the Angels and therefore detached from all life on earth. Similarly, the Mother of God with wings is a person transported to the heavenly world, and standing outside the earthly circle of historical acts" (Buslaev, n. 703 supra, p. 295).

XII. LETTER ELEVEN: FRIENDSHIP

- 719. This question will be examined in greater detail in my article "O *vozra-stanii tipov*" [On the growth of types].
- 720. For details and proofs on the classical usage of the verbs of love and their derivatives, see J. H. Hein. Schmidt, *Synonimik d. griechischen Sprache*, III, Lpz., 1879, No. 136, Par. 476–491; No. 134, Par. 463–471; No. 135, Par. 471–474. Also see n. 726 *infra*.
- 721. Curtius, n. 13 *supra*, 4-te Auf., S. 172, No. 122 (= 2-te Aufl., S. 158 = 3-te Auf., S. 163).
 - 722. Prellwitz, n. 13 supra, S. 2: agapaō.
- 723. Boisacq, n. 13 *supra*, 1-re liv., pp. 3–4: *aga*-; and p. 6: *agapaō*. One will find citations of Prellwitz's critics here.
 - 724. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1, 11; *Opera*, n. 37 *supra*, Vol. 2, col. 1, 17–21.
- 725. The words to phileisthai agapasthai estin auton di auton are rendered by the French translator as "être aimé signifie être chérie pour son mérite personnel;
- ^k Anna Schmidt was a writer for a newspaper in Nizhnii Novgorod who considered Vladimir Solovyov [see note *c* on p. 432] to be one of the incarnations of Christ, and herself to be the personal incarnation of Sophia [See note on *a* p. 231]. The two met shortly before Solovyov's death in 1900. According to Sergius Bulgakov she was a mystically gifted writer (see Bulgakov's article "Vladimir Solovyov and Anna Schmidt" in *Tikhie dumy* [Quiet meditations], 2d ed. [Paris, 1976], pp. 71–114). In his memoir *Nachalo veka* [Beginning of the century], pp. 121–25, Andrei Belyi draws a caricature of Schmidt and indicates that she was the inspiration for his famous poem *The Second or Dramatic Symphony*. Schmidt's writings were published in Moscow in 1916 in an edition edited by Florensky entitled *Iz rukopisei A. N. Shmidt s prilozheniem pisem k nei Vl. Solov'eva* [From the manuscripts of A. N. Schmidt, with Vl. Solovyov's letters to her appended].

this is directly opposite to our translation, though it is almost indisputable that the translator meant to say the same thing." See *La Rhétorique d'Aristote*, trad. par M. E. Gros, Paris, 1822, p. 155.

- 726. Aristotle, Nicomach. Ethics, I, 3; see n. 37 supra, pp. 1095, col. II–1096, col. I.
- 727. It must be remarked that here I am not considering Plato's peculiar use of *eran* and *erōs* and their derivatives. Plato imparted to these words epistemological and ontological nuances and a more spiritualized content. For Plato's usage see Fr. Astius, *Lexicon Platonicum*, Lipsiae, 1835, Vol. 1, pp. 822–29, 830–31.
 - 728. Dal', n. 8 supra, Vol. 1, col. 1716 = ed. 1863, p. 618.
 - 729. Mikutsky, n. 10 supra, pp. 33-34.
- 730. For details and proofs on the question of the usage of the Biblical verbs of love and their derivatives, see Cremer, n. 18 *supra*, Gotha, 1902, Sec. 10–15, 15–19, 20; S. Smirnov, *Filologicheskie zamechaniia o iazyke novozavetn. v slichenii s klassich. pri chtenii Posl. ap. Pavla k efessianam* [Philological remarks on the language of the New Testament as compared with the classical language, with reference to the Epistle to the Ephesians], M., 1873, pp. 31–36. Rev. W. F. Moulton and Rev. A. S. Geden, ed., *A Concordance to the Greek Testament*, 2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1899, pp. 6–8, 990–91.
- 731. If the saintly mystics were not afraid of using a word that was clearly condemned by nearly the whole community, there must have been very good reason for it, and thus there must not have been a more appropriate word.
- 732. Until recently the word $agap\bar{e}$ has been defined by authoritative philologists as "vox solum biblica et ecclesiastica," "vox mere biblica," as "der Profan-Gräcitat völlig fremd," "vox profanis ignota." However, the latest discoveries in papyrology indicate that this word was probably of the colloquial speech. Thus, the letter of a certain Dionysius to Ptolomey, found in the archive of Serapeum (Pap. Par. 49, 3) and written between 164 and 158 B.C., contains the word $agap\bar{e}$ (G. A. Deissmann, Bibelstudien, Marburg, 1895, S. 80. The text of the letter is here. Also by Deissmann: Neue Bibelstudien, S. 27). Also known is a case of its use dating to the 1st century B.C. (see Deissmann, Licht von Osten, Das Neue Testament . . . , Tübingen, 1909, SS. 48 sq.). Thus, even if it does refer to apax eurēmena, in any case it is not of the apax eirēmena (ibid., S. 48).
- 733. Arnoldi Geulincx Antverpiensis, *Ethica*, Tract. I, Cap. 1:*Amor*, 1–8 (*Opera Philosophica*, recognovit G. P. N. Land, Hagae Comitum, 1893, Vol. 3, pp. 9, 14); ibid., *Annotata ad Ethicam*, pp. 154–63.
- 734. One such romance is described by J. Bois in *Le Monde invisible*, n. 253 *supra*. This kind of love is depicted in V. Briusov's *Ognennyi Angel* [Fiery Angel] and in many other works of literature and autobiography.
- 735. Here I am making a conjecture, for in the *Op. phil.* of Geulincx (see n. 733 supra, Vol. 3, p. 163, 10, sup. in *Annot.*), one reads: "neque amor dilectionis, neque amor affectionis," which does not make any sense, since these two loves are the same. Clearly, in place of a. affectionis one should read a. effectionis. This conjecture is in complete agreement with the corresponding passage of the text (*Ethica*, Tr. I, Cap. I, Par, 1:2, Vol. III, p. 10).
- 736. St. Methodius, Feast of the Ten Virgins or on Virginity, Collected Works, trans. from the Greek under the supervision of E. Loviagin, 2nd. ed., S.P., 1905.
 - 737. Sohm, see n. 586 supra.

738. On the agapes, see P. Sokolov, *Agapy ili vecheri liubvi v drevne-khristianskom mire* [Agapes or feasts of love in the early Christian world], Sergiev Posad, 1906. F. X. Kraus, *Real-Encyklopädie der christl. Alterthümer*, Freiburg im Br., 1880, Bd. I, Sec. 25–27. H. Leclercq, *Agape* (*Dict. archéol. chrét.* par F. Cabrol, T. 1, col. 775–848, with illustrations and an abundant bibliography in col. 845–848. On survivals of agapes among the Georgians and Armenians, see N. Marr, "*Sled agapē u armian*" [Traces of *agapē* among the Armenians] in *Khristianskii Vostok*, Vol. 1. fasc. 1, S.P., 1912, pp. 41–42.

739. This derivation is indicated in *Fil. Zap.*, 1888, p. 2. On its uncertainty see Walde, n. 20 *supra*, S. 313 and Curtius, n. 13 *supra*, S. 303; Prellwitz (see n. 13 *supra*, S. 341) rejects it decisively.

740. Recently the late N. N. Nepliuev diligently and tirelessly emphasized the essential importance of a systematically organized brotherhood for church life. However one views the "Fraternity of Work" [Trudovoye Bratstvo] organized by Nepliuev, one cannot take away from this activist the merit of having revived this foundation of church life. See the Works of Nepliuev and, about him, the panegyric collection of articles: Nepliuev, podvizhnik zemli Russkoi: Venok na mogilu [Nepliuev, Christian hero of the Russian land: A wreath on his grave], Sergiev Posad, 1908 (= Khristianin, 1908).

741. There is no doubt that, at first, Christianity was kept a deep secret, and outwardly resembled the mystery religions. The sacraments of baptism, chrismation, ordination, and communion; the liturgy, the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, the creed, and the Lord's Prayer—these eight sacraments were transmitted only to the initiated, and numerous expressions existed for the designation of the rules of silence concerning these sacraments, namely: epikrupsis siopē, aprosēgoria, to krubdēn, adēmosieuton, mustērion, gnosis aporrēta, mustēriokrupsia, dogma, tropos paideias, occultatio, reticentia sacrorum, silentium sacrum, arcanum, and—coined in the 17th century by Th. Geier—disciplina arcani (see Augusti, Handbuch der christ. Archäologie, Lpz., 1836-1837, Bd. I, S. 93). Keeping the sacraments secret, for which there is much evidence, was, however, not just a manifestation of modesty. No. Church rules demanded strict silence from the summustai, the "co-mystics" (see St. Ignatius, Epistle to the Ephesians, 12:2; Funk, n. 320 supra, Par. 84), i.e., those initiated in the sacraments of the Church, and the absence of such silence was seen to be a typical trait of heretical communities. It is partly from the soil of such rules that the symbolic language of early Christianity grew, the language that St. Theodoret, writing in the 5th century, calls "kekrummenos kai mustikos logos." The late Count A. S. Uvarov insisted on the essential significance of disciplina arcani for early Christianity (see Uvarov, Khristianskaia simvolika [Christian symbolism], posth. ed., Part 1, M., 1908. On pp. 3–7 there are testimony and rules concerning the disc. arcani. For other testimony of this kind and a bibliography, see F. X. Kraus (n. 738 supra), Bd. I, Sec. 74–76, Peters, Arcandisziplin. But in addition to this outward and, so to speak, crude esotericism of the Church, there is a much more subtle esotericism: the mysteriousness of the life of the Church for anyone who is not initiated in this life, i.e., the existence in the Church of a special organization of the soul without which nothing in the Church can be correctly perceived and understood, and which is transmitted only through the chain of living Church tradition. In this sense, one can speak, if you will, of a certain analogy between church life and the ancient mysteries, where one can also find a new, wholly special world- and life-feeling. On the inner relation between the mysteries and Christianity, see R. Steiner, n. 119 supra; by the same author: The Way of Initiation, Kaluga, 1911. Ed. Schuré, Sanctuaires d'Orient, 4-me ed., Paris, 1907; by the same author: Les grands initiés, Paris; there are more than 10 editions, and a Russian translation. G. Wobbermin, Religions-gesch. Studien zur Frage d. Beeinflussung des Urchristentums dur das antike Mysterienwesen, Berlin, 1896. G. Anrich, Das antike Mysterienwesen in seiner Einfluss auf das Christentum, Göttingen, 1894. Fr. Cumont, Die Mysterien des Mithra, autor. deutsche Ausg. von G. Geurich, Lpz., 1903.

742. Ad. Trendelenburg, "Zur Gesch. des Wortes Person" in Kantstudien, XIII, SS. 1–17. R. Eisler, Wörterbuch d. Philos. Begr., 3-te Aufl., Berlin, 1910, Bd. 2, SS. 989–993, "Person." Stern, see n. 3 supra.

743. He kaine Diatheke. Text with crit. apparatus, published by the Brit. and Foreign Bible Society, London, 1904, p. 27.

744. Two is a feminine number; therefore, "two" form a molecule with feminine impressionability and mystical compliance with respect to good, if they attend to God, and with respect to evil, if they turn to the Devil. But, in any case, in the dualistic psychology, in opposition to unitary or ternary psychology (which is actively masculine), there is unquestionably some sort of special "softness" capable of "drinking in" otherworldly waftings. The life of two is a life of feeling, but uncontrolled by the intellect. One is will; two is feeling; three is reason.

745. See n. 586 supra.

746. See n. 21 supra.

747. On the ontological reality and mystical significance of the Name of Jesus, see: Father John of Kronstadt, Moia zhizn' vo Khriste (see n. 46 supra). Philokalia, especially Vol. 5, the discussions of Callistos and Ignatius Xanthopulos. Otkrovennye passkazy strannika (see n. 565 supra). Iz rasskazov strannika o blagodatnom deistvii molitvy Iususovoi [From tales of a pilgrim about the gracegiving effect of the prayer of Jesus], the Optina Pustyn' ed., Sergiev Posad, 1911. Schemamonk Ilarion, Na gorakh Kavkaza [On the mountains of the Caucasus], 3rd ed., Kiev-Pech. Lavra, Kiev, 1912. Hieroschemamonk Antonii (Bulatovich), Apologiia very vo Imia Iisus [Apology of faith in the name of Jesus], M., 1913, published by Rel.-fil. Bibl. Monk Pavel Kusmartsev, Mysli otsov tserkvi o Imeni Bozhiem: Materialy k vyiasneniu Afonskogo bogoslovskogo spora [Thoughts of the Fathers concerning the Name of God: Materials toward a clarification of the Mt. Athos theological dispute], S.P., 1913. Materialy k sporu o pochitanii Imeni Bozhiia [Materials toward the dispute on the veneration of the Name of God], fasc. 1, published by Rel.-fil. Bibl., M., 1913. The following are works of a polemical character: F. E. Mel'nikov, V tenetak eresei i prokliatii [In the snares of heresies and maledictions], M., 1913; Tserkovnye vedomosti, 1913, No. 20 (Synodal letter and articles of Arch. Nikon, Arch. Antonii, and E. Troitsky). The other literature (now unsurveyable), consisting mainly of newspaper articles, is of secondary importance. Also see Bishop Theophanus, nn. 251, 21 supra.

748. Petrus Bungus Bergomatus, *Numerorum Mysteria*, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1618. A. I. Sadov, *Znamenatel'nye chisla* [Significant numbers], S.P., 1909 (= *Khris. Cht.*, 1909–1910) (this has a bibliography of the subject). Also see:

Baron D. O. Schepping, *The Symbolism of Numbers*, Voronezh, 1843 (= Fil. Zap.). Hellenbach, *Die Magie der Zahlen*, 1882. L. Keller, *Die heiligen Zahlen u. die Symbolik d. Katakomben*, Lpz. u. Jena, 1906 (= Vorträge u. Ansätze aus d. Comenius-Ges., XIV, 2).

749. Ibid.

- 750. Nearly all the commentators recognize it as such. Some of the many attempts to interpret this parable are enumerated, as Trench has indicated, in Schreiter's book, *Explic. parab. de improbo oeconomo*, Lips. 1803. In Russian see: Trench, *Tolkovanie pritchei Gospoda nashego I.X.* [Interpretation of the parables of our Lord Jesus Christ], 2nd ed., S.P., 1888, parable 25, pp. 356–78. Filaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, *Orations and Discourses*, Vol. 3, 2nd Collection, 1861, p. 362. M. M. Tareev, *Osnovy khristianstva* [Foundations of Christianity], Vol. 2, pp. 364–66 (= *Bog. V.*, 1904, May, pp. 149–60). I. P. Iuvachev, *Tainy Tsarstva Nebesnogo* [Mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven], Part 1, S.P., 1910, p. 134–44. O. D. Durnovo, *Tak govoril Khristos* [This is what Christ said], 2nd ed., M., 1912, pp. 48–52, 270–71. There are also the investigations of M. D. Muretov and Father T. Butkevich.
- 751. This was clarified by the Slavophiles, and they were followed in this by certain school theologians. Let us mention, almost at random, Iu. F. Samarin, *Iezuity i ikh otnoshenie k Rossii* [The Jesuits and their relation to Russia], *Works*, Vol. 6, M., 1887. Bishop Sergii, *Pravoslvanoe uchenie o spasenii* [The Orthodox doctrine of salvation], see n. 282 *supra*.
- 752. The experience of being as a good is an outgrowth of the ontological proof of the existence of God, whether in the naive form of Anselm of Canterbury or in the subtle argumentation of Schelling (*Philosophie d. Offenbarung, Samtl.* 1858, Abth. II, Bd. 3, Introd.). This idea is also the focus of Dostoevsky's understanding of life. Therefore, essentially unfounded is A. I. Vvedensky's response to S. S. Glagolev's defense of the ontological argument. The fact of the matter is that "realized evil" is *less* real than unrealized evil. The reality of the former is illusory, and, by its "realization," evil only removes itself from the domain of being into the outer darkness (S. S. Glagolev, "*Vera i znanie*" [Faith and knowledge], *Vera i razum*, 1909, No. 21. A. I. Vvedensky, *Logika, kak chast' teorii poznaniia*, see n. 87 *supra*, p. 404 n.).
- 753. M. D. Muretov, "*Iuda Predatel*'" [Judas the Traitor], IV, 1, *Bogoslovsky Vestnik*, 1905, July–Aug., p. 551.
- 754. For a justification of the pair combinations and for more detail on this subject, see n. 753 *supra*, pp. 551–53.
- 755. As Augustin Thierry said, legend does not err, the way that historians err, for legend is reality itself purified in the crucible of time from all that is accidental, illuminated artistically to the status of an idea, elevated into a *type*. Legend is living tradition, almost always more true than what we call history. Indeed, legend is history *par excellence*, for "poetry is closer to philosophy and more full of content than history," according to the testimony of the most sober of philosophers, the father of modern science, Aristotle (P. Florensky, "*Prashchury liubomydriia*" [The ancestors of love of wisdom], *Bogoslovsky Vestnik*, 1905, May).
- 756. Aug. Mommsen, *Athenae christianae*, Lipsiae, 1878, p. 135, annot. 2, with a reference to Heldricus.

- 757. Shestakov, see n. 263 *supra*, pp. 151, 157, 187, 250 (= *Varsh. Un. Iz.*, 1910, No. 10, No. 4). The list is according to Shestakov; the names in parentheses are according to Mommsen.
- 758. St. Jerome, Commentary on Mark, 2 (cited from Bishop Sergii, n. 751 supra).
 - 759. St. Augustine, Quaest. Evang. 2, 14.
- 760. For a survey of Council resolutions and monastic rules concerning the necessity for monks always to be in pairs, see A. Dad. Alteserra, Asceticon sive originum rei monasticae libri decem, rec. C. F. Glück, Hale 1782, lib. VI, cap. X, pp. 558-61. Also see Drevnie inocheskie ustavy pr. Pakhomiia vel., sv. Vas. Vel. i pr. [The ancient monastic rules of Pachomius the Great, St. Basil the Great, and Others], collected by Bishop Theophanus, M., 1892. The monastic custom of walking two by two is typified by the following anecdote, related in one of the epigrams of Konrad Zeltis (IV, 53), with reference to Albert the Great in the title: Two monks were caught in a thunderstorm: lightning appeared to have incinerated one of them, leaving, however, his cloak intact. Meanwhile, the other's cloak was burned, but he himself was unscathed. This monk, not seeing his companion, donned the latter's cloak and, when he got back to the monastery, reported that his companion was apparently taken up into heaven (G. Senger, "Krit. zametki k tekstu epigramm Konr. Tsel'tisa" [Critical remarks on the text of the epigrams of Konr. Zeltis], 96; Zhur. Min. Nar. Prosv., XXXVI, 1911, Nov., p. 540).
- 761. Clement of Alexandria, What Rich Man Will Be Saved? 32; PG, Vol. 9, col. 620.
- 762. Clement of Rome, 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians, 12, 2; see n. 136 supra, S 74.
 - 763. See pp. 222–27 of the present book.
 - 764. Clement of Rome, see n. 761 *supra*, 12: 3–6; SS. 74–75.
- 765. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Gnomic Distichs*, 97–98; PG, Vol. 37, col. 923, vv. 97–98.
- **766.** Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 11, to the brother of Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nyssa; PG, Vol. 35, col. 831 B. C. Cf. Maximus the Confessor: "There is nothing equal to a faithful friend."
 - 767. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 6, On Peace 1; PG, Vol. 35, col. 728.
 - 768. See n. 766 supra, col. 833 C.
- 769. Gregory of Nazianzus, Exhortatory Epistle to Hellinios, on monks; PG, Vol. 37, col. 1468, vv. 231–232.
- 770. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 23, On Peace 3. In general, see the whole oration.
 - 771. Thallasios, see n. 54 supra, the first hundred chapters, 1.
 - 772. Ibid. 5.
- 773. Basil the Great, *Kata platos*, 3. Answer to the question of love for one's neighbor; PG, Vol. 32, col. 917A and, in general, the entire chapter, col. 915C–917D.
- 774. In order to avoid misunderstandings, we consider it not inappropriate to mention that the real subject of our discussion is the inner life, not linguistics. That is why here (as well as in many other places) we deliberately refer to etymologies that are recognized as dubious or, at best, inconclusively clarified. For us linguistic theories are not arguments in the strict sense. (Indeed, are such argu-

ments possible at all in questions of the inner life? And if they are possible, are they necessary—there where life itself speaks more eloquently than all arguments?) But if they are not arguments, what are they? They are distinctive symbols, of course. To what extent these symbols are approved by contemporary linguists is not so important. After all, the experiences of the inner life are for all times and nations, whereas scholarly opinions are only a transitory and changing fashion, not more permanent than the fashion of a woman's hat or sleeve. And if modesty does not permit one to lag too far behind what the whole world believes at a given moment, nevertheless self-protection cannot allow the vain chasing after the latest fashion, be it the female fashion with regard to hats or the male fashion with regard to scientific trends. Thus, if a certain symbolism suits our task, we shall not permit ourselves to worry about what linguists have to say about this symbolism.

Furthermore, relying here upon the greatest of authorities in philosophy, i.e., Plato, we find no difficulty, following his example, in referring to propositions of linguistics that we ourselves have refuted or will refute at other times and in other places. Philosophy, although it is Ancilla Theologiae, is not Ancilla Scientiarum; in relation to science, philosophy is *Domina*. Philosophy creates language; it does not study it. Let us say it bluntly: according to Wilhelm Humboldt's dictum, now become classic, language is not an immobile thing, not ergon, but eternally living activity, energeia. The word is continuously being created, and that constitutes its very essence. The word is therefore what the creator of language, the poet or the philosopher, gives it [as a gift] to be. "The external form of the word," i.e., its phoneme together with the morpheme, exists for the sake of its soul, the sememe, and outside of the sememe, we have not the word, but only a physical process. The sememe only takes into account the external form to a certain degree, but it is far from being the slave of the external form. Let us explain this with an example: Is it the case that a poet is prohibited from clothing his creative intentions in a garment of terms and theories considered antiquated by science? "A mother's heart is a prophet." Saying this, are we really obligated to consider anxiously the James-Lange theory of emotions and to seek its approval of this saying? Or, does the expression "the spiritual atmosphere was saturated with electricity" really await evaluation by a physicist? Thus, the philosopher too listens to the theories of the linguist more out of politeness than seriously. But if for his peace of mind the reader nevertheless demands a "scientific" judgment, let us satisfy him, to the extent that this is in our power—even if it be only through the means of Sacchari *albi* in a capsule ("to be taken a half hour after eating!"):

Some have derived the Russian word *priatel*' from the verb of active voice *priati*, with the root *imu* and the present tense *priemliu* (see Reif's *Etymological Dictionary*). The interpretation of *priatel*' as *priemliushchii* (one who receives) is apparently not alien to liturgical books, even if it be in the form of a play of words. Thus, in the sticheron of the litia on the day of the Nativity of the Most Holy Mother of God, the following is sung: "Mother and Virgin, and *priatelishche* (receptacle) of God, while in the apostiche ("Glory . . . and now . . .") on that day She is called "The holy temple, the *priatelishche* of Divinity." However, it is not appropriate to affirm decisively that two concepts become one here: "one who has received God into herself" and the "friend of God." But later the verb *priati*, lying at the base of the word *priatel*', was recognized as a special verb, though with the consonant root *imu*, i.e., as a verb of medium voice and with the

present tense *priaiu*. It is from this verb that the entire nest of words related to the word analyzed here is derived, namely the Polish *przyjac*, *sprzyja*, *przyja-je*, *-ciel*; the Czech *prati*, *priti*, *preji*; the Romanian *prii*, *prieten*, *preten* (= *amicus*), etc. Cf. the Sanskrit *pri*, *pri-na-ti*, *pri-ja* (dear friend), *-ajate*, *praj-as* (love), *pri-ti-s*, *prè-tar-*, *pri-jamana*; the Zend *fry-a*; the Gothic *frij-on*, *fri-jond-s*; the Old High German *fri-unt*, *fri-u-dil*; the Lithuanian *pri-é-tel-is*; the German *Freund*, *frei*, *-en*, *Frei-her* (fiancé), *Frei-tag* (= *Veneris dies*), etc. See Shimkevich, n. 11 *supra*, pp. 26–27: *priat*'. Also see Goriaev, n. 7 *supra*, pp. 280–281: *priatel*'.

775. From a poem of Tyutchev, the Rus. Arkhiv ed., M., 1894, p. 269.

776. A. S. Khomyakov.

777. "Tanto nostri [sc. M. Minucii Felicis] semper amore flagraverit [Octavius], ut et in ludicris, et seriis pari mecum voluntate concineret, eadem vellet vel nollet. Crederes unam mentem in duobus fuisse divisam" (Minucius Felix, Octavius, I, II; PL, Vol. 3, col. 233 A, and in general see all of Chapter 1; cf. col. 232–234).

778. "Nec enim possent in amicitia tam fideli cohoerere, nisi esset in utroque mens una, eadem cogitatio, par voluntas, aequa sententia" (Lactantius, On the Death of the Persecutors, 8. Lucii Coleii Lactantii Firmiani Opera Omnia, ed. Io. Ludolp. Bünemann, Halae, 1765, T. 2, p. 234, 1).

779. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, 8 (*Aristoteles Opera*, ed. Acad. Reg. Borussica. Vol. 2, Berolini, 1831, pp. 1385–86). *La rhét. d'Arist.*, see n. 725 *supra*, pp. 286–95.

780. *The Theater of Euripides*, trans. I. F. Annensky, Vol. 1, S.P., 1907, pp. 351–412: *Herakles*. For a highly interesting analysis of this tragedy, see ibid., pp. 415–48: *Mif i tragediia Gerakla* [The myth and tragedy of Herakles], especially pp. 442–47.

781. Maximus the Confessor, On Love, 4; PG, Vol. 93, col. 1072A.

782. I quote from S. Zarin's book.

783. Plato, Symposium, 209B; 210A, and elsewhere.

784. John Chrysostom, On the 1st Epistle to the Thessalonians, Oration II, 439; PG, Vol. 62, col. 406. And, in general, see the entire 3rd and 4th parts of this oration (col. 402–406), devoted to the praise of friendship.

785. John Chrysostom, On the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians, Oration 23, III; PG, Vol. 41, col. 280.

786. S. Nilus, *Zhatva zhizni: Pshenitsa i plevely* [Harvest of life: The wheat and the chaff], *Troitskaia narodnaia beseda*, Bk. 46, Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, 1908, p. 30.

787. Cf. "Virtue acts with grandeur for the sake of laws; fanaticism for the sake of its ideal; love for the sake of its object. From the first category we choose for ourselves lawgivers, judges, and kings; from the second category we choose heroes; and only from the third our friends. We respect the first group, are astonished by the second group, and love the third" (Schiller, *Letters on Don Carlos*, Letter XI, *Collected Works*, translated by Russian writers under the supervision of S. A. Vengerov, S.P., 1902, Vol. 4).

788. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 255D, see n. 88 supra, p. 719.

789. Schiller, Letters on Don Carlos, Letter III (see n. 787 supra, p. 244).

790. Schiller, *Don Carlos*, Act II, Scene 2, trans. M. Dostoevsky (ibid., 1901, Vol. 2, p. 105).

- 791. Homer, Odyssey, XVII, 217.
- 792. Nietzsche.
- 793. Schiller, *Philosophical Letters: Love* (Collected Works, see n. 787 supra, 1902, Vol. 4, p. 234).
 - 794. Ibid., p. 233.
- 795. Plato, Lysis, 221E, see n. 38 supra, p. 554: "humeis ar ei philoi eston allēlois, phusei pēi esth humin autois—if you are friends, you belong to each other by nature." Ibid., 222A, p. 554: "to men dē phusei oikeion anagkaion hēmin pephantai philein—by nature what is one's own necessarily appears in friendship."
 - 796. See p. 128 in the present book.
- 797. Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Ephesians, 13: 1:2; see n. 136 supra, S. 84.
 - 798. Ia. Tarnovsky, see n. 454 supra, p. 5.
 - 799. Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to Polycarp, 6:1; see n. 136 supra, S. 107.
 - 800. Polycarp of Smyrna, Epistle to the Philippians, 3: 3; n. 136 supra, S. 110.
- **801.** *Istoricheskoe opisanie Optinoi Pustini* [Historical description of the Optina Hermitage], 1902, p. 71.
- 802. On the distinction between these terms see: A. I. Vvedensky, *Opyty postr. teorii materii na printsipakh kritich. filosofii* [Attempts to construct a theory of matter on the principles of critical philosophy], Part 1, S.P., 1888, pp. 36–39; by the same author: Introduction to Descartes' *Meditations*, p. XLV n. G. Chelpanov, *Problema vospriatiia prostranstva* [The problem of space perception], Part 2, Kiev, 1904, pp. 134–37.
- 803. John Chrysostom, On the 1st Epistle to the Thessalonians, Hom. 2:3; PG, Vol. 57, col. 404.
- 804. M. Maeterlinck, Le Trésor des humbles, 24-me éd., Paris, 1901: La bonté invisible, pp. 236-37. I have altered the text slightly.
 - 805. Ibid., pp. 198-200.
 - 806. William James, see n. 29 supra, lec. XI–XIII, p. 251.
- 807. For its picturesqueness, I take this tale from the highly rare *Alfavitnyi Paterik* [Alphabetical Paterik], printed at Suprasl' in 1791 and bearing the full title: *Sobranie sloves i deanii prepodobnykh otets skitskikh, izhe obretaiumsia v'pateritsekh' po-alfavitu* [Collection of the words and acts of venerable hermitage fathers, found in the pateriks in alphabetical order]. There is a copy of this most complete of all the existing pateriks in the Library of the Moscow Theological Academy (Gor. 4151).
- 808. John Moschus, *The Spiritual Meadow*, Ch. 97; PG, Vol. 87:3, col. 2956–2957.
- 809. Let us present part of the literature on brotherhood or adelphopoiesis (bratotvorenie and pobratismstvo): N. A. Nachov, Za pobratimstvo (Periodichesko spisanie, 1895, Books 49–50, 51; 1896, Books 52–53), with bibliography. Father K. Nikol'sky, O sluzhbakh russkoi Tserkvi, byvshikh v prezh. pechatn. bogosl. knigakh [On offices of the Russian Church in ancient printed liturgical books], S.P., 1885 (on pp. 370–88 is the "rite of adelphopoiesis"; appendices give adelphopoiesis rites taken from different rituals). J. Goar, Euchologion graecum, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1647, pp. 898–900: akolouthia eis adelphopoiēsin. A. S. Pavlov, 50-ia glava Kormchei knigi, kak ist. i prakt. ist. russk. brach. prava [The

50th chapter of the Kormchaia kniga as a historical and practical source of Russian marriage law], M., 1887, III, 1, pp. 187-90; by the same author: Nomokanon pri Bol'shom Trebnike [The nomocanon in the Great Ritual], M., 1897, Article 165, pp. 310–13: prohibition of the adelphopoiesis rite and reasons for this prohibition. Father M. I. Gorchakov, O taine supruzhestva: Proiskh., ist.-iur. znach. i kan. dost. 50-i glavy Pechatnoi Kormchei knigi [On the sacrament of marriage: Sources, historical and juridical significance, and canonical validity of the 50th chapter of the printed Kormchaia knigal, S.P., 1880. A. V. Gorsky and K. I. Nevostruev, Opisanie slaviansk. rukop. Mosk. Sin. Bibl. (kn. bogos.) [Description of the Slavonic manuscripts of the Moscow Synodal Library (Liturgical books)], Sec. 3, Part 1, M., 1869, No. 371, p. 128, No. 377, p. 206. E. E. Golubinsky, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi [History of the Russian Church], Vol. 1:2; first period, M., 1881, Chap. 5, Sec. 2, p. 398 and supplement on p. 784. The Tale of Blessed Peter, Prince of the Horde. One of the redactions of this touching tale bears the title: "Life of the saintly father Cyril, Archbishop of Rostov, how he comported himself with honor in the midst of the Tatars, how the Holy Mother of God, with the Infant and St. Nicholas and the saintly martyr Dmitri appeared, how they appeared to the adolescent." This tale is found in the Collection of the Kazan' Theological Academy (Sec. 4, No. 854) and was published in *Pravosl. Sob.*, 1859, Part 1, pp. 360-76 (N.B. pp. 371-72). It refers to a period "not later than the 16th century." Another redaction bears the title "Life of the blessed Peter, bratanich of King Berkin. How he came to the fear of God, and his soul knew lovingkindness, and he returned from the Horde to Rostov to be baptized, and how he had a vision of the holy apostles Peter and Paul in the fields. In that place there is now a church of the holy apostles Peter and Paul." This work is found in a 17th-century collection of saints' lives which belongs to Prof. V. I. Grigorovich (see Pravosl. Sob., ibid., p. 357, n.). Also see A. N. Veselovsky, "Geterizm, pobratimstvo i kumovstvo v kupal'noi obriadnosti" [Heterism, adelphopoiesis, and godparenthood in the bathing ritual], Zhur. Min. Narod, Pros., 1894, Feb., Vol. 291, pp. 287-318; one will find an abundant bibliography here. Brückner, Ueber pobratimstvo bei Polen und Russen in XVI Jahrh. (Archiv für slavische Philologie, herausg. von V. Jagic, 1893, Bd. XV, SS. 314–15: kleine Mitteilungen). For ancient lists of pairs of brother-friends, philadelphoi, and comrade-friends, philetairoi, famous in antiquity, see: Paradoxographoi. Scriptores rerum mirabilium graeci, ed. Ant. Westermann, Brunsvigae-Londini, 1839, pp. 219-220 sq.

810. Fyodorov, n. 83 supra, p. 106.

811. Ibid., p. 105.

812. Many of the canons have as their aim the affirmation of jealousy, which prevents the chaotic confusion of all with all. It is not accidental that the relation between a bishop and a priest in a parish is viewed as a kind of conjugal relation, while ordination is viewed as a kind of marriage.

XIII. LETTER TWELVE: JEALOUSY

813. We hear typical intelligentsia opinions about jealousy from the most typical member of the intelligentsia, V. G. Belinsky: "Aleko's heart is possessed by jealousy," he writes. "This passion characterizes people who are egotistical by

their very nature or people who are morally undeveloped. A morally developed person loves calmly and confidently, because he respects the object of his love (love without respect is impossible for him). Cooling [of the loved object] will make him suffer, because a loving heart cannot fail to suffer when it loses its beloved. But it will not be jealous. To be jealous without sufficient reason is a sickness of insignificant people, who do not respect themselves or their right to the devotion of the object they love. Jealousy expresses the petty tyranny of a being that has fallen to the level of animal egotism. Such jealousy is impossible for a morally developed person, but in precisely the same way jealousy is impossible for him for sufficient reason. For such jealousy necessarily presupposes the torments of suspicion, insult, and the thirst for vengeance . . ." etc., etc. And all this rationalizing argumentation is sprinkled with the phrases: "if a person," "a morally developed being," "human dignity," etc. (V. G. Belinsky, *The Works of A. Pushkin* ("On the Gypsies"), *Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 458 sq.).

- 814. Fr. Kirchner, Wörterbuch d. Philosophischen Grundbegriffe, 3-te Aufl., Lpz., 1897, S. 106: Eifersucht.
- 815. I take these aphorisms from N. Makarov, Enstiklopediia uma, ili slovar' izbrannykh myslei avtorov vsekh narodov i vsekh vekov [Encyclopedia of the mind, or a dictionary of selected thoughts of authors of all nations and all ages], S.P., 1877, pp. 271–72.
- 816. Spinoza, Ethices, pars prima, Prop. XXXV, Sch. (Opera, n. 96 supra, Vol. 1, p. 151).
- 817. Ibid., pars III, Prop. XXXIII–XXXVIII, pp. 150–54; trans. N. A. Ivantsov, M., 1892. Cf. the exposition of Kuno Fischer, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. 2, S.P., 1906, pp. 444–45.
 - 818. Ethics, Ivantsov's translation, n. 817 supra, pp. 184, 186, 189.
- 819. Nietzsche, Thoughts and Sketches toward the Untimely Meditation "We Philologists." Posthumous Works, 1874–1875. Trans. P. Rutkovsky II, 3, 103 (Collected Works, M., Vol. 2, 1909, p. 302).
 - 820. Cf. Walt Whitman's poem: "To You."
 - 821. Aristotle, *Nicom. Ethics*, VIII, 7, n. 36 *supra*, p. 1158:1–8.
 - 822. See pp. 57–60 in the present book.
- 823. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 37d, 38a, 38b; n. 30 *supra*, pp. 209:16–20, 31–32, 39–43.
- **824.** This tendency to the isolation of the object of love has something that resembles modesty (see n. 289 *supra*).
 - 825. Archbishop Seraphim, see n. 43 supra, p. 132.
 - 826. See pp. 322–26 in the present book.
- 827. Goriaev, n. 7 supra, p. 296: rvenie; p. 297: revniv. Dal', n. 8 supra, Vol. 3, col. 1666–1667: revnivets; col. 1667: revnovat'.
 - 828. Dal', ibid., Vol. 3, col. 1667.
- 829. Boisacq, n. 13 *supra*, 4-me livr., p. 309; certain etymologies are presented here. Curtius, n. 13 *supra*, 4-te Aufl., Lpz., 1873, SS. 380–381, n. 567.
 - 830. Prellwitz, n. 18 *supra*, S. 109: *zalē*; S. 110: zēlas, *zēteō*.
- 831. Gesenius, *Handw.*, n. 25 *supra*, SS. 692–693; with references to the corresponding passages in Holy Scripture.
- 832. O. K. Steinberg, Russian-Hebrew Dictionary, S.P., 1860, published by the Minstr. of Nat. Ed., p. 737.

- 833. Gesenius, n. 831 supra, S. 820.
- 834. Isaac the Syrian, *Oration* 32 in Russ. translation, n. 421 *supra*, pp. 143–44; *Oration* 61 in the Greek text.

XIV. AFTERWORD

- 835. Bergson develops this idea with particular insistence in *Creative Evolution*; see n. 2 *supra*.
- 836. The definition of the *continuous* which is given in contemporary mathematics by G. Cantor in "Fondements d'une théorie générale des ensembles" (Acta Mathematica, 183, 2:4, pp. 405–406) and represents it as a combination of point elements goes hand in hand with the contemporary tendency to introduce the notion of discontinuity everywhere. Thus, electricity has been decomposed into indivisible electrons, and "the quantum hypothesis" (M. Planck and H. Poincaré, Modern Theories in Thermodynamics, trans. A. A. Alekseev, S.P., 1913, Physice) attempts to do something similar for heat. An attempt has been made to revive the "theory of flux," i.e., to divide light itself into atoms of a sort. Finally, one cannot fail to mention Father Serapion Mashkin's attempt to conceive space and time as composed of finite, further-indivisible elements. At the present time Cantor's definition of the continuous has grown into the broad "Continuumproblem," to enter into the controversies of which there is neither possibility nor need here.
- 837. On Zeno's antinomies see, in particular, Tannery, "Le concept scientifique du continu" (Rev. philos., 1885, No. 10). It is precisely on these antinomies, and their overcoming, that the entire philosophical system of Father Serapion is built.
 - 838. This expression was a favorite one of the late A. I. Vvedensky.
 - 839. G. Hagemann, Logik und Noetik, 4-te Aufl., Freib. im Br., S. 23.
 - 840. W. Wundt, *Logik*, 2-te Aufl., Bd. I, S. 558 f.
 - 841. Schubert-Soldern, Grundlagen zu einer Erkenntnis-theorie, 1884, S. 172.
 - 842. This idea has been very subtly developed by H. Cohen in his Logic.
 - 843. See p. 409 in the present book.
 - 844. See n. 80 supra.

XV. CERTAIN CONCEPTS FROM THE THEORY OF INFINITY

845. There is no complete bibliography on the theory of infinity. One can find some bibliographic indications in: Vivanti, "Lista bibliografia della teoria degli aggregati," 1893–1899 ("Bibliotheca mathematica," 3:1, 1900, p. 160), where 70 articles and books are listed. L. Couturat, De l'infini mathématique, Paris, 1896, pp. 657–60. Encyclopädie d. Math. Wissensch., Lpz., 1898–1904, Bd. I, 1, SS. 184 ff. In addition to the numerous works of the founder of the modern theory of actual infinity, G. Cantor (Grundl. einer allgemeinen Manningfaltigkeitslehre, Lpz., 1883; articles in Math. An., Bdd. 46, 49; the most important articles from other journals are collected in Acta Math., 1883, 2:4), it is necessary to mention in particular: Killing, "Ueber transfiniten Zahlen" (Math. An., Bd. 48). Veronese, "Intorno ad alcune osservazioni sui segmenti infiniti et infinitesimali attuali" (ibid., Bd. 47). Lindelöf (Comptes Rendus, 1903[2], 37). Evellin, Infini et quantité: Etude sur le concept de l'infini en philos. et dans les sciences, Paris, 1880. Ger. Hessenberg, Grundbegriffe der Mengenlehre, Göttingen, 1906 (Sonderabdr.

aus den Abhandl. der Fries'schen Schule, Bd. 1, Hft. 4); by the same author: Das Unendliche in die Mathematik (ibid., Bd. 1, Hft. 3). E. Zermelo, "Beweis, dass jede Menge wohlgeordnet werden kann" (Math. An., Bd. 59, 1904, SS. 514–516). Arth. Schoenflies, "Die Entwickelung d. Lehre von den Punktmanningfaltigkeiten" (Jahresbericht d. Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung, Lpz., 1900, Bd. 8, Hft. 2). Borel, see n. 857 infra. In Russian: I. Zhegalkin, Transfinitnye chisla [Transfinite numbers], M., 1907. H. Weber and S. Wellstein, Encyclopedia of Elementary Mathematics, trans. from the Germ. under the supervision of V. Kogan, Mathesis, Vol. 1, Odessa, 1907. H. Poincaré, Science and Method, see n. 209 supra. A. V. Vasiliev, Vved. v analiz [Introduction to analysis], fasc. II, published by N. N. Iovlev, Kazan', 1908. Florensky, see n. 1 supra. Nov. idei v matem. [New ideas in mathematics], collection No. 1, Obraz, S.P., 1913. Bolzano, n. 209 supra.

846. Schelling, Bruno, supra n. 98.

847. H. Poincaré, *La science et l'hypothèse*, pp. 20 sq; there is a Russian translation. Analogously, Tannery affirms that "the concept of the whole number already contains the concept of infinity" (*Pure Mathematics: Method in the Sciences*, trans. from the 2nd Fr. ed. by I. S. Iushkevich and I. K. Brusilovsky, *Obrazovanie*, S.P., 1911, p. 35).

848. Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Celestial Hierarchy, 14 (Russ. trans., 1898, p. 52).

849. Goethe, Voyage to Italy.

850. Con. Gutberlet, "Das Problem d. Unendlichen" (Zeitschr. f. Philos. und philos. Kr., Bd. 88, 1886, S. 215).

851. This excursus is an abridged extract from O simv. bezk., n. 1 supra. To the works indicated in n. 45 supra on the history of the concept of infinity, let us add: Tannery, "Hist. du concept de l'infini au IV siècle" (Rev. philos., XIV, 618).

XVI. A Problem of Lewis Carroll and the Question of Dogma

852. Couturat, *Pr. d. M.*, n. 212 *supra*, p. 16, with reference to Carroll's article, published in *Mind*, 1906, April and July, pp. 293, 400.

853. Ibid.

854. For an accessible exposition of the theory of the sky's blueness, see J. Tyndall, *The Role of Imagination in the Development of the Natural Sciences*, trans. F. Pavlenkov, Viatka, 1873 (*Speeches and Articles*, M., 1875); by the same author: "*Dust and Diseases*" (J. Tyndall, *Articles on the Natural Sciences*, with introduction and notes by Helmholtz, trans. from the Germ. by O. Bobylev, P. Gesechus, N. Egorov, and others, S.P., 1876, pp. 1–62).

XVII. IRRATIONALITIES IN MATHEMATICS AND DOGMA

855. R. Dedekind. Continuity and Irrational Numbers, 1872, trans. from the Germ. with notes by S. O. Shatunovsky, Odessa, published by Mathesis, 2nd ed., 1909, supplemented by the article "Proof of the Existence of Transcendental Numbers." Weber and Wellstein, see n. 845 supra. Vasiliev, see n. 845 supra, Par. 18–31. J. Tannery, Introduction to the Theory of Functions of One Variable, 1913 (the 1st French ed. is a bibliographic rarity); by the same author: A Course

of Theoretical and Practical Arithmetic, trans. A. A. Kotliarevsky under the supervision of D. L. Volkovsky, M., 1913. M. Volkov, Evoliutsiia poniatiia o chisle [Evolution of the concept of number], S.P., 1899. F. Klein, Problems of Elementary and Higher Mathematics, Part 1, Odessa, 1912, trans. under the supervision of V. Kogan, published by Mathesis, pp. 47-56; by the same author: Anwendung d. Differential- u. Integralrechnung auf die Geometrie: Eine Revision d. Principien, Lpz., 1901, 2-te Ausg., 1907. A. Voss, On the Essence of Mathematics, trans. I. V. Iashunsky, S.P., 1911, published by *Physice*. Ch. du Méray, Nouv. précis d'analyse infinitésimale, Paris, 1872 (he calls the fundamental series the "convergent variant," while equal series are called "equivalent"). G. Cantor, "Ueb. di Ausdehnung eines Satzes aus der Theorie d. trigon. Reihen" (Mat. An., Bd. 5). Pasch, Einl. in d. Dif. u. Int.-rechn., Lpz., 1882. B. Russell, Principles of Mathematics, 1902. Heine, "Die Elemente d. Funktionlehre" (Crelle's Journ., Bd. 74). Weierstrass's theory has not been expounded by Weierstrass himself in original works; for its exposition see Korsak, Die Elemente d. Arithmetik, Berlin, 1872. Dini, Grundl. für eine Theorie d. Funktionen, Halle, 1880, 2-te Aufl., 1898. A. Pringsheim, "Irrationalzahlen u. Konvergenz unendlicher Processe" (Enc. d. Math. Wis., Lpz., 1898-1904, Bd. I, 1, SS. 47 ff.). P. Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen d. exakten Wissenshcaften, Lpz., 1910. O. Stoltz u. I. A. Gmeiner, Theoretische Arithmetik, Lpz., 1902. Couturat, De l'infini math., see n. 845 supra.

857. N. H. Abel, "Note sur un mémoire de M. L. Olivier ayant pour titre 'Remarque sur les séries infinies'" (Oeuvres complètes, nouv. éd. par L. Sylov et S. Lie, T. 1, pp. 399–402). Abel proves that the feature of convergence cannot be given in the form of an equality. N. V. Bugaev, Skhodimost bezk. riadov po ikh vnseh. vidu [Convergence of infinite series according to their external aspect], M., 1863; by the same author: Vved. v analiz i dif. isch. [Introduction to analysis and the differential calculus], 2nd. ed., M., 1898, pp. 143–44. L. Euler, "De infinities infinitis gradibus" (Acta Petrop., 1778). P. du Bois-Reymond, Die allgemeine Funktionentheorie, Tübingen, 1882. E. Borel, Leçons sur la théorie des fonctions, Paris, 1898; L. sur les fonctions entières, Paris, 1900; L. s. l. séries divergentes,

Paris, 1901; L. s. l. séries a termes positifs, rec. et red. par R. d'Adhémar, Paris, 1902; L. s. l. fonctions méromorphes. N. Parfent'ev, Issledovaniia po teorii rosta funktsii [Investigations on the theory of the growth of functions], Kazan', 1910.

856. E. Borel, Leçons sur la théorie des fonctions, see n. 857, IV, pp. 54–55.

858. Of the few attempts of this kind, and this only with respect to irrationalities, I am familiar with: Solomon Maimon's attempt; see B. Iakovenko, "Filosofs. kontseptsiia Sol. Maimona" [Solomon Maimon's philosophical conception], VFP, 1912, Books 114 (IV) and 115 (V). Also see Benno Kerry, System einer Theorie d. Grenzbegriffe: Eine Beitrag zur Erkenntnisstheorie, Erst. Theil, her. von. G. Kohn, Lpz. u. Wien, 1890. K. Zhakov, Osnovy evoliutsionnoi teorii poznaniia (limitizm) [Foundations of the Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge (Limitism)], S.P., 1912 (the author diverges from the main trends of contemporary mathematics). Father P. Florensky, Predely gnoseologii [The Limits of gnoseology], Serg. Pos., 1913 (= Bog. V., 1913, Jan.). The modern transcendentalists also use the concept of limit but, surprisingly, not on the scale on which they could use it. They could use it in such a way that not only would they not violate but they would even reinforce the main lines of their constructions.

XVIII. THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY IN SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

- 859. Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gent., IV, 14.
- 860. Thomas Aquinas, Summa, I, q. XLVII a. 2c; Contra Gent., 92; Q. disp., De Ver., q. XII, a. 13 ad 3.
- 861. Nuntius Signoriello, *Lexicon peripateticum philosphico-theologicum in quo scholasticorum distinctiones et effata principua explicantur*. Ed. novissima, locupletior atque emendatior, Neapoli, 1906, litt. G II, pp. 150–51. The citations in notes 859 and 860 *supra* are taken from this work.
- 862. There is a certain contradiction in this exposition; the previously indicated distinction was recognized to be specific.
- 863. Thomas Aquinas, In Lib. I Sent., Dist. XXIV, q. I, a 1 sol. (Signoriello, see n. 861 supra, litt. U VI, p. 371).
 - 864. Signoriello, see n. 861 supra.
- 865. Suarez, Disput. metaphys., Sect. 9, num. 9 (cited from Cornoldi, Thesaurus Philosophorum, 1891, U. v. II, 70, p. 156).

XIX. THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC

- 866. Plato, Euthydemus (Russ. trans. Solovyov, Vol. 2, p. 145).
- 867. *Hippias Major*, ibid, p. 133–40.
- 868. Couturat, n. 212 supra, Pr. d. M., pp. 51-52.
- 869. Ibid., pp. 16-21.
- 870. Ibid., p. 24.
- 871. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
- 872. Ibid., p. 23.
- 873. Ibid., pp. 24–25.
- 874. Cf. ibid., p. 26.
- 875. Ibid., p. 26.
- 876. Ibid., pp. 33-34.

XX. TIME AND FATE

- 877. After having written this excursus, I found a collection of citations on the same theme of *Tempor destruttore* in Lapshin, n. 29 *supra*, pp. 562–64.
- 878. Mikloshich compares the word *vre-mia* (time) with **vert-men*, from **vr"t-eti* as the *kolovorot* (vortex) of time, which can be related to *pre-vrat-n-yi* (changeable, vicissitudinal). Brugmann also compares *vremia* with the Sanskrit *vart-man*, *Bahn*, exploit; and from this he derives the German *werden*, *Gegenwart*, the present time (Goriaev, n. 7 *supra*, p. 57). Mikutsky (see n. 10 *supra*, fasc. II, p. 58) compares it with the Lithuanian *wora*, procession, a long series of moving objects, and explains time as motion. "Time is measured by motion, and it appeared to our ancestors as continuous, infinite motion" (ibid., p. 58).
- 879. I. Solomonovsky, "Material dlia slovoproizvodstven. slovaria" [Material for an etymological dictionary], 7, n. (Fil. Zap., 1888, p. 5). According to Potebnia, see n. 883 infra, p. 156, the Polish rok signifies a "judicial term and a year," while the Serbian rok signifies "term."
 - 880. Dal', n. 8 supra, Vol. 3, p. 1712: rok.

- 881. Goriaev, n. 7 supra, p. 301: rok.
- 882. Sreznevsky, n. 286 supra, Vol. 3, 1, p. 163.
- 883. Goriaev, n. 7 supra, p. 301. The Czech rok signifies "that which is established by agreement; in particular, a term, a definite period, a year" (A. A. Potebnia, O dole i srodnykh s neiu sushchestvakh [On fate and related entities], I, Tr. Mosk. Arkeol. O-va, M., 1865, Vol. 1, p. 156). Potebnia's interpretation of the word rok is somewhat different from ours: the significance of rok as fatum "could have been formed on the basis of the word for decision (the Polish wyrock, the Czech vyrok), in particular the decision of a superior being." However, there is no reason to prefer this explanation to that which introduces the idea of fate and the expression of the idea of time. "There are a sufficient number of indications of the dependence of fate on time, especially on the time of birth . . . " [examples follow] "The dependence of fate on time can easily be reconciled with beliefs in fate as a living being. The time of birth of an individual is responsible for his receiving one fate or another" (ibid., pp. 156–57). But what is Fate in the popular understanding? Having indicated the possibility of a two-fold understanding of Fate, as a personification and as a mythical being, Potebnia tends to accept the second solution (ibid., pp. 164-68) and links Fate with other mythical beings, akin to it (ibid., pp. 168 sq.).
 - 884. Miklosich, Lexic. palaeosloven.
 - 885. Vanicek, n. 20 supra, S. 104, W. bha.
 - 886. Roscher, n. 278 supra, Bd. I, col. 1446.
 - 887. Serv. Aen. 10, 628.
 - 888. Ibid., 12:808.
 - 889. Isid. Or. 8, 11, 90 (Roscher, n. 278 supra, Bd. I, col. 1447).
 - 890. Roscher, n. 278 supra, col. 1449-1450: Fatum.
 - 891. Ibid., col. 1452-1453: Fatus, Fata.
- 892. W. F. Otto, *Genius* (Paulys, *Real-Encyklopädie d. classichen Alter-thumswissenschaft*, Neue Bearb., herausg. v. G. Vissowa und W. Kroll, Stuttgart, 1910, Bd. VII, 1, col. 1155–1170). Preller-Jordan, *Röm. Myt.*, 3. Aus., Bd. I, SS. 76 ff. Roscher, *Lex.*, Bd. I, SS. 1613 ff., etc.
 - 893. Verg. Aen. 5:707.
 - 894. Lucretius, I, 70. Roscher, col. 1447:54-56.
 - 895. Ibid, col. 1477:58-60.
 - 896. Senec. Oed. 1059.
 - 897. Confirmed by Roscher, see n. 278 *supra*, col. 1447–1448.
 - 898. Cited in Roscher, col. 1452:23-31.
 - 899. Cited in Roscher, col. 1448:19-21.

XXI. THE HEART AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF MAN ACCORDING TO SCRIPTURE

900. Iurkevich, n. 461 supra, pp. 64-69.

XXII. AN ICON OF THE ANNUNCIATION

901. Acathistus of the Protection of the Virgin, ikos 12. We cite this acathistus only to explicate the theme of the icon; of course, we do not claim that there is a

direct connection between the two, for the acathistus has a much later origin than the icon.

902. Ibid.

903. V. V. Bolotov, n. 241 supra, Vol. 2, p. 354.

XXIII. ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE HISTORICAL CRITIQUE

904. One can find explanations and references in E. Czuber, "Wahrsheinlich-keitsrechnung," Sec. 16 (Encykl. d. Mat. Wis., see n. 855 supra, Lpz., 1900–1904, Bd. I, 2, SS. 764–765). Also see any course on the theory of probability: Laplace, Philosophical Essay on the Theory of Probabilities, trans. A. J. B., under the supervision of A. K. Vlasov, M., 1908. A. K. Vlasov, Teoriia veroiatnostei [Theory of probabilities], M., 1909. L. K. Lakhtin, Teoriia veroiatnostei, M., 1902. P. A. Nekrasov, Teoriia veroiatnostei, 2nd ed., S.P., 1912. Poincaré, n. 209 supra, Ch. XI, etc. Jevons, n. 212 supra, Ch. 12, 16, and 17. Mill, Logic, n. 180 supra, Bk. 3, etc.

905. Czuber, n. 904 supra, Sec. 17, etc.

906. Jevons, n. 212 supra, p. 192.

907. Laplace, n. 904 supra.

908. Jevons, n. 212 supra, p. 484.

909. Ibid., pp. 193, 208.

910. P. A. Nekrasov (see n. 183 *supra*) insists on the idea of judgments with a coefficient of probability.

911. P. Stoian, *Puti k Istine: Sotsial'no-filosofskii ocherk* [Ways to the Truth: An essay in social philosophy], S.P., May, 1908, Part 1, Sec. 15, p. 34. On pp. 35–35 one finds an example of the application of these characteristics to a particular judgment.

912. The magnitude of moral expectation and possible increments $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \ldots$ of a value a is measured by the function

$$h = (a + \alpha)^p (a + \beta)^q (a + \gamma)^r \dots - a,$$

where p, q, r . . . are the probabilities that these increments are obtained (D. Bernoulli, *Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura sortis*, Petrop. Comm. 5, 1738, and a new German ed., Lpz., 1896. Laplace, *Théorie analyt. des probabilités*, Paris, 1812, 1814, 1820, *Oeuv.*, Vol. 7, p. X).

913. Jevons, n. 212 *supra*, Bk. 4, Ch. 26, p. 548. "Pascal remarks that one should consider unreasonable a man who would not agree to die if dice landed '6' twenty times in a row, but would receive a crown if they did not. Since the probability of death here is only 1 in 6 to the 60th power (or unity divided by a number of 47 digits) one could say that each day we face a greater chance of death by playing croquet" (Jevons, pp. 206–207). We find a similar conception of the necessity, in any activity, of certain suprarational motions of the will, in John Locke: "He that will not eat, till he has Demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir, till he infallibly knows the Business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do, but sit still and perish" (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, London, 1768, Vol. II, Book IV, Chap. XIV, Par. 1, p. 271). However, questions of faith are not ordinary questions, but essential for our life. As long we are alive, we are forced to chose between faith and unfaith.

XXIV. THE TURQUOISE ENVIRONMENT OF SOPHIA AND THE SYMBOLISM OF SKY-BLUE AND DARK-BLUE

- 914. Philo, Life of Moses, 3.
- 915. Joseph Flavius, Judaic Antiquities, III, VII, 7.
- 916. St. Jerome, Epistles, 64:18; PL, Vol. 22, col. 617.
- 917. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., I, II, CII, 4 ad 4.
- 918. Jerome, n. 916 supra, col. 618.
- 919. Thomas Aquinas, n. 917 supra, 5 ad. 10.
- 920. Ibid., 6 ad 7. The citations in notes 914–920 are taken from Bähr, *Symbolik d. mosaischen Cultus*, Heidelberg, 1837, Bd. I, SS. 303–311, 316–340; and H. Lesêtre, "*Couleurs*" (*Dict. d. la Bible* par F. Vigouroux, Paris, 1899, T. 2, col. 1069–1071). According to the symbolism of colors accepted by Catholics, "white signifies innocence, joy or simplicity. Blue indicates celestial contemplation. Red announces love, suffering, power, justice. Crystalline gives the idea of immaculate purity and clarity. Green speaks of hope or of incorruptible youth, or of the contemplative life. Gold stands for celestial glory. Yellow signifies trial by suffering, as well as envy. Brown or gray is the color of humility. Violet expresses silence or contemplation. Black is the color of sorrow, death or rest. Purple is the symbol of the royal or episcopal rank" (Rev. M. C. Nieuwbarn, *Church Symbolism: A Treatise on the General Symbolism and Iconography of the Roman Catholic Church Edifice*, translated from the Dutch by the Rev. John Waterreus, London, 1910, p. 140).
- **921.** O. Weininger, *Last Words*, trans. A. Gren and B. Ts., the *Sphinx* edition (s.l. et a.). *Metaphysics*, p. 143.
- 922. J. Ruskin, *Mornings in Florence*, trans. A. Gertsyk, S.P., 1902, pp. 136–46. Similarly, in the "Seven Sacraments" of Roger van der Weyden, the angels wear symbolic vestments. For example, the angel of blessing (chrismation) wears green (hope); the angel of penitence wears fiery red (redemption); the angel of priesthood wears violet (spiritual dignity); the angel of marriage wears blue (trust and faithfulness), and so on (see Nieuwbarn, n. 920 *supra*, p. 141).
 - 923. Ruskin, n. 922 *supra*, Par. 56, pp. 73–74.
- 924. P. Muratov, *Obrazy Italii* [Images of Italy], M., 1911, Vol. 1, pp. 134–35. There is a picture of this vault (unfortunately, not a color picture) in Cabrol's *Dictionary*, n. 25 *supra*, 1907, Vol. 1: 2: *Astres*, col. 3019.
- 925. Frédéric Portal, Des couleurs symboliques dans l'antiquité, le Moyen Age et les temps modernes, Paris, 1837, 312 pp.; Les symboles des Egyptiens, comparés a ceux des Hebreux, Paris, 1840, 148 pp., Chap. III: "Application aux symboles des couleurs," pp. 109–124.
 - 926. Portal, Coul. Symb., pp. 10-11.
 - 927. Ibid., p. 11.
 - 928. Ibid., p. 165.
 - 929. Ibid., pp. 28-30.
 - 930. Ibid. pp. 143-65.
 - 931. Eusebius, Evangelical Preparation, 3:12.
 - 932. Aeliani, Var. hist., 14:34.
 - 933. Portal, Symbol. Egypt., n. 925 supra, pp. 116–17.
 - 934. Ibid., p. 116.

- 935. Latin Bible of the 10th-century, ms. of the Bibl. Royale, No. 6, T. I.
- 936. Breviarium Sarisber., ms. Bibl. Roy., 15th century.
- 937. Guigniaut, Notes sur la symbolique de Creuzer, T. I, p. 552.
- 938. La Mothe-Levayer, Opuscules, p. 245.
- 939. Horus Apollo, p. 13, ed. Caussin.
- 940. Aeliani, de Animalibus, X, 15.
- **941.** Caussin, *Symbol. égypt.*, p. 179.
- 942. Anselme, Palais d l'Honneur, p. 11.
- 943. Plato, Timaeus, 67C-68D; M. Sartorius, "Plato und die Malerei" (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil., Bd. IX, N.F. II. Bd., SS. 123-148).
- 944. Walth. Kranz, "Die ätltesten Farbenlehre d. Grieschen" (Hermes, 1912, I, XLVII, SS. 126–140).
- 945. Leonardo da Vinci, *Trattato della pittura*, 254 (the citation is from E. Mach, *Analysis of Sensations*, trans. from the 5th Germ. ed. by G. Kutler, 2nd ed. M., 1908, IV, 6, p. 72; with precise references).
 - 946. Ibid., p. 255.
 - 947. Goethe, Articles on Optics (1791 and 1792); Theory of Colors (1810).
- 948. Goethe, Zur Farbenlehre, 6-te Abth. "Sinnlich-sittlich Wirkung d. Farbe" (Goethes Sam. Werk. in vierzig B-de, Stuttgart u. Tübingen, 1840, Bd. 37, Par. 765–777, SS. 251–254).
 - 949. Ibid., Par. 777, S. 254.
 - 950. Ibid., Par. 765, S. 251.
 - 951. See pp.357–58 in the present book and n. 854 supra.
 - 952. Goethe, see n. 948 supra, Par. 778, S. 254.
 - 953. Ibid., Par. 779, SS. 254-55.
 - 954. Ibid., Par. 780, S. 255.
 - 955. Ibid., Par. 781.
 - 956. Ibid., Par. 782.
 - 957. Ibid., Par. 783.
 - 958. Ibid., Par. 784.
 - 959. Ibid., Par. 785.
 - 960. Thomas Seebeck, Grundzügen d. Farbenlehre, 1811.
- 961. L. Henning first read the public course "On Goethe's doctrine of colors from the point of view of natural philosophy" at the University of Berlin during the summer of 1823 (K. Fischer, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. 8:1, S.P., p. 162).
- 962. Joh. Müller, Zur vergleichenden Physiologie d. Gesichtssinnes, VIII, Fragmente z. Farbenlehre, insbesondere z. Goetheschen Farbenlehre, Lpz., 1826, SS. 395 ff.
- 963. Schopenhauer, On Vision and Colors; Parerga, II, Chap. 7; see a detailed exposition in Fischer: Arth. Schopenhauer, trans. from the German under the supervision of V. P. Preobrazhensky, M., 1896, pp. 191–202.
- 964. Hegel, Course on Aesthetics, trans. V. Modestov, M, 1859, Sec. III, Part 1, II, 2, pp. 137–39 (= Werke, Bd. X); Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), Par. 317–320 (= Werke, Bd. VII, Abth. I, SS. 3:7). For an exposition see K. Fischer, Hist. of Modern Philos., Vol. 8:1, S.P., 1901, pp. 623–26.
 - 965. Schelling, On the World Soul (1798), Werke I, Bd. 2, SS. 399, 400.
 - 966. Hegel, Course on Aesthetics, see n. 964 supra, pp. 138–39.

- 967. The literature on the symbolism of precious stones is indicated in the works of Geminianus (n. 975 infra), Menzel (n. 972 infra), Behr (n. 914 supra), Patkanov (n. 969 infra), Levesque (n. 971 infra), etc. Among other authors let us mention Pliny the Elder (Natural History) and Isidor of Spain (PL, Vols. 82, 83). Also see D. O. Schepping, "Symbolism of Precious Stones" (Trudy Mosk. Ark. O-va, M., 1865, Vol. 1, pp. 135–52). Izbornik of Sviatoslav (Buslaev, Historical Chrestomathy, p. 263). M-me Félicie d'Ayzac, Symbolique des pierres précieuses, Paris, 1846. Grässe, "Symbolik d. Edelsteine" (in the collection: Romberg, Die Wissenschaft der XIX Jahrhundert). Mélanges Archéologiques, Paris, 1851, II, IV. I. P. Iuvachev, Tainy tsar., see n. 750 supra, Part 1, pp. 225–31: "Jasper and sard" (the author attempts to prove that the Biblical jasper was diamond while the Biblical sard was ruby).
- 968. Sapphire and ruby in the corundum group; different forms of zircon; topaz and aquamarine; garnets, brown-red, blood-red, bright red, yellow, green, black, white; all forms of quartz: black crystal, smoky topaz, amethyst, jasper, heliotrope, chalcedony, agate, etc.
- 969. C. W. King, The Natural History, Ancient and Modern of Precious Stones and Gems, and of the Precious Metals, London, 1865, p. 195. Cited in K. P. Patkanov, Dragotsennye kamni, ikh nazvaniia i svoistva po poniatiam armian v XVII veke [Precious stones, their names and properties according to Armenian conceptions in the 17th century], S.P., 1873, p. 14.
- 970. C. Plinius Secundus, Historia naturalis, IX, 41, Ed. ex. rec. J. Harduini, Parisiis, 1723, T. 1, p. 527. "Eas gemmas Magorum vanitas resistere ebrietati promittit, et inde appelatos" (ibid., XXXVII, 40, T. 2, p. 784). Also see Marbodeus, Lib. de lapidib. pret. 4; Albertus Magnus, Lib. 2 de miner., p. 228: "(ameth.) operatur autem contra ebrietatem, ut dicit Aaron, et facit vigilem" (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 784, n. 14).
- 971. E. Levesque, "Pierre précieuse," IV, 19 (art. Dict. Bibl., publié par F. Vigouroux, Paris, 1908, Fasc. XXXII, col. 426).
- 972. On this use of lapis lazuli, see Wolfg. Menzel, *Christliche Symbolik*, Regensburg, 1854, Erster Theil, S. 135, with references to Ritter, *Vorhalle*, 133 and Beckmann, *Gesch. d. Erfindungen*, III, 184.
- 973. Menzel, n. 972 supra, S. 135, with references to Bunsen, Beschr. von Rom. III, 3, 504.
 - 974. Menzel, SS. 536-537.
- 975. Joannes S. Geminianus, Summa de exemplis et rerum similitudinibus locupletissima ... post omnes alias editiones diligenti cura aucta a Magistro D. Aegidio Gravatio, Antverpiae, 1630, Lib. II, cap. VI, fol. 123 v. Here is what Geminianus says: "Contemplatio assimilatur saphyro. Primum propter aspectum coloris. Est enim saphyrus gemma caerulea coelo sereno in colore simillima. Similiter contemplativi viri habent colorem, id est conversationem serenam et caelestem, secundum illud Phil. (4): Nostra conversatio in coelis est. Supra firmamentum, quod erat imminens capiti eorum, quasi aspectus lapidi sau[p?]hyri. Secundo, propter excessum valoris" etc.
- 976. Ibid., fol. 123 v. r.: "Item contemplatio coelestium assimilatur Zimeth, id est venae terrae, de qua fit laturium. Primo, ratione coloris. Quia lapis hic est tanto melior, quanto colori coelesti similior. Et habet quaedam corpuscula, quasi aurea intersecta: Ita contemplativi viri, tanto sunt meliores, quanto coelectibus

civibus sunt in contemplatione, et conservatione similores. Unde virginitas coniugio praefertur, quia incorruptioni vitae coeletis similius conformatur (Luc. 20). In resurrectione neque nubent, neque nubentur, sed erunt sicut Angeli Dei in coelo. Secundo . . ." etc. Let us add that, according to Pope Innocent III in his letter to Richard, the King of England, "the celestial color of sapphire signifies our hope, directed to the heavens, whereas the whiteness of beryl, like the color of water when the sun's rays are reflected in it, personifies the Holy Scripture suffused with the wisdom of the Divine Word" (D. O. Schepping, *The Symbolism of Precious Stones*, n. 967 supra, p. 139, with a reference also to J. Brunon. Astens, Praefat. in lib. sup. Apocal.). For more on sapphire see Geminianus, fol. 128 v.-r, 135 r.

- 977. S. Nilus, "Svidetel'stvo zhivoi very. III. Videnie odnogo poslushnuika" [Testimony of living faith. III. The vision of a novice] (S. Nilus: Sila Bozhiia i nemosch' chelovecheskaia [God's power and man's impotence], Sergiev Posad, 1908, p. 264).
- 978. G. Bourgeat, *Magic*, trans. from the 3rd Fr. ed. by Bargus, S.P., 1911, Ch. III, pp. 52–56.
- 979. Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov, Works, Vol. 3, pp. 13–15; Vol. 4, pp. 277–78; Vol. 1, pp. 108–109, 118.
 - 980. Bourgeat, n. 978 supra, Ch. 9, p. 135.
- 981. Steiner, THEOSOPHIA; see n. 29 supra, IV, 6, pp. 150-51; also by Steiner: Way of Initiation, n. 741 supra.
- 982. THEOSOPHIA, pp. 154–58. One can find magnificent color reproductions of auras and other details in Annie Besant and C. W. Leadbeater, *Thought-Forms*, London and Benares, 1905; Ethel M. Mallet, *First Steps in Theosophy*, London, 1905; Leadbeater, *Man Visible and Invisible*.
 - 983. Homer, Odyssey, n. 335 supra, VI, 39–41, pp. 160–61.
 - 984. Ibid. VI, 44–46.
- 985. Viacheslav Ivanov, "*Pokrov*" [The veil] in *Cor ardens*, 1911, p. 77. Here, by the way, is one of a multitude of examples of "strange" coincidences: the numbers 7, 77, etc. are the numbers of Sophia, and the verses about Her are on p. 77.
 - 986. Lafcadio Hearn, Kwaidan, n. 296 supra, pp. 112–13, 114.
- 987. The hieroschemamonk Parfenii, "meditating once with some doubt on what he had read somewhere, namely that the Holy Virgin was the first nun on earth, fell asleep and saw a majestic nun wearing a mantle and carrying a crozier in her hands coming from the holy doors of the Lavra, accompanied by a crowd of monks. Approaching him, She said; 'Parfenii, *I am a nun!*' He woke up and since then he has, with heartfelt conviction, called the Most Holy Mother of God the Mother Superior of the Caves Lavra" (*Skazanie*, n. 532 *supra*, p. 26).
- 988. Paterik of Mt. Athos, n. 485 supra, Part 1, p. 105. The Life of Athanasius is taken from Kalokafinē.
- 989. Ibid., p. 106. We find a striking parallel in the words of the Blessed Nilus: "If one desires to see the renewal of his own mind, let him deprive himself of all thoughts, and then he will see himself akin to sapphire or the color of heaven." These words are reported by St. Gregory Palamas (PG, Vol. 150, col. 1083. Bishop Aleksii, *Vizantiiskie tserkovnye mistiki 14-ogo veka* [Byzantine church mystics of the 14th Century], Kazan', 1906, p. 45).

990. Catalogue of the Exhibition of Representations of the Mother of God, M., 1897, p. 7, No. 5.

991. Perret, Catacombes de Rome, Vol. 2, pl. VI.

992. Ibid., Vol. I, pl. 83.

993. See *supra* n. 990, pp. 12–13, No. 20.

994. Ibid., p. 13, No. 21.

995. Ibid., p. 14, No. 23.

996. Ibid., p. 15, No. 25.

997. Ibid., p. 19, No. 44.

998. Ibid., p. 25, No. 25.

999. One can find a color reproduction of the "Impregnable Wall" after a drawing of F. G. Solntsev in *Drevnosti Rossiiskago Gosudarstva: Kievo-Sofiiskii Sobor* [Antiquities of the Russian Empire: The Cathedral of St. Sophia of Kiev], published by the Imperial Russian Archeological Society, tabl. 3.

1000. Ibid., frontispiece.

1001. Ruskin, Mornings in Florence, trans. A. Gertsyk, S.P., 1902, par. 27, p. 37.

1002. Menzel, see n. 972 supra, T. II, S. 99.

1003. Menzel, T. I, S. 134.

1004. Ibid.

1005. Menzel, T. II, SS. 94-95.

1006. Ibid., T. II, S. 96.

1007. This icon belongs to the Ecclesiastical Museum of the Moscow Theological Academy. In order to complement what has been said, let us present the testimony of a specialist in Catholic symbolism: "Her colors [he is speaking of the Mother of God] have their symbolic significance. In the representation of the Coronation, She is wearing very sumptuous garments, and they are of the same material as the garments worn by Her Divine Son. In the representation of the Annunciation She is wearing, as the Handmaid of the Lord, simple red and blue garments. As the Queen of Heaven, She is wearing azure garments, speckled with golden stars, or a queen's mantle of purple or golden brocade. Rose-red represents the dawn preceding the rising of the Sun of Truth. The green of the veils and of the undergarments signifies the expectations of the nations, while the immaculate white symbolizes the Virgin of virgins" (Nieuwbarn, n. 920 supra, pp. 113–14).

XXV. PASCAL'S "AMULET"

1008. L.F. Lelut, "De l'amulette de Pascal" (C. R. Acad. Sc. Mor. et Pol., T. VI, 1844, pp. 453–76, Paris, 1846). Also by the same author: "L'abîme imaginaire de Pascal" (ibid., VIII, p. 139).

1009. I take the text from the "critical" edition of the *Pensées*, Paris, 1858, pp. 40–41, n. 1.

1010. If my memory does not deceive me, this attempt was made by Sully Prudhomme in *La vraie religion selon Pascal*, Paris, 1905.

1011. A. S. Khomyakov, *Collected Works*, vol. 2, 5th ed., M., 1907, p. 543, editor's note to p. 147. S. S. Glagolev, *Iz chtenii o religii* [From lectures on religion], Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, 1905, pp. 222, 233, 235.

XXVI. ON THE HISTORY OF THE TERM "ANTINOMY"

- 1012. E. A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods*, New York, 1885, p. 185.
- 1013. Skarlatos D. Buzantios, *Lexikon tēs hellēnikēs glōssēs*, *ekdote hupo Andreou Koromēla*. En Athenais, 1852, p. 123.
- 1014. Anthimos ho Gazēs, Lexikon hellēnikon. Ekdosis prōtē. Tomos prōtos. En Venetiai, 1809, p. 446.
- 1015. Th. Kind, Handwörterbuch d. neugriechischen u. deutschen Sprache, Lpz., 1888.
- 1016. M. Fabius Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria*, VII, 10:2; cf. VII, 1:15 and 7:1. This work dates from 93–95.
- 1017. St. Augustine, *Rhetoric*, 11 (*Rhethores lat. min.*, ed. Halm, pp. 137–51). This work dates from the last quarter of the 4th century.
- 1018. Codex Justianinus, lib. 1, tit. 17, constit. 1, Par. 8 (Krüger, Corpus juris civilis, ed. stereot., II, 1877).
- 1019. C. Jul. Victor, Ars rhetorica, 3, 11 (Rhet. lat. min., ed. Halm, pp. 373–448). Hermog., 15, 3, 56, 4 (Rhetores graeci). Hierocl., C. A. 42, 2 (Gaisford's Stobaeus, II). Plutar., II, 741 D (ed. Paris, 1624). Notes 1016–1019 are compiled on the basis of the dictionaries cited in notes 1012–1014 as well as on the basis of Lenert's article in Thesauras linguae Latinae editus auctoritate et consilio Academiarum quinque Germanicarum Berolinensis Gottingensis Lipsiensis Monacensis Vindobomenensis, Vol. 2, Fasc. 1, Lipsiae, 1901, col. 170: "Antin."
- 1020. "antinomikos, ho anēkōn eis (periechōn) antinomian, antiphatikos" (Skarlatos, n. 1013 supra, p. 123); antinomikos—hopoios anēkei eis tēn antinomian (Gazes, n. 1014 supra, p. 446); antinomikos—pertaining to antiomia (Plutarch, II, 741D, ed. Paris, 1624); antinomikōs, adv. by antinomia (Argum. Dem. Androt., 592) (Sophocles, Lexicon, p. 185).
- 1021. Fr. Astius, Lexicon Platonicum, Lipsiae, 1835, Vol. 1. Herm. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Berolini, 1870.
 - 1022. R. Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 1613, p. 110.
- 1023. For example, in Cornoldi, *Thesaurus Philosophorum*, 1891, and in Signoriello, n. 861 *supra*. It also does not occur in Plexiacus, *Lexicon philosophicum*, Hagae Comitis, 1716.
- 1024. Stephanus Chauvinus, Lexicon philosophicum, novum opus, Leovardiae, 1713.
- 1025. Rud. Eucken, *Geschichte d. philosophischen Terminologie*, Lpz., 1879. Eisler (*Wört. d. philos. Begr.*, 3-te Aufl., Berlin, 1910, Bd. 1, S. 62) refers to this book, but I have not found this reference in Eisler.
 - 1026. E. L. Radlov, Philosophical Dictionary, S.P., 1904, p. 13.
- 1027. According to Kant, antinomies are "Widerstreit der Gesetze der reinen Vernunft" (Critique of Pure Reason, B, p. 440; Kherbach, p. 340), "contradictions in which reason becomes tangled in its attempt to think the absolute, the contradictions of reason with itself" (ibid.). Very important for clarifying Kant's notion of antinomy is, aside from the Critique of Pure Reason, his thesis: "What has the actual progress of metaphysics in Germany been since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?," trans. N. Lossky (Trudy S. Pet. Filos. O-va, Fasc. 6, S.P., 1910).
 - 1028. See n. 209 supra.

XXVII. ESTHETICISM AND RELIGION

1029. See n. 426 *supra*. To this it is necessary to add: Fr. K. N. Aggeev, *Khr-vo i ego otnoshenie k blagoustreniiu zemnoi zhizni* [Christianity and Its relation to the organization of life on earth], Kiev, 1909, and reviews of this book by B. Ekzempliarsky and V. Zavitnevich (extract from journals of the Council of the Kiev Theological Academy, 1909–1910, Kiev, 1910, pp. 243–272).

1030. Leontyev, n. 605 supra, p. 82.

1031. V. Zavitnevich, Response to Fr. K. N. Ageev's dissertation, n. 1029 supra.

XXVIII. HOMOTYPY IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN BODY

- 1032. Dr. Adrien Péladan, Anatomie holologique: La triple dualité du corps humain et la polarité des organs splanchniques, Paris. My exposition follows G. Encausse-Paus, L'Anatomie philosophique et ses divisions, Paris, 1894, pp. 107–11.
- 1033. Burt. G. Wilder, *Polarité pathologique*, ou ce qui a été appelé symétrie dans les maladies. This work was originally published in English in America in 1866; its French translation is appended to Péladan's book: see n. 1032 *supra* (Encausse, pp. 113–14).
- 1034. Dr. Foltz, "L'Homologie des membres pelviens et thoraciques de l'homme" (Journ. de physiol. de Brown-Séquard, 1863, No. 21, janv., et No. 24, juil.; Bullet. Soc. Conf. anat. de Lyon, 1866, 1872 bis, 1873 bis, 1874). Extracts from these works can be found in Encausse, n. 1032 supra, pp. 89–107.
 - 1035. Encausse, n. 1032 supra.
- 1036. Péladan, n. 1032 supra, p. 127 (= Encausse, p. 112). For wonderful images of Neith in this pose, see, e.g., C. L. F. Panckoucke, Description de l'Egypte ou recueil des observations et des recherches qui ont été faites en Egypte pendant l'expedition de l'armée française, Paris, 1822, T. 2, pl. 82; T. 1, pl. 96 1; pl. 10 1.

XXIX. REMARKS ON TRINITY

1037. Cf. John of Kronstadt, n. 46 supra.

1038. That is why the doctrine of Trinity must be, and half-consciously often has been, the foundation of philosophical thought. I. V. Kireevsky wrote the following to A. I. Koshelev on 2 October 1852: "The doctrine of the Holy Trinity attracts my mind not only because it is the highest center of all sacred truths communicated to us by revelation, but also because, in writing a work of philosophy, I have become convinced that the direction of philosophy depends, in its first principle, on the conception we have of the Holy Trinity" (N. A. Elagin, *Materialy dlia biografii I. V. Kireevskogo* [Materials for a biography of I. V. Kireevsky], *Collected Works* of Kireevsky in two volumes, edited by M. Gershenzon, *Put*', M., 1912, Vol. 1, p. 74). Schelling's "philosophy of revelation" is one of the few attempts to realize a philosophical thought based on a conscious acceptance of the dogma of Trinity. Father Serapion Mashkin's conception is different. One can also mention the names Fr. Baader, V. S. Solovyov, A. N. Schmidt, and a

few others. Most philosophers have not troubled to define their attitude toward this dogma.

- 1039. The incorruptible Light is a living light; it is Life, the spiritual light. But its spirituality can be perceived in various ways. On the fact that one can to some extent perceive this spirituality even in sensory experience, see N. O. Lossky, n. 87 *supra*.
- 1040. Setting aside for the moment the justification in principle of this affirmation, let us only note the remarkable fact that the most profound philosophers, especially at the highest points of their reflections, have always been drawn to speculations on numbers. Included among these philosophers are Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, Augustine, Nicholas of Cusa, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, V. Solovyov, etc., not to mention mystics of all lands and nations. See n. 748 *supra*.
- 1041. Without burdening the book with a bibliography of this question, I consider it my duty to indicate a single book that is worthy of the historian's attention: that of an abundantly and many-sidedly gifted thinker who died prematurely: N. A. Gulak[-Artemovsky], *Opyt geomtrii o chetyrekh izmereniakh*: *Geometriia sinteticheskaia* [Attempt at a four-dimensional geometry: A synthetic geometry], Tiflis, 1877, 150 pp.
- 1042. René de Saussure, "Théorie des phénomènes physiques et chimiques" (Archives des Sciences Physiques et Naturelles, 1891, Nos. 1 and 2). Leo Königsberger, Die Principien d. Mechanik, 1901 (Mechanics of a multidimensional space).
 - 1043. See n. 570 supra.
- 1044. They were made by the German idealists, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Also see: R. H. Lotze, Syst. d. Philos., Thl. II: "Metaphysik," 1879; "Grundzzüg d. Metaphysik, 2 Aufl., Lpz., 1887. Gust. Teichmüller, The Real and Apparent World, trans. from the Germ. by E. Krasnikov, Kazan', 1913, Bk. 2, Chap. 1. Highly characteristic is the inability to rationalize the three-dimensionality of space in P. N. Strakhov, Mir kak tseloe [The World as a Whole], S.P., 1872, p. 246. The latest formulation of the problem of the dimensionality of space is connected with the so-called "principle of relativity": Ger. Minkowski, Space and Time, trans. I. V. Iashunsky, S.P., 1911.
- 1045. See especially the German idealists, Lotze (n. 1044 *supra*), Teichmüller (n. 1044 *supra*, Book 2, Chap. 2).
- **1046.** As far as I know, there is no language where the number of grammatical persons is other than three.
- 1047. Although numerous attempts have been made to reduce psychic life to one of the principles, to representation, will, or feeling.
- 1048. It is this formal resemblance in the development of each of the three coordinates of psychic life that has served as a tempting pretext to reduce any two of them to the third.
- 1049. Interesting examples of this have been collected by A. I. Sadov, n. 1052 *supra*, but their number can be increased many-fold. (Typical here is the predilection of Kant and the idealists who followed him for trichotomy, which served as the spring of their dialectic).
- 1050. Buttmann in Mythologus, I, 29; Gerhard in Griechische Mythologie, I, 141.

1051. H. Usener, "Dreiheit" (Rheinisches Museum f. Philologie, N. F., Bd. 58, 1903, SS. 3–4)

1052. Usener, n. 1051 supra, SS. 1–47, 161–208, 321–362. Th. Neidhardt, "Ueber Zhalensymbolik der Griechen und Römer," I; Die Drei und Neunzahl (Prog. d. k. Progymnasiums in Fürth., 1895, SS. 1–40). The materials collected in these two works serve as the basis of A. I. Sadov's study "Znamenatel'nye chisla" [Significant numbers] (Khrist. Cht., 1909, Oct., Nov., Dec.; 1910, Feb. On the number three: Oct. 1909); there is a bibliography (though an incomplete one) here on pp. 1313–15 and Nov., p. 1458. These works have also been published separately, S.P., 1909. Notes 1050–52 are taken from Sadov. Also see n. 748 supra.

1053. Usener, n. 1051 supra, S. 35; cf. S. 161.

1054. Some of these attempts are described by Sadov, n. 1052 *supra*, V, Dec. 1909, pp. 1581–94.

1055. Ibid., Feb. 1910, p. 1964.

1056. We find such attempts among the neoplatonists and, perhaps, even in Plato. There are numerous such attempts among the Church fathers, e.g., Athanasius the Great, Basil the Great, both Gregories, and so on. In the modern period many mystics have tried such a deduction, e.g., Boehme, Pordage, Baader, and others, as have many philosophers, e.g., the German idealists, primarily Schelling in his *Philosophy of Revelation*, as well as Baader, Saint-Martin, Solovyov, Archimandrite Serapion Mashkin, and others. Of the little-known works on this theme, let us mention: *Dogmat o Sv. Troitse i polnoye znanie* [The dogma of the Holy Trinity and perfect knowledge], Sergiev Posad, 1904. N. F. Fyodorov and A. N. Schmidt expressed profound thoughts on the Trinity.

1057. (i.e., 3, N.B.) St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*. Augustine's analogies by which the mystery of Trinity is clarified are collected by Th. Gangauf in *Augustinus Speculative Lehre von Gotten dem Dreieiningen*, SS. 204–95. Also see P. I. Vereshchatsky, *Plotin i bl. Avgustin v ikh otnosheniiakh k trinitarnoi probleme* [Plotinus and St. Augustine in their attitudes toward the trinitarian problem], Kazan', 1911. Prince E. N. Trubetskoi, *Rel. obsh. ideal zapad. khr-va v XI v.: Mirosozertsanie bl. Avgustina* [The religious social ideal of western Christianity in the 11th century: St. Augustine's world-view], M., 1892. A. P. Orlov, *Trinitarnye vozzreniia Ilariia Piktov.* [The Trinitarian views of Hilary of Poitiers], Sergiev Posad, 1908. I. I. Adamov, *Uchenie o Troitse sv. Amvorsiia Med.* [The doctrine of the Trinity of St. Ambrose of Milan], Sergiev Posad, 1910.

CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN SYMBOLS AND DRAWINGS

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THE COLORS of the book cover are chosen from the basic colors of the ancient Novgorodian icons of Sophia. The frontispiece is taken from the book *Amoris Divini Emblemata*, *studio et aere Othonis Vaeni concinnata*, Antverpiae, ex officina plantiniana Balthasaris Moreti, MDCLX, p. 125. The vignettes are reproduced from *Symbola et Emblemata selecta* [of Ambodicus], 1st ed. The three drawings of icons of Sophia on pp. 270, 273, 275 are taken from Filimonov's article, n. 703 *supra*). The picture of the icon of Sophia from the Tret'iakov Gallery on p. 271 is reproduced from N. P. Likhachev's work *Materialy dlia istorii russkogo ikonopisaniia: Atlas snimkov* [Materials for a history of Russian iconography: Atlas of photographs], Part 2, S.P., 1906, tabl. CCLXIII, No. 487. See below the "brief description," No. 54.

It appears to me that the symbolic meaning of the majority of the vignettes does not require explanation. Only the picture placed on p. 106 might turn out to be incompletely comprehensible. It represents a military projectile known already in antiquity and called *murex ferreus* by the Romans and *Fussangel* by the Germans. In Russia it was commonly known as rogul'ki zheleznye, podmetnye or pometnye karakuli; in Sergiev Posad, however, it was known as Troitsky chesnok [Trinity garlic]. In its simplest form this is an iron object whose four radial branches are inscribed in a regular tetrahedron and have sharp serrated points resembling fish hooks. Each of the rods is about \(^{3}\)4 vershoks long [1 vershok = 4.4 cm], and the angle between bars is 120 degrees. The projectile depicted on the drawing has an added complication consisting in additional branches. A certain number of such projectiles, from the supplies of the former armory of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, are now stored in the sacristy of this monastery. It is clear that however one throws this projectile it will always sit stably on three branches, while the fourth will stick upward with its sharp point. Therefore these projectiles were used in ancient times to impede the path of an enemy cavalry. Encountering many such projectiles spread over a road, horses would have their hooves ripped apart, and would fall. An attack against the horsemen by those besieged would then complete the defeat. (Valer. Max. III, 7, 2; Curt. IV, 17). Such a projectile was also used during the siege of the Trinity Lavra by the Poles; on such projectiles, see Anthony Rich, Illustriertes Wörterbuch der römischen Alterthümer . . . aus dem Englischen übersetz . . . von C. Müller, Paris and Leipzig, 1862, p. 407; E. Golubinsky, Prepodobnyi Sergii Radonezhsky i sozdannaia im Troitskaia Lavra [St. Sergius of Radozezh and the Trinity Lavra that he founded, 2nd ed., M., 1909, p. 266; N. V. Sultanov, Pamiatnik Imp. Aleksandru II v Kremle Moskovskom [Monument to Emperor Alexander II in the Kremlin of Moscowl, S.P., 1898, pp. 606–609. This projectile appears to be a natural symbol for an antinomic dogma, which always says "yes," setting itself up firmly on any of its faces, while always raising up a sharp point that will wound anyone who imagines that this "yes" weakens and destroys the dogma. With such projectiles in its fortress the Church has no need to go out into the field and do battle with the enemy—with the enemy's weapon, rationalism. It is sufficient that the enemy cavalry have the hooves of its horses torn to shreds without getting to the besieged walls. This projectile—the power of the Spirit that strikes from afar—is one of the essential properties of the Church.

THE END,
AND GLORY TO GOD!

• • •

OF THE hundreds (if not thousands) of names and concepts contained in Florensky's text and notes, only the most significant have been covered in this index. For the most part, emphasis has been placed on terms and concepts peculiar to Florensky's world view. No attempt has been made to index every occurrence of "Church," "Christ," "spirit."—Translator

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